Draft Memorandum Opinion and Order
Working File
January 1, 1971

13 pages
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Case Files, Milliken Hardbacks. Draft Memorandum Opinion and Order, 1971. b2319fa4-52e9-ef11-a730-7c1e5247dfc0. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/09b51531-464a-44f9-aee2-47fc2ffcdba4/draft-memorandum-opinion-and-order. Accessed October 09, 2025.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION RONALD BRADLEY, et al, Plaintiffs, -vs- WILLIAM G. MILLIKEN, et al, No. 35257 Defendants, and DETROIT FEDERATION OF TEACHERS LOCAL 231, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, AFL-CIO, Intervening Defendant, and DENISE MAGDOWSKI, et al. Intervening Defendants. _____________________________________________ / MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER This class action was commenced in August 1970 by plaintiffs, the Detroit Branch of the National Association for the Advance ment of Colored People and individual parents and students on behalf of themselves and similarly situated parties. Defendants are the Board of Education of the Detroit Public Schools and its former superintendent, Dr. Norman A. Drachler, the Governor, Attorney General and State Superintendent and State Board of Edu cation of the State of Michigan. In their complaint, plaintiffs V ru - 2 - attacked a statute of the State of Michigan known as Act 43 of the 1970 Legislature on the ground that it put the State of Michigan in the position of unconstitutionally interfering with the execution and operation of a voluntary plan of partial high school desegregation (known as the April 7, 1970 Plan) which had been adopted by the Detroit Board of Education to be effective beginning with the fall 1970 semester. Plaintiffs also alleged that the Detroit Public School System was and is segregated on the basis of race as a result of the official policies and actions of the defendants, including both the District and State defendants and their predecessors in office. Additional parties have intervened in the litigation since it was pommenced. The Detroit Federation of Teachers (DPT) which represents a majority of Detroit public school teachers in collective bargaining negotiations with the defendant Board of Education, has intervened as a defendant, and a group of white parents has also intervened as defendants. Initially the matter was heard on plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction to, inter alia, restrain the enforcement of Act 48 and to require the April 7 Plan to.be implemented. On that issue, this Court initially ruled that plaintiffs were not entitled to a preliminary injunction since there had been no proof that Detroit was a segregated school system. The Court of Appeals held, however, that any such interference by the state with a determina tion of a local board to pursue the goals of racial equality was forbidden and that, at a minimum, the state must avoid steps whose effect can only be to heighten or maintain racial segregation. 3 The plaintiffs then sought to have this Court direct the defendant Detroit Board to implement the April 7 Plan by the start of the second semester in order to remedy the deprivation of constitutional rights wrought by the unconstitutional statute. In response to an order of the Court, defendants suggested two other plans in addition to the April 7 Plan which they preferred over the April 7 Plan. The Court rejected the plaintiffs' argu ments against the "magnet" plan at that time and approved it rather than ordering April 7 implemented. Again, plaintiffs appealed but the Court of Appeals refused to pass on the merits of any plan until a trial on the merits. The case was remanded with instructions to proceed immediately to a trial and decision on the merits of plaintiffs' substantive allegations about the Detroit School System. That trial began April 6, 1971 and has continued until this time with the exception of several brief recesses necessitated by demands upon the time of Court and counsel. Plaintiffs introduced substantial and extensive evidence in support of their contentions, including expert testimony, factual testimony, School Board documents and demonstrative exhibits. At the close of plaintiffs' case in chief, the Court ruled that they had presented a prima facie case of state-imposed segregation in the Detroit Public Schools; accordingly, the Court enjoined (with certain exceptions) all further school construction in Detroit pending the outcome of the litigation. - 4 - The Court has also denied the motion to dismiss filed by the state defendants at the close of plaintiffs*proof. The proof adduced by the plaintiffs was not solely limited to the role played by the Detroit Board, its predecessors and employees in bringing about the present highly segregated condition of the public schools. It also demonstrated inescapably that the State of Michigan and its agencies have, by acts and omissions seemingly violative of its obligation under the Michigan Constitution (Article VIII, Sections 1 & 2) and avowed policies of the State Board of Education