Memphis City Schools Board of Education v. Northcross Brief in Opposition to Certiorari

    I n the

&upr?au> (Enurt nf lititeii &tate
October Term, 1979 

No. 79-1629
Board of Education op the Memphis 

Cit y  Schools, et al.,
Petitioners,

v.

Deborah A. Northcross, et al.

No. 79-1630
City  of Memphis, et al.,

Petitioners,

Deborah A. Northcross, et al.

o n  p e t it io n  for w r it s  of certiorari to  t h e

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO CERTIORARI

W illiam  E. Caldwell 
Ratner & Sugarmon 
525 Commerce Title Bldg. 
Memphis, Tennessee 38103 
(901) 525-8601

N o rm an  J. Ch a c h k in  
520 Woodward Bldg.
733 15th Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20005 
(202) 628-7446

Jack Greenberg 
James M. Nabrit, 111 
B ill  L ann  L ee 

Suite 2030 
10 Columbus Circle 
New York, N. Y. 10019 
(212) 586-8397

Attorneys for Respondents



TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Counterstatement of  Questions
Presented ....................................................  2

Statement ..............................................................  4

Reasons f o r  Denying the Writs ..............  10

Conclusion ............................................................  19

Ap p en d ix ................................................................  la



TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Albemarle Paper Co. v.  Moody, 422 U.S.
405 (1975)  ............     17

Arenson v. Board of  Trade, 372 F. Supp.
1349 (N.D. 111. 1974) 14

Bradley v .  School Bd. o f  Richmond,
416 U.S. 696 (1974) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8,16

Brotherhood o f  Locomotive Firemen and
Enginemen v. Bangor Aroostook R. Co.,
389 U.S. 327 (1967) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12

Brown v. Bathke, 588 F.2d 634 (8th
Cir .  1978) . . . . ____ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16

Brown v. Board o f  Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954)  .............  4

Brown v. Board o f  Educ., 349 U.S.
294 (1955) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4

Christiansburg Garment Co. v .  EEOC, 434
U.S. 412 (1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13

City  o f  Detro i t  v. Grinnel Corp. , 495
F . 2d 448 (2d Cir.  1974) _____. . . . . . . . .  12

City  o f  Detro i t  v. Grinnel Corp. , 560
F .2d 1093 (2d Cir.  1977) . . . . . . . . . . . .  12

City o f  Philadelphia  v. Chas. P f i z e r  
Co., 345 F. Supp. 454 (S.D. N.Y.

Page

Colson v.  H il ton Hotels Corp.,  59 F.R.D.
324 (N.D. 111. 1972) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14

-  n  -



Page

Davis v. County o f  Los Angeles, 8 EPD
1 9444 (C.D. C a l i f .  1974) ....................  14

Donaldson v.  O'Connor, 454 F. Supp.
311 (N.D. Fla. 1978) .............................  16

Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel ,  503 F.2d
177 (D.C. Cir .  1974) ............................. 10

Farmington Dowel Products Co. v.  Forster 
Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 61 (1st Cir .
1970) .................................................    15

Frankenstein v. McCrory, 425 F. Supp.
762 (S.D. N.Y. 1977) ................................  14

Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v.  Wolf Brothers
& Co., 240 U.S. 251 (1916) ..................  12

Hew Corp. v .  Tandy Corp. , 480 F. Supp.
758 (D. Mass. 1979) ...................................  14

Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) ........  17

Johnson v.  Georgia Highway Express, Inc . ,
488 F .2d 714 (5th Cir .  1974) ..............  12

King v. Greenblatt,  560 F.2d 1024 (1st 
Cir.  1977), ce r t ,  denied, 438 U.S.
916 (1978) ..................................................  12

Lamphere v. Brown Univ.,  610 F.2d 46
(1st Cir .  1979) .....................................   16

Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v .  American 
Rad. & Stand. Sanitary Corp., 487 
F .2d 161 (3d Cir.  1973) ........................  12

Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v .  American 
Rad. & Stand. Sanitary Corp. , 540 
F .2d 102 (3d Cir.  1976) .......... .. 12

- iii -



Page

Locklin v. Day-Glo Color Corp.,  429 
F .2d 873’ (7th Cir.  1970), c e r t .  
denied, 400 U.S. 1020 (1971) . . . _____ 15

McGowan v. K ing, In c . ,  569 F .2d 845
(5th Cir .  1978) . . . . . . . . _____. . . . . . . . .  15

Nedeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275 (1st
Cir.  1978) . . . ___ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15,16

Northcross v. Board o f  Education, 302 
F .2d 818 (6th C i r . ) ,  c e r t ,  denied,
370 U.S. 944 (1962) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5

Northcross v. Board o f  Education, 333 F.2d
661 (6th C ir .  1964) .......... ............ . . . .  5

Northcross v. Board of  Education, 397
U.S. 232 (1970) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5

Northcross v. Board o f  Education, 412
U.S. 427 (1973) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5,7

Northcross v. Board o f  Education, 489 
F . 2d 15 (6th Cir .  1973), ce r t ,  
denied, 416 U.S. 962 (1974T7. ........... 5

Oppenlander v. Standard O i l  Co., 64 F.R.D.
597 (D. Colo. 1974) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14

Palmer v. Rogers, 10 EPD 1 10,499 (D. D.C.
1975) .........   15

Pitchford S c i e n t i f i c  Inst .  Corp. v.
Pepi,  Inc . ,  440 F. Supp. 1175 (W.D.
Pa. 1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17

Quirke v.  Chessie Corp., 368 F. Supp.
558 (S.D. N.Y. 1974) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14

- iv -



Page

Raney v.  Board o f  Education, 391 U.S.
443 (1968) ............................   6

Schaeffer  v. San Diego Yel low Cabs, Inc . ,
462 F . 2d 1002 (9th Cir .  1972) ............  15

Shapiro v. Consolidated Edison Co., CCH 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1 196 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) ............................................................  14

Stanford Daily  v.  Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680
(N.D. C a l i f .  1974) ......................   14

TWA v .  Hughes, 312 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.
N.Y. 1970) ...............      14

United States v. M i tche l l ,  580 F.2d
789 (5th Cir .  1978) ................................ 15

Walker v. Ralston Purina Co., 409 F. Supp.
101 (M.D. Ga. 1976) ................................ 15

Wheeler v. Durham City Bd. o f  Educ. ,
585 F . 2d 618 (4th Cir .  1978) ..............  17

Statutes :

20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976) ...... ........... ........... .. 7,8

42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976) ..................................  8

v



Page

Other Author i t ies

122 CONG. REC. S16451, S16457 (d a i l y  e d . , 29
Sept. 1976) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13

122 CONG. REC. H12159 (d a i l y  e d . , 1 Oct.
1976) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13

H.R. No. 94-1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
4 (15 Sept. 1976) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13

S. REP No.94-1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
6 (29 June 1976) . . . ____. . . . . . . . . . . . .  14

-  V I  -



IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

October Term, 1979 

No. 79-1629

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE MEMPHIS 
CITY SCHOOLS, et a l . ,

P e t i t i o n e r s ,

v.

DEBORAH A. NORTHCROSS, et a l .

No. 79-1630

CITY OF MEMPHIS, et a l .

P e t i t i o n e r s , 

v.

DEBORAH A. NORTHCROSS, et a l . ,

On Pe t i t ions  fo r  Writs o f  C e r t io ra r i  to the 
United States Court o f  Appeals for  the Sixth C ircu it

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO CERTIORARI

Deborah A. N o r th c ross ,  e t  a l . ,  p l a i n t i f f s  

below, r espec t fu l l y  request that the Court deny



the pe t i t ion s  fo r  wr i ts  of  c e r t i o r a r i  f i l e d  by the 

Board of  Education o f  the Memphis C ity  Schools, et 

a l . [ " B o a r d " ] ,  No. 79-1629, and the C i t y  o f  

Memphis, et a l .  [ " C i t y " ] ,  No. 79-1630, seeking 

review o f  the Sixth C i r c u i t ' s  judgment and opinion 

reported at 611 F .2d 624 (23 Nov. 1979), Pet. App. 

1-A to  35-a M

COUNTERSTATEMENT OF QUESTIONS PRESENTED

- 2 -

The judgment below disposed o f  consolidated 

appeals from two separate orders o f  the d i s t r i c t  

cour t  r u l i n g  on a p p l i c a t i o n s  o f  p l a i n t i f f s  in 

t h i s  l on gs ta n d in g  schoo l  d e s e g r e g a t i o n  a c t i o n  

f o r  awards o f  costs ,  including reasonable a t t o r ­

n ey s '  f e e s  and o u t - o f - p o c k e t  expenses.  The 

p r i n c i p a l  appea l  be low ,  concerns the d i s t r i c t  

court 's  4 November 1977 "Award on Appl icat ion o f  

the P l a i n t i f f s  fo r  Attorneys Fees" (Pe t .  App. 53-A 

[here ina f te r ,  " f i r s t  award"],  granting in part, and 

denying in part the request f o r  fees and expenses 

from both  the Board and the C i t y  c o v e r in g  the 

period from the commencement o f  the l i t i g a t i o n  

through October 1976. The second appeal below,

1/ "Pe t .  App." r e f e rs  to  the separate ly -pre­
sented appendix f i l e d  by the Board in No. 79-1629.



concerned the d i s t r i c t  c o u r t ' s  7 July  1978 

"R u l in g  on A p p l i c a t i o n  f o r  A t t o rn ey s  Fees and 

Expenses fo r  May 1977 Hearing" (Pet .  App. 63-A) 

[here ina f te r ,  "second award"],  granting in part 

and denying in part  the reques t  f o r  f e e s  and 

expenses from the Board a lone  r e l a t e d  to  a 

f i v e -day  hearing held in May 1977. On appeal from 

the f i r s t  award, the court o f  appeals remanded the 

case fo r  further considerat ion in accordance with 

i t s  op in ion .  Pe t .  App. 28A, 34-A. On appeal 

from the second award, the court  o f  appeals 

remanded with instructions to enter f o r  p l a i n t i f f s  

in an amount spec i f i ed .  Pet. App. 34-A.

