Kennard v. McKamer Realty Company Brief of Appellants
Public Court Documents
September 5, 1960

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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Kennard v. McKamer Realty Company Brief of Appellants, 1960. ca931de1-b99a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/076faa8a-7069-426a-98ee-fd0739e73418/kennard-v-mckamer-realty-company-brief-of-appellants. Accessed May 18, 2025.
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In The Court of Appeals of Maryland September Term , 1960 N o. 131 MAMIE E. KENNARD, et al., JU LIA JONES, et al. and LILLIAN WATERS, Appellants, McKAMER REALTY COMPANY, e t a l ., Appellees. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Baltimore City ( Anslem Sodaro, Judge) (S. Ralph Warnken, Judge) BRIEF O F APPELLANTS Tucker R. B earing, P aul J. Cockrell, W. A. C. Hughes, J r., J uanita J ackson Mitchell, J ulius P. Robinson, Archie D. W illiam s, A ttorneys for Appellants. The Daily Record Co,, Baltimore 3, Md, I N D E X Table of Contents page Statement of the Ca s e .................................................. 1 Questions in Controversy ............................................ 1 Statement of the Fa cts ................................................ 3 Argument ......................................................................... 6 Conclusion ....................................................................... 50 Table of Citations Cases Abel v. Proprietors of Greenmount Cemetery, 56 A. 2d 26 ............................................................. .............. 11,16 Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 6 S. Ct, 209 .............. 16 Catholic Cathedral v. Manning, 72 Md. 116 .............. 26 City of Cincinnati v. Cook, 140 N.E, 655, 107 Ohio St. '223 ............................................................................... 49 City of New York v. New York, New Haven & H. Ry. ' Co., 344 U.S. 293, 73 S. Ct. 299 .............................. 19 Coombs v. Getz, 285 U.S. 434, 52 S. Ct. 435 .................. 14,15 Conney v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141, 76 S. Ct. 724 19 County Commissioners v. School Commissioners of Worcester County, 113 Md. 305, 77 A. 605 ........... 26 Davis v. State, 7 Md. 160 ..........................................26, 27, 28 Dawson v. W estern M aryland Ry. Co., 107 Md. 70, 68 A. 305 ..................................................................... 10 Drennen v. Banks, 80 Md. 310, 30 A. 655 .................. 26, 31 Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 3 L, Ed. 162 .............. 14 Graham v. Graham, 59 A. 2d 180, 190 Md. 434 .......... 46 Griffin v. Griffin, 66 S. Ct. 975 ...................................... 19 Hairston v. Danville & Western Ry. Co., 208 U.S. 598, 28 S. Ct, 331 17 11 H ardester v. C harretts, 84 Md. 146 ................................ 20 Hays v. Richardson, 1 G. & J. 336 .................................... 10 Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 54 S. Ct. 2 8 1 ................................................................... 17 K afka v. W ilkinson, 99 Md. 238, 57 A. 6 1 7 ................... 27 L am bert v. People of S ta te of California, 78 S. Ct. 240 19 Lew is’ Appeal, 67 Pa. 153 ................................................ 24 L iberto v. M. & C. C. of Baltim ore, 23 A. 2d 4 3 ........... 49 Louisville Jo in t Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 55 S. Ct. 854 ................................................ 14,15 Lum an v. H utchens Bros., 90 Md. 1 4 ............................ 21,16 M arbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 ................................ 24 M atter of Bensel, 29 N.Y. Supp. 682 ................................ 44 M atter of Simmons, 114 N.Y. Supp. 575 ....................... 44 M atter of N. Y. W. & B. R. Co., 130 N.Y. Supp. 1005 45 Mayor, Etc. v. Reitz, 50 Md. 574 .................................... 26 Mayor, Etc. v. S tate, 15 Md. 469 .................................... 24 Mealey v. Hagerstown, 92 Md. 741 ................................ 38 Miggins v. Mai lot. 169 Md. 435 ........................................ 29 M iller v. Wicomico Co., 107 Md. 438 ............................ 30 M ullane v. C entral H anover Bank & T rust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S. Ct. 652 .................................................. 19 N utw ell v. A nne A rundel County, 110 Md. 667 ....... 39 P ain ter v. M attfeldt, 119 Md. 466, 87 A. 4 1 3 ............... 22 Panhandle E astern P ipe Line Co. v. S ta te H ighw ay Commission of Kansas, 55 S. Ct. 563 ................... 18 Parkinson v. S tate, 14 Md. 1 8 4 ........................................ 28 Partridge, E t Al. v. F irs t Independent Church of Baltim ore, 39 Md. 620 ............................................ 10,11,12 Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 43 S. Ct. 158 ................................................................... 17 People v. D raper, 15 N.Y. 543 ............................................ 24 Phillips Petroleum Co., E t Al. v. Jenkins, 297 U.S. 629, 56 S. Ct. 611 ........................................................ 14 Q uenstedt v. Wilson, 173 Md. 11 .................................... 29 PAGE I l l Regents, Etc. v. W illiams, 9 G. & J. 408 ........................ 24 R eport of Ruggles (N.Y .), 4 B radf. Sun. 503 ........... 45 Scharf v. Tasker, 73 Md. 378, 21 A. 5 6 ............................ 26 Shea v. S tate, 148 Md. 256 ................................................ 32 Shelly v. K raem er, 68 S. Ct. 836 .................................... 19 Silverwood v. Latrobe, 68 Md. 620, 13 A. 161 ........... 11,13 S tate v. Baltim ore & Ohio R. R. Co., 127 Md. 434, 96 A. 636 ............................................................................. 14 S ta te v. McKinney, 29 Mont. 375, 74 P. 1095 ............... 26 S ta te v. Morris, 70 Md. 91 ................................................ 28 S ta te v. Schultz Gas F ix tu re & A rt M etal Co., 83 Md. 58, 34 A. 243 ......................................................... 26 Trustees of D artm outh College v. W oodward, 4 W heat 518, 4 L. Ed. 629, 17 U.S. 5 1 8 ........................ 13, 14 Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 4 W all 535, 18 L. Ed. 403 ................................................................................... 14 W alker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 118, 77 S. Ct. 200 ................................................................................... 19,21 W ar then Company v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 425, 54 S. Ct. 816 ................................................................................... 14 W hitm an v. S tate, 80 Md. 410, 31 A. 325 ....................... 26 W hitm ore v. W oodlawn Cem etery, 75 N.Y. Supp. 847 44 W indt v. Church, 4 Sandf. 471 ........................................ 11 PAGE Miscellaneous A nnotated Code of M aryland: Art. 16, Sec. 120 ....................................2, 3, 7,13,16,18, 20, 21, 27, 36, 43, 48, 49 A rt. 23, Sec. 176 ............................................................ 11 Art. 23, Sec. 165 ...................................................... 13, 42,43 Art. 16, Sec. 119............................................................ 36, 37 M aryland Constitution, Art. I ll, Sec. 29 ...............2, 23, 25, 27 IV M aryland Rules of P rocedure: Rule 1 ............................................................... 6 Rule 104 ......................................................................... 20 Rule 105 (g) .................................................................2,4, 6, 7 Rule 180 ......................................................................... 19 U nited S tates Constitution: A rt. I, Sec. 10 .............................................................7,14,18 14th A m endm ent ........................................................ 18, 20 Laws of M aryland: Law s of 1852, Ch. 2 21 ................................................ 9,12,13 Laws of 1868, Ch. 211 .......................................... ...... 32, 40 Laws of 1888, Ch. 369 ............................................34, 46, 40 Laws of 1900, Ch. 75 .................... 38 Laws of 1912, Ch. 345 ............................................... 22 Laws of 1957, Ch. 630 ................................21, 37, 38,39, 43 Black’s Law Dictionary, 3rd Edition ............................ 15 Cooley on Con. Lim., 3rd Edition, 175 ......................... 24 Cyclopedic Law Dictionary, 1940 E d itio n .................. 15 The Law of Cadavies, 1936 E d itio n ................................ 45 16 C.J.S. 178 ........................................................................... 49 49 C.J.S. 269 ........................................................................... 46 PAGE In The Court of Appeals of Maryland September Term , 1960 N o. 131 MAMIE E. KENNARD, et al., JU L IA JONES, et al. and LILLIAN WATERS, Appellants, v. McKAMER REALTY COMPANY, et al., Appellees. Appeal, from the Circuit Court of Baltimore City (A nslem Sodaro, Judge) (S. Ralph Warnken, Judge) BRIEF OF' A PPELLANTS STATEMENT O F TH E CASES These are th ree appeals from separate decrees passed by th e C ircuit Court of Baltim ore City (Sodaro and W arnken, Judges) dismissing A ppellants’ Bills of Com plaint for Re view and other relief. QUESTIONS IN CONTROVERSY I. W ere the Decree Pro Confesso and the subsequent F inal D ecree en tered by th e C ircuit C ourt of Baltim ore City Docketed as Case Docket 97A, Folio 878 of the said C ourt p u re nullities in view of the absolute failure of the Com plainants to file the affidavit as required by Rule 105(g) 2 of th e M aryland Rules of P rocedure prom ulgated by the C ourt of Appeals of M aryland? If so, was not such Court of Equity w ithout jurisdiction and therefore powerless to pass any such decree or decrees? II. Did th e Chancellors in th e in stan t cases e rr in refusing to en ter a judgm ent declaring th a t A rticle 16, Section 120 of the A nnotated Code of M aryland is in contravention of A rticle I, Sec. 10 of the Constitution of the U nited States in th a t A rticle 16, Section 120 of the A nnotated Code of M aryland abrogates the contracts of th e Com plainants and the m em bers of the class represented by the Complainants? III. Did the Chancellors e rr in the instan t cases in refusing to strike out th e D ecree P ro Confesso and the final decrees in view of A ppellants’ allegations and proof th a t said de crees w ere en tered in violation of the D ue Process Clause of the F ourteen th A m endm ent to the Constitution of the U nited States? IV. W ere the D ecree P ro Confesso and the subsequent final decree en tered by the C ircuit Court of Baltim ore City docketed as Case Docket 97A, Folio 878 of the said Court p u re nullities in view lof the fact th a t A rticle 16, Section 120 of the A nnotated Code of M aryland is in violation of A rticle III, Section 29 of the Constitution of M aryland? V. A re th e A ppellants entitled to have the D ecree of the C ourt in th e case of McKamer Realty Company v. Anderson Enterprises, Incorporated, et a t, 97A, Folio 878, set aside inview of the proofs presented th a t such D ecree was ob tained by fraud upon the Court? 3 VI. Should A rticle 16, Section 120 of the A nnotated Code of M aryland be declared unconstitutional to the ex ten t tha t it attem pts to delegate the police pow er of the S tate of M aryland to p riva te individuals? VII. Is A rticle 16, Section 120 of the A nnotated Code of M ary land unconstitutional for the reason th a t it is an unreason able discrim ination against cem etery lot ow ners in B alti m ore City in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the F ourteen th A m endm ent to the U nited S tates Constitution? STATEMENT OF FACTS Laurel C em etery was incorporated in 1852 pursuan t to an A ct of the M aryland Legislature. Follow ing this in corporation the m anagem ent of the cem etery proceeded to sell lots and issue deeds under the seal of the corporation. Num erous bodies w ere in terred in the cem etery and for m any years following 1852 the cem etery enjoyed a high repu ta tion as a cem etery in the Baltim ore community. D uring the 1930’s and 40’s the m anagem ent of th e ceme te ry became lax to the ex ten t th a t the cem etery was not being w ell kept even though in ternm ents w ere continuing. In 1949 a group of in terested lot owners form ed an associa tion and raised about $1,000.00 w hich was spent for the im provem ent and beautification of th e cem etery. John G. K aufm an, then P residen t of the cem etery, m et w ith this group of in terested lot ow ners and the ir a tto rney and dis cussed plans for the im provem ent of the cem etery, how ever Mr. K aufm an failed to give any assistance in this regard. In 1952 John G. K aufm an pu t the cem etery in voluntary bankruptcy w here nothing more was done un til 1957 w hen the M aryland Legislature passed a Bill authorizing 4 the sale of cem eteries in Baltim ore City w hen such ceme teries w ere 75% abandoned. Follow ing the passage of this law the M cKamer R ealty Company, a corporation form ed by John G. Kaufm an, C lem ent R. Mercaldo and Lloyd G. M cAllister, purchased the cem etery from the