Hines v. State Court Documents
Public Court Documents
June 22, 1981

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Case Files, Bozeman & Wilder Working Files. Hines v. State Court Documents, 1981. c1fd75bd-f092-ee11-be37-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/02c93c24-d5d9-4dce-85a5-23904eed5d7b/hines-v-state-court-documents. Accessed April 16, 2025.
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I ''l THOMAS LEE HINES App61lant, v. STATE OP ALAB Appe11ee. IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF ALABAIUJ\ ) \ ' Nos. 79-200565 ) 79-200166 1 79-200167 ; ro-ol.8eo . 6 Div. 573 ) ) APPLICATION FOR REHEARING AND BRTEF IN SUPPORT OF APPLTCATION FOR REHEARING UNDER ALA. R. APP. PRO. 10, STATEMENT OF FACTS UNDER ALA; .R;.APP';.PRO: 39(K), AND CONDITIONAL PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND/OR PROHIBITTON, UNDER ALA. R. APP. PRO.- zL(A) ELATNE R. JONES DEMETRIUS C. NEWTON . BRENT SIMMONS L722-2L2L Bullding Sulte 91O 2L2l North Eighth Avenue 806 15th Street, N.W. Birmlngham, Alabama 35203 Washington, D.C. 2OOO5 JACK GREENBERG OSCAR W. ADAMS, III JAI\,IES S. LTEBNIAN 16OO-2L2L Building Suite 2O3O 2t2l North Eighth Avenue 10 Columbus Circle Birmingham, Alabama 35203 New York, New York 1OO1-9 Attorneys for Appellant-Petitioner Appellant, v. STATE OF ALABAMA, IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF ALABAIWq THOMAS LEE HINES ) ) ) Nos. 79-200465 79-200466 79-200/*67 80-o 1 890 6 Div. 573 Appe1lee. APPLTCATION FOR REHEARING AND BRTEF TN SUPPORT OF APPLTCATION FOR REHEARING UNDER ALA. R. APP. PRO. 40, STATEMENT OF FACTS UNDER ALA. R. APP. PRO. 39(K), AND CONDITIONAL PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND,/OR PROHIBITION, UNDER ALA. R. APP. PRO 2T(A) Appellant and Petitioner, Thomas Lee Hines Ihereinafter, ,,appel1ant"], by_counsel, hereby respectfully requests the Court, pursuant to A1a. R. Crim. Pro. 40, to grant rehearing of its June 8, 1981 Order dismissing the above-referenced Appeal, on motion, dated June 5, 1981, by Appellee, the State of Alabama. As is demonstrated in the attached Statement of Facts, filed pursuant to AIa. R. App. Pro. 39(k), and Brief in support of Application for Rehearing, filed pursuant to AIa. R. App. Pro. 40, this Court does have clear appellate jurisdiction to hear this appeal in light of the finality and irreparability of the Circuit Court's Orders of December 15, 198O denying appellant's Amended Motion to Clarify Alter or Amend the Order of November 24, 1980 (as amended on December 3, 1980) and to Release Defendaiit From Custody Forthwith Unless Civil Commitment Proceedings Are ) ) ) rl fmmedlately Instltuted, and denying appellant's Motion to Dismiss the fndictment. Appellant further respectfully requests, pursuant to A1a. R. App. Pro. 39(k) that the Court, if it should deny petitioner's application for rehearingr, add the Statement of Facts, included herein, to its opinion dismissing appellant's appeal, because the facts discussed in said Statement are necessary to an accurate and proper understanding of the issues raised in the appeal and of the Court's jurisdiction to hear that appeal. Appellant further respectfully requests, pursuant to A1a. R. App. Pro. 2L, if his application for rehearing is denied, that the Court issue a writ of prohibition or writ of mandamus directing the Circuit Court to dismi-ss the indictments pendi.ng against appellant and to release him from custody unless civil commitment proceedings are immediately instituted against him. Because petitioner ' s present confinement in Alabama state mental institu- tj.ons by order of the Circuit Court is permanent, and is patently unconstitutional under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, see Jackson v. Indiana , /*06 U. S . 7L5 (1972) ; Klopf er v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. ZL3 (fgOZ), and because the Circuit Court has a clear duty to relieve petitioner of these burdens on his clear constitutional rights, a writ of mandamus or prohibition will 1ie,'insofar as'an appeal is not available. WHEREFORE, appellant respectfully requests that the Court either ( 1 ) grant him rehearing pursuant to RuIe 40, or (2) add the Statement of Facts, included herein, to its opinion'dismissing his appeal, pursuant to Rule 59(k) and (3) grant a writ of mandamus or . -: --I 2 \ prohibitlon requiring the Circuit Court to dismlss the indictments against appellant and to order him released from custody forth- with unless civil commitment proceedings are immedlately insti- tuted against him. r. STATEMENT OF FACTS The following statement of the crucial facts and proceedings in appellant's case is filed pursuant to both A1a. R. Crim. Pro. 39(k) and A1a. R. Crim. Pro. Zt(a), and in order that the Court may properly ajudicate appellant's application for rehearing under AIa. R. App. Pro. tO. A fulI statement of facts is partl- cularly necessary here because appellee's motion to dismj-ss was granted before appellant had the opportunity to file his brief on the merits (see this Court's Order of ttay 25, 1981, extendi.ng the time for filing the court reporter's transcript of the pro- ceedings for L4O days from May 2L, 1981, thereby moving back the date on which appellant's brief is due until next Fa1I at the earliest) and before appellant even received notice of and had time to respond to appellee'S June 5, 1981 motion to dismiss. Accordingly, appellant has never before had the opportunity to present thi.s Court with the crucial facts in his case. Should the Court deny appellant's application for rehearing, appellant further requests that the Court add the following Statement of Facts to its opinion dismissing the appeal, pursuant to the pro- cedure set forth in A1a. R. App. Pro. 39(k).L/ -'- -I L/ Many of the facts this Court's statement (e1a. Cr. App. 1980). discussed in this statement of facts in Hines v. State, other facts ffi are drawn from 38/* So . 