Vasquez v. Hillery, Jr. Motion for Leave to File Brief and Brief Amicus Curiae
Public Court Documents
October 7, 1985
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Vasquez v. Hillery, Jr. Motion for Leave to File Brief and Brief Amicus Curiae, 1985. fb8a4bfe-c79a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/0534bcb5-1516-43f5-9fec-2d409f8ab58b/vasquez-v-hillery-jr-motion-for-leave-to-file-brief-and-brief-amicus-curiae. Accessed June 15, 2025.
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No, 84-836
1st the
8>tx#tmx (&mxt uf % Imfrit Ji>tate
OCTOBER TERM, 1985
Daniel Yasquez, the Warden o£
San Quentin State Prison,
y.
Petitioner,
B ooker I . H ille e y , J r ,,
Respondent,
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OE APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE
AND BRIEF OF THE NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE &
EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC., AS AMICUS CURIAE
J u l iu s L bV o n n e C h a m b e r s
S te v e n L. W in t e r *
99 Hudson Street
16th Floor
New York, New York 10013
(212) 219-1900
A n t h o n y G . A m ster d a m
New York University
Law School
40 Washington Square South
New York, New York 10012
Attorneys for the NAACP Legal
Defense S Educational Fund,
Inc., as Amicus Curiae
*Counsel of Record
No. 84 -836
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1985
DANIEL VASQUEZ , the Warden of
San Quentin State Prison,
Pet i t ioner ,
v .
BOOKER T. HILLERY, JR . ,
Respondent.
On Writ of Cert iorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circui t
MOTION OF THE NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE &
EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC. , FOR LEAVE TO FILE
BRIEF AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT
OF RESPONDENT
The NAACP Legal Defense & Educational
Fund, I n c . , ( "LDF") r e s pe c t f u l l y moves the
Court pursuant to Rule 3 6 . 3 , Rules of the
Supreme Court o f the United S t a t e s , for
leave to f i l e the attached b r i e f as amicus
- 1 -
c u r i a e in s u p p o r t o f r e sp o n d e n t . Respon
d e n t has c o n s e n t e d , b u t th e S t a t e o f
C a l i f o r n i a has re fus ed i t s c o n s e n t .
LDF i s a n o n - p r o f i t c o r p o r a t i o n
o r g a n i z e d under the laws o f the S ta te o f
New York. I t was formed t o a s s i s t b l a c k s
t o s e c u r e t h e i r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s
through the c o u r t s . Under i t s c h a r t e r , LDF
r e n d e r s l e g a l a i d t o impover i shed b l a c k s
s u f f e r i n g i n j u s t i c e by reason o f r a c e . For
many years , i t s a t t o r n e y s have re presented
p a r t i e s and appeared as amicus c u r i a e in
t h i s C our t on a b r o a d range o f i s s u e s
i n c l u d i n g b o t h the s u b s t a n t i v e and
p r o c e d u r a l law r e l e v a n t t o c a s e s o f
r a c i a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n .
T h i s c a s e i n v o l v e s qu e s t i o n s r e gar d
ing a p p r o p r i a t e r e m e d i e s f o r r a c i a l
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n in the s e l e c t i o n o f grand
j u r i e s . I s sues o f r a c i a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n in
j u r y s e l e c t i o n have bee n a long standing
c o n c e r n o f LDF; i t has r e p r e s e n t e d
c r i mi na l de f endants r a i s in g ju r y d i s c r i m i
- 2 -
nat ion c la i ms on d i r e c t a p p e a l , e .g . ,
Alexander v . Louis iana , 405 U .S . 625
( 1 9 7 2 ) ; Swain v . Alabama, 380 U .S . 202
(1965 ) ; represented potent ia l black jurors
who have been excluded from j u r y s e r v i c e ,
e .g . , Turner v . Fouche , 396 U .S . 346
(1970 ) ; and i s part icipating in th is Court
as amicus curiae in pending cases raising
important i s s u e s o f jury discriminat ion.
E.g . , Batson v. Kentucky, No. 84-6263.
This case pr e s e n t s the important
qu e st i o n o f the remedy fo r grand ju ry
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n and a complicated issue of
habeas corpus j u r i s p r u d e n c e . In l i g h t o f
LDF's h i s t o r i c concern with and involve
ment in jury i s s u e s , and in l i g h t o f LDF's
recognized e x p e r t i s e in " t h e d i f f i c u l t
questions o f law that frequently ar ise in"
these c a s e , see NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
4 1 5 , 422 ( 1 9 6 3 ) , we r e s p e c f u l l y submit
that i t s part ic ipat ion w i l l be o f a s s i s t
ance to the Court.
- 3 -
For the
r e s p e c t f u l l y
p a r t i c i p a t e as
f o r e g o i n g r e a s o n s , we
r e q u e s t t h a t l e a v e t o
amicus c u r i a e be g r a n te d .
R e s p e c t f u l l y s ub m i t t e d ,
JULIUS LeVONNE CHAMBERS
STEVEN L. WINTER*
99 Hudson S t r e e t
16th Floor
New Y or k , N.Y. 10013
(212) 219-1900
ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM
New York U n i v e r s i t y
Law School
40 Washington Sq. S .
New York , N.Y. 10012
At torneys f o r the NAACP
Lega l D e f e n s e &
Educat ional Fund, I n c . ,
as Amicus Curiae
*Counsel o f Record
- 4 -
T a b le o f C o n te n ts
Table of Authorities................................................................... ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE................................................................... 1
A. Statement of Facts: Grand Jury
Discrimination ..................................................... 1
B. Course of Proceedings.................................................13
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT..................................................................... 32
ARGUMENT............................................................................................35
I . THE VERY NATURE OF THE CLAIM OF RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION IN THE SELECTION OF THE
GRAND JURY RENDERS A HARMLESS ERROR
ANALYSIS INAPPROPRIATE.........................................................35
II . THE EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE IS FULLY SATIS
FIED WHEN THE STATE COURTS HAVE CONSIDERED
THE SAME QUESTION PRESENTED IN FEDERAL
HABEAS......................................................................................... 44
A. The Federal Habeas Statute and the
Exhaustion Requirement.................................................. 47
B. Neither the Habeas Statute, the Rules
Nor the Decisions of this Court Contem
plate that Each Piece of Evidence Would
Have First Been Presented to the State
Courts................................................................................... 54
C. No Policy of Comity or Federalism
Requires the Repeated Return to the
State Courts to Exhaust Specific Items
of Evidence Relating to Claims Already
Fairly Presented to Those Courts..............................61
CONCLUSION....................................................................................... 65
T a b le o f A u t h o r i t i e s
Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625
(1972).......................................................................... 3, 21 , 30,
31 , 38, 53
Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4 (1982) ........ 49
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Corp. , 429 U.S. 252 (1977) ............... 12
Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1952) ........... 56
Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980) ............. 42
Bob Jones University v. United States,
___ U.S. ___ , 76 L.Ed.2d 157 (1983) ____. . . 37
Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478 (1969) . . . . . 50
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1954) . . . . . . . . 34, 57
Bums v. Estelle, 695 F.2d 847
(5th Cir. 1978) ...................................................... 49
Cassel v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950) ........... 7 , 8
Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482
(1977) ........................................................................ 11 , 12, 22,
31 , 29, 53, 56
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980) . . . . 61
Guice v. Fortenberry, 661 F.2d 496
(5th Cir. 1981) (en banc)................................... 48
Hawk v. Harm, 103 F.Supp. 138
(D.Neb. 1952) ....................................................... . 64
Ex Parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944) ................. 64
Cases: Page
l i
Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) . . . . 22, 56
Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942) ................. 7, 8
Hillery v. California, 386 U.S. 938,
reh'g denied, 386 U.S. 1000 (1967 ............. 17
Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189
(E.D. Cal. 1982) ............................. ..................... 28, passim
Hillery v. Pulley, 563 P.Supp. 1228
(E.D. Cal. 1983) .................................................... 1 , passim
Hillery v. Pulley, No. 83-2017
(9th Cir. May 14, 1984) ..................................... 32
Hillery v. Sumner, 496 F.Supp. 632
(E.D. Cal. 1980) ................................................... 24, passim
In re Hillery, 71 Cal. 2d 857, 79 Cal.
Rptr. 733, 457 P.2d 565 (1969) ....................... 18
Hobby v. United States, 468 U.S. ___ ,
82 L.Ed.2d 260 (1984) ..................777................ 36, 38, 41
Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972) . . . . . . 61
Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205
(1973) ........................................................................ 42
Kemp v. Pate, 359 F.2d 749
(7th Cir. 1966) ...................................................... 48
Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S.
487 (1962) ................................................................ 29
Miller v. United States, ___ U.S. ____ ,
85 L.Ed.2d 99 (1985) .......................777............. 42
Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881) ........... 35
Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972) ............... 36
Cases:
- i i i -
Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270 (1971) . . .47 , 48, 49, 51
People v. Hillery, Cal.2d ,
34 Cal. Rptr. 853, 386 P.2d 477 (1963) ___ 17
People v. Hillery, 2 Cal.2d 692,
44 Cal. Rptr. 30, 401 P.2d 382 (1965) . . . . . 17
People v. Hillery, 65 C al.2d 795, 56
Cal. Rptr. 180, 423 P.2d 208 (1967) ............. 18
People v. Hillery, 10 Cal. 3rd 897,
112 Cal. Rptr. 524, 519 P.2d 572 (1974) . . . 19
Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466
(1933) ..................................................... 61
Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967) . . . . 62
Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545
(1979) .......................................................................23, 24, 31 ,
35 , 37 , 39 , 40
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) . . . . . 35-36
Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1
( 1963) ........................ 49
Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940) . . . . . . . . 8
Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212
(1960) .................................. 42
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) ............. 20
Strickland v. Washington,
___ U.S.___ , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) ................ 45
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) . . . 38
Thomas v. Zant, 697 F.2d 977
(11th Cir. 1983) ......................................... .. 48, 58
Cases: Page
iv
Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293
(1963) ........................................................................26, 48, 50,
55, 58, 59, 60
United States v. Brandt, 196 F.2d 653
(2d Cir. 1952) ........................................................ 61
Vela v. Estelle, 708 F.2d 954
(5th Cir. 1983) ...................................................... 50
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) . . . . 61
Witherspoon v. I llin o is , 391 U.S. 510
(1968) ........................................................................ 18, 25
Other Authorities;
28 U.S.C. § 455 ........................................................ 55-56
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) .......................................... 47
28 U.S.C. § 2254(c) ............................................... 47
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) ....................................... 34 , 57 , 58 , 63
H.R. Rep. No. 1344, 88th Cong.,
2d Sess. (May 6 , 1964) ....................................... 57
S. Rep. No. 1791 , 89th Cong. ,
2d Sess. (Oct. 18, 1966), 1966 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 3663 ............................... 62
Rule 21.1(a) , Rules of the Supreme
Court of the United States ................................. 47
Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases
in the United States District Courts
Rule 4 ........................................................................ 28
Rule 5 ........................................................................ 28
Cases Page
v
P^e
Rule 6 ............ 58
Rule 7 ....................................................................... 21 , 22
26 , 58 , 59
Rule 8 ........................................................ ................ 58, 59
Rule 9 ........................................... ........................... 23, 24
Advisory Committee Notes
Rule 4 ......................................................... 59
Rule 5 ............................................................ . .......... 59
Rule 8(a) ...................... 58
Hart & Wechsler' s THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM ............................................. 64
vi
STATEMENT OF THE CASK
A. Statement o f F a c t s : Grand Jury
Discr iminat ion~
The d i s t r i c t court found that
r e spo nd ent , Booker T. H i l l e r y , was
in d ic t e d fo r murder in 1962 by a Kings
County, C a l i f o r n i a , grand jury from which
a l l e l i g i b l e b l a c k s were excluded in
vio la t i on of the equal prot ect ion c l a u s e .
H i l l e r y v . P u l l e y , 563 F.Supp. 1228 (E.D.
Cal. 1983) . 1
The basic h i s t o r i c a l fac ts were never
in d i s p u t e . P o t e n t i a l grand j u r o r s were
s e l e c t e d by the superior court judge from
the l i s t o f e l i g i b l e jurors in the county.
