United States v. Scotland Neck City Board of Education Brief for Respondents

    IN  T H E

Supreme Court of the United S tates
October T erm, 1971

No. 70-130

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Petitioner,

v.
SCOTLAND NECK CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION,

ET AL.

No. 70-187

PATTIE BLACK COTTON, ET AL.,
Petitioner,

v.
SCOTLAND NECK CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION,

ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED 
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 

FOURTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS

C. K itc h in  J osey 
Scotland Neck, North Carolina 
W illiam  T. J oyner 
Joyner & Howison 
Box 109, Wachovia Building 
Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 
Attorneys for Respondent Scotland 

Neck City Board of Education 
Hon. R obert M organ 
Attorney General 
Hon. Ra lph  M oody 
Deputy Attorney General 
Raleigh, North Carolina 
On Behalf of Respondent State of 
North Carolina

COMMERCIAL PRINTING COMPANY, RALEIGH, N. C.



I N D E X

Question Presented______________________________  1

Statement______________________________________  2
A. Three Determinative F acts___________________ 2
B. The Background______________________    4
C. Chapter 31, 1969 Session Laws of North Carolina 5
D. The Vote ________________________________  7
E. The Preliminary Injunction___________________ 8
F. The First Further Answer___________________ 9
G. The Advertisement for Contributions_________  11
H. The Hearing on the Merits and the Decision of

the District Court ________________ :______ 13
I. The Hearings and the Decision in the Court

of A ppeals_______________________________  15
J. The Decline in School Enrollment Following

the Injunction_____________________________  16

Introduction and Summary of Argument______________ 17

Argument_______________________________________ 20
I. Four Leading Cases on Dismantling Control Dis­

position of This Case and Those Cases Support 
the Majority Opinion of the Fourth Circuit___ 20

A. The Brown Cases_____________________ 20
B. The Green C ase______________________ 21
C. The Swann C ase______________________ 22

II. The Jurisdictional Prerequisite for the Assign­
ment of Pupils to a School Because of Race is the

PAGE

( i )



PAGE

Finding of Fact That There is a Remaining Vestige 
of Segregation in the Situation___ ___________24

III. The Only Vestige of Segregation to be Dismantled
Here Is An Attitude, a Reluctance To Exercise 
Freedom of Choice; and Both White Flight and 
Black Flight Must Be Deterred in Order to Cor­
rect This A ttitude__________________________ 25

IV. The Statute Does Not Deter Dismantling. In
Fact it Has Unique Merits As a Tool For Dis­
mantlement, Namely Overcoming The Mental 
Attitude Which Obstructs Freedom of Choice__ 29

V. The Plan By the District Court Does Not Meet 
the Requirement of Reasonableness and Real­
ism -------------------------------------------------------_ 31

VI. Reply To Some Special Points In The Briefs 
of Petitioners______________________________ 35

Conclusion ______________________________________ 37

Appendix A _____________________________________ 39

Appendix B ---------------------------------------------------------40

Appendix C ---------------------------------------------------------45

Appendix D ___________________________________  52

Appendix E ____________________________________  55

CITATIONS
Cases :

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 
(1954) (Brown I) 17, 20, 22



PAGE
Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 298

(1955) (Brown I I ) ___________________ 17,20,22

Davis v. Board of Commissioners of Mobile
County, 402 U.S. 33 (1 9 7 1 )______________  16,32

Green v. New Kent County Board of Education,
391 U.S. 439 (1968) ___________ 5, 6,17,20,21,

22, 26, 27, 30

Monroe v. Board of Commissioners, 391 U.S.
450 (1968) _______________________________  5

Raney v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 443
(1968) ___________________________________  5

Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971) _______ 17,20,22,23,

24, 25, 35, 37

U. S. v. Scotland Neck City Board of Education,
442 F. 2d 575 (4th Cir. 1971)_______ 2, 4, 5, 15

U. S. v. Scotland Neck City Board of Education,
314 F. Supp. 65 (E.D.N.C. 1 9 7 0 )_________ 4, 14

Statutes :