2d l- 171 the competency 3 Appellant is a 28 year o1d black man who slnce 197O has repeatedly and consistently been diagnosed as severely retarded. Indeed, appellant is so retarded that he functions at a level below that of 99 percent of all of the retarded people in this country. In L978, appellant was .indicted on four criminal charges in Morgan County, Alabama. Later that year, appellant was tried on one of those charges, rape, in the Cullman County Circuit Court, to which Court venue had earlier been changed. "In an atmosphere infected with racial conflict and tension", appellant was convicted in the Cullman County Court. Hines v. State, 384 So. 2d LL71, LL72 (ela. Crim. App. 1980). This Court subsequently overturned appellant's conviction on several grounds, "the most significant" being "the defendant's mental subnormality as affe.cting the voluntariness and admiss- ability of his confession. " Id. Basdd on "the totality of circumstances surrounding Iappellant's alleged] confession" and particularly on "the defendant's mental deficiency" which this Court found "to be the most controlling factor of all the circum- stances", this Court held that statements to the police aI1eged1y made by appellant and introduced at his trial had been obtained involuntarily and in violatj-on of his ltltqnqe rights. fd. at 1184. In so holding, this Court found as a fact that appellant's ,,mental deficiency Iis more] extensive" and more "extreme" than in "any case involvlng mental retardation and the voluntariness hearing held in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Alabama dur- ing the week of November L7,1980. The reporter's notes from that hearing, dt which appellant was found by a.jury to be incompetent to stand trial, have not yet been transcribed. See this Court's 1 of a confession" that the Court was able to find after a diligent search of the case law on the subject in Alabama and elsewhere. Id. at 1181. This finding, tn turn, was based on the Court's conclusions (a) that appellant's inteliiget". quotient (I.a.) lies somewhere in the 3O's range, where 90 to 1LO is normal and anything below 70 ls retarded, id., (b) that appellant was in- capable of "know[ing] what a constitution is" and of "understanding [the Miranda rights form] if you read it ten ti-mes, " and (c) that appellant is highly "susceptible to suggestion. " Id. at lL76-77 . On remand, venue in appellant's case was transferred to the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Alabama. Upon motion by appe11- ant, the Circuit Court conducted a hearing before a jury on the question of appellant's competency to stand triaI. At the hearing, five mental health professionals testified one for the State (or. James Thompson) and four for appellant (ors. Robert Estock, Lloyd Baccus, Al1an Shealy, and David Hook). A11 five of these professionals, representing both sides of the case and including the most prominent forensic psychiatrist and psychologist at the University of Alabama Medical School in Birmingham (Ors. Estock and Shealy) and one of the most widely respected forensic psycho- logists in the South (Or. Baccus) agreed that appellant is extremely retarded, with ; I.Q. in the 3o's range. A11 also agreed that, wh11e appellant may at some time ln the past have been psychotic, or mentally "iIIrr as we1l, h€ was assuredly not - -_I Order of May 25, 1981, extendi-ng the time reporter's transcript of the proceedings. cussed herein are undisputed. for filing the court AII of the facts dis- E J psychotic or mentally 11I at the time of trial, his only mental dj-sorder at that time stemming from his severe retardation. Finally, aI1 five agreed and testified that unlike an "j.llness" or psychosis, mental retardation is neither curable nor may its symptoms be treated and even temporarily placed in "remission. " They testlfied that once a person's brain ce1ls are damaged (as appellant's apparently have been sj-nce birth), there is simply no way known to medicine (or like1y to become known in the near future) in which those ce11s can be made to function or in which their loss can otherwise be compensated for. Based on petitioner's extensive retardation, the jury con- cluded that he was incompetent to stand trial a conclusion which the State did not appeal. Based on the uncontradicted testimony of the expert witnesses for both the State and appellant, moreover, it is also clear that the jury concluded that, due to the permanence of retardation, Thomas Lee Hines is as competent (or incompetent) to stand trial now as he will ever be and that no amount of time spent in a mental institution will make him any more mentally capable than he now is of standing trial in the future. In short, the jury concluded that appellant is now, and' forever will be, incompetent to stand trial. See also Jackson v. fndiana, 4c^6 U.S. 715 (tgZZ) and State v. Wil1iams, 392 So. 2d 61L (f,a. 1980) in which other courts reached similar 'conclusions about the permanence of the incompetence to stand trial of persons whose mental conditions are similar to appellant's. On November 24, 1980, the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Alabama, Judge Charles R. Crowder presiding, entered an order ..: _- 6 acknowlegingthejury.sconclusionthatdefendant..wasincompetent.: to stand trlal and ordering "that the defendant be and he is hereby committed to the Alabama State Hospitals where he mus! remain until such time as he becomes mentally competent tO stand trial.,, order of November 21, ].98o, dS amended by order of December 3, 1980 (emphasis added). (copies of these two orders areattachedtothesepapersasanaddenda.)TheNovember24, 1980 Order (as amended) makes no provision for any change what- Soever in appellant,s status of confinement in State mental institutions aside from the possibilitity non:existeht:'in petitioner,s case that he will "become[] mentally competent to stand triaI,, in the future. Therefore, because appellant's incompetence to stand trial stems from his retardatj-on' which is immutable and permanent, Judge crowder's November 24' 1980 Order has the unequivocal effect of commi-tting appellant, who is now 2g years oId, to the Alabama stat6 Hospit-als until such time as hre dies onDecemberS,lgso,appellantbycounselfi}edtwomotions with the circuit court, based on the United states supreme court decision in Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (L972') ' The titles of these motions are descriptive of the relief sought: (1) "Amended Motion to clarify, Alter or Amend the order of November 2/*' 1980' and to Release Defendant from custody Forthwith unless civil commitment Proceedings Are Immediately Instituted," and (2) "Motion to Dismiss the Indictments"' On December 15' 1980' Judge Crowder denied both motions, and appellant time}y appealed those deniars. see Notice of Appeal, filed January 23, 1981 ' --- --r 7 i On May 25, 1980, this Court entered an Order extending the time for filing the court reporter's transcript of the proceedings by L1O days from May 2L, 1981. Thereafter, on Friday June 5, 1981, the State filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal, alleging