Kings County had only one superior court
1 Mr. Hillery, a black, was also tried and convicted
for the murder of a white by a petit jury that was
all white. All claims of exclusion of blacks from
Mr. Hillery's trial jury were dismissed by the first
habeas judge as "conclusionary and unsupported." See
n. 12 infra. Thus, the issue was not explicated at
the habeas”hearing . Nevertheless, it appears that at
Mr. Hillery's tr ial , the prosecution exercised its
peremptory challenges to strike all blacks from the
venire. Hilley v. Pulley, No. 83-2017 (9th Cir.)
Clerk's Record Doc. No. (to.R.") 5 at 11.
- 1 -
j u d g e . At the t ime o f Mr. H i l l e r y ' s
i n d i c t m e n t and t r i a l , t h i s j u d g e was
M e r e d i t h Wing r o v e , who had s e r v e d s i n c e
1 956 . By h i s own a d m i s s i o n , R .T . 1 0 2 , 2
he ne v er s e l e c t e d a b l a c k t o s e r v e on a
g r an d j u r y u n t i l 1963, the year a f t e r Mr.
H i l l e r y ' s c h a l l e n g e to the com po s i t i o n o f
the grand ju r y and t r i a l . That f i r s t b lack
g r a n d j u r o r , Ann B. C o l e , was — as both
the C a l i f o r n i a Supreme Co ur t , J .A . 48, and
the habeas c o u r t , 563 F. Supp. at 1232 &
n. 8 , found — the f i r s t b l ac k ever t o s i t
as a grand j u r o r in Kings County s in c e i t s
i n c o r p o r a t i o n in 1893.
Whi l e the b l a c k p o p u l a t i o n o f Kings
County was s m a l l , t h e r e were s u f f i c i e n t
e l i g i b l e b l a c k s to have appeared on grand
j u r i e s in the a b s en c e o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n .
A l t ho u gh b l a c k s c o n s t i t u t e d o n l y about 1%
o f the county p r i o r t o World War I I , p o s t
2 Citations to the 1962 state court hearing are
designated "R.T." Citations to the record in the
Ninth Circuit are designated "C.R." Citations to
"J.A." refer to the Joint Appendix in this Court.
- 2 -
war migrat ion brought increasing numbers
of b lacks . Blacks consti tuted 3.9% of the
county by 1950 and 5.1% by 1960. J . A .
4 4 - 4 5 . Blacks served as t r i a l j u r o r s
throughout t h i s period even though, as
la ter developed at the habeas hearing , the
number o f b l a c k s over twenty-one years
o l d , the minimum age for jury duty at that
t i m e , was s l i g h t l y below the overal l per
centage o f b l a c k s in the cou nty : about
3.8% in 1950 and 4.7% in 1960 . 563
F.Supp. at 1232; J .A. 61.
In 1 9 6 2 , C a l i f o r n i a law governing
e l i g i b i l i t y fo r grand ju ry s e r v i c e
required that the potent ia l juror be " o f
f a i r c h a r a c t e r , approved i n t e g r i t y , and
sound judgment . " 563 F.Supp at 1231 & n.
3. The records o f both the s t a t e court
and the habeas hearing make c lear that in
1962 there were blacks in Kings County who
met these c r i t e r i a . Judge Wingrove
mentioned Mr. Lloyd Welcher, who, he had
determined, was qual i f ied to serve. Judge
3-
Wingrove n e v e r t h e l e s s d e c l i n e d t o submit
h i s name f o r the d u b i o u s r e a s o n t h a t he
3
was e m p lo y e d . I t was a l s o e s t a b l i s h e d
that b l a c k s had s e r v e d on p e t i t j u r i e s ,
J .A . 48, the q u a l i f i c a t i o n s f o r which were
e s s e n t i a l l y s i m i l a r . 563 F .S up p . at
1 2 4 5 .3 4
3 As Judge Wingrove put i t , "you can't expect to
put somebody on the Grand Jury who is going to have
to inter fere with his employment too much." 563
F.Supp. at 1233; J.A. 50.
The reliance on the fact o f employment to disqualify
an otherwise e lig ib le black is dubious in light o f
Judge Wing rove ' s statements that he looked for
potential jurors "o f the better type" and his e fforts
"to get occupations, farmer, businessmen and other
various types so i t w ill be real — a real represen
tative group o f people, o f the better type." R.T. at
38. I f Mr. Welcher had been unemployed would not
that have suggested to Judge Wingrove that he was not
"of the better type?"
It should also be noted that the habeas court found
"that grand jury service would have been a hardship
but that some blacks, i f asked to serve, would have
made the s a c r ific e ." 563 F.Supp. at 1234.
4 Indeed, when Judg e Wing rove fin a lly beg an seriously
to consider blacks for grand jury service for 1963,
he turned to Bessie Welcher, a black resident o f the
county, who had previously served on King s County
tr ia l juries in the 50's and early 60' s . He.did not
select Mrs. Welcher in 1963 because she had served as
a t r i a l ju ror in 1962; under the s ta tute , jury
service in the immediately preceding year was a
di squal i f i cat i on. Deposition o f Bessie Welcher at
11-12, C.R. 52. See discussion infra.
- 4 -
At the habeas hearing , Mr. H i l l e r y
submitted the tes t imony o f e l d e r l y b l ac k
r e s i d e n t s o f Kings County and that of Mr.
H i l l e r y ' s o r i g i n a l t r i a l c o u n s e l , Hugh
Goodwin, to c o r r o b o r a te that there were
qu al i f ied blacks e l i g i b l e for grand jury
service in 1962. The habeas court s p e c i f i -
c a l l y c r e d i t e d this testimony. Together
with the evidence in the s t a t e court
r e c o r d , i t e s t a b l i s h e d that " there were
in Kings County in the 1 9 5 0 ' s b l a c k s 5
5 The habeas court particularly relied on Mr.
Goodwin's testimony, 563 F.Supp. at 1233, which it
explicitly characterized as "credible." Id. at 1246.
Both in the petition for certiorari, at 16-17, and in
its brief on the merits, at 41-42, the state sets
forth the the substance of its cross-examination of
these elderly black witnesses concerning the qualifi
cations for grand juror in an attempt to suggest to
the Court the unreliability of this testimony. But
the federal district court that heard this cross-exa
mination, saw these witnesses, and observed their
demeanor was in the best position to weigh the
reliability of their testimony and the success of the
attempted impeachment. Not only did the district
court speci f ical ly note the credibi l i ty of Mr.
Goodwin, it also "note[d] that the only thirg more
disturbing than the State's failure to introduce
expert statistical analysis was respondent's coun
sel 's pointless honing o f his cross-examination
ski l l s on the elderly black citizens of Kings
County.. . . " 563 F.Supp. at 1242 n. 16.
- 5 -
evene l i g i b l e f o r g r a n d j u r y s e r v i c e ,
g i v e n the l i m i t e d l i t e r a c y and e d u c a t i o n
l e v e l t h a t p r e v a i l e d among the b l a c k
po p u la t i on at the t i m e . . . . " 563 F .Supp .
at 1234, 1232-33 , & 1245-46.
Why these e l i g i b l e b l a c k s sur faced on
the c o u n t y ' s p e t i t j u r i e s b u t no t i t s
grand j u r i e s i s made c l e a r on the f a c e o f
the s t a t e c o u r t r e c o r d . For Judge
Wingrove e x p l a i n e d how he c h o s e p o t e n
t i a l g r an d j u r o r s . App ly ing th e o p e n l y
s u b j e c t i v e s t a t u t o r y c r i t e r i a , he l o o k e d
f o r " the b e t t e r type o f our c i t i z e n s , " 563
F.Supp. at 1232; R.T. 37, "someone who has
some s u b s t a n c e , . . . someone who, in the
C o u r t ' s o p i n i o n , i s i n t e l l g e n t . . . . " Id . ;
R . T . 104. Th u s , w h i l e Judge Wingrove
as s er te d that he t r i e d t o g e t a " d i s t r i b u
t i o n o f r a c i a l de s c e nt s . . . bo th sexes . . .
o c c u p a t i o n s , f a r m e r , b u s i n e s s men and
v a r i o u s o t h e r t y p e s . . . , " i d . ; R .T . 38 ,
t h i s was q u a l i f i e d by h i s d e s i r e t o ob t a i n
"a re a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e group o f p e o p l e , o f
- 6 -
the b e t t e r t y p e . " I d . (emphasis added) .
As a r e s u l t , Judge Wingrove openly
acknowledged that he
never had a colored person on the panel
not through lack o f d e s i r e , but purely
through lack o f a b i l i t y to f ind one
that the Court f e e l s would make a
proper Grand Juror.
563 F.Supp. at 1233; R.T. 3 8 . 6
These s tate men ts are a candid
admission of discrimination under the then
governing law. " I n e xp la i n in g the f a c t
that no Negroes appeared on t h i s grand
jury l i s t , the [judge] said that [he] knew
none avai lable who q u a l i f i e d . . . . " Cassel
v. T e x a s , 339 U.S. 282 , 287 (1950 ) . Yet ,
he a l s o f a i l e d in h i s " c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
duty" to "seek to learn whether there are
in f a c t any qu al i f ied to s e r v e . . . , " Hi l l
v . T e x a s , 316 U.S. 4 0 0 , 404 ( 1 9 4 2 ) , and
" t o f a m i l i a r i z e [himself] f a i r l y with the
6 Judge Wingrove even touted his racial evenhan-
dedness in classic terms, R.T. 39: "My goodness, . . .
for three or four years I palled [sic] around with a
colored boy and I will certainly be happy to name the
gentleman Gene Roberts, his father worked for my
father. I have many friends who are colored people."
R.T. 40-41.
- 7 -
q u a l i f i c a t i o n s o f the e l i g i b l e j u r o r s o f
the c o u n t y w i t h o u t r e g a r d t o r a c e and
c o l o r . " Casse l , 339 U.S. at 289. For , as
the d i s t r i c t c o u r t f ound,
g i v e n the most generous reading o f the
j u d g e ' s d e s c r i p t i o n o f h i s e f f o r t s to
f u l f i l l h i s du ty under H i l l , C a s s e l ,
and Smith [ v . Texas , 311 U.S . 128
( 1 94 0 )1 , i t d id not amount t o much.
563 F.Supp. at 1248 n. 28.^
Judge Wing rove was fa r more s u c c e s s
f u l in f i n d i n g e l i g i b l e b l a c k s a f t e r Mr.
H i l l e r y ' s J u l y 1 962 c h a l l e n g e t o the
c o m p o s i t i o n o f the g r an d j u r y . In l a t e
1962 o r e a r l y 1963 , Judge Wingrove
c o n t a c te d Mrs. B e s s i e W e l c he r c o n c e r n i n g
s e r v i c e on the 1 9 6 3 g rand j u r y . Because 7
7 Judge Wingrove made clear his view that, as far as
any duty to include blacks on the grand jury , "the
law certainly doesn't require such a thing ." R.T. 59 ,
37. Indeed, he expressed his view that the Court's
jury discrimination cases applied to the South, not
California. R.T. 59-60; see n. 20 infra.
Judge Wingrove asserted that he had obtained some
names o f e lig ib le blacks from Mr. Hi l lery ' s t r i a l
counsel, Hugh Goodwin, earlier that year (1962). It
was not made clear whether that was for the 1962 or
1963 grand jury. Mr. Goodwin denied any independent
recollection o f that exchange. R.T. 42-43.
- 8 -
she had been as a t r i a l juror in 1962, she
was d i s q u a l i f i e d by s t a t u t e from grand
jury s e r v i c e in the immediately following
year. The judge then asked her to provide
the names of three qu al i f ied b l a c k s , which
she did. This led to the u l t i m a t e s e l e c
t ion o f Ann B. Cole as the f i r s t b lack
grand juror ever to s i t in Kings County.
See C.R. 52 , Deposition of Bessie Welcher
at 11-12.
F i n a l l y , the finding o f discrimina
tion was premised on s t a t i s t i c a l ana ly ses
of the h i s to r i c a l data. At the request of
the f e d e r a l d i s t r i c t cou rt j u d g e , Mr.
