Order Granting Motion of Amicus Curiae
Public Court Documents
December 9, 1987

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Case Files, Chisom Hardbacks. Order Granting Motion of Amicus Curiae, 1987. 88bbe380-f211-ef11-9f8a-6045bddc4804. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/0c8d5c1c-e555-4541-a057-3a9cf43850bd/order-granting-motion-of-amicus-curiae. Accessed April 27, 2025.
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IN THE* STATES COURT OF APPAL FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 87-3463 RONALD CHISOM, MARIE BOOKMAN, WALTER WILLARD, MARC MORIAL, LOUISIANA VOTER REGISTRATION/ EDUCATION CRUSADE, and HENRY A. DILLON, III, versus EDWIN EDWARDS, in his capacity as Governor of the State of Louisiana, ET AL., 114,, COURIIIMAPPEALS FILED OEC - 919871 AMR" E. CANUCHEAU CLERK Plaintiffs-Appellants, Defendants-Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana ORDER: IT IS ORDERED that the motion of amicus curiae, the State of Mississippi, for leave to file an out-of-time brief is GRANTED. /s/SAM D. JOHNSON United States Circuit Judge LAW OFFICES CUPIT & MAXEY P.O. BOX 22666 30.4 NORTH CONGRESS STREET J AC K SON, M ISSISSIPPI 39205 DANNY E. CUPIT JOHN L. MAXEY, II JOHN G. JONES SAMUEL LEE BEGLEY or COUNSEL: JOHN L. QUINN FEDERAL EXPRESS December 8, 1987 The Honorable Gilbert F. Ganucheau Clerk of the Court United States Court of Appeals 600 Camp Street New Orleans, Louisiana 70130 Re: No. 87-3463 Ronald Chisom, et al. Edwin Edwards, et al. Dear Mr. Ganucheau: TELEPHONE (601) 355-1553 TELECOPIER (60)) 355-1571 Enclosed for filing in the above styled cause are the original and three copies of the motion of the State of Mississippi to file an amicus curiae brief and the original and six copies of the brief in the event leave of the Court is granted. It is our understanding that this case is set for oral argument on December 10, 1987, and, of course, the State of Mississippi does not seek to participate at oral argument. We would, however, appreciate your immediate attention to this matter so that the Court will be aware of the interest the State of Mississippi has in the outcome of the subject matter. By copy of this letter, a copy of the motion and two copies of the brief are being served on all counsel of record. Please give me a call if you have any questions. Yours sincerely, CUPIT & MAXEY BY JLM:lah Enclosures cc: All counsel of record • NO. 87-3463 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT RONALD CHISOM et al., V . EDWIN EDWARDS, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, Defendants-Appellees. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI' Comes the State of Mississippi through counsel to request leave of the Court to file a brief as amicus curiae on behalf of the State of Mississippi pursuant to Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. As a state, the State of Mississippi is given a presumptive right to file such mnicus brief. Since this brief is filed out of the normal schedule, the State of Mississippi requests that the Court permit this brief to be filed and considered, without oral argument. The brief in proper form and required number is attached to this motion. This day of December, 1987. Respectfully submitted, STATE OF MISSISSIPPI AMICUS CURIAE Stephen J. Kirchmayr Deputy Attorney General Post Office Box 220 Jackson, Mississippi 39205 601-359-3680 Hubbard T. Saunders, IV Crosthwait, Terney . & Noble Post Office Box 2398 Jackson, Mississippi 39205 (601) 352-5533 nj axey, II • if' o P Maxey Office Box 22666 Jackson, Mississippi 39205 COUNSEL FOR AMICUS CURIAE CERTIFICATE The undersigned hereby certifies that on the date set forth hereinafter, a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Brief of Amicus Curiae, State of Mississippi, in support of Defendants-Appellees was caused to be served upon the following counsel of record: THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. GUSTE, J Attorney General KENDALL L. VICK, ESQUIRE Assistant Attorney General EAVELYN T. BROOKS, ESQUIRE Assistant Attorney General Louisiana Department of Justice 234 Loyola Avenue, 7th Floor New Orleans, Louisiana 70112 -2- • -' M. TRUMAN WOODWARD, JR., ESQUIRE 110 Whitney Building New Orleans, Louisiana 70130 BLAKE G. ARATA, ESQUIRE 210 St. Charles Avenue Suite 4000 New Orleans, Louisiana 70170 A. R. CHRISTOVICH, ESQUIRE 1900 American Bank Building New Orleans, Louisiana 70130 MOISE W. DENNERY, ESQUIRE 21st Floor, Pan American Life Center 601 Poydras Street New Orleans, Louisiana 70130 WILLIAM P. QUIGLEY, ESQUIRE 631 St. Charles Avenue New Orleans, Louisiana 70130 PAMELA S. KARLAN, ESQUIRE 99 Hudson Street, 16th Floor New York, New York 10013 This kfrit the day of December, 1987. Ae t , J9gN MAXEY, II ft(.1 NO. 87-3463 In The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit RONALD CHISOM, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, V0 EDWIN EDWARDS, et al., Defendants-Appellees. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES Stephen J. Kirchmayr Deputy Attorney General P. 0. Box 220 Jackson, MS 601-359-3680 Hubbard T. Saunders, IV Crosthwait, Terney & Noble P. O. Box 2398 Jackson, Mississippi 39255-2398 (601) 352-5533 Counsel for Amicus Curiae John L. Maxey, II Special Counsel P. O. Box 22666 39205 Jackson, MS 39205 601-355-1553 TABLE OF CONTENTS INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE 1 STATEMENT OF CASE 2 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 2 ARGUMENT 1 1. SECTION TWO OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT APPLIES ONLY TO "REPRESENTATIVES", WHICH JUDGES BY DEFINITION ARE NOT 3 2. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 2 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT DOES NOT SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION THAT IT SHOULD BE APPLIED TO JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 11 CONCLUSION 13 TABLE OF CASES Baker v. Carr, 369, U.S. 186, 82 S. Ct. 1691, 72 L.Ed. 2d 663(1962) 7,8 Buchanan v. Rhodes, 249 F. Supp. 860, 865 (N.D. Ohio 1966). appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 3, 87 S. Ct. 33, 17 L.Ed.2d 3 (1966) 9,10 Chishom v. Edwards, 659 F.Supp.183 (E. D. La. 1987) 2 City of Mobile, Alabama v. Bolden, 446 U.S .55 (1980) 11 Consumer Products Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S. Ct.2051, 2056, 64 L. Ed. 2d 766 (1980) 5,12 Director v. Perni North River Associates, 459 U.S. 297, 319-20, 103 S. Ct. 634, 648, 74 L. Ed. 2d 465, 482 (1983) 11 Escondido Mutual Water v. La Jolla, 466 U.S.765, 772, 104 S. Ct. 2105, 2110, 80 L. Ed. 2d 753 (1984) 5 New York State Association of Trial Lawyers v. Rockefeller, 267 F. Supp. 148(S.D.N.Y. 1967) 9,10 Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. 430 U.S. 1, 97 S. Ct. 926, 51 L. Ed. 2d 124 (1977) 12 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S. Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964) 8 Stokes v. Fortson, 234 F. Supp. 575, 577 (N. D. of Ga. 1964) 8,9 Thornberg v. Gingles, 106 S. Ct. 2752 (1986) 11 Touche Ross and Company v. Redington 442 U.S. 560,568, 99 S. Ct. 2479, 61 L.Ed.2d 82 3,4 Wells v. Edwards, 347 F. Supp. 453, 454-55 (M.D. La. 1972) (three-judge court), aff'd mem., 409 U.S. 1095, 93 S. Ct. 904, 34 L. Ed. 2d 679 (1973) 10 Martin v. Allain, United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, Civil Action No. J84-0708(B) 1,2 Martin v. Allain, 658 F.gupp. 1183,1200 (1987) 2 11 OTHER AUTHORITIES Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, as amended in 1982, 42 U.S. §1973 1 2,3,4,5,8,10,11,12 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist, No. 78 7 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (1835) 7 Commentaries on the Laws of England. (Chicago: Callaghan and Company, 1871) 1. 69-70 5,6 Fifteenth Amendment, U. S. Constitution 10 Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause U. S. Constitution 10,11 111 'NO. 87-3463 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT RONALD CHISOM et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, V . EDWIN EDWARDS, et al., Defendants-Appellees. BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE, STATE OF MISSISSIPPI, IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS _APPELLEES INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE William A. Allain is the Governor of the State of Mississippi, Edwin Lloyd Pittman is the Attorney General, and Dick Molpus the Secretary of State. They comprise the Election Commission of the State of Mississippi. They have been named as defendants in a case filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, Martin v. Allain, Civil Action No. J84-0708(B). Briefly, the plaintiffs in Martin have alleged, inter alia, that the method of electing circuit, chancery and certain county judges in Mississippi violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, as amended in 1982, 42 U.S. §1973. On April 1, 1987 the district court in its memorandum opinion accepted the position of the Martin plaintiffs that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act covers judicial elections. Martin v. Allain, 658 F Supp. 1183, 1200. The Mississippi district court's ruling in Martin opposes the decision reached by the Louisiana district court below. Accordingly, the amicus curiae have a strong interest in the decision to be rendered by the court in the instant appeal. It is submitted that if this court affirms the decision of the district court below that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act does not apply to the election of judges, it will curtail the continuing litigation in the Martin case now before the Mississippi district court. STATEMENT OF CASE The amici curiae will refer to the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the memorandum opinion of the district court below. Chishom v. Edwards, 659 F. Supp.183 (E. D. La. 1987). SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act does not contemplate the regulation of elections of state judicial officers. They are not representatives, as the statute specifically applies, and Congress gave no indication that it intended to extend its scope to state judges. There are important policy reasons that injoin the application of statutory voting rights standards to the election of the judiciary while representatives to the legislative or executive branches of government seek to balance the interests of their constituents, the judiciary must apply -2- the