Draft Memorandum Opinion and Order
Working File
January 1, 1971
13 pages
Cite this item
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Case Files, Milliken Hardbacks. Draft Memorandum Opinion and Order, 1971. b2319fa4-52e9-ef11-a730-7c1e5247dfc0. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/09b51531-464a-44f9-aee2-47fc2ffcdba4/draft-memorandum-opinion-and-order. Accessed November 23, 2025.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
RONALD BRADLEY, et al,
Plaintiffs,
-vs-
WILLIAM G. MILLIKEN, et al,
No. 35257
Defendants,
and
DETROIT FEDERATION OF TEACHERS
LOCAL 231, AMERICAN FEDERATION
OF TEACHERS, AFL-CIO,
Intervening Defendant,
and
DENISE MAGDOWSKI, et al.
Intervening Defendants.
_____________________________________________ /
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This class action was commenced in August 1970 by plaintiffs,
the Detroit Branch of the National Association for the Advance
ment of Colored People and individual parents and students on
behalf of themselves and similarly situated parties. Defendants
are the Board of Education of the Detroit Public Schools and its
former superintendent, Dr. Norman A. Drachler, the Governor,
Attorney General and State Superintendent and State Board of Edu
cation of the State of Michigan. In their complaint, plaintiffs
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attacked a statute of the State of Michigan known as Act 43 of
the 1970 Legislature on the ground that it put the State of
Michigan in the position of unconstitutionally interfering with
the execution and operation of a voluntary plan of partial high
school desegregation (known as the April 7, 1970 Plan) which had
been adopted by the Detroit Board of Education to be effective
beginning with the fall 1970 semester. Plaintiffs also alleged
that the Detroit Public School System was and is segregated on
the basis of race as a result of the official policies and actions
of the defendants, including both the District and State defendants
and their predecessors in office.
Additional parties have intervened in the litigation since
it was pommenced. The Detroit Federation of Teachers (DPT) which
represents a majority of Detroit public school teachers in collective
bargaining negotiations with the defendant Board of Education, has
intervened as a defendant, and a group of white parents has also
intervened as defendants.
Initially the matter was heard on plaintiffs' motion for
preliminary injunction to, inter alia, restrain the enforcement of
Act 48 and to require the April 7 Plan to.be implemented. On that
issue, this Court initially ruled that plaintiffs were not entitled
to a preliminary injunction since there had been no proof that
Detroit was a segregated school system. The Court of Appeals held,
however, that any such interference by the state with a determina
tion of a local board to pursue the goals of racial equality was
forbidden and that, at a minimum, the state must avoid steps whose
effect can only be to heighten or maintain racial segregation.
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The plaintiffs then sought to have this Court direct the
defendant Detroit Board to implement the April 7 Plan by the
start of the second semester in order to remedy the deprivation
of constitutional rights wrought by the unconstitutional statute.
In response to an order of the Court, defendants suggested two
other plans in addition to the April 7 Plan which they preferred
over the April 7 Plan. The Court rejected the plaintiffs' argu
ments against the "magnet" plan at that time and approved it
rather than ordering April 7 implemented. Again, plaintiffs
appealed but the Court of Appeals refused to pass on the merits
of any plan until a trial on the merits. The case was remanded
with instructions to proceed immediately to a trial and decision
on the merits of plaintiffs' substantive allegations about the
Detroit School System.
That trial began April 6, 1971 and has continued until this
time with the exception of several brief recesses necessitated
by demands upon the time of Court and counsel. Plaintiffs
introduced substantial and extensive evidence in support of their
contentions, including expert testimony, factual testimony, School
Board documents and demonstrative exhibits. At the close of
plaintiffs' case in chief, the Court ruled that they had presented
a prima facie case of state-imposed segregation in the Detroit
Public Schools; accordingly, the Court enjoined (with certain
exceptions) all further school construction in Detroit pending
the outcome of the litigation.
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The Court has also denied the motion to dismiss filed by the
state defendants at the close of plaintiffs*proof. The proof
adduced by the plaintiffs was not solely limited to the role
played by the Detroit Board, its predecessors and employees in
bringing about the present highly segregated condition of the
public schools. It also demonstrated inescapably that the State
of Michigan and its agencies have, by acts and omissions seemingly
violative of its obligation under the Michigan Constitution (Article
VIII, Sections 1 & 2) and avowed policies of the State Board of
Education contributed toward bringing about this result.