The two sets o f  pe t i t ion e rs  seek to present a 

wide va r i e t y  o f  issues,  numbering twelve in a l l ,  

to th is  Court fo r  decis ion.  Many o f  the lega l  

" q u e s t i o n s "  which they  p o s i t  a r i s e  on ly  as a 

resu lt  o f  p e t i t i o n e r s '  strained reading o f  the 

court o f  appeals '  ru l ing :  fo r  example, the claim 

that the decis ion below withdraws a l l  d iscre t ion  

from the d i s t r i c t  court on remand. F a i r l y  con­

strued, the ruling below presents two unexception­

able questions.



- 4 -

1, Whether the cour t  o f  appeals  e r r ed  in 

remanding the major part o f  the case (the f i r s t  

award) fo r  entry o f  f indings and conclusions which 

would enab le  i n t e l l i g e n t  r e v i e w  o f  any award?

2. Whether the court o f  appeals abused i t s  

discretion, in determining the amount o f  fees  on a 

small part of  the case (the second award) pre­

sented for  review on a complete and fu l l y  l i t i ­

gated record?

Statement

A de ta i l ed  descr ip t ion  of  the proceedings in 

the d i s t r i c t  cour t  and the court  o f  appeals  

leading to entry o f  the judgments o f  which review 

is sought appears as an appendix to  th is  B r ie f  at 

pp. la-20a i n f r a . The essen t ia l  elements o f  th is  

case are as fo l lows:

From i t s  commencement in  1960 u n t i l  the 

present day, th is  suit has involved but a s ingle  

claim f o r  r e l i e f :  the e f f e c t i v e  dismantling o f  

the state-imposed dual school system in Memphis, 

Tennessee. A f t e r  Brown v. Board o f  Educ., 347

U.S. 483 (1954), 349 U.S. 294 (1955), the board 

o f  education refused to plan for  the education



of  i t s  black and white chi ldren together un t i l  

forced to do so by court orders issued in this 

l i t i g a t i o n .  See, e . g . , Northcross v. Board o f  

Educ. ,  302 F .2d 818 (6th C i r . ) ,  c e r t . denied, 370 

U.S. 944 (1962 ) ;  i d . ,  333 F.2d 661 (6 th  C i r .  

1964).

A decade ago th is  Court summarily reversed a 

court o f  appeals decis ion and d irec ted  that prompt 

action be taken to complete the conversion of  the 

Memphis p u b l i c  schoo ls  to  a u n i t a r y  system. 

Northcross v. Board o f  Educ. ,  397 U.S, 232 (1970). 

Subsequently, the case was again brought to this 

Court by the p l a i n t i f f s  a f t e r  the court o f  appeals 

denied a request for  an award o f  a t to rneys1 fees 

covering one appellate  proceeding without " s t a t -  

[ ing ]  reasons fo r  the denial [making i t ]  . . .  not 

poss ib le  fo r  th is  Court to determine whether the 

Court o f  Appeals applied the proper standard in 

reaching th is  r e s u l t . "  Northcross v. Board o f  

Educ. ,  412 U.S. 427, 427-28 (1973) ( per curiam).

T h e r e a f t e r ,  the d i s t r i c t  cou r t  approved a 

" f i n a l "  p lan  o f  d e s e g r e g a t i o n  f o r  the system 

("P lan Z " ) ,  the Sixth C ircu it  af f irmed, and this 

Court den ied  r e v i e w .  Nor thcross  v .  Board o f

- 5 -

Educ., 489 F .2d 15 (6th Cir.  1973), c e r t . denied,



416 U. S. 962 (1974). At th is  f i r s t  r esp i te  in 

what the court below c o r r e c t l y  described as th is  

continuous course o f  l i t i g a t i o n ,  see Pet. App. 

3-A, p l a i n t i f f s  sought to obtain agreement on an 

appropriate award o f  attorneys '  f e es ;  and when 

negot ia t ions  proved unavail ing,  f i l e d  th e i r  motion 

fo r  an award o f  costs including reasonable counsel 

fees —  which led u l t imate ly  to the judgments now 

under consideration.

The main subject o f  th is  l i t i g a t i o n  was far  

from quiescent, however. Mindful o f  th is  Court's 

admonition, Raney v. Board o f  Educ. , 391 U.S. 443 

(1968), the d i s t r i c t  court had retained ju r i s d i c ­

t ion  over  the case to insure that i t s  decree was 

implemented and proved ac tua l ly  e f f e c t i v e .  Each 

year a f t e r  i t  had approved a " f i n a l "  desegrega­

t i o n  p lan ,  the  d i s t r i c t  cou r t  was con fron ted  

with a request from the Board o f  Education to  make 

a ser ies  o f  modif ications to that plan. In the 

spring o f  the fourth year of  Plan Z 's  operation, 

the d i s t r i c t  court concluded in an opinion issued 

24 May 1977 that the Board had f a i l e d  to  establ ish 

a unitary school system and, in f a c t , had engaged 

in f r e s h , post- judgment acts  o f  purpose fu l  

r a c i a l  d i s c r im in a t i o n  in the o p e r a t i o n  o f  the

- 6 -



7

public schools of  Memphis. This determination was 

not appealed.

The curren t  c o n t r o v e r s y  stems from the 

d i s t r i c t  c o u r t ’ s subsequent award o f  attorneys '  

fees to counsel fo r  p l a i n t i f f s ,  who were "pre­

v a i l i n g  pa r t i e s "  with respect both to the main 

part o f  the case resu l t ing  in entry o f  the " f i n a l "  

plan o f  desegregat ion and also with respect to 

the post-judgment proceedings in 1977.

As set fo r th  in greater  d e ta i l  in the appen­

d i x  h e r e t o ,  a t  pp. 5a-9a i n f r a , the d i s t r i c t  

court u t t e r l y  f a i l e d  —■ despite  the lesson of  th is  

Court 's holding in Northcross v. Board o f  Educ. , 

412 U.S. 427 (1973) —  to explain the process by 

which i t  determined upon the serv ices for  which 

counsel would be compensated by an award o f  fees 

pursuant to § 718 o f  the Education Amendments o f  

1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976), except that the 

serv ices  of  cer ta in  counsel f o r  the p l a i n t i f f s  

were regarded as completely unnecessary and not 

subject to  any compensation. Nor did the t r i a l  

court c l a r i f y  the basis fo r  the determination of  

the hourly rates at which time expended by coun­

s e l  f o r  the p l a i n t i f f s  was to  be compensated.



8

P l a i n t i f f s  appealed the adequacy o f  both fee 

awards made by the d i s t r i c t  court. A f t e r  b r i e f in g  

and ora l  argument, the Sixth. C ircu it  "conclude [d ] 

tha t  both o rders  g ra n t in g  a t t o r n e y s '  f e e s  and 

expenses provide inadequate compensation, contain 

l e ga l  e r rors ,  and reach factual  conclusions not 

supported by the record . "  Pet.  App. 10-A. Since 

the record on the f i r s t  award was not in a posture 

f o r  f in a l  d ispos i t ion  ( see note 4a i n f r a ) , the 

court remanded the p r inc ipa l  part o f  the case " f o r  

further  proceedings in accordance with the stan­

dards set out in th is  op in ion . "  I d . The record 

on the second award for  the 1977 post-judgment 

proceedings was "adequate . .  . f o r  us to  indepen­

dently  assess an appropriate award, . . .  and we do 

so to demonstrate the f indings and conclusions 

which we hold the d i s t r i c t  courts must enter  in 

the record in making fee  awards." I d .

The b a s i c  l e g a l  p r i n c i p l e s  a p p l i e d  by the 

court below are as fo l lows:  (1 )  In accordance with 

th i s  C o u r t ' s  r u l in g  in Brad ley  v .  School Bd, 

o f  Richmond, 416 U.S.696 (1974), both the Educa­

t ion  Amendments o f  1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976) 

and the C i v i l  Rights A t to rneys ' Fees Awards Act of  

1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976) authorize an award



9

o f  fees  in th is  l i t i g a t i o n  f o r  serv ices rendered 

p r io r  to th e i r  enactment to pending cases such as 

the in s ta n t  a c t i o n .  ( 2 )  Under the 1976 A c t ,  

p l a i n t i f f s  who preva i led  in th is  l i t i g a t i o n  are 

en t i t l ed  to counsel fees covering a l l  necessary 

serv ices "as is  t r a d i t i on a l  with attorneys com­

pensated by a f e e - p a y in g  c l i e n t ,  f o r  a l l  t ime 

reasonably expended on a matter , "  Pet App. 19-A, 

in re l iance  on express l e g i s l a t i v e  h is to ry .  S. 

