Brown v. Rippy Appellees' Brief
Public Court Documents
January 1, 1956

Cite this item
-
Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Brown v. Rippy Appellees' Brief, 1956. e2fa70b1-b69a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/030b49a7-e46a-46c2-abb5-bf6871b03bec/brown-v-rippy-appellees-brief. Accessed June 02, 2025.
Copied!
fJ No. 15,872 In the United States Court of Appeals FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Charles Brown, a minor, by his father and next friend, Walter Brown, Jr., et al., Appellants, v. Dr. Edwin L. Rippy, as President of the Board of Trustees of the Dallas Independent School District, Dallas County, Texas, et al., Appellees. APPELLEES’ BRIEF A. J. Truss, Jr., Attorney for Defendant. W A R L I G K L A W P R I N T I N G C O . L A W B R I E F P R I N T I N G - D A L L A S R 1 - 6 7 11 No. 15,872 In the United States Court of Appeals FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Charles Brown, a minor, by his father and next friend, Walter Brown, Jr., et al., Appellants, v. Dr. Edwin L. Rippy, as President of the Board of Trustees of the Dallas Independent School District, Dallas County, Texas, et al., Appellees. APPELLEES’ BRIEF I . The appellants in the trial court asked for a preliminary injunction which would have had the effect of immediately admitting all negro children of scholastic age to any and all schools where white children were admitted. The motion for preliminary injunction in part stated (Transcript of Record, pages 25-26) : “ from assigning plaintiffs, or any member of the class of Persons that they represent because of race and 2 color, to any public free school within the Dallas Inde pendent School District, or from refusing and deny ing Plaintiffs, or any member of the class of persons that they represent, because of race or color, the right and privilege of registering at, entering and attend ing classes, and receiving instruction in the public free school nearest to their respective homes, at the same time, and under the same conditions and circum stances that all other public free school pupils regis ter, enter and attend classes and receive instruction without any distinctions being made as to plaintiffs and members of the class of persons that they repre sent, on the basis of race or color.” The show cause order in part recited (Transcript of Record, page 28) : “ The Court having considered the Complaint * * *, and, the Application for Temporary Injunction, * * * the Clerk of this Court is directed to issue Notice to the Defendants, * * * to be, and appear before this Court at 10 o’clock, A. M., on the 16th day of Septem ber, 1955, * * * and show cause, if any they have, why said Temporary Injunction should not be issued.” II. The Defendants filed a verified Answer stating in sub stance : 1 2 (1) The budget fo r school expenditures and assign ment of teachers and students had been made for the school year 1955-56. (R. 30-32.) (2) Confusion would result if any rearrangement was attempted in September, 1955. (R. 32.) 3 (3) Studies had been initiated July 13, 1955, pre paring for the eventualities of a desegregated school system.1 (4) Confusion, chaos and a complete breakdown in public school education will result unless the present system is continued until the Board has had sufficient time to obtain adequate information and statistical data to find a way to convert the system to an edu cational operation which protects the civil and educa tional rights of all citizens under a new concept just announced by the United States Supreme Court. (R. 36.) 1 1 (Transcript of Record, page 32, et seq.) “ The distribution of students to school buildings is related both to the budget expenditures and estimated costs and also to available physi cal facilities and calls for the study of many other problems. Accord ingly, on July 13, 1955, the President of the Board issued a statement regarding desegregation and outlined twelve problems for study, which are; “ ‘In order to be prepared for eventualities in this connection, this Board of Education months ago instructed Dr. W. T. White, the Superin tendent of Schools of this District, to proceed with a detailed study of the problems inherent to desegregating a major school system, and these studies are in progress in the following areas: “ ‘1. Scholastic boundaries of individual schools with relation to racial groups contained therein. “ ‘2. Age-grade distribution of pupils. “ ‘3. Achievement and state of preparedness for grade-level assign ment of different pupils. “ ‘4. Relative intelligence quotient scores. “ ‘5. Adaptation of curriculum. “ ‘6. The overall impact on individual pupils scholastically when all the above items are considered. “ ‘7. Appointment and assignment of principals. “ ‘8. The relative degree of preparedness of white and Negro teachers; their selection and assignment. “ ‘9. Social life of the children within the school. “ ‘10. The problems of integration of the Parent-Teacher Association and the Dads Club organization. “ ‘11. The operation of the athletic program under an integrated system. “ ‘12. Fair and equitable methods of putting into effect the decree of the Supreme Court’ .” 4 The case was submitted on an agreed statement of facts : (1) The Board of Education had acted in good faith. (R. 51.) (2) The Court said the pleadings were agreed to. (R. 52.) There was no contention made in the trial court, and none is made here, that the measure of responsibility of the Board of Education extended only to the duty of pro viding separate but equal educational facilities and oppor tunities. The trial court recognized the necessity of the situation and the often repeated admonition of the many decisions that local authorities must be given a reasonable measure of discretion to work out their problem, keeping in mind the ultimate results fixed by the principles announced by the Supreme Court of the United States. The trial judge stated (R. 62): “To grant an injunction in this case would be to ignore the equities that present themselves for recog nition and to determine what the Supreme Court itself decided not to determine. Therefore, I think it appro priate that this case be dismissed without prejudice to refile it at some later date. “Give them some time to see what they can work out, and then we will pass upon that equity.” III. 5 ARGUMENT The Court did not approve of or dispose of this case on the doctrine that equal facilities available to negro children was compliance with constitutional mandate. The trial court followed the principle announced by the U. S. Supreme Court2 that: Full implementation of these constitutional prin ciples may require solution of varied local school problems. School authorities have the primary re sponsibility for elucidating, assessing and solving these problems; courts will have to consider whether the action of school authorities constitutes good faith implementation of the governing constitutional prin ciples.” The trial court having found the appellees needed time to work out the problem in good faith to accomplish con stitutional mandate, properly dismissed the case without prejudice to later refiling. The trial judge stated (R. 61) : “ The facts show, as I have already recited, that equal school opportunities are furnished to both col ored and white. The direction from the Supreme Court of the United States requires that the officers and principals of each institution, and the lower Courts, shall do away with segregation after having worked out a proper plan. That direction does not mean that a long time shall expire before that plan is agreed upon.” The school authorities have a heavy duty. They must facilitate a transition from the separate but equal system 2Bro'wn v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294, 99 L. Ed. 1083. 6 to the desegregated system, taking into review all of the factors, facts and emotions of people. The learned District Judge with incomparable exactitude in Bush v. Orleans Parish School District (U. S. District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana) had occasion to note: “ The problem of changing a people’s mores, par ticularly those with an emotional overlay, is not to be taken lightly. It is a problem which will require the utmost patience, understanding, generosity and forbearance from all of us, of whatever race. But the magnitude of the problem may not nullify the prin ciple.” The Dallas School authorities have not been recalcitrant in facing up to a drastic change. The Appellants make no challenge on the good faith of the Board. Not one word of negation has been uttered against the Board except they have not abruptly made a change where patience is needed on all sides. The Courts wanted the governing authorities to follow a reasonably cautious course, having the needs of the situa tion in mind, yet not neglecting the end result— the judi cial mandate. There should be no change in the trial court’s judgment. Even an ambiguous, indeterminate order would under the facts of this case create the implication the Appellees have not performed their separate and several duties. The Court can take judicial notice of the surrounding conditions in Dallas, Texas, the large scholastic popula 7 tion, the percentage of whites to negroes, and the tradi tional concept of education drastically and dramatically changed. A consciousness of the timing is most important as when and what steps must be taken to desegregate. Precipitous action can be worse than over caution. CONCLUSION Appellees pray that the Judgment below be affirmed. Respectfully submitted, A. J. Thuss, Jr., Attorney for Defendant. W A R L I C K