H i l l e r y produced expert testimony th a t ,
even g i v e n the low number o f e l i g i b l e
black s in Kings County, the p r o b a b i l i t y
that the t o t a l absence o f b l a c k s on the
grand ju r i es between 1900 and 1962 was due
to chance was 57 in 100 ,0 00 m i l i o n . The
expert a l s o t e s t i f i e d that i f on ly the
years o f Judge Wing r o v e ' s tenure were
c o n s i d e r e d , the p r o b a b i l i t y that no
- 9 -
b l a c k s w ou ld have b een c h o s e n t o s e r v e on
the grand j u r y i f o n l y random f a c t o r s had
governed was two - tenths o f one p e r c e n t , or
two in a thousand. 563 F .S up p . a t 1241;
J .A . 67.
A l t h o u g h the habeas c o r p u s c o u r t
c r e d i t e d the e x p e r t ’ s c o n c l u s i o n , 563
F .Supp at 1 243 , 1 245 , i t d id not do so by
r o t e . R a t h e r , b e c a u s e o f the s t a t e ' s
" b a f f l i n g " f a i l u r e t o c a l l a s t a t i s t i c a l
exper t o f i t s own, 536 F.Supp. at 1242 n.
16 , and b e c a u s e o f i t s f a i l u r e t o r ebut
the s t a t i s t i c a l showing " t h r o u g h o t h e r
e v i d e n c e , c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n , o r a r g u
m e n t . . . , " i_d. at 1 242 , the habea s c o u r t
u n d e r t o o k i t s own s t a t i s t i c a l a n a l y s i s .
Limit ing i t s e l f t o the years o f Judge Win-
8g r o v e ' s t e n u r e , the d i s t r i c t c o u r t 8
8 The expert had looked at the course o f grand jury
selection in Kings County sin ce the turn o f the
century. The court, on the other hand, postulated
that the selection process over these years might, in
r e a l i t y , be a discontinuous series because o f the
change in the id en tity o f the s e le c to r with the
ascension o f each new superior court judge. The court
employed "a homey il lu s tra tio n .. . , " 563 F.Supp. at
1242, to make its point: the use o f repeated sta tis
- 1 0 -
appl ied the standard d e v i a t i o n a n a l y s i s
used by t h i s Court in Castaneda v. Par-
t i d a , 430 U.S. 482 , 496 n. 17 (1977 ) . It
c a l c u l a t e d th at the d i f f e r e n c e between
the expected number o f b l a c k s ( 9 . 6 6 ) and
the actual number (0) was " j u s t over three
standard d e v i a t i o n s . " 563 F.Supp. at 1244
& n. 23 . I t noted that the f igure would
be even l a r g e r i f the e n t i r e course o f
conduct from 1900 onward were considered,
g
Id. at 1245. Thus, the d i s t r i c t court , 9
t ical sampling o f a deck of cards in order to
ascertain whether the 8 of diamonds has been palmed
by the dealer is valid only i f there has been one
dealer. " I f , however, during the course of the game
in question, a different dealer was substituted now
and again, the probability that the final dealer
palmed the card cannot be calculated from the fact
that it is probable that there is no 8 of diamonds in
the deck." Id. at 1243. Because of the failure of the
state to produce any rebuttal statistical analysis,
the court could not conclude from the record whether
the 1900 to 1962 period was a continuous or discon
tinuous series. Id. Accordingly, it adopted the more
conservative assumption that it was discontinuous.
9 Of course, even the district court acknowledged that
the entire period from 1900 should be considered
because the continuous series analysis was probably
correct. Id. at 1243 & n. 18. Continuing with its 8
of diamonds metaphor, it recognized that, if the
deck also changed with each new dealer, and "the
experiment is conducted after each new dealer and the
probabilities after each such experiment is [sic]
- 1 1 -
even a f t e r e x e r c i s ing c a u t i o n , f i n d s
t h a t s t a n d a r d d e v i a t i o n a n a l y s i s
s u p p o r t s [ t h e e x p e r t ] 1s c o n c l u s i o n s
a n d , under the " r u l e o f e x c l u s i o n , "
i n d i c a t e s that " r a c i a l o r o th e r c l a s s -
r e l a t e d f a c t o r s e n t e r e d i n t o the
s e l e c t i o n p r o c e s s . "
563 F .Supp. at 1245 ( q u o t i n g C a s t a n e d a ,
430 U.S. at 494 n. 13) . * 8
that there is no 8 o f diamonds in the deck, then we
have powerful evidence concerning the house’ s policy
on cheating." Id. at 1243 n. 18. Transposing the
metaphor to the problem at hand, it is clear that in
each year there was a pool o f e lig ib le grand jurors
containing some blacks — i . e . , a deck containing an
8 o f diamonds — and in each year from 1900 to 1962
no blacks ever surfaced on the grand jury no matter
which superior judge —i . e . , which dealer — was
sitting . According l y , the inference o f discrimination
is "powerful."
Moreover, the h istoric record o f total absence
o f blacks from Kings County grand juries is important
for one further reason. Amongst the circumstantial
evidence to be considered in making the "sensitive
inquiry" into discrimination is : "The h istorica l
background o f the decision . . . , particularly i f it
reveals a se r ie s o f o f f i c i a l a ction s taken for
invidious purpose.. . . "Arling ton Heights v. Metro
politan Housing Corp. , 42§ uts . 252, 257-59 (1977) .
Thus, even i f the process o f selecting grand jurors
since the turn o f the century is considered a
discontinuous se r ie s , evidence o f prior h istorica l
practice would be relevant ( t o use the d i s t r i c t
court' s metaphor) to "the house' s policy on cheating "
— i . e . , the policy and practice that had h istoric
sanction when Judge Wingrove took over the selection
o f grand jurors in 1956.
- 1 2 -
B. Course of Proceedings
In an indictment returned on June 27 ,
1962, an a l l white grand jury indicted Mr.
H i l l e r y for murder. On July 16, 1962, he
f i l e d a motion to quash the indictment on
the ground that blacks had been systemati
c a l l y excluded from Kings County grand
j u r i e s . J . A . 19-20. A hearing was held
on July 31 , 1962 , and the motion was
denied the same d a y . ^
The hearing was pre s id ed over by
Judge Wingrove , the only s u p e r io r court
judge s i t t i n g in Kings County. A l l o f
Judge Wingrove's predecessors were deceas
ed. Because Judge Wingrove had personally
selected the grand jury that i n d i c t e d Mr.
H i l l e r y , and the seven preceding grand
j u r i e s as w e l l , respondent asked Judge
Wingrove to t e s t i f y . The judge dec l ined ,
Judge Wing rove repeatedly obstructed Mr. Goodwin's
attempt to prove the historical exclusion of blacks
by calling the district attorneys who had practiced
before the grand jur ies , characterizing i t as
"negative evidence" that would take too long. R.T.
31, 33, 42, 45, 46, 47, 53. He made clear that he
vould only give the hearing one day. R.T. 55.
- 1 3 -
R .T . 102 , a l t h o u g h t h e r e were s t a t e
p r o c e d u r e s a l l o w i n g t r a n s f e r t o a n o t h e r
j u d g e t h a t would have e n a b l e d him t o do
s o . 563 F .S u pp . at 1 230-31 n. 1.
A c c o r d i n g l y , he was not sworn as a wi tness
nor s u b j e c t t o c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n . Judge
Wing r ove d i d , h o w e v e r , make s e v e r a l
statements on the r e c o r d ; he o r d e r e d th at
t h e s e s t a t e m e n t s be c o n s i d e r e d h i s
" t e s t i m o n y . " R.T. 102.
The s t a t e i n t r o d u c e d the c e n s u s
f i g u r e s f rom 1910 onward . These showed
t h a t b l a c k s c o n s t i t u t e d be tw e e n .8% and
1.1% o f the c o u n t y p o p u l a t i o n p r i o r t o
World War I I , 3.97% in 1950, and 5.1% in
1960. J . A . 45 . R e s p o n d e n t ’ s a l l e g a t i o n
t h a t b l a c k s had never served on the grand
j u r y was n o t d i s p u t e d ; i t was f u r t h e r
s u p p o r t e d by the t e s t i m o n y o f the county
s h e r i f f , who had r e s i d e d in the c o u n t y
s i n c e 1930, and a newspaperman, who had
worked on the l o c a l paper s in c e 1910. The
c o u n t y c l e r k t e s t i f i e d t h a t b l a c k s had
- 1 4 -
served on t r i a l j u r ie s since she had taken
o f f i c e in 1953. J . A . 3 2 , 39 . I t was a l s o
e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t , in the decade prior to
Mr. H i l l e r y ' s indictment, only four felony
prosecutions were i n i t ia te d by indictment,
al though there had been over 1 ,000
. . 11criminal prosecutions during that period.
There had been only one indic tment in
1962, H i l l e r y ' s . J .A. 32 -33 . In addition
to Mr. H i l l e r y , one other o f the i n di c t ed
defendants was b l a c k . J . A . 33 . Both the
prosecutor and the judge i n d ic a t e d that
the primary function of the grand jury was
to serve as a watchdog agency, supervising
the county government. J .A. 33; R.T. 107.
Judge Wingrove made e x t e n s iv e
comments on the record concerning both the
motion to quash and his role in s e l e c t i n g
the grand jury. His comments on the l a t te r
issue have been des cr i be d above. With
regard to the motion, he stated that " the 11
11 It was not explained whether the 1 ,000 criminal
prosecutions were ail felony cases or whether they
included misdemeanor cases.
- 1 5 -
Court r e s e n t s any a c c u s a t i o n s o f d i s c r i m i
nat i on shown by t h i s C o u r t . . . , " R .T . 6 5 ,
and t h a t " t h e C ou r t v e r y s t o u t l y d e n i e s
and r e f u t e s and f e e l s somewhat i n c e n s e d
w i th the i m p l i c a t i o n t h a t there has been
any d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . . . . " R.T. 64 ( s i m i l a r
s tatements appear at R.T. 36, 3 9 ) . On the
u l t i m a t e i s s u e o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , he
a s s e r t e d : "There c e r t a i n l y never has be e n ,
as f a r as the p r e s e n t C ou r t i s c o n c e r n e d
. . . any s y s t e m a t i c e x c l u s i o n o f anybody
from the Grand Jury because o f any r a c i a l
d e s c e n t . . . , " R.T. 39, and that " ( a 3 s f ar
as the p r e s e n t C ou r t i s c o n c e r n e d . . .
t h e r e has n e v e r bee n any f e e l i n g o f
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n o f any k ind . . . a g a i n s t
a n y o n e . . . . " R . T . 60 ( s i m i l a r d e n i a l s
appear at R.T. 4 0 -4 1 , 105) .
R es po n d e n t was c o n v i c t e d o f f i r s t
degree murder and s e n t e n c e d t o d e a t h in
November 1 962. As se t out in the s t a t e ' s
b r i e f , the e v i d e n c e a g a i n s t Mr. H i l l e r y
was e n t i r e l y c i r c u m s t a n t i a l . Both the
16-
c o n v i c t i o n and the sentence o f death were
affirmed on appeal . People v. H i l l e r y ,
Cai - 2d ____ , 34 Cal . Rptr. 853 , 386 P. 2d
477 ( 1 9 6 3 ) . Rehearing was g r a n t e d ; the
court a f f i r m ed the c o n v i c t i o n , holding
that the c i r c u m s t a n t i a l ev idence was
s u f f i c i e n t to connect respondent to the
c r i m e , but reversed the sentence. People
v . H i l l e r y , 2 C a l . 2d 6 9 2 , 44 Cal . Rptr.
3 0 , 401 P.2d 382 ( 1 9 6 5 ) . In i t s second
o p i n i o n , the C a l i f o r n i a Supreme Court
af f i rm ed Judge Wing r o v e ' s ru l ing on the
grand jury d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i s s u e as amply
supported by the r e c o r d . In a s s e s s i n g
that record, the Ca l i fornia court emphasi
zed Judge Wing rov e ' s statements, devoting
j u s t over h a l f o f i t s summary o f the
f a c t u a l record on the i s s u e to those
statements. J .A . 49 - 50 . This Court denied
c e r t i o r a r i , H i l l e r y v . C a l i f o r n i a , 386
0 . S . 9 3 8 , reh 'g d e n i e d , 386 U .S . 1000
( 19 67 ) , three Just ices dissenting on the
ground th a t the admiss ion o f evidence
- 1 7 -
concern ing a p r i o r c o n v i c t i o n , r e l e v a n t t o
the i s s ue o f s e n t e n c e , at a n o n - b i f u r c a t e d
proceed in g v i o l a t e d due p r o c e s s .
