Robinson v TN Reply to Petition for Writ of Certiorari

    SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

No.

NELSON WILBERT ROBINSON, JR ., 
Petitioner,

v .

STATE O F TENN ESSEE, 
Respondent.

REPLY TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI.

GEORGE F. McCANLESS,
Attorney General, 

State of Tennessee.

THOMAS E. FOX,
Deputy Attorney General,

State of Tennessee.

St. Louis L aw Pbxnting Co., Inc., 411-15 N. Eighth St., 63101. CEntral 1-447T.



INDEX.
Page

Question presented ...........................................................  1

Circumstances surrounding petitioner’s statement to 
the police ...........................   2

Argument ............................................................................  8

Conclusion ........................................................     15

Cases Cited.
Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 XJ. 8. 199, 80 8. Ct. 274,

4 L. Ed. 2d 242 ................................... ........... . 14
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U. S.

715, . . .  S. Ct. . . . . . . .  L. Ed................ .......................  10
Clewis v. State of Texas, 386 U. S. 706, 709, 87 S. Ct.

1338, 1340, . . .  L. Ed. 2d ........................................... 10,15
Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U. S. 568, 81 S. Ct. 1860,

6 L. Ed. 2d 1037 .......................................................... 14
Davis v. North Carolina, 384 TJ. S. 737, 86 S. Ct. 1761,

16 L, Ed. 2d 895 ...........................................................  15
Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U. 8. 191, 77 S. Ct. 281, 1 L. Ed.

2d 246 ..........................   14
Harris v. State, 217 Tenn. 582, 587 ...............................  14
Haynes v. Washington, 373 U. S. 503, 83 S. Ct. 1336,

10 L. Ed. 2d 513 ........................... ............................ 14-15
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 IT. S. 436, 86 S. Ct, 1602, 16

L. Ed. 2d 694 .........................................................1,8,9,10
Reck v. Pate, 367 U. S. 433, 81 8. Ct. 1541, 6 L. Ed.

2d 948 ......     14
Shannon v. State of Tennessee, for publication but not

yet in Advance Sheets .................................................  10
Spano v. New York, 360 IT. S. 315, 79 S. Ct, 1202, 3 

L, Ed. 2d 1265 ............................................................... 14
IT. S. v. Price, 383 IT. S. 787, 86 S. Ct, 1152, . . .  L. Ed.

2d 10



IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No.

NELSON WILBERT ROBINSON, JR., 
Petitioner,

v.
STATE OF TENNESSEE, 

Respondent

REPLY TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI.

The petitioner, Nelson Wilbert Eobinson, Jr., asks that 
a writ of certiorari issue to the Supreme Court of Tennes­
see for the record in the criminal proceeding against him 
or certain designated parts thereof so that its judgment 
affirming petitioner’s conviction of murder in the second 
degree and his sentence of not less than ten nor more than 
twenty years in the Tennessee State Penitentiary may be 
reviewed by this Court. The opinion of the Supreme Court 
sought to be reviewed was never published but a copy has 
been attached to the petition.

QUESTION PRESENTED.

Whether or not a statement made by the petitioner to 
newspaper reporters, without first being warned as re­
quired by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 IT. S. 436, 86 S. Ct.



1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, admitting the homicide about 
thirty-five minutes after making a similar admission to 
the police officers investigating the incident who gave him 
no Miranda warning, amounted to a violation of peti­
tioner’s Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to 
the Constitution of the United States. (The admission 
made to the police officers was held by the trial judge to 
be inadmissible because it did not meet Miranda require­
ments.)

CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING PETITIONER’S 
STATEMENT TO THE POLICE.

The petitioner was questioned by the police during 
January, 1966, before the Miranda opinion. The usual pro­
cedure followed by the Memphis, Tennessee, Police Force 
prior to Miranda was that persons suspected of an offense 
were told they did not have to answer any questions and 
if they did, anything they said would possibly be used 
against them in a trial of the case. Whether or not such 
a procedure was followed in this case was never questioned 
after the police inspector announced the usual procedure 
as stated in the foregoing sentence.