contributed toward bringing about this result. The defendants have now completed presentation of their proof and plaintiffs have presented a short rebuttal. The parties are required by previous order of the Court to prepare proposed S findings of fact and conclusions of law for submission to the Court by July 26, 1971. However, the Court deems it desirable at this time, because of the important public nature of the questions involved as well as the requirements of Supreme Court decisions which the Court holds are applicable to this situation, to issue an interim order directing the parties to begin developing a remedy for the unconstitutional conditions the Court finds to 1/ exist. Because of the length of the trial and the several pauses the Court has had ample opportunity to consider and evaluate the evidence as it was presented. This Court was further required to expedite all aspects of this matter by the Court of Appeals and is obligated under the law, because of its conclusion that the present racial segregation in the Detroit schools results from a pattern 5 of acts and omissions by the State defendants and the defendant Detroit School District in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, to require the defendants to act immediately to eliminate this segregation and its effects. The Court will make some general interim findings at this time upon which the interim decree is based and the Court is confident that its detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law, which will be issued as expeditiously as possible after careful consideration of the record and the proposed findings of the parties will fully support the general conclusions hereinafter stated. The Court finds that the Detroit Public Schools have been racially segregated as a result of official state actions of the Detroit Board of Education, the State Department of Education, their agents and predecessors. While there have been efforts to eliminate some of the more obvious segregation practices, the most significant effort to reduce segregation, the defendant District's plan of April 7, 1970, described by a number of District witnesses as a "modest" start, was frustrated by affirmative state acts which have been found by the Court Appeals to violate the 2/ Constitution of the United States. The state defendants, in a variety of ways established in this record, have exercised their powers over the Detroit schools in a way which, by direct act, selection of particular alternatives and omissions, has resulted in racial segregation. The defendant Detroit Board of Education, as a subordinate unit of state govern ment, has, by similar exercise of the powers delegated to it, contributed substantially to the segregated patterns of pupil and faculty assignment in the Detroit schools. Recent actions of both sets of defendants have served to deliberately reinforce this pattern of "containment" or segregation. This court finds that under the law and where there has been this showing of state action in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment it has the authority and the duty to act. The Court is convinced by the weight of the evidence that it is not dealing with a situation of fortuitous racial imbalance existing in the schools because of voluntary housing choices. Rather, the proof reflects not only that Negroes were limited in their choices and segregated residentiaily by public and private actions^, but that the defendants availed themselves of opportunitie to contain an expanding Negro population in identifiable Negro schools when changes in housing patterns occurred. The Court concludes, therefore, that the situation before it, like that in Pontiac, is distinguishable from cases involving so-called de facto segregation and that in this instance the defendants have an affirmative duty to '.take whatever steps are necessary to remedy the situation and eliminate the illegal segregation. This affirmative duty must be met at once under 'the relevant decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court therefore concludes that it is appropriate to require defendants immediately to prepare to put before the Court in accordance with the law the full, range of alternatives which might be said to fulfill their affirmative duty in order that the Court may select that which f : - 7 - achieves the greatest possible amount of actual desegregation and order its immediate implementation. Although the Court previously expressed approval, at least on a trial or interim basis, of the magnet concept as embodied in the so-called McDonald Plan, two considerations prompt the Court to withdraw that approval at this time. First of all, the testi mony of the Board's own staff at the trial establishes that the McDonald Plan as actually implemented has failed to produce and is unlikely to produce at any time in the future the degree of inte gration that was predicted for it. In light of the fact that the Court has now concluded that the defendants bear an affirmative duty to desegregate these schools immediately, as well as the essential similarity of