Order Granting Motion of Amicus Curiae

    IN THE* STATES COURT OF APPAL 

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 

No. 87-3463 

RONALD CHISOM, MARIE BOOKMAN, 
WALTER WILLARD, MARC MORIAL, 
LOUISIANA VOTER REGISTRATION/ 
EDUCATION CRUSADE, and HENRY A. 
DILLON, III, 

versus 

EDWIN EDWARDS, in his capacity 
as Governor of the State of 
Louisiana, ET AL., 

114,, COURIIIMAPPEALS 

FILED 
OEC - 919871 

AMR" E. CANUCHEAU 
CLERK 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Louisiana 

ORDER: 

IT IS ORDERED that the motion of amicus curiae, the 

State of Mississippi, for leave to file an out-of-time brief 

is GRANTED. 

/s/SAM D. JOHNSON 

United States Circuit Judge 



LAW OFFICES 

CUPIT & MAXEY 
P.O. BOX 22666 

30.4 NORTH CONGRESS STREET 

J AC K SON, M ISSISSIPPI 39205 
DANNY E. CUPIT 

JOHN L. MAXEY, II 

JOHN G. JONES 

SAMUEL LEE BEGLEY 

or COUNSEL: 

JOHN L. QUINN 

FEDERAL EXPRESS  

December 8, 1987 

The Honorable Gilbert F. Ganucheau 
Clerk of the Court 
United States Court of Appeals 
600 Camp Street 
New Orleans, Louisiana 70130 

Re: No. 87-3463 
Ronald Chisom, et al. 
Edwin Edwards, et al. 

Dear Mr. Ganucheau: 

TELEPHONE 

(601) 355-1553 
TELECOPIER 

(60)) 355-1571 

Enclosed for filing in the above styled cause are 
the original and three copies of the motion of the State of 
Mississippi to file an amicus curiae brief and the original 
and six copies of the brief in the event leave of the Court 
is granted. 

It is our understanding that this case is set for 
oral argument on December 10, 1987, and, of course, the 
State of Mississippi does not seek to participate at oral 
argument. We would, however, appreciate your immediate 
attention to this matter so that the Court will be aware of 
the interest the State of Mississippi has in the outcome of 
the subject matter. 

By copy of this letter, a copy of the motion and 
two copies of the brief are being served on all counsel of 
record. 

Please give me a call if you have any questions. 

Yours sincerely, 

CUPIT & MAXEY 

BY 

JLM:lah 
Enclosures 
cc: All counsel of record 



• 

NO. 87-3463 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 

RONALD CHISOM et al., 

V . 

EDWIN EDWARDS, et al., 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF 
ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI' 

Comes the State of Mississippi through counsel to 

request leave of the Court to file a brief as amicus curiae 

on behalf of the State of Mississippi pursuant to Rule 29 of 

the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. As a state, the 

State of Mississippi is given a presumptive right to file 

such mnicus brief. Since this brief is filed out of the 

normal schedule, the State of Mississippi requests that the 

Court permit this brief to be filed and considered, without 

oral argument. 

The brief in proper form and required number is 

attached to this motion. 



This day of December, 1987. 

Respectfully submitted, 

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI 
AMICUS CURIAE 

Stephen J. Kirchmayr 
Deputy Attorney General 
Post Office Box 220 
Jackson, Mississippi 39205 
601-359-3680 

Hubbard T. Saunders, IV 
Crosthwait, Terney . & Noble 
Post Office Box 2398 
Jackson, Mississippi 39205 
(601) 352-5533 

nj axey, II • 

if' o P Maxey Office Box 22666 
Jackson, Mississippi 39205 

COUNSEL FOR AMICUS CURIAE 

CERTIFICATE  

The undersigned hereby certifies that on the date 

set forth hereinafter, a true and correct copy of the above 

and foregoing Brief of Amicus Curiae, State of Mississippi, 

in support of Defendants-Appellees was caused to be served 

upon the following counsel of record: 

THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. GUSTE, J 
Attorney General 
KENDALL L. VICK, ESQUIRE 
Assistant Attorney General 
EAVELYN T. BROOKS, ESQUIRE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Louisiana Department of Justice 
234 Loyola Avenue, 7th Floor 
New Orleans, Louisiana 70112 

-2-



• -' 

M. TRUMAN WOODWARD, JR., ESQUIRE 
110 Whitney Building 
New Orleans, Louisiana 70130 

BLAKE G. ARATA, ESQUIRE 
210 St. Charles Avenue 
Suite 4000 
New Orleans, Louisiana 70170 