Petitioner was arrested about 11:30 a. m., February 24, 
1965, at the home of the deceased, Robert E. Huey, by 
whom petitioner was employed to some extent. According 
to petitioner he and a companion, Hubert Hill, had called 
the police fearing that something had happened to his 
employer. The police arrived, discovered deceased’s body 
and had petitioner and his companion sit in the back seat 
of the police car out of the rough weather (Tr. 55). The 
petitioner became nervous, started crying and stated that 
“he was not responsible for what he had done, he was a 
mental patient” etc. (Tr. 48 and 55). One of the policemen 
indicated in his testimony that the petitioner’s statement 
was made without questioning (Tr. 48). Another police­



man testified that when he tried to talk with the petitioner, 
he (petitioner) reacted as set out above. Because of peti­
tioner’s conduct he was transported with his companion to 
police headquarters for further investigation (Tr. 57).

Questioning of the petitioner and two other suspects 
began about 1:30 p. m., on the day of the arrest, February 
24, 1965, at police headquarters. Petitioner admitted the 
homicide to the police about 2:55 p. m., two days later, 
February 26, 1965. Petitioner insists that he was ques­
tioned almost continuously during that two day period 
and opposing counsel in the petition insist that he was 
questioned by teams of policemen. The State insists that 
he was only questioned at intervals of twenty-five to thirty 
minutes regarding information obtained by the police after 
their previous questioning of the petitioner. One police­
man testified that he was present on two or three occasions 
when the petitioner was talked to in this manner and that 
each time the questioning lasted about twenty-five min­
utes (Tr. 91-94).

The petitioner testified that he was beaten and coerced 
into making the statement he made to the policemen. This 
was denied by the officers. According to the officers 
whenever the death of the deceased was mentioned to 
the petitioner, he would start screaming and saying that 
he did not want to talk to anybody (Tr. 85-87, 92-94). 
Newspaper reporters heard petitioner and apparently sus­
pected that the police were mistreating him and they 
asked the Police Inspector to talk with the petitioner.

Finally, after petitioner’s confession, the Police Inspec­
tor informed the petitioner that some newspaper reporters 
wanted to talk to him, that he (petitioner) could talk with 
them if he wanted to, but that he (petitioner) did not 
have to talk with the newspaper reporters (Tr. 84 and 
88). The petitioner informed the officers that he wanted 
to see the reporters (Tr. 80).



•—  4 —

The first reporter, Brown Allen Flynn, representing the 
Memphis Press Scimitar, testified that in response to his 
questions the petitioner, who did not appear emotionally 
upset but on the contrary pretty calm, informed him that 
he had not been abused or threatened by the police in 
any manner and that he had admitted the killing of the 
deceased voluntarily (Tr. 98-99). This was in police head­
quarters and there were policemen around. Inspector 
Swann was present when the petitioner made his con­
fession to the police, but the policemen who were present 
were courteous to the petitioner and did not prompt him 
in any manner during the interview made by the reporter 
(Tr. 98-99).

The next reporter was Jimmy Covington of the Mem­
phis Commercial Appeal and his interview of the peti­
tioner followed apparently that of the previous reporter 
and his testimony regarding the interview was for all 
practical purposes the same as that of the previous re­
porter (Tr. 104-106).

The following morning while the petitioner was being 
transferred by the police from police headquarters to the 
county jail another Commercial Appeal reporter, John 
Stokes, interviewed the petitioner. Petitioner at that time 
repudiated his confession and stated that the police had 
beaten him and held a pistol at his head to obtain his 
confession (Tr. 119-120).

The criminal proceeding which resulted in petitioner’s 
conviction was held January 4-5, 1967. Prior to this 
proceeding on November 15, 1966, a proceeding was held 
in which Dr. Frank H. Luton, Clinical Director of Central 
State Psychiatric Hospital, Nashville, Tennessee, was 
questioned regarding the hospital staff’s report to the 
effect that the petitioner was received at Central State 
Hospital November 24, 1965, for an evaluation of his 
mental condition, and that as a result of a staff meeting 
which included Dr. Luton, Dr. Seigmann, and Dr.



•—  5 —

Schroeder, held March 8, 1966, the petitioner was found 
to be sane and capable of assisting his counsel in the 
preparation of a proper defense to the charge against 
him (Tr. 1 and 2, Vol. 2 of the Record). In his testimony 
-Dr. Luton by way of summary stated that the petitioner 
“ has an outgoing personality, but very quick to disen­
gage himself from any real commitment to problems, by 
saying I ’m a mental patient; from conversation one gets 
the impression that his mental history and hospitalization 
have give him some kind of secondary reward in excusing 
him from responsibility. The physiological problems which 
seem psychosomatic in character makes one think of the 
psychoneurotic. He impresses one as quite intelligent, at 
least he’s verbal. However IQ is only at the level above 
the line to dull normal”  (Tr. 4, Vol. 2 of the Record).