law to the individual interests before it and irrespective of the general interests of those who elected the judge. The judiciary must treat all litigants fairly and impartially regardless of where they live; representatives are to advance the interests of the district from which they are elected. These differences are substantive and deeply imbedded in the foundations of our system of jurisprudence. Amicus will not attempt to address the arguments made by the parties in this appeal. The purpose of this is to raise the policy issues in an historical context as some possible aid to this court's deliberations and because of the possible impact of this decision on the pending litigation in Mississippi. ARGUMENT 1. SECTION TWO OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT APPLIES ONLY TO "REPRESENTATIVES", WHICH JUDGES BY DEFINITION ARE NOT. The amicus submits that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act does not apply to the election of state court judges. The plain wording of Section 2, bolstered by analogous precedents from other areas of civil rights law removes the judiciary from the scrutiny of the Voting Rights Act imposed on the elections of officers in the legislative and executive branches of government. In undertaking the task of providing a correct interpretation of Section 2, the court should begin by reading the language of the statute itself. Touche Ross and -3- Company v. Redington 442 U.S. 560, 568, 99 S. Ct. 2479, 61 L. Ed. 2d 82. Section 2 as written in full follows: (a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color, or in the contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 1973(f)(2), as provided in subsection (b) of this section. (b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the totality of the circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State of political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate' in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, that nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (emphasis supplied). In the language of Section 2 above, a substantial operative term is "representatives". It is submitted that a "representative" as ordinarily used in describing political officials does not include state court judges. Accordingly, since state court judges are not "representatives" of the citizenry, the elections for judicial offices are not covered under Section 2. The term "representative" is not specifically defined in the Voting Rights Act. Nor does the legislative history present any specific attempt to define the term "representative". As a consequence, the court must employ recognized methods of statutory construction to arrive at a suitable definition of "representative" under Section 2. In construing Section 2, it should generally be assumed that Congress expresses its purpose through the ordinary meaning of the words its selects. Escondido Mutual Water v. La Jolla, 466 U.S.765, 772, 104 S. Ct. 2105, 2110, 80 L. Ed'. 2d 753 (1984). Moreover, "absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, statutory language must ordinary be regarded as conclusive." Consumer Products Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S. Ct.2051, 2056, 64 L. Ed. 2d 766 (1980). In our system of government, judges simply are not "representatives". The term "representatives" is typically applied to elected members of legislative bodies, i.e. the United States House of Representatives, and to elected executive officers. Judges, on the other hand, have been traditionally viewed as above partisan and political frays and, therefore, generally not considered to be conducting their duties in a representational capacity. As Sir William Blackstone stated in his Commentaries of the Law, judges are "the depositories of the law; the living oracles who must -5- decide in all cases of doubt and who are bound by an oath to decide according to the law of the land". Consequently, judges are not supposed to give credence to popular opinion or the political winds of the day. Moreover, judges are not free to make policy as they see fit. As Blackstone said, "for it is an established rule to abide by former precedents, where the same points come again in litigation....[the judge] being sworn to determine, not according to his own private judgment, but according to the known customs and laws of the land, not delegated to pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expand the old one". Commentaries on the Laws of England. (Chicago: Callaghan and Company, 1871) 1. 