T rustee in B ankruptcy for the nom inal sum of $100.00. T hereafter the M cK am er R ealty Company transferred a portion of the cem etery, by Q uit Claim Deed, to Anderson Enterprises, Incorporated. On Decem ber 10, 1957 the M cKamer R ealty Company filed its B ill of Com plaint in the C ircuit C ourt of B altim ore C ity for the sale of the cem etery under th e provisions of A rticle 16, Section 120 of the A nnotated Code of M aryland. The Bill nam ed as defendants, A nderson Enterprises, Inc., several know n defendants w ithout addresses, and other unknow n defendants. An O rder of Publication w as issued in accordance w ith the S tatu te, and A nderson Enterprises, Inc., filed an answ er through its solicitor. On A pril 14, 1958 a D ecree Pro Gonfesso was issued even though no affidavit w as ever filed in compliance w ith the requirem ents of Rule 105 (g ) of the M aryland Rules of Procedure. The case was referred to the Exam iner-M aster and on A pril 24, 1958 testim ony w as taken. Several witnesses, in cluding Complainants President-Counsel, testified as to various aspects of the cem etery, and Com plainants P resi dent-Counsel testified th a t he had made a thorough and exhaustive search for lot owners, b u t had been unable to locate any of them. On M ay 16, 1958, the Exam iner-M aster, apparently being concerned about the fact th a t burials w ere still being m ade in the cem etery, recalled Complainants President-Counsel for additional testim ony a t w hich tim e it was adm itted th a t there had been a burial a short tim e before, bu t no inform ation could be gotten as to the w here about tof the deceased person’s family. On M ay 27, 1958 the report of the Exam iner-M aster was filed in the C ircuit C ourt 5 w ith a recom m endation th a t the C ourt decree a sale of the cem etery. On Ju n e 10, 1958 the Court ordered the sale of the ceme te ry and appointed Edw ard A. Anderson, P residen t of De fendant A nderson Enterprises, Inc., T rustee for the purpose of m aking the sale upon certain conditions. On Ju ly 10, 1958 the Belair Roads E nterprises w as incorporated and on the sam e day Clem ent R. Mercaldo, John G. K aufm an and Lloyd G. M cAllister, sole owners of Com plainant Corpora tion, purchased all of the stock of the B elair Roads E nter prises, Inc., and C lem ent R. Mercaldo, President-Counsel for Com plainant, was elected president of the Belair Roads Enterprises, Inc. On Ju ly 14, 1958 B elair Roads Enterprises, Inc., en tered into a contract w ith Edw ard A. Anderson, T rustee for th e purchase of the cem etery by B elair Roads Enterprises, Inc. This contract was signed by one Benjam in J. M artin as president of Belair Roads Enterprises, Inc. On Ju ly 25, 1958 Clem ent R. Mercaldo resigned as president of B elair Roads Enterprises, Inc., and Benjam in J. M artin was elected president. On October 16, 1958 Benjam in J. M artin resigned as president of Belair Roads Enterprises, Inc., and Clem ent R. M ercaldo was again elected presi dent. On Septem ber 11, 1958 the Court ratified th e sale of the cem etery to Belair Roads Enterprises, Inc., and subse quently th a t corporation set about to rem ove the bodies to a corn field in C arroll County. A bout December, 1958 Com plainants herein learned through the local press tha t the cem etery had been sold and bodies w ere being removed. In May, 1959 Complainants brought the th ree cases herein involved, all seeking to have the Court review and set aside its prior action. D efendants filed Answ ers and moved to have the cases consolidated for trial, bu t abandoned the ir motion and w ent to tria l on the Jones and Waters 6 cases on Decem ber 18, 1959 before the Honorable S. Ralph W arnken sitting as a Chancellor in Equity. The Kennard case was heard before the H onorable A nselm Sodaro in Jan u a ry 1960. N um erous witnesses w ere called by Com pla inants for the purpose of establishing the fact th a t the sale of the cem etery had been accomplished by a fraud having been practiced upon the Court, and th a t Com plainants have a valid defense to th e sale of the cem etery. ARGUMENT I. W ERE T H E DECREE PRO CONFESSO AND T H E SUBSEQUENT FINAL DECREE ENTERED BY T H E C IRCU IT COURT O F BA LTI M ORE C ITY D OCKETED AS CASE D OCKET 97A FOLIO 878 O F T H E SAID C IRCU IT COURT PURE NULLITIES IN V IE W OF T H E ABSOLUTE FAILURE O F T H E COM PLAINANTS TO FILE T H E A F FID A V IT AS REQUIRED BY RULE 105G OF TH E MARYLAND RULES O F PROCEDURE PROM ULGATED BY T H E COURT O F APPEA LS O F M ARYLAND? IF SO, W AS NOT SUCH COURT OF EQUITY W IT H O U T JU R ISD IC T IO N AND TH ER EFO R E POW ERLESS TO PASS ANY SUCH DECREE OR D ECREES? The D ecree P ro Confesso and the subsequent F inal D ecree entered by the C ircuit C ourt of B altim ore City docketed as Case Docket 97A, Folio 878 of th e said C ircuit C ourt w ere p u re nullities in view of the com plainants abso lu te failure to file the affidavit required by Rule 105G of th e M aryland Rules of Procedure prom ulgated by the Court of Appeals of M aryland. I t therefore follows th a t the Court of E quity of B altim ore C ity was w ithout jurisdiction and powerless to pass th e D ecree P ro Confesso and F inal Decrees. Rule I of the M aryland Rules p rovides: “The following Rules of P rocedure apply to appeals to the C ourt of Appeals and to procedure in all Crim i nal and Civil Actions a t Law and in Equity, including juvenile causes in C ourt of this State. They m ay be cited as the ‘M aryland Rules’.” 7 Rule 105G of the M aryland Rules of this Court p rovides: “W here notice by publication alone has been given, because th e residence or w hereabouts of the defendant is unknown, no in terlocutory or final judgm ent for the plaintiff shall be given un til proof is m ade by affidavit to the satisfaction of the C ourt th a t reasonable efforts to locate the defendant and to w arn him of th e pend ency of th e action, have been made. The failure of the plaintiff to m ake such reasonable effort in good faith, and to offer proof thereof, shall be ground for th e post ponem ent or denial of the en try of a D ecree P ro Con- fesso, judgm ent by default or final judgm ent.” W e contend th a t compliance w ith Rule 105, Section G, requiring the affidavit to be filed is m andatory and Defen dants in the instan t case, the plaintiffs in McKamer Realty Company v. Anderson Enterprises, Inc., fa ilu re to file the affidavits v itiated the en tire proceedings and rendered the action of th e Court in entering the D ecree Pro Confesso and F inal D ecree a legal nullity. W e fu rth e r subm it th a t the C ourt w as w ithout jurisdic tion to en te r th e D ecree P ro Confesso and F inal Decree w here plaintiffs in th e McKamer case had not and did not comply w ith Rule 105, Section G. II. DID T H E CHANCELLORS IN TH E IN STAN T CASES ERR IN R E FUSING TO ENTER A JUDGM ENT DECLARING T H A T ARTICLE 16, SECTIO N 120 O F T H E A NN OTATED CODE OF MARYLAND IS IN CON TRA VEN TION O F ARTICLE I, SECTION 10 OF T H E C O N STI TU TIO N O F TH E UNITED STA TES IN T H A T ARTICLE 16, SECTION 120 O F TH E A NN OTATED CODE O F MARYLAND ABROGATES T H E CONTRACTS O F TH E COM PLAINANTS AND TH E MEMBERS O F T H E CLASS REPRESENTED BY T H E COM PLAINANTS? The Chancellors in th e instan t cases erred in refusing to en ter a judgm ent, declaring th a t A rticle 16, Section 120 of th e A nnotated Code of M aryland is in contravention of A rticle I, Section 10, of the Constitution of the U nited 3 States, in th a t A rticle 16, Section 120, abrogated th e deeds of lot holders and divested vested p roperty rights. P lain tiffs’ deeds in th e instan t cases gran ted fee title to th e bu ria l lots and also easem ents of egress and ingress to each lot. Most of th e deeds held by plaintiffs and the m em bers of th e class w hich they represen t are in th e fol low ing form : “Know all M en by these presents, th a t L aurel Ceme te ry Company, in consideration of S ix ty Dollars, the receip t of which is hereby acknowledged, has granted, bargained and sold, and conveyed, and by these pres ents doth grant, bargain and sell, and convey to C lar ence E. Roy — His heirs and assigns one lot of ground in L aurel Cem etery in Baltim ore County in th e S ta te of M aryland, and N um bered 186 in Section R, on the p lan of said cem etery, containing eighty square feet, m ore or less, w hich plan is in possession of said cor poration for inspection by the G rantee, his heirs and assigns a t all reasonable times, w ith th e righ t of w ay to and from the said lo t along the avenues, walks, paths and ways of said cem etery, to have and to hold th e said lo t and th e righ t of w ay aforesaid to th e said Clarence E. Roy, his heirs and assigns forever, for the purposes of sepulture alone and none o ther subject to the pro visions of a general act of the G eneral Assem bly of M aryland, passed a t Jan u ary Session, E ighteen H un dred and Fifty-two, C hapter 221, entitled: ‘A n act to Incorporate C em etery Companies and subject also to conditions, ru les and regulations’, adopted and to be adopted by th e M anagers of said L aurel Cem etery Company. No transfers recognized unless m ade and attested a t the office of the company. In Testim ony whereof, the P residen t and M anagers of L aurel Cem etery Company have caused their Cor porate Seal to be fixed to this Deed and the P resident of said Corporation hath hereto subscribed his name, th is 20th day of December, N ineteen H undred and N ineteen.” 9 This deed is signed and w itnessed by th e P residen t and S ecretary of the Laurel Cem etery Company, and th e Cor porate Seal was affixed. On th e back of the deed the in term ents in said lo t are recorded. This deed points up th e form used in all the deeds held by plaintiff lo t owners and the m em bers of the class represented by plaintiffs. The Laurel Cem etery Company of Baltim ore was incor porated in th e Superior Court of Baltim ore C ity on June 26, 1852, pu rsuan t to th e provisions of C hapter 221, titled “An A ct to Incorporate Cem etery Companies”. Said A ct was passed M ay 11, 1852, by the M aryland Legislature and was signed by G overnor E. Louis Lowe. Sections 5 and 6 of C hapter 221, provides as follows: Section 5: “A nd be it enacted, th a t every burial lo t sold or con veyed in such cem etery, shall be held by the proprie tors thereof, for the sole purpose of sepulture, and for none other, and shall not in any m anner be subject to attachm ents or execution for debts, or affected by the insolvent laws of the S ta te of M aryland, b u t the estate of the ow ner or owners, in their respective lots, shall descend as rea l estate to heirs, m ay be devised by will, or m ay be disposed of by the ow ner by sale, w ith the approval of the president and m anagers of th e cor poration.” Section 6: “A nd be it enacted, th a t a certificate under seal of the corporation of the ownership of any lot, sold and conveyed as aforesaid, shall, in all respects, have the sam e effect as any conveyance from such corporation of said lo t w ould have, if executed, acknowledged and recorded as conveyances of real estate, are, by the laws of this S tate, required to be.” Section 9 of said Act provides: “And be it enacted, th a t this A ct shall be in force from and after its passage.” 10 In the case Partridge, et al. v. The First Independent Church of Baltimore, decided M arch 3, 1874, 39 Md. 620, The F irs t Independent Church of Baltim ore purchased a lo t of ground in fee fo r a cem etery, and it was used for such purpose. To those purchasing th e rig h t of burial therein, a certificate w as issued, w hereby it w as certified th a t th e p a rty to whom it was issued w as the proprietor of a certain designed lo t in th e cem etery of The F irs t Independent Church of Baltim ore, and th a t such lo t w as granted and conveyed by th e Church to the party , his heirs and assigns forever; subject to th e regulations of th e trustees of the Church. This certificate was neither under seal, nor ac knowledged, nor recorded; b u t was sim ply signed by the C hairm an of the Trustees and attested by the register. The C ourt held: “W e th ink it clear th a t it (certificate) conferred no title or estate in the soil; nor could it operate as a gran t of an easem ent, because i t was not under seal, nor acknowledged and recorded, so as to be effective to convey such an interest, Hays v. Richardson, 1 G. & J. 336. The righ t to an easem ent m ust be founded upon a g ran t by deed, or upon prescription, for it is a perm a n en t in terest in ano ther’s land, w ith a r ig h t of enjoy m ent; w hereas a m ere license is b u t an au thority to do a particu la r act, or series of acts, upon another’s land, w ithout possessing estate therein, 3 Kent. 452. A t most then, the certificate, such as w e have here, conferred only a privilege or license to m ake in term ents in the lot described exclusively of others, as long as the ground rem ained a burying ground or cem etery.” I t is elem entary th a t in th e absence of a sealed in stru m ent you cannot convey an in terest in rea l estate. In Dawson v. Western Maryland R. Co., 107 Md. 70, 68 A. 305, th e C ourt of Appeals of M aryland said a t page 93 : “I t has been settled by a long line of decisions in this S ta te th a t our s ta tu te requiring deeds conveying an estate of inheritance