Counsel for the petitioner in the criminal proceeding 
had some medical proof he desired to present. It was re­
jected by the trial judge but the trial judge informed 
counsel for the petitioner that his ruling would not pre­
vent the filing of a plea of present insanity and allow the 
petitioner a jury trial on the issue if his counsel desired 
(Tr. 12). During the trial of the case counsel for the 
petitioner did introduce the deposition of a psychiatrist, 
Dr. Stanley H. Tyler, who examined the petitioner June 2, 
1965, obviously on the issue of petitioner’s mental ca­
pacity at the time the offense was committed. It was Dr. 
Tyler’s opinion that the petitioner at the time of the exam­
ination was of such an unsound mind he was not capable 
of assisting counsel in the preparation of a proper defense 
to the indictment against him, that, the petitioner at the 
time the offense was committed did not know right from 
wrong in the sense of an adult with average intellect and 
judgment, and that petitioner’s mental condition was not 
likely to improve (Tr. 205).

The petitioner’s confession was well corroborated by 
other circumstances recited in the record. The victim did



appear to be beaten to death with a stick as the petitioner 
stated in his confession. Petitioner left the home of 
Frankie Lou Epps about 6:30 to 7:00 p. m., on the date in 
question to see “ his boss man”  (Tr. 22). Deceased had 
previously told petitioner to return to his (deceased’s) 
home about 7:00 p. m., that day (Tr. 10). About fifteen 
minutes were required to walk from the Epps’ home to 
the victim’s home (Tr. 23). Petitioner returned to the 
Epps’ home in about two hours (Tr. 23). He had a bottle 
of wine with him (Tr. 23). Deceased had bought a bottle 
of wine that afternoon (Tr. 14). The victim had been 
seen on that day by a taxi driver who left food for him 
about 6:40 p. m. (Tr. 17). The petitioner asked Frankie 
Lou Epps and Hubert Hill, who lived at Frankie Lou 
Epps’ home, to go with him (petitioner) to the deceased’s 
home to cook the deceased some steaks (Tr. 24).

In petitioner’s confession he admitted going to the vic­
tim’s home about 8:00 p. m., on the date in question where 
he found the victim drinking and very abusive toward 
him (petitioner). The victim then began hitting the peti­
tioner with a stick. Petitioner took the stick away from 
the victim and hit him several times with it but did not 
“ know that he was dead.”  He further stated in his con­
fession that he went to the home of some friends and tried 
to get his friends to go back with him to see about his 
employer (Tr. 105). There is hearsay evidence in the 
record indicating that petitioner came by Frankie Lou 
Epps’ home where Hubert Hill lived and asked Hill to go 
by the deceased’s home to see about the deceased who was 
bleeding (Tr. 86). When the police arrived at deceased’s 
home, they were informed by the petitioner and Hill (the 
record does not state which) they found the deceased’s 
home locked, that no one answered the doorbell and they 
were afraid something had happened to the person inside 
the house (Tr. 37). The police testified that they could 
see deceased lying on the floor through the front door

-—  6 —



(Tr. 38). Petitioner in his testimony testified that he 
found the deceased dead with blood all over him and one 
of the windows to the home raised (Tr. 110). He told the 
officers when asked why he was crying “ I told them I said 
I was hurt over it and I wondered who was, I was con­
cerned about who had did this murder to him. And I told 
him that I was a mental patient and I was concerned. I 
know I not responsible but I know right from wrong and
I don’t believe in anything to torture t h e ..............type.”
He also admitted being at the deceased’s home the night 
before (Tr. 110).



ARGUMENT.

Three reasons are advanced by counsel representing the 
petitioner for granting a petition for certiorari in this 
cause (1) To determine what construction should be 
placed upon the opinion in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 
436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, with respect to 
incriminating statements made by an accused to persons 
other than police officers or other officers investigating 
the crime; (2) To consider the application of “ scope-of- 
taint”  principles when incriminating statements have 
been made by an accused subsequent to previous incrimi­
nating statements made under circumstances not in ac­
cord with the Miranda formula for taking statements 
from a defendant; and (3) To determine whether or not 
the confession made by the petitioner in this case was 
made voluntarily.

These reasons are listed in the order set out in oppos­
ing counsel’s brief and will be discussed in that order for 
the sake of clarity although a determination of the third 
question renders unnecessary a discussion of the second.

