Docket Sheet; Order; Order Amending Opinion

    • 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA 

RONALD CHISOM, et al., 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
V . 

EDWIN EDWARDS, et al., 

Defendants-Appellees. 

Civil Action 
No. 86-5075 
Section A 

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 

WILLIAM P. QUIGLEY 
901 Convention Center Blvd. 
Fulton Place 
Suite 901 
New Orleans, LA 70130 
(504) 524-0016 

ROY RODNEY, JR. 
643 Magazine Street 
New Orleans, LA 70130 
(504) 586-1200 

JULIUS L. CHAMBERS 
CHARLES STEPHEN RALSTON 
C. LANI GUINIER 
JUDITH REED 
PAMELA S. KARLAN 

99 Hudson Street, 16th Floor 
New York, New York 10013 
(212) 219-1900 

RON WILSON 
Richards Building, Suite 310 
837 Gravier Street 
New Orleans, LA 70112 
(504) 525-4361 



TABLE OF CONTENTS  

Page  

Table of Authorities   ii 

Introduction   1 

The Procedural History of this Case   1 

Argument   4 - 

I. Plaintiffs Are Entitled to a Preliminary Injunction.   4 

A. Plaintiffs Are Likely to Succeed on the Merits .5 

1. The Appropriate Legal Standard   5 

2. The Evidence in this Case   7 

a. The Lack of Minority Electoral Success. .   7 

b. Racially Polarized Voting   8 

c. Evidence Concerning Other Senate 
Factors   11 

d. The Three-Pronged Gingles Test   14 

B. Plaintiffs Face a Substantial Threat of 
Irreparable Injury   15 

C. The State Will Suffer No Injury If the Upcoming 
Election Is Postponed  19 

D. The Public Interest Would Best Be Served By 
Enjoining the Upcoming Election  20 

II. The Possibility of a Petition for Certiorari Should 
Not Deter This Court from Imposing a Preliminary 
Injunction  22 

Conclusion  24 

Certificate of Service  25 

Appendix  27 



TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  

Cases Pages  

Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972)   18 

Canal Authority v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567 (5th 
Cir. 1974)     4 

Chisom V. Edwards, F.2d (5th Cir. 
May 27, 1988)   3 

Chisom V. Edwards, 831 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1988) . 2, 5, 7, 15, 
20, 22 

Citizens for a Better Gretna V. City of Gretna, 
636 F. Supp. 1113 (E.D. La. 1986), aff'd, 
834 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1987) . . . . ....... 8, 9, 12 

City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975) . 19, 22, 

23 

City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980)   14 

Cook v. Luckett, 575 F. Supp. 479 (S.D. Miss. 1983) . 16, 20 

Cosner V. Dalton, 522 F. Supp. 350 (E.D. Va. 1981) 
(three-judge court)   20 

Deerfield Medical Center v. City of Deerfield 
Beach, 661 F.2d 328 (5th Cir. 1981)   15 

Elrod V. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976)   16 

Haith V. Martin, 477 U.S. , 91 L.Ed.2d 559 
(1986)   22 

Hamer V. Campbell, 358 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1966)   3, 21 

Harris v. Graddick, 593 F. Supp. 128 (M.D. Ala. 
1984)   16 

Hendrix V. McKinney, 460 F. Supp. 626 (M.D. Ala. 
1978)   8 

Herron V. Koch, 523 F. Supp. 167 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) 
(three-judge court)   22 

Johnson v. Halifax County, 594 F. Supp. 161 
(E.D.N.C. 1984)   4, 17 

11. 



Kirksey V. Allain, 635 F. Supp. 347 (S.D. Miss. 1986) 
(three-judge court)   19 

Kirksey v. Allain, Civ. Act. No. J85-0960(B) 
(S.D. Miss. May 28, 1986)   4, 6, 17-19 

Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965)   12 

Major v. Treen, 574 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. La. 1983) 
(three-judge court)   7, 9, 12, 14, 21 

Mallory v. Eyrich, 839 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1988)   22 

Martin v. Allain, 658 F. Supp. 1183 (S.D. 
Miss. 1987)   19 

McMillan v. Escambia County, 748 F.2d 1037 
(11th Cir. 1984)   8 

Middleton-Keirn v. Stone, 655 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1981) . 16 

Mississippi State Chapter, Operation PUSH 
V. Allain, 674 F. Supp. 1245 (N.D. 
Miss. 1987)   13 

Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)   16 

Smith v. Paris, 386 F.2d 979-(5th Cir. 1967) 
(per curiam)   20, 21 

South Carolina v. United States, 585 F. Supp. 418 
(D.D.C.) (three-judge court), appeal dism'd, 
469 U.S. 875 (1984)     18 

Taylor v. Haywood County, Tennessee, 544 F. Supp. 
1122 (W.D. Tenn. 1982)   4, 17 

Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. , 92 L.Ed.2d 
25 (1986)   5, 6, 10, 14, 15 

United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979)   11 

Valteau v. Edwards, 466 U.S. 909 (1984)   18 

Valteau v. Edwards, Civ. Act. No. 84-1293 (E. D. 
La. Mar. 21, 1984) (three-judge court) •  19 

Watson v. Commissioners Court of Harrison 
County, 616 F.2d 105, 107 (5th Cir. 
1980) (per curiam)   16, 21 

Yick Wo. V. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)   16 

iii 



Zimmer v. McKeithan, 485 F.2d 1297, 1306 (5th Cir. 
1974) (en banc), aff'd on other grounds sub  
nom. East Carroll Parish School Board v. 
Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976) (per curiam)   12, 13 

Legislative History  

128 Cong. Rec. S6716, 6718 (daily ed. June 14, 1982)   23 

H.R. Rep. No. 97-227 (1982)   14 

S. Rep. No. 97-417 (1982)   5, 6, 13, 14 

Other 

U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, The Voting Rights 
Act: Ten Years After (1975)   14 

iv 



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA 

RONALD CHISOM, et al., 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
V. 

EDWIN EDWARDS, et al., 

Defendants-Appellees. 

