Bard v. Kentucky Petition for Rehearing
Public Court Documents
January 1, 1926

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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Bard v. Kentucky Petition for Rehearing, 1926. 64821e78-be9a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/0a9094ec-2dc6-4819-90fe-68d3ab8f7703/bard-v-kentucky-petition-for-rehearing. Accessed August 19, 2025.
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COURT OF APPEALS OF KENTUCKY NATHAN BARD, Appellant, COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, - Appellee. PETITION FOR REHEARING. Appeal from Hopkins Circuit Court. ROSCOE CONKLING, Attorney for Appellant.. W M T M H E L M O H T * CO., H tC O K O U TU D , L O C IIT IU Jt , K T . From: To: Subject: Date----- -— - M EM O R AN D UM ll / * ) INDEX. PAGE Failure of appellant to receive Commonwealth, ’s brief in time to file a reply brief........................... 1 Appellant did not receive fair and impartial trial guaranteed him by Constitution......................... 2 Failure of testimony to corroborate testimony of ac complice. Lack of identification......................... 5 Kentucky Criminal Code, Section 241. COURT OF APPEALS OF KENTUCKY Nathan B ard, - - - - - - Appellant, vs. Commonwealth of K entucky, - - Appellee. PETITION FOR REHEARING. APPEAL FROM HOPKINS CIRCUIT COURT. Appellant, Nathan Bard, moves the Court to grant him a rehearing on the following grounds: 1. Appellant in this case did not receive the ap pellee’s brief in time to file a reply brief. There are numerous points in appellee’s brief to which the ap pellant could make answer and to which authorities might be cited and which he would have made had the opportunity been given him. The Court rendered its decision within less than a week after appellant was in receipt of appellee’s brief. Appellant believes that he should have had time in which to file his reply brief before this case was decided. The Commonwealth held in its brief that the wit ness, Hollis, was not an accomplice, yet appellant was not given sufficient time within which to answer this statement. 2 2. Because of the intense feeling and excited state of the public mind appellant could not and did not have a fair and impartial trial as guaranteed him by the Constitution. Your Honors can readily see the conditions exist ing both immediately before and at the time of the trial held in Madisonville at which this appellant was convicted. We feel, in spite of the fact that a motion for a change of venue was not made and the reasons therefor which have not and can not be brought be fore Your Honors, that you should take judicial no tice of these conditions existing and that Your Honors can take judicial notice of the presence of the soldiers in Madisonville and the reasons for their presence there. Following the commission of the crime the populace arose and threatened to lynch this appellant. I t was necessary that he be spirited away in order to protect the good name of the State, yet he was brought back amid wild scenes of excitement surrounded by soldiers to the number of five hun dred to be indicted and tried. From among this seething public were chosen men for jury service, men who were part and parcel of this seething public, men who appeared to seek jury service, men who, to our minds, had already made up their minds to con vict, and these same men sat upon the jury and tried this case. On the streets martial law was declared; at the door of the courthouse and at the ja il squads of soldiers were manning loaded machine guns. At the courthouse door every one who entered was com- 3 pelled to show his pass in order to enter. Each per son was searched for weapons upon reaching the first landing place on the stairway. Soldiers were sta tioned there for that purpose. Even jurors were compelled to go through this procedure, each person had impressed upon him the conditions existing at this time. How, under these circumstances, was it possible for appellant to have a fair and impartial trial? What of the guarantee of our Constitution? Is it only a scrap of paper made to be destroyed at w ill; does it carry with it a guarantee to all people, black or white, rich or poor ? As stated before, soldiers lined the streets, the town was under martial law, these prisoners, when they were brought to the ja il from the courthouse and taken from the courthouse to the jail, were guarded by squads of soldiers and led back and forth amid these stirring scenes. At the time these prison ers and this appellant were brought to the courthouse on the day of the trial, this venire, which was chosen, was there to see and hear everything that went on, they passed back and forth in the streets; they talked to their friends and they actually imbibed the feeling exhibited by the people in Madisonville, and yet this man was tried. Was this trial fa ir? Was it im partial ? Was it a trial by a jury of his peers, or was it a cut and dried verdict, ready to convict, anxious to convict and anxious to serve on the jury in order to convict? 