(1) The real purpose of the first reason for granting 
the writ advanced above is to have this Court extend the 
Miranda requisites for obtaining a confession from people 
suspected of crime to all persons who might inquire of 
the suspected person questions which might result in that 
person (accused person) involving himself in a crime 
rather than apply it to custodial questioning by police 
officers. This contention of counsel for the respondent— 
State of Tennessee, is predicated upon the following state­
ment from the brief of opposing counsel: “ A construc­
tion of Miranda which permits third parties to testify 
freely to what the police are prohibited to introduce in 
evidence gravely threatens the policies which Miranda



requirements were formulated to protect, and is an in­
vitation to abuse.”  (Petition, Pages 11-12.) Further down 
in the discussion on this same question it is said the 
petitioner was never informed by the newspaper reporters 
of his right to remain silent so he could not have waived 
such a right. (Opposing Counsel’s Brief, Page 12).

Apparently it is thought by counsel for the petitioner 
that the police forces of this nation will circumvent the 
holding of Miranda by engaging persons not otherwise 
connected with law enforcement agencies to interview 
suspected persons and report the information to them or 
be available to testify against accused persons in court 
and that the courts of this nation will be prone to uphold 
such a practice. To disprove this theory and so that this 
Court will know the Supreme Court of Tennessee requires 
a full faith application of the Miranda formula by the 
officers and the trial courts of this state, the following 
excerpt from a most recent opinion (opinion dated April 
15, 1968), is set out below:

“ In the light of these statements this Court cannot 
in good conscience, by the artifice of calling Shan­
non’s continued confession to the booking officer, a 
voluntary admission against interest, permit it to be 
used as evidence. Especially, when it is obvious as 
can be that from the very beginning, in spite of the 
plain and clear warning of the Supreme Court of the 
United States in Miranda by which this Court and all 
other courts and law enforcement officers are bound, 
the officers in charge of the investigation pursued an 
unconstitutional and illegal course to supply by con­
fession the evidence they had not been able to un­
cover by police work.

“ The sooner it is realized by all concerned that the 
Miranda guarantees must be afforded an accused, in

—  9 —



—  10 —

full good faith and with intention on the part of 
the interrogators to comply fully therewith, in the 
spirit in which these tests are laid down and re­
quired, the sooner the time will come when it will 
not be necessary for this Court to reverse as it must 
do in this case. Let it be noted that the concern of 
this Court is not to favor a defendant but to see 
that the scales of justice be in balance between him 
and the State, which cannot be if the constitutional 
guarantees of Miranda can be withheld by its offi­
cers. ’ ’

Shannon v. State of Tennessee, for publication 
but not yet in Advance Sheets.

An attempt is made to show that the questioning of 
the petitioner by newspaper reporters with the permission 
of the police makes the questioning the acts of the state. 
In support of this proposition the cases of U. S. v. Price, 
383 U. S. 787, 86 S. Ct. 1152, . . .  L. Ed. 2d . . . ,  and 
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U. S. 715, 
. . .  S. Ct. . . . ,  . . .  L. Ed. . . . ,  are relied upon. Those 
cases are easily distinguishable from the present case. 
In the Price case the evidence showed that the officers 
were acting in concert or jointly engaged with the state 
officials in constitutionally prohibited acts, and in the 
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority case, the state 
authorities did have knowledge that there was a con­
tinuing practice of segregation by the restaurant operator 
which was known or should have been known by state 
officials. In the present case the police officers did not 
know what questions the reporters would ask the peti­
tioner. All indications were that the newspaper reporters 
were interested in finding out whether or not the officers 
were abusing the petitioner (Tr. 81 ).1 The officers re­

1 No they just told him who they were and they told him of 
the fact that they heard some hollering, wanted to know what



—  11 —

framed from asking petitioner questions while the news­
paper people were present to eliminate the possibility 
they were attempting to influence or slant petitioner’s 
answers (Tr. 81). Further, in this connection the officers 
did not ask petitioner “ if he would speak”  to the re­
porters as stated in the petition. They informed him 
the reporters wanted to talk to him, asked petitioner 
if he had any objections, and informed the petitioner 
that he did not have to talk to the reporters “ unless he 
wanted to” . The petitioner replied that he wanted to 
talk to the reporters and when the reporters entered he 
informed them likewise (Tr. 80).