Civil Action 
No. 86-5075 
Section A 

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE 

FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 

Introduction 

Plaintiffs Ronald Chisom et al., black registered voters in 

Orleans Parish, Louisiana, have moved for a preliminary 
_ 

injunction restraining defendants (hereafter "the State") from 

conducting any elections to fill positions on the Louisiana 

Supreme Court from the First Supreme Court Judicial District 

until the disposition of plaintiffs' challenge to the current use 

of a multimember election district. 1 

The Procedural History of this Case 

The Louisiana Supreme Court consists of seven justices. 

Five are elected from single-member districts. The other two are 

elected from the only multimember district--the First Supreme 

1 Plaintiffs have challenged the present election scheme 
under both section 2 of the Voting Rights Act •of 1965 as amended 
in 1982, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments to the Constitution. They seek a preliminary 
injunction on only their section 2 results claim. 



Court District. The First District contains Orleans, St. 

Bernard, Plaquemines, and Jefferson Parishes. Justices serve 

ten-year terms. One of the two justiceships allocated to the 

First Supreme Court District--the one now held by Justice 

Calogero--is scheduled to be filled by election in the fall of 

1988; the other seat--the one now held by Justice Marcus--is to 

be filled by election in the fall of 1990. 

On September 19, 1986, two years before the first scheduled 

election, plaintiffs filed a complaint in this Court. It 

challenged the use of an election scheme that submerged Orleans 

Parish's predominantly black electorate in a majority-white 

multimember district under both the "results" prong of section 2 

and the intent standard of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 

Amendments. In an opinion and order dated May 1, 1987, and 

subsequently amended on July 10, 1987, this Court granted the 

State's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' section 2 claims on the 

ground that section 2 does not cover judicial elections. 

On February 29, 1988, the Court of Appeals reversed 

unanimously, holding both that section 2 applies to judicial 

elections and that plaintiffs' complaint had adequately pleaded 

its constitutional allegations. Chisom v. Edwards, 831 F.2d 1056 

(5th Cir. 1988). The State petitioned for rehearing and 

rehearing en banc. Plaintiffs responded by moving either for an 

injunction against the upcoming election or for issuance of the 

mandate to permit them to seek immediate preliminary injunctive 

relief in this Court. 

2 



On May 27, 1988, the Court of Appeals unanimously denied the 

State's petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en 

banc. In addition', despite the State's announced intention to 

petition for certiorari, see Opposition to Plaintiff-Appellants' 

Motion for an Injunction Pending Appeal at 16, 30, and the 

provisions of Fed. R. App. P. 41(a) and (b) that postpone 

issuance of the mandate to allow parties seeking certiorari to 

receive a stay, the Court of Appeals ordered the immediate  

issuance of the mandate. 

The same day, the panel issued an opinion denying 

plaintiffs' motion for an injunction pending appeal "[i]n 

accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), which provides that an 

injunction request must ordinarily be made in the district court 

on first instance," 2 Chisom v. Edwards, F.2d (5th Cir. 

May 27, 1988), slip op. at 1, and dismissing as moot plaintiffs' 

motion for issuance of the mandate. In that opinion, the Court 

stated that: 

In the event the plaintiffs assert their injunction 
request to the district court, whichever way the 
district court rules, this Court notes that any 
election held under an elections scheme which this 
Court later finds to be unconstitutional or in 
violation of the Voting Rights Act is subject to being 
set aside and the office declared to be vacant. See 
Hamer v. Campbell, 358 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1966). 

Slip op. at 1-2. 

2 At the time plaintiffs sought injunctive relief from 
the Court of Appeals, they could not have sought such relief from 
this Court since this case had been closed following the entry of 
the Court's June 8, 1987, judgment. See Record Excerpts on 
Appeal at 3. 



Argument 

I. Plaintiffs Are Entitled to a Preliminary Injunction 

The test for whether this Court should issue a preliminary 

injunction focuses on four issues: (1) whether plaintiffs are 

likely to prevail on the merits; (2) whether there is a 

substantial threat of irreparable injury; (3) whether the 

threatened injury outweighs the threatened harm an injunction 

might do to the defendant; and (4) whether granting an 

injunction will serve the public interest. Canal Authority v.  

Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1974). 

In Kirksey V. Allain, Civ. Act. No. J85-0960(B) (S.D. Miss. 

May 28, 1986), 3 Judge Barbour, applying the Callaway criteria, 

enjoined judicial elections throughout the state of Mississippi 

pending the adjudication of the plaintiffs' section 2 claims; see 

also, e.g., Johnson V. Halifax County, 594 F. Supp. 161 (E.D.N.C. 

1984) (granting preliminary injunction stopping elections for 

county commission in face of section 2 challenge); Taylor v.  

Haywood County, Tennessee, 544 F. Supp. 1122 (W.D. Tenn. 1982) 

(granting preliminary injunction stopping elections for county 

road commission in face of section 2 and constitutional 

challenges). 

3 A copy of the district court's unpublished order in 
Kirksey is attached to this Brief as Appendix A. 

4 



A. Plaintiffs Are Likely To Succeed on the Merits  

1. The Appropriate Legal Standard 

In its unanimous opinion 

judicial elections, the Court 

its express terms, extends to 

839 F.2d at 1060. One of the 

of Appeals relied in reaching 

holding that'section 2 applies to 

of Appeals held that "section 2, by 

state judicial elections." Chisom, 

primary sources 

this conclusion 

history of the 1982 amendments to section 2. 

The purpose of those 1982 amendments was 

on which the Court 

was the legislative 

See id. at 1061-63. 

to eliminate the 

requirement that plaintiffs show that challenged voting practices 

are the product of purposeful discrimination. Thornburg v.  

Gingles, 478 U.S. , 92 L.Ed.2d 25, 37, 42 (1986). The Senate 

Report accompanying the 1982 amendments, which Gingles  

characterized as an "authoritative source" for interpreting 

section 2, Gingles, 92 L.Ed.2d at 42 n. 7, listed nine "[t]ypical 

factors" that can serve to show 'a violation of section 2's 

"results test." S. Rep. No. 97-417, p. 28 (1982) ["Senate 

Report"]. 4 

4 These factors are: 
"1. the extent of any history of official 

discrimination in the state or political subdivision 
that touched the right of the members of the minority 
group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate 
in the democratic process; 

2. the extent to which voting in the elections of 
the state or political subdivision is racially 
polarized; 

3. the extent to which the state or political 
subdivision has used unusually large election 
districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot 
provisions, or other voting practices or procedures 

5 



In cases challenging the use of at-large elections, "the 

most important Senate Report factors . . are the 'extent to 

which members of the minority group have been elected to public 

office in the jurisdiction' and the 'extent to which voting in 

the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially 

polarized." Gingles, 92 L.Ed.2d at 45, n. 15. The other 

factors are "supportive of, but not essential to, a minority 

voter's claim." Id. 