REP No. 94-1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (29 June 

1976). Further, "the hours claimed need not be 

automatically accepted by the d i s t r i c t  court, but 

to the extent that hours are r e jec ted ,  the court 

must i n d i c a t e  some reason f o r  i t s  a c t i o n .  . . .  

Hours may be cut f o r  d u p l i c a t i o n ,  padding or 

f r i vo lous  c la im s. "  Pet. App. 20-A. Since in i t s  

f i r s t  award, the d i s t r i c t  court  had "s im ply  

e l iminated, without comment, hundreds o f  hours o f  

documented s e r v i c e , "  the court remanded that part 

o f  the case " f o r  entry o f  f indings o f  fact and 

conclusions o f  law adequate to permit our review 

o f  the award." Pet.  App. 19-A to  21-A. (3 )  In 

determining the appropriate rate  o f  compensation, 

the " f a i r  market value o f  the serv ices provided" 

(Pet.  App. 23-A) is  the appropriate standard to 

implement the intent o f  Congress.



10

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRITS

The court o f  appeals has wr i t t en  an eminently
2 / .

sens i b l e  o p i n i o n "  when con f r o n ted  w i th  a d i s ­

t r i c t  court d ispos i t ion  that kept the appel la te
3/body "complete ly  in the dark"— as to the bases

fo r  decis ion,  but which on i t s  face was contrary
4/

to the w i l l  o f  Congress,”  The court o f  appeals 

d id  no more than e s t a b l i s h  a s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d  

framework fo r  determining awards o f  fees based 

i n i t i a l l y  on hours claimed and normal hourly rate

2/ The p e t i t ion s  be fore  the Court are devoid o f  
c i ta t ion s  to the opinions o f  the lower courts. 
P e t i t i o n e r s '  sweeping character izat ions o f  the 
actions o f  the courts below are not supported by 
an examination o f  what those courts actua l ly  did 
and said.

3/ Evans v. Sheraton Park H o te l , 503 F . 2d 177, 
T88 (D.C. Cir.  1974).

4/ Apparently the Sixth C ircu i t  has frequently  
found i t s e l f  in  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n .  The court  o f  
appeals stated: "This Court has been disturbed by 
the extraordinary va r ia t ions  in fee  awards that 
have come before  i t  on review,  and by a marked 
f a i l u r e  on the par t  o f  the d i s t r i c t  cour ts  to 
explain th e i r  reasoning, making necessary f indings 
o f  f a c t ,  or  demonstrate  the  c a l c u l a t i o n s  used 
to a r r ive  at a fee .  Such awards may we l l  con­
s t i tu t e  an abuse o f  d is c re t ion  whi le  rendering 
the award v i r t u a l l y  u n re v i e w a b le . "  P e t .  App. 
20-A.



11

o f  counsel, with a r t icu la ted  adjustments upward or 

downward f o r  such f a c t o r s  as con t ingency  or 

dupl ication o f  e f f o r t .  In th is  context , there is 

no merit to p e t i t i o n e r s '  complaint (Board Pet. 15) 

that the court o f  appeals has usurped the preroga­

t i v e s  o f  the d i s t r i c t  c o u r t P l a i n l y , i t  was 

not error  to remand the major part o f  the case 

(the f i r s t  award) f o r  i n t e l l i g i b l e  d ispos i t ion ,  

and i t  is noteworthy that at leas t  as much remains 

to be decided in th is  case on these issues as has 

been dec ided  to  d a te ,  see pp. 12a-18a, i n f r a . 

I t  is just as d i f f i c u l t  to  see how the court o f  

appeals erred, with re ference to  a small aspect o f  

th is  extensive l i t i g a t i o n  (the second award), by 

app ly in g  the standards i t  a r t i c u l a t e d  f o r  the 

bene f i t  o f  the d i s t r i c t  judges in the Sixth C ir ­

cu i t ,  including th is  d i s t r i c t  court on remand. 

The determination o f  fees  simply does not r i s e  to

5/ The second award was fu l l y  l i t i g a t e d  in the 
d i s t r i c t  court and both p l a i n t i f f s  and the Board 
appealed. The Board did so much as even suggest 
to e i t h e r  the d i s t r i c t  cour t  o r  the court  o f  
appeals that a transcr ipt  o f  the f i v e -day  May 1977 
hearing was necessary to proper d ispos i t ion  o f  any 
aspect of the fees  dispute. The Board's current 
contention that such transcr ipt  is indispendable 
(Board Pe t .  15) comes too  l a t e  in  the day; i t  
attempts to in jec t  an issue not l i t i g a t e d  below in 
any fashion.



12

an abuse o f  d iscre t ion .  Other c i r c u i t s ,  some o f  

them even in h ighly  v i s i b l e  landmark decisions 

have attempted to deal with the de ta i l s  o f  fees 

determinations in a s imi lar  manner.—^

With r e s p e c t  to  the d e c i s i o n  o f  the court  

o f  appeals to remand the major part o f  the case, 

th a t  d e c i s i o n  i s  "not  y e t  r i p e  f o r  r e v iew  by 

t h i s  C o u r t , "  Brotherhood o f  Locomotive Firemen 

and Enginemen v .  Bangor A roos took  R. Co. , 389

U.S. 327 (1967 ) ,  and the i n t e r l o c u t o r y  na ture  

o f  a decree  is  "a  f a c t  tha t  o f  i t s e l f  a lone 

furnishe [s ] s u f f i c i e n t  ground fo r  the denial of  

the app l ica t ion "  fo r  c e r t i o r a r i .  Hamilton-Brown 

Shoe Co. v. Wolf Brothers & Co. ,  240 U.S. 251, 

258 (1916).

Under the opinion below the d i s t r i c t  court 

reta ins  ample d is c re t ion  " to  assure fundamental 

fa irness  to a defendant" (Board Pet. 12), which,

6_/ S ee , e . g . , Johnson v .  Georg ia  Highway
E x p res s , I n c . , 488 F . 2d 714 (5 th C i r . 1974);
L in d y  B r o s B u i l d e r s , Inc ,  v .  American Rad. & 
Stand. Sanitary Corp. ,  487 F . 2d 161 (3d Cir.  1973) 
(Lindy I ) ;  C ity  o f  Detro it  v.  Grinnel l  Corp. ,  495 
F . 2d 448 (2d Cir .  1974) (Gr innell  I ) ;  Lindy I I ,  
540 F .2d 102 (3d Cir .  1976)“ T en banc);  Grinnel l  
I I ,  560 F.2d 1093 (2d Cir.  1977); King v. Green- 
b l a t t , 560 F .2d 1024 (1 s t  C i r .  1977),  cerF .
denied, 438 U.S. 916 (1978).



13

we might add, appears here as a proven " v i o l a t o r

o f  f edera l  law." Christiansburg Garment Co. v .

EEOC, 434 U.S.  412, 418 (1978 ) .  N ev e r th e l e s s

" th e  [ s ch oo l  d e s e g r e g a t i o n ]  p l a i n t i f f  i s  the

chosen instrument o f  Congress to v i n d i c a t e  'a

po l i c y  that Congress considered o f  the highest 
7 /

p r i o r i t y . " '  j[d_.— In § 1988 Congress d i r e c t e d

that p reva i l in g  school desegregation p l a i n t i f f s '

lawyers should have th e i r  fees  f ixed  "by the same

standards which p reva i l  in other types o f  equally

complex F ed e ra l  l i t i g a t i o n ,  such as a n t i t r u s t

c a s e s . "  See P e t .  App. 12-A. A n t i t r u s t  and

s im i l a r  commercial cases are l e g i o n  in which

lawyers  comparably s k i l l e d  and expe r ien ed  to

p l a i n t i f f s '  ch ie f  t r i a l  counsel have been awarded

much more than the base rate  o f  $125/hr. which the
8/

court below, on a complete record,— found reason-

]_/ The Senate con s id e red ,  and r e j e c t e d  by a 
v o t e  o f  50-32, a proposed amendment o f  § 1988 
tha t  would have exc luded  schoo l  d e s e g re g a t i o n  
cases from the s t a t u t e ' s  c o ve ra ge .  122 CONG. 
REC. S16451, SI 6457 (d a i l y  ed. 29 Sept. 1976); 
See a l s o  H.R. REP. NO. 94-12558, 94th Cong.,  
2d Sess.  4-5 ,  7 (15 Sept .  1976); 122 CONG.
REC. H12159 ( d a i l y  ed.  1 Oct. 1976) (remarks 
o f  Rep. Drinan).

8/ The reasonableness o f  the hourly ra te  claimed 
by p l a i n t i f f s '  ch ie f  counsel was attes ted  to  by



14 -

able fo r  court room work.—-

On the issue o f  compensat ing p r e v a i l i n g  

p a r t i e s '  counsel " f o r  a l l  time reasonably expended 

on the matter , "— ^pe t i t ion e rs '  asserted c o n f l i c t

8/ cont 'd .

the a f f i d a v i t s  o f  three prominent Memphis a t t o r ­
neys ;  the Board p resen ted  no c o u n t e r v a i l i n g  
evidence on th is  issue.