The defendants have now completed presentation of their proof
and plaintiffs have presented a short rebuttal. The parties are
required by previous order of the Court to prepare proposed
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findings of fact and conclusions of law for submission to the
Court by July 26, 1971. However, the Court deems it desirable
at this time, because of the important public nature of the
questions involved as well as the requirements of Supreme Court
decisions which the Court holds are applicable to this situation,
to issue an interim order directing the parties to begin developing
a remedy for the unconstitutional conditions the Court finds to
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exist. Because of the length of the trial and the several pauses
the Court has had ample opportunity to consider and evaluate the
evidence as it was presented. This Court was further required to
expedite all aspects of this matter by the Court of Appeals and is
obligated under the law, because of its conclusion that the present
racial segregation in the Detroit schools results from a pattern
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of acts and omissions by the State defendants and the defendant
Detroit School District in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment,
to require the defendants to act immediately to eliminate this
segregation and its effects.
The Court will make some general interim findings at this
time upon which the interim decree is based and the Court is
confident that its detailed findings of fact and conclusions of
law, which will be issued as expeditiously as possible after careful
consideration of the record and the proposed findings of the
parties will fully support the general conclusions hereinafter
stated.
The Court finds that the Detroit Public Schools have been
racially segregated as a result of official state actions of the
Detroit Board of Education, the State Department of Education,
their agents and predecessors. While there have been efforts to
eliminate some of the more obvious segregation practices, the
most significant effort to reduce segregation, the defendant
District's plan of April 7, 1970, described by a number of District
witnesses as a "modest" start, was frustrated by affirmative state
acts which have been found by the Court Appeals to violate the
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Constitution of the United States.
The state defendants, in a variety of ways established in
this record, have exercised their powers over the Detroit schools
in a way which, by direct act, selection of particular alternatives
and omissions, has resulted in racial segregation. The defendant
Detroit Board of Education, as a subordinate unit of state govern
ment, has, by similar exercise of the powers delegated to it,
contributed substantially to the segregated patterns of pupil
and faculty assignment in the Detroit schools. Recent actions
of both sets of defendants have served to deliberately reinforce
this pattern of "containment" or segregation. This court finds
that under the law and where there has been this showing of
state action in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment it has the
authority and the duty to act.
The Court is convinced by the weight of the evidence that it
is not dealing with a situation of fortuitous racial imbalance
existing in the schools because of voluntary housing choices.
Rather, the proof reflects not only that Negroes were limited in
their choices and segregated residentiaily by public and private
actions^, but that the defendants availed themselves of opportunitie
to contain an expanding Negro population in identifiable Negro
schools when changes in housing patterns occurred.
The Court concludes, therefore, that the situation before
it, like that in Pontiac, is distinguishable from cases involving
so-called de facto segregation and that in this instance the
defendants have an affirmative duty to '.take whatever steps are
necessary to remedy the situation and eliminate the illegal
segregation. This affirmative duty must be met at once under 'the
relevant decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court therefore
concludes that it is appropriate to require defendants immediately
to prepare to put before the Court in accordance with the law the
full, range of alternatives which might be said to fulfill their
affirmative duty in order that the Court may select that which
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achieves the greatest possible amount of actual desegregation
and order its immediate implementation.
Although the Court previously expressed approval, at least
on a trial or interim basis, of the magnet concept as embodied in
the so-called McDonald Plan, two considerations prompt the Court
to withdraw that approval at this time. First of all, the testi
mony of the Board's own staff at the trial establishes that the
McDonald Plan as actually implemented has failed to produce and is
unlikely to produce at any time in the future the degree of inte
gration that was predicted for it. In light of the fact that the
Court has now concluded that the defendants bear an affirmative
duty to desegregate these schools immediately, as well as the
essential similarity of the magnet plan to the discredited "freedom
v,of choice" concept (as noted by the Court of Appeals), the magnet
plan would not appear to meet the Board's obligation to desegregate
its schools. Second, the Court's previous approval of the McDonald
Plan v/as based upon its projections vis a vie the results of the
April 7th plan. At this juncture, the sufficiency of any proposed
desegregation plan is to be judged according to the measure of the
constitutional deprivations which the Court finds were created and
perpetuated by the state and local defendants. In other words, in
equity the scope of the remedy is measured by uhe extent of the
wrong.