On remand , respondent was resentenced
t o d e a t h . This sentence was a f f i r m e d . 65
C a l . 2d 795, 56 C a l .R p t r . 180, 423 P . 2d 208
( 1967) , c e r t , denied , 389 U.S. 986 , reh *g
d e n i e d , 390 U .S . 9 1 3 ( 1 9 6 8 ) . F o l l o w i n g
t h i s C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n in W i t h e r s p o o n v.
1 1 1 1 i n o i s , 391 U.S . 510 ( 1 9 6 8 ) , Mr.
H i l l e r y f i l e d an o r i g i n a l p e t i o n f o r
habeas c o r p u s in the C a l i f o r n i a Supreme
C our t ask ing t h a t c o u r t t o r e c a l l i t s
r e m i t t i t u r and judgment t o c o n s i d e r
whether a d e a t h - s c r u p l e d j u r o r had
improper ly been e x c u s e d f o r c a u s e at the
s e c o n d p e n a l t y t r i a l . The C a l i f o r n i a
Supreme C our t f ound a W i t h e r s p o o n
v i o l a t i o n and r e v e r s e d t h e s e n t e n c e o f
d e a t h . In re H i l l e r y , 71 C a l . 2d 8 5 7 , 79
C a l .R p tr . 733, 457 P.2d 565 (1969 ) .
A t h i r d j u r y imposed the de at h
s e n t e n c e . Mr. H i l l e r y once again a p p e a l
-1 8
ed , r a i s i n g c l a i m s c h a l l e n g i n g both the
sentence and the o r i g i n a l , 1962 c o n v i c
t i o n . On March 12, 1974, the Ca l i fornia
Supreme Court a f f i r m ed the o r i g i n a l
c o n v i c t i o n but once again re versed the
sentence o f death. People v. H i l l e r y , 10
C a l . 3rd 8 9 7 , 112 C a l . R p t r . 524, 519 P.2d
572 (19 74) .
Proceeding pro s e , respondent H i l lery
then f i l e d a p e t i t i o n for a writ o f habeas
corpus in s t a t e cou rt r a i s i n g the grand
jury claim. The s t a t e t r i a l co u rt denied
the p e t i t i o n on January 3 0 , 1978. J .A . 4.
The Cal i fo rn ia Court o f Appeal denied the
p e t i t i o n on March 8 , 1978 . J . A . 5 . On
A pr i l 18 , 1 9 7 8 , the C a l i f o r n i a Supreme
Court also denied the p e t i t i o n . Id.
S t i l l proceeding pro s e , Mr. Hi l lery
f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r a w r i t o f habeas
corpus in the f e d e r a l d i s t r i c t court for
the Northern D i s t r i c t o f Ca l i fornia on May
22, 1978. J .A. 5 - 6 . I t was transferred to
the Eastern D i s t r i c t and assigned to Judge
- 1 9 -
MacBride. Id . On January 31 , 1979, Judge
MacBride d i s m i s s e d some claims1 ̂ b u t , on
the grand j u r y d i s c r i m i n a t i o n c l a i m , found
t h a t Mr. H i l l e r y had s ta te d a prima f a c i e
c ase o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , i s sued an o rd er to
show c a u s e why the w r i t should not i s s u e ,
and d i r e c t e d the s t a t e t o f i l e an answer .
J .A . 69-76 .
In i t s r e t u r n t o the p e t i t i o n , the
s t a t e agreed that Mr. H i l l e r y had e x h a u s
t ed h i s s t a t e r e m e d i e s by r a i s i n g the
i s s ue on d i r e c t appeal and in s t a t e habeas
p r o c e e d i n g s . I t n e v e r t h e l e s s c la imed that
f e d e r a l habeas should be pr ec lud ed because
Mr. H i l l e r y had "an o p p o r t u n i t y f o r a f u l l
and f a i r l i t i g a t i o n " o f the c la i m and that
the s t a t e c o u r t " r e c o r d c l e a r l y demon
s t r a t e s that th e re was no r a c i a l d i s c r i m i -
^ He dismissed a claim under the fourth amendment on
the basis o f Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465(1976). The
order a lso dTsmis sed~as~^onc 1 us ionary and unsup
ported" additional claims challenging "the composi
tion o f his ju r ie s ." J.A. 70 n. 1. See n. 1 supra.
These were contained in a second pleading filed on
July 26, 1978, that apparently never made i t s way
in to the record. See Clerk's Index o f Proceeding
(Docket Sheet) at 1.
- 2 0 -
nation in the s e l e c t i o n o f the grand
j u r y . " C.R. 4 at p. 2.
S u b s e q u e n t l y , Judge MacBride took
senior s ta tus and the case was transferred
to the Hon. Lawrence K. K a r l t o n . Judge
Kar1 ton reviewed the p l e a d i n g s and the
s t a t e co u rt record. On March 27 , 1980 , he
denied Mr. H i l l e r y ' s motion f o r b a i l ;
granted the motion to appoint c o u n s e l ;
vacated Judge MacBride's prior order; and,
as provided by Rule 7 o f the Rules
Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United
St a te s D i s t r i c t C o u r t s , d i r e c t e d the
p a r t i e s to supplement the s t a t e court
re cor d . C .R. 8 . Applying t h i s C o u r t ' s
admonition th at a c la im o f grand ju ry
discrimination requires a " f a c tu a l inquiry
. . . that takes i n t o account a i l p o s s i b l e
f a c t o r s . . . , " Alexander v . Louis iana, 405
U. S. 6 2 5 , 630 ( 1 9 7 2 ) , Judge Kar lton
concluded that " [ t ] o accompl ish t h i s , i t
is necessary to supplement and c l a r i f y the
state court record which i s s i l e n t or
- 2 1 -
unclear as to a number o f r e l e v a n t
i s s u e s . " C.R. 8 at p. 2.
Judge Kar l t on f i r s t d i r e c t e d the
s ta te to provide "more f igures . . . demon
s t r a t i n g what p o r t i o n o f the Black
pop ulat ion o f Kings County was e l i g i b l e
for grand jury s e r v i c e . " Ld. at 3 ( ci t ing
Castaneda , 430 U .S . at 4 8 8 - 8 9 n. 8 ) .
Pursuant to Rule 7 (b) he al so propounded
in terrogator ies " d e s i g n e d to c l a r i f y the
s t a t e court record and the i ssues in th is
c a s e . . . , " C.R. 8 at 4 , by f l e s h i n g out
va r io u s f a c t u a l q u e s t i o n s not here
relevant . JLd. at 8.
Judge Kar l ton observed th at the
s tate court record " c o n t a i n s no in forma
t i o n as to the re s u l t s obtainable through
the appl icat ion o f s t a t i s t i c a l analys is to
the f a c t s o f t h i s c a s e . " Id_. at 3.
Because he understood Castaneda , 430 U.S.
at 494 n. 13, and Hernandez v. Texas , 347
U .S . 4 7 5 , 482 (19 5 4 ) , to " f o c u s [ ] on the
l ike l ihood that chance or a c c i d e n t alone
- 2 2 -
could account for the exclusion of a group
from grand jury s e r v i c e . . . , " C.R. 8 at p.
3 , Judge Kar l ton concluded " t h a t the
a p p l i c a t i o n o f s t a t i s t i c a l p r o b a b i l i t y
a n a l y s i s may be o f s u b s t a n t i a l a s s i s
t a n c e . . . , " i_d. at 3 - 4 , and d i r e c t e d the
p a r t i e s to respond with t h e i r views on
both the appropriateness o f such a n a l y s i s
and how i t should be presented.
The s ta te responded with a motion to
dismiss premised on two grounds. C.R. 16.
F i r s t , i t invoked Rule 9 and argued that
i t was p r e j u d ic e d in i t s a b i l i t y to
respond to the p e t i t i o n because Judge
Wingrove had died in 1966. Second, i t
argued that th is Court ' s decision in Rose
v. M i t c h e l l , 443 U .S . 545 ( 1 979 ) , " p r e
c l u de s supplementation of the s tate court
record------ " C.R. 16 at p. 7. This l a t t e r
argument was premised not on any aspect of
the exhaustion requirement, but r at h er on
language in Rose that r e f e r r e d to the
habeas p e t i t i o n e r s ' ev ident iary showing,
- 2 3 -
which had been introduced in the s t a t e
c o u r t s , and concluded: "On the record o f
th is c a se , i t i s that testimony alone upon
which respondents' a l l e g a t i o n s o f d i s c r i
mination must stand or f a l l . " 443 U.S. at
570 . C .R. 16 at p p . 9 - 1 1 . From t h i s
o b s e r v a t i o n , the s t a t e a b s t r a c t e d a
general pr in c ip le that a habeas co u rt " i s
l i m i t e d to the record pre sen ted to the
s t a te t r i a l court under the c l e a r autho
r i t y of Rose v. M i t c h e l l . . . . " C.R. at p.
1 1 .
Judge Kar l ton r e j e c t e d both these
arguments. H i l l e r y v. Sumner, 496 F.Supp.
632 (E.D. C a l . 1 9 8 0 ) . The Rule 9 claim
was r e j e c t e d on a l t e r n a t i v e procedural
g r o u n d s , jU3. at 6 3 5 - 3 6 , and one d i s p o s i
t i v e s u b s t a n t i v e ground: Judge Kar lton
po s i te d the b e s t f a c t u a l assumption for
the s t a t e , " [a j s su min g , arguendo that the
los s of Judge Wing r o v e 1s te s t i mo ny would
be s u f f i c i e n t p r e j u d i c e to the s t a t e to
support d i s m i s s a l . " Id. at 637. Reviewing
- 2 4 -
the " h i s t o r y o f p e t i t i o n e r ' s s t a t e
p r o c e e d i n g s . . . , " i d . , he concluded t h a t ,
because o f the pr in c ip le of comity and the
then governing Ninth C i r c u i t p r e c e d e n t s ,
the pending s t a t e proceedings meant that
" a t the e a r l i e s t p e t i t i on e r could not have
f i l e d in fede ra l court unti l 1 9 6 7 . . . , and
perhaps not even unt i l 1974 when the s tate
l i t i g a t i o n was f i n a l l y re s o l v e d . " Id. in
e i t h e r c a s e , Judge Wingrove had already
passed away b e f o r e Mr. H i l l e r y ' s c l a i m s
were r ip e for f e d e r a l habeas and, thus ,
"no prejudice from de l a y s u f f e r e d by the
s t a t e i s a t t r i b u t a b l e to p e t i t i o n e r
[ H i l l e r y ] . " I_d. A l t h o u g h , Judge Karlton
did not determine whether the l o s s o f
̂ Judge Karlton reasoned that it was not until 1967,
when the California Supreme Court affirmed the
second death sentence , that the state proceeding s had
ended and that a ll ofMr. Hillery's claims were ripe
for presentation on federal habeas corpus. In fact,
however, Mr. Hillery successfully reopened the state
proceedings by filing an original habeas petition in
the California Supreme Court raising a Witherspoon
claim. That led to a new sentencing proceeding and 'a
third direct appeal, on which the California Supreme
Court rejected additional claims going to the 1962
conviction. Thus, in fact , the case was not ripe for
federal habeas until 1974.
- 2 5 -
Judge W i n g r o v e ' s l i v e te s t i mo ny was in
f a c t p r e j u d i c i a l , i t would seem c l e a r
that the j u d g e ' s u n c r o s s - e x a m i n e d , 1962
comments were as f a v o r a b l e a record for
the s t a t e as i t was l i k e l y to have
obtained had he l i v e d .
Judge Kar l ton a l s o r e j e c t e d the
s t a t e ' s c o n t e n t i o n th at the habeas
proceeding was l imi ted to the s ta te court
record under R o s e . He noted that " the
s i n g l e sentence in Rose that the t r i a l
j u d g e ' s a f f i d a v i t ' formed no part of the
case put on by r e s p o n d en t s ' . . . seems a
s l e n d e r reed to base such a s t a r t l i n g
departure from Rule 7 ( c ) , 28 U . S . C . §
2 2 5 4 ( d ) , and Townsend v. S a i n [ , 372 U.S.