In Kirksey v. Allain, the district court found that 

plaintiffs had shown a likelihood of success on the merits 

because 

that may enhance the opportunity for discriMination 
against the minority; 

4. if there is a candidate slating_process, 
whether the members of the minority group have been 
denied access to that process; 

5. the extent to which members of the minority 
group in the state or political subdivision bear the 
effects of discrimination in such areas as education, 
employment and health, which hinder their ability to 
participate effectively in the political process; 

6. whether political campaigns have been 
characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals; 

7. the extent to which members of the minority 
group have been elected to public office in the 
jurisdiction. 

[8.] whether there is a significant lack of 
responsiveness on the part of elected officials to the 
particularized needs of the members of the minority 
group. 

[9.] whether the policy underlying the state or 
political subdivision's use of such voting 
qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard, 
practice or procedure is tenuous." 

S. Rep. No. 97-417, pp. 28-29 (1982). "[T]here is no requirement 
that any particular number of factors be proved, or that a 
majority of them point one way or the other." Id. at 29. 

6 



they will probably prove a history of past racial 
discrimination in Mississippi . . . ; racially 
polarized voting in Mississippi elections; socio-
economic disparities between black and white citizens 
of Mississippi, with blacks being less affluent and 
less well educated; a lack of prior electoral success 
by black judicial candidates in contested elections; 
and that at the trial on the merits the key issue will 
be the continued use of multi-member districts. 

Slip op. at 2-3. 

In this case, the evidence concerning those same relevant 

factors is undisputed. Indeed, much of the evidence is reflected 

in the opinion of the 'three-judge district court in Major v.  

Treen, 574 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. La. 1983). At the hearing before 

Judge Collins on November 6, 1986, concerning attorneys' fees in 

Major v. Treen, the State disputed plaintiffs' requested award on 

the grounds that the Major plaintiffs should have sought summary 

judgment rather than going to trial because the evidence in their 

favor was so overwhelming. If that is so, then preliminary 

relief is surely appropriate in this case, where the Court has 

the advantage of being able to rely upon Major v. Treen's 

findings, made after a trial on the merits involving essentially 

the same parties. 

2. The Evidence in this Case 

a. The Lack of Minority Electoral Success  

With regard to the first of the factors identified as 

critical in Gingles, the evidence is undisputed and, as the Court 

of Appeals observed, "particularly significant," Chisom, 839 F.2d 

at 1058: "[N]o black person has ever been elected to the 

7 



Louisiana Supreme Court, either from the First Supreme Court 

District or from any one of the other_five judicial districts." 

Id. 

Indeed, no black candidate has run. The affidavits of 

Judges Ortique and Augustine attached to Plaintiffs' Motion for a 

Preliminary Injunction explain why: the current configuration of 

the First Supreme Court District denies black voters an 

opportunity , to elect the candidate of their choice and thus 

deters black candidates from running. In cases such as this one, 

"the lack of black candidates is a likely result of a racially 

discriminatory system." McMillan v. Escambia County, 748 F.2d 

1037, 1045 (11th Cir. 1984). See, e.g., Citizens for a Better 

Gretna V. City of Gretna, 636 F. Supp. 1113, 1119 (E.D. La. 1986) 

("axiomatic" that when minorities are faced with dilutive 

electoral structures "candidacy rates tend to drop'") (quoting 

Minority Vote Dilution 15 (C. Davidson ed. 1984)), aff'd, 834 

F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1987); Hendrix V. McKinney, 460 F. Supp. 626, 

631-32 (M.D. Ala. 1978), (fact of racial bloc voting, when 

combined with at-large elections for county commission 

"undoubtedly discourages black candidates because they face the 

certain prospect of defeat"). 

b. Racially Polarized Voting  

With regard to the second factor--the presence of racially 

polarized voting--the evidence is also clear. Elections in the 

parishes that constitute the current First Supreme Court 

District, particularly judicial elections, are characterized by 

8 



racial bloc voting. 

Major v. Treen struck down a congressional districting 

scheme which diluted the strength of Orleans Parish's 

predominantly black electorate by splitting that electorate in 

half and submerging the two parts in majority-white suburban 

congressional districts. The combined area of the two 

congressional districts involved in Major v. Treen constituted 

essentially the First Supreme Court District being challenged in 

this case. See 574 F. Supp. at 328. The Court there found "a 

substantial degree of racial polarization exhibited in the voting 

patterns of Orleans Parish." Id. at 337. It also held that 

voting preferences in the "adjacent suburban parishes, whose 

recently enhanced populations can be partially ascribed to the 

exodus from New Orleans of white families seeking to avoid court-

ordered desegregation of the city's public schools" made those 

parishes even less receptive to black candidates. Id. at 339; 

see also, e.g., Citizens for a Better Gretna, 636 F. Supp. at 

1124-30 (finding racially polarized voting in Jefferson Parish 

municipality). 

Major v. Treen's finding of legally significant racial 

polarization rested in significant part on the existence of 

racial bloc voting in local judicial elections. The court 

expressly relied on a regression analysis performed by 

plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Gordon Henderson, which studied the 

results of thirty-nine elections in Orleans Parish during the 

period 1976 to 1982 in which black candidates ran. See 574 F. 

9 



Supp. at 337-38. Thirteen, or one-third, of these elections 

involved judicial positions. 

Racial bloc voting in judicial elections for positions on 

lower courts within the First Supreme Court District continues to 

this day. Dr. Richard L. Engstrom, a nationally recognized 

expert in the quantitative analysis of racial voting patterns, 

see Gingles, 92 L.Ed.2d at 48 n. 20, 50 & 60 (citing Dr. 