9/ Compare, e . g . ,  Shapiro  v .  C onso l ida ted
Edison Co. , CCH Fed. Sec.” L. Rep. § 196, 364 (S.D. 
N.Y. 1978); Frankenstein v. McCrory, 425 F. Supp. 
762 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Quirke v. Chessie Corp. , 368 
F. Supp. 558 (S.D.N.Y7 1974); Arenson v. Board o f  
Trade, 372 F. Supp. 1349 (N.D. 111. 1974); TWA
v. Hughes, 312 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); C ity  
o f  Philadelphia  v. Chas. P f i z e r  Co. ,  345 F . Supp. 
454 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Colson v .  H i lton Hotels Corp.,  
59 F.R.D. 324 (N.D. 111. 1972); Oppenlander v .
Standard O i l  Co. , 64 F.R.D, 597 (D. Colo. 19747; 
Hew Corp. v. Tandy Corp. , 480 F . Supp. 758 (D.
Mass. 1979).

10/ The court  o f  a p p e a l s ' s tandard is  taken 
verbatim from S. REP. NO. 94-1011, 94th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 6 (29 June 1976), which in turn quoted the
holdings in Davis v.  County o f  Los Angeles, 8 EPD
1 9444 (C.D. C a l i f .  1974), and" Stanford~~Daily v . 
Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680 (N.C. C a l i f .  1974). In
S tan fo rd  D a i l y , 64 F.R.D. a t  684, a t  the page 
c i t ed  in the l e g i s l a t i v e  h is to ry ,  the d i s t r i c t  
court re jec ted  the pos i t ion  taken by some federa l  
courts, " that hours spent on the l i t i g a t i o n  o f  un-



15

among the c i r cu i t s  is  considerably more imaginary 

than rea l .  The two courts of  appeals and four 

d i s t r i c t  courts which p e t i t ion e rs  c i t e  (Board Pet.

11-12; C ity  Pet. 17-18) in fa c t  are not in con-
11/

f l i c t  w i th  the r u l in g  b e low .—  Moreover ,  the 

courts which have expressly considered the app l i ­

cable l e g i s l a t i v e  h is to ry  are in complete agree-

10/ cont 'd .

successful claims should be deducted from the num­
ber o f  hours which an attorneys '  fees  award is  
computed." The Court held:  "However, severa l  r e ­
cent decis ions,  adopting a d i f f e r e n t  tack, deny 
fees for  c l e a r l y  mer i t less  claims but grant fees 
fo r  l ega l  work reasonably calculated to advance 
th e i r  c l i e n t s '  in te res ts .  These decis ions ac­
knowledge that courts should not require a t t o r ­
neys (o f ten  working in new or changing areas of  
the law) to  devine the exact parameters o f  the 
cour ts  ' w i l l i n g n e s s  to  grant r e l i e f . "  This 
was (and i s )  the usual ru le  in n o n -c iv i l  r igh ts  
cases .  See , e . g . ,  L o c k l in  v.  Day-Glo Color  
Corp, 429 F.2d 873 (7th Cir.  1970), c e r t . denied, 
400 U.S. 1020 (1971); Farmington Dowel Products 
Co. v. Forster  Mfg. Co. , 421 F.2d 61 (1st Cir. 
1970); McGowan v.  King, In c . ,  569 F.2d 845 (5th 
Cir.  1978). See also^ e . g . , Palmer Rodgers, 10 
EPD .1 10,499 (D. D.C. 1975); Walker v. Ralston 
Purina Co. , 409 F. Supp. 101 (M.Ek Ga. 1976); c f . 
United States v. M i t c h e l l , 580 F.2d 789 (5th Cir.  
1978).

11/ The c i r c u i t  decisions r e l i e d  upon by p e t i ­
t i o n e r s  are Nadeau v.  Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275 
(1 s t  C i r .  1978),  and S c h a e f f e r  v .  San Diego



- 16 -

ment with the Sixth C i r c u i t .—  Congress did no 

more than adopt the general rule extant at the

11/ cont 'd .

Yel low Cabs, In c . , 462 F.2d 1002 (9th Cir.  1972) 
(a pre-§ 1988 case construing T i t l e  V I I ) .  These 
d e c i s i o n s  are  w h o l l y  d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e  from the 
in s ta n t  case on the s imple  ground tha t  they 
involved mult ip le  claims f o r  r e l i e f , on only one 
or a few o f  which p l a i n t i f f s  p reva i led ,  whereas 
th i s  case i n v o l v e s  a s i n g l e  c la im  f o r  schoo l  
desegregation on which p l a i n t i f f s  en t i r e l y  pre­
va i led .  The F i r s t  C ircu i t  has made i t  c lea r  that 
i t  does not d i s a g r e e  w i th  the S ix th  C i r c u i t ' s  
approach below. In Lamphere v. Brown Univ. , 610 
F. 2d 46, 47 (1st Cir.  1979), the court c i t ed  and 
distinguished i t s  e a r l i e r  decis ion in Nadeau as 
f o l l o w s :

Also,  i t  was not error  to award fees fo r  the 
t ime spent by counse l  in  an unsuccess fu l  
a ttempt to broaden the scope o f  remedies 
ava i lab le  under the decree. This issue was 
a l l  part  o f  and p a r c e l  o f  one matter  - -  
counse l  should not  be p e n a l i z e d  f o r  every  
l o s t  motion. This is not the same as a case 
where c la ims are t r u l y  f r a c t i o n a b l e . C f . 
Nadeau v. Helgemor, 1 C i r . ,  1978, 581 F.2d 
275.

The d i s t r i c t  cour t  d e c i s i o n s  r e l i e d  upon by 
p e t i t i o n e r s  are s i m i l a r l y  d i s t in g u i s h a b l e  as 
cases "where c la ims are t r u l y  f r a c t i o n a b l e . "

12/ See, e . g . ,  Brown v .  Bathke , 588 F .2d 634 
(8th Cir.  1978); Donaldson v. O'Connor, 454 F. 
Supp. 311 (N.D. Fla. 1978).



17

time i t  passed § 1988 ( see note 10, supra) , and

the S ix th  C i r c u i t  d id  no more than adhere to

c l e a r  c o n g r e s s io n a l  des ign  and i n t e n t ,  "The

statute  c a l l s  f o r  a reasonable fee ,  not a bargain- 
13/

basement f i gu re . -— The Sixth C ircu it  has l e f t  

i n t a c t  the  t r a d i t i o n a l  d i s c r e t i o n  o f  d i s t r i c t  

cour ts  in these  m a t te r s ;  the court  has simply 

recognized that "such d iscre t ionary  choices are 

not l e f t  to a court 's  ' in c l in a t ion ,  but to i t s  

judgment; and i t s  judgment i s  t o  be guided by 

sound l e ga l  p r i n c i p l e s . " '  Albemarle Paper Co. , 

v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 416 (1975).

F ina l ly  there is  no v a l i d i t y  to  the Board's 

contention (Pet.  13-14) that the appl icat ion of 

§ 1988 and § 1617 to th is  continuously ac t ive  case 

is  i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  t h i s  C o u r t ' s  d e c i s i o n  in 

Bradley v. School Bd. o f  Richmond, 416 U.S. 696
14 j

(1974)—  We have repeatedly  challenged the Board

13/ C f . P i t c h f o r d  S c i e n t i f i c  I n s t .  Corp. v 
P ep i ,  I n c . ,  440 F. Supp. 1175, 1177 (W.D. Pa. 
1977).

14/ Wheeler v. Durham City  Bd. o f  Educ. ,  585 F.2d 
^T8 (4th C i r . 1978), Is not contrary . There the 
case had become dormant then the fee statute  was 
passed, and there was nn pending l i t i g a t i o n  over 
any issue. This case, in  t o ta l  contrast , was the 
subject o f  ac t ive ,  heated l i t i g a t i o n  when both 
appl icable  f ee  statutes were enacted. See Hutto 
v .  F inney ,  437 U.S. 678, 694-95 n. 23~Cl978)  .



- 18 -

to a l l e g e  the pre judice and in ju s t i c e  necessary to 

f i t  the "m a n i f e s t  i n j u s t i c e "  e x c e p t i o n  to  the 

Bradley ru le ,  but the Board has f a i l e d  to respond 

and i t  does not respond here. Nowhere does the 

Board claim that i f  i t  had known o f  i t s  po ten t ia l  

statutory l i a b i l i t y  f o r  fees ,  "rather  than simply 

the common-law a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  an award, [such 

knowledge] would hve caused the Board to order i t s  

conduct so as to render th is  l i t i g a t i o n  unecessary 

and thereby preclude the incurr ing o f  such c o s t s . "  

Id at 721. To the contrary, the Board’ s e f f o r t  to 

undermine the desegregation plan in the spring of 

1977, we l l  a f t e r  the passage o f  both § 1617 and 

§ 1988, demonstrates that knowledge o f  poten t ia l  

attorneys '  fees  l i a b i l i t y  had no impact on the 

conduct o f  th is  board o f  education. The court o f  

appeals was manifestly  correct in  concluding that 

th e re  i s  a complete  absence o f  p r e ju d i c e  to  

the Board. Pet. App. 17-A.

This  case  does not m er i t  r e v i ew  by th i s  

Court.

14/ cont'd.