293 ( 1 963 ) ] . " I d . Rather , he c orr ect ly
exp la in ed the Rose opinion as concerning
" t h e proce du ra l po st ur e o f the c a s e , "
— i . e . , the f a c t th at the S i x t h C i r c u i t
premised " i t s f inding o f a prima f a c i e
c a s e " on mat te rs f i r s t introduced on
- 2 6 -
r e b u t t a l in the habeas p r o c e e d i n g , 496
F.Supp. at 638 (emphasis in o r i g i n a l ) .
A f t e r the p a r t i e s responded to the
c o u r t ' s i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s , the c o u r t held a
s t a t u s c o n f e r e n c e . At that t i m e , the
p a r t i e s ag ree d : ( 1) th at Mr. H i l l e r y ' s
evidence was s u f f i c i e n t to support an
order to show cause why the wri t should
not i s sue; (2) that an evidentiary hearing
was n e c e s s a r y , in par t to enable the
s t a t e to c r o s s - e x a m i n e Mr. H i l l e r y ' s
w i t n e s s e s ; and (3) th at the s t a t e
continued to mainta in th at " e v i d e n c e
outside the record should not be a l l o w e d "
and preserved " t h i s i s s u e fo r appeal
purposes . " C.R. 32 at p. 1.
D e sp i t e the s t i p u l a t i o n , the s t a t e
f i l e d a motion to d i s m i s s and, s h o r t l y
th e r e a f t e r , a motion to deny Mr. H i l l e r y ' s
request f o r an e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g . I t
was in th e s e motions that the s tate f i r s t
raised an exhaustion question with regard
to the "new" e v i d e n c e . Although Judge
- 2 7 -
Karl ton was " somewhat f r u s t r a t e d " by the
s t a t e ' s "not ion that i t may f i l e a motion
to d i s m i s s in a habeas corpus proceeding
whenever the s p i r i t moves i t to do s o . . . , "
Hil lery v. P u l l e y , 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1193
& n . 5 (E .D . Cal . 1982) , he nevertheless
i 4
entertained the motion on the meri ts .
On the ex h au st i on i s s u e , Judge
Karl ton s t a r t e d from the premise that " i t
i s c l e a r th at the p e t i t i o n e r must have
presented to the s t a t e court e s s e n t i a l l y
the same c l a i m as th at pre se n te d to the
d i s t r i c t c o u r t . " Ijd. at 1197 . " I t is
e q u a l l y c l e a r . . . , " he o b s e r v e d , " t h a t a
habeas p e t i t i o n e r i s not l i m i t e d to the
record made in s t a t e co u rt but that
evidence can and, in some c a s e s , must be
Ordinarily, the exhaustion question is raised either
in the state 's answer under Rule 5 or by way of a
motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer after the
habeas judge has determined under Rule 4 that summary
dismissal is inappropriate. In agreeing to the
stipulation, "the state admitted that summary
disposition was inappropriate." 533 F.Supp. at 1194.
Plainly, the state could have and should have raised
the exhaustion issue prior to stipulating that the
case could not be dismissed summarily but should
instead go to an evidentiary hearing.
- 2 8 -
t a k e n . " IcU Noting t h a t " [ n ] e i t h e r the
c a s e s , the federal s t a t u t e s , nor the rules
' s t r i p the d i s t r i c t courts o f a l l d i s c r e
t i o n to e x e r c i s e the ir common s e n s e . . .
i d . at 1199 n. 19 (quoting Machibroda v.
United S t a t e s , 368 U.S. 487 , 495 ( 1 9 6 2 ) ) ,
he conc luded th a t " i t d e f i e s l o g i c to
assert that one l i k e l y r e su l t o f gra nt i ng
an e v i d e n t i a r y hearing — namely that the
d i s t r i c t court w i l l r e c e i v e e v i den ce not
presented to the s t a t e court — requ ires
d i s m i s s a l f o r f a i l u r e to exhaust . " Id. at
1199 (emphasis added).
Judge Kar l ton i d e n t i f i e d the three
items that the s ta te objected t o as "new"
e v i d e n c e : ( 1) the addition o f census data
fo r 1900 ; ( 2 ) the te s t i mo ny o f thr ee
w itnesses c a l le d to e s ta b l i s h the e l i g i b i
l i t y o f blacks for grand jury s e r v i c e and
other h i s t o r i c a l f a c ts such as exc lus ion;
and (3) the s t a t i s t i c a l a n a l y s i s o f the
census d a t a . 533 F.Supp. at 1200. On the
b a s i s o f " [a] calm examinat ion o f the
- 2 9 -
ne v i d e n c e . . . , ” ijd. at 1201, he re jected the
s t a t e ' s assertion that th is "new" evidence
"dramatical ly changes" the c laim.
The f i r s t two i t e m s , Judge Kar lton
noted, were at best cumulative. The "new"
evidence th at b l a c k s had never served on
the grand jury did not a l t e r the c l a i m :
That h i s t o r i c a l fac t had been accepted by
the s t a t e c o u r t s . The "new" ev idence o f
e l i g i b l e b l a c k s was s i m i l a r l y cumulative
because that fac t was es tabl i shed by Judge
W i n g r o v e ' s s ta tement that he declined to
appoint an e l i g i b l e b lack.
Judge Kar l t on a l s o r e j e c t e d the
s t a t e ' s argument th at the s t a t i s t i c a l
a n a l y s i s " fundamental ly a l t e r s " the claim
because i t i s " d i s p o s i t i v e . " S t a t i s t i c a l
a n a l y s i s , he n o t e d , i s only one part of
" a f a c t u a l in q u ir y . . . th a t takes into
account a l l poss ib le explanatory f a c t o r s . "
533 F.Supp. at 1202 (quoting A l e x a n d e r ,
405 U .S . at 6 3 0 ) . "More i m p o r t a n t . . . , "
Judge Karlton continued,
- 3 0 -
i s the f a c t th a t r e s p o n d e n t ' s argu
ments m is co n str u e the nature o f the
evidence in question. The te s t i m o n y . . .
i s s imply the ex pe r t a n a l y s i s o f
evidence already before the c o u r t . . . .
[ S ] t a t i s t i c a l analysi s o f censu s data
i s the kind o f information designed to
make the f ac ts r e l a t i v e to the absence
of Blacks in grand j u r i e s s i g n i f i c a n t ,
i . e . to aid the t r i e r o f f a c t in
understanding the evidence before the
c o u r t .
533 F.Supp. at 1 202 . This conclusion was
corroborated, Judge Karl ton o b s e r v e d , by
t h i s C o u r t ' s use o f s t a t i s t i c a l analys is
in Alexander and Castaneda even though
such a n a l y s i s was not part o f the record
in the courts below. IcL at 1203.
Judge Kar l ton found th a t H i l l e r y ' s
pr o f f e r e d ev iden ce s t a t e d a prima f a c i e
case under Castaneda and ordered an
evidentiary hear ing. Af ter the hearing , he
found that blacks had been s y s t e m a t i c a l l y
excluded from Kings County grand j u r i e s .
He r e j e c t e d the s t a t e ' s argument that
grand ju ry d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i s harmless
error both on the b a s i s o f Rose v .
M i t c h e l l and because of the need to deter
- 3 1 -
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n and maintain the in te gr i ty
of the j u d i c i a l p r o c e s s . 563 F.Supp. at
1252. Accordingly, he issued the writ . I d .
The Ninth Circui t af f irmed, one judge
d i s s e n t i n g on the ex h au s t i on i s s u e .
H i l l e r y v . P u l l e y , No. 83-2017 (9th Cir .
May 14, 1984) . In a per curiam opinion, i t
r e l i e d on " t h e reasons s e t f o r t h i s the
e x c e l l e n t and e x t e n s i v e D i s t r i c t Court
op in io n g r a nt i ng the a p p l i c a t i o n . . . , "
c i t i n g each o f Judge K a r l t o n ' s three
published op in io n s . 563 F.Supp 1228; 533
F.Supp. 1189; and 496 F.Supp. 632.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
For over 100 y e a r s , the Court has
held that r a c i a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n in the
s e l e c t i o n o f the i n d i c t i n g grand jury
r e q u i r e s r e v e r s a l o f the r e s u l t i n g
convic t ion . This princ ip le i s supported by
f iv e important con s i derat ions . F i r s t , the
very fu n c t io n o f the grand j u r y is
d i s t o r t e d when i d e n t i f i a b l e groups with
d i s t i n c t experiences and perspectives are
- 3 2 -
removed from the decision-making pr oc e ss .
Second, c l a i m s o f r a c i a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n
have a s p e c i a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l f o r c e in
l i g h t o f the fundamental concern with
r a c i a l e q u a l i t y that emerges from t h i s
c o u n t r y ' s h i s t o r y . T h i r d , the t a i n t o f
racia l di scrimination impugns the i n t e g r i
ty and legi timacy o f the administration of
c r im in a l j u s t i c e . Fou rth , as a prac t ic a l
matter, the remedy repeatedly a f f i r m ed by
the Court i s the only e f f e c t i v e one.
F i n a l l y , the notion that a subsequent
c o n v i c t i o n renders a t a i n t e d indictment
harmless m i s c o n c e i v e s the r o l e o f the
grand j u r y . A grand jury not only decides
whether a criminal case should go forward,
i t a l s o d e c i d e s how the pr o s e c u to r w i l l
proceed by determining the scope and
sever ity o f the crime charged. A harmless
error a n a l y s i s i s i n ap pl i ca bl e because a
court cannot r e c o n s t r u c t how a p rop er ly
c o n s t i t u t e d grand jury would have charged
the defendant.
- 3 3 -
The v e r s i o n o f the ex haust ion
requirement proposed by the s t a t e has no
support in the habeas s t a t u t e , the rules
governing habeas proceedings, the p r e c e
dents o f the C o u r t , or any i d e n t i f i a b l e
p o l i c y o f f e d e r a l i s m . Once a habeas
p e t i t i o n e r has f a i r l y presented the legal
and factual substance of his c l a i m to the
s t a t e c o u r t s , he cannot f a i r l y be penal i
zed for the ir f a i l u r e e i th er to af ford him
a f u l l and f a i r hearing or to consider his
claim in l i g h t o f the governing c o n s t i
t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s . No considerat ions of
federalism or sound j u d i c i a l a d m i n i s t r a
tion c a l l for a rule that reduces the role
o f a f e d e r a l habeas judge to a rubber
stamp o f the s t a t e p r o c e s s . R a t h e r , the
habeas scheme long embedded in s tatute and
case law e xp e ct s and r e q u i r e s f e d e r a l
judges to conduct an independent, c o n s t i
t u t i o n a l l y s e n s i t iv e inquiry into a l l e g a
t i o n s o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l error . Se e , e , g . ,
Brown v. A l l e n , 344 U.S. 443 , 507 (1954 ) .
34-
ARGUMENT
I . THE VERY NATURE OF THE CLAIM OF
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN THE
SELECTION OF THE GRAND JURY
RENDERS A HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS
INAPPROPRIATE
The s t a t e ' s case fo r o v e r r u l i n g a
century o f precedent only rehashes p o i n t s
the Court has l o n g , r e p e a t e d l y , and
r e c e n t l y r e j e c t e d . See , e ,g . , Rose v ,
Mitchel l , 443 U.S. 545 ( 1979) .
I t has been s e t t l e d law since 1880
that the C i v i l War Amendments barred
the States from discriminating because
o f race in the s e l e c t i o n o f j u r i e s ,
whether grand or pet t y . As a r e s u l t , a
convict ion cannot stand which i s based
on an indictment found by a grand jury
from which Negroes were kept because
of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . . . . We ought not to
reverse a course o f d e c i s i o n s o f long
standing d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t r a c i a l
discr iminat ion in the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n
of j u s t i c e .
C a s s e l l v . Texas , 339 U .S . 2 8 2 , 290
( 1 9 5 0 ) ( Frankfurter , J . , concurring) (cit ing
Neal v . De la wa re , 103 U .S . 370 ( 1 8 8 1 ) ) .
The d o c t r i n e o f s t a r e d e c i s i s c a r r i e s
added weight in the c o n t e x t o f the
fundamental n a t i o n a l norm p r o h i b i t i n g
r a c i a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . See Runyon v.
- 3 5 -
McCrary , 427 U.S. 160 , 191 ( 1 9 7 6 ) ( Stevens ,
J . , concurring) .