1969 Session Laws of North Carolina, Chapter 
31 ------------------------------------------ 5, 6, 7, 9, 14

1969 Session Laws of North Carolina, Chapter 
579 ______________________________________  5

1969 Session Laws of North Carolina, Chapter 
628 5



IN THE

Supreme Court of the United S ta tes
O ctober T erm , 1971

No. 70-130

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

v.
Petitioner,

SCOTLAND NECK CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION,
ET AL.

No. 70-187

PATTIE BLACK COTTON, ET AL.,

v.
Petitioner,

SCOTLAND NECK CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION,
ET AL.

ON W RIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED 
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 

FOURTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS

We accept the Petitioners’ statement of Opinions below, 
Jurisdiction and Constitutional and Statutory provisions in­
volved.

QUESTION PRESENTED
We do not accept the statement of the issue in the brief 

of either petitioner. Each assumes a conclusion that the 
Scotland Neck plan of December 1969 would impair required 
desegregation. That is a question which is in issue here.



Our Statement of Question Presented is this:

Does the North Carolina statute, which the District Court 
and the Court of Appeals found to be an honest effort to 
achieve quality education, meet the requirements of this 
Court as a realistic “Interim Corrective Measure” to dis­
mantle the remaining vestige of law imposed segregation 
in the Scotland Neck Area?

STATEMENT
A. THREE DETERMINATIVE FACTS
We find it necessary to make a statement of what we 

think are determinative facts.

At the threshold of such statement we call special attention 
to three key facts, the first of which was the subject of a 
mere casual reference and the second and third of which 
were not mentioned at all in the Statements of the petitioners. 
Those three key facts are:

1. The full intent and plan of operations of the Scot­
land Neck City Board of Education is set forth in its 
First Further Answer and in its published advertisement 
soliciting contributions to finance the defense of this 
lawsuit. Those papers are so important that we have put 
them in an Appendix to this brief. (App. A and B.).

2. The Court of Appeals found “there is nothing in 
the record to suggest that the greater percentage of white 
students in Scotland Neck is a product of residential 
segregation resulting in part from state action.” U.S. v. 
Scotland Neck City Board of Education 442 F. 2d 575 
at page 582. (App. 1115). Neither brief for the peti­
tioners mentioned that quotation.

3. The record shows that, in the 26 months following 
the temporary injunction of the District Court of Au­

2



3

gust 26, 1969, 46.7 % of the white students left the public 
schools of the Halifax County District; thereby increas­
ing the black ratio in the district from 77.7% to 85.8%. 
(See Table I, App. E ). Because of the importance of 
this fact we have placed in an appendix to this brief a 
copy of three affidavits of W. Henry Overman dated 
September 15, 1970, December 2, 1970, and October 14, 
1971 (App. D).

They show school attendance in the Halifax County District 
by race for the school year 1970-71 and for October 1971. 
Again neither brief for the petitioners mentions this signifi­
cant experience.

The original injunction was sought and the reversal of the 
Court of Appeals is now sought on the theory that by making 
the Black-White ratio in Scotland Neck nearly even there 
would be left available less white Scotland Neck students for 
distribution among the other schools of the district; namely 
that the district ratio would become 80% under the Scotland 
Neck plan, an increase less than 3 percentage points in the 
Black ratio in that remaining portion of the district.

As said above, the Halifax County district ratio in the 
twenty-six month period following the injunction was increased 
from 77.7% Black in 1968-69 to 85.8% in 1971-72. (See 
Table I, App. E).

The District Court erred in not making a realistic ap­
praisal of the prospective student flight.

We submit that the impact of those three facts is strong.
Hereafter in the argument portion of this brief, (infra, 

p. 20), we shall point out that the law heretofore declared by 
the Supreme Court supports rather than invalidates the 
North Carolina Statute.