69-70. What Blackstone was of course referring to is the special responsibility of judges to follow the principle of stare decisis. The principle of stare decisis is a unique and overriding restriction placed on the judicial branch of government. In a fundamental way, it prevents judges from considering what a majority of the citizens may want in a particular matter or what the judge personally thinks is best. In other words, it prevents a judge from exercising a representative function. In our system of government, representatives are those who can express or effectuate the will of the citizenry and can convert that will into public policy, programs and other forms of action. Legislators and executive officers have broad powers in which to perform -6- these representatives functions. On the other hand, the judge's powers are extremely limited. One of our founding fathers, Alexander Hamilton, expressed it best in Federalist, No. 78. The executive not only dispenses honors, but hold the sword of the community. The legislature not only commands the purse, but prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated. The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE NOR WILL, but merely judgment. Alexander Hamilton, Federalist, No. 78. Unlike the legislative and executive branches of government the judiciary cannot on its awn initiative undertake to tackle issues of public importance. "As long, therefore, as a law is untested, the judicial authority is not called upon to discuss it." Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (1835). Moreover, the judiciary "pronounces on special cases and not upon general principals." "...[A] characteristic of judicial power is its inability to act unless it is appealed to, or until it has taken cognizance of an affair.. ..the judicial power is by its nature devoid of action; it must be put in motion in order to produce a result." Democracy in America. The United States Supreme Court decisions establishing the principle of one person, one vote, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369, U.S. 186, 82 S. Ct. 1691, 72 L.Ed. 2d -7- 663(1962); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S. Ct. 1362, 12 L. Ed. 2d 506 (1964) are based upon the concept of the rights of citizens to be fairly "represented" through the election of public officials. These one man, one vote cases in their application should be helpful to the Court in reaching a resolution as to whether the term "representative" under Section 2 should be applied to judges. In particular, it should be noted that none of these one man, one vote, precedents have ever been applied by a court to the election of state judges. In fact, the cases reported have rejected this application. For instances, in 1964 a three judge court refused to apply the one person, one vote doctrine of Baker v. Carr to the election of state court judges in Georgia. Stokes v. Fortson, 234 F. Supp. 575, 577 (N. D. of Ga. 1964). Finding that judges were not "representatives" the court opined the following: The one man-one vote doctrine, applicable as it now is to selection of the legislative and executive, does not extend to the judiciary. Manifestly, judges and prosecutors are not representatives in the same sense as are legislators or the executive. Their function is to administer the law, not to espouse the cause of a particular constituency. Moreover there is no way to harmonize selection of these officials on a pure population standard with the diversity in type and number of cases which will arise in various localities, or with the varying abilities of judges and prosecutors to dispatch the business of the courts. An effort to apply a population standard to -8- the judiciary would, in the end, fall on its own weight. Stokes v. Fortson, supra, at 577. Clearly, the Stokes decision turned on the premise that judges are not "representatives" when compared to legislators or executive officers. The court in Buchanan v. Rhodes, 249 F. Supp. 860, 865 (N.D. Ohio 1966). appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 3 87 S. Ct. 33, 17 L. Ed. 2d 3 (1966), took the same approach as Stokes in rejecting a one man one vote challenge to the election of state court judges in Ohio. As in Stokes, the notion 'that judges were not "representatives" of the people was an important factor in the Buchanan court reaching its resolution: "One glaring distinction between the functions of legislators and the functions of judges: judges do not represent people, they serve people." On the heels of Stokes and Buchanan a district court in New York dismissed a law suit seeking reapportionment of judicial districts in the State of New York, again on the theory that judges and the judiciary are not "representatives". New York State Association of Trial Lawyers v. Rockefeller, 267 F. Supp. 148(S.D.N.Y. 1967). The state judiciary, unlike the legislature, is not the organ responsible for achieving representative government. Nor can the direction that state legislative districts be substantially equal in population be converted into a requirement that a state distribute its judges on a per capita basis. -9- * * * * Plaintiffs' attempt to pattern judicial apportionment after legislative apportionment ignores the obvious truth that the administration of a state's judiciary, unlike the apportionment of a legislative body, cannot be governed by simple arithmetic. Id. at 153 & 154. In Wells v. Edwards, 347 F. Supp. 453, 454-55 (M.D. La. 1972) (three-judge court), aff'd mem., 409 U.S. 1095, 93 S. Ct. 904, 34 L. Ed. 2d 679 (1973), a three-judge court held that that one-man, one-vote apportionment doctrine did not apply to the judicial branch of government and agreed with the statement in Buchanan that "judges do not represent people, they serve people." The Supreme Court affirmed. 