Five important considerat ions sustain
the time honored r u l e th at grand jury
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n f a t a l l y undermines the
v a l i d i t y o f the ind ic tme nt and the
result ing convic t ion : F i r s t , the exclusion
o f an i d e n t i f i a b l e segment of the commu
n i t y from the the grand j u r y undermines
i t s function by
rernov[ i n g ] from the ju ry room qua
l i t i e s o f human nature and v a r i e t i e s
of human experience the range of which
i s unknown and perhaps unknowable.
Pete rs v . K i f f , 407 U.S. 493 , 503 ( 1972) .
This range o f p e r s p e c t i v e i s as c r i t i c a l
when the jury in employed at the charging
sta ge as i t i s at t r i a l . In noting the
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i m m a t e r i a l i t y o f the
mi nis ter ia l pos i t ion of grand jury foremen
in Hobby v . United S t a t e s , 4 68 U . S . ____,
82 L. Ed.2d 260 ( 1984) , the Court affirmed
by n e c e ss ar y i m p l i c a t i o n th at the grand
jury i t s e l f i s so s i g n i f i c a n t to the
- 3 6 -
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f j u s t i c e th at d i s
crimination in [ i t s ] appointment . . .
impugns the fundamental f a i r n e s s o f
the p r o c e s s i t s e l f so as to under
mine the i n te gr i ty o f the indictment.
Id. , 82 L.Ed.2d at 2 6 6 . 15
Second , the fundamental norm prohi
b i t i n g r a c i a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n has special
c on st i tu t io n al forc e .
[T]here can no longe r be any doubt
that r a c i a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . . . v i o
l a t e s deeply and widely accepted views
o f e lementary j u s t i c e . . . . Over the
past quart er of a century, every pro
nouncement o f t h i s Court and myriad
Acts o f Congress and Executive Orders
a t t e s t a firm national p o l i c y to p r o
h i b i t r a c i a l s e g r e g a t i o n and d i s c r i
mination .
Bob Jones University v. United S t a t e s , ____
U.S. ___ _, 76 L.Ed.2d 157, 174 (19 83 ) . That
r a c i a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n in grand jury
s e l e c t i o n o f f e n d s t h i s f irm n a t i o n a l
p o l i c y has been emphasized both by t h i s
C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n s , see R o s e , and by
c o n g r e s s i o n a l enactment s p e c i f i c a l l y
^ s_ee also id. at 267 (no constitutional error
" [s]o long as the composition of the grand jury as a
whole serves the representational due process
value. . . " ) .
- 3 7 -
making such d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a c r i m in a l
o f f e n s e . 18 U . S . C . § 243 ; see Alexander ,
405 U. S . at 629 n. 8.
Third , " t h e ju ry p l a y s a p o l i t i c a l
fu n c t io n in the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f the
l a w . . . . " Tay lor v . L o u i s i a n a , 419 U.S.
5 2 2 , 529 ( 1 9 7 5 ) . The s p e c t e r o f r a c i a l
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n in the c r i m in a l j u s t i c e
system — pa rt icu la r l y where the key actor
i s the judge h i m s e l f - - i s " n o t . . .
c o n s i s t e n t with our democratic heri tage"
nor conducive " t o public confidence in the
f a i r n e s s o f the criminal j u s t i c e system. "
Id. at 530. It
d e s t r o y s the appearance o f j u s t i c e
and thereby c a s t s doubt on the
i n t e g r i t y o f the j u d i c i a l p r o c e s s . . . ,
impair[ing] the confidence of the pub
l i c in the administration of j u s t i c e .
Rose, 443 U.S. at 5 5 5 - 5 6 . 16
6̂ Justice Stevens has expressed much the same
idea: "A rule that forbids discrimination in the
selection of a grand jury must be justified by the
overriding interest in maintaining the integrity of
the judicial process — both the actual fairness of
that process and the symbolic values that it embo
d ies." Hobby, 82 L.Ed.2d at 277.
- 3 8 -
The fact that Ca l i f orn ia grand j u r ie s
only rarely serve the charging f u n c t i o n ,
but o r d i n a r i l y serve as "watchdog " over
county government, reenforces r a t h e r than
di m in is h e s these con cerns . Nothing could
be more central to democratic notions than
the grand j u r y ' s r o l e as overseer of the
c i t i z e n s ’ e lected and appointed o f f i c i a l s .
The e x c l u s i o n of blacks from th is aspect
of s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t i s amongst " t h e
primary e v i l [ s ] at which the Amendments
adopted a f te r the War Between the S t a t e s
. . . were aimed." Rose, 443 U.S. at 554.
Moreover , the very r ar i ty with which
Cal i fornia prosecutors seek indic tment by
grand jury r at h er than proceeding by
information under l ines the importance o f
the grand j u r y ' s r o l e . When a prosecutor
can charge u n i l a t e r a l l y , he i s l i k e l y to
seek indic tment by grand jury only in
those n o t o r i o u s or c o n t r o v e r s i a l c as e s
where i t i s of heightened importance that
the l e g i t i m a c y o f the c r i m in a l j u s t i c e
-39
process be supported by the the imprimatur
of the community’ s judgment . But that
i n c r e a s e s the importance of assuring that
no segment o f the community i s excluded
from the grand jury .
Fourth , as the Court noted in Rose,
r e v e r s a l o f c o n v i c t i o n s premised on
indictments tainted by racia l discrimina
t i o n i s the only e f f e c t i v e mechanism for
enforcement o f these fundamental i n t e r
e s t s . Both criminal prosecutions and c i v i l
actions are r a r e , and c o s t l y . 443 U .S . at
558 . An aggr ieved defendant i s wel l
p o s i t i o n e d to v i n d i c a t e the underlying
s oc ie t a l interes t in deterring discrimina
t i o n ; the p o t e n t i a l l o s s o f o therwise
supportable convict ions is l i k e l y to be a
powerful deterrent to the s e l ect or who, as
h e r e , i s o f t e n an a c to r in the criminal
j u s t i c e sys tem. In t h i s very c a s e , Mr.
H i l l e r y ' s motion to quash was the cata lys t
that ended more than h a l f a century of
-40
t o t a l e x c l u s i o n o f b l a c k s from the grand
j u r i e s in Kings County.
F i n a l l y , the harmless error rule i s
p a r t i c u l a r l y d i f f i c u l t to apply in cases
of grand jury d iscriminat ion . The argument
that c o n v i c t i o n beyond a reasonable doubt
moots any t a i n t at the charging l e v e l
mi sc onc eiv es the fu n c t io n o f the grand
jury p r o c e s s . 17 For the grand jury i s more
than a simple b ina ry g a te k ee p er deciding
whether a p a r t ic u l a r defendant enters the
criminal j u s t i c e system. I t a l s o performs
a d i s c r e t i o n a r y r o l e in shaping the
pro ce sse s to f o l l o w by the terms o f the
indic tment i t r e t u r n s . I f a grand jury
i n d i c t s on ly f o r a l e s s e r included
o f f e n s e , that i s the g r e a t e s t crime for
which the de fendant can be c on vi c te d
r e g a r d l e s s o f the nature of the proof at
17 It also misconceives the nature of the constitu
tional harm. I f the constitutional injury is to the
"synbolic values" of the criminal justice process.
Hobby, 82 L.Ed.2d at 277, and the integrity and
pII>Tic legitimacy of that process, then the sib se
quent conviction does not undo the harm. The process
s t i l l stands impugned.
- 4 1 -
t r i a l . See Stirone v . United States , 361
U .S . 21 2 (1 9 6 0 ) ( c i ted in Mi l ler v. United
S t a t e s , ____ U .S . ____ , 8 5 L.Ed. 2d 9 9 , 107
( 1 9 8 5 ) ) . S i m i l a r l y , i f i t charges a higher
o f f e n s e that in c l u d e s l e s s e r o f f e n s e s ,
that w i l l a f f e c t the de c i s i on facing the
p e t i t j u r y , increasing the r e l i a b i l i t y of
the l a t e r de te r m i n a t i on o f g u i l t or
innocence . See Keeble v . United S t a t e s ,
412 U.S. 205 (1973 ) ; Beck v. Alabama, 447
U.S. 625 (1980 ) .
These c o n s i d e r a t i o n s reach t h e i r
zenith in the n o t o r i o u s or c o n t r o v e r s i a l
c a s e . When the p r os e c u to r seeks the
imprimatur o f the grand j u r y on the
d e te r m in a t io n s of both whether and how to
pr o c e e d , he i s asking for the community's
evaluation o f the sever i ty o f the o f fense .
Consider for example a recent case of some
n o t o r i e t y concerning a l l e g a t i o n s that a
white shot four b l a c k s youths in a New
York subway. Two grand j u r i e s heard
s u b s t a n t i a l l y s i m i l a r t e s t i m o n y . One
- 4 2 -
charged the de fendant with attempted
murder, the o ther on ly charged him with
gun p o s s e s s i o n v i o l a t i o n s . Suppose the
di f ference between the two submissions was
not in the quantum of the evidence but in
the grand j u r i e s : one chosen from a
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e c r o s s - s e c t i o n , the other
r a c i a l l y skewed. P l a i n l y , the consequences
of the actions o f these hypothetical grand
ju r ie s would not be erased by subsequent
t r i a l determinations in e i ther c a s e , and
no amount o f j u d i c i a l h i n d s i g h t could
parse out those e f f e c t s .
The f a c t s o f t h i s case su ggest
s i m i l a r problems . H i l l e r y , a b l a c k man,
was charged with and c o n v i c t e d o f the
murder o f a young white woman, e nt ir e l y on
the bas is of c i rcumstantial e v i d e n c e . The
evidence al so suggested an attempted rape.
On th is evidence, an a l l white grand ju ry
in an overwhelmingly white county made him
stand t r i a l f o r h is l i f e . I f there had
been some b lacks on his grand j u r y , might
- 4 3 -
t h e y have c o n s i d e r e d the c i r c u m s t a n t i a l
nature o f the ev i d e nc e and c h a r g e d o n l y a
l e s s e r o f f e n s e ? A t t e m pt in g a h a rm les s
e r r o r a n a l y s i s in t h i s c o n t e x t would
p l a c e the c o u r t s in an i n e x t r i c a b l e
s p e c u l a t i v e t h i c k e t .
I I . THE EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE IS FULLY
SATISFIED WHEN THE STATE COURTS
HAVE CONSIDERED THE SAME QUESTION
PRESENTED IN FEDERAL HABEAS________
The b a s i c f a c t o f t h i s case speaks
s t a r k l y f r om the r e c o r d and i s not
c h a l l e n g e d by the s t a t e on c e r t i o r a r i
b e f o r e t h i s Cour t . The C a l i f o r n i a super io r
c o u r t j u d g e who s e l e c t e d the g r a n d jury
that i n d i c t e d Mr. H i l l e r y — and who a l s o
p r e s i d e d a t h i s t r i a l and d e c i d e d the
motion c ha l l e ng in g the c o m p o s i t i o n o f the
grand jury exc luded b l a c k s from s e r v i c e
on the j u r y in v i o l a t i o n o f the equal
p r o t e c t i o n c l a u s e .
The s t a t e n e v e r t h e l e s s a r g u e s that
the r e l i e f was wrongly g ranted because not
e v e r y s i n g l e p i e c e o f ev idence supporting
- 4 4 -
t h i s de te rm in a t io n was " e x h a u s t e d " in
the s tate courts . I t f i r s t wrongly asserts
that exhaust ion i s a j u r i s d i c t i o n a l
p r e r e q u i s i t e . S t a t e ' s B r i e f at 7 1 ; but
compare Strickland v. Washington, ____ U.S.
____t 80 L . Ed.2d 6 7 4 , 691 ( 1 9 8 4 ) ( " t h e
exhaustion r u l e . . . i s not j u r i s d i c t i o n a l " ) .
Then, admitting the question i s "a matter
of degrees" that depends "upon the nature
of the supplemental e v i de n c e ___/ ' S t a t e ' s
Br ief at 74 , i t makes several a l t e r n a t i v e
a s s e r t i o n s concerning when "new" evidence
must be " e x h a u s t e d . " These i n c l u d e : (1)
"Where the new f a c t u a l m a t e r i a l 'whol ly
t r a n s f o r m s ' the c a s e , " i_d. at 8 1 ; (2)
where i t on ly " ' m a t e r i a l l y changes' i t , "
i d . ; (3) where i t " p u ts the case in a
markedly d i f f e r e n t posture , " _id. at 71 -72 ;
o r , ev en , (4) " i f the new f a c t u a l
al le gat ion s are simply more ' c o m p e l l i n g . ' "
I d . at 81 . I t concedes that exhaustion i s
not required only when the "new" evidence
- 4 5 -
"does not ma te r i a l ly a f f e c t the nature of
p e t i t i o n e r ' s c a s e . . . . " Id. at 74.