Engstrom's scholarly writings with approval), analyzed judicial 

election contests involving black and white candidates during the 

period 1978 to 1987 on behalf of the plaintiffs in Clark v.  

Edwards, No. 86-435-A (M.D. La.), a case challenging the method 

of electing Louisiana district court judges. Dr. Engstrom used 

the analytic techniques--bivariate ecological regression and 

extreme case analysis--approved by the Supreme Court in Gingles, 

92 L.Ed.2d at 48. As part of his analysis, Dr. Engstrom analyzed 

election returns from the geographic area relevant to this case 

involving thirty-one black candidates in twenty-seven separate 

contests. In twenty-five of twenty-seven races, a black 

candidate was the preferred choice of black voters. 5 In no 

election was a black candidate the choice of white voters. In 

the twenty-five contests in which the black community supported a 

black candidate, an average of 77.06 percent of the black 

5 In twenty-three elections, a black candidate received 
an outright majority of the votes cast by black voters. In the 
other two--the Feb. 6, 1982, Orleans-Criminal I election and the 
Sept. 29, 1984, Orleans Juvenile Court C, election--a black 
candidate was the plurality choice. 

10 



electorate voted for the preferred black candidate, 6 while only 

13.76 percent of white voters voted for the preferred black 

candidate. 

c. Evidence Concerning Other Senate Factors  

This Court may take judicial notice of findings by other 

courts and census data with regard to several of the other, 

historical and socio-economic factors mentioned in the Senate 

Report. Fed. R. Evid. 201; see United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 

U.S. 193, 198 n. 1 (1979) (findings of discrimination in craft 

unions were so numerous as to be a proper subject for judicial 

notice). 

1. A history of official discrimination touching upon the  

right to vote. --Louisiana's pervasive efforts to prevent blacks 

from participating in the political process cannot seriously be 

disputed. As Judge Politz, writing for the three-judge court in 

Major v. Treen noted, from 1898 to 1965, the State used a variety 

6 Four of these races involved more than one black 
candidate. In the first (the Feb. 2, 1982 election for Orleans-
Criminal I), Julien was the plurality victor among black voters, 
and 72.3 percent of black voters preferred one of the black 
candidates. Julien subsequently received over 88 percent of the 
black vote in the runoff. In the second (the Feb. 1, 1986 
election for Orleans-Civil F), Magee was the choice of 75.3 
percent of black voters, and 97.1 percent of black voters 
preferred one of the black candidates. In the third (the Sept. 
16, 1978, race for Orleans Parish Juvenile Court B), Douglas was 
the choice of 57.1 percent of black voters, and 80.9 percent of 
black voters preferred one of the black candidates. In the 
fourth (the Sept. 24, 1984, election for Orleans Parish Juvenile 
Court A), Gray received 68.9 percent of the black vote, and 88.6 
percent of black voters preferred one of the black candidates. 
Gray subsequently received 95.7 percent of the black vote in the 
runoff. 

11 



of stratagems, including educational and property requirements 

for voting, a "grandfather" clause, an "understanding" clause, 

poll taxes, discriminatory purging procedures, an all-white 

primary, a ban on single-shot voting, and a majority-vote 

requirement to "suppres[s] black political involvement . • • .11 

574 F. Supp. at 340; see also, e.g., Louisiana V. United States, 

380 U.S. 145 (1965) (discussing Louisiana's long history of 

racial discrimination in voting); Zimmer v. McKeithan, 485 F.2d 

1297, 1306 (5th dr. 1974) (en banc), aff'd on other grounds sub  

nom. East Carroll Parish School Board v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 

(1976) (per curiam); Citizens for a Better Gretna, 636 F. Supp. 

at 1116-17. 

2. Socio-economic disparities--Both Major v. Treen and 

Citizens for a Better Gretna recognized that the black citizens 

of Orleans and Jefferson Parishes suffer from the effects of 

discrimination in such areas as education and employment and that 

their depressed socio-economic status hinders their ability to 

participate effectively in the political process. See Citizens  

for a Better Gretna, 636 F. Supp. at 1117; Major V. Treen, 574 F. 

Supp. at 341. 

Census figures for 1980 (the last year for which racial 

breakdowns were compiled) show that while over 70 percent of the 

•white adults (age 25 and over) in New Orleans are high school 

graduates, less than half of the black adults are. Moreover, the 

percentage of black adult residents who have completed fewer than 

eight years of schooling (21.78) is nearly twice the percentage 

12 



of white residents with a similarly limited education. 

According to the 1980 Census, black per capita income in 

Orleans Parish was only 40 percent of white per capita income. 

The percentage of black families living below poverty level 

(33.4) was roughly four-and-one half times the percentage of 

white families living below poverty level. And over twice the 

percentage of black-occupied housing units as white-occupied 

housing units lacked telephones and motor vehicles--two critical 

resources for political mobilization, see, e.g., Mississippi  

State Chapter, Operation PUSH v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. 1245, 1256 

(N.D. Miss. 1987). 

3. The presence of voting practices that enhance the  

opportunity for racial discrimination. --All three practices 

expressly identified by Congress as tending to exacerbate the 

discriminatory impact of at-large elections, see Senate Report at 

29, are present in this case. First, the First Supreme Court 

District is an "unusually large election distric[t]," Id. It is 

far larger in population than any other Louisiana Supreme Court 

District. Moreover, it is the only multimember district, and 

thus departs from the standard Supreme Court District, which 

elects a single justice. Second, Louisiana has a majority-vote 

requirement for judicial elections. See Zimmer, supra  

(discussing majority vote requirement); Senate Report at 29. 