In the following statement it will be necessary to repeat 
some of the facts in Statements for the Petitioners in order 
that the facts which we think are so important may be under­



4

stood in their proper context. We will attempt to hold 
repetition to a minimum.

B. THE BACKGROUND

We have adopted the statement of facts in the District 
Court opinion 314 F. Supp. 65 at 67 (E.D. N.C. 1970), 
(App. 1062) and in the majority opinion in the Court of 
Appeals 442 F. 2d 575 (4th Cir. 1971) (App. 1104). We 
will call attention to some additional facts and will present 
them argumentatively.

The District Court found: “Scotland Neck, a small town 
with a population of approximately 3,000, is located in the 
southeastern corner of Halifax County, a rural and agricul­
tural region of North Carolina which has a predominantly 
black population. The population of the town itself is approxi­
mately 50% white and 50% black.” 314 F. Supp. 65 at 
67. (App. 1063).

The people, black and white in the area have cooperated 
closely and have enjoyed and are enjoying excellent racial 
relations. (App. 436).

The residential patterns of Scotland Neck and of the 
surrounding territory have not been caused by State action. 
The Court has so found. The majority of the Court of Ap­
peals said in its opinion “There is nothing in the record to 
suggest that the greater percentage of white students in 
Scotland Neck is a product of residential segregation re­
sulting in part from State action.” 442 F. 2d 575 at 582. 
(App. 1115.)

With its economic and geographic attributes it appears 
certain that Scotland Neck must achieve and must maintain 
two objectives, one, good schools, and two, good racial re­
lations.

That background lends meaning to all that was done by 
the people of Scotland Neck as recorded in this case, by the



5

Legislature of North Carolina and by the Scotland Neck 
City Board of Education.

C. CHAPTER 31, 1969 SESSION LAWS OF NORTH 
CAROLINA

The Majority Opinion in the Court of Appeals describes 
carefully and accurately the struggle of the people in Scot­
land Neck to get a better school and their frustration at the 
hands of the County School Board and of the Legislature. 
Those efforts antedated the decisions of this Court in 
Green v. School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 
430 (1968), Rainey v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 443 
( 1968) and Monroe v. Board of Commissioners, 391 U.S. 
450 (1968). The Majority Opinion says “Local control and 
increased taxation were thought necessary to increase the 
quality of education in their schools. Previous efforts to up­
grade Scotland Neck schools had been frustrated.” 442 F. 
2d 575 at 580. (App. 1104).

Early in the 1969 Session of the North Carolina Legisla­
ture the legislative act here in question was enacted (March 3, 
1969, Chapter 31, 1969 Session Laws). That statute was 
not a part of a package. It stood alone. It antedated the 
Warrenton School Bill enactment (May 23, 1969, Chapter 
579, Session Laws of 1969) and the Littleton-Lake Gaston 
Laws (May 26, 1969, Chapter 628, Session Laws of 1969). 
Both the Scotland Neck proponents and the Legislative en­
actors of the bill must have been familiar with the Green case 
and its companion decisions. They must have concluded that 
the Scotland Neck bill met the requirements of those decisions.

They knew that the Supreme Court of the United States in 
a unanimous opinion in the Green case had said “There is no 
universal answer to complex problems of desegregation; 
there is obviously no one plan that will do the job in every 
case . . . Moreover, whatever plan is adopted will require 
evaluation in practice, and the Court should retain jurisdic­
tion until it is clear that state imposed segregation has been 
completely removed.” 391 U.S. 430 at 440-41 (1968).