(2) The test for determining whether or not a con­
fession is tainted with illegality because a previous con­
fession by the same accused person was extracted contrary 
to the law has been so clearly enunciated by this Court 
no further explanation of the matter is needed. It was 
succinctly stated by this Court in Olewis v. State of 
Texas, 386 U. S. 706, 709, 87 S. Ct, 1338, 1340, . . .  L. Ed. 
2d . . . .

“ It plainly cannot on these facts, be separated from 
the circumstances surrounding the two earlier ‘ con­
fessions’. There is here no break in the stream of 
events from the time Sunday morning when peti­
tioner was taken to the police station to the time 
Tuesday morning some nine days later that he signed 
the statement from the effect of all that went before. 
Compare United States v. Bayer, 331 U. S. 532, 540, 
67 S. Ct. 1394, 1398, 10 L. Ed. 1654 (1947), with 
Reck v. Pate, 367 U. S. 433, 444, 81 S. Ct. 1541, 1548, 
6 L. Ed. 2d 948 (1961).”

it was about, wanted to know whether or not he had been sub­
jected to any abuses, whether he’d been hit by the police, 
various questions like this, and also about what had taken 
place with regard to Mr. Huey (Tr. 81).



—  12

Counsel for the State of Tennessee does not concede that 
the confession made by the petitioner was not freely and 
voluntarily made and under the third topic for discussion 
in this brief, the reasons for this position will be set out, 
but even if the police had required the petitioner to make 
incriminating statements involuntarily and against his 
will, the atmosphere was completely changed before he 
made a subsequent confession to the newspaper reporters. 
As stated above, the purpose of the reporters desiring an 
interview with the petitioner was to find out if he had 
been mistreated. Their first questions were to that effect 
(Tr. 98 and 105). The police had nothing to say at the 
time the newspaper reporters talked with the petitioner. 
It was made clear to the petitioner that he did not have 
to talk to the newspaper reporters unless he wanted to 
(Tr. 104). Petitioner informed the reporters that he had 
not been abused or threatened by them and that what he 
told them was told voluntarily (Tr. 99), so if the peti­
tioner were forced to make incriminating statements, it 
was not evidenced to the newspaper reporters to whom 
he made the statement which he now insists should not 
have been admitted into evidence. The purpose of the 
Miranda formula and holding is to make sure that per­
sons accused of crime not be required to give evidence 
against themselves, that is, to police officers under circum­
stances where there is some pressure upon such persons 
to make incriminating statements. No such circumstances 
can be found here. The test is the same whether the 
statement is an initial statement or a subsequent state­
ment. A failure to comply with Miranda in taking self- 
incriminating statements from a person accused of a crime 
does not mean that the statements were the result of co­
ercion or that they were not freely and voluntarily made 
by the person after a full understanding of his rights, but 
the rule was necessary as a safeguard to make certain 
that no accused person be required to make a statement



—  13

against his will or without fully understanding his right 
not to make such a statement.

(3) The final and third reason insisted upon for grant­
ing the petition for certiorari in this case is to determine 
the “ voluntariness”  of the petitioner’s confession. It is 
said in opposing counsel’s brief that the petitioner re­
quested permission to telephone his mother but was re­
fused permission by the officers. His complete statement 
on the subject was, “ No, sir. Lieutenant Marshall on 
Thursday night at 8:30, I looked at the clock, hung up 
in her face and asked about Eugene Washington, he’s 
deceased now. And I don’t knowr what Mother said and 
but Mr. Marshall eased the phone down and that’s the 
night when he carried me back in the interrogation room 
for isolation and held three rifles to my head”  (Tr. 107). 
Petitioner did not produce his mother to verify this state­
ment nor was Lieutenant Marshall called for that purpose. 
Petitioner testified to numerous other circumstances which 
obviously were not true and so found by the trial judge 
and the jury.

One of the policemen on cross-examination testified that 
petitioner did not want to talk about the murder of the 
deceased (Tr. 94), but this statement taken at face value 
does not mean that the statement he made to the police 
was involuntary. Considering petitioner’s statements and 
conduct all together it is obvious that he was pretending 
nervousness and excitement when the incident was men­
tioned just as Dr. Luton testified he had become accus­
tomed to doing over a long period of years in order to 
avoid being held responsible for his acts. Petitioner in 
his own testimony stated that he knew what he was doing 
but that he was not responsible. The petitioner was not 
informed of his right to remain silent as required by 
Miranda, but the investigation or interrogation of the pe­



