Brown v. Rippy Appellees' Brief
Public Court Documents
January 1, 1956
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Brown v. Rippy Appellees' Brief, 1956. e2fa70b1-b69a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/030b49a7-e46a-46c2-abb5-bf6871b03bec/brown-v-rippy-appellees-brief. Accessed November 23, 2025.
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No. 15,872
In the
United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles Brown, a minor, by his father and next friend,
Walter Brown, Jr., et al.,
Appellants,
v.
Dr. Edwin L. Rippy, as President of the Board of Trustees
of the Dallas Independent School District, Dallas
County, Texas, et al.,
Appellees.
APPELLEES’ BRIEF
A. J. Truss, Jr.,
Attorney for Defendant.
W A R L I G K L A W P R I N T I N G C O . L A W B R I E F P R I N T I N G - D A L L A S R 1 - 6 7 11
No. 15,872
In the
United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles Brown, a minor, by his father and next friend,
Walter Brown, Jr., et al.,
Appellants,
v.
Dr. Edwin L. Rippy, as President of the Board of Trustees
of the Dallas Independent School District, Dallas
County, Texas, et al.,
Appellees.
APPELLEES’ BRIEF
I .
The appellants in the trial court asked for a preliminary
injunction which would have had the effect of immediately
admitting all negro children of scholastic age to any and
all schools where white children were admitted.
The motion for preliminary injunction in part stated
(Transcript of Record, pages 25-26) :
“ from assigning plaintiffs, or any member of the class
of Persons that they represent because of race and
2
color, to any public free school within the Dallas Inde
pendent School District, or from refusing and deny
ing Plaintiffs, or any member of the class of persons
that they represent, because of race or color, the right
and privilege of registering at, entering and attend
ing classes, and receiving instruction in the public
free school nearest to their respective homes, at the
same time, and under the same conditions and circum
stances that all other public free school pupils regis
ter, enter and attend classes and receive instruction
without any distinctions being made as to plaintiffs
and members of the class of persons that they repre
sent, on the basis of race or color.”
The show cause order in part recited (Transcript of
Record, page 28) :
“ The Court having considered the Complaint * * *,
and, the Application for Temporary Injunction, * * *
the Clerk of this Court is directed to issue Notice to
the Defendants, * * * to be, and appear before this
Court at 10 o’clock, A. M., on the 16th day of Septem
ber, 1955, * * * and show cause, if any they have, why
said Temporary Injunction should not be issued.”
II.
The Defendants filed a verified Answer stating in sub
stance : 1 2
(1) The budget fo r school expenditures and assign
ment of teachers and students had been made for the
school year 1955-56. (R. 30-32.)
(2) Confusion would result if any rearrangement
was attempted in September, 1955. (R. 32.)
3
(3) Studies had been initiated July 13, 1955, pre
paring for the eventualities of a desegregated school
system.1
(4) Confusion, chaos and a complete breakdown in
public school education will result unless the present
system is continued until the Board has had sufficient
time to obtain adequate information and statistical
data to find a way to convert the system to an edu
cational operation which protects the civil and educa
tional rights of all citizens under a new concept just
announced by the United States Supreme Court. (R.
36.) 1
1 (Transcript of Record, page 32, et seq.)
“ The distribution of students to school buildings is related both to
the budget expenditures and estimated costs and also to available physi
cal facilities and calls for the study of many other problems. Accord
ingly, on July 13, 1955, the President of the Board issued a statement
regarding desegregation and outlined twelve problems for study, which
are;
“ ‘In order to be prepared for eventualities in this connection, this
Board of Education months ago instructed Dr. W. T. White, the Superin
tendent of Schools of this District, to proceed with a detailed study of
the problems inherent to desegregating a major school system, and these
studies are in progress in the following areas:
“ ‘1. Scholastic boundaries of individual schools with relation to racial
groups contained therein.
“ ‘2. Age-grade distribution of pupils.
“ ‘3. Achievement and state of preparedness for grade-level assign
ment of different pupils.
“ ‘4. Relative intelligence quotient scores.
“ ‘5. Adaptation of curriculum.