the magnet plan to the discredited "freedom v,of choice" concept (as noted by the Court of Appeals), the magnet plan would not appear to meet the Board's obligation to desegregate its schools. Second, the Court's previous approval of the McDonald Plan v/as based upon its projections vis a vie the results of the April 7th plan. At this juncture, the sufficiency of any proposed desegregation plan is to be judged according to the measure of the constitutional deprivations which the Court finds were created and perpetuated by the state and local defendants. In other words, in equity the scope of the remedy is measured by uhe extent of the wrong. The Court has determined, therefore, to direct the defendants, by v/ay of interim decree pending issuance of detailed factual findings and legal conclusions', to prepare desegregation plans for t - 8 - Detroit. In considering the dimensions of plans which the Court desires to have presented to it, the Court is conscious of the motion made near the close of defendants' proof by the intervening defendants that some 85 school districts surrounding the City of Detroit be added as parties for the purpose of sharing in any desegregation plan ordered into effect by the Court. The Court is aware, as it has stated many times during the trial, of the racial composition of the Detroit public schools in the City of Detroit and also of the racial composition of the suburban areas surrounding the city. The Court has remarked several times upon the practical problem of drawing a desegregation plan for a school system pro jected to be 80% black by 1980 which is and will be surrounded immediately by large white suburban areas from which blacks are largely excluded. The Court is also aware of the ultimate responsibility of the state defendants for the conduct of education throughout the State of Michigan and the ultimate authority or the state defendants to restructure the administrative organization of school districts to carry out the State's educational policies and meet its obligations. This has partially been accomplished through the creation of the Wayne County Intermediate School District for the exercise of certain functions and the consolidation of districts within it for educational purposes, although that entity in no way limits any further regionalization. 9 The aforesaid motion has not been heard as of this time nor has the Court reached any conclusion as to its merits. However, inasmuch as the state defendants are properly before the Court and have been found liable along with the Detroit Board of Education to take affirmative action to accomplish desegregation, the Court concludes that it is appropriate to direct the state defendants to consider, make recommendations upon and prepare alternative desegre gation plans involving an area or areas larger than the City of Detroit in order to most feasibly accomplish "the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation." It may be that r.o other parties will be needed at this time in order to effectuate the equity power of this court. Finally, the Court concludes that the defendants must be required to take some immediate steps to substantially improve the desegregation picture in the Detroit public schools not later than the 1971-72 school year*s commencement. Notwithstanding whatever alternatives the Court might select when the full range of such alternatives is available, the Court is required by decisions of the United States Supreme Court to see that the unlawful existing status of the Detroit Public Schools is changed at once. Therefore, even if the process of preparing, submitting and passing upon and selecting the best plan is not completed, defendants will be required to take such steps as they are able in order to achieve the greatest possible amount of actual desegregation in Detroit for the coming school year. The Court will also consider delaying the opening of schools if it appears that a short delay will make it 3/ possible to implement a superior plan without educational harm. In consideration of the foregoing the Court enters the following decree: 1. The defendant Detroit Board of Education shall prepare and submit within ten days a plan for faculty and staff assignment within the Detroit Public Schools so that for the 1971-72 school year the racial composition of the faculty and staff in each school reflects approximately the racial composition of the system's entire faculty and staff. 