There are probably more than 100 lower court de­
c is ions in accord with the Sixth C i r c u i t ' s  de­
c is ion  in th is  case.



19

CONCLUSION

For the forego ing reasons, the pe t i t ions  fo r

wr i ts  o f  c e r t i o r a r i  should be denied.

Dated: 13 May, 1980

Respect fu l ly  submitted,

WILLIAM E. CALDWELL
Ratner & Sugarmon 
525 Commerce T i t l e  Bldg. 
Memphis, Tennessee 38103 
(901) 525-8601

NORMAN J. CHACHKIN
520 Woodward Bldg.
733 15th Stree t ,  N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20005 
(202) 628-7446

JACK GREENBERG 
JAMES M. NABRIT, I I I  
BILL LANN LEE

Suite 2030 
10 Columbus C irc le  
(212) 586-8397

Attorneys f o r  Respondents



APPENDIX



APPENDIX

The " l o n g ,  com p l ica ted  h i s t o r y  o f  th i s

b i t t e r l y  c o n te s t ed  schoo l  d e s e g r e g a t i o n  case"

(Pet.  App. 2-A) may be traced through the reported

opinions of  th is  Court (which has twice granted

r e v i e w ) ,  the Court o f  Appeals f o r  the  S ix th

Circuit  ( ten  reported d ec is ions ) ,  and the d i s t r i c t

court (innumerable decisions and orders ) .  See
la/

e . g . , Board Pet. 2.----- A "genera l  desc r ip t ion , "

s u f f i c i e n t  " t o  g i v e  an understanding o f  the 

scope and qua l i ty  o f  representation provided by 

the p l a i n t i f f s '  attorneys in the course o f  the 

las t  two decades" (Pe t .  App. 2-A to  3-A) ,  is  set 

out in the opinion below. Pet. App. 3-A to  4-A,

The F i rs t  Appl icat ion and Award

Two weeks a f t e r  th is  Court declined to  review 

the f in a l  plan o f  desegregation ordered by the 

d i s t r i c t  c ou r t ,  416 U.S. 962 (22 A p r i l  1974),

l a / A comprehensive summary o f  the h is to ry  o f  
th is  l i t i g a t i o n  takes up nearly 50 pages o f  our 
opening B r i e f  f o r  P I a i n t f f s - A p p e l l a n t s , f i l e d  
in the court below, 6th Cir  Nos. 78-1289,-1290,- 
1291 (served 4 December 1978).

la



p l a i n t i f f s '  counsel wrote counsel fo r  the Board, 

i n i t i a t i n g  an e f f o r t  to s e t t l e  p l a i n t i f f s '  claim 

fo r  costs , including reasonable a ttorneys '  fees  

and out-of-pocket expenses. When these e f f o r t s  

f a i l e d ,  p l a i n t i f f s  f i l e d  a formal motion fo r  such 

an award, against both the Board and the C i ty  on 1 

August 1974. Protracted l i t i g a t i o n  over the fees 

issues then ensued.

The d i s t r i c t  cour t 's  24 March 1976 "Ruling on 

the App l ica t ion  o f  P l a i n t i f f s  fo r  Attorneys Fees" 

addressed p l a i n t i f f s  enti t lement to an award o f  

fees .  The court he ld:  (1 )  that,  as to the Board 

defendants, p l a i n t i f f s  are the "p r e va i l in g  party"  

and otherwise f u l f i l l e d  the requirements o f  § 718 

o f  the Emergency School Aid Act o f  1972, 20 U.S.C. 

§ 1617 ( P e t .  App. 4 2 - A ) ; ( 2 )  tha t  § 1617, as 

construed in Bradley v.  School Bd. o f  Richmond, 

supra , a u th o r i z e s  an award on ly  f o r  s e r v i c e s  

rendered a f t e r  the e f f e c t i v e  date o f  the statute ,  

1 July 1972, because (a )  there was on that date no 

app l icat ion  f o r  fees "pending under circumstances 

where in  i t  was sub jec t  t o  a d i r e c t  a p p e l l a t e  

rev iew" (Pet.  App. 44-A) or (b ) in the a l terna­

t i v e ,  because under the standard enunciated by the 

law o f  th is  case, Northcross v. Board o f  Educ. o f  

the Memphis City  Schools, 412 U.S. 427 (1972), 

"the lack o f  s p e c i f i c  guidel ines and the resu l t ing

- 2a



t r i a l  and error  experimentation [ in  school deseg­

regat ion  cases] ,  coupled with the fact that the 

p l a i n t i f f  never applied f o r  any attorneys fees 

p r i o r  to  the l a t t e r  par t  o f  1972, are c ircum­

stances  which would make a r e t r o a c t i v e  award 

unjust" (Pe t .  App. 48-A);  (3 )  that, add i t iona l ly

as to the Board defendants, p l a i n t i f f s  are en­

t i t l e d  to an award o f  fees f o r  serv ices  rendered 

a f t e r  the decisions in Swann v . Charlotte-Meck­

l enburg Bd. o f  Educ. , 402 U.S. 1 (A p r i l  20, 1971), 

and companion cases, because the Board's l i t i g a ­

t ion  conduct in response to those decisions was 

"obst inate  and obdurate" (Pet.  App. 45-A to  46-A);  

and (4 )  that p l a i n t i f f s  are en t i t l ed  to recover 

fees as part o f  the costs to be assessed against 

the C i t y  de fendants  under both § 1617 and the 

"obst inate  and obdurate" standard. Pet. App. 49-A 

to  51-A.

Therea fter ,  p l a i n t i f f s  documented over 4,800
2a/

hours—  o f  serv ices  rendered by p l a i n t i f f s '  law-

2a/ Nearly 4,000 hours were in connection with 
proceedings ar is ing  out o f  p l a i n t i f f s '  1968 Motion 
fo r  Further R e l i e f .  The 1968 motion was f i l e d  
pursuant to  t h i s  C o u r t ' s  d e c i s i o n  in  Green v . 
County School  Bd. , 391 U.S. 430 (1968 ) ,  and 
companion cases. In i t s  24 March 1976 ruling the

3a



yers in l i t i g a t i o n  against the C ity .  P l a i n t i f f s  

also amended th e i r  app l ica t ion  to include re l iance  

on i n t e r v e n in g  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  the  C i v i l  R igh ts  

A ttorney 's  Fees Awards Act o f  1976, amending 42 

U.S.C. § 1988. P l a i n t i f f s  supported the i r  a p p l i ­

c a t i o n  w i th  a d e t a i l e d  f a c t u a l  p r e s e n ta t i o n :  

answers to  in t e r roga to r i e s ;  a 14-page s t ipu la t ion  

o f  fac ts  perta in ing to  the C i ty ,  along with an 

agreed  7-page p r e -h e a r in g  o rder  d e s i g n a t in g  

re levant parts o f  the record; near ly  100 pages o f  

a f f i d a v i t s  and suppor t ing  documentat ion from 

counsel f o r  p l a i n t i f f s  i temiz ing  the necessary 

s e r v i c e s  rendered  and l i t i g a t i o n  expenses i n ­

curred; o f  a f f i d a v i t s  from three prominent Memphis 

attorneys fam i l ia r  with the h is to ry  o f  th is  case

2a/ cont fd .

d i s t r i c t  court c o r re c t l y  observed that "the denial  
of  c e r t i o r a r i  by the Supreme Court in A p r i l  1974 
was the cu lm ina t ion  o f  p roceed ings  which were 
in i t i a t e d  in August 1968 when there was f i l e d  on 
b e h a l f  o f  the  p l a i n t i f f s  a Mot ion f o r  Further  
R e l i e f . . . "  P e t .  App. 47 -A . As the court  o f  
appeals described the intervening years: "For the
next four and a h a l f  years, the case moved at a 
steady pace back and for th  between the d i s t r i c t  
court, th is  Court [o f  Appeals] and the Supreme 
Court, as one phase a f t e r  another of  an e f f e c t i v e ,  
comprehensive desegregation plan was hammered out. 
In 1973, a new twis t was added when the C ity  o f  
Memphis attempted t o  b lock  d e s e g r e g a t i o n . . . . "  
Pet. App. 3-a.

- 4a -



and w i th  ra t e s  charged in  the community f o r  

complex federa l  l i t i g a t i o n ;  and o f  a f f i d a v i t s  from 

out-of-town attorneys fam i l ia r  with school de­

segregat ion l i t i g a t i o n  in general and with the 

importance and complexity o f  th is  case in part icu­

la r .  In response, the Board f i l e d  no a f f i d a v i t s
3a/

or any other evidence,—  and the C i ty  f i l e d  two 

a f f i d a v i t s  from Memphis lawyers ,  c o n s i s t i n g  

o f  a t o t a l  o f  three substantive sentences and not 

r e f e r r in g  at a l l  to federa l  court l i t i g a t i o n .  In 

addit ion,  the d i s t r i c t  court held a hearing on 22 

October 1976, resu l t ing  in a transcr ipt  of  109 

pages.