A. R. CHRISTOVICH, ESQUIRE 
1900 American Bank Building 
New Orleans, Louisiana 70130 

MOISE W. DENNERY, ESQUIRE 
21st Floor, Pan American Life Center 
601 Poydras Street 
New Orleans, Louisiana 70130 

WILLIAM P. QUIGLEY, ESQUIRE 
631 St. Charles Avenue 
New Orleans, Louisiana 70130 

PAMELA S. KARLAN, ESQUIRE 
99 Hudson Street, 16th Floor 
New York, New York 10013 

This kfrit  the   day of December, 1987. 

Ae 
t , J9gN MAXEY, II 

ft(.1 



NO. 87-3463 

In The 
United States Court of Appeals 

for the 
Fifth Circuit 

RONALD CHISOM, et al., 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

V0 

EDWIN EDWARDS, et al., 

Defendants-Appellees. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA 

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI 
IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES 

Stephen J. Kirchmayr 
Deputy Attorney General 
P. 0. Box 220 
Jackson, MS 
601-359-3680 

Hubbard T. Saunders, IV 
Crosthwait, Terney & Noble 
P. O. Box 2398 
Jackson, Mississippi 39255-2398 
(601) 352-5533 

Counsel for Amicus Curiae  

John L. Maxey, II 
Special Counsel 
P. O. Box 22666 
39205 Jackson, MS 39205 
601-355-1553 



TABLE OF CONTENTS  

INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE  1 

STATEMENT OF CASE  2 

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT  2 

ARGUMENT  1 

1. SECTION TWO OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT APPLIES 
ONLY TO "REPRESENTATIVES", WHICH JUDGES BY 
DEFINITION ARE NOT 3 

2. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 2 OF THE 
VOTING RIGHTS ACT DOES NOT SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION 
THAT IT SHOULD BE APPLIED TO JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 11 

CONCLUSION 13 



TABLE OF CASES  

Baker v. Carr, 369, U.S. 186, 82 S. Ct. 1691, 
72 L.Ed. 2d 663(1962)  7,8 

Buchanan v. Rhodes, 249 F. Supp. 860, 865 
(N.D. Ohio 1966). appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 3, 
87 S. Ct. 33, 17 L.Ed.2d 3 (1966)  9,10 

Chishom v. Edwards, 659 F.Supp.183 (E. D. La. 1987) 2 

City of Mobile, Alabama v. Bolden, 446 U.S .55 (1980)  11 

Consumer Products Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania,  
Inc. 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S. Ct.2051, 2056, 
64 L. Ed. 2d 766 (1980)  5,12 

Director v. Perni North River Associates, 
459 U.S. 297, 319-20, 103 S. Ct. 634, 648, 
74 L. Ed. 2d 465, 482 (1983)  11 

Escondido Mutual Water v. La Jolla, 466 U.S.765, 772, 
104 S. Ct. 2105, 2110, 80 L. Ed. 2d 753 (1984)  5 

New York State Association of Trial Lawyers v.  
Rockefeller, 267 F. Supp. 148(S.D.N.Y. 1967)  9,10 

Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. 430 U.S. 1, 
97 S. Ct. 926, 51 L. Ed. 2d 124 (1977)  12 

Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S. Ct. 1362, 
12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964)  8 

Stokes v. Fortson, 234 F. Supp. 575, 577 
(N. D. of Ga. 1964)  8,9 

Thornberg v. Gingles, 106 S. Ct. 2752 (1986)  11 

Touche Ross and Company v. Redington 442 U.S. 560,568, 
99 S. Ct. 2479, 61 L.Ed.2d 82 3,4 

Wells v. Edwards, 347 F. Supp. 453, 454-55 
(M.D. La. 1972) (three-judge court), aff'd mem., 
409 U.S. 1095, 93 S. Ct. 904, 34 L. Ed. 2d 679 (1973) 10 

Martin v. Allain, United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Mississippi, Civil Action No. 
J84-0708(B)  1,2 

Martin v. Allain, 658 F.gupp. 1183,1200 (1987)  2 

11 



OTHER AUTHORITIES  

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 
as amended in 1982, 42 U.S. §1973 1 2,3,4,5,8,10,11,12 

Alexander Hamilton, Federalist, No. 78 7 

Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (1835)  7 

Commentaries on the Laws of England. 
(Chicago: Callaghan and Company, 1871) 1. 69-70 5,6 

Fifteenth Amendment, U. S. Constitution  10 

Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause 
U. S. Constitution 10,11 

111 



'NO. 87-3463 

IN THE 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE 
FIFTH CIRCUIT 

RONALD CHISOM et al., 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

V . 