This means that even if the majority white electorate were to 

split its votes among several candidates, a black candidate would 

not have the opportunity to win by a plurality. According to 

13 



Major v. Treen, this requirement "inhibits political 

participation by black candidates and voters" and "substantially 

diminishes the opportunity for black voters to elect the 

candidate of their choice." 574 F. Supp. at 339. Third, 

elections from the First Supreme Court District are subject to 

the functional equivalent of an "anti-single shot" provision, 

Senate Report at 29. Single-shot voting requires multi-position 

races. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 184 

(1980). But because the terms of the two justices from the First 

Supreme Court District are staggered, only one seat is filled at 

any election. Thus "the opportunity for single-shot voting will 

never arise." Id. at 185 n. 21 (internal quotation marks 

omitted; quoting U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, The Voting Rights 

Act: Ten Years After 208 (1975)); see also, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 

97-227, p. 18 (1982) (condemning staggered'terms). 

d. The Three-Pronged Gingles Test 

In Gingles, the Supreme Court used a three-pronged test for 

assessing whether the choice of multimember, rather than single-

member, districts "impede[s] the ability of minority voters to 

elect representatives of their choice." Gingles, 92 L.Ed.2d at 

45: 

First, the minority group must be able to demonstrate 
that it is sufficiently large and geographically 
compact to constitute a majority in a single-member 
district. . . . Second, the minority group must be able 
to show it is politically cohesive. . . . Third, the 
minority must be able to demonstrate that the white 
majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it 

14 



. . . usually to defeat the minority's preferred 
candidate. 

Id. at 46, 47. 

The second two prongs of this test ask, in essence, whether 

voting is racially polarized. See Gingles, 92 L.Ed.2d at 50. 

For the reasons discussed above, plaintiffs satisfy these two 

prongs. 

With regard to the first prong, the evidence is also 

undisputed. Over half the First Supreme Court District's 

population lives in Orleans Parish, and, as of March 31, 1988, 

slightly over 52 percent of the registered voters in Orleans 

Parish were black. See Affidavit of Silas Lee, III. Judicial 

districts are not required to comply with the requirement of one-

person, one-vote. See Chisom, 839 F.2d at 1060. Thus, there is 

no -need--particularly in assessing whether plaintiffs have shown 

a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits, as opposed to 

actually imposing a remedial plan after a final determination of 

section 2 liability--for this Court to address the precise 

contours of a proper division of the present First Supreme Court 

District. 

B. Plaintiffs Face a Substantial Threat of Irreparable 
Injury  

The Court of Appeals has held that an injury is irreparable 

"if it cannot be undone through monetary remedies." Deerfield  

Medical Center v. City of Deerfield Beach, 661 F.2d 328, 338 (5th 

Cir. 1981). The right at issue in this case is entirely 

15 



nonpecuniary, and no amount of financial compensation can redress 

its deprivation. 

The right to vote is the "fundamental political right, 

because preservative of all rights." Yick Wo. V. Hopkins, 118 

U.S. 356, 370 (1886). That right "can be denied by a debasement 

or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote just as effectively 

as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise." 

Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964). 

The courts have long recognized that conducting elections 

under systems that impermissibly dilute the voting strength of an 

identifiable group works an irreparable injury on both that group 

and the entire fabric of representative government. See, e.g., 

Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. at 585; Watson v. Commissioners Court 

of Harrison County, 616 F.2d 105, 107 (5th Cir. 1980) (per 

curiam) (ordering district court to enjoin elections because 

failure to do so would subject county residents to four more 

years of government by an improperly elected body); Harris v.  

Graddick, 593 F. Supp. 128 (M.D. Ala. 1984) (impediment to right 

to vote "would by its nature be an irreparable injury"); Cook v.  

Luckett, 575 F. Suppe 479, 484 (S.D. Miss. 1983) (noting the 

"irreparable injury inherent in perpetuating voter dilution"); 

cf. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (denial of rights 

under the First Amendment "unquestionably constitutes irreparable 

injury"); Middleton-Keirn V. Stone, 655 F.2d 609, 611 (5th Cir. 

1981) (irreparable injury to both black workers and Nation's 

labor force as a whole is presumed in Title VII cases). And, 

16 



contrary to the State's suggestion in the Court of Appeals, 

district courts have found a sufficient threat of irreparable 

injury in cases in which a final determination of invalidity has 

not yet been made. See, e.g., Kirksey v. Allain, slip op. at 3; 

Johnson, 594 F. Supp. at 171; Taylor, 544 F. Supp. at 1134. 

There is a substantial threat in this case of such a 

dilution of black voting strength in the October 1, 1988, 

election. First, the voting strength of Orleans Parish's 

predominantly black electorate will be subsumed within the 

larger, majority-white suburban electorate. See supra. 

Second, as the affidavits of Judges Augustine and Ortique 

show, the present election scheme will deter candidates who rely 

primarily on the support of black voters from running. And those 

candidates will be unable to obtain the financial backing 

necessary for a credible candidacy as long as the present 

district configuration continues. Thus, black voters will not 

even have an equal opportunity to vote for candidates of their 

choice, let alone the equal opportunity to elect such candidates 

promised by section 2. If the Court does not grant preliminary 

injunctive relief, the merits will not be determined in time for 

the October 1, 1988, election, let alone far enough before the 

election for potential candidates who enjoy the support of the 

black community to meet filing requirements, raise sufficient 

funds, and run serious campaigns. 

Forcing candidates to expend considerable time, energy, and 

resources campaigning in a district whose configuration violates 

17 



the Voting Rights Act both injures the candidates, see, e.g., 

South Carolina v. United States, 585 F. Supp. 418, 423 (D.D.C.) 

(three-judge court), appeal dism'd, 469 U.S. 875 (1984), and 

deprives the voters who support those candidates of their 

fundamental constitutional right to a racially fair electoral 

process. As the Supreme Court recognized in Bullock v. Carter, 

405 U.S. 134, 143-44 (1972), the impact of placing heavy 

financial burdens on candidates is closely "related to the 

resources of the voters supporting a particular candidate," and 

such burdens may therefore deny economically disadvantaged voters 

the ability to support and elect the candidates of their choice. 

