Bard v. Kentucky Petition for Rehearing
Public Court Documents
January 1, 1926
Cite this item
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Bard v. Kentucky Petition for Rehearing, 1926. 64821e78-be9a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/0a9094ec-2dc6-4819-90fe-68d3ab8f7703/bard-v-kentucky-petition-for-rehearing. Accessed November 23, 2025.
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COURT OF APPEALS OF KENTUCKY
NATHAN BARD, Appellant,
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, - Appellee.
PETITION FOR REHEARING.
Appeal from Hopkins Circuit Court.
ROSCOE CONKLING,
Attorney for Appellant..
W M T M H E L M O H T * CO., H tC O K O U TU D , L O C IIT IU Jt , K T .
From:
To:
Subject:
Date----- -— -
M EM O R AN D UM
ll / * )
INDEX.
PAGE
Failure of appellant to receive Commonwealth, ’s
brief in time to file a reply brief........................... 1
Appellant did not receive fair and impartial trial
guaranteed him by Constitution......................... 2
Failure of testimony to corroborate testimony of ac
complice. Lack of identification......................... 5
Kentucky Criminal Code, Section 241.
COURT OF APPEALS OF KENTUCKY
Nathan B ard, - - - - - - Appellant,
vs.
Commonwealth of K entucky, - - Appellee.
PETITION FOR REHEARING.
APPEAL FROM HOPKINS CIRCUIT COURT.
Appellant, Nathan Bard, moves the Court to
grant him a rehearing on the following grounds:
1. Appellant in this case did not receive the ap
pellee’s brief in time to file a reply brief. There are
numerous points in appellee’s brief to which the ap
pellant could make answer and to which authorities
might be cited and which he would have made had the
opportunity been given him. The Court rendered its
decision within less than a week after appellant was
in receipt of appellee’s brief. Appellant believes
that he should have had time in which to file his reply
brief before this case was decided.
The Commonwealth held in its brief that the wit
ness, Hollis, was not an accomplice, yet appellant was
not given sufficient time within which to answer this
statement.
2
2. Because of the intense feeling and excited
state of the public mind appellant could not and did
not have a fair and impartial trial as guaranteed him
by the Constitution.
Your Honors can readily see the conditions exist
ing both immediately before and at the time of the
trial held in Madisonville at which this appellant was
convicted. We feel, in spite of the fact that a motion
for a change of venue was not made and the reasons
therefor which have not and can not be brought be
fore Your Honors, that you should take judicial no
tice of these conditions existing and that Your
Honors can take judicial notice of the presence of
the soldiers in Madisonville and the reasons for their
presence there. Following the commission of the
crime the populace arose and threatened to lynch this
appellant. I t was necessary that he be spirited away
in order to protect the good name of the State, yet
he was brought back amid wild scenes of excitement
surrounded by soldiers to the number of five hun
dred to be indicted and tried. From among this
seething public were chosen men for jury service,
men who were part and parcel of this seething public,
men who appeared to seek jury service, men who, to
our minds, had already made up their minds to con
vict, and these same men sat upon the jury and tried
this case. On the streets martial law was declared;
at the door of the courthouse and at the ja il squads
of soldiers were manning loaded machine guns. At
the courthouse door every one who entered was com-
3
pelled to show his pass in order to enter. Each per
son was searched for weapons upon reaching the first
landing place on the stairway. Soldiers were sta
tioned there for that purpose. Even jurors were
compelled to go through this procedure, each person
had impressed upon him the conditions existing at
this time. How, under these circumstances, was it
possible for appellant to have a fair and impartial
trial? What of the guarantee of our Constitution?
Is it only a scrap of paper made to be destroyed at
w ill; does it carry with it a guarantee to all people,
black or white, rich or poor ?
As stated before, soldiers lined the streets, the
town was under martial law, these prisoners, when
they were brought to the ja il from the courthouse
and taken from the courthouse to the jail, were
guarded by squads of soldiers and led back and forth
amid these stirring scenes. At the time these prison
ers and this appellant were brought to the courthouse
on the day of the trial, this venire, which was chosen,
was there to see and hear everything that went on,
they passed back and forth in the streets; they talked
to their friends and they actually imbibed the feeling
exhibited by the people in Madisonville, and yet this
man was tried. Was this trial fa ir? Was it im
partial ? Was it a trial by a jury of his peers, or was
it a cut and dried verdict, ready to convict, anxious
to convict and anxious to serve on the jury in order
to convict?
4
We maintain that although this trial was held
with a semblance of law, yet, in back of it all, was the
hatred of this appellant, a desire to do him bodily
harm, a desire to punish some one to obtain a victim.