that the orders appealed from were not appealable. On Monday June 8, 1981, the same day that counsel for appellant received a copy of the Motion to Dismiss in the mail, the Court dismissed the appeal "on motion by appellee," Order, June 8, 1981. rI. BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION FOR REHEARING fn its June 8, 1981 Order, this Court dismissed Thomas Lee Hines' appeal "on motions by appe11ee." The motion to which the Court refenred argued, in summary fashion, that "It]his Court has no jurisdiction over these appeals" because they do not involve "final orders of conviction." Motion to Dismiss, dt 1. The State supported this argument with nothing more than a citation to Code of Alabama -$ t2-22-13o and a few cases interpreting that 2/provision.s' The State has therefore entirely misconceived the nature of the present appeal, and it has wholly ignored the statutory basis for this Court's jurisdiction to hear that appeal. As is clear from the following discussion, appellant is appealing ,'If]rom tal final judgment of the circuit court" of Jefferson County, ir which situation the law of Alabama clearly provides that "an appeal lies to the appropriate appellate court as a matter of right" by the aggrieved party. Code of Alabama 1975, s L2-22-2. 2/ Because the State's Motion For Appellant received a coPY opportunity to resPond to the to Dismiss was granted before counsel of it, this is Appellant's first State's Motion. I _ _: -:I As a prellmlnary matter, lt is important to emphaslze what this case does not lnvoIve, for in that way the pecullarly and uniguely final and irreparable effect of the circult court's action will then appear. In the first place, this is not a case ln which a cri-mina1 defendant is appealing a determination that he is competent to stand trlal. In that far more cornmon situation, it is clear that the finding of competency is merely a prelude or temporary way statlon on the road to a trial on the merits of the criminal charges against the defendant a trial which by law must speedily occur following the competency determi- nation. fn that situation, therefore, the finding of competency has no final or irreparably harmful effect on the defendant, for he will quickly be tried. If he is acquitted, of course, there will then be no harm at aII and no need for appellate review. On the 'other hand, if the competent defendant is convicted, an appeal to redress that irreparable harm will immediately 1ie to protect the defendant. Moreover, this is not even the case of a psychotic, oF mentally "i11" (as opposed to a mentally "retarded" ) , defendant who is found to be incompetent. For in that si-tuation, it is medlcally understood that the defendant, after a temporary and relatively brief perlod of confinement and treatment, will have his mental illness cured or placed in "remissioo", through drug or other therapy, dt which polnt he will be speedily tried and either acguitted and released or convicted and allowed to appeal the conviction. Again, ds in the above situation of the defendant found to be competent, the mentally ill defendant who is found incompetent is not i-rreparably harmed, since hi.s incompetence and --- --lt 9 ffr,r" his pretrial confinement, is assumed and understood by all to be temporary, and since there is accordingly no question but that the defendant will be speedily tried and either acquitted or convicted in the very near future. What this case does involve is the unique and rare situation of a mentally retarded person who has been found to be permanently incompetent and has been ordered by a court to be confined in a mental institution "until such time as he becomes competent to stand triaI" (Order of November 24, 1980), LS., who has been ordered confined forever. In that peculiarly aggravated situation, the very same circumstances that militate against finality and irre- parability in the more usual cases of the defendant who is found to be competent to stand trial and the defendant who is found to be incompetent by reason of mental illness, impose a condition of final and irreparable harm on the defendant who is found to be incompetent by reason of mental retardation. For in this last- described category, in which Thomas Lee Hines fal1s, it is clear (1) that the defendant's incompetence is utterly permanent and incurable, and (2) that an order (as in this case) involuntarily confini-ng hlm in a mental institutj.on "untiI such time as he becomes mentally competent to stand trial" has the final and irre- pa-rabIe effect of involuntarily confining the defendant to a state-operated institution forever, since (3) there will never be a trial ( "speedy" or otherwise) , nor will there ever be either .3/acquittal and release or conviction and a post-conviction appeal.- 3/ Appellant has not invented this distinction between himself Ene mentally retarded and thus permanently incompetent defendant and all other defendants (whether they be competent, or only temporarily incompetent). Rather, the United States. Supreme Court -10 The State has completely ignored the crucial distinction between, on the one hand, the final and irreparable harm vlsited upon appellant by the circuit court's permanent and involuntary commitment of him and, on the other hand, the, 6t worst, tempor- ary and remediable harm visited upon the more usual defendant who has been found competent, or only temporarlly incompetent. However, the law of Alabama is not so bIind. Rather, the law of Alabama provides that: J':1,::{ ii:3',3"tfl:":;"::":l:,:'I3;:l,3iE"l";;;' as a matter of right by either part ... " Code of Alabama 1975, $ L2-22-2 (emphasis added). Moreover, the law of Alabama provides that "the test of finality" 1s not a technical or mechanistic standard "and is not controlled by the fact that the cause remains in fieri, " but instead is a practical test for whether the decision of the circuit court causes final and "irreparable injury." 