EDWIN EDWARDS, et al., 

Defendants-Appellees. 

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE, STATE OF MISSISSIPPI, 
IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS _APPELLEES  

INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE  

William A. Allain is the Governor of the State of 

Mississippi, Edwin Lloyd Pittman is the Attorney General, 

and Dick Molpus the Secretary of State. They comprise the 

Election Commission of the State of Mississippi. They have 

been named as defendants in a case filed in the United 

States District Court for the Southern District of 

Mississippi, Martin v. Allain, Civil Action No. J84-0708(B). 

Briefly, the plaintiffs in Martin have alleged, inter alia, 

that the method of electing circuit, chancery and certain 

county judges in Mississippi violates Section 2 of the 

Voting Rights Act, as amended in 1982, 42 U.S. §1973. On 

April 1, 1987 the district court in its memorandum opinion 

accepted the position of the Martin plaintiffs that Section 



2 of the Voting Rights Act covers judicial elections. 

Martin v. Allain, 658 F Supp. 1183, 1200. The Mississippi 

district court's ruling in Martin opposes the decision 

reached by the Louisiana district court below. Accordingly, 

the amicus curiae have a strong interest in the decision to 

be rendered by the court in the instant appeal. It is 

submitted that if this court affirms the decision of the 

district court below that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act 

does not apply to the election of judges, it will curtail 

the continuing litigation in the Martin case now before the 

Mississippi district court. 

STATEMENT OF CASE  

The amici curiae will refer to the findings of 

fact and conclusions of law contained in the memorandum 

opinion of the district court below. Chishom v. Edwards, 

659 F. Supp.183 (E. D. La. 1987). 

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT  

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act does not 

contemplate the regulation of elections of state judicial 

officers. They are not representatives, as the statute 

specifically applies, and Congress gave no indication that 

it intended to extend its scope to state judges. There are 

important policy reasons that injoin the application of 

statutory voting rights standards to the election of the 

judiciary while representatives to the legislative or 

executive branches of government seek to balance the 

interests of their constituents, the judiciary must apply 

-2-



the law to the individual interests before it and 

irrespective of the general interests of those who elected 

the judge. The judiciary must treat all litigants fairly 

and impartially regardless of where they live; 

representatives are to advance the interests of the district 

from which they are elected. These differences are 

substantive and deeply imbedded in the foundations of our 

system of jurisprudence. 

Amicus will not attempt to address the arguments 

made by the parties in this appeal. The purpose of this is 

to raise the policy issues in an historical context as some 

possible aid to this court's deliberations and because of 

the possible impact of this decision on the pending 

litigation in Mississippi. 

ARGUMENT  

1. SECTION TWO OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT APPLIES 
ONLY TO "REPRESENTATIVES", WHICH JUDGES BY 
DEFINITION ARE NOT. 

The amicus submits that Section 2 of the Voting 

Rights Act does not apply to the election of state court 

judges. The plain wording of Section 2, bolstered by 

analogous precedents from other areas of civil rights law 

removes the judiciary from the scrutiny of the Voting Rights 

Act imposed on the elections of officers in the legislative 

and executive branches of government. 

In undertaking the task of providing a correct 

interpretation of Section 2, the court should begin by 

reading the language of the statute itself. Touche Ross and 

-3-



Company v. Redington 442 U.S. 560, 568, 99 S. Ct. 2479, 

61 L. Ed. 2d 82. Section 2 as written in full follows: 

(a) No voting qualification or 
prerequisite to voting or standard, 
practice, or procedure shall be imposed 
or applied by any State or political 
subdivision in a manner which results in 
a denial or abridgment of the right of 
any citizen of the United States to vote 
on account of race or color, or in the 
contravention of the guarantees set 
forth in section 1973(f)(2), as provided 
in subsection (b) of this section. 

(b) A violation of subsection (a) of 
this section is established if, based on 
the totality of the circumstances, it is 
shown that the political processes 
leading to nomination or election in the 
State of political subdivision are not 
equally open to participation by members 
of a class of citizens protected by 
subsection (a) of this section in that 
its members have less opportunity than 
other members of the electorate to 
participate' in the political process and 
to elect representatives of their 
choice. The extent to which members of 
a protected class have been elected to 
office in the State or political 
subdivision is one circumstance which 
may be considered: Provided, that 
nothing in this section establishes a 
right to have members of a protected 
class elected in numbers equal to their 
proportion in the population. 