or freehold, or any declaration or 11 lim itation of use, or any estate above seven years, to be executed, acknowledged and recorded as therein provided, is applicable to grants of or covenants for easem ents in land (citing cases) * * * th e principle has been announced in equity, as well as a t law .” The Partridge case, supra, is no t in point here because the deeds of th e lot owners w ere under seal. The grantor in the p resen t deeds was a cem etery company, incorporated under the laws of the S ta te of M aryland. The certificate in the Partridge case was issued by a Church. I t is settled law in M aryland th a t lots in a cem etery are real estate, Abel v. Proprietors of Green Mount Cemetery, 56 A. 2d 26; Silverwood v. Latrobe, 68 Md. 620, 13 A. 161. In the Abel case, the C ourt said: “The A ppellant in fu rtherance of her position shows th a t Section 176 of A rticle 23 of the Code provides th a t the estate of the ow ner in a bu ria l lot in a cem etery is rea l estate, th a t th e A ct of 1837, C hapter 164, incor porating the proprietors of the G reen M ount Cemetery, declares a lot in th a t cem etery to be real estate and th a t th e case of Silverwood v. Latrobe, supra, states th a t th e grantee of such lots has a qualified fee lim ited to the purpose of sepulture. She therefore claims tha t restrictions on th e use of such lots should be trea ted in the sam e m anner as ord inary restrictions on the use of land and not favored by the law, and are s tric tly construed against the grantor. * * * Such lots are thus m ade a striking exception to free transfer. Places of bu ria l are not for b a rte r and sale. They are expected to rem ain in the possession of the fam ily of those purchas ing them and it is a fact of w hich w e m ay take judicial notice th a t they frequently do for generations.” In the Silverwood case, supra, “W hen burying lots in a cem etery have been conveyed by a corporation, a righ t of property is conferred on the purchaser which is like any o ther righ t to real estate. W indt v. Church, 4 Sandf. Ch. 12 471.” The C ourt then distinguishes th e Partridge case, supra: “U nlike the case of Partridge, 39 Md. 631, the Appel lan t has a title to th e lo t by v irtu e of an instrum ent of w riting, under seal, w hich operates as a deed of con veyance. The A ct of 1837 declares the p roperty to be rea l estate. The grantee has a qualified fee lim ited to the purpose of sepulture. The second clause of the in strum en t conveying the property , gives him the righ t to p lan t and cultivate trees, shrubs, and flowers. * * * W hen he accepted the deed, and paid the purchase money, he acquired th is right. H ad he been unable to secure th e right, it is possible, and even probable, th a t he would not have purchased the property. No order subsequently passed by the grantors can be so con strued as to have a retroactive operation, and thus lim it or annul the privilege secured to the grantee by a solemn instrum ent under seal. * * * They m ight m ake general rules and regulations for th e m anagem ent of the cem etery, bu t not special rules w hich would der ogate from prior grants.” I t is clear from these decisions th a t plaintiffs enjoyed a qualified fee in the ir lots in the cem etery. I t is also clear from th e A ct of Assem bly giving L aurel Cem etery the righ t to incorporate, C hapter 221, 1852, from the C harter of the Cem etery Companies, and from th e deeds granting these lots to plaintiffs and the m em bers of the class which they represent, th a t each lot ow ner had “the rig h t of w ay to and from th e said lo t along th e avenues, walks, paths and w ays of said cem etery”. The cem etery company was the tru stee of these rights. P laintiffs w ere the beneficiaries of said tru s ts set up in every deed. The p roperty rights here w ere indestructible and could not be destroyed by th e trustees. The Court in th e bankruptcy proceedings was careful not only to recog nize these rights b u t to reserve the righ ts of these plaintiff s. W e fu rth er sta te th a t th e Court did not have jurisdiction 13 to deprive plaintiffs of these rights by order of publication w hich rare ly notifies persons of any proceedings and did not notify any of the plaintiffs or m em bers of th e ir class in the condem nation proceedings in this Court. F urtherm ore Section 165, A rticle 23, 1957 Code (said Section has been in th e Code since 1868 ) provides th a t the estate of the ow ner in a burial lot in a cem etery is real estate. W e subm it th a t the language in C hapter 221, Sections 5 and 6, is ju s t as appropriate fo r conveying an estate in a cem etery lo t as th e language w hich this Court found in Section 8, C hapter 164 of the Acts of 1837, conveyed an estate in a cem etery lo t in G reenm ount C em etery in Silver- wood v. Latrobe, supra. I t is clear th a t the lot owners in the instan t cases had vested estates in the ir lots w hich th e Legislature and Courts w ere powerless to divest by subsequent action. The action of th e C ircuit C ourt of Baltim ore C ity pu r suant to Section 120 of A rticle 16 of the A nnotated Code of M aryland im paired th e obligation of the deeds. F u rth e r the action of the C ircuit Court of B altim ore C ity pursuant to Section 120 of A rticle 16 of the A nnotated Code of M ary land im paired the obligation of the C harter of th e Laurel C em tery Company granted to it by the S ta te of M aryland on th e 26th day of Ju n e 1852 pursuan t to th e provision of C hapter 221 of the A cts of the M aryland G eneral Assembly passed in 1852. Courts have held in a long line of cases th a t im pairm ent of the obligation of a contract by an act of th e Legislature of a S ta te contravenes A rticle I, Section 10 of th e Consti tu tion of the U nited S tates providing th a t “No S ta te shall pass any law im pairing obligation of th e contracts.” Trus tees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819), 4 W heat. 14 518, 4 L. Ed. 629, 17 U.S. 518; State v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, 127 Md. 434, 96 At. 636; Fletcher v. Peck (1810), 6 Cranch. 87, 3 L. Ed. 162; Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 4 Wall. 535, 18 L. Ed. 403; Phillips Pe troleum Co. et al. v. Jenkins, 297 U.S. 629, 56 S. Ct. 611; W arthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 425, 54 S. Ct. 816; Coombes v. Getz, 285 U.S. 434, 52 S. Ct. 435; Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 55 S. Ct. 854. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, supra, held th a t a 1769 royal C harter giving “The Trustees of D art m outh College”, au thority to fill all vacancies in the ir own body could not be changed by a S ta te s ta tu te of New H am pshire in 1816. This C ourt held in State v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., supra, th a t the charter of a railroad company by the S ta te is a contract betw een th e S ta te and the com pany w ith in the protection of A rticle I, Section 10 of the U nited S tates Constitution and the Legislature m ay not w ithou t th e consent of th e company, repeal or m odify the im m unity from taxation conferred by the charter. In Fletcher v. Peck, supra, contracts w ith in the m eaning of A rticle I, Section 10, em brace those th a t are executed, tha t is, grants, as w ell as those th a t are executory. In Von Hoff man v. City of Quincy, supra, i t was held th a t th e ow ner of coupons on bonds of th e C ity issued under an A ct of th e Legislature authorizing the C ity to collect taxes for its paym ent could not be deprived of his rig h t to paym ent by a subsequent act of the Legislature repealing th e Act authorizing th e bonds. Phillips Petroleum Co., et al. v. Jenkins, supra, held th a t the reserved pow er to am end is no t unlim ited and cannot be exerted to defeat the purpose for w hich the corporate powers w ere granted, or to take property w ithout compen sation, or arb itra rily to m ake alterations th a t are incon sistent w ith th e scope and object of th e charter o r to de stroy or im pair any vested p roperty right. Warthen Co. v. 15 Thomas, supra, held th a t a S ta te s ta tu te w hich exem pt pro ceeds of life policy from liability or seizure under judicial process was unconstitutional under th e contract clause of U. S. Constitution; as applied to debt owing and reduced to judgm ent before th e enactm ent, notw ithstanding legisla tive declaration of emergency, w here act contained no lim i tations as to time, am ount, circum stances or need. In Coombes v. Getz, supra, “The au thority of a S ta te under the so called reserved pow er is wide; b u t is no t unlim ited. The corporate charter m ay be repealed or am ended and w ithin lim its not now necessary to define, the in terrelations of S tate, corporation, and stockholders m ay be changed; bu t neither vested property rights nor th e obligation of con tracts of th ird persons m ay be destroyed or im paired.” In Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, supra, th e Suprem e Court held the F irs t F razier A ct w hich pro vided for the F arm er M ortgagors failing to obtain a compo sition or extension of existing indebtedness could re ta in possession for five years upon paym ent of a reasonable ren ta l fixed by the Court, w ith an option to purchase a t appraised or reappraised value during th a t period, was invalid. “The B ankruptcy pow er like the o ther G reat Substantive Pow ers of Congress is subject to th e F ifth A m endm ent to the Constitution of the U nited S tates.” A deed m ay be defined as a “w ritten instrum ent under seal, containing a contract o r agreem ent w hich has been delivered by the obligee or covenantee. A w riting under seal, by w hich lands, tenem ents, or hereditam ents are con veyed for an estate no t less; than a freehold.” The Cyclo pedic Law D ictionary, 1940 Edition. “A t common law, a sealed instrum ent, containing a contract or covenant delivered by the p a rty to be bound thereby, and accepted by th e p a rty to whom th e con trac t or covenant runs. * * * A w riting containing a contract sealed and delivered.” Black’s Law Diction ary, 3rd Edition. 16 I t has already been established th a t plaintiffs, and the m em bers of the class represen ted by plaintiffs had a prop e rty righ t in th e lots in L aurel Cemetery. Abell and Latrobe cases, supra. W hether the lot owners had fee simple deeds or fee qualified deeds, they still had a p roperty in terest in these lots. U nder the deeds they had, the righ t to have th e ir dead rem ain in terred in th is cem etery un til it should be abandoned, these w ere vested p roperty rights. W hen Section 120 of A rticle 16 provided for the taking of the cem etery w hen it should become 75% abandoned, th is substantially lessened and im paired these contract rights. The plaintiffs have found no requirem ent th a t lo t ow ners in a cem etery record the ir deeds anyw here ex cept a t the cem etery company. The fact th a t D efendants have either w ilfully destroyed or negligently lost said recorded deeds cannot invalidate said recordation a t the cem etery company. Section 120 purports to take, w ithout notice or ju s t compensation, the p roperty of “all deed holders” p roperty not recorded a t the Court House, w ithout any notice to them th a t they m ust record them and w ith out giving them a reasonable opportunity to record them. This abrogated the ir contracts, See 131 A. 2d 49, Opinion of the N ew Hampshire Justices; Campbell v. Hold, 620, 115 U.S., 6 S. Ct. 209. In the Campbell case it w as held tha t rem oval of the bar of th e S ta tu te of Lim itations w here property rights had vested, to divest such property rights was unconstitutional. A rticle 16, Section 120 is void for the reason th a t the legislation was not addressed to a legitim ate end; the legis lation w as for the advantages of particu la r individuals and not for the protection of a basic in terest of society. F urther, no em ergency existed in M aryland w hich fu r nished a proper occasion for the exercise of the reserved pow er of the S ta te to p ro tect any basic in terest of society. 17 Home Building & Loan Ass’n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 54 S. Ct. 281. I t is contended that, w hile some values incident to prop e rty are enjoyed under an im plied lim itation, and the governm ent m ay to some ex ten t dim inish such values w ithout compensation, the im plied lim itation is subject to lim its, in view of the contract and due process clauses. In Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 43 S. Ct. 158, there w as a b ill in equity to enjoin th e Pennsylvania Coal Company from m aking operations under plaintiff’s property in such a w ay as to rem ove the sup ports and cause a subsidence of the surface and of plaintiff ’s house. The deed conveyed the surface b u t in express term s reserved the righ t to rem ove all the coal under the same and the grantee took the prem ises w ith the risk and w aived all claims for damages th a t m ight have arisen from m ining out the coal. The plaintiffs asserted th a t w hatever m ay have been le ft of the com pany’s rights w ere taken aw ay by the K ohler A ct which forbade the m ining of an thracite coal in such w ay as to cause the subsidence of, among other things, any s truc tu re used as a hum an hab ita tion w ith certa in exceptions. The rights of the public in a stree t purchased or laid out by em inent domain are those th a t it has paid for. The protection of p rivate prop erty in the F ifth A m endm ent presupposes th a t it is w anted for public use, bu t provides th a t it shall no t be taken for such use w ithout compensation. A sim ilar assum ption is m ade in the decisions upon the F ourteen th Amendm ent. Hairston v. Danville & Western Ry. Co., 208 U.S. 598, 605, 28 S. Ct. 331. 