The Court has determined, therefore, to direct the defendants,
by v/ay of interim decree pending issuance of detailed factual
findings and legal conclusions', to prepare desegregation plans for
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Detroit. In considering the dimensions of plans which the Court
desires to have presented to it, the Court is conscious of the
motion made near the close of defendants' proof by the intervening
defendants that some 85 school districts surrounding the City of
Detroit be added as parties for the purpose of sharing in any
desegregation plan ordered into effect by the Court. The Court is
aware, as it has stated many times during the trial, of the racial
composition of the Detroit public schools in the City of Detroit
and also of the racial composition of the suburban areas surrounding
the city. The Court has remarked several times upon the practical
problem of drawing a desegregation plan for a school system pro
jected to be 80% black by 1980 which is and will be surrounded
immediately by large white suburban areas from which blacks are
largely excluded.
The Court is also aware of the ultimate responsibility of the
state defendants for the conduct of education throughout the State
of Michigan and the ultimate authority or the state defendants to
restructure the administrative organization of school districts to
carry out the State's educational policies and meet its obligations.
This has partially been accomplished through the creation of the
Wayne County Intermediate School District for the exercise of
certain functions and the consolidation of districts within it for
educational purposes, although that entity in no way limits any
further regionalization.
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The aforesaid motion has not been heard as of this time nor
has the Court reached any conclusion as to its merits. However,
inasmuch as the state defendants are properly before the Court and
have been found liable along with the Detroit Board of Education
to take affirmative action to accomplish desegregation, the Court
concludes that it is appropriate to direct the state defendants to
consider, make recommendations upon and prepare alternative desegre
gation plans involving an area or areas larger than the City of
Detroit in order to most feasibly accomplish "the greatest possible
degree of actual desegregation." It may be that r.o other parties
will be needed at this time in order to effectuate the equity
power of this court.
Finally, the Court concludes that the defendants must be
required to take some immediate steps to substantially improve
the desegregation picture in the Detroit public schools not later
than the 1971-72 school year*s commencement. Notwithstanding
whatever alternatives the Court might select when the full range
of such alternatives is available, the Court is required by decisions
of the United States Supreme Court to see that the unlawful existing
status of the Detroit Public Schools is changed at once. Therefore,
even if the process of preparing, submitting and passing upon and
selecting the best plan is not completed, defendants will be
required to take such steps as they are able in order to achieve
the greatest possible amount of actual desegregation in Detroit for
the coming school year. The Court will also consider delaying the
opening of schools if it appears that a short delay will make it
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possible to implement a superior plan without educational harm. In
consideration of the foregoing the Court enters the following decree:
1. The defendant Detroit Board of Education shall prepare
and submit within ten days a plan for faculty and staff assignment
within the Detroit Public Schools so that for the 1971-72 school
year the racial composition of the faculty and staff in each school
reflects approximately the racial composition of the system's
entire faculty and staff.
2. The defendant Detroit Board of Education shall:
a. Prepare and submit within twenty days a plan of pupil
assignment within the Detroit Public Schools that accomplishes
for the 1971-72 school year the greatest possible degree of
actual desegregation so that to the extent reasrbie no schools
are .substantially disproportionate in the racial composition
in comparison to the system as a whole at each grade level.
b. Prepare and submit within forty days a plan of pupil
assignment within the Detroit Public Schools to be implemented
at the earliest possible date and in no event later than the
commencement of the 1972-73 school year that eliminates all
schools substantially disproportionate in their racial compo
sition in comparison to the system as a whole at each grade
level and achieves the greatest possible degree of actual
desegregation.
c. In such plans of pupil assignment, utilize no method
which has the effect of segregating pupils within the class
rooms of any particular school or schools, whether such assign
ment be accomplished by track or any other method.