8.9., FaIk v. FaIk, 355 So. 2d 722 (A1a. Civ. App, fgze); Morton v. Chrysler Motors, 353 So. 2d 5O5 (ata. L977); Kimbrough v. Dickinson, 25L AIa. 677, 39 So. 2d has held that constitutional rights turn on that very distinction -- --rr Thus, iD Jackson v. Indj.ana, 406 U.S. 7L5 (L972), the Court held that, although the States may constitutionally order defendants confined for competency examinations before tria1, and may even order that temporarily (e.9., mentally iII) defendants who are found to be incompetent be confined in a mental institution before trial until they become competent and can be tried, a State may not constitutionally order that a permanently (i.e., mentally retarded) defendant who has been found incompetent be confined in a mental institution "until such time as he becomes competent." As to the latter defendant, alone, the Court held, either civil commitment proceedings must be initiated, or the defendant must be released, and his charges dropped 11 21L (1949); Carter v. Mltchell , 225 AIa. 287, 293, L12 So. 5L/* (rgSZ); Ex parte Elyton Land Co., 1O4 AIa. 88, 91, 15 So. 939 (1893); Adams v. Sayre, 76 AIa. 5O9, 518 (1884). See also Glllespie v. U. S. Steel Corp. , 379 U.S. L18, L52 ( 1954) ; Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth OiI Refining Co., 297 F. 2d 80 (2d Cir. L961); Dunlop v. Ledet's Footliner, 5O9 F. 2d L387, 1389 (Stn Cir. i.975). fndeed, the Alabama Supreme Court has emphasized that statutes such as Section t2-22-2, conferring appellate jurisdic- tion following final orders, "should be 1iberally construed in favor of a party seeking redress by appea1." In re Coburn, Lo4 So. 346 (AIa. 1925). Applying these well-established principles to appellant's case, it is clear that because the effect of the orders of the circuit court from which appellant appeals is to confine him involuntarily to a state mental institution forever unless this Court acts to relieve that unconstitutional situation (see note 3, supra), there can be no doubt of irreparability of harm and thus no doubt of finality and appealability under Section L2-22-2. Put simply, the orders of the circuit court wi-11 result'in tlre --- -:r permanent and unconstitutional confinement (see note 3, supra) of appellant, and, barring relief from this Court, that confinement will tast until appellant, who is now only 28 years o1d, dies. A more graphic instance of irreparability and finality can hardly be imagined. Because of the rarity of appellant's situation, it h.as never before been precisely confronted by the courts of this State However, this very situation of a retarded criminal defendant L2 who has been found incompetent to stand trial and has been ordered confined "until competerlt", i.e., forever -- has been faced by the courts in various of Alabama's sister states. The courts that have confronted this question, moreover, have concluded that the "criminal commitment" order in such a situation, albeit in some senses a "pretrial" order in a criminal case, is nonetheless j-n practical effect a "final" and thus appealable "order" under "final judgment" rules identical to that set forth in Code of Alabama L975, S tz-zz-zz "[A]s the defendant's mental disturbance may be of long duration, perhaps for life, and his trial may therefore be delayed over a long time, and perhaps forever, the order adjudging him incompetent for trial has a phase of finality in it. " People v. Fields, 62 Ca1. 2d 538, 399 P. 2d 369, 37O (CaI. 1965), cert. denied , 382 U. S . 858 ( 1965 ) ; accord, Higgi.ns v. United States , 2O5 F. 2d 650, 652 (gth Cir. 1953); State v. Wi11iams, 363 So. 2d /*1L (La. 1978); State v. Burrows, 198 So. 2d 393, 396 (ta. L967); State v. Yaun, L1O So. 2d 573 (t a. 1959); Jolley v. State, 384 A. 2d 91 (ua. 1978); Commonwealth v. Ragone, L76 A. /*54 (pa. 1935). The general rule of appealability under the final order rule is laid out in Annot., Appealability of Pretrial Orders or Rulings in Criminal Cases as to Accused's Mental Competency, 16 A.L.R. 3d 7O8, 7ts (1s6s ) . As these decisions uniformly recog-nize, although pretrial orders in criminal cases are typically not final and only become appealable following a judgment of conviction, see Code of Alabama 1975, $ L2-22-L3O, ln the rare cj-rcumstance of a defendant found - -- -:l 13 permanently lncompetent, and committed to a mental instltution "until competeot", finality attaches before conviction, parti- cularly since no conviction wiIl likely ever occur. fn view of the above Iaw, which the State so studlously avoided discussing in its Motion to Dismiss, it is clear that rehearing should be granted under A1a. R. App. Pro. 10 and appellant should be allowed to appeal under Code of Alabama 1975, S L2-22-2.!/ ITI. BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR A WRIT For the reasons set forth in the preceding section of this brief, appellant ("petltioner", in this section) believes that he has a clear right to appeal the circuit court's denials of his motions to dismiss his indictments and to'release him if civil commitment proceedings are not inj-tiated immediately. Nonetheless, if this Court should conclude that petitioner has no appellate remedy, pleti.t1.onei'.wootd theri be :without'-an'-*ad=Ofi"a..-'tega1 remedy" to cure the "defects i-n justice and [to] prevent [the] lrreparable injury" visited upon him by the lower court's rulings. Ex parte Weissinger, 22 So. 2d,51O, 515 (AIa. 1945). In that situation, mandamus clearly 1ies, id., and petitioner respectfully requests that if the Court concludes that there is no appellate jurisdiction over this matter, it issue a writ of mandamus (or, if approprlate, a writ of prohibition) directing the circuit court /*/ fnsofar as AIa. R. App. Pro. 27(b), rather than Rule 40, is the proper basis for the relief requested herein, appellant moves under that RuIe. to dlsmlss petitloner's indictments and to reLease petitioner unless civil commitment proceedings are commenced immediately. 'Under Alabama Iaw, the prerequisites for a, writ of man- damus are well established. First, "the Jurisdiction of the court must be duly invoked by proper petition. " Ex Parte Brannon, 139 So. 2d 319, 35O (AIa. Civ. App. 1962). Second, "there must not be any other adequate remedy open to petitioner," and, in particular, there must be no adequate appellate remedy, id., see Ex parte Welssinger, 22 So. 2d,51O, 515 (AIa. 1945); Ex parte Hennies, 31 So. 2d L7, 19 (A1a. Civ. App. L9/.7). Third, there must be "a clear legal right in the petj-tioner to the order sought," which is "irreparabl[y]" or "undu[fy] injurIed]" by action of the respondent (in this case, Judge Crowder). Titl e Guaranty Fundlng Corp. v. Bolling, 260 So. 2d 589, 597 (AIa. 1972); Ex parte Brannon, 139 So. 2d 3/*9, 35O (AIa. Clv. App. 1962) ; Ex parte Garrison, 260 AIa. 37g, 7L So. 2d,33 (1954). Fina11y, there must be a "duty upon the resondent in the petition for mandamus to perform which he has refused to do. " Ex parte Brannon, 139 So. 2d 349; 35O (eIa. Cir. App. 1962). A11 of these prerequisites are either clearly met here, or would be clearly met