Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment
Public Court Documents
January 18, 1984

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Case Files, Bozeman v. Lambert and Wilder v. Lambert Court Documents. Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment, 1984. 11539140-ed92-ee11-be37-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/08bb3ab2-b030-49c5-be0b-2326635826b4/petitioners-motion-for-summary-judgment. Accessed April 06, 2025.
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t-r IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT !i.' FOR THE II{IDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 'L;i .l,i . .: MONTGOIVIERY DTVI S I ON JULIA P. WILDER, ll e ,|l rF.- -X : Civil Action No. 83-H-580-NPetit ioner, against EALON M. LAMBERT, JACK C. LUFKIN AND : JOHN T. PORTER TN THEIR OFFICAL CAPACITIES AS MEII{BERS OF THE ALABAMA 3 BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLES, AND TED BUTLER, A PROBATION AND PAROLE : oFFICER, EltPtoYED BY THE ALABAMA BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLES, 3 Respondents. -x PETITIONER'S Ii{OTION FOR SUMIT'IARY JUDGIIENT TO THE SAID HONORABLE COURT: NOW COMES JULIA P. WILDER, petitioner, by and through her attorneys and, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, respectfully moves this Court to enter summary judgment for petitioner on the constitutional claims raised by paragraphs 17-21, 24 and 25 of her petition for writ of habeas corpusr oll the ground that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact concerning said con- stitutional claims and the petitioner is entitled to judg- ment on said constitutional claims as a mat,ter of Iaw. f-t I. This motion is based exclusively upon the claims raised in paragraphs L7-2t, 24 and 25 of petitioner's habeas corPus Peti- tion. For.the Court's convenience, those paragraPhs are repro- duced below: ,17. The indictment charging petitioner with violating S 17-23-1 was for each of the reasons sPecified in paras. 7g-Zt, infra, insufficient to inform petitioner of the nature aiZ-Tause of the accusation against herr as required by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments' 18. The indictnent against petitioner charges that petit ioner: !'COUNT ONE 'rdid vote more than once, or did deposit more than one ballot for the same office as her vote, or did vote il1egal1y'or fraud- ulentIy, in the Democratic Primary Run- off Election of SePtember 25, 1978 | "COUNT TWO ndid vote more than once as an absentee vot,er t ot did deposit more than one absen- tee ballot for the same office or offices as her vote, or did cast illega1 or fraudulent absentee baIlots, in the Democratic Pri- mary Run-off Election of September 26, 1978 | "COUNT THREE xdid cast i1Iega1 or fraudulent absentee ballots in the Democratic Primary Run- off Election of September 26, 1 978, in that she did deposit with the Pickens County Circuit Clerk, absentee ballots which were fraudulent and which she knew to be fraudulent, against the peace and dignity of t'he State of Alabama. " 19. The indictment was constitutionally insufficient because it failed to provide notice of the charges submitted to petitioner's jury as the basis for her conviction under S 1?-23-1, The indictment accused petitioner of violating s 17-23-1 by ',votIing] i11egally" or "cast Iing] i11ega1 ... 2 absentee baIlotsr" but it failed to identify either the acts constituting the alleged illegalities or the elements of the statutes wfri.ctr purportedly caused those acts to be i1IegaI. That failure deprived petitioner of constitution- a1ly required notice. (a) The trial judge instructed the jury on four statutes, A1a. Code S 17-10-3 (1975) [miscited by the judge as S 17-23-31, Tr. 308-309; A1a. Code S 17-10-5 ilgis) lmiscited by the judge as S 17-10-77, Tr. 309-310; AIa. Code S 17-10-7 (1975) | Tr. 310-3'l 1; and Ala. Code S 13-5-115 (1glS), Tr. 311. None of these statutes or their elements was charged against petitioner in the indictment. (b) The jury was instructed that proof that petitioner had committed any act "t9t authorized by o.. or ... contrary to, any 1aw would constitute an "iIIegaI' act warranting petitioner's conviction under S 17-23-1. Tr. 308. The eifect of that instruction and of the subsequent instructions on each of the statutes listed in para. 19(a)r supra, was to make each of those statutes a separate ground ffiiabilit,y under S 17-23-1. The indictment made no allegations whatsoever that petitioner had violated those statutes or had engaged in acts which would constitute violations of those statutes. (c) For these reasons the indictment failed to provide notice of the offenses actually submitted to the jrrry as required by the constitution, and petitioner's iesutting conviction was obtained in violation of due Process. 