On 4 November 1977 the d i s t r i c t  court f i l e d  

th is  "Award on Appl icat ion o f  the P l a i n t i f f s  fo r  

Attorneys Fees" (Pe t .  App. 53-A to  62-A),  dispos­

ing  o f  p l a i n t i f f s '  c la ims as f o l l o w s :  (1 )  the 

cour t  d e c l in e d  to  r e c o n s id e r  i t s  r u l i n g  that  

§ 1617 does not authorize fees  fo r  serv ices ren-

3a/ By agreement,  the  Court was r eq u i r e d  to  
respond to  p l a i n t i f f s '  p r e s e n ta t i o n  only  as 
i t  re la ted  to serv ices  rendered since the Swann 
d e c i s i o n  in 1971. Pursuant to the court  o f  
a p p e a ls '  remand, the Board w i l l  now have the 
o p p o r tu n i t y ,  i f  i t  chooses,  t o  respond to  the 
i t e m i z a t i o n s  r e l a t i n g  to  pre-1971 s e r v i c e s .

- 5a -



dered p r i o r  to  1 July  1972, and a l s o  h e ld  42
A a  /

U.S.C .  § 1988 to  be i n a p p l i c a b l e , — ' thereby

denying recovery f o r  about 2,084 hours o f  serv ices 

(Pet- App. 55-A ) ; (2 )  the court awarded $21,490 to 

two o f  p l a i n t i f f s '  attorneys fo r  one-hal f  o f  816 

hours o f  serv ices in connection with the Board's 

"obdurate and obst inate "  conduct in the l a t t e r  

h a l f  o f  1971 and the spring of  1972 (Pet .  App. 

55-A),  and omitted a l together  347 hours o f  ser­

v i c e s  o f  th ese  two a t t o r n e y s  dur ing t h i s  t ime
5a/

frame without any discussion at a l l ; -— ■ (3) the

4a/ The court had e a r l i e r  decl ined to award fees 
under § 1617 fo r  pre-July 1972 serv ices  on the 
ground that  that  s t a t u t e ' s  a p p l i c a b i l i t y  was 
" l im i ted  to  cases where the matter o f  an award for  
attorneys fees was pending under circumstances 
where in  i t  was su b jec t  t o  a d i r e c t  a p p e l l a t e  
r ev iew . "  Pet. App. 44-A. Although th is  condit ion 
was f u l f i l l e d  by the 1976 amendment to  42 U.S.C. 
§ 1988, passed w h i l e  the ques t ion  o f  f e e s  was 
pending decis ion in the d i s t r i c t  court, the court 
refused to apply § 1988 on the new ground that 
" th e  Judgment in the  case had become f i n a l  in 
1974." Pet. App. 55-A).

5a/ The Board appealed the d i s t r i c t  cour t 's  bad 
fa i th  f inding and the l im ited  award o f  fees based 
on tha t  f i n d in g .  The court  o f  appeals  p r e -  
termitted decis ion o f  those issues with i t s  ho ld­
ing that fees for  serv ices rendered since 1968 
are au th or i z ed  by s t a t u t e .  The Board has not 
renewed i t s  pos i t ion  here.

6a



court  awarded the same two lawyers  $7,200 f o r

one-hal f  o f  240 hours o f  serv ices  rendered a f t e r  1

July  1972 "because the p l a i n t i f f s '  [proposed

desegregation]  plan was re jec ted  and there fore  to

that extent they did not p r e v a i l "  (Pet .  App. 56-A

to 57-A); and omitted, without discussion, 580

hours o f  s e r v i c e s  rendered  by these  a t to rneys

dur ing  the same p e r i o d ,  as w e l l  as 39 hours

c la imed by a t h i r d  a t t o r n e y ; — - ( 4 )  the court

denied recovery o f  a l l  hours claimed by p l a i n t f f s '

New York cocounsel associated with the NAACP Legal

Defense and Educat iona l  Fund, I n c . ,  w i th  the

s ing le  statement that "there  has been no showing

that h is  serv ices  were necessary in addition to
7a /the serv ices  o f  l o ca l  counsel" (Pet .  App. 58-A)—-  

(the claim is f o r  829 hours, o f  which 619 were in

6a/ The d i s t r i c t  court 's  award nowhere id en t i ­
f i e s  or  d iscusses  the many hours o f  s e r v i c e s  
which were exc luded from compensat ion a l t o ­
g e th e r .  In 31 pages o f  appendices at tached 
to  our opening b r i e f  in  the court  o f  appeals 
( see note la , supra) , we "attempted,"  in the words 
of  the court o f  appeals, " l a r g e l y  by guesswork, 
t o  i d e n t i f y  which hours o f  s e r v i c e  . . .  were 
excluded from cons idera t ion . "  Pet. App. 21-A.

l a j  The court o f  appeals c o r rec t ly  noted that New 
York counsel "p r o v id ed  the p l a i n t i f f s  w ith  
many hours o f  serv ice  which were not provided by 
anyone e l s e ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  in  connec t ion  with  
th is  Court and the Supreme Court. " 611 F.2d at 
657.

7a



t ime p e r io ds  o th e rw is e  covered  by the c o u r t ' s

e n t i t l e m e n t  r u l i n g ) ;  ( 5 )  the court  awarded

a g a in s t  the C i t y  $6,930 f o r  ove r  115 hours o f

serv ices  (out o f  a claim fo r  over 305 hours) (Pet .
8a/

App. 58-A to 61-A)—— and $343.26 in costs and
/

expenses;—  (6 ) the court evaluated the serv ices 

o f  the two p l a i n t i f f s  ' lawyers who were allowed 

fees at a routine hourly ra te  o f  $60 per hour for  

" lead counsel" and $40 per hour fo r  subordinate 

counsel (Pet.  App. 57-A),  but summarily declined 

(Pet. App. 58-A) to consider e i th e r  the ex t rao rd i ­

nary circumstances urged by p l a i n t i f f s  to  warrant 

an upward adjustment in  the base r a t e  o r  the

8a/ The d i s t r i c t  court i d e n t i f i e d  the excluded 24 
hours o f  serv ices against the C ity  on grounds o f  
unnecessary duplicat ion .  Pet. App. 59-A and 60-A. 
These f ind ings,  the only s p e c i f i c  facts  found were 
not disturbed by the court o f  appeals, but are 
subject to reconsideration on remand.

9a/ The court, a lso  without f indings,  awarded 
p l a i n t i f f s  part ($8,007.31 o f  $19,548.77 expended) 
of  th e i r  statutory costs and out-of-pocket ex­
penses incurred in l i t i g a t i o n  against the Board 
from September 1971 through 1974 (Pet.  App. 61-A),  
and denied, without mention, p l a i n t i f f s '  claim 
f o r  $12,619.95 in  c o s t s  and expenses incurred  
p r io r  to September 1971. Questions r e la t in g  to 
s t a t u t o r y  c o s t s  and l i t i g a t i o n  expenses were 
remanded f o r  r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n  by the court  o f  
appeals (Pet .  App. 25-A to  28-A) ; none of these 
issues is  presented f o r  review here.

- 8a



extreme in f l a t i o n  of  the intervening years which 

had s i g n i f i c a n t l y  devalued the 1971-73 rates.

A judgment in conformity with th is  ru l ing  was 

entered by the d i s t r i c t  court pursuant to FED. R. 

CIV. P. 54 (b ) ;  p l a i n t i f f s  appealed and both the 

Board and the C ity  cross appealed.

The Second Appl icat ion and Award

In the words o f  the court o f  appeals (Pet.  

App. 4 - A ) :

In the meantime, a new controversy had 
f l a r e d  up, when the School Board sought 
s u b s t a n t i a l  m o d i f i c a t i o n  o f  P lan Z which

10a/ P l a i n t i f f s  presented documentation to the 
d i s t r i c t  court showing that by 1976 the Board o f  
Education lawyers over the years had been paid —  
when th e i r  serv ices  were rendered, win, lose or 
draw —  the e q u i v a l e n t  o f  o v e r  350,000 1975 
do l lars  to defend the dual system. Appl icat ion o f  
the Consumer Pr ice  Index increases since 1975 to 
the same f igures  ( i . e . ,  excluding fees paid by the 
Board since 1975) resu l ts  in an amount equivalent 
to  about 550,000 1980 d o l l a r s .  These d o l l a r  
f igures  r e la t e  only to attorneys '  fees and revea l  
no th in g  about the u n to ld  worth o f  the endless  
hours devoted by the Board's superintendent and 
h is  s t a f f  t o  the de fense  o f  t h i s  l i t i g a t i o n .

9a



wou ld  have  s l o w ed  down and underm ined  
the progress of  desegregat ion.  A f ive -day  
t r i a l  was held in 1977, and the defendant's 
proposals were, fo r  the most part,  r e jec ted  
by the court.

See also Pet. App. 63-A to  64-A. Pursuant to the

d i s t r i c t  cour t 's  determination at the conclusion

of  i t s  24 May 1977 Memorandum that p l a i n t i f f s  were

the p reva i l in g  party e n t i t l e d  to a ttorneys '  fees ,

p l a i n t i f f s  documented 271.25 hours o f  necessary
11a/

s e r v i c e s  r e l a t e d  t o  the May 1977 h e a r in g .