42 U.S.C. § 1973 (emphasis supplied). 

In the language of Section 2 above, a substantial 

operative term is "representatives". It is submitted that a 

"representative" as ordinarily used in describing political 

officials does not include state court judges. Accordingly, 

since state court judges are not "representatives" of the 



citizenry, the elections for judicial offices are not 

covered under Section 2. 

The term "representative" is not specifically 

defined in the Voting Rights Act. Nor does the legislative 

history present any specific attempt to define the term 

"representative". As a consequence, the court must employ 

recognized methods of statutory construction to arrive at a 

suitable definition of "representative" under Section 2. In 

construing Section 2, it should generally be assumed that 

Congress expresses its purpose through the ordinary meaning 

of the words its selects. Escondido Mutual Water v. La  

Jolla, 466 U.S.765, 772, 104 S. Ct. 2105, 2110, 80 L. Ed'. 2d 

753 (1984). Moreover, "absent a clearly expressed 

legislative intention to the contrary, statutory language 

must ordinary be regarded as conclusive." Consumer Products  

Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 447 U.S. 102, 108, 

100 S. Ct.2051, 2056, 64 L. Ed. 2d 766 (1980). 

In our system of government, judges simply are not 

"representatives". The term "representatives" is typically 

applied to elected members of legislative bodies, i.e. the 

United States House of Representatives, and to elected 

executive officers. Judges, on the other hand, have been 

traditionally viewed as above partisan and political frays 

and, therefore, generally not considered to be conducting 

their duties in a representational capacity. As Sir William 

Blackstone stated in his Commentaries of the Law, judges are 

"the depositories of the law; the living oracles who must 

-5-



decide in all cases of doubt and who are bound by an oath to 

decide according to the law of the land". Consequently, 

judges are not supposed to give credence to popular opinion 

or the political winds of the day. 

Moreover, judges are not free to make policy as 

they see fit. As Blackstone said, "for it is an established 

rule to abide by former precedents, where the same points 

come again in litigation....[the judge] being sworn to 

determine, not according to his own private judgment, but 

according to the known customs and laws of the land, not 

delegated to pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expand 

the old one". Commentaries on the Laws of England. 

(Chicago: Callaghan and Company, 1871) 1. 69-70. What 

Blackstone was of course referring to is the special 

responsibility of judges to follow the principle of stare  

decisis. The principle of stare decisis is a unique and 

overriding restriction placed on the judicial branch of 

government. In a fundamental way, it prevents judges from 

considering what a majority of the citizens may want in a 

particular matter or what the judge personally thinks is 

best. In other words, it prevents a judge from exercising a 

representative function. 

In our system of government, representatives are 

those who can express or effectuate the will of the 

citizenry and can convert that will into public policy, 

programs and other forms of action. Legislators and 

executive officers have broad powers in which to perform 

-6-



these representatives functions. On the other hand, the 

judge's powers are extremely limited. One of our founding 

fathers, Alexander Hamilton, expressed it best in 

Federalist, No. 78. 

The executive not only dispenses honors, 
but hold the sword of the community. 
The legislature not only commands the 
purse, but prescribes the rules by which 
the duties and rights of every citizen 
are to be regulated. The judiciary, on 
the contrary, has no influence over 
either the sword or the purse; no 
direction either of the strength or of 
the wealth of the society; and can take 
no active resolution whatever. It may 
truly be said to have neither FORCE NOR 
WILL, but merely judgment. 

Alexander Hamilton, Federalist, No. 78. 

Unlike the legislative and executive branches of 

government the judiciary cannot on its awn initiative 

undertake to tackle issues of public importance. "As long, 

therefore, as a law is untested, the judicial authority is 

not called upon to discuss it." Alexis de Tocqueville, 

Democracy in America (1835). Moreover, the judiciary 

"pronounces on special cases and not upon general 

principals." "...[A] characteristic of judicial power is its 

inability to act unless it is appealed to, or until it has 

taken cognizance of an affair.. ..the judicial power is by 

its nature devoid of action; it must be put in motion in 

order to produce a result." Democracy in America. 

