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Press Releases, Volume 6. Memorandum on Involvement in Affirmative Action Cases Post-Bakke, 1978. 35685a88-bb92-ee11-be37-00224827e97b. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/f2659a94-3318-410d-a095-2a2d403a051d/memorandum-on-involvement-in-affirmative-action-cases-post-bakke. Accessed August 19, 2025.
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MEMORA NDUM December 28, 1978 To +: JACK GREENBERG FROM: NAPOLEON B. WILLIAMS, JR. RE =: affirmative action And Reverse piscriminati on Note: In light of Bakke it has become important for the Legal Defense Fund to intervene in a number of "reverse discriminatio n" cases in order to raise the defense of past racial discriminatio n as a support for the affirmative action. With the exception of the litigation in Detroit, the parties to these cases are reluc- tant to make this defense. It is also becoming apparent in Bakke type cases that the cases will be decided upon their own special facts. For aifferent categories of cases there may be different legitimate interests that can sustain the affirmative action under challenge. Hence an adverse decision in one type of case may have a limited impact upon our chances of success with respect to another type of reverse discriminati on case. For example, 2 loss in Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. V- Weber is likely to have limited impact on the police case in Detroit. Other situations like this are bound to develop, especially when a defense can be based upon the new EEOC affirmative action regulations. Listed below is a summary of some of the affirmative action cases in which we are involved. 1. Bostick V- Byrd (Federal pistrict Court in North Carolina. plaintiffs in this action seek to invalidate the affir- OF Memorandum December 28, 1978 Page 2 mative action admission program at the University of North Carolina School of Law. LDF has been informally advised that the court will grant its motion to intervene. The intervention is necessary because of the refusal of the University and the State of North Carolina to defend the affirmative action program on the basis of past discrimination against black applicants, LDF also seeks to justify the School's admission program on the basis that there are compelling legitimate reasons which support the program, such as the need for diversity and the need to provide lawyers for black residents, and other residents, in North Carolina. 2. Uzzell v. Friday (Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit). The case also involves the University of North Carolina. The Court of Appeals is presently considering whether to uphold University's practices in which one-third of the seats on the Student Council is set aside for black students and four-sevenths of the seats on the Student Honor Court can be filled by students belonging to the same race or sex as the person being tried by the Court. The following issues have been raised by LDF in this case: (1) the effect of governmental findings of past dis- crimination by the University against blacks; (2) the impact of HEW's orders requiring the University to eliminate its dual school system in higher education; and (3) the right of the University to provide representation of all students on itslegis- Memorandum December 28, 1978 Page 3 lative bodies and to provide a judicial tribunal that is free of racial and sexual bias. 3. Driscoll v. Regents of the University of California (District Court) This action sought to invalidate the University of California's policy which allegedly provides more advantageous terms of financial assistance to black students than to white stu- dents. The action was dismissed for procedural reasons which have nothing to do with the underlying merits of the case, 4. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Weber (United States Supreme Court) In this action a white employee challenges the validity of an affirmative action program which was allegedly instituted without proof of past discrimination against blacks. The issues raised in this case are as follows: (1) the extent to which employees subject to Title VII can voluntarily establish, without running afoul of Title VII, affirmative action programs in order to counter a drastic underrepresentation of minorities in the workforce; (2) the extent to which a private employee can employ an affirmative action program utilizing quotas and preferences as a means of complying with the President's Executive Order; and (3) the extent to which an employee who has reason to believe that he may be in violation of Title VII on account of the underrepresentation of blacks may institute an affirmative action program.