The s t a t e ' s p o s i t i o n has no basis
in the s t a t u t e , r u l e s , or d e c i s i o n s of
t h i s Court concerning f e d e r a l habeas
c o r p u s . R a t h e r , i t i s t r a n s p a r e n t l y
r e s u l t o r i e n t e d : Exhaustion would always
be required unless the ev idence makes no
d i f f e r e n c e at a l l . This p o s i t i o n de n i
g r a t e s the r o l e s o f the f e d e r a l habeas
judge and c o u n s e l , and d i m i n is h e s the
habeas remedy as Congress and the Court
have long envisioned i t .
In the s e c t i o n s that f o l l o w , we
d i s c u s s the b a s i c parameters of federal
habeas corpus and the exhaustion require
ment. Prom the se , we derive a sensible and
workable rule governing exhaustion that is
c o n s i s t e n t with both the system e s t a b
l ished by Congress and the Court and the
considerations of comity and federalism.
- 4 6 -
A. The Federal Habeas Statute and the
Ex h au s t ion Requ irement ~
I t i s helpful to s t a r t with the words
of the s t a t u t e . What must be " e xhausted
. . . in the c o u r t s o f the S t a t e " i s " the
question presented . " 28 U.S .C. § 2 2 5 4 ( c ) .
"Question presented" i s a term o f art that
has an es tab l i shed and accepted meaning .
For example , under the r u l e s o f t h i s
Co urt , " [ t ] h e s tatement o f a q u e s t i o n
presented w i l l be deemed to comprise every
s u b s i d i a r y q u e s t i o n f a i r l y included
t h e r e i n . " Rule 2 1 . 1 ( a ) , Rules o f the
Supreme Court o f the United States .
The e s s e n t i a l requirement o f
52254(b) & (c) i s that the s t a t e p r i s o n e r
provide the state courts with f a i r notice
of each of h i s f e d e r a l con st i tu t ion a l
c laims so th at they have " t h e f i r s t
op po rtu ni ty to hear the c l a i m . . . . " Picard
v. Connor , 404 U.S. 270 , 276 (19 71 ) . This
"not ice and opportunity" requirement means
that " t h e f e d e r a l c la im must be f a i r l y
47-
p r e s e n t e d , " i d . at 27 5 ; but i t i s " the
substance of a federal . . . c l a i m , " id_. at
2 7 8 , that must be p r e s e n t e d , not every
f i l l i p and c u r l icu e .
[T]here are i n s t a n c e s in which " the
ultimate question for d i s p o s i t i o n . . . "
wil l be the same despite var iat ions in
the l e g a l theory or f a c t u a l a l l e g a
t ions . . . .
Picard , 404 U .S . at 277 (quoting Kemp v.
Pate , 359 F.2d 749 , 751 (7th Cir . 1966 ) ) . 18
The c a s e s s u b s t a n t i a t e th at the
ex haust ion requirement i s about f a i r
n o t i c e and o p p o r t u n i t y , not procedural
e x a c t i t u d e . Thus , when the p e t i t i o n e r
f i r s t p r e s e n t s the c la im to the s t a t e
court as a s ta te law v i o l a t i o n and l a t e r
frames i t in f e d e r a l t e r m s , the s ta te
courts have not had a f a i r op po rtu n i ty to
co n s id er the q u e s t i o n . Picard , su pra ;
Of course, the defendant cannot knowingly withhold
from the state courts relevant facts. But sandbagging
of th is type is avoided by the application of the
"deliberate bypass" and "inexcusable neglect"
standards. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317
( 1963) ; Guice v. Fortenberry, 661 F.2d 496, 507 & n.
5 (5th Cir. 1981)(en banc); Thomas v. Zant, 697 F,2d
977, 984-85 (11th Cir. 1983).
- 4 8 -
Anderson v. H a r l e s s , 459 U.S. 4 ( 1982) .
Another example i s a case in which the
defendant claimed in s tate court th at h i s
counsel was i n e f f e c t i v e in f a i l i n g to
make a p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t i o n . In f e d e r a l
habeas , he raised a claim of i n e f f e c t i v e
assi stance premised on the e n t i r e course
of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . There, the state court
was not f a i r l y apprised o f the c la im and
had no r e a l o p p o r tu n i ty to c o n s i d e r i t .
See Burns v . E s t e l l e , 695 F.2d 847 (5th
Cir. 1978) .
On the o ther hand, Sanders v. United
S t a t e s , 373 U.S. 1 , 16 ( 1 9 6 3 ) , provides a
counter i l l u s t r a t i o n . Sanders f i r s t
challenged his c o n f e s s i o n as in vo lu n ta ry
because of physical coercion. On c o l l a t e r
a l a t t a c k , he c laimed p s y c h o l o g i c a l
coercion as wel l . The Court held that only
one c laim was p r e s e n t e d . The Sanders
i l l u s t r a t i o n - - a f f i r m ed for the exhaus
t i on c o n te x t in Picard , 404 U .S . at 277
- -under l ines the " f a i r notice and opportu
-49
n i t y " p r i n c i p l e . Under the governing
precedents , the or i g i n a l claim was one of
i n v o l u n t a r i n e s s o f the c o n f e s s i o n under
the t o t a l i t y o f the c i r c u m s t a n c e s . See ,
e . g . , Boulden v. Holman, 39 4 U.S. 4 78 , 480
(1969 ) . That put the f i r s t court on notice
to c o n s i d e r and review a l l the c ircum
s t a n c e s , including those not spec i f ied by
the defendant.
A s i m i l a r example i s a case in which
a defendant f i r s t raised a claim premised
on a course o f conduct amounting to
i n e f f e c t i v e ass i stance of c o u n s e l . In his
f e d e r a l habeas p e t i t i o n , he s p e c i f i e d
d i f f e r e n t aspects o f c ou n s e l ' s performance
in support o f h i s c l a i m . There was no
fa i l u re o f exhaustion despite the pleading
of "new" facts because the s tate court had
f a i r notice and an opportunity to consider
the claim. See, e . g . , Vela v. Es t e l le , 708
F.2d 954 , 957-60 (5th Cir . 1983) .
Yet another example i s provided by
Townsend v. Sa i n , 372 U.S. 293 (1963 ) . In
-50
s t a t e c o u r t , the defendant c laimed that
his c o n f e s s i o n was in v o l u n t a r y because
e l i c i t e d while he was under the influence
of a spe c i f ied drug. In federal habeas, he
sought to adduce th a t the drug was
commonly known as a " t r u t h serum. "
C e r t a i n l y , t h i s v e r s i o n o f the evidence
was, to use the s t a t e ' s term, "more
c o m p e l l i n g . " But the Court did not send
the case back to the s t a t e c o u r t s to
exhaust the "new" evidence; i t remanded,
holding that a federal evidentiary hearing
was required. Id .
Thus, the s t a t e ' s purported versions
o f the ex haust ion requirement are not
supported by the s t a t u t e , the c a s e s , or
the d o c t r i n e s o f comity and f e d e r a l i s m
that inform them. What is required i s only
that the defendant have
provided the [ s t a t e ] " c o u r t with 'an
opportunity to apply control l ing legal
p r i n c i p l e s to the f a c t s bearing upon
[his] c on st i tu t io n al c l a i m . ' "
P i c a r d , 404 U .S . at 277 . But t h i s i s
- 5 1 -
prec ise ly what Mr. Hi l lery did.
The q u e s t i o n pre sented to the s ta te
c o u r t s was i de n t ic a l to that presented to
the habeas c o u r t . They were t o l d that
blacks had never served on the grand jury,
that there was a postwar black populat ion
o f 3 . 9 to 5 . 1 % , that there were e l i g i b l e
b l a c k s , and th at the s e l e c t i o n c r i t e r i a
were s u b j e c t i v e . The c laim was framed in
federal c o n s t i t u t i o n a l terms . The s ta te
c o u r t s could have performed whatever
s t a t i s t i c a l c a l c u l a t i o n s appeared useful
to them to a s s e s s these f a c t s . They
d i d n ' t . Judge Kar l ton decided t h a t , in
performing h is r e s p o n s i b i l i t y as a habeas
judge, he would be ass i s ted by s t a t i s t i
cal analysis and s p e c i f i c a l l y asked for it
from both p a r t i e s . Judge Wing rove , in
c o n t r a s t , saw h i s r o l e d i f f e r e n t l y : He
d i d n ' t evaluate Mr. H i l l e r y ' s evidence of
rac i a l d i scr iminat ion , he t r ied to explain
i t away.
-52
Analysis o f the "new" evidence demon
s t r a t e s that the exhau st i on requirement
was not circumvented. Neither the addition
of one e a r l i e r s e t o f census f i g u r e s nor
the proof of the h i s t o r i c a l f ac ts o f to ta l
e x c l u s i o n and b l a c k e l i g i b i l t y through
d i f f e r e n t means a l t e r e d the qu e s t i o n
presented. Nor did the s o - c a l l e d " s o p h i s
t i c a t e d computer a n a l y s i s , " which was
nothing more than a s e r ie s of m u l t i p l i c a
t i o n s . See 563 F.Supp. at 1242 ( p e t i t i o n
e r ' s f i g u r e s "obtained in a rather d irect
manner") .
S t a t i s t i c a l a n a l y s i s i s not " e v i
dence; " i t i s a way o f thinking about or
ev aluat ing e v i d e n c e . Thus, in Alexander,
the Court evaluated the raw f igures in the
record on the b a s i s o f a s t a t i s t i c a l
a n a l y s i s that was f i r s t s e t out in the
p e t i t i o n e r ' s b r i e f on the m e r i t s in t h i s
Court. 405 U.S. at 630 n. 9 . S i m i l a r l y , in
Castaneda , a habeas case , the s t a t i s t i c a l
a n a l y s i s was f i r s t performed by the Court
53-
i t s e l f . 430 U.S . at 496 n. 17. S t a t i s t i c a l
analys i s i s something the s t a t e c o u r t s ,
f a i r l y appr ised o f the same i s s u e , could
have done f o r the mselves i f they chose.
Their f a i l u r e cannot be a ttr ibuted to the
habeas pe t i t i o n e r under the r u b r i c o f the
exhaustion requirement.
B. Nei ther the Habeas S t a t u t e , the
R u l e s , Nor the Dec i s ferns o f th is
Court Contemplate that~~E~ach 'Piece
o f Evidence Would Have F ir s t Been
Presented to the State Courts
One c r i t i c a l problem with the s t a t e ' s
p o s i t i o n i s that i t c o n f l i c t s with the
habeas scheme s e t up by s t a t u t e , rules ,
and decisions o f th is Court. The converse
of the p r i n c i p l e that a s t a t e pr isoner
must provide the s t a t e c o u r t s with f a i r
n o t i c e o f the claim and an opportunity to
cons ider i t i s that he i s e n t i t l e d to a
f u l l and f a i r opportunity to l i t i g a t e that
c l a i m . When the s t a t e c o u r t s do not
provide him a f u l l and f a i r hearing ,
f ed er a l habeas i s f u l l y open: The s tate
cou rt f i n d i n g s are not presumed correct ,
- 5 4 -
see 28 U . S . C . § 2 2 5 4 ( d ) , and a f e d e r a l
evidentiary hearing i s mandatory. Townsend
v. Sain.
In that c a s e , i t f o l l o w s that the
f e d e r a l co u rt w i l l hear and c o n s i d e r
evidence that was not pre sented to the
state courts . That i s what the hearing i s
for . I f material f ac t s were not adequately
developed at the s t a t e hearing , then the
presumption o f correctness does not apply,
§ 2 2 5 4 ( d ) ( 3 ) , and Townsend r e q u i r e s a
h e a r in g . The same i s true i f " t h e f a c t
f inding procedure employed by the St a te
court was not a d e q u a t e . . . . " _I£. , subsec
t ion (2) .