In this case, allowing the elections to go forward will have one 

of two results: (1) black candidates will once again be deterred 

from running by both the cost of campaigning throughout the First 

Supreme Court District and the virtual impossibility of winning 

in the overwhelmingly white district,and black voters will once 

again be deprived of the ability even to vote for a candidate of 

their choice; or (2) if black candidates run, the resources 

available from the black community to contest a special election 

will be diminished by the expenditure of effort in an essentially 

meaningless contest in 1988. See Kirksey v. Allain, slip op. at 

3 (finding irreparable injury to plaintiff-intervenors--incumbent 

judges--"should elections go forward, campaign expenses be 

incurred, and such elections be nullified by subsequent order of 

this court"). Indeed, in Valteau V. Edwards, 466 U.S. 909 (1984) 

(denying application for stay), the State of Louisiana argued, in 

18 



seeking a stay of an order compelling it to hold a presidential 

preferential primary, that it would "suffer irreparable harm" if 

it were forced to expend approximately $2 million to conduct 

elections whose results were later overturned. Application for 

Stay at 5. 7 

C. The State Will Suffer No Iniury If the Upcoming 
Election Is Postponed 

The State will not be adversely affected in any way if the 

1988 election is postponed until the merits of plaintiffs' claims 

are determined. Such a postponement would continue the terms of 

the two sitting justices from the First Supreme Court District. 

Cf. City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 365 (1975) 

(city council elected in 1970 remained in office until 1975 

during pendency of Voting Rights Act challenge to annexations); 

Kirksey v. Allain, supra; 8 Kirksey V. Allain, 635 F. Supp. 347 

7 Valteau involved a challenge, under section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act, to Louisiana's attempt to suspend the 
operation of its presidential primary in 1984 and to have 
political parties select delegates to their national conventions 
through• caucuses instead. The district court entered an 
injunction requiring the State to conduct a primary. Valteau v.  
Edwards, Civ. Act. No. 84-1293 (E.D. La. Mar. 21, 1984) (three-
judge court). The State sought a stay of the district court's 
order from the Supreme Court, arguing that it was possible that 
the Department of Justice would preclear the switch to caucuses 
thus rendering the results of the primary nugatory. 

8 Subsequently, in Martin v. Allain, 658 F. Supp. 1183 
(S.D. Miss. 1987) (Kirksey was consolidated with Martin, a case 
challenging judicial elections in districts containing Hinds 
County), the district court found that Mississippi's use of 
multi-member, numbered post judicial districts in certain parts 
of the state violated section 2. At the present time, remedy 
proceedings are underway, and judicial elections in the affected 
districts have been postponed for the past two years. 

19 



(S.D. Miss. 1986) (three-judge court) (enjoining judicial 

elections for unprecleared jurisdictions). Thus, the Louisiana 

Supreme Court will be able to continue its work unaffected. 

The only potential injury defendants might suffer is the 

expense of conducting a special election, should the district 

court ultimately conclude that such an election is required. See 

Cook, 575 F. Supp. at 485. It is entirely possible, however, 

that any future election*to fill seats on the Supreme Court can 

be coordinated with regularly scheduled elections, and such 

expense avoided entirely. See, e.g., Smith V. Paris, 386 F.2d 

979 (5th Cir. 1967) (per curiam) (shortening terms of officials 

elected under discriminatory at-large scheme so that new 

elections would coincide with next regularly scheduled 

elections); Cosner v. Dalton, 522 F. Supp. 350, 364 (E.D. Va. 

1981) (three-judge court) (shortening terms of state legislators 

elected under invalid apportionment scheme). Moreover, that 

injury is entirely counterbalanced by the danger of additional 

expense in conducting a special election should the current  

election proceed and plaintiffs then establish liability. 

D. The Public Interest Would Best Be Served By 
Enjoining the Upcoming Election  

The public interest in a racially fair election scheme is 

absolutely fundamental. "The right to vote, the right to an 

effective voice in our society cannot be impaired on the basis of 

race in any instance wherein the will of the majority is 

expressed by popular vote." Chisom, 831 F.2d at 1065. 

20 



Because plaintiffs sought relief over two years before the 

scheduled election, if this Court denies an injunction pending 

appeal and plaintiffs ultimately prevail on the merits, the 

results of the upcoming election will have to be set aside as the 

Court of Appeals recognized in its per curiam opinion of May 27, 

1988. Slip op. at 1, citing Hamer v. Campbell, suDra. A justice 

elected in 1988 pursuant to an election system that dilutes black 

political power cannot be permitted to serve for 10 years, until 

1998 when the term would normally expire. See, e.g., Watson, 616 

F.2d at 107 (service for another four years too long); Smith v.  

Paris, 386 F.2d at 980 (ordering special election at next 

regularly scheduled election, in two years); Hamer v. Campbell, 

358 F.2d at 222 (service for another four years too long). And 

the public interest in having a judiciary free from racial 

discrimination in its selection is obviously of the highest 

importance, as the Court of Appeals decision in Chisom 

recognized. 

In light of plaintiffs' likely success on the merits, the 

public interest would best be served in not conducting an 

election in 1988. First, such an election would likely have to 

be repeated in two years. This possibility might dampen interest 

both in seeking office and in voting and might decrease financial 

support for candidates. Second, given the probable illegitimacy 

of the present system, it would be unfair for a candidate to run 

under the present scheme and thereby have an unfair advantage as 

an incumbent only two years later. Cf. Major v. Treen, 574 F. 

21 



Supp. at 355. Third, the qualities of deliberation and non-

politicization that the decade-long term of office now serves 

might be undermined by creating, in essence, a two-year term. 

II. The Possibility of a Petition for Certiorari Should Not 
Deter This Court from Imposing a Preliminary Injunction 

This Court should not decline to order preliminary 

injunctive relief on the ground that the State is likely to seek 

certiorari on the question whether section 2 applies to judicial 

elections. See Opposition to Plaintiff-Appellants' Motion for an 

Injunction Pending Appeal at 16, 30 (announcing intention to 

petition for certiorari). Plaintiffs believe that a grant of 

certiorari in this case is unlikely. Both Courts of Appeals to 

have addressed the question have concluded that judicial 

elections are covered by section 2. See Chisom; Mallory v.  

Eyrich, 839 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1988). Those decisions are 

entirely consonant with the Supreme Court's decision in Haith v.  

Martin, 477 U.S. , 91 L.Ed.2d 559 (1986), that section 5 of 

the Voting Rights Act applies to judicial elections. 9 Thus, 

there is neither a conflict among the circuits, nor a conflict 

with any Supreme Court precedent. 

Nonetheless, the timing of the State's petition will result 

in a substantial lapse of time before the Supreme Court disposes 

of the petition. The State's petition is unlikely to be filed 

9 And in fact, under section 5 courts have consistently 
enjoined elections pending disposition of plaintiffs' challenges. 
See, e.g., City of Richmond v. United States, supra; Herron v.  
Koch, 523 F. Supp. 167 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (three-judge court). 