4 We maintain that although this trial was held with a semblance of law, yet, in back of it all, was the hatred of this appellant, a desire to do him bodily harm, a desire to punish some one to obtain a victim. A prisoner was at bar, guilty or innocent, a prisoner should be punished. W e say and I firmly believe that no matter who had been at the bar of justice on the day this trial was had, no matter who had been indicted for this crime that person would have been convicted by a jury, should this case be permitted to go to the jury. The only way on earth to have pre vented a conviction in this case, or in the case of any person who had been charged with this crime was for the Judge of the lower Court to give a peremptory instruction for the jury. Guilty or not guilty a man is entitled to that fair and impartial trial guaranteed him by the Constitution; to that trial by a jury of his peers; to that trial before a jury who are impaneled not to convict, but to listen to the evidence with an unbiased mind, to weigh the testimony of the Com monwealth and of the defendant and to resolve any reasonable doubt to the benefit of the defendant. This is no criticism of the lower Court. The Judge before whom this case was tried was as fair-minded as it is possible for a Judge to be, but this is a criti cism of the town of Madisonville and its inhabitants, of the county of Hopkins and its inhabitants; this is a criticism of those men, and they were in the great majority, who sat to take the life of this appellant even before a trial, even before an indictment, a town 5 and a county which before this trial had already de cided that this appellant was guilty; a town which had decided that this appellant was guilty even with out any evidence whatsoever; a town and county which needed a victim and this poor darkey, the ap pellant herein, stands before this Honorable Court as a victim of an unfair trial, a victim of a verdict by a jury which had theretofore made up their minds to convict; a victim because Hopkins County and the town of Madisonville needed a victim to pay for the crime that had been committed against this young girl. We feel that Your Honors have not considered the facts and circumstances existing at the time of this trial and that is the reason that we have at tempted to dwell so fully upon the conditions exist ing at that time. 3. As to the identification in this case, we do not feel that it has taken place. Other than the witness, Columbus Hollis, we have the witness, Adair Stum, to corroborate Hollis’ testimony. Adair Stum, a proven coward, a man who was afraid to look the at tackers in the face, a man who goes out with a little girl quite a bit his junior and fails to protect her in the face of a brutal assault; a man who. even though at the point of the gun, faced the wall and held his hands up in the air and this man says that he recog nizes the appellant in this case. Other than Adair Stum and Columbus Hollis, who is it that picks out Nathan Bard? Adair Stum, as stated, had his back turned toward these men; Adair Stum was afraid 6 even to turn Ms head in defense of this poor little defenseless girl and yet he identifies the man as the perpetrator of this crime. We do not feel that Your Honors have really given a close inspection to Adair Stum’s testimony. The night was dark and raining; the night was cold, the lights of the club house were extinguished and there was no one at this club house excepting Adair Stum and this little girl and sup posedly three men. Adair Stum as he testified was startled by the appearance of a man on either side of the car and Adair Stum himself had turned the lights out on his automobile, yet Adair Stum, in spite of testifying in answer to a question as to whether or not he attempted to defend this girl, replied: “ Do you think I wanted to be killed,” and this man who was afraid, as we have stated before, to make a move in defense of this poor little girl, testified that he identified this man. We do not feel that Adair Stum could be believed under oath, we feel that Adair Stum was so frightened, so overwrought by the occurrences there that Adair Stum could not recognize anybody and his appearance on the stand bears out our con tention and the Court will recall here Louisiana Hol lis was not there to identify Nathan Bard. Louisiana Hollis knew nothing about Nathan Bard because, if the testimony is true, Nathan Bard, or whoever the person was in Columbus Hollis’ auto mobile, if he was there, got out of this automobile before it reached Louisiana Hollis’ home. I t is with the greatest of respect to the lower Court that we call 7 Your Honors’ attention to the fact and it is a pe culiar fact, that in order to convict this man it was necessary to have somebody identify him other than Columbus Hollis and that in order to convict the other appellant in this same offense it was necessary that somebody identify shoe prints. I t was impos sible for the Commonwealth to identify this one shoe as belonging to different people and there is where Adair Stum came in ; he could identify this one man, but we seriously doubt the identification and we feel that because of the failure of this identification, the failure to sufficiently corroborate the testimony of the accomplice, Columbus Hollis, corroboration strong enough which tended to connect the defendant with the crime, we feel that under Section 241 of our Crim inal Code that the Court in this case should have di rected the jury to bring in a verdict for the de fendant. Upon this whole case it appears to u s: First. That whether or not this appellant is guilty he did not obtain a fair trial. Second. That this appellant should be given time to file a reply brief in this case, and Third. That the appellant should have received a directed verdict from the Court acquitting him be cause of the failure to properly corroborate the tes timony of Columbus Hollis, and we respectfully ask that a rehearing be granted herein and that this cause be reversed. R oscoe Conkling, Attorney for Appellant. Nathan B a r d , ............................................ v. Hopkins County. Commonwealth of Kentucky, Appellant, Appellee. PETITION FOR REHEARING.