The s t a t e t r i a l hearing in th is case
was not f u l l and f a i r because the judge
who pre s id ed was an in te res te d party who
expressed on the record his resentment o f
the a l l e g a t io n s . He was a material witness
who e f f e c t i v e l y s h i e l d e d h i m s e l f from
c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n and impeachment. 19 He
19 Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (disqualification of
-55
both obstructed the defendant ' s attempt to
prove h is c a s e , see n .1 0 supra , and
mi sap pl ie d the governing c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
law .20 The " f i n d i n g s " of the s tate supreme
cou rt were s imply an a f f i r m an c e o f the
f lawed proceeding in the t r i a l c ou r t .
Indeed, the s ta te supreme co u rt accepted
Judge Wing r o v e ' s " t e s t i m o n y " wholesale,
even though exculpatory p r o t e s t a t i o n s of
the d i s c r i m i n a t o r are normal ly i n s u f
f i c i e n t . 21 Faced with t h i s , Judge Karlton
properly undertook to r e a s s e s s the f act s
and to hold a habeas hearing.
federal judge when his or her "impartiality might
reasonably be questioned"); id . , subsection (b)(1)
("personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts").
20 Judge Wing rove expressed his view that the Court's
jury discrimination cases "apply mostly to the
southern part of the United States where there was
established a pattern of white people in the minori
ty" excluding blacks from all aspects of political
l i f e , a condition that "has never been true to my
personal knowledge in the County of King s or anywhere
in the State of California." R.T. 40, 59-60.
21 Avery v. Georg i a , 345 U.S. 559, 561 (1952);
Hernandez, 347 U .S .~ t 481; Castaneda, 430 U.S. at
496 n. VL ------ --------
- 5 6 -
Moreover , Judge Kar l ton did exact ly
what the de c is ion s o f t h i s Court and the
draf ters of S 2254(d) and the habeas rules
envisioned. When, in 1 9 6 3 , the Committee
on Habeas Corpus o f the Judicia l Confer
ence co n s i de re d what l a t e r became §2254
( d ) , s t a t e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s proposed that
a l l s t a t e co u rt f i n d i n g s be accorded a
conclusive presumption of correctness . The
committee d i sa gr ee d because i t "would be
wholly i nco mp at ib l e with the duty o f
Federal c o u r t s to determine Federal
cons t i t ut ion al q u e s t i o n s . " H.R. Rep. No.
1 3 8 4 , 88th C o n g . , 2d S e s s . , 23 (May 6 ,
1964) . The committee reviewed th is Court ' s
d e c i s i o n s , id_. at 2 4 - 2 5 , noting part icu
l a r l y the d i s c u s s i o n in Brown v. A l l e n ,
344 U.S. at 4 6 3 - 6 5 , balancing the respect
to be accorded s t a t e de te r m i n a t i o n s o f
f a c t with the d iscret ion of the d i s t r i c t
court to hold a hearing and deve lop the
f a c t s . Id_. On that b a s i s , i t proposed
what i s now § 2254 (d) to gui de f e d e r a l
- 5 7 -
habeas judges in determining when and how
they are l imi ted by the f act s developed in
state proceedings.22
The r u l e s adopted by the Court and
approved by Congress s im i l ar ly contemplate
that a f e d e r a l habeas co u rt w i l l hear
e v i d e n t i a r y f a c t s not pre sented to the
s t a t e c o u r t s . Thus, the rules provide for
the appointment o f counsel , Rule 8 ( c ) , the
expansion o f the r e c o r d , Rule 7 , the
gra nt i ng o f d i s c o v e r y , Rule 6 , and the
holding o f a hearing pursuant to the
Townsend c r i t e r i a . Rule 8 ( a ) ; Adv. Comm.
Note to Rule 8 ( a ) . The r o l e o f counsel
— at l e a s t when pr o p e r l y performed - - is
not jus t to make legal arguments, but also
to develop and p r e s e n t f a c t s th at w i l l
In considering the question whether material facts
never presented to the state courts could neverthe
less be presented in federal habeas, the Eleventh
Circuit reviewed the leg islative history of § 2254(d)
and concluded: (1) that Congress essentially "codi
fied" Townsend in adopting its criteria; and (2) that
the "reason Congress . . . remain[ed] silent on the
sandbagg ing issue is . . . the issue had already been
decided by Townsend1 s deliberate bypass/inexcusable
neglect criteria/"""Thomas v. Zant, 697 F.2d at
983-85. --------------------------
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persuade the judge to g r a n t r e l i e f . The
role of the judge in expanding the record
under Rule 7 i s to f i l l in f act s missing
from the s ta te court record. Indeed, he i s
empowered to shape the record himself by
propounding s p e c i f i c i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s .
Subsect ion ( b ) . S i m i l a r l y , the po in t of
d i s c o v e r y i s to o b t a i n new f a c t s not
p r e v i o u s l y known. And the h e a r i n g ,
pursuant to Rule 8 and Townsend , i s to
develop m a t e r i a l f a c t s not in the s ta te
court re co r d . 22
The handling o f t h i s case by Judge
Karlton e x e m p l i f i e s what a c o n c i e n t i o u s
habeas judge i s supposed to do under the
ru les . He reviewed the state co u rt record
and found i t wanting. He ordered the
part ies to expand the record, propounding
i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s designed to f i l l in the
22 i t is noteworthy that the drafters of the
rules never intended that exhaustion issues would be
determined after discovery or at the time of the
hearing; as they saw i t , exhaustion was to be
assessed on the basis of the claims set out in the
petition and the state 's return. See discussion in
the Adv. Comm. Notes to Rules 4 & ~5T
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e v i d e n t i a r y g a p s . He r e co gn iz e d that
s t a t i s t i c a l a n a l y s i s was r e l e v a n t but
lacking , and he asked the p a r t i e s to
produce i t . He did not accept the ir
showing at face va lue , but delved into i t
and performed h is own s t a t i s t i c a l an a ly
s i s . A c o n s t r u c t i o n o f the exhaust ion
requirement th a t would condemn such
f i d e l i t y to the " [ e x a c t i n g ] duty o f the
Federal d i s t r i c t cou rt on h a b e a s . . . , "
Townsend, 372 U. S . at 3 1 6 , and instead
imprison the f e d e r a l habeas judge within
the c o n f i n e s o f the i n q u i r i e s that the
s t a t e c o u r t s saw f i t to make, i s plainly
inconsistent with the habeas scheme.
Moreover , such an unsupported
construction of the exhaustion requirement
would demean the authority and responsibi
l i t y that f e d e r a l judges p o s s e s s in any
proceeding before them. I t is their o f f i c e
to act as " the governor o f the t r i a l for
the purposes o f assur ing i t s proper
conduct and o f determining q u e s t i o n s of
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l a w . " Quercia v . United S t a t e s , 289 U.S.
466 , 469 ( 1933) . Federal judges are o b l i g
ed to think f o r themselves in applying
f e d e r a l law to the f a c t s . Cuyler v .
S u l l i v a n , 446 U .S . 3 3 5 , 3 4 - 4 2 ( 1 9 8 0 ) ;
Wainwright v . S y k e s , 433 U .S . 7 2 , 80
( 1 9 7 7 ) . That o b l i g a t i o n n e c e s s a r i l y
comprises within i t the power to make such
inquiries as he or she f e e l s are needed to
evaluate the reco rd . Indeed , e v e n , in a
jury t r i a l , a federal judge
enjoys the p r e r o g a t i v e , r i s i n g o f t e n
to the standard o f a d u t y , of e l i c i
ting those f a c ts he deems necessary to
a c lear presentation of the i s s ues .
United States v. Brandt, 196 F.2d 653 , 655
(2d Cir . 1952) .
No P o l i c y of Comity or Federalism
Requires the Repeated Return to
the S t a t e Courts to Exhaust
S p e c i f i c Items o f Evidence
Relat ing to Claims Already Fairly
Presented to Those Courts
"There i s , o f course , no requirement
that pe t i t io n e r f i l e r e p e t i t i o u s a p p l i c a
t i o n s to s t a t e c o u r t s . " Humphrey v. Cady,
405 U.S. 5 0 4 , 516 n. 18 ( 1 9 7 2 ) . Once a
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c la im has f a i r l y been pre sented to the
s tate c ou r ts , requiring continued exhaus
t i o n for a d d i t i o n a l e v i d e n t i a r y items
p r ov id e s very l i t t l e in the way of
a d d i t i o n a l b e n e f i t s . When, as h e r e , the
s t a t e c o u r t s have d e f a u l t e d on the ir
respons ib i 1 i l t y properly to apply federal
law , no re as on ab le benef i t accrues by
requir ing a return v i s i t with yet another
f a c t support ing the o r i g i n a l c l a i m . Cf .
Roberts v. La Val lee , 389 U.S. 40 (1967) .
In d e e d , to r eq u ire exhaustion under
these c i r cu m s t an c es would subvert the
i n t e n t behind § 2 2 5 4 ( d ) . The purpose of
that sect ion was " t o be a strong induce
ment to the States . . . to provide adequate
p o s t c o n v i c t i o n remedies and proce
d u r e s . . . . " S . Rep. No. 1791, 89th Cong. ,
2d Sess. (Oct . 1 8 , 1 966) , 1 966 U .S . Code
Cong. & Ad. News 3663, 3672. That purpose
i s furthered by according a presumption of
c o r r e c t n e s s to s t a t e court f in d i n g s
rendered under procedures that are " f u l l ,
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f a i r , and a d e q u a t e . . . . " § 2254 ( d ) ( 6 ) . But
i t i s not f u r th er e d when s t a t e s with
inadequate procedures are a f f o r d e d
addit ional b i t e s at the apple whenever the
more adequate federal remedy turns up new
evidence.
A new f a c t might j u s t i f y re turn to
state court on the same question presented
when, through no f a u l t o f the s t a t e
processes , a m at er ia l , noncumulative f a c t
i s l a t e r d i s c o v e r e d . This i s not that
case . But even in such a c a s e , the c o s t s
of requir ing a second v i s i t to the state
courts appear to outweigh any conceivable
b e n e f i t . For there are rea l c o s t s not only
to the defendant but a l so to the j u d i c i a l
system. J u d i c i a l energy already expended
in the federal d i s t r i c t court i s squander
ed. F ina l d e te r m in a t i on of the c o n s t i tu
t ional issue i s put o f f ; the f i n a l i t y o f
the o r i g i n a l s t a t e cou rt judgment i s
postponed yet further .
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R equ ir ing r e p e a t e d e x h a u s t i o n o f t h i s
s o r t t h r e a t e n s the very " c e l e b r a t e d
procedural t a n g l e s , " Hart & Wechsler 's THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1490
(2d e d . 1 9 7 3 ) , that occurred at the time
of Ex parte Hawk , 321 U. S - 114 ( 1 9 4 4 ) .
Because o f the exhaustion requirement, i t
was not u n t i l 1952 th at a f e d e r a l court
heard and granted Hawk’ s pe t i t io n for the
writ on his 1936 convic t ion . Hawk v. Harm,
103 F.Supp. 138 (D.Neb. 1952) . Mr. Hil lery
has spent over 12 years in the s t a t e
c o u r t s and 7 more in the federal courts .
To r e qu ir e him to return to the s t a t e
c o u r t s so that they can perform s t a t i s t i
cal analyses o f the same evidence that was
before them 23 years ago makes no sense.
This underscores the va lue o f a
prompt, f u l l and f a i r de te r m i n a t i on of
c on st i tu t io n al claims by the s t a t e cou rts
in the f i r s t i n s t a n c e . But that was
lacking he r e . The purpose o f fed e ra l
habeas i s to provide a remedy in jus t this
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circumstance. The imposition of addit ional
exhaustion requirements would only subvert
that remedy.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing r e a s o n s , amicus
r e s p ec t f u l l y submits that the judgment o f
the Ninth Circuit should be aff irmed.
Respectful ly submitted,
JULIUS LeVONNE CHAMBERS
STEVEN L. WINTER*
99 Hudson Street
16th Floor
New York, N. Y. 10013
(212) 219-1900
ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM
New York U n i v e r s i t y
Law School
40 Washington Sq. S.
New York, N. Y. 10012
Attorneys for the NAACP
Legal Defense &
Educational Fund, I n c . ,
as Amicus Curiae
* Counsel o f Record
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