The United States Supreme Court decisions 

establishing the principle of one person, one vote, e.g., 

Baker v. Carr, 369, U.S. 186, 82 S. Ct. 1691, 72 L.Ed. 2d 

-7-



663(1962); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S. Ct. 1362, 

12 L. Ed. 2d 506 (1964) are based upon the concept of the 

rights of citizens to be fairly "represented" through the 

election of public officials. These one man, one vote cases 

in their application should be helpful to the Court in 

reaching a resolution as to whether the term 

"representative" under Section 2 should be applied to 

judges. In particular, it should be noted that none of 

these one man, one vote, precedents have ever been applied 

by a court to the election of state judges. In fact, the 

cases reported have rejected this application. For 

instances, in 1964 a three judge court refused to apply the 

one person, one vote doctrine of Baker v. Carr to the 

election of state court judges in Georgia. Stokes v.  

Fortson, 234 F. Supp. 575, 577 (N. D. of Ga. 1964). Finding 

that judges were not "representatives" the court opined the 

following: 

The one man-one vote doctrine, 
applicable as it now is to selection of 
the legislative and executive, does not 
extend to the judiciary. Manifestly, 
judges and prosecutors are not 
representatives in the same sense as are 
legislators or the executive. Their 
function is to administer the law, not 
to espouse the cause of a particular 
constituency. Moreover there is no way 
to harmonize selection of these 
officials on a pure population standard 
with the diversity in type and number of 
cases which will arise in various 
localities, or with the varying 
abilities of judges and prosecutors to 
dispatch the business of the courts. An 
effort to apply a population standard to 

-8-



the judiciary would, in the end, fall on 
its own weight. 

Stokes v. Fortson, supra, at 577. Clearly, the Stokes  

decision turned on the premise that judges are not 

"representatives" when compared to legislators or executive 

officers. 

The court in Buchanan v. Rhodes, 249 F. Supp. 860, 

865 (N.D. Ohio 1966). appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 3 87 S. Ct. 

33, 17 L. Ed. 2d 3 (1966), took the same approach as Stokes  

in rejecting a one man one vote challenge to the election of 

state court judges in Ohio. As in Stokes, the notion 'that 

judges were not "representatives" of the people was an 

important factor in the Buchanan court reaching its 

resolution: "One glaring distinction between the functions 

of legislators and the functions of judges: judges do not 

represent people, they serve people." 

On the heels of Stokes and Buchanan a district 

court in New York dismissed a law suit seeking 

reapportionment of judicial districts in the State of New 

York, again on the theory that judges and the judiciary are 

not "representatives". New York State Association of Trial  

Lawyers v. Rockefeller, 267 F. Supp. 148(S.D.N.Y. 1967). 

The state judiciary, unlike the 
legislature, is not the organ 
responsible for achieving representative 
government. Nor can the direction that 
state legislative districts be 
substantially equal in population be 
converted into a requirement that a 
state distribute its judges on a per 
capita basis. 

-9-



* * * * 

Plaintiffs' attempt to pattern judicial 
apportionment after legislative 
apportionment ignores the obvious truth 
that the administration of a state's 
judiciary, unlike the apportionment of a 
legislative body, cannot be governed by 
simple arithmetic. 

Id. at 153 & 154. 

In Wells v. Edwards, 347 F. Supp. 453, 454-55 

(M.D. La. 1972) (three-judge court), aff'd mem., 409 U.S. 

1095, 93 S. Ct. 904, 34 L. Ed. 2d 679 (1973), a three-judge 

court held that that one-man, one-vote apportionment 

doctrine did not apply to the judicial branch of government 

and agreed with the statement in Buchanan that "judges do 

not represent people, they serve people." The Supreme Court 

affirmed. 409 U.S. 1095 (1973). 

The appellants attempt to make little of these 

cases above which rejected one-man, one-vote standards to 

elections for judicial posts. The appellants attempt to 

distinguish these cases because they were brought under the 

equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and not 

under the 15th Amendment or the Voting Rights Act. However, 

it is submitted that the functional analysis and the factual 

definition employed by the courts in the one-man one-vote 

cases along, is a valid approach to be employed in looking • 

at the term "representative" as it is used in Section 2 of 

the Voting Rights Act. Thus, it is clearly established that 

prior to 1982, when Congress amended Section 2 of the Voting 

Rights Acts, and included the word "representative" the 

-10-



case law had established the proposition that one person, 

one-vote dilution analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment's 

Equal Protection Clause did not apply to the election of 

judges and that judges did not represent people. By using 

the term "representatives in Section 2 of the Voting Rights 

Act, Congress was using a term of art that had already been 

employed in the one-man one vote cases. Of course, it 

should be presumed by this court that when enacting new 

legislation Congress is well aware of the existing law. 