52 L. Ed. 637. W hen this seemingly absolute protection is found to be qualified by the police power, the n a tu ra l tendency of hum an na tu re is to extend the qualification m ore and m ore un til a t last p riva te p roperty disappears. B ut th a t cannot be accomplished in this w ay under the C onstitution of the U nited States. 18 The general ru le a t least is th a t w hile property m ay be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far, it w ill be recognized as a taking. We are in danger of for getting th a t a strong public desire to im prove the public condition is not enough to w arran t achieving the desire by a shorter out than the constitutional w ay of paying for the change.” Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. State Highway Com mission of Kansas, 294 U.S. 613, 55 S. Ct. 563, held: “ * * * pr ivate righ t of w ay is ‘easem ent’ and ‘land’, and hence state highw ay commission’s order directing pipe line company transporting n a tu ra l gas in both in te rs ta te and in trasta te commerce to remove, lower, or in case pipe and telephone lines w here new highw ays would cross com pany’s righ t of w ay would take p rivate p roperty for public use, S ta te S tatu te, construed as authorizing commission’s o rder w ithou t compensation to company, denies due process,” For the aforegoing reason w e subm it th a t A rticle 16, Sec tion 120, is unconstitutional for the reason th a t it violates both A rticle I, Section 10 of the U nited S tates Constitution and the Due Process Clause of the 14th A m endm ent of the Constitution of the U nited S tates in th a t it takes p rivate property w ithout D ue Process of Law. III. DID T H E CHANCELLOR ERR IN T H E IN STAN T CASES IN RE FUSING TO STRIK E O U T TH E DECREE PRO CONFESSO AND TH E FINAL DECREES IN V IEW OF A PPELLAN TS’ ALLEGATIONS AND PR O O F T H A T SAID DECREES W ERE ENTERED IN V IOLA TION OF T H E DUE PROCESS CLAUSE O F T H E FO U R TEEN TH AMENDMENT TO T H E CO N STITU TIO N O F T H E UNITED ST A T E S? The Chancellor errored in the instan t cases in refusing to strike ou t the Decree P ro Confesso and the final decree in view of A ppellants’ allegation and proof th a t said de crees w ere entered in violation of the Due Process Clause of the 14th A m endm ent of the Constitution of the U nited States. 19 I t is a requirem ent of due process of law under the Four teen th A m endm ent of the Constitution of the U nited S tates th a t w here a p roperty ow ner is a resident of th e S ta te w here th e p roperty is situate, th a t a property ow ner m ust be given a notice of even a condem nation proceeding by public officials. W alker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 118, 77 S. Ct. 200; Lambert v. People of State of California, 78 S. Ct. 240; Shelley v. Kraemer, 68 S. Ct. 836; Griffin v. Griffin, 66 S. Ct. 975; Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S. Ct. 652. In the Hutchinson case the C ourt re itera ted the ru le it sta ted in the Mullane case, th a t adequate notice under the D ue Process Clause, if feasible, m ust be reasonably calcu la ted to inform parties of proceedings w hich m ay directly and adversely affect the ir legally protected interests. See also Conney v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141, 76 S. Ct. 724; and City of New York v. New' York N. H. & H. R. Co., 344 U.S. 293, 73 S. Ct. 299. The Suprem e C ourt of the U nited S tates stated in the Hutchinson case, supra, “M easured by the principles stated in th e M ullane case, supra, w e th ink th a t the notice by publication here falls short of the requirem ents of due process. I t is common knowledge th a t m ere new spaper publi cation ra re ly inform s a landow ner of proceedings against his property. In M ullane w e pointed out m any of the infirm ities of such notice and em phasized the advantage of some kind of personal notice to in terest parties. In the present case there seems to be no com pelling lor even persuasive reasons w hy such direct notice cannot be given. A ppellant’s nam e w as know n to the city, and was on the official records. Even a le tte r would have apprised him th a t his p roperty was about to be taken and th a t he m ust appear if he w anted to be heard as to its value.” The order of publication in the instan t cases did not m eet th e requirem ents set fo rth in Fade 180, sections (a), (b) 20 and (c) of the M aryland Rules of P ractice and Procedure. The defendants had in th e ir possession the nam es of ap proxim ately fou r hundred persons w ho w ere buried in th e cem etery; they could easily have obtained th e nam es and n ex t of kin of these persons from the public records found in the H ealth D epartm ent; they could fu rth er have easily found the address or the last know n addresses iof these persons from said records. They only alleged the defendants w ith very few exceptions and in vague term s in the Bill of Com plaint and O rder of Publication in McKamer Realty Company v. Anderson Enterprises, Inc. We therefore con tend th e caption of the Bill of Com plaint and O rder of Publication was too vague and uncertain and therefore, did not m eet the requirem ents of Rule 180; M aryland Rules of P ractice and Procedure, Michie Code, 1957 Edition. The C ourt of A ppeals in Hardester v. Charretts, 84 Md. 146, 34 A. 1122, stated th a t a S ta tu te providing fo r construc tive service by publication m ust be s tric tly complied w ith; and w here a b ill was filed against the unknow n heirs of the children of Benjam in H ardester, deceased, and the order of publication notified and w arned th e children of A braham H ardester to appear, the notice was fata lly de fective. N either was Rule 104 of th e Rule governing M ary land procedure complied w ith by these defendants in the condem nation su it in this Court. A rticle 16, Section 120 violates th e Due Process Clause of the 14th A m endm ent for the reason th a t the S ta tu te pro vides for taking of p rivate property for p rivate use by order of publication alone w ithout com pensation and does not provide for personal service on M aryland Residence. Mr. M ercaldo and Mr. K aufm an had personal knowledge in the ir possession of the names and location of some of the lot owners who are m em bers of the class represented by com plainants in the in stan t cases b u t neither took any 21 steps to notify personally any of them even by a le tte r or otherw ise of the proceeding pending against them. Both Mr. M ercaldo and Mr. K aufm an w ere officials of th e corpo ra tion and therefore th e ir knowledge is im puted to the M cKam er R ealty Co., Inc. Therefore failu re of plaintiffs in the M cKamer Case, Docket a t 87A, Folio 878 in the C ircuit Court of B altim ore C ity to notify plaintiffs or any m em bers of the class represented by plaintiffs in the instan t cases v itiated the proceedings in the McKamer case, see City of Hutchinson, supra. IV. W ERE T H E DECREE PRO CONFESSO AND T H E SUBSEQUENT FINAL DECREE AS AFORESAID PURE NULLITIES IN T H A T A R T I CLE 16, SECTIO N 120 O F TH E ANN OTATED CODE OF TH E STA TE O F MARYLAND IS IN V IOLA TION O F A RTICLE III, SECTIO N 29 O F T H E CO N STITU TIO N OF T H E ST A T E O F M ARYLAND? A rticle 16, Section 120, A nnotated Code of M aryland introduced into the G eneral Assem bly of M aryland as House Bill 594 and enacted as C hapter 630 of th e Laws of M aryland, 1957 Edition is unconstitutional in th a t the title to such Act is m isleading by apparently lim iting the act to a m uch narrow er scope than the body of th e Act is m ade to encompass. ( See Luman v. Hitchens Bros, 90 Md. 14, 44 Atl. 1051, 46 L.R.A. 393). Title to Bill Set F orth The title to House Bill 594, enacted as C hapter 630 of the Laws of M aryland, 1957 Edition reads, in full, as follows: An Act to add a new section to A rticle 16 of the Anno ta ted Code of M aryland (1951 Edition), title “Chancery”, sub-title “Jurisd iction”, said new section to be know n as 124A and to follow im m ediately a fte r Section 124 of said A rticle 16, providing for the sale and disposition of cem eteries or bu ria l grounds in Baltim ore City under certain conditions for which provision has not been made for the perpetual care an a m aintenance thereof and w hich have been 22 abandoned or are a menace or detrim ental to the public health, safety, security or w elfare; providing for the use and d istribution of funds which m ay be derived from the sale of any such cem eteries or burial grounds, and providing for th e transfer and conveyance of title to the purchasers of any such cem eteries or burial grounds sold under th e provisions of this Act, and re lating generally to the sale and disposition of certain cem eteries or burial grounds in Baltim ore C ity under certain conditions. The leading M aryland case covering the subject of the unconstitu tionality of S ta tu tes based on defective titles to A cts is Painter v. M attfeldt, 119 Md. 466, 87 A. 413, w hich case com prehensively sets fo rth the rules governing the subject. Since this decision, a long line of M aryland de cisions have reaffirm ed the rules set fo rth in th e Painter v. M attfeldt case and the principles announced there in w ithout any suggestion of deviation from its broad doc trines. In the Painter case, supra, the facts w ere th a t the Acts of 1912, C hapter 345, en titled “An Act to provide for a Com m ission to be know n as th e good roads Commission of B alti m ore County, w ith full pow ers to construct and im prove a system of public roads, and providing the ways and m eans for the construction thereof by a bond issue.” Section 1 of said Act provided for the O rganization of the Commission and for the paym ent of the ir salaries by th e County Com m issioners out of the general road and bridge fund of the County, w hile Section 3 required the Commission to expend the funds derived from the sale of bonds in the various elec tion districts of the County and to em ploy all necessary attorneys and assistants for the prom otion of any of the work. O ther Sections provided for the condem nation of land and for the bringing of actions by and against the Commission for the paym ent of judgm ent against the Com mission by the County Commissioners and for the paym ent 23 of the bond issue by the County. In th a t case, it was pointed out th a t A rticle 3, Section 29 of th e Constitution of M ary land declares th a t an Act m ay contain b u t one subject which shall be expressed in its title. The specific title to the act in the Painter case w as as follow s: “An A ct to provide for a Commission composed of Jam es Rittenhouse, George W. Y ellott and Asa B. G ardiner, Jr., to be know n as ‘The Good Roads Com mission of Baltim ore County’ w ith fu ll pow ers to con stru c t and im prove a system of im proved public roads, highw ays and bridges in B altim ore County, M aryland, and providing also the ways and m eans for the con struction and im provem ent thereof by a bond issue of $1,500,000, to be a lien upon the assessable p roperty in said county, and repealing C hapter 744 of th e Acts of the G eneral Assem bly of M aryland, passed a t the Session of 1910.” As indicated above, the body of the act contained pro visions which subjected the County to a great and indefinite liability in excess of th e designated $1,500,000. The C ourt held th a t the T itle to the A ct w as “G laringly false, decep tive, and m isleading,” and the provisions so im properly inserted w ere so in tim ately and inseparably connected w ith its m ain purpose th a t the whole act m ust be declared void. The C ourt fu rth er held th a t the title to such act did not inform th e Taxpayers of the County th a t they w ere to be burdened otherw ise than by the bonds, and th e various other provisions m entioned not being germ ane to the title b u t being necessary to the purposes of th e A ct m ade such title and S ta tu te defective. D uring the course of its opinion, the Court pointed out tha t; of course, upon its provisions which w e shall presently exam ine th e constitutionality or unconstitutionality of such Act is dependent. Before exam ining such provisions, however, w e shall sta te some general principles w hich the C ourt m ust observe and be guided by in passing upon the constitutionality of an Act of the G eneral Assembly. 