20. The indictment contained conclusionary allegations of fraudulent conduct by petitioner, but it failed to provide fair notice as required by the Constitution in that it failed to give sufficient notice of the particulars of the alleged fraud. (a) The indictment alleged in Count I, in the alternative with other allegations, that petitioner voted fraudulently in the run-off. It a11eged, in the alternative with other ltlegations in Count fI, that she cast fraudulent absentee ballots in the run-off. In Count III, it alleged that she deposited fraudulent absentee ballots with the Pickens County Circuit Clerk, and that she knew the ballots were fraudulent. (b) In order to provide constitutionally requisite notice, the inoictment was required to identify the particu- lars of the allegeo fraud with sufficient specificit,y to inform petitioner fairly of the actions or transactions which constituced the alleged fraud with which she was charged. It did not do Sor and its failure to make those factual allegations deprived petitioner of the notice demanded by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. 3- 21. The indictment failed to a11ege accurately each of the elements of S 17-23-1, and therefore failed to provide the minirnum notice required by the Constitution. (a) In this case, fraud is a necessary element of s 17-23-1 under the rules of Alabama law set forth in para. 16(a), supra. (b) Counts one and two of the indictnent do not allege that petitioner acted with frauoulent intent or knowledge. They a11ege no mens rea of any sort. (c) Since the verdict against petitioner was a general verdict finding her "guilty as charged in the Indictmeltr" Tr. 316, and since she was thereupon adjudged guiity of one undifferentiated violation of S 17-23-1, the aeficient counts prejudiced petitioner and rendered the indictment as a whole insufficient under the Constitution. 24. If any of the constructions of s 17-23-1 mentioned in paras. t6(a) and 23(d), supra, were valid and operative at Lfre tirne of petitioner's-Eiial, the instructions to the jury impermissibly broadened the statute so aS to create ex post facto liability in violation of the Due Process dlause-E-EEe Fourteenth Amendment as construed in Bouie v. Citv of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1963). The instructions toffipermissib1ybroadeneds13-5-115causing, under the same principles, a separate violat,ion of the Due Process Clause. (a) The jury instructions permitted various statutes to be incorporltea into S 17-23-1, as described in para. 19(a) supra. They further permitted a conviction for .iltegEl" voting without any showing of mental culpability, as deicribed in para. 19(b), supra, and thus allowed petitioner to be convicted on a strict liability basis for lny transgression of any of the incorporated statutes. If S 17-23-1 $ras subject to limiting constructions at the time of petitioner's trial, these jury instructions abrogated the constructions retroactively in violation of Bouie. (b) Section 13-5-115 penalizes the making of a sworn statement required under the election laws "falsely and corruptlytr -- i.€., with criminal intent. The trial court instructed Lhejury that petitioner could be 1iab1e under S 13-5-115 for "falseIy and incorrectly" making a required statement. By substituting "incorrectly" for "corruptlyr" the instructions removed the intent element from S 13-5-115 and thus impermissibly expanded the reach of the statute in violation of Bouie. 4- 25. Both S 17-23-1 and S 13-5-115 were presented to the jury as strict liability offenses. ttr. 308, 311. Therefore, as applied to petitioner, those statutes denieo her due Processl- especially inasmuch as they touched on rights protected by the Constitution. Petitioner's convic- ti5n stinds in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.rl II. The only facts material to this motion are contained in the certified transcript of the trial proceedingsr submitted on September 21, 1983 by respondents as Exhibit "J." AccordinglY, there can be no dispute as to any of the facts relevant to t'his motion. WHEREFORE, PREIIISES CONSIDERED, pet,itioner Prays that this Court grant summary judgment uPon the pleadings and uncontro- verted evidence before the court, grant the petition for a writ of habeas corpus and discharge petitioner from the unconstitu- tional restraints of her conviction and the conditions of parole imposed uPon her, and grant such other relief as may be aPpro- priate. Dated: JanuarY 18, 1984 639 Martha Street MontgomeEY, Alabama 35108 262-7 337 JACK GREENBERG LANI GUINIER 99 Budson Street, 15th Eloor New York, New York 10013 (212) 219- 1 900 Attorneys for Petitioner 5- tt-'--'r Of Counsel: Anthony G. Amsterdam N.Y.U. 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