6

Further they knew that the Green case said “Where it 
offers real promise of aiding a desegregation program to 
effectuate conversion of a state-imposed dual system to a 
unitary, nonracial system there might be no objection to allow­
ing such a device to prove itself in operation. On the other 
hand, if there are reasonably available other ways, such for 
illustration as zoning, promising speedier and more effective 
conversion to a unitary, nonracial school system, ‘freedom 
of choice’ must be held unacceptable,” 391 U.S. 430 at 442, 
and “The Board must be required to formulate a new plan, 
and, in light of other courses which appear open to the 
Board, such as zoning, fashion steps which promise realisti­
cally to convert promptly to a system without a ‘white’ school 
and a ‘negro’ school, but just schools.” 391 U.S. 430 at 
442.

The proponents and the legislative enactors also knew 
that as a footnote to the quotation last given above the Court 
had said “In view of the situation found in New Kent County, 
where there is no residential segregation, the elimination of the 
dual school system and the establishment of a ‘unitary, non­
racial system’ could be readily achieved with a minimum of 
administrative difficulty by means of geographic zoning— 
simply by assigning students living in the eastern half of the 
county to the New Kent School and those living in the west­
ern half of the county to the Watkins School.” 391 U.S. 430 
at 442, N. 6.

The proponents and the enactors knew that an authorita­
tive spokeswoman for the Federal Department of Flealth, 
Education and Welfare had made public announcement, 
which was in the press and was put into this record, that the 
Department had no interest in the Halifax County bill if it 
treated Blacks and Whites alike. (App. 776.)

Further the proponents and the legislators knew (and 
acted on that knowledge) that the thrust of the Halifax 
County bill, its scope and its certain effect, was to set up a



7

school district with about a 57% white pupil residence and 
43% black pupil residence. They knew that they were to 
be treated precisely alike, that there would be no discrimina­
tion. They knew that the structure of state-imposed segrega­
tion within the borders of Scotland Neck would be totally and 
completely demolished.

The Legislators also knew that the operation under the 
Halifax County Bill and all matters of administration such 
as the making of transfers in and out of the Scotland Neck 
School would be under the certain and careful supervision 
of the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of 
North Carolina. They knew that no child could be trans­
ferred from the Scotland Neck School to a Halifax District 
School against the wishes or requirements of the Court.

So, the Legislators stopped at the establishment of the 
district. Thereafter, transfers and other administrative mat­
ters were problems between the Scotland Neck City Board 
of Education and the Halifax District Board of Education 
and the District Court for the Eastern District of North 
Carolina.

The intent of the Legislature was plain. It was the enact­
ment of the bill, which speaks for itself. That bill accom­
plished the purpose of the Legislature completely. In a later 
section (infra p. 13) we will discuss “Motivation”, includ­
ing a desire to deter the withdrawal of students from the 
public school system.

D. THE VOTE
Following the passage of the statute there was held a 

vote of the people. They approved and accepted the terms 
and conditions of the bill and authorized a special school 
tax of 50c on the $100 of property valuation within the 
boundaries of Scotland Neck.

There are three things which we underscore about that 
vote which occurred on April 8, 1969:



8

1. More people voted than had ever voted before in a 
Scotland Neck election (Deposition of Henry L. Harrison,
p. 16).

2. The affirmative majority was very unusual — 71%. 
(App. 1062).

3. It is a matter of general knowledge that any approval 
of a special school tax in North Carolina is very rare these 
days.

After the resounding approval by the voters the Scotland 
Neck City Board of Education proceeded to prepare for the 
opening of its school.

E. THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

On June 16, 1969, complaint was filed in the District 
Court of the United States by the United States Department 
of Justice against the Halifax County Board of Education.

That complaint sought relief on three grounds stated es­
sentially as follows:

12. The enactment and implementation of Chapter 
31 commands, encourages and fosters segregation based 
on race or color in the operation of the public schools 
of Halifax County.

13. Chapter 31 sets up a separate school system which, 
on grounds of its size and pupil enrollment, has no edu­
cational justification.