24 F irst : Every presum ption favors the validity of the S tatu te; i t cannot be stricken down as void unless it p lainly contravenes some provision of the Constitution: a reason able doubt as to its constitutionality is sufficient to sustain it; and th e p a rty assailing the A ct m ust po int out the special provision of the Constitution to w hich it is ob noxious. “P lena ry pow er in the Legislature for all p u r poses of civil governm ent is the rule. A prohibition to exercise a particu la r pow er is an exception.” People v. Draper, 15 N.Y. 543; Lewis’ Appeal, 67 Pa. 153. The general ru le upon th is subject is that, except w here the S ta te or Federal Constitution has imposed lim its upon the legislative power, it m ust be considered as practically unlim ited; b u t this broad pow er appears to be subject, in th is S ta te to some qualifications. Regents, etc. v. Williams, 9 Gill & J. 408, 31 Am. Dec. 72; Mayor, etc. v. State, 15 Md. 469, 74 Am. Dec. 572. Second: The Constitution apportions the powers of gov ernm ent, bu t does not m ake any one of th e th ree depart m ents subordinate to the o ther w hen exercising th e tru s t com m itted to it. The Court m ay declare legislative enact m ents unconstitutional and void in some cases, b u t not be cause the Judicial pow er is superior in degree or dignity to the legislative. Being required to declare w hat th e law is in the cases w hich come before them, they m ust enforce the Constitution as th e param ount law, w henever a legis la tive enactm ent comes in conflict w ith it. (Cooley on Con. Lim., 3d Ed., 175), or, as said by Chief Justice M arshall in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60; “I t is em phatically the province and du ty of the Judicial D epartm ent to say w hat the Law is. Those who apply the ru le to particu lar cases must, of necessity, expound and in terp re t th a t rule. If two laws conflict w ith each other, the Courts m ust decide on the operation of each. So if a Law be in opposition to the Constitution, if both 25 the Law and the Constitution apply to a particu lar case, so th a t the Court m ust e ither decide th a t case conformably to the law disregarding the Constitution, or conformably to the Constitution, disregarding th e law, the Court .must determ ine w hich of these conflicting rules governs th e case. This is the very essence of Judicial duty. If then, the Courts are to regard the Constitution, and th e Constitution is superior to any ord inary A ct of the Legislature, the Constitution, and not such ordinary A ct m ust govern the case to w hich they both apply. Those, then, who contro v e rt the principle th a t the Constitution is to be considered in Court as th e param ount law, are reduced to th e necessity of m aintaining th a t C ourts m ust close th e ir eyes on the C onstitution and see only the law. This doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all w ritten Constitutions. I t w ould declare th a t an Act, w hich according to the principles and theory of ou r governm ent, is entirely void is yet, in practice, com pletely obligatory. I t w ould de clare that, if the Legislature shall do w hat is expressly for bidden, such Act, notw ithstanding the expressed prohi bition, is in reality effectual. I t would be giving to the Legislature a practical and real omnipotence, w ith the sam e breath w hich professes to restric t the ir pow ers w ith in narrow limits. I t is prescribing lim its and declaring th a t those lim its m ay be passed a t pleasure.” Third: The Court w ill not declare an Act unconstitu tional because it is unw ise o r inexpedient, nor w ill i t strike i t down because it w ill operate harsh ly upon persons af fected by it. These are m atters com m itted to the Judgm ent of th e Law-m aking Power. They are pu rely political and are not review able by the Court. F ourth : Section 29, Art. 3 of the Constitution is M anda tory; bu t the general disposition of the Court has been to give the Section a liberal construction so as not to in terfere w ith or im pede legislative action. The purposes of this 28 provision of the Constitution are “to prevent the Legisla tu re from the enactm ent of laws surreptitiously; to p re ven t ‘Log Rolling’ legislation; to give the people general notice of the character of th e proposed Legislation, so they m ay not be misled; to give all in terested an opportunity to appear before com m ittees of the Legislature and to be heard upon th e advisability of th e proposed legislation; to advise m em bers of th e character of the proposed legislation and to give each an opportunity to intelligently w atch the course of the proposed bill; to guard against fraud in legis lation and against false and deceptive titles. These p u r poses have been so plainly announced in num erous opinions by this Court th a t a statem ent of the ru le and the citation of cases would seem to be sufficient.” State v. McKinney, 29 Mont. 375, 74 Pac. 1095, 1 Ann. Cas. 579; Davis v. State, 7 Md. 160, 61 Am., Dec. 331, Drennen v. Banks, 80! Md. 310, 30 Atl. 655; Mayor, etc. v. Reitz, 50 Md. 574; County Com missioners v. School Commissioners of Worcester County, 113 Md. 305, 77 Atl. 605. F ifth : The title, w hilst it m ust indicate the subject, need not give an abstract of th e act, nor need it m ention the m eans and m ethods by w hich the general purpose is to be accomplished. Catholic Cathedral v. Manning, 72 Md. 116, 19 Atl. 599; Scharf v. Tasker, 73 Md. 378, 21 Atl. 56; Drennen v. Banks, 80 Md. 310, 30 Atl. 655; W hitman v. State, 80 Md. 410, 31 Atl. 325. B u t “Though the title need not contain an abstract of the bill nor give in detail the provisions of the Act, it m ust not he misleading by apparently limiting the enactment to a much narrower scope than the body of the A ct is made to encompass ” Luman v. Hitchens Bros., 90 Md. 14, 44 Atl. 1051, 46 L.R.A. 393, and it m ust not be such as to d ivert atten tion from the m atters contained in the body of the Act. State v. Schultz Gas Fixture and A rt Metal Co., 83 Md. 58, 34 Atl. 243. 27 W hile this section of the Constitution has received a liberal construction, the Court has not hesitated to declare m any acts invalid which w ere clear infractions of its p u r poses. Kafka v. Wilkinson, 99 Md. 238, 57 Atl. 617. S ix t h : “A S ta tu te m ay be good in part, w hile other p arts are invalid. If a portion be unconstitutional, the Court is not authorized, for th a t reason to declare th e whole void.” Davis v. State, 7 Md. 151, 61 Am. Dec. 331. A rticle 16, Section 120 of the A nnotated Code of M ary land, 1957 Edition, enacted as C hapter 630 of th e Laws of M aryland, 1957, is unconstitutional and in violation of the Constitution of the U nited S tates and th e Constitution of th e S ta te of M aryland for the following reason: 1. Defective Title The Title to such Act is Defective and in Violation of Article 3, Section 29 of the Constitution of the State of Maryland. The recorded debates and proceedings of the several Constitutional conventions in M aryland are no t sufficiently com plete to give w hat was said, if anyth ing as to the need fo r im proving th e quality of titles to legislative Acts: however, the background conditions have been vividly sketched in a num ber of subsequent cases involves titles, so th a t the reasons for adding these title requirem ents to th e Constitution are easily apparent. In 1854, ju s t th ree years a fte r the title provision was first inserted into the M aryland Constitution of 1851, the M aryland Court of Appeals held th a t: “The object of th is Constitutional provision is obvi ous and highly commendable. A practice had crep t into our system of legislation, of engrafting, upon subjects of g reat public benefit and im portance, for local or selfish purposes, foreign and often pernicious m atters, and ra th e r than endanger the main subject, or for the purpose of securing new strength for it, m em bers w ere 28 often induced to sanction and actually vote for such provisions, w hich if they w ere offered as independent ; subjects, would never have received the ir support. In th is way, the people of our State, have been frequently inflicted w ith evil and injurious legislation. Besides, foreign m a tte r has often been stealth ily incorporated into a law, during th e haste and confusion always in cident upon the close of sessions of all legislative bodies, and it has not infrequently happened, th a t in this way, th e s ta tu te books have shown th e existence of enactm ents, th a t few of the m em bers of th e legisla tu re knew anything of before. To rem edy such and sim ilar evils, was this provision inserted into th e Con stitution, and w e th ink wisely inserted.” Davis v. State, 7 Md. 151, 160 (1854). Essentially the same was said in another early case in 1859: “I t cannot be doubted th a t this restric tion upon the Legislature was designed to p reven t an evil w hich had long prevailed in th is State, as it had done elsew here: which was th e practice of blending, in the same law, subjects not connected w ith each other, and often en tire ly different. This w as not unfrequen tly resorted to for th e purpose of obtaining votes, in support of a m easure, w hich could not have been carried w ithout such a device. A nd in bills of a m ultifarious character, no t inappropriately called omnibus bills, provisions w ere sometimes smuggled in and passed, in th e h u rry of business, tow ard the close of a session, which if they had been presented singly w ould have been rejected .” Parkinson v. State, 14 Md. 184, 193 (1859). Chief Judge Alvey sum m ed it up neatly in the case of State v. Norris w hen he stated tha t: “The objects designed to be a tta ined by the Constitu tional provision are two-fold: The first is to prevent th e com bination in one A ct of several distinct and in congruous subjects; and the second is, th a t the Legis la tu re and the People of the S ta te m ay be fa irly ad vised of the real na tu re of pending legislation.” State v. Norris, 70 Md. 91. 29 In 1948, Judge D elaplaine paraphrased the substance of w hat w as quoted in Davis v. State, supra, and cited th a t case in applying the provisions of Section 29 of A rticle 3 of th e Constitution of M aryland. In Miggins v. Mallot, 169 Md. 435, 441 (1936), th e Court of Appeals stated th a t “The tru e test, in each case, is w hether th e new law is sufficiently explicit to p u t in ter ested parties on notice th a t the th ing intended to be done by the Legislature is, in fact, accomplished.” A nother sta te m en t of this idea w as m ade in Quenstedt v. Wilson, 173 Md. 11, 22. G eneral statem ents like the ones referred to above, and variations of them , have been repeated in literally dozens of cases in the M aryland Reports. The principles of con stru ing titles, therefore, are well settled; it is only in apply ing these principles to individual factual situations tha t difficulties arise. There are th ree generally used styles for d rafting titles; and so fa r as form is concerned, any one of th e th ree is valid. F irst, the title m ay contain a general description of w hat th e A ct does, w ithout any reference e ither to A rticle and Section num bers in th e Code or to prior Acts on th e same subject. Secondly, it m ay contain such references to A rticle and Section num bers, or to a prior Act, together w ith the title of the A rticle in the Code w ithou t any general de scriptive words. Finally, it m ay be a com bination of these two, th e typical exam ple of w hich w ould be a particu lar A ct affected and the title announces th a t i t am ends certain sections of such article, followed by a short description of w hat is to be accomplished. The exam ples given below have all been considered by the Court of Appeals of M aryland: 30 A. Titles Giving a General Description Only. The first style of title describes in general words w hat the A ct is to do w ithout including any references to the A rticle and Section num bers by w hich th e A ct m ay be identified in the Code. The following is illustrative of such titles: “A n A ct to change th e nam e of th e F idelity Loan and T rust Company of B altim ore City, to th e F idelity and Deposit Company of M aryland, and to am end and de fine the pow ers of said company.” C hapter 263 of the A cts of 1890; construed in Gans v. Carter, 77 Md. 1, 10 (1893). B. Titles Giving Only a Code Reference. This style of titles shows how th e bill is to fit into the Code, such as by nam ing th e artic le and subtitle, or be referring to a p rio r A ct of th e Legislature, b u t except in this indirect fashion gives no clue to its subject. Exam ples of this form of title follows: “An A ct to repeal sec. 183, A rticle 81, Code of Public general Laws of M aryland, title, Revenue and Taxes, sub-title, Tax on Mortgages, and to reenact the same w ith am endm ents.” C hapter 794 of the Acts of 1906; Miller v. Wicomico County, 107 Md. 438, 444 (1908). also “An A ct to repeal section 205 of A rticle 93 of the Code of Public G eneral Laws (as said section stands in th e Code of 1904), ti tle ‘Testam entary L aw ’, sub title ‘Inventory and list of D ebts’, so fa r as said section applies to th e City of Baltim ore; and a new section to A rticle 4 of th e Code of Public Local Laws, title ‘C ity of B altim ore’, sub-title ‘Register of W ills’, to follow section 354 and to be designated as section 354A, Chap te r 118 of the Acts of 1908; Baron v. Sm ith, 108 Md. 317, 327 (1908). C. Combination Titles. This style of titles is th a t w hich tends to combine the first first two styles set fo rth above. I t gives the appro 31 pria te references to the Code, and then adds a general description to show w hat the bill is designed to accomplish. A n exam ple of this sty le of form is as follows: “A n Act to repeal sections 119, 122, and 123 of Art. 8 of the Code of Public Local Laws, title 'Cecil County’, sub-title ‘County T reasu rer’, and to reenact the same w ith am endm ents providing for th e election of a Trea su rer of said county in 1895, and his appointm ent in the m eantim e.” Chapter 25 of the Acts of 1894; Drennan v. Banks, 80 Md. 310, 316 (1894). Most of the acts now passed by th e G eneral Assem bly of M aryland have titles m ore or less sim ilar to this form of title ; The D epartm ent of Legislative Reference during the past fo rty years has done m uch to standardize procedure in this respect. In due respect to th e excellent standards m aintained by such D epartm ent, i t should be noted here th a t C hapter 630 of th e Laws of 1957 w hich Plaintiffs in th e instan t case contend is invalid due to num erous con stitu tional objections including the contention th a t th e title to such sta tu te is defective in violation of A rticle 3 Section 29 of the Constitution of M aryland, was not d rafted in the D epartm ent of Legislative Reference. This fac t was testi fied to by the representative of such D epartm ent in the in stan t case. The first title to a sta tu te to be declared invalid in the S ta te of M aryland w as the title to C hapter 403 of the Acts of 1880, reading as follow s: “A n A ct to repeal an A ct passed a t the January Session, 1872, C hapter 363, en titled ‘An A ct to * * *’.” A lthough the title said only th a t an earlier s ta tu te w as to be repealed, th e body of such A ct also enacted affirmative legislation. The title was held to be misleading, and th e A ct was held unconstitutional and void insofar as it attem pted to enact affirmative legislation; however, the repeal of the earlier sta tu te w as in stric t con form ity w ith the title and therefore valid. Chapter 403, Acts of 1880, Stiefel v. Md. Institution for the Blind, supra. 