Director v. Perni North River Associates, 459 U.S. 297, 

319-20, 103 S. Ct. 634, 648, 74 L. Ed. 2d 465, 482 (1983). 

Accordingly the presumption can be made that Congress was 

well aware of the prevailing Civil Rights Law as it applied 

to voter dilution in one-man one-vote cases and had in mind 

the previously used definition of "representatives" when it 

drafted the language now found in Section 2 of the Voting 

Rights Act. 

2. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 2 OF THE 
VOTING RIGHTS ACT DOES NOT SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION 
THAT IT SHOULD BE APPLIED TO JUDICIAL ELECTIONS. 

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act was amended in 

1982 partially in response to City of Mobile, Alabama v.  

Bolden, 446 U.S 55 (1980), wherein the Supreme Court held 

that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, as it was then 

written, could only be applied to voting practices adopted 

or maintained for a discriminatory purpose. The U.S. 

Supreme Court in Thornberg v. Gingles, 106 S. Ct. 2752 

(1986) determined that the legislative purpose behind 

-11-



Congress' passage of its amendment to Section 2 was "to make 

clear that a violation of Section 2 could be proved by 

showing discriminatory effect alone rather than having to 

show discriminatory purpose and to establish as the relevant 

legal standard the (results test)." Unfortunately, there is 

no specific guidance in the legislative •history of the 1982 

amendment to Section 2 which supplies a definition 

"representatives of their choice". Nowhere in the 

legislative history of the 1982 amendment is there is any 

mention that judges are to be included, or excluded, from 

coverage. 

It has been said that the reliance on the 

legislative history in divining the intent of Congress is a 

step to be taken cautiously. Piper v. Chris-Craft  

Industries, Inc. 430 U.S. 1, 97 S. Ct. 926, 51 L. Ed. 2d 124 

(1977). Moreover, absent clearly expressed legislative 

intent to the contrary, the language in the statute itself 

is to be given the first consideration and that language 

must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive. Consumer Product  

Safety Product Commissioner v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 447 U.S 

102, 100 S. Ct. 2051, 64 L. Ed 2d 776 (1980). 



CONCLUSION  

For the foregoing reasons, the amicus curiae 

respectfully requests the Court to affirm the decision of 

the district court. 

Respectfully submitted, 

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI 
AMICUS CURIAE 

Stephen J. Kirchmayer 
Deputy Attorney General 
Post Office Box 220 
Jackson, MS 39205 
601-359-3680 

Hubbard T. Saunders, IV 
Crosthwait, Terney & Noble 
Post Office Box 2398 
Jackson, Mississippi 39205 
(601) 35 -5533 

UI 
Cup tit( ax y 
Po'Office Box 22666 
Jackson, Mississippi 39205 

COUNSEL FOR AMICUS CURIAE 



CERTIFIATE  

The undersigned hereby certifies that on the date 

set forth hereinafter, a true and correct copy of the above 

and foregoing Brief of Amicus Curiae, State of Mississippi, 

in Support of Defendants-Appellees was caused to be served 

upon the following counsel of record: 

THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. GUSTE, JR., ESQUIRE 
Attorney General 
KENDALL L. VICK, ESQUIRE 
Assistant Attorney General 
EAVELYN T. BROOKS, ESQUIRE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Louisiana Department of Justice 
234 Loyola Avenue, 7th Floor 
New Orleans, Louisiana 70112 

M. TRUMAN WOODWARD, JR., ESQUIRE 
110 Whitney Building 
New Orleans, Louisiana 70130 

BLAKE G. ARATA, ESQUIRE 
210 St. Charles Avenue 
Suite 4000 
New Orleans, Louisiana 70170 

A. R. CHRISTOVICH, ESQUIRE 
1900 American Bank Building 
New Orleans, Louisiana 70130 

MOISE W. DENNERY, ESQUIRE 
21st Floor, Pan American Life Center 
601 Poydras Street 
New Orleans, Louisiana 70130 

WILLIAM P. QUIGLEY, ESQUIRE 
631 St. Charles Avenue 
New Orleans, Louisiana 70130 

PAMELA S. KARLAN, ESQUIRE 
99 Hudson Street, 16th Floor 
New York, New York 10013 

1/ 1/4# This the  0  day of December, 

-14-

1987. 

II