2. The defendant Detroit Board of Education shall: a. Prepare and submit within twenty days a plan of pupil assignment within the Detroit Public Schools that accomplishes for the 1971-72 school year the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation so that to the extent reasrbie no schools are .substantially disproportionate in the racial composition in comparison to the system as a whole at each grade level. b. Prepare and submit within forty days a plan of pupil assignment within the Detroit Public Schools to be implemented at the earliest possible date and in no event later than the commencement of the 1972-73 school year that eliminates all schools substantially disproportionate in their racial compo sition in comparison to the system as a whole at each grade level and achieves the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation. c. In such plans of pupil assignment, utilize no method which has the effect of segregating pupils within the class rooms of any particular school or schools, whether such assign ment be accomplished by track or any other method. L - ll - 3. State defendants shall prepare and submit within sixty days plans and recommendations for desegregation of staff and pupils in the Detroit Public Schools and such area or areas larger than the City of Detroit whose addition would most feasibly accomplish and maintain the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation in the Detroit community. 4. In preparing the plan or plans required to be submitted by the state defendants, the defendants may employ any and all of the procedures or devices provided or authorized by the constitution and laws of the State of Michigan and any other such criteria and techniques as are educationally sound and administratively feasible; defendants may if they so desire use any concepts of decentraliza tion presently authorized by state law; however, any state law V requirement that administrative units created for the purpose of decentralization be restricted to ‘‘'compact and contiguous zones" shall not be used where the effect of such restriction would be to create school zones or school administrative units which are racially isolated. No plan, however, may be made contingent for its implementation upon electoral approval. However, the pro visions of Michigan law with respect to the election of any succes sor district or districts may be utilized for the establishment of the governing board or boards of the reorganized district. 5. Each of the plans required to be submitted by the District and the state defendant(s) shall be supported by data showing with respect to all schools affected by the plans the 70-71 racial composition of faculty, staff and pupils, as well as the data % 1. - 12 - showing racial composition of faculty, staff and pupils under the proposed plan of desegregation. 6. The ultimate responsibility for the preparation of the plans required by paragraph three of this order is that of the state defendants and all costs incurred shall be borne by them; provided, however, that the state defendants and the defendant Distract shall consult and cooperate, without reservation or qualification, in the development of such plans. The state defendants shall exercise ail of their constitutional and statutory powers to secure the effective compliance of all affected entities and individuals in the preparation of any plan. 7. All plans for the racial desegregation of pupils and teachers developed pursuant to the terms of this order shall themselves be equitable and nondiscriminatory; that is, some inconvenience to pupils and parents may be unavoidable, but the defendants shall take ail reasonable steps to insure that the burden of such inconvenience is not imposed disproportionately upon families of either race. 8. Pending the adoption of a final.plan of desegregation the construction injunction issued pendente' lite shall remain in full force and effect. This the day g ; , 1971. Stephen J. Roth United States District Judge V 1/ Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) 349 U.S. 294, (1955) ; Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, ____ U.S. ____, 91 S.Ct. 12G7, 1273-79 (1971); Davis v. Board of School Commissioners, ____ U.S. ____ 39 U.S.L.W. 4447 (April 20, 1971) ; Spangler and United States v. Pasadena City Board of Edu cation, 311 F.Supp 501 (C.D.Calif., 1970); United States v. School District 151, 301 F.Supp. 201 (N.D.Ill., 1969) affirmed as modified 432 F.2d 1147, 1151 (7th Cir., 1970), cert, denied)____ U.S. ___ , 39 L.W. 3486 (1971); Turner v. Fouche , 396 U.S. 346, 360 (1970); Davis v. School District of the City of Pontiac,, 309 F.Supp. 734 (E.D.Mich., 1970), affirmed, ____ ?.2d____ (6th Cir., 1971); United States v, Montgomery County Board of Education, 395 U.S. 225, 231-232 (1969) and Swann supra (faculty) ; Green. v» County School Foard, 391 U.S. 43; Raney v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 443; Ilonroe v. Board of Commissioners, 391 U.S. 450 (free choice - open enrollment and transfer) [see: Bradley v. Mil liken -#21036 slip op. page 3 note 1, Feb. 22, 1971]; Alexander v. Board of Education 396 U.S. 19, (prompt relief)$ Johnson v. San Francisco Unified School District, #C-70 1331, ____ F.Supp. N.D.Calif.,April 28, 1971; ____ F.Supp. ____ June 2, 1971. - Bradley Mil liken, 433 F.2d 897 (6th Cir., 1970) . Since the appointment or Supt. Drachler xn 1966 come effort and progress has been made in attempting to correct some of the constitutional violations. However, there has not been any substantial correction of the effects of past violations (Tr. Vol. 38 p. 3347). Certain practices continue until the present day. 3/ U.S. v_. Texas Education Agency. 431 F.2d 1313, 1316 (5th Cir. 1970).