14. The enactment and implementation of Chapter 
31 . . . denies equal protection of the laws to Negro 
children of school age residing in the jurisdiction of the 
Halifax County Board, outside the boundaries of Scot­
land Neck, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution. (App. 29).
On July 17, 1969, petitioner for the first time filed motion 

for preliminary injunction. (App. 39). The Scotland Neck



9

City Board of Education (hereinafter called the School 
Board) was not made a party at the time of the filing of 
the Complaint. On August 16, 1969, the School Board and 
its members were notified that they had been made parties 
and that a preliminary answer must be filed by August 20, 
(App. 60), and that a hearing on a motion for a preliminary 
injunction would be held in Raleigh, North Carolina on 
August 21. (App. 60). On August 21 those defendants found 
that they faced a two Judge District Court, composed of 
Chief District Judge Algernon L. Butler and District Judge 
John D. Larkins (in whose division Scotland Neck lies). 
After hearings on August 21, 22 and 23 the two Judge Court, 
on August 25, entered a preliminary injunction against the 
School Board, stopping all of its activities. (App. 788-89).

The August 25th Order establishing the Preliminary Injunc­
tion made it clear that the District Court was not declaring 
the statute unconstitutional. Rather it condemned the effect 
of the operation of the transfer provision. The District Court 
said in its memorandum opinion pursuant to the order, “with­
out determining the constitutionality of Chapter 31 of the 
1969 Session Laws of North Carolina, the act in its applica­
tion creates a refuge for white students and promotes segre­
gated schools in Halifax County.” (App. 792).

F. THE FIRST FURTHER ANSWER

On September 3, 1969, the City Board of Education, with 
permission by the Court filed an Amended Answer, suf- 
planting the answer which it had hurriedly prepared and 
filed on four days requirement by the District Court. We 
submit that the allegations of that Answer and the filing 
of that Answer are so important in determining the issues 
in this appeal that we included in an appendix to our brief, for 
ready reference, t&it First Further Answer (App.
A). We call to the special attention of this Court paragraph 8 
and the prayers of that Answer which read as follows:



10

8. It is the present intention of this Defendant, and 
this Defendant makes this continuing representation, 
that, if and when there is removed the temporary in­
junction barrier preventing operation under the Statute, 
Defendant will confine its student body to those students 
residing within the geographical limits of the Town of 
Scotland Neck, plus or minus such student transfers as 
may be in conformity to the law and/or Court order or 
orders applicable to Defendant, and in conformity to a 
plan of limitation of transfers to be prepared by De­
fendant and submitted to this Court.

WHEREFORE, this Defendant respectfully prays 
that:

1. The Court declare to be constitutional Chapter 
31 of the 1969 Session Laws of North Carolina;

2. The Court dissolve the temporary injunction here­
tofore issued in this cause on the 25th day of August, 
1969;

3. The Court retain jurisdiction of this cause for the 
receipt of a plan of transfer to be submitted by the De­
fendant to the Court and for the hearing of any objec­
tion that may be filed thereto.

We submit that, by such filing and such commitment by 
the Defendant Board, it severed the question of the possi­
bility of contaminating performance from the question of the 
constitutionality of the statute. Thereafter transfer perform­
ance was not to be made by the Board first and subject to 
attack if opponents desired, but, rather, was to be made only 
after approval by the Court of what was to be done. That 
is a unique and distinctive feature in this case.

Furthermore, we submit that by that action the City 
Board fortified its contention with respect to the intent of 
the proponents of the statute, namely that the improvement



11

of the quality of education was the central dominant moti­
vating factor of the proponents of the bill. The Board, in 
essence, was saying plainly and convincingly that we will 
take as the basis of a new and better school the residents 
within the borders of Scotland Neck together with special 
tax money and local control; these will be our prime work­
ing tools for school betterment; beyond those basic essentials 
we will proceed only in such manner as shall receive the prior 
approval of the Court.

We submit that, when this matter was presented to the 
District Court for determination on its merits in December 
1969, there was presented only the question of the constitu­
tionality of the statute.