32 Perhaps the oddest opinion by the M aryland C ourt of A ppeals regarding the title to a s ta tu te was rendered in the case of Shea v. State w hich construed th e following title : “A n A ct to repeal and reenact, w ith am endm ents, Sections 332, 333, 334, 336, 339, and 340 of A rticle 3 of the Code of Public Law s of M aryland, title ‘B alti m ore County,’ sub-title ‘L iquor and Intoxicating D rinks,’ as codified by T. Scott Offutt, Esq., regulating the m anufacture and sale of certain alcoholic and fer m ented beverages.” The T rial C ourt had held this title invalid in th a t it did not comply w ith th e requirem ents of A rticle 3, Section 29 of the Constitution of the S ta te of M aryland. The C ourt of Appeals held this decision to have been correct, w ith no discussion as to reasons. (C hapter 350 of the Acts of 1920, Shea v. State, 148 Md. 256, 1925). I t is impossible to judge of the m erits of th a t case. The appellee’s brief had contended the title w as m isleading because th e body of the A ct concerned alcoholic beverages w hich had less than percent of alcohol by volume, these being declared in the A ct to be “non-intoxicating beverages w ith in the m eaning of the E ighteenth A m endm ent.” Since th e question of percentages is involved in A rticle 16, Section 120 it is now appropriate to analyze and exam ine the title and body of such Act. Before doing so; however, the history of condem nation as respects Cem eteries in M aryland should be referred to here. The predecessor to th e s ta tu te involved in th e instan t case was enacted as C hapter 211 of the Laws, of M aryland, 1868, w hich sta tu te is set fo rth in fu ll as follow s: Chapter 211, Laws of 1868 An A ct to add additional sections to A rticle Sixteen of the Code of Public G eneral Laws, en titled “Chan cery,” to come in a fte r Section Seventy-eight of said Article. 33 Section 1. Be it enacted by the G eneral Assem bly of M aryland, th a t the following sections be added to th e s ix teen th artic le of the Code of Public General Laws, en titled “Chancery,” to come in a fte r Section Seventy-eight in said Article. T hat upon any bill filed for the sale of any ground dedicated and used for the purposes of burial in w hich lots have been sold and deeds executed or certificates issued to the purchasers of such lots, provided such lots shall be no longer used fo r bu ria l purposes, the court m ay order notice to be given by publication in one or m ore new spapers published in the City or county in w hich the ground to be sold m ay be situated, stating the substance and object of the said bill, and con tain ing the nam es of th e original lotholders or th e ir assignees if known, w arning all th e lotholders, w hether they be residents or non-residents, adults or in fan ts to appear on or before a day fixed in such order and show cause w hy the relief p rayed should not be granted, and such notice shall be published as th e Court m ay direct, not. less how ever than once a w eek fo r four successive weeks, tw o m onths before th e day fixed by such order for th e appearance of the parties, and if such lotholders shall no t appear a t the tim e stated in such notice a commission to take testim ony, th a t it is neces sary and w ould be for the in terest and advantage of the parties in terested th a t the ground should be sold, m ay fo rthw ith pass a decree for the sale of the same upon such term s as it shall deem proper, and shall d istribu te th e proceeds of th e sale among the parties; in terested according to th e ir several in terests as th e same shall be shown to the court. T hat a decree passed in a pro ceeding for th e sale of a burial ground shall be valid to pass the title to the purchaser o r purchasers of the sam e or any p a rt thereof free, clear and discharged of and from th e claims of th e Corporation or trustees who m ay hold the same for the purposes; aforesaid, the ir successors or assigns and of all persons in in terest as lotholders; in such ground w hether they are en titled as original lotholders and w hether they be residents or non-residents, adults or infants. 34 Section 2. A nd be it enacted, tha t this A ct shall take effect from th e date of its passage. A pproved March 28, 1868. I t is in teresting to note th a t the above sta tu te was appli cable only w here “such lots shall be no longer used for bu ria l purposes,” Also, “T hat after the re tu rn of such com mission, the Court, upon being satisfied from the testim ony, th a t it is necessary and w ould be for the in terest and ad vantage of the parties in terested th a t the ground should be sold, m ay fo rthw ith pass a decree etc. * * Such statu te fu rth e r provided th a t the C ourt “shall d istribu te the pro ceeds of the sale among the parties in terested according to th e ir several in terests as the same shall be shown to the Court.” The above sta tu te w as repealed and reenacted by C hapter 369 of the Laws of 1888 w hich Law is set forth in full as follow s: Chapter 369, Laws of 1888 A n A ct to repeal chapter tw o hundred and eleven of the Acts of the G eneral A ssem bly of M aryland passed a t the January Session, eighteen hundred and sixty- eight, in relation to th e sale of burial grounds and to reenact the same amended. Section 1. Be it enacted by the G eneral Assembly of M aryland, th a t C hapter two hundred and eleven of the Acts of th e G eneral Assembly of M aryland passed a t the Jan u ary Session, eighteen hundred and sixty- eight, en titled “A n act to add additional sections to article sixteen of th e Code of Public G eneral Law s,” en titled “Chancery,” to come in a fte r section seventy- eight of said article, be and th e same is hereby repealed and reenacted, am ended as follows : Section 79. T hat in any case in w hich a burial ground has ceased to be used for burial purposes, and the said ground has been dedicated and used for burial purposes, and lots have been sold therein, and deeds executed or certificates issued to purchasers thereof, 35 and it shall be considered desirable to dispose of said bu ria l ground for o ther purposes, upon a bill being filed in any of th e C ircuit Courts of the State, in equity, in th e city or county in w hich said bu ria l ground is situated, setting fo rth th e aforegoing facts, and con tain ing th e names of the lot owners or th e ir assignees so fa r as known, the court shall order notice by publi cation in one or m ore new spapers published in th e county or city w here such buria l ground is: situated, w arn ing all the lo t holders or o ther persons in interest, residents or non-residents, adults or infants, to appear in court on or before th e day fixed in said notice, to show cause w hy th e relief p rayed for should not be granted; and said notice shall be such as th e court m ay direct, not less, however, than once a w eek fo r four successive weeks tw o m onths before the day fixed by such order for the appearance of the parties; and upon a failure of appearance by any of said lo t owners or any p a rty in in terest by th e tim e lim ited in said notice, the court may order testim ony to be taken ex parte , ac cording to the usual course in equity in cases of de fau lt for non-appearance, and upon testim ony taken in th e cause ex parte, or otherwise, if it is m ade to appear to the satisfaction of the court th a t it is expedient or would be to the in terest and advantage of th e parties concerned th a t the said bu ria l ground should be sold, the court m ay fo rthw ith pass a decree for the sale of said ground upon such term s and notice as: it shall deem proper, and shall d istribu te the proceeds of sale among th e parties in terested according to th e ir several in ter ests, as the same shall be shown to the court; and before m aking said distribution the court m ay order and d i rec t th a t so m uch and such p a r t of said proceeds of sale, as shall be necessary for the purpose, shall be set aside and applied to the rem oval and buria l of any dead th a t m ay lie in said burial ground, in the purchase of lot in any cem etery, graveyard, or o ther appropriate place of sepulture, and in the expense of d isin term ent and re in term en t of said dead; and any decree passed in a proceeding for a bu ria l ground, as hereinbefore pro vided for, shall be valid to pass to the purchaser or pur- 38 chasers of said burial ground the title of the same free, clear and discharged of, and from th e claim of th e cor poration or trustees who m ay hold th e same, the ir suc cessors or assigns, and of all persons in in terest as lot holders in such ground, w hether they are en titled as original lotholders, and w hether they be residents or non-residents, adults or infants. (A pproved Apr. 5, 1888). The title of ne ither of the foregoing s ta tu tes is presently in dispute; however, it should be noted here th a t C hapter 369 of the Acts of 1888, supra, is the p resen t A rticle 16 Sec tion 119 w hich sta tu te was th e governing law p rio r to the enactm ent of A rticle 16 Section 120. I t is th e contention of Plaintiffs th a t A rticle 16 Section 119 is still the governing law in th a t A rticle 16 Section 120 is unconstitutional and void. A rticle 16 Section 119 set fo rth above contains the following provisions th a t should be noted here: F irst, such sta tu te had S tate-w ide application; Second, such sta tu te is applicable “in any case in which a burial ground has ceased to be used for burial purposes * * * and it shall be considered desirable to dispose of said burial ground for other purposes * * Third, the legal procedure to be followed in such case is by the filing of a Bill in Equity. Fourth , ex p a rte testim ony m ay be taken as in usual cases, and Fifth, if it is m ade to appear to the satisfaction of the Court th a t it is expedient or would be to th e in terest o r advantage of the parties concerned th a t the said burial ground should be sold, the Court m ay fo rthw ith pass a decree for th e sale of said ground upon such term s and notice as it shall deem proper, “and shall d istribu te th e proceeds of sale among the parties in terested according to the ir several interests, as the same shall be shown to the Court.” (Em phasis ad ded ). Such sta tu te fu rther provides 37 th a t before distribution, the Court m ay order enough set aside to defray the expenses of (a) rem oving and burial of any dead still in the cem etery (b) purchasing a lot in some o ther burial ground, and (c) the expenses of rem oval or rein term ent. Also, the purchaser a t any sale of the p roperty involved gets a clear title. Such w as the state of the law governing the subject p rio r to the enactm ent of A rticle 16 Section 120, M aryland Code, 1957 Edition. Chapter 630, Laws of 1957 Inasm uch as House Bill 594, M aryland G eneral Assembly, enacted as C hapter 630 of the Laws of M aryland, 1957, has been introduced into evidence in th e in stan t case, such S ta tu te w ill not be reproduced here; however, th e re are certain aspects of the S ta tu te th a t should be analyzed here; F irst, the scope of this s ta tu te is restric ted to cem eteries located in Baltim ore City. Second, in order to come w ith in the purview of the statu te , such cem etery m ust have no provision established for perpetual care or maintenance. Third, such cem etery m ust have become a t least 75% abandoned, or a m enace detrim ental to the public health, safety, security or welfare. Fourth, the righ t to take action under the provisions of this section is restric ted