A prisoner was at bar, guilty or innocent, a prisoner
should be punished. W e say and I firmly believe
that no matter who had been at the bar of justice on
the day this trial was had, no matter who had been
indicted for this crime that person would have been
convicted by a jury, should this case be permitted to
go to the jury. The only way on earth to have pre
vented a conviction in this case, or in the case of any
person who had been charged with this crime was for
the Judge of the lower Court to give a peremptory
instruction for the jury. Guilty or not guilty a man
is entitled to that fair and impartial trial guaranteed
him by the Constitution; to that trial by a jury of his
peers; to that trial before a jury who are impaneled
not to convict, but to listen to the evidence with an
unbiased mind, to weigh the testimony of the Com
monwealth and of the defendant and to resolve any
reasonable doubt to the benefit of the defendant.
This is no criticism of the lower Court. The Judge
before whom this case was tried was as fair-minded
as it is possible for a Judge to be, but this is a criti
cism of the town of Madisonville and its inhabitants,
of the county of Hopkins and its inhabitants; this is
a criticism of those men, and they were in the great
majority, who sat to take the life of this appellant
even before a trial, even before an indictment, a town
5
and a county which before this trial had already de
cided that this appellant was guilty; a town which
had decided that this appellant was guilty even with
out any evidence whatsoever; a town and county
which needed a victim and this poor darkey, the ap
pellant herein, stands before this Honorable Court as
a victim of an unfair trial, a victim of a verdict by a
jury which had theretofore made up their minds to
convict; a victim because Hopkins County and the
town of Madisonville needed a victim to pay for the
crime that had been committed against this young
girl. We feel that Your Honors have not considered
the facts and circumstances existing at the time of
this trial and that is the reason that we have at
tempted to dwell so fully upon the conditions exist
ing at that time.
3. As to the identification in this case, we do not
feel that it has taken place. Other than the witness,
Columbus Hollis, we have the witness, Adair Stum,
to corroborate Hollis’ testimony. Adair Stum, a
proven coward, a man who was afraid to look the at
tackers in the face, a man who goes out with a little
girl quite a bit his junior and fails to protect her in
the face of a brutal assault; a man who. even though
at the point of the gun, faced the wall and held his
hands up in the air and this man says that he recog
nizes the appellant in this case. Other than Adair
Stum and Columbus Hollis, who is it that picks out
Nathan Bard? Adair Stum, as stated, had his back
turned toward these men; Adair Stum was afraid
6
even to turn Ms head in defense of this poor little
defenseless girl and yet he identifies the man as the
perpetrator of this crime. We do not feel that Your
Honors have really given a close inspection to Adair
Stum’s testimony. The night was dark and raining;
the night was cold, the lights of the club house were
extinguished and there was no one at this club house
excepting Adair Stum and this little girl and sup
posedly three men. Adair Stum as he testified was
startled by the appearance of a man on either side
of the car and Adair Stum himself had turned the
lights out on his automobile, yet Adair Stum, in spite
of testifying in answer to a question as to whether
or not he attempted to defend this girl, replied: “ Do
you think I wanted to be killed,” and this man who
was afraid, as we have stated before, to make a move
in defense of this poor little girl, testified that he
identified this man. We do not feel that Adair Stum
could be believed under oath, we feel that Adair Stum
was so frightened, so overwrought by the occurrences
there that Adair Stum could not recognize anybody
and his appearance on the stand bears out our con
tention and the Court will recall here Louisiana Hol
lis was not there to identify Nathan Bard.
Louisiana Hollis knew nothing about Nathan
Bard because, if the testimony is true, Nathan Bard,
or whoever the person was in Columbus Hollis’ auto
mobile, if he was there, got out of this automobile
before it reached Louisiana Hollis’ home. I t is with
the greatest of respect to the lower Court that we call
7
Your Honors’ attention to the fact and it is a pe
culiar fact, that in order to convict this man it was
necessary to have somebody identify him other than
Columbus Hollis and that in order to convict the
other appellant in this same offense it was necessary
that somebody identify shoe prints. I t was impos
sible for the Commonwealth to identify this one shoe
as belonging to different people and there is where
Adair Stum came in ; he could identify this one man,
but we seriously doubt the identification and we feel
that because of the failure of this identification, the
failure to sufficiently corroborate the testimony of the
accomplice, Columbus Hollis, corroboration strong
enough which tended to connect the defendant with
the crime, we feel that under Section 241 of our Crim
inal Code that the Court in this case should have di
rected the jury to bring in a verdict for the de
fendant.
Upon this whole case it appears to u s:
First. That whether or not this appellant is
guilty he did not obtain a fair trial.
Second. That this appellant should be given time
to file a reply brief in this case, and
Third. That the appellant should have received a
directed verdict from the Court acquitting him be
cause of the failure to properly corroborate the tes
timony of Columbus Hollis, and we respectfully ask
that a rehearing be granted herein and that this
cause be reversed.
R oscoe Conkling,
Attorney for Appellant.
Nathan B a r d , ............................................
v. Hopkins County.
Commonwealth of Kentucky,
Appellant,
Appellee.
PETITION FOR REHEARING.