lf this Court dismisses petitioner's appeal. Thus, petltioner has by way of this petitlon duly invoked the jurisdiction of this Court to issue a writ of mandamus. Moreover, lf this Court finds that no appellate remedy is available, "there is no other lega1 remedy" available to petitioner besides mandamus. Ex palte weissinger, 22 So. 2d 51O, 515 (eIa. 1945). - -- -:I Further, petltioner has a crystal clear right this case that is enforceable through mandamus. In to relief in Jackson v. 15 Indiana, 1OO U.S. 7LS (L972), discussed in note 3, supra, the Supreme Court of the United States held that a criminal defendant who had been found incompetent to stand trial, whose mental condi- tion was unlikely to changg and who therefore was unlikely to become competent in the "near futurg" has the right to have the charges against him dropped and has the right to be released from a state mental institution immediately, unless civil commit- ment proceedings with all of their attendant due process and "right to treatment" protections are immediately commenced against him. Id. at 733, 738. The Supreme Court expressly appli-' ed this holding to the retarded defendant involved in that case. See id. at 718-19. In addition, Klopfer v. North Carollna, 386 U.S. 213 (fg0Z) stands for the proposition that petitioner's lndefinite confinement pending a criminal trial that will assuredly not occur in the "near future" violates his constitutional right to a speedy tria1. The clear constltutional rights discussed in Jackson and Klopfer have been recog:nized, since those decisions were announced, by the Unj-ted States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, €.9. , -- -:r United States v. Wood, 469 F. 2d 676 (Stfr Cir. L972), as well as by many state courts. E.9., State v. Williams, 392 So. 2d 64L, 643 (La. 19BO); Garrett v. State, 39o So. 2d,95,96 (FIa. 1980); State v. wi'l1iams, 363 So. 2d 4/.L (1,a. 1978); q@, 318 So. 2d 856, 858 (t"tiss. 1975). In additi.on, there is no doubting that Judge Crowder's orders and subsequent inaction have subjected petitioner to "irreparable injury" and "undue harm", and that a failure to prO- vide some relief will result in "a failure of justice." Guaranty 16 Funding Corp. v. Bollino, 260 So. 2d 589, 597 (AIa. L972); Ex parte Garrison, 260 A1a. 379, 7L So. 2d 33 (1954). In these circumstances, barring an appeal, mandamus is particularly appropriate. Id. Final1y, Judge Crowder has clearly abrogated his duty under the Constitution by falling to order the relief requested by petitioner. After the jury. found petltioner incompetent to stand tria1, Judge Crowder entered an order committing petitioner to a state mental institution "until such time as he becomes mentally competent to stand trial." Order of November 21, L98O, amended Order of December 3, 1980. (Both Orders are attached to this petition as an addendum. ) Thereafter, petitioner filed two motions which pointed out to the court, first, that the effect of his order, --- in combination with petitioner's permanent retardation and thus his permanent incompetency, was to commit peti-tioner to a mental institutj-on for life without any due process, without any showing that he i-s dangerous, and without ?ny assurance'that he will receive the treatment he needs, and second, that such an order unequivocally violates the constitutlonal principles set forth in Jackson v. fndiana, supra, and Klopfer v. North Carolina, supra (The two motions filed by petitioner are reproduced in the adden- dum to this petition. ) Nonetheless, havJ.ng been clearly confronted with his constitutional duty to act to amend his November 24, 1980 order and to release petitioner unless civl1 commitment proceedings are initiated, the lower court simply deni.ed petitioner's motions without any explanation at all. The Court gave no indicatlon that petiti-oner could or would ever have his confinement status altered unless he -- miraculously and contrary to all medical expectations was cured of the damage to his brain that has rendered him severely L7 mentally retarded since birth. In short, there has not only been an "abuse of discretion," on Judge Crowder's part, whlch clearly justifies rnandamus under Alabama law, see State v. Cannon, 369 So. 2d 32 (AIa. L979), but there has also unequivocally been "a refusal to act on the part of" Judge Crowder and a refusal "to perform his lconstitutional] duty," Ex parte Brannon, 139 So. 2d 319, 35o (AIa. Civ. App. L962). rn these circumstances, if an appellate remedy is not available, then mandamus will lie to re- lease petitioner of the "undue injury" which Judge Crowder's refusals to act have caused petitioner and will continue to cause hj-m for the rest of his life unless this Court exercises its juris- diction. Indeed, the Supreme Court of Alabama has utilized the mandamus procedure in pretrial crimj-nal matters strikingly similar to the present one. 8.g., EX partq Garrett, 76 So. 2d 681 (Ala. 1ss4). Accordingly, if this Court does not reinstate petitj-oner's appeal, it must issue a wri.t of mandamus (or prohibition) ordering Judge Crowder to dismiss the indictments against petitioner and to release him unless civil commitment proceedings are immediately --: ._I initiated agalnst hlm. See State v. Wil1iams, 392 So. 2d 611 (La. 1980). It bears emphasis that if this Court denj-es petitioner relj-ef be lt by way of an appeal or by *-y Jf a writ of mandamus this Court w111 by that act also be depriving petitioner of his constitutional rights under Jackson v. fndiana, supra, and Klopfer v. North Carolina, supra, since it will be acquiescing in, and pre- venting petitioner from redressing, the irreparable injury that occurs every day that his unlawful involuntary confinement continues. 