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3. State defendants shall prepare and submit within sixty
days plans and recommendations for desegregation of staff and
pupils in the Detroit Public Schools and such area or areas larger
than the City of Detroit whose addition would most feasibly accomplish
and maintain the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation
in the Detroit community.
4. In preparing the plan or plans required to be submitted
by the state defendants, the defendants may employ any and all of
the procedures or devices provided or authorized by the constitution
and laws of the State of Michigan and any other such criteria and
techniques as are educationally sound and administratively feasible;
defendants may if they so desire use any concepts of decentraliza
tion presently authorized by state law; however, any state law
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requirement that administrative units created for the purpose of
decentralization be restricted to ‘‘'compact and contiguous zones"
shall not be used where the effect of such restriction would be
to create school zones or school administrative units which are
racially isolated. No plan, however, may be made contingent for
its implementation upon electoral approval. However, the pro
visions of Michigan law with respect to the election of any succes
sor district or districts may be utilized for the establishment of
the governing board or boards of the reorganized district.
5. Each of the plans required to be submitted by the District
and the state defendant(s) shall be supported by data showing with
respect to all schools affected by the plans the 70-71 racial
composition of faculty, staff and pupils, as well as the data
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showing racial composition of faculty, staff and pupils under the
proposed plan of desegregation.
6. The ultimate responsibility for the preparation of the
plans required by paragraph three of this order is that of the
state defendants and all costs incurred shall be borne by them;
provided, however, that the state defendants and the defendant
Distract shall consult and cooperate, without reservation or
qualification, in the development of such plans. The state
defendants shall exercise ail of their constitutional and
statutory powers to secure the effective compliance of all
affected entities and individuals in the preparation of any plan.
7. All plans for the racial desegregation of pupils and
teachers developed pursuant to the terms of this order shall
themselves be equitable and nondiscriminatory; that is, some
inconvenience to pupils and parents may be unavoidable, but the
defendants shall take ail reasonable steps to insure that the
burden of such inconvenience is not imposed disproportionately
upon families of either race.
8. Pending the adoption of a final.plan of desegregation the
construction injunction issued pendente' lite shall remain in full
force and effect.
This the day g ; , 1971.
Stephen J. Roth
United States District Judge
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Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) 349 U.S.
294, (1955) ; Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,
____ U.S. ____, 91 S.Ct. 12G7, 1273-79 (1971); Davis v. Board of
School Commissioners, ____ U.S. ____ 39 U.S.L.W. 4447 (April 20,
1971) ; Spangler and United States v. Pasadena City Board of Edu
cation, 311 F.Supp 501 (C.D.Calif., 1970); United States v. School
District 151, 301 F.Supp. 201 (N.D.Ill., 1969) affirmed as modified
432 F.2d 1147, 1151 (7th Cir., 1970), cert, denied)____ U.S. ___ ,
39 L.W. 3486 (1971); Turner v. Fouche , 396 U.S. 346, 360 (1970);
Davis v. School District of the City of Pontiac,, 309 F.Supp. 734
(E.D.Mich., 1970), affirmed, ____ ?.2d____ (6th Cir., 1971);
United States v, Montgomery County Board of Education, 395 U.S.
225, 231-232 (1969) and Swann supra (faculty) ; Green. v» County
School Foard, 391 U.S. 43; Raney v. Board of Education, 391 U.S.
443; Ilonroe v. Board of Commissioners, 391 U.S. 450 (free choice -
open enrollment and transfer) [see: Bradley v. Mil liken -#21036
slip op. page 3 note 1, Feb. 22, 1971]; Alexander v. Board of
Education 396 U.S. 19, (prompt relief)$ Johnson v. San Francisco
Unified School District, #C-70 1331, ____ F.Supp. N.D.Calif.,April 28, 1971; ____ F.Supp. ____ June 2, 1971.
- Bradley Mil liken, 433 F.2d 897 (6th Cir., 1970) . Since
the appointment or Supt. Drachler xn 1966 come effort and progress
has been made in attempting to correct some of the constitutional
violations. However, there has not been any substantial correction
of the effects of past violations (Tr. Vol. 38 p. 3347). Certain
practices continue until the present day.
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U.S. v_. Texas Education Agency. 431 F.2d 1313, 1316 (5th
Cir. 1970).