“ ‘6. The overall impact on individual pupils scholastically when all
the above items are considered.
“ ‘7. Appointment and assignment of principals.
“ ‘8. The relative degree of preparedness of white and Negro teachers;
their selection and assignment.
“ ‘9. Social life of the children within the school.
“ ‘10. The problems of integration of the Parent-Teacher Association
and the Dads Club organization.
“ ‘11. The operation of the athletic program under an integrated
system.
“ ‘12. Fair and equitable methods of putting into effect the decree of
the Supreme Court’ .”
4
The case was submitted on an agreed statement of facts :
(1) The Board of Education had acted in good
faith. (R. 51.)
(2) The Court said the pleadings were agreed to.
(R. 52.)
There was no contention made in the trial court, and
none is made here, that the measure of responsibility of
the Board of Education extended only to the duty of pro
viding separate but equal educational facilities and oppor
tunities.
The trial court recognized the necessity of the situation
and the often repeated admonition of the many decisions
that local authorities must be given a reasonable measure
of discretion to work out their problem, keeping in mind
the ultimate results fixed by the principles announced by
the Supreme Court of the United States. The trial judge
stated (R. 62):
“To grant an injunction in this case would be to
ignore the equities that present themselves for recog
nition and to determine what the Supreme Court itself
decided not to determine. Therefore, I think it appro
priate that this case be dismissed without prejudice
to refile it at some later date.
“Give them some time to see what they can work
out, and then we will pass upon that equity.”
III.
5
ARGUMENT
The Court did not approve of or dispose of this case on
the doctrine that equal facilities available to negro children
was compliance with constitutional mandate.
The trial court followed the principle announced by the
U. S. Supreme Court2 that:
Full implementation of these constitutional prin
ciples may require solution of varied local school
problems. School authorities have the primary re
sponsibility for elucidating, assessing and solving
these problems; courts will have to consider whether
the action of school authorities constitutes good faith
implementation of the governing constitutional prin
ciples.”
The trial court having found the appellees needed time
to work out the problem in good faith to accomplish con
stitutional mandate, properly dismissed the case without
prejudice to later refiling. The trial judge stated (R. 61) :
“ The facts show, as I have already recited, that
equal school opportunities are furnished to both col
ored and white. The direction from the Supreme Court
of the United States requires that the officers and
principals of each institution, and the lower Courts,
shall do away with segregation after having worked
out a proper plan. That direction does not mean that
a long time shall expire before that plan is agreed
upon.”
The school authorities have a heavy duty. They must
facilitate a transition from the separate but equal system
2Bro'wn v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294, 99 L. Ed. 1083.
6
to the desegregated system, taking into review all of the
factors, facts and emotions of people.
The learned District Judge with incomparable exactitude
in Bush v. Orleans Parish School District (U. S. District
Court, Eastern District of Louisiana) had occasion to note:
“ The problem of changing a people’s mores, par
ticularly those with an emotional overlay, is not to
be taken lightly. It is a problem which will require
the utmost patience, understanding, generosity and
forbearance from all of us, of whatever race. But the
magnitude of the problem may not nullify the prin
ciple.”
The Dallas School authorities have not been recalcitrant
in facing up to a drastic change. The Appellants make no
challenge on the good faith of the Board. Not one word of
negation has been uttered against the Board except they
have not abruptly made a change where patience is needed
on all sides.
The Courts wanted the governing authorities to follow
a reasonably cautious course, having the needs of the situa
tion in mind, yet not neglecting the end result— the judi
cial mandate.
There should be no change in the trial court’s judgment.
Even an ambiguous, indeterminate order would under the
facts of this case create the implication the Appellees have
not performed their separate and several duties.
The Court can take judicial notice of the surrounding
conditions in Dallas, Texas, the large scholastic popula
7
tion, the percentage of whites to negroes, and the tradi
tional concept of education drastically and dramatically
changed.
A consciousness of the timing is most important as when
and what steps must be taken to desegregate. Precipitous
action can be worse than over caution.
CONCLUSION
Appellees pray that the Judgment below be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
A. J. Thuss, Jr.,
Attorney for Defendant.
W A R L I C K