18 WHEREFORE, appellant respectfully requests that the Court either ( 1 ) grant hlm rehearing pursuant to Rule 10, or (2) add the Statement of Facts, included hereln, to lts opinlon dismissing his appeal, pursuant to Rule 39(k) and (3) grant a writ of mandamus or prohibition reguiring the Circuit Court to dismiss the indictments against appellant and to order him released from custody forthwith unless civil commitment proceedings are immediately instituted against him. submi-tted, ELATNE R. JONES BRENT SIMMONS Suite 94O 806 L5th Street,.N.W. Washington, D.C.' 2OOO5 JACK GREENBERG JAMES S. LIEBMAN Suite 2O3O 10 Columbus Circle New York, New York 1OOL9 DEMETRIUS C. NEWTON L722-2121 Building 2L2L North Eighth. Avenue Birmingham, Alabama 35203 OSCAR W. ADAMS, IIT |6OO-212L Building 2L2L North Eighth Avenue Bi-rmingham, Alabama -_- -I Attorneys for Appel lant-Peti tioner Respectful-1y ES S. LIE 19 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE r certlfy that I have served a copy of the foregoing on the appellee and respondent by mailing copies to them, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: The Hon. Charles R. Crowder Circult Judge, Tenth Judicial Circult Jefferson CountY Courthouse Birmingham, Alabama 35263 Ed Carnes Assistant Attorney General 25O Administrative Building 61 North Union Street Montgom€ry, Alabama 36130 C. Burton Dunn Deputy District AttorneY Tenth Judicial Circuit of Alabama Room 61O Courthouse Birmingham, Alabama 35263 This 22nd day of June, 1981 - _- '-il t I I 'l Whereos thc defendant, .Thornas Lee Hines. Is presenily being . . confined In the phyciatrie unir of the univcrsrty of atafama Hosprtal in 'f Bilmingham, Jefferson county, atauarn.a,:and Is charged uf hai"tm"nt rrom' Morgan county, Alabarna, wrth the oficnic of rapc. ,, n"i o..n assertcd by counsel foc defendant thet due to mentaidisease and defect he is presenuy i 1 mentally ineompctent to stand triat on the chacge. on Novernbec l?, 19g0,' .1a jury was duty scrected in this.courtlto dccidc urc issue Jf ,n" "o.p","n",of this defcndant. Aftec both thc staie. of Alaboma ona tn" defendanr had .put on evidence before the jury in iupport of their ccspective prositions in the case, said jury on November zq rseo, found that tire defendant was . presently mentauy ircornpctcnt to stund trial on said charge. tn accordance with that vedict this court finds that the defendant is pcesently menta[y incompetent to stand trial : It b ORDERED AND OeCn'EeO that the defehdant be and he is . hereby eommitted to the Arabama Siate Hospital for the rnsane where he rnust re.main until such timc as hc beiomes mentauy eompetent to stsnd trial when thd Superintendent of the Siate Hospital snau be of the opinion that thc defendant is rc restoceo, n" ri"u forthwitli in'writing infocrn this court and the sherirf of Jefferson cqunty, Alabama "rtrn., ,"",, -rrn"ruu*n the defendant shall be remanded to ihe custody.of the sheriff of Jeffe]son county on order of this. couct. In no event shall the defendant be set at large rc long as such prosieutron is jenoing or so long as ire continues to be mentally incompctent to stand trial .t I Thc Sheriff of Jefferson C.orrnty, Alabama, is heceby directed to trarufer and deliver the defendant.io it," custody of the Atabarna state Hospital for the Insone in cornpliance with this order. i . . TEN'rH JUDICIAL CIITCUIT sr^l.rf'ot, At.itnAMA. (. vs. THOtIIAS LEE tttNES atier TOMMY LEE HINES t rN Trili ciltc( couR,n, TUrnt JUUICIAL Ctrcurr Of ALAUAMA cnrMtNAd DrvtstoN "^,,*ffilZ? ::llxyrii .t .i . ra - -- -:I t I t t' ! s-\ STATE OF vs. AIISAI{A HINES a1lae HINES TIIOMAS . TOMMY LEE LEE IN TltE CIRCUIT COURT, TENIIT JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF AI.ABAUA CRIMINAL DIVISION CASE NO: CC80001890, CC79000455 cc79000467, cc79000465 AI,IENDED ORDER Whereas the defendant, Ttromas Lee Hines, is presenEly betng confined in the phyciaEric. unlt of rhe University of Alabama llospltal in Birningham,. Jefferson Councy, Alabana, and is charged by lndicUoenE froo l.iorgan Counc,y, Alabaea, wiEh the offense of rape. ft has been asserted by cotrnsel {or defendanE that due Eo mental disease aod d,efect he is presenEly mentally incourpetent to stand trial on the charge. 0nNovember L7,1980, a jury was duly selected in this court.to decide the issue of che competency of chis defendanE. After boch the SEaEe .of Alabama and. the defendanE had put on evidence before the jury in support of their respective positions in the case, ..!. said jury on November 2L,1980, found that the defendant was presentlv aentally incocpetent to siand trial on srid charge. In accordance with that verdict tiis courc find,s that the defendant is presencly mentally incoopetenc Eo stand trial It is oRDERED AND DECREED persuanr ro Tirle 15-15-21 Code of Alabanra 1975 that, the defendanE be and he is hereby cotirniEted to the Alabaoa State Hospicals.where he must renain until such time as he becomes urentally compeEenE Eo stand crial . l"'tren the Superin- Eer-denE or- the Stac.e Hospical .shal1 be of the opinion Ehat the <iefenia .i's so restored, he shal1 forthwith in writing info:m Ehis courc and the Sheriff of Jefferson CounEy, Alaba.roa, of thaE facE,'.'hereupon the defendar,t shall be rersanded to the custody of che Sheriff of Jeffers.-r, Ccunty orr order of th!.s Couri,. In no ei'aii shall. the tiefenrlairr i.e set et large so long as such Drosecution 1s penciing or so lonE: as he iL'n:ia!'es to be -rtnta.ll.r, i:,c.c::'rt..ii 'o . '.,:,i "'l .1. --r I I t 'lbr\ Ihe Sherlff of Jefferson County, Alaba.oa, Ls hcreby dlrecEed Eo transfer and dellver the dcfendant Eo the custody of thc Alabarna Stat,e Hospitalp ln conpliance wlEh th{.s order. CIRCUIT JIIDGE IENTTI JUDICIAI. CIRCUIT Doue and ordered thls 3rd day of December, 1980. I! ! I I r. t I 'li3 Lr,: - o l ii lt lj1 IN IHi CIRCUIT COURT OF '^,[tP..il,S.'ffr0,,JEFFERSON COUNIY, ALA.TAUA iai ..4 . .:a ItG. ,n9 STAIE OF lr.aaAliu{, t ' I Plalntllf, r cAsE NUITBERS va. r cc 80-1980 cc 79-00465 .TEOMAS LEE HTNES, ' CC 79-00465 cc 79-00467 Defendant,. t MOTTON TO DISI,IISS 3HE TNDICTI.IENTS Comes.now the defendant Thomas Lee Eines and , moves this honorable cqurt. to dismiss the indictments t pending against hirn in the above-numbered cases. In support of this motion, the defendant would show unto the. court the following: . . . 1. On November 2\, 1980, a special jury en- paneled by this court for:nd defendant incompetent to stand trial 6n the charges pending against him. 2. fr, .f."f"on v. Indiana, 405 U.S. 7I5 (Lg72), . the Supreme Court of the United States held that when . a defendant is found mentally incompetent to stand tria1, and when the evidenqe relied on to establish incompetency also establishes that the defendant is not substantially Likely to become competent in the foreseeable future, the . State'is reguired by the Constitution to "release the - .,_defend"3ts'..from a1I custody forthwith unless a "civil com- fd. at 725, 727, 739. 3. At the competency hearing recently held in .;;. defendant's case'which involved a.one-week'jury trial, .i l- -.'. : .