G. THE ADVERTISEMENT FOR 
CONTRIBUTIONS

The Temporary Injunction had tied the hands of the City 
Board in every respect, including the denial of the use of 
any of the tax money to defend this suit. Defense had to be 
financed, if at all, by public contributions. On October 10, 
1969, the Scotland Neck City Board caused to be printed 
in the newspaper published in that community, The Scotland 
Neck Commonwealth*, an advertisement soliciting contribu­
tions in aid of defense of the pending suit. That advertise­
ment was signed by the Chairman and each other member 
of the Board. It was evidence of the publicly proclaimed in­
tent of the Board. It was offered and received in evidence 
in the District Court. (App. 964). We think that the con­
tents of that advertisement are so important with respect 
to motive, intent and future operations that they are worthy 
of special attention. We have included a copy of that ad­
vertisement in Appendix B to this Brief. We here call the 
Court’s special attention to the language as follows:

1. The special act sets up a special school district 
with lines which are just the same as those of the long 
existing city limits. There is no change in the lines.



12

2. The district embraces all children of school age 
living in our Scotland Neck Community. It is contem­
plated by the Statute, it is required by law, it is the in­
tent of this Board that every child living in this com­
munity shall be treated just the same, regardless of race, 
creed or color. There will be no segregation under our 
operation.

3. The basic school population of our community, 
would be approximately 57% white and 43% negro. We 
do not know of any complaint which has ever been made 
anywhere of such a ratio.

4. Transfers out of or into the Scotland Neck Schools 
would be made in accordance with a plan or plans of 
transfer to be prepared by our board and filed with the 
Court, in order that any objections to such plans could be 
made to the Court and heard by it.

5. Every operation of our Board would be in the 
plainest kind of a spotlight, in the spotlight of public 
opinion and the spotlight of Court observation.

6. It is the firm intent of our Board, and the firm 
intent of the people of Scotland Neck, to make our new 
School District Work, to make ours an outstanding 
school, not a “segregated school,” not an “integrated 
school,” but just a school “for all of our children with­
out regard to race, creed or color.”

7. It is our firm conviction that the successful opera­
tion of “just a school” would be good for our community 
of Scotland Neck, good for our County of Halifax, 
good for our State and good for our Nation. The wel­
fare of Scotland Neck, and possibly its survival, depend 
upon the success of just such a school.” (App. B.)



13

H. THE HEARING ON THE MERITS AND THE 
DECISION OF THE DISTRICT COURT

Approximately three months after the filing of the First 
Further Answer and approximately two months after the 
advertisement soliciting defense funds, the matter was heard 
on the merits in the District Court on December 17-18, 
1969. At that hearing there were presented exhibits, deposi­
tions and witnesses as appear in the record. We call special 
attention to one phase of that record. It shows that the de­
fendant City Board of Education presented as a witness and 
examined Chairman Shields of the Scotland Neck City Board 
of Education. His testimony is set forth in App. 961-965 
and is reproduced as Appendix C to this brief. Mr. Shields 
covered the subjects of the statements made by his board in 
its First Further Answer and in the Advertisement for Con­
tributions. He testified as to the quality of the community 
support. At the conclusion of his testimony he was tendered 
for cross examination. Counsel for plaintiffs said “No ques­
tions, your honor.” (App. 965). Immediately after the testi­
mony of Mr. Shields the other four members of the Scot­
land Neck City Board of Education were sworn and pre­
sented as witnesses. They were requested to raise their hands 
if they agreed with the testimony given by Mr. Shields. The 
record (App. 966) (reproduced here as Appendix C to this 
brief) shows that “each member of the board held up his 
hand.” That page of the record shows that those four wit­
nesses were tendered for examination by the Court and for 
cross examination. The record shows that counsel for plain­
tiffs stated “No questions.” It further shows on that same 
page that no question was asked by either member of the 
Court.