22 



until at least the end of June. Given the manner in which the 

Supreme Court schedules petitions for consideration at 

Conference, it is unlikely, even if plaintiffs were to waive 

their right to respond or to file an opposition long before their 

30 days to reply had run, that the case could be considered 

before the Supreme Court recesses for the summer at the end of 

June. Thus, the petition for certiorari will not be disposed of 

before the first Monday in October, after the scheduled election. 

In any event, the fact that a petition for certiorari is 

pending, or even has been granted, does not affect the need to 

preserve the status quo pending resolution of the question 

whether conducting the upcoming election using the current First 

Supreme Court District violates section 2. Cf. City of Richmond, 

422 U.S. at 365 (keeping city council in office for five years 

pending decision on legality of new election scheme). 

The Court of Appeals' decision to issue the mandate 

immediately, thus preventing the State from obtaining an 

automatic stay of the mandate until the Supreme Court rules, 

strongly suggests that it did not intend for this Court to let 

the pendency, intended or actual, of a petition for certiorari 

deter it from addressing the merits of plaintiffs' request for 

injunctive relief. 

No public interest could be more important than the 

eradication of racial discrimination that impairs the right to 

23 



vote. 1° Thus, plaintiffs have satisfied all four prongs of the 

test for a preliminary injunction and this Court should therefore 

order the postponement of the upcoming elections. 

Conclusion 

Two years ago, plaintiffs filed a lawsuit challenging the 

method of electing justices from the First Supreme Court District 

in the hope that by 1988 a fair election system would be in 

place. They now face the threat that once again their voices 

will not be heard equally in the election process. Accordingly, 

they ask this Court to provide them with preliminary relief. 

WILLIAM P. QUIGLEY 
901 Convention Center Blvd. 
Fulton Place 
Suite 901 
New Orleans, LA 70130 
(504) 524-0016 

ROY RODNEY, JR. 
643 Magazine Street 
New Orleans, LA 70130 
(504) 586-1200 

Dated: June 14, 1988 

tfully submitted, 

JULIUS L. CHAMBERS 
CHARLES STEPHEN RALSTON 
C. LANI GUINIER 
JUDITH REED 
PAMELA S. KARLAN 

99 Hudson Street, 16th Floor 
New York, New York 10013 
(212) 219-1900 

RON WILSON 
Richards Building, Suite 310 
837 Gravier Street 
New Orleans, LA 70112 
(504) 525-4361 

Counsel for Plaintiffs 

10 See 128 Cong. Rec. S6716, 6718 (daily ed. June 14, 
1982) (remarks of Sen. Moynihan) (Voting Right Act is intended 
"to reaffirm this Nation's commitment to that most basic and 
fundamental guarantee . . . which is the right of every citizen 
to exercise his or her right to vote for those who would 
represent them in 'Government"). 

24 



CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE  

I hereby certify that on June 14, 1988, I served copies of 

the foregoing brief upon the attorneys listed below via United 

States mail, first class, postage prepaid: 

William J. Guste, Jr., Esq. 
Atty. General 
La. Dept. of Justice 
234 Loyola Ave., Suite 700 
New Orleans, LA 70112-2096 

M. Truman Woodward, Jr., Esq. 
1100 Whitney Building 
New Orleans, LA 70130 

Blake G. Arata, Esq. 
210 St. Charles Avenue 
Suite 4000 
New Orleans, LA 70170 

A. R. Christovich, Esq. 
1900 American Bank Building 
New Orleans, LA 70130 

Moise W. Dennery, Esq. 
21st Floor Pan American Life Center 
601 Poydras Street 
New Orleans, LA 70130 

Robert G. Pugh 
330 Marshall Street, Suite 1200 
Shreveport, LA 71101 

Robert Berman 
Civil Rights Division 
Department of Justice 
P.O. Box 66128 
Washington, D.C. 20035 

Michael H. Rubin, Esq. 
Rubin, Curry, Colvin & Joseph 
Suite 1400 
One American Place 
Baton Rouge, LA 70825 

25 



• 
Peter Butler 
Butler, Heebe & Hirsch 
712 American Bank Building 
New Orleans, LA 70130 

Charles A. Kronlage, Jr. 
717 St. Charles Avenue 
New Orleans, LA 70130 

26 

Counsel for Plaintiffs 



APPENDIX 

27 



SOUMERN DisTRICT 0/-

FILED 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT OURT-

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MIS issiWY 28 1985 
JACKSON DIVISION 

HENRY KIRKSEY, et al., 
on behalf of themselves 
and all others similarly 
situated, 

Plaintiffs, 

NATHAN P. ADAMS, JR. AND 
NAT W. BULLARD, 

Plaintiffs-Intervenors, 

CLARENCE A. PIERCE. CLERK 

BY 
DEPUTY 

v. CIVIL ACTION NO. J85-0960(B) 

WILLIAM A. ALLAIN, Governor of 
Mississippi, et al., 

Defendants. 

ORDER 

This civil action came on for hearing on May 27, 

1986, on the plaintiffs' Motion for A Temporary 

Restraining Order and/or Preliminary and/or Permanent 

Injunction which the court and the parties have treated as 

a request for preliminary injunctive relief enjoining the 

defendants from conducting any elections for the offices 

of circuit judge in the State of Mississippi, chancery 

judge in the State of Mississippi, and county judge in 

only Harrison County, Hinds County, and Jackson County, 

Mississippi, pending this court's trial and decision on 

the merits of the plaintiffs' claims for relief under 



• 

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended in 

1982, 42 U.S.C. S 1973, 42 U.S.C. S 1983, and the 

Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States 

Constitution and the entry of a future order of the court 

rescheduling such elections. 