On the question o f  amounts to be recovered, 

the d i s t r i c t  court entered i t s  ru ling  on 7 July 

1978 (Pet .  App. 63-A),  awarding $8,382.00 in fees 

and holding as fo l lows:  (1 )  the court awarded

fe e s  f o r  197.25 hours o f  the 271.25 hours o f  

s e r v i c e s  rendered  by p l a i n t i f f s '  a t t o r n e y s ,  

disapproving, without i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  or sp ec i f i c  

f indings,  74 hours o f  claimed necessary serv ices ;  

( 2 )  as to approved hours,  the  court  (a g a in ,  

without s p ec i f i c  f ind ings )  employed an across- 

the-board discount o f  20% as "an adjustment [ that ]

11a/ P l a i n t i f f s  made no c la im  f o r  s e r v i c e s  
re la ted  to th e i r  separate contention that a new 
high school (rather  than renovation o f  an ex is t ing  
s c h o o l )  should be b u i l t  in  the Westwood area ,  
excep t  f o r  2 hours which were in a d v e r t e n t l y  
included in the a f f i d a v i t s  and e x p l i c i t l y  excluded 
by the d i s t r i c t  c o u r t .  See P e t .  App. 65-A to  
66-A.

- 10a -



should be made f o r  the time devoted to parts of  

issues on which the p l a i n t i f f s  did not p r e va i l "

( P e t .  App. 6 6 - A ) ; -----  ( 3 )  w h i l e  approv ing  the

"normal h o u r ly  r a t e s "  c la im ed  by p l a i n t i f f s '  

attorneys Noel and F ie lds  ($6G/hr. and $40/hr., 

r e s p e c t i v e l y ) ,  the court reduced ( t o  $75/hr. ) as 

"excess ive "  (but without exp lanation )  the base 

rate  ($125/hr.) claimed by p l a i n t i f f s '  ch ie f  t r i a l  

lawyer  Lucas (P e t .  App. 6 6- a ) ;   ̂ ( 4 )  the

court re jec ted  p l a i n t i f f f '  request for  an upward 

adjustment o f  the award, s tat ing  i t s  "opinion that 

an incent ive  or m u l t ip l i e r  fac tor  is not author­

ized or al lowed fo r  the serv ices  rendered in th is

l_2aJ  For example, p l a i n t i f f s  opposed the Board's 
m o d i f i c a t i o n  and schoo l  c l o s in g  p lan in  i t s  
e n t i r e t y  on the  ground tha t  the proposa l  as a 
whole was in ten t iona l ly  r a c ia l l y  discr iminatory, 
was a rb i t ra ry ,  and portended disruption o f  deseg­
regated schools which appeared to  be s ta b i l i z ed .  
The d i s t r i c t  judge agreed with these contentions 
and en te red  p r e c i s e  f in d in g s  and conclus ions  
to th is  e f f e c t ,  but in the process o f  separately  
a n a ly z in g  each p i e c e  o f  the t o t a l  package, 
he found a few proposals so innocuous as not to  
r e q u i r e  d is a p p r o v a l .  These are the s o r ts  o f  
"parts  of issues"  which the p l a i n t i f f s  are pre­
sumed to have los t .

13a/ The rates fo r  Noel and Fie lds have not been 
disputed, but the rate  for  Lucas was reviewed and 
r e v i s e d  by the court  o f  appeals  and the Board 
makes i t  an issue here. Board Pet. 15-16.

11a -



phase of  the case . "  Pet. App. 66~a.——-

The court  o f  appea ls  c o n so l id a t e d  c ross  

appeals  from the f i r s t  and second awards f o r  

argument and decis ion.

The D e c i s i o n  o f  the Court o f  Appeals 

In i t s  d e c i s i o n  o f  23 November 1979, the 

S ix th  C i r c u i t  "cone lude  [d ] tha t  both orders  

g ra n t in g  a t t o r n e y s '  f e e s  and expenses p ro v id e  

inadequate compensation, contain l e ga l  e rrors ,  and 

reach factua l  conclusions not supported by the 

r eco rd . "  Pet.  App. 10-A. Since the record on the 

f i r s t  award was not in a posture f o r  f i n a l  dispo­

s i t i o n  ( see note 3a, supra) , the court remanded 

the pr inc ipa l  part o f  the case fo r  further pro­

ceed ings  in accordance w i th  the standards se t  

out in th is  op in ion . "  I d . The court determined, 

however, that the record on the second award was 

"adequate . . .  fo r  us to independently assess an 

appropriate award, . . .  and we do so to demonstrate

14a/ On the ground that they were "excess ive "  or 
without " j u s t i f i c a t i o n , "  the court awarded only 
one-half  o f  p l a i n t i f f s '  expenses fo r  exper t -w i t ­
ness fees ,  preparation of  a pr ivate-school  pupi l -  
locator  map, and photocopying, thereby awarding 
$5,200.16 o f  the $7,788.96 expended by p l a i n t i f f s .  
P e t .  App. 67-A to  68-A. The court  o f  appeals  
sustained a l l  aspects of  th is  holding, except the 
disallowance of photocopying expenses (Pet .  App. 
32-A to  33-A ) , and none o f  these issues is  pre­
sented fo r  review.

12a



the f in d in g s  and con c lu s ions  which we ho ld  

the d i s t r i c t  courts must enter in the record in 

making fee  awards." I d . The court said ( id .  ) :

We understand tha t  the f in d in g s  o f  f a c t  
which are required to substantiate a court 's  
exerc ise  of  i t s  d is c re t ion  in making a fee 
award are f r e q u e n t l y  v e ry  com p l ica ted .  
Nevertheless,  both the court 's  f indings and 
i t s  mode o f  analysis must be c lear  to enable 
an appel la te  court to i n t e l l i g e n t l y  review 
the award. The p l a i n t i f f s  are e n t i t l e d  to  
some e x p la n a t io n  o f  the r eason ing  used to  
exclude those hours which were cut, and some 
descr ipt ion o f  the f indings which were r e l i e d  
upon to f ind  that expenses and b i l l i n g  rates 
were excessive .  Any review o f  the court 's  
awards in th is  case would require substant ia l 
amounts o f  sheer conjecture on our part,  as 
we sp ecu la t e  as to  reasons why the court 
might have cut cer ta in  documented hours. In 
fac t ,  i t  is impossible to t e l l  whether the 
d i s t r i c t  judgement might not have s imply 
o v e r lo ok ed  c e r t a i n  s e r v i c e s  p ro v ided  by 
p l a i n t f f s '  a t t o r n e y s .  C e r t a in l y  no more 
substant ia l reason appeals in th is  record.

The court  o f  appea ls  h e ld ,  f i r s t ,  tha t  20 

U.S.C. § 1617 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988, both enacted 

while  th is  case was in ac t ive  l i t i g a t i o n ,  author­

i ze  fees fo r  serv ices rendered to p l a i n t i f f s  since 
15a/1968.----- The court e lected  to focus i t s  decis ion

15a/ Because o f  an unresolved dispute about the 
meaning o f  a 1966 order, a f t e r  which the case was

13a



on the app l ica t ion  of  § 1988 and i t s  comprehensive 

l e g i s l a t i v e  h i s t o r y .  P e t .  App. 11-A. On the 

b a s i s  o f  t h i s  C o u r t ' s  d e c i s i o n  in B rad ley  v . 

School Bd. o f  Richmond, supra, and the e x p l i c i t  

l e g i s l a t i v e  h i s t o r y  o f  § 1988 th a t  the new 

statutory author izat ions f o r  a t torneys '  fees  apply 

to a l l  pending cases (cases in which " there  was an 

ac t ive  controversy . . .  at the time the Act became 

e f f e c t i v e " ) ,  "unless spec ia l  circumstances ex is t  

which would make an award m a n i f e s t l y  u n ju s t . "  

Pet.  App. 14-A. Applying that standard to th is  

case, the court held that while  " [ c ] e r t a i n  interim 

aspects o f  the case may have been subject to  a 

f in a l  order s e t t l in g  the issue o f  a t torney 's  fees 

to that point,  rendering the reopening o f  long-  

s e t t l ed  aspects o f  the case un fa i r "  (Pet.  App. 

16-A), there has been no such order since 1968 in 

t h i s  l i t i g a t i o n .  In  response to  the d i s t r i c t  

court 's  reasons f o r  denying app l icat ion  o f  the 

s t a t u t e ,  the  court  h e ld  ( P e t .  App. 17-A and 

18-A):

15a/ cont 'd .

dormant un t i l  p l a i n t i f f s  f i l e d  th e i r  Green motion 
in 1968 ( see Pet. App. 3-A) ,  the court o f  appeals 
remanded the question of  entit lement to fees for  
pre-1968 s e r v i c e s  to  the d i s t r i c t  court  f o r  
further  considerat ion. Pet.  App. 17-A to 18-A. 
That issue is  not before  the Court.