In addition to that most convincing acknowledgment of 
the sincerity of the members of the Board and of the truth 
of their expressions, we call attention to the next impressive 
fact; that at the hearing on December 17-18, 1969, the 
plaintiffs did not produce one witness who questioned the



14

honesty of those Board members or the truth of anything 
that they had said in either of those important documents or 
on the stand at the hearing.

We call attention to the fact that at no time did plaintiffs 
produce even one witness who was a resident of Scotland 
Neck and who questioned the sincerity of the objective to 
achieve a better school or who complained about either the 
enactment of the statute or any contemplated operation un­
der it.

The District Court excepted, from its consideration of the 
constitutionality of the Statute, the performance matters 
which occurred prior to the filing of the First Further Answer. 
It did find that the Statute “. . . interferes with the de­
segregation of the Halifax County School System, in accord 
with the plan adopted by said board to be implemented on 
or before June 1, 1970,” 314 F. Supp. at 78. (App. 1083). 
Necessarily, operation under the Statute would require a 
change of the plan made for a district which embraced Scot­
land Neck. The District Court made no effort to compare 
the quality of the “interim corrective measure” presented by 
the plan which had theretofore been adopted for the whole 
district and the desegregation which would occur under the 
Statute.

The District Court made very plain what was the sole 
basis for its decision. It said:

Therefore, this Court’s findings of fact that the legis­
lative bill creating the district was at least partially mo­
tivated by a desire to stem the flight of white students 
from the public schools, the Court must find that the 
act is unconstitutional and in violation of the Equal Pro­
tection Clause of the 14th Amendment and must enter 
permanent injunctive relief for the plaintiff. 314 F. Supp. 
at 78. (Emphasis added.) (App. 1084).



15

I. THE HEARINGS AND THE DECISION IN THE 
COURT OF APPEALS

In due course the appeal from the District Court was heard 
on September 16, 1970, by a panel of the Court of Appeals 
consisting of Judges Boreman, Bryan and Craven. Subsequent­
ly by order of the Court there was an oral argument on De­
cember 7, 1970, before the full Court sitting en banc.

On March 23, there was a decision by the majority of the 
Court, 442 F. 2d 475 (4th Cir. 1971) (App. 1104). The 
opinion was by Judge Craven. Dissents were filed by Judges 
Sobeloff and Winter. 442 F. 2d at 588. (App. 1126).

We think it would serve no useful purpose to repeat in 
any detail the points of the opinions. The differences of 
opinion between the majority and the dissenters were made 
clear.

The majority speak of desegregation.

The dissenters speak of integration.

The majority speak of flexibility in handling the prob­
lems of dismantling.

The dissenters speak of rigidity of treatment and of fixed 
ratios.

The majority speak of danger of flight of students to 
private schools.

The dissenters do not speak at all about the danger of 
flight of students to private schools.

The opinions of the majority are more persuasive and 
more realistic than are the dissents. The majority looked 
toward peace and cooperation, progress and better educa­
tion.



16

J. THE DECLINE IN SCHOOL ENROLLMENT 
FOLLOWING THE INJUNCTION

The enrollment figures for the Halifax County School Dis­
trict for the school year 1968-69 were Black 8196 (77.7%) 
and White 2357 (22.3%). (Overman deposition—App. 219) 
(Table I, App. E ) .

The enrollment figures for the Halifax County District 
for the school year 1970-71 and for the school year 1971-72 
were furnished by affidavits of Superintendent Overman. 
They are three in number dated September 15, 1970, (App. 
1100), December 2, 1970, (App. 1102), October 14, 1971, 
(App. 1153). The first two were put into the record before 
the Court of Appeals without objection. The third was added 
to the record of the Court of Appeals by consent and Stipu­
lation of Counsel, (as appears in footnote App. 1153). The 
admission and consideration of these three affidavits appears 
to be in accord with the language and action of the Court 
in Davis