Having considered the motion, the supporting and 

opposing briefs, the documentary evidence received into 

evidence at the hearing, and the four well-established 

prerequisites for the granting of a preliminary 

injunction, see, e.g., Canal Authority v. Callaway, 489 

F.2d 567, 572-77 (5th Cir. 1974), the court rendered 

bench opinion at the conclusion of the hearing in which it 

stated its findings - f fact and conclusions- of law 

required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a). For the reasons stated 

in that bench opinion, the court hereby rules that 

plaintiffs have satisfied the conditions for a preliminary 

injunction: 

1. Plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success on 

the merits. In light of the exhibits presented to this 

court, plaintiffs have shown that they will probably prove 

a history of past racial discrimination in Mississippi 

which has an effect upon the ability of black citizens of 

Mississippi to elect judicial candidates of their choice; 

racially polarized voting in Mississippi elections; 

socio-economic disparities between black and white 



citizens of Mississippi, with blacks being less affluent 

and less well educated; a lack of prior electoral success 

by black judicial candidates in contested elections; and 

that at the trial on the merits the key issue will be the 

continued use of multi-member districts. Plaintiffs have 

therefore shown some probability of success on the 

merits. 

2. Irreparable injury will ensue to the black 

plaintiff class should elections go forward and the 

present electoral system ultimately be found in violation 

of the rights protected by the Voting Rights Act and the 

Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States 

Constitution. Additionally, irreparable injury will 

befall plaintiff-intervenors, the incumbent Chancery Court 

judges for the Ninth District, should elections go 

forward, campaign expenses be incurred, and such elections 

be nullified by subsequent order of this court. 

3. The relative harm to plaintiffs from the denial 

of an injunction will exceed the harm to defendants from 

the granting of such an injunction. Defendants have 

pointed to the risk of lower vote turnout should the 

elections not be held as scheduled as the only 

identifiable potential harm to the state defendants. 

4. The public interest will best be served by the 

granting of an injunction. In light of the order of April 

3, 1986, by a three-judge' court in this matter enjoining 



•-• 
*1, 

some of the judicial elections under Section 5 of the 

Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. S 1973c, the risk of 

confusion to the voters of divergent election dates for 

the challenged judgeships, the need to hold new elections 

should plaintiffs prevail, and the possible preclusion of 

special appointments of incumbent judges who were defeated 

it the polls, this court finds that the best interests of 

all concerned are met by entering the following 

injunction. 

Therefore, the court finds and concludes that the 

plaintiffs' motion is meritorious and should be granted. 

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED: 

1. That, pending a final decision by this court in 

this action and the entry of a future order of this court 

scheduling elections for the affected judicial offices, 

defendants William A. Allain, in his official capacity as 

Governor of Mississippi and as a member of the State Board 

of Election Commissioners; Edwin L. Pittman, in his 

official capacity as the Attorney General of Mississippi 

and as a member of the State Board of Election 

Commissioners; Dick Molpus, in his official capacity as 

Secretary of State of Mississippi and as a member of the 

State Board of Election Commissioners; the Mississippi 

State Board of Election Commissioners; the Democratic 



\. 

Party of the State of Mississippi State Executive 

Committee; and the State of Mississippi Republican Party 

State Executive Committee, and their officers, agents, 

servants, employees, and attorneys (the defendants) are 

hereby ENJOINED AND PROHIBITED from conducting any primary 

election or general election in the State of Mississippi 

for all circuit judge offices in the State of Mississippi, 

all chancery judge offices in the State of Mississippi, 

and the county court judge offices in Harrison, Hinds, and 

Jackson Counties; 

2. That, given the nearness of the June 3, 1986, 

primary and the fact that ballots have been prepared for 

the primary election which include the offices subject to 

this injunction, the court hereby directs how the 

defendants and all other election officials may comply 

with the injunction contained in Paragraph 1 above: 

A. That, in the event that any ballots have not been 

finalized, the defendants and all other election officials 

are directed to delete from any such ballot the offices 

subject to the injunction contained in Paragraph 1 above; 

B. That, in the event that ballots have been 

prepared which include the offices subject to the 

injunction contained in Paragraph 1, the defendants and 

all other election . officials need not prepare new 

ballots. However, the defendants and all other election 



officials are hereby directed not to tabulate, total, 

tally, recap, publish, disclose, reveal, or otherwise 

disseminate any votes or the number of votes which may be 

cast for the offices which are subject to this 

injunction; 

C. That, in those counties utilizing voting machines 

which can "block out" from voting by the electors these 

particular offices subject to this injunction, the 

defendants and all other election officials are directed 

to "block out" such offices; and 

D. That, in those counties utilizing voting machines 

which cannot mechanically "block out" selected offices on 

the previously prepared ballot, the defendants and all 

other election officials are enjoined not to publish, 

disclose, reveal, or otherwise disseminate any totals or 

tallies which may be automatically , recorded by such 

machines for the particular offices which are subject to 

this injunction; 

3. That the defendant Secretary of State is hereby 

directed to give. prompt telephonic notification to all 

state and county Democratic and Republican Party Executive 

Committees and all circuit clerks/county registrars of the 

provisions of this injunction and the Secretary of State 

shall follow-up on such telephonic notification by mailing 

a written notice; and 



4. That the injunction contained in 

applies only to all 

of Mississippi, all 

of Mississippi, and 

offices of circuit judge 

offices of chancery judge 

all county judge offices 

this order 

in the State 

in the State 

in Harrison, 

Hinds, and Jackson Counties, Mississippi. This order does 

not apply to any other offices which may be on the ballot 

on June 3, 1986, or thereafter, and it specifically does 

not apply to or affect the election of: 

Supreme Court Justices; 

County Judge in those counties which have 

court and only one county judge: Adams, Bolivar, 

DeSoto, Forrest, Jones, Lauderdale, Lee, Leflore, 

a county 

Coahoma, 

Lowndes, 

Madison, Pike, Rankin, Warren, Washington, and Yazoo 

Counties; 

Youth Court Judge in Clay County; or 

Family Court Judge in Harrison County. 

SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED, on this, the 

May, 1986. 

AP ROVED AS TO 

Carroll Rhodes 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Samuel Issacharq.e 
Attorneys for Praintiffs 

day of 

e hen J. irchma r 
Deputy torney General 
Attorney for State 

Defendants 

cpiqlgaLadaoi a' l 

Hubbard T. Saunders, IV 
Attorney for State 

Defendants 

A TRUE COPY, I HEREBY CERTIFY 
Clarence A. Pierce, QLERK 

— 7 — By: 

••••=0 "  

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