- j . substantial and uncontrddicted evidence rra.s adduced from i both prosecution and defense experts the defendant is 7l' --- -I currently functloning at "his best" possible level in- tellecb:a1Ly;' emotionally and socially; that his psychosis is now in remission leaving his mental retardation as the sole cause of his inablllty to stand trial. The uncon- tridicted evidence further showed that mental retardation I I I (' tpacdy trLal, duo procesg and cgual protactlon as guarantecd by tho Slxth and Fourtoenth Amcndmants of tho Constitution Respccttully subsrlited, ;! -:v oscAR !{. ADArs, IIr' 1600 - 2L2L Building " . 2121 North Eightsh Avenue Birmlngharn, Alabama 35203 : EI.AINE R. JONES BRENT SIMMONS Suite 940 ,l 806 - 15th street, N.w.' Washington, D.C. 20005 JACK.GREENBERG JAUES S. LTEB}IAN Suite 2030 -; 1.0 Columbus Circle New York,, Nee, York 1001-9 ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDAT{T CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 2121 North Birmingham, BuiIding Eighth Avenue Alabama 35203 I hereby certify. that r have this 8*- day of - December, -1980, served a copy of the foregoin_o motion on counsel for alj parties to thi-s. proceeding by United staces mail, postage prepaid. -_- -I D t I I .l '8i/ lrii !,, Ail li ,r'; :. rLtu lr 0iri.:i ISLLr CUXn.'.UL Ctthr: Jl" IN TE CIRCIIII COT'xuI OE i JESTERSON ClClnflnr, ALABA!{c-.t I ,{ sTJ|tE oa AraBA.l,IA, .. I I I I CISE NT]I'{BERS I cc eo-rgeo i cc zg-ooaes cc 79-00465 i cc 79-00467 ; Ita vlt. rEOt,tAS I.EE ENES, ; , Lastituted. The defendant of this moti.on. PlalntLff, ' .a,. - Defendant. . AHENDED ) ) ) ) ) I'ro(troN To craRrna,-.ILTER oR A-I'(END TEE oRDEB OP NO\/EMBER 24, 1980, AIID TO RE- LEASE DEFENDAITB PRO}I CUSTODY TORTEI.TITE ITNT.ESS CrVrL COMI{ITME.YI PROCEEDINGS t. I Comes nor.r the defendant. Thooas Lee Eines by eounsel and ooves this Court for'an order clarifying, altering or -.. , i aoendlng its Order of Noveobet 24, 1980 l(as amended), and -'..i releasiug defendant froq the custody oflthe State of Alabarna -' ..' : forthnith unless civil gooraitment proceedings are imnediately ARE IMMEDIATELY TNSTIflITED . :.' !;, '_- : . ,l : 't- lists 'th; 'a..: followilrg grounds in support -_- _-I 1. oa Nove-l,er 2L, 'iggo, a special jury empaneled by l.:'.: :'ttris Court found defendaot incoopetent to stand trial on the | .!:\ i-'': I charges pendiog against hiP.' i ' ir: I 2. Oa Noveober 24,.I98O, this Court entered an order .:. : ,l:....,.. I .i ' . t . -' (slnce aneoded on DeceobeE:'?r 1980) comrgitting defendant ' t '".. 1' ... .l indefinltely to the sustody of "the Alabalqa State Eospitat ' ". a - : rrrrtil such tLme as he be&aes mentally coropetent to stand trial, - and forbiddlng those confining defendant froo setting : . ... . ''t I I I i t' I larga 'so long aa spcb proseertlon ls pcndLng or hn contlnue! to b"t.. ,I Ioentally ineoopetenE to stand t' ' 3. fa .Taekson v. fndiana, 406 Supreme Court of the Unlted. States unanipously held rthat , t-''*' I a'person charged, by a State wlth a crirniiral offense sho . Ls c.omnl.tted [to a State .oe1!al facility] on account of his .t lficapacity to proceed to t;1a1, " and vho, because of ,,raental : deficiencyr' Ls not subst'antially likelyl to ,atitain that ' capacity in the foreseeabt6'future," canlot constitutionally :;' ; be confined il a state mental facility based on.nothing more i than the finding of incompetenry to staah Erial. rd. at 723-i- I 39. Such confinement, thehe .Supreoe Courtl held, violates both, his at loag as trLal. r tbe Egual Protection and Dt19 Proiess Clauses of the Four-':.-.1 teeoth Amendrient to the gnlt'ea Stat,es Constltutlon.r r i..-.. i 4. ilackson v. Indiana'.holds that urhen a defendant is II found nentally incorupetent to stand trial, and, when the evi- deace relied on to establish'incompeteac.i also establishes. :..':.i,. I that tbe defendant is not'substantially lilcely to become neotally cooperent * ra".!.rrlal in Ehefro..r"".ole furure, : 'i " rl .the State ls reguired by the. Constitution to .re1ease the 'l defenda-t" froor all custody"fortlruith unless a ,customary I,'.'.:".i . ei..vil, commituent,proceediyrg"- has been orlis inmediately insti- ' tuted. ...I9. at 725, 727? 739.;' No such civll'corcraitment procee4inS hag been lnstitgtg_d ia tbis case. i:r'n,... 'l ';.;.i'f : l .' 'r "' 5. At Ebe corrpetene'y.'.p,loceediag relently held in ..-i,-. ,i' defendaatrs case, substantial and uncontradicted evidence nag ,:i'; .l adduced froru both prosecutioi ar,a aee"nJl o<perts establishing :'-z I tf a 't r. !t ! (( I rhrt defcndant ls cr.rrraatly frurctlonlng it "hls beat, po!!l-t.'. 'b1a lcvel LstclIectualIy, eootionalfy ""J soclilly, becauas 1!,1 r Ihlr paychosl.r 1r aon Ln remlsslon, leavlq'g hla aental retar-:.1 datloa as thc sole eausG of,r hls lnabillty to stand trial.:,.'..,1 Thc eeidencc at the cropetency proceedlng also unegulvocally'.;l deaonstrated, as tt dld Lu Jackson, that Lenta1 retardation is Lncura.ble and that the Leirel o]-rrra"r.rlectuaf functioning I I of, retarded, persons can neegf improve, alt,hough it nay.': ldeteriorate over tiae. Slnce; as thei,jurl, foun{, defendantts . a_ prgseat 'best" cond.ition is.iot sound enough for .hin consti- tutionally to be forced to stand trial, and because there is no chance that, his oental cbndition and 1evel of intellectual ....j ,,.1 functioning will J.mprove in the foreseeable future, substan- ; tiar and uncontradicted eltidence acduced tv both sides in the '";- ,.recent coopetencry hearing demonstrates that there is no like- . :.i..: ! I.ihood at alJ., much less a';,,rlhstantial liielihood, that .i .; - t defendant will becoure.competent in the .foleseeable future. : .:':: I' 6. AlJ. of the expert wiLesses in the recent proceeding | - "':'-,' I who addressed ttre issue direetly testifieh, without contra- 'i- l':: i dlctl-on froro aay other witness, that defendani alEost assuredly ,irt not becooe courpereoa I;.li.".rd rrlal |.r, al" foresieable. :-':.-- . ,t- I future. . i -..,. ' .'l- t-.. . !; .l,i froo custody fdrthtrith unleis'civLl commLtment proceedings are .:: I i 7. Under Jackson v. In4iana, because the evidence at the '; 't.i' irecest competency.heariug established that defendant is: .-, : .ri_. : Ipresently incompetent to 'stand trlal and. is sr:bstantially .t unltkely to becroe competeni:llo st.nd a=r"Lr iu the foresee- ."ble future, Lt ls defendarit',p right under the lourteenth ,i .:-'- ':..,.., t . tuendnen! to the United Stites Constitutiin to be released I .a --- -I .f./. \( i ; t . .l*dlec.ly hrrltur.d, .ad rhr Bivcdrr 24, l;so,J;rdcr (ie racadrd) .'.i ' ,' '. : i',r" . I"^' vloletrr tbrG rltbt. 't,:..'