- 14a -



However, we r e j e c t  the no t ion  tha t  mere 
uncertainty in the law is a "spec ia l  circum­
stance" ju s t i f y in g  r e j e c t i o n  of  the statutory  
remedy. A major purpose o f  the Fees Awards 
Act was to encourage the bringing o f  suits in 
new and undeveloped areas o f  c i v i l  r i g h t s  
law, and i t  would be anomalous indeed i f  we 
were to  deny f e e s  f o r  the  ve ry  reason the 
statute was passed. F ina l ly ,  the p l a i n t i f f s '  
d e l a y  i n  a p p l y i n g  f o r  f e e s  (w h ich  was 
l a r g e l y  due t o  the f a c t  tha t  th e re  was no 
e a r l i e r  appropriate time to pause fo r  l i t i g a ­
t i o n  o f  the  f e e  i s su e ,  at  l e a s t  not s in ce  
1966) i s  h a rd ly  grounds f o r  denying f e e s .  
The de fendants  have f a i l e d  t o  po in t  to  
any prejudice or harmful e f f e c t s  on them as a 
result  o f  the p l a i n t i f f s '  delay.  The pre­
ju d i c e ,  i f  any, has inured to  p l a i n t f f s ' 
attorneys who have provided years o f  serv ice  
w i thout  compensat ion in hand. This is  
not a case where, years a f t e r  a case has been 
f i n a l l y  d isposed  o f ,  the p r e v a i l i n g  par ty  
seeks to  reopen the case to l i t i g a t i o n  of  the 
f e e s  issue .  Cf United S ta tes  v .  P in to ,  44 
F.R.D. 357 (W.D. Mich. 1968).

*  *  *  *  *  *

However, from 1968 un t i l  short ly  before  the 
app l ica t ion  f o r  fees was made by the p la in­
t i f f s ,  the  case was in  cont inuous,  a c t i v e  
l i t i g a t i o n .  Not on ly  was th e r e  no " f i n a l  
judgment" which could reasonably be said to 
s e t t l e  the issue o f  fees during that period, 
but there was not time to ra ise  the matter 
o f  fees at a l l .

15a -



Second, the Sixth C ircu it  held that in th is  

s ing le -c la im  school desegregation case in which 

the p l a i n t i f f s  had "preva i led  on the case as a 

whole" (Pe t .  App. 18-A) and "obtained the r e l i e f  

which they sought" (Pe t .  App. 19-A), the d i s t r i c t  

court p la in ly  erred "by deciminating the to ta l  

hours c la imed w i th  a r b i t r a r y  p e rc en ta ge s "  to  

account fo r  " issues or parts o f  issues" on which 

p l a i n t i f f s  had asserted ly  not preva i led .  Pet. 

App. 18-A and 19-A. supra . The r u l e  adopted,  

based on the l e g i s l a t i v e  h is to ry  o f  § 1988, is 

that a l l  necessary serv ices  are to  be compensated, 

"as is  t r a d i t i o n a l  with attorneys compensated by a 

fee-pay ing c l i e n t ,  fo r  a l l  time reasonably ex­

pended on a matter . "  Pet.  App. 19-A. "The hours 

claimed need not be automatically  accepted by the 

d i s t r i c t  court, but to  the extent that hours are 

r e jec ted ,  the court must indicate  some reason for  

i t s  a c t i o n . . . .  Hours may be cut f o r  duplicat ion, 

padding or f r i vo lou s  c la ims. "  Pet. App. 2Q-A. 

Since in  i t s  f i r s t  award the d i s t r i c t  court 

had "simply e l iminated, without comment, hundreds 

o f  hours o f  documented s e r v i c e , "  the court remand­

ed that part o f  the case " f o r  entry o f  f indings o f  

fac t  and conclusions o f  law adequate to  permit our

- 16a -



review o f  the award." Pet.  App. 21-A.——̂

F in a l l y ,  the court addressed the appropriate 

standard f o r  determining a reasonable hourly rate ,  

and concluded that the " f a i r  market value o f  the 

serv ices  provided" (Pet.  App. 23-A) is  the appro­

p r i a t e  standard to  implement the in t en t  o f  

Congress.  The court  adhered to  i t s  e a r l i e r  

decis ion in O l iver  v.  Kalamazoo Bd. o f  Educ. , 576 

F . 2d 714 (6th Cir.  1978), d isa llowing "a 'bonus' 

m u l t i p l i e r . "  Pet. App. 23-A. But the court did 

recognize (Pet .  App. 24-A):

This  does not mean that  the r ou t in e  
hour ly  r a t e  charged by a t t o rn ey s  is  the 
maximum which can or should be awarded. In 
many cases tha t  r a t e  i s  not " r e a s o n a b l e , "  
because i t  does not take in to account special  
c i rcum stances ,  such as unusual t ime con-

16a/ Pursuant to th e i r  attempt below to id en t i f y  
the hours excluded without comment by the d i s t r i c t  
court ( see note 6a, supra) , p l a i n t i f f s  determined 
that the d i s t r i c t  court had el iminated a l l  hours 
during the period covered by i t s  award r e la t in g  to 
monitoring the f in a l  desegregation decree (136.8 
h r s . ) ,  to  s e r v i c e s  rendered on appeal (231.5 
h r s . ) ,  and hours expended on the l i t i g a t i o n  of  
p l a i n t i f f s  claim f o r  costs and fees (341 h r s . ) .  
The court o f  appeals held that compensation is  due 
fo r  these serv ices  (Pet.  App.21-A to 22-A), and 
that holding is  not contested here.

17a -



s t r a i n t ,  or  an unusual ly  unpopular cause, 
which a f f e c t  the market value o f  the serv ices 
rendered .  Perhaps the most s i g n i f i c a n t  
fac to r  in these cases which at time renders 
the routine hourly fee  unreasonably low is 
the fact that the award is contingent upon 
success.

The court there fore  held that in such appropriate 

cases an upward adjustment in the routine hourly 

r a t e  may be necessa ry  in  o rde r  t o  a r r i v e  at a 

"reasonable” fee  fo r  par t icu la r  serv ices  rendered.

The court then applied these standards to  the 

second award, invo lv ing  a claim fo r  271.25 hours 

o f  se rv ices .  The d i s t r i c t  court had awarded an 

average of  $31 Air. f o r  these serv ices .  The court 

o f  appea ls ,  f i n d i n g  th a t  "we have a complete 

record and conclude that the in teres ts  o f  ju s t ic e  

w i l l  be served, in l i gh t  o f  the long delay in th is  

case ,  by our r e c a l c u l a t i o n  o f  an a p p ro p r ia t e  

award . . , "  (Pet .  App. 28-A) , scrut in ized  the record 

and found the d i s t r i c t  court 's  award to  be inade­

quate. Pet. App. 29-A to  32-A. The court there­

f o r e  made adjustments  to  the award, the end 

resu l t  of which was to award p l a i n t i f f s '  attorneys 

an average  o f  $63/hr. f o r  th ese  s e r v i c e s ,  in  

contrast to  the $31/hr. awarded by the d i s t r i c t

18a -



court. With respect to the 74 hours o f  serv ices 

which the d i s t r i c t  court  had exc luded  without  

f ind ings,  the court o f  appeals determined: "Not 

only is th is  cut unsupported in the record, but we 

conclude that i t  i s  c l e a r l y  excessive g iven the 

f a c t s  o f  t h i s  case "  where " th e r e  was l i t t l e  

overlapping o f  s e r v i c e s . "  Pety. App. 29-A. (For 

that " l i t t l e  over lapping" the court reduced the 

compensable hours by 5%). The court a lso  re jec ted  

the  d i s t r i c t  c o u r t ' s  20% r ed u c t i o n  a l l e g e d l y  

des igned  to  d iscount  f o r  " p a r t s  o f  i s s u e s "  on 

which p l a i n t i f f s  did not p r e va i l .  See Pe t .  App. 

18-A.

The court further found that while  the normal 

hourly f e d e r a l - l i t i g a t i o n  rate  of  $125/hr. fo r  

p l a i n t i f f s 1 experienced ch ie f  t r i a l  counsel was 

"high f o r  o f f i c e  s e r v i c e s , "  i t  was "reasonable and 

supported both by the record and our own expe­

r ience with fees charged by lawyers o f  his expe­

r i e n c e  and l e g a l  s ta tu re  f o r  t r i a l  s e r v i c e s . "  

Pet.  App. 39-A. In response to  p l a i n t f f s '  conten­

t ion  that there was a high degree of  contingency 

in th is  aspect of  the case because s imi lar  though 

l e s s  e x t e n s i v e  Board-proposed m o d i f i c a t i o n s  

o f  the desegregation plan had been approved over 

p l a i n t i f f s '  objections during each o f  the three

19a



preceding years,  the court o f  appeals found that 

although "there  was a rea l  element o f  contingency 

as to whether the attorneys would be compensated 

f o r  t h e i r  s e r v i c e s  at a l l , "  the con t ingency  

element was reduced by other fac tors ,  pr imar i ly  by 

the fact that "the burden was on the Board" which 

"here was seeking to a l t e r  a f in a l  judgment o f  the 

d i s t r i c t  cour t  which had been a r r i v e d  at on ly  

a f t e r  many years o f  b i t t e r  l i t i g a t i o n . "  Pet. App. 

31-A. The court there fore  concluded that an award 

adjustment o f  only 10% was adequate to a r r iv e  at a

reasonable f e e  in l i g h t  o f  the contingency fac tor .
17a/

Id .—----

The Board (but not the C i t y )  pe t i t ioned  the 

court o f  appeals fo r  rehearing, with suggestion 

f o r  en banc considerat ion, which was duly denied 

without dissent.

17a/ The court a lso  af f irmed the d i s t r i c t  court 's  
d i s p o s i t i o n  w i th  r e sp ec t  t o  cos ts  and o u t - o f -  
pocket expenses, except fo r  the denial  of photo­
copying costs .  These issues are not be fo re  the 
court. See note 17, supra.

20a ~



ME1LEN PRESS IN C  —  N. Y. C. 219