409 U.S. 1095 (1973). The appellants attempt to make little of these cases above which rejected one-man, one-vote standards to elections for judicial posts. The appellants attempt to distinguish these cases because they were brought under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and not under the 15th Amendment or the Voting Rights Act. However, it is submitted that the functional analysis and the factual definition employed by the courts in the one-man one-vote cases along, is a valid approach to be employed in looking • at the term "representative" as it is used in Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Thus, it is clearly established that prior to 1982, when Congress amended Section 2 of the Voting Rights Acts, and included the word "representative" the -10- case law had established the proposition that one person, one-vote dilution analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause did not apply to the election of judges and that judges did not represent people. By using the term "representatives in Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, Congress was using a term of art that had already been employed in the one-man one vote cases. Of course, it should be presumed by this court that when enacting new legislation Congress is well aware of the existing law. Director v. Perni North River Associates, 459 U.S. 297, 319-20, 103 S. Ct. 634, 648, 74 L. Ed. 2d 465, 482 (1983). Accordingly the presumption can be made that Congress was well aware of the prevailing Civil Rights Law as it applied to voter dilution in one-man one-vote cases and had in mind the previously used definition of "representatives" when it drafted the language now found in Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. 2. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 2 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT DOES NOT SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION THAT IT SHOULD BE APPLIED TO JUDICIAL ELECTIONS. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act was amended in 1982 partially in response to City of Mobile, Alabama v. Bolden, 446 U.S 55 (1980), wherein the Supreme Court held that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, as it was then written, could only be applied to voting practices adopted or maintained for a discriminatory purpose. The U.S. Supreme Court in Thornberg v. Gingles, 106 S. Ct. 2752 (1986) determined that the legislative purpose behind -11- Congress' passage of its amendment to Section 2 was "to make clear that a violation of Section 2 could be proved by showing discriminatory effect alone rather than having to show discriminatory purpose and to establish as the relevant legal standard the (results test)." Unfortunately, there is no specific guidance in the legislative •history of the 1982 amendment to Section 2 which supplies a definition "representatives of their choice". Nowhere in the legislative history of the 1982 amendment is there is any mention that judges are to be included, or excluded, from coverage. It has been said that the reliance on the legislative history in divining the intent of Congress is a step to be taken cautiously. Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. 430 U.S. 1, 97 S. Ct. 926, 51 L. Ed. 2d 124 (1977). Moreover, absent clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, the language in the statute itself is to be given the first consideration and that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive. Consumer Product Safety Product Commissioner v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 447 U.S 102, 100 S. Ct. 2051, 64 L. Ed 2d 776 (1980). CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the amicus curiae respectfully requests the Court to affirm the decision of the district court. Respectfully submitted, STATE OF MISSISSIPPI AMICUS CURIAE Stephen J. Kirchmayer Deputy Attorney General Post Office Box 220 Jackson, MS 39205 601-359-3680 Hubbard T. Saunders, IV Crosthwait, Terney & Noble Post Office Box 2398 Jackson, Mississippi 39205 (601) 35 -5533 UI Cup tit( ax y Po'Office Box 22666 Jackson, Mississippi 39205 COUNSEL FOR AMICUS CURIAE CERTIFIATE The undersigned hereby certifies that on the date set forth hereinafter, a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Brief of Amicus Curiae, State of Mississippi, in Support of Defendants-Appellees was caused to be served upon the following counsel of record: THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. GUSTE, JR., ESQUIRE Attorney General KENDALL L. VICK, ESQUIRE Assistant Attorney General EAVELYN T. BROOKS, ESQUIRE Assistant Attorney General Louisiana Department of Justice 234 Loyola Avenue, 7th Floor New Orleans, Louisiana 70112 M. TRUMAN WOODWARD, JR., ESQUIRE 110 Whitney Building New Orleans, Louisiana 70130 BLAKE G. ARATA, ESQUIRE 210 St. Charles Avenue Suite 4000 New Orleans, Louisiana 70170 A. R. CHRISTOVICH, ESQUIRE 1900 American Bank Building New Orleans, Louisiana 70130 MOISE W. DENNERY, ESQUIRE 21st Floor, Pan American Life Center 601 Poydras Street New Orleans, Louisiana 70130 WILLIAM P. QUIGLEY, ESQUIRE 631 St. Charles Avenue New Orleans, Louisiana 70130 PAMELA S. KARLAN, ESQUIRE 99 Hudson Street, 16th Floor New York, New York 10013 1/ 1/4# This the 0 day of December, -14- 1987. II