.i'i'.' . I.,..r-.1 t. r1tlr 15-16-21 Co& o! lLlebenr, !975, rrlolrcrr. rhc defeodaaltr rlghca uodrr rh. Coulrlrutloo of rb. totld; SEecar. Tltlt f5-16-21, Codr of al:baor, I 1975r fu r.ocoostlducloaal. l1clr 'U-16-21, vrotectr rhc dcfandea!rc rlghts "..i ; uadcr thc Fllsh, SLxtb, Zlghth qgd'?ourtecoth Aoeudcars to lhG Coost{tuclon of the lraltcd Statcc of .Aaarlcr. .t'. i " .;.i i "u I I tt-Jr ..: L722 - 2l2l! Bu11d1uB '. 2l2l North Elghrh Avcnue . Blrolnthao,'Alabaoa 35203 '.' . . oscAR I{. ADAI''S, III l50O - 2l2L'Bul1dIng 2121 North Elghrh Avenue llrrnl.ughaa,! A1abaoa 35203 .. EI.AINE R. JONES BRENT SI}CIONS SuLtc 940 ' .:. . 806 15ch srrect, N.IJ. . lJashlogtoor'D. C. 20005 : .i .JACK GREENBERC ' JAHES S. LIIBHAN SuLtc 2030 ' l0 Cohsbtrs Clrclc Nen fork, l{es York 10019 ATTOBNEYS FOR DEEE}IDA}IT CERTIFICI,TE OF SER'ITCT . . -i ' r bereby ceirtlfy that r trave rtu.s elghtb day of Dccerber, 19g0, served i:: i !' '.::. ! . r coPy o! Bhc lorogolng troEloq on'couneel for ell parcler Eo Eh16 prccaed{:rg by :r.'.:l.iC -r:b:s: :,-,:lir i- ;. ... . j -_- -_-I I I ,if, 'i ,t tI 1 t'. ,! .: . TO* LFE HnrES ) Apprltrot, .- -. va. SIAIE 0F ALAlAltfA. '81 Jllt( ' lrl:t ao ^. f[.tU tx?f li-l r-rJtLt Ulrra;i;..Ui. CU ni( ) ru THE CIRCITI! COURT OF') ) JETFERSOil @mtTY, AI.ABAHA ) ) ) ) cAsE No: 80-1890 ) z9-00465 Appc11rc. ) t9-00466 ) t94o46t ilOTICE OF APPEAI TO TTIE COURT OF CRIHINAL APPEAI.S OF ALASAilA Noctc. 1a hcrcby glvcn that pursuaoc 1boony I:c Elncis, appeala to thG abovc-aaud Cour! froo thc deolal of chc denlal of chc folloulng notlong enrered Lo thcsc carca oo Deceober 15, l98o by thc clrcul.t court of Jefferson cotmcy: ' l. Dcfcndant'g lueoded Hotloo to clarlfy, Alrcr, or Aoend che ordcr of Nover bcr 24r 1980, (as aoeaded oo Deceobcr 3, 1980), and co Re_lease Defeodanc froa Custody. !orthwlth lJuless Clrrll CoooltErenc.Procecdiags are T*edtately Instltuced; and 2. llotloa to Disnlss che Indlccnents. Ihc rulLngs of the t.rial court deoylng che above rcclons froo r,rhich rulings Defendaac hereby appeals constlcute 1ega1 error and are contrary to chc verdlct of, and che cwldence adduced before, the.Jury eopanelred on Noveober l7; I98o uhlch Jury declded unaoloously on Noveober 21, 1980 thac Defendanc is lncoopetenE co scaod Erlal. Flled January 23, 1981. DeEecrlus C. Neston L722 - 212l Building 212l North Etghth Avenue Blrulnghao, Alabaua 35203 c2o5) 2s2-92O3 oscAR I{. ADAMS, III 1600 - 2l2t Butldtng 2121 North Elgh.th Avenuc ELrnlnghan, Alabana 35203 c205) 324-4445 gl.AINE'8. JONES ERENT SI}EiONS Sulta 940 806 lsth SErGat N.!J. lleshlngton, D.C. 20005 - -- --I t t ) I I 1.. I t c.t' ,- 'J ( JACr ctEEt{tEnc JAlct g. LE!!{AI{ Ssltr 2030 t0 Colrdut Clrctr llrr tott, lhv tot*, 10019 ATTOE|ETS DO8, DEIEilDrtrr ,. a ] TUE ST TE OF AITB HA _ JUDICI{L DEpARTyEm rUE ALA8AXA COURT OT CRI}IIIIAL APPEALS :? Undrr thc provlslonr o! Rular 2(b) end 11(e), AMP, lhc Court of CrlnlneJ. Appeals hcreby extendr thc Bfuoe for llltng EhG court rtport.rt! tr.ntcrl.pt of che procacdlngs ln cach of thc foIloulng appcalr as shoutr: JEITERSON CIRCUIT COT'RT '4- 6 Dlv. 573 Ttrooas Ler Elncs v. Stata (/lcclg-0o465, 466, 167 & CC-80-01890) 140 days f.roa S|ZL|EL : It 1c further ordered tha! thc cloe' for flllng !,he record by Che clarlc of thc'trlal court be extended for sevcn (7) days froa lhe explra!1on o( thG cxEeoalou herel.nabova granced or thc soonar ll}lng of cha courc rePorter'a ErrurcrlpC of Chc proceodlngs in chc offlca or at. clrcuLt clcrk In each of the eborrc.eppeals. . IJITIIESS' Ho1llc Jordrn, Clcrk of rhc Court of Crlulnrl Appcels Ehls 25t} dey o! Hry, 1981. \MrnSA^Ba^. CLERK, COURT OF CRIHINAL APPEALS OF AITEAYA ,. -_- .__I 'r."r*i a t t'. t ! I TOI,IMY LEE v. . STATE OF HINES, Appcllant, ALAEAMA, Appel 1ee. I IN TIIE COURT OP CNII{I}TAL APPEALS OP AI.ABAIIA Nos. 79-200455 79-200\66 79'?OO\67 80-01890 i'IOTION TO DISI.IISS APPEAL The Statc of Alabanra, as appellee, moves thls Honorable Court to dlsmlss the appeal 1n the above-styled cases, and as grounds for thls motton shows as follows: 1. ltrls Court's appellate Jurlsdlctlon exEends only to flnal orders of convlctlon 1n crlmLnal cases. Code of Alabama 1975, S12-22-130i see, Harrls v. State, 44 Ara. App. 632,2L8 So. 2d 285; McKlnlby v. Ftorrls, 280 Ala. App. 408, 194 So. 2d 565; Esters v. State, l4 Ala. App. 383, 308 So. 2d 7 \2. 2. The appeals atternptcd 1n these cases are not from f1nal orders of convlctlon. 3. Thls Court has no Jurtsdlctton over these appeals. 4. Slnce tnfs Court has no Jurlsdlctton over these appeals, they should.be dlsnlssed now 3o t'hat the SEaUe rr1ll not be requlred to unnecessarlly spend thousands of dollars 1n publlc funds for preparallon of transcrlpts. ---- -I a ir a: e, ln{.E}tEFoRE, for thls Honorable Court thegc reasona, thc State rtlsrnlsg t,hese appeals. requects that the h1s Respectfully subml !tett, Y. evrr4vrt ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEI COUNTY CIRCUITJEFFEBSON CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE f cerLlfy thaE I have scrvcd a copy of the foregolng on appellant by r.rall1ng a copy, postage prepald, adciressed to attorney as follows: Honorable Demltruls Newton \722 2l2I Bu1ld1ng 8th Avenue North Blrmlngharn, Alabama 3SZO3 Done thls rtre 5{( day of June, I9gf. ADDRESS OF COUNSEL: Asslstant Attorney General Ed 250 Adnlnlstrattve BulL!1ng 64 North Unlon Streec l,lontgomery, Alabama 35I30 ASSISTANT ATTONNEY OENENAL Carnes OENERAL ASSI.STAN? AITORNEY CENENAL c- )t t RE: Clrcui! Ct. ,CC-79-00465,466t461 & CC 8f01890 Court of Crlolnrl Apgerlr 16 Dlv. 573 eatL THE STATE OF ALABA},IA...JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT THE COUNT OF CRIMTNAL APPEALS OF ALABAMA Ocfu,betTltm, r9-q0-91 To thc C1;ak o! the Cil,r.cl/t Court ,o! _.-_Jrotg!!- Courrty, Grcctirgz Vfl*tcer, the Rccotil and Prccccdiag ol thc Ci:,anit Cotrc.ot said Conaty, irr c certeia ccu.lc lat.ly pald,hg itr la,id, Cotrt bctroccn TITOHAS LEE BI}IES Apptlbat--, rAE STATE ., Appclbc-, rohcrcia by rcid Court, adoersely to said, appellant.*, u)erc btought belote our Cowt ol Cri:rrri:rral Appeoh, by appeal taken, pttsuatt to bu, on beholl o/ scid appclio,at_ Nou., it is herebg certilid, That it lulrrs thetelrpon considereil by ortr Cortrt of Cnrrrinal Appeak, * 11.- 8th ilog o!.-- Jto" ----19 81 , --_.--- -0!L-I{OII0US FY AITELLEE--- _that the sotil appeal be and staad dirrnissed,' offijoec@odE3.+6r.or.crlcEn cglq6rcg<ttlaeqpr{brry =l: it uror consUercd - -_I pogrii-+----*ff"r-'-idcofry(eco{l,gttdrorErrExrbirpGhI)(B!4BAnrX- Ifitacss, Mollia Jotdcn, Clak of thc Court of Crirniaal Appccb ol Alobar*a,6t thc Ccpitol, RECEIVED JUN I .I X(I