to anyone having a property rig h t in such burial ground o r any public agency having an in terest in the elim ination or abatem ent of the con ditions in such cem etery. On the surface, this provision w ould appear to he m ore restric tive than Section 119 of A rticle 16 in th a t the said Section 119 m erely requires th a t such burial ground has ceased to be used for burial purposes and it shall be considered desirable to dispose of said burial ground for o ther purposes. I t m ight, therefore, appear 38 th a t the title w ould not have to reflect such a change; how ever, a close argum ent regarding the description in a title was p resen t w hen the Court of Appeals was review ing the title to C hapter 75 of the Acts of 1900, being “A n A ct to provide for th e establishm ent of an electric ligh t p lan t in H agerstown, M aryland.” The contention against th e title was th a t the re was nothing in it to show th a t the electric ligh t p lan t was to be established by the M unici pality itself. The T itle was held to be valid; however, in the course of its decision the C ourt of Appeals used the following language, “The w orst th a t can be said about th e A ct is th a t the title does not specify by whom the p lan t is to be constructed; and w hile it does not indicate th a t it was to be a m unicipal plant, there also is nothing in the title to lead anyone to believe that it was to be established by some private corporation.” (Em phasis added.) I t was fu rth e r reasoned th a t the incorporation of electric light companies was covered b y a general law, so th a t the legislature could not in any event have been passing a special act for such an incorporation. Therefore, “w ould anyone w ith the know l edge of the existing law (and the m em bers of the Legisla tu re and others are presum ed to have knowledge of it) be mislead into the belief by th e w ording of th a t title th a t it was not the m unicipality th a t the au thority was to be given to?” Mealey v. Hagerstown, 92 Md. 741 (1901). D uring the course of testim ony in the instan t case, the defendants adm it th a t a fictitious purchase of lots in Laurel Cem etery was m ade for the purpose lof providing them w ith a nom inal defendant in th e Condem nation proceedings. Such p a rty was la te r made nom inal trustee for purposes of th e sale of such property. D uring th e course of the trial, S tate Senator Joseph V. Mach testified th a t House Bill 594 la te r enacted as C hapter 630 of the Laws of M ary land, 1957, was presented and introduced to m em bers of the Legislature as a Bill sponsored by the Baltim ore City ad m inistration and such B ill was eventually enacted into 39 Law. I t is the contention of the Plaintiffs th a t the uncontra dicted testim ony of Senator Mach in this regard should be given considerable w eight if the question of ascertaining th e legislative in ten t becomes necessary; however, in view of the decisions of th e C ourt lof Appeals and in view of the fact th a t now here in the title to C hapter 630, Laws of M aryland, 1957 does it appear th a t au thority to condemn cem eteries th a t are only 75% abandoned is being granted to p rivate individuals or corporations, such S ta tu te ought to be declared defective for th a t reason alone. In the case of N utwell v. Anne Arundel County, the title to the A ct w as as follows: “A n A ct to add tw o new sections to A rticle 2 of the Code of Public Local Laws, title ‘A nne A rundel County,’ sub-title ‘Roads’ so as to require all owners of vehicles using public streets and roads in Anne A rundel County to have a license therefor.” The A ct itself added tw o new sections, and requ ired a license on all such vehicles except ox carts, horse carts, farm wagons and m ilk wagons. The Court of Appeals held th a t the title was clearly misleading, there being in it not th e fain test suggestion to lead anyone to suspect th a t the exem ptions contained there in w ere or m ight be introduced in the law, and fu rth e r held th a t inasm uch as this exem p tion fea tu re w as one of th e essential p arts of the law, and w as no doubt inserted to secure its passage, the whole law should be declared void. Nutwell v. Anne Arundel Co., 110 Md. 667. In the instan t case, C hapter 630 of the Laws of M aryland, 1957 w as enacted in four sections. Section 1 contains the body of the Act; Section 2 repeals all inconsistant laws; Section 3 provides for the continued existence of all parts of such A ct not judicially declared to be invalid; and Section 4 makes such Act become effective as of Ju n e 1, 1957. I t is in teresting to note th a t except for a provision 40 protecting the rights of those deed holders of record as disclosed by the Land Records of Baltim ore City im m ediately p rio r to th e sale of such cem etery or bu ria l ground, now here in the S ta tu te is there a savings clause excluding and protecting from th e operation of th e S ta tu te the rights of lo t owners th a t have become vested p rio r to the effective date of the S tatu te. I t is the contention of Plaintiffs th a t Section 2 of such S ta tu te should, in some m anner, have been reflected in the title to such S tatu te. One w ay in w hich this could have been accomplished would have been a repeal and reenactm ent w ith A m endm ents of C hapter 369, Laws of 1888 in the same m anner th a t the said C hapter 369 recited a Repeal and Reenactm ent, w ith A m endm ents of C hapter 211 of the Laws of 1868. If such procedure had been followed in the case of C hapter 630, Law s of 1957, the title to such A ct m ight be valid, b u t the Act would still be unconstitutional for o ther reasons cited herein. F ifth , th e action to condemn such cem etery m ust be commenced in an Equity Court of Baltim ore C ity by a Bill of Com plaint w hich Bill of Com plaint m ust set forth the nam es of lot ow ners or th e ir assignees so far as known. There is no substantial change in this provision and the provision of the p rio r S ta tu te as relates to Baltim ore City. Sixth, the only notice requ ired by such S ta tu te is (a) O rder of Publication, or (b) Posting on the premises, in the discretion of the Court. This provision fu rth er provided th a t such O rder of Publication m ust w arn all Lot owners or o ther persons in in terest to appear in C ourt by a certain day and show cause w hy such cem etery should not be condemn. In the instan t case notice w as given by O rder of Publication, only. Seventh, the sta tu te fu rth e r provides for taking ex parte testim ony. I t fu rth e r provides th a t upon th e taking of such testim ony, if it should appear to the satisfaction of 41 the Court th a t (a) all or m ore than 75% of the cem etery has become (1) abandoned, or (2) a menace, or (3) detri m ental to the public health , safety, security, or welfare, the C ourt m ay pass a decree ordering th e sale of th e land, all lots, and any other in terest in such land, and appoint a tru stee to do so. Eighth, under the term s of such statu te, afte r a sale of such land, the proceeds from such sale was to be paid out for the following purposes: (a) To defray the expenses involved in purchasing a lo t in another cem etery and covering all costs inci dental to rem oving and in re in terring all bodies th a t can be definitely located w ith reasonable care. b) In the event a lo t is being kept in good condition and a m onum ent or m arker is being m aintained in good order and are not damaged but in good condition (em phasis added), then any m oney le ft over from th e proceeding purpose m ay be used to defray such expenses. c) A ny funds rem aining a fte r the above would be ap plied to the expense of rem oving and reerecting on the new location m onum ents or m arkers th a t can be definitely identified w ith a body or bodies removed. d) Funds still rem aining would then be applied to th e abatem ent of all existing conditions th a t consti tu te a menace or are detrim ental to the public health, safety, security, o r w elfare unless the contract to sell such cem etery provides for such abatem ent. e) The sta tu te then provides th a t “A fter any and all expenses incurred for or in connection w ith doing any and all of th e things m entioned in or contem plated by the first four items hereof, and the cost of conducting the necessary legal proceedings, including court costs, tru stees’ commissions and legal fees, and all taxes, if any, have been paid in full, then 42 1 the balance of the proceeds of sale rem aining in the : hands of the tru stee shall be paid over to the legal en tity w ho had record title to such cem etery or bu ria l ground in its entirety , subject to the burial rights which had, been granted therein as disclosed by the Land Records of Baltimore City, immediately prior to the sale of such cemetery or burial ground by the said trustee as hereinbefore provided, free, clear and discharged of, and from, any and all claims of any lot ow ners or o ther persons in in terest in such cem etery or burial grond or th e land or p roperty contained therein, regardless of w hether they m ay be en titled as original lo t owners or heirs or as signees and regardless of w hether they are resi dents, nonresidents, adults, infants or other persons under any legal incapacity.” (Em phasis added.) The section of the s ta tu te quoted in sub-paragraph (e) above is invalid for a num ber of reasons. In the first place, the underlined clause above, as has been previously re ferred to, constitutes th e only savings clause in the en tire s ta tu te th a t adequately protects existing vested rights. In the second place, such clause w hen view ed in ligh t of the s ta tu te as a whole and particu larly Section 2 of said statu te, constitutes a repeal of p arts of another s ta tu te th a t is now here referred to in either the title or the body of Chap te r 630, Law s of 1957; namely, “A certificate under th e seal of the cem etery or m ausoleum corporation or of any person or corporation acting as trustee therefor, of the ow nership of any lo t o r crypt, sold or conveyed as aforesaid, shall in all respects have th e same effect as any conveyance for such corporation of said lot or cryp t w ould have if executed, acknowledged or recorded as conveyances of rea l estate are by the law s of th is S ta te requ ired to be.” Maryland Code, Art. 23 Sec. 165. 43 The above defect constitutes a second reason why plain tiffs contend th a t A rticle 16 Section 119 should have been repealed and reenacted, w ith am endm ents in order to avoid a title defect. There is no reference to a repeal or an am end m en t to any portion of A rticle 23 Section 165 in the title to C hapter 630 of th e laws of 1957; indeed, no reference to a repeal of any section of any statute is evident in the title to C hapter 630. Law s of 1957. In approaching th e above problems, the C ourt is faced w ith tw o choices; F irst, it m ay declare sub-paragraph (e), supra, to be valid. If it should do so, then, in accordance w ith Section 2 of C hapter 630, the Court m ust fu rth e r de clare a repeal of A rticle 23 Section 165 as it relates to cem eteries in th e City of Baltim ore for w hich no provision fo r perpetual care and m aintenance has been provided, and w here a t least 75% of such cem etery has become aban doned, or a menace, etc., and w here such cem etery is sought to be condemned pursuan t to A rticle 16 Section 120'. Ob viously,' th is course is fraugh t w ith difficulties involving im pairm ent of the obligations of contracts, equal protection of the laws, due process of law, defective titles, and nu m erous o ther constitutional safeguards; secondly, the C ourt m ay declare sub-paragraph (e), supra, or o ther portions of the s ta tu te to be invalid. If this course is adopted, th e Court should fu rth e r ru le th a t all holders of deeds under th e seal of the Laurel Cem etery Company are still th e ow ners of such lots and, fu rther, th a t the ir grave righ ts ex tend not m erely to th e ir individual lots evidenced by such deeds bu t as easem ents to th e paths and roadw ays in said cem etery providing egress and ingress to such lots; th a t th e ir indi v idual lots constitute the dom inant estate while the o ther land constitutes the serv ien t estate. P laintiffs urge the C ourt to adopt the second choice as the correct statem ent of the law. Plaintiffs are m indful of the m yriad of problem s in 44 volved In condem nation cases involving cem eteries and respectfully urge th a t “W here abandonm ent for cem etery purposes results in the taking of p a r t of the lands by reason of condem nation proceedings, the certificate holders, if any certificates are outstanding, have a righ t to paym ent of the ir proportions of the award. Whitmore v. Woodlawn Cemetery, 71 App. Div. 257, 75 N.Y. Supp. 847; M atter of Bensel, 129 N.Y. Supp, 682, 144 App. Div. 751. “I t is ordinarily the fee of land th a t is taken, though th e pow er of em inent dom ain m ay be exercised to take an easem ent. I t is obvious, however, th a t as a m a tte r of bu ria l law no o ther use of land is com patible w ith its devotion to the burial use. Consequently, though an easem ent ra th e r than a fee be taken, th e value of th e fee for burial use is as thoroughly destroyed as if the absolute fee w ere taken, and com pensation w ill neces sarily en tail paym ent for the value of th e fee * * *” “In com puting value for a particu la r use, no t only m ust th e availability for such use be determ ined bu t the probability of sale for such special use m ust be con sidered. Matter of Simmons, 130 App. Div. 356, 359, 114 N.Y. Supp. 575. “ * * * W here a burial righ t has been sold by the cem etery prior to condemnation, it is the lot ow ner who suffers by the taking, since th e value of the fee rem aining in the cem etery corporation a fte r the sale of the burial righ t is bu t nominal. The lot ow ner who purchased from the cem etery a lot for use for burial purposes, upon being deprived of its use as a resu lt of th e taking in condem nation proceedings, m ay claim dam age on a basis of square foot value. T hat was the basis on which he bought th e lot from the cem etery; th a t was the basis on w hich he paid the cem etery for it; and th a t is the basis w hich determ ines its value to him. The basic ru le of condemnation, th a t the con- dem nee m ust be m ade whole, dem ands such a conclu sion. ‘The proper pecuniary value of a cem etery may, however, be enhanced by its religious accessories and particu larly by its position in a churchyard * * * any 45 thing, w hether real or im aginary, w hich renders land m ore desirable as a place of interm ent, necessarily adds to its pecuniary value.’ Report of Ruggles, (N .Y .) 4 Bradf. Surr. 503, 512. The square foot un it valuation is m ore susceptible of use here than it is in the cases w here it is generally applied, i.e,, in the condem nation of City lots, Matter of N.Y.W. & B.R. Co., 73 Misc. 219, 230, 130 N.Y. Supp. 1005, since here, except in special cases, each square foot of land w ith in the lo t has the sam e value as each other. T here is no appreciation in burial lots; by reason of frontage values or short lot rules. “The Law of Cadaviers” by Percival E. Jackson, New York, Prentice-Hall, Inc., “1Q?6 Edition.” The above quotations are subm itted by P laintiffs in sup p o rt of th e ir contention regarding the character of the in terest they hold in the Cemetery. Plaintiffs also point out the defect on the title to House B ill 594 as introduced into evidence. The title to such Bill as shown on th e outside cover contains th e clause “for w hich provision has been m ade for the perpetual care and m aintenance thereof * * *” The title to' such Bill as listed on the inside page and as shown in the bound volum e of the Law s of M aryland, 1957, recite th a t the act refers to burial grounds “* * * for w hich provision has not been m ade for th e perpetual care and m aintenance thereof * * *” Plaintiffs are w ell aw are of the fact th a t the above m ight m erely have been, a typographical e rro r on th e outside cover; however, since such Bills are often read by and through the ir titles; only, the cover of such B ill th a t appears to contain such erro r was m isleading and presented a “false” situation to anyone who m ight have read it. The e rro r involved is of no small consequence inasm uch as the presence of the w ord “not” brings Laurel Cem etery w ith in th e purview of th e Act; w hereas, the absence of the w ord “no t” would tend to exclude Laurel Cem etery from the purview of the statute. Plaintiffs therefore contend th a t th is constituted another factor th a t was highly misleading. 46 V. A RE TH E A PPELLANTS ENTITLED TO H AV E T H E DECREE OF T H E COURT IN T H E CASE OF M cK A M E R R E A L T Y C O M P A N Y v. A N D E R S O N E N T E R P R IS E S , IN C O R P O R A T E D , E T AL., 97A, FOLIO 878, SE T A SIDE IN V IE W O F T H E PROOFS PRESEN TED T H A T SU CH DECREE W AS OBTAINED BY FRAUD UPON T H E C O U R T ? 49 C.J.S. 269 a t page 488 reads as follows: “F raud practiced on the C ourt is always ground for vacating the Judgm ent, as w here the C ourt is deceived or m isled as to m aterial circumstances, or its process is abused, resu lting in the rendition of a judgm ent w hich would not have been given if the whole conduct of the case had been fair. So a judgm ent m ay be vacated for m isrepresentations or tricks practiced on defendant to keep him aw ay from the trial, or to p re v en t h im from claim ing his righ ts in th e premises, or from setting u p an available defense, or fo r fraudu len t collusion betw een some of the parties to the action, or betw een th e counsel in the case, w orking in ju ry to th e ju s t rights of the others.” Indeed this C ourt in the case of Graham v. Graham, 59 A. 2d 180, 190 Md. 434 had this; to say: “F rau d w ill v itia te anything, and if a Court acts w ithout jurisdiction, its action is a nullity, and Equity dem ands th a t a proceeding not heard upon the m erits be reopened and th e respondent be perm itted to answ er and defend if taken by surprise.” In th e instan t cases th e evidence was clear and uncontradicted th a t th e Com plainants in the McKamer case had gone into C ourt w ith a cleverly conceived p lan to deceive the C ourt into the passage of its Decree. This scheme in the m ain was as follows: (a) M ake Anderson Enterprises, Inc., a p a rty defendant “for the purpose of having a live defendant” (E„ 367); m ake it appear to the Court th a t A nderson was a genuine party a t in terest; and have A nderson testify th a t he owned cer ta in lots in the cem etery, w hen in fact A nderson had no in terest w hatsoever in the cem etery because his burial 47 rights had been elevated to a fee by M cKam er’s qu it claim deed to A nderson on N ovem ber 18, 1957 (E. 368 and 509 ) less than one m onth before th e action w as filed in the C ir cu it Court. (b) The continued insistance by Com plainants th a t they did not know how to locate any of the lot owners, and th a t a thorough and exhaustive search had been made in an effort to locate lo t owners, w hen in fact Com plainants president and counsel in the proceedings had, shortly be fore filing his Bill of Complaint, held a telephone conversa tion w ith a lo t ow ner and discussed in some detail the sta tus of the cem etery (E. 409). This same president and counsel during the proceedings swore under oath th a t he had m ade a thorough and exhaustive search for lot owners, b u t had been unable to locate any of them. Com plainants Secretary-Treasurer, John G. Kaufm an, who also testified in the proceedings, had fo r m any years been intim ately associated w ith the cem etery and was personally ac quain ted w ith lo t ow ners and other persons who had been associated w ith the cem etery and who could have given inform ation as to th e iden tity and location of lo t owners. Y et this same Secretary-T reasurer kept silence as to this inform ation w hen there was a duty upon him as an officer of Com plainant to disclose it. (c) The successful a ttem p t on th e p a r t of Complainants to m ake it appear to th e C ourt th a t the sale of the cem etery w as bona fide w hen in fact th e buyer corporation had as its ow ners and officers the same persons who w ere owners and officers; of Com plainant in the proceedings (E. 372). This fact w as disguised from th e C ourt by the use of one B enjam in J. M artin for the purpose of signing the con trac t of sale as president of the purchasing corporation on Ju ly 14, 1958 (E. 372), w hen in fact Benjam in J. M artin did not become president of the Belair Roads Enterprises, 48 Inc., un til Ju ly 25, 1958. A t the tim e of the m aking of th is contract C lem ent R. M ercaldo was president of the Belair Roads Enterprises, Inc., and fu rtherm ore th e same Clem ent R. M ercaldo was president of M cKamer1 R ealty Company, th e Com plainant in th e proceedings, and also counsel of record for the same M cKamer R ealty Company. C lem ent R. Mercaldo, as counsel for Complainant, and as an officer of the C ourt had a clear du ty cast upon him self to disclose these facts to the Court, bu t ra th e r than disclose them , he actively participated in the scheme to w ithhold such facts from th e Court. VI. SHOULD ARTICLE 16, SECTIO N 120 O F T H E ANN OTATED CODE O F MARYLAND BE DECLARED U N CON STITUTIO NA L TO T H E EXTEN T T H A T IT A TTEM PTS TO DELEGATE T H E POLICE PO W ER O F T H E ST A T E O F MARYLAND T O PR IV A T E INDIVIDUALS? A rticle 16, Section 120 of the A nnotated Code of M ary land reads in p a r t : “ * * * has been abandoned or is or becomes a m enace or detrim ental to the public health, safety, security o r w elfare, anyone having a p roperty righ t in such cem etery or burial ground or any public agency having an in terest in th e elim ination o r abatem ent of the con ditions in such cem etery or burial ground w hich are or becomes a public nuisance shall have the righ t to file a Bill of Com plaint in either one of th e Equity Courts of Baltim ore City * * *” This language clearly gives to those individuals hav ing a p roperty rig h t in a cem etery the rig h t to exercise the police pow er of the S ta te of M aryland by the ir p re tending to pro tect the health, safety, security and w elfare of the people of Baltim ore City. I t is of course well recog nized th a t cem eteries by th e ir very n a tu re are an ap propriate subject of legislative control, and to the ex ten t th a t th is s ta tu te is aim ed a t the protection of the w elfare of the citizens of B altim ore City, and vests authority in the appropriate agencies of B altim ore "City it would be valid, 49 b u t to th e ex ten t th a t it casts upon private persons the responsibility of m aking the determ ination of w hat is good for the health and w elfare it is invalid. The Court of Appeals of M aryland in the case of Liberto v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 23 A. 2d 43, in discussing the police pow er used th is language: “N either a Legislature or a City Council can by legis lation divest itself of the pow er to protect th e lives, health , morals, com fort and general w elfare of the citizens of the com m unity.” W hile the Court in th a t case was not dealing w ith the specific problem here involved, th e im plication is clear th a t the S ta te alone is vested w ith police power, and such pow er can only be exercised by appropriate agencies of the state. 16 C.J.S. 178 a t page 913 states: “The police pow er of the state cannot be delegated to p riva te persons.” W hile this problem has not been dealt w ith by this Court, o ther sta te courts hold em phatically th a t the police pow er cannot be delegated to p rivate persons, City of Cincinnati v. Cook, 140' N.E. 655, 107 Ohio St. 223. VII. IS ARTICLE 16, SECTIO N 120 O F TH E A NN OTATED CODE OF MARYLAND UNCON STITUTIO NA L FOR TH E REASON T H A T IT IS AN UNREASONABLE DISCRIM INATION A GAINST CEM ETERY LOT OW NERS IN BALTIM ORE CITY IN V IOLA TION OF T H E EQUAL PR O T E C T IO N CLAUSE OF TH E FO U R TEEN TH AMENDMENT TO T H E UNITED STA TES C O N STITU TIO N ? P rio r to the passage of this section of the code the law of M aryland had long been established regarding the sale of cem eteries and un til the passage of this section th e rights of lot ow ners could not be foreclosed until the cem etery w as abandoned, and this law righ tly applied to the en tire S ta te of M aryland. Of course i t is well recognized th a t a sta te m ay in the exercise of the police pow er discrim inate betw een localities, bu t it is universally held th a t there m ust be some ractional basis for such discrim ination and 50 th a t such discrim ination m ust not be arb itrary . The sta tu te here arb itrarily set aside B altim ore City as th e object of its operation w ithout th e slightest p re tex t th a t Baltim ore C ity presented any different situation w ith regard to the health and w elfare of its citizens th a n any other m unici pality in the S tate of M aryland. Indeed th e expert testi m ony a t th e tria l by Dr. W illiams (E. 98) of the Baltim ore C ity H ealth D epartm ent, and the Police Commissioner of Baltim ore C ity (E. 123) was to th e effect th a t B altim ore C ity did not p resen t any different situation w ith regard to the existance of a cem etery than any o ther M aryland community. This s ta tu te is fu rth e r discrim inatory for the reason th a t it sets up a different form ula fo r th e distribution of the proceeds tof the sale of the cem etery thereby fore closing rights of lot ow ners to partic ipate in the proceeds of such sale on no o ther ground th a t the cem etery happens to be located in B altim ore City. CONCLUSION T hat the D ecree P ro Confesso and the final Decree of the C ircuit Court of B altim ore C ity in the case of McKamer Realty Company v. Anderson Enterprises, Inc., et al., Docket 97A, Folio 878 should be vacated because obtained by fraud upon th e C ourt and for the fu rth e r reason th a t D efendants in th a t case w ere not given an opportunity to defend the case upon its m erits so th a t those Defendants m ay now file pleas and have the case heard upon th e m erits, and fu rth e r th a t this C ourt should declare A rticle 16, Section 120 of the A nnotated Code of M aryland to be unconstitutional for reasons given, and in such eventuality th e Decrees of the C ircuit Court pu rsuan t to such sta tu te should be vacated and the Bill of Com plaint dismissed. Respectfully subm itted, TUCKER R. DEARING, JU AN ITA JACKSON M ITCHELL, PAUL J. COCKRELL, JU LIU S P. ROBINSON, W. A. C. HUGHES, JR „ A RC H IE D. W ILLIAM S, A ttorneys for A ppellants.