—  14

titioner by the police was done in January, 1965, more 
than a year before the Miranda opinion was announced. 
The procedure followed by the Memphis Police in such 
interrogation at that time, prior to Miranda, was to tell 
an accused person that he did not have to say anything 
and that anything he did say would be used against him 
at the time of the trial (Tr. 88). The rule in the State 
of Tennessee before Miranda was as set out in the case of 
Harris v. State, 217 Tenn. 582, 587, as follows:

“In such case it is not necessary to remind the ac­
cused that he is under arrest and that he is not 
obliged to reply because, if he did so, the answers 
might be used against him, when there is no induce­
ment, fear or threat made to produce such statements, 
and they were voluntarily made. State v. Boyer, 1963, 
61 Wash. 2d 484, 378 P. 2d 936. The failure of the 
police or sheriff to so advise a defendant is merely a 
fact to consider in determining whether the confession 
was voluntary. In other words, the trial court on the 
evidence pro and con on this question determines 
whether or not the defendant has been fundamentally 
prejudiced in his defense at a trial in the case by 
making statements to the officers without advice of 
counsel. This line of reasoning seems to us to be in 
line with the opinion of Jackson v. Den no, 378 U. S. 
368, 84 S. Ct. 1774, 12 L. Ed. 2d 908.”

Several cases are cited as being similar to the case at 
bar in which this Court held confessions by the defendants 
in those cases not to be made freely and voluntarily. Fikes 
v. Alabama, 352 U. S. 191, 77 S. Ct. 281, 1 L. Ed. 2d 246; 
Reck v. Pate, 367 U. S. 433, 81 S. Ct. 1541, 6 L. Ed. 2d 948; 
Spano v. New York, 360 U. S. 315, 79 S. Ct. 1202, 3 L. Ed. 
2d 1265; Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U. S. 568, 81 S. Ct. 
1860, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1037; Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 IT. S. 
199, 80 S. Ct. 274, 4 L. Ed. 2d 242; Haynes v. Washington,



373 U. S. 503, 83 S. Ct. 1336, 10 L. Ed. 2d 513; Davis v. 
North Carolina, 384 IT. S. 737, 86 S. Ct. 1761, 16 L. Ed. 2d
895; and Clewis v. Texas, supra. All of those cases are dis­
tinguishable from the case at bar upon the grounds that 
the interrogation of the defendant in those cases was done 
in a manner which disclosed an undeviating intent to ex­
tract a confession from the defendant by rigorous ques­
tioning in most cases over a long period of time, whereas 
in the present case, there was no such undeviating attempt 
by the police to obtain the defendant’s confession of the 
offense. The police were holding three suspects for the 
purpose of checking their whereabouts at the time the 
homicide of the deceased occurred. They did not “ actually 
accuse Robinson of whether he did or did not kill Mr. 
Huey”  (deceased) (Tr. 86), nor did they question these 
suspects incessantly. The record indicates petitioner was 
not questioned more than twenty-five to thirty minutes at 
a time (Tr. 93). Apparently short questioning sessions 
were held as the police obtained new information which 
petitioner had not previously had an opportunity to ex­
plain. The petitioner was told that he did not have to 
make a statement unless he wished and if he did it would 
be used against him in court.

CONCLUSION.

In view of the foregoing, it is the insistence of counsel 
for the Respondent—State of Tennessee, that the confes­
sion made by the petitioner to the police officers was not 
the result of interrogation continued over a long period 
of time with a purpose and under such circumstances as 
to make the whole proceeding an effective instrument for 
extorting an unwilling admission of guilt from him and 
that the confession made by the petitioner to the news­
paper reporters was taken under circumstances and in a 
manner which further removed any question that the pe­



titioner’s will was broken and the confession made because 
it was made to appear to him that the police would not 
cease their interrogation and holding him until they did 
obtain a confession from him.

Respectfully submitted,

— 16 •—

GEORGE F. McCANLESS, 
Attorney General,

State of Tennessee,

THOMAS E. FOX,
Deputy Attorney General,

State of Tennessee.

Certificate of Service.

I certify that a copy of this Reply to Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari has been forwarded to the Honorable Jack 
Greenberg and Michael Meltsner, Attorneys at Law, 10 
Columbus Circle, New York, New York; Honorable An­
thony G. Amsterdam, Attorney at Law, 3400 Chestnut 
Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and to the Honorable 
John G. Mitchell, Jr., Attorney at Law, 618 Stahlman 
Building, Nashville, Tennessee, on this the 23 day of 
April, 1968.

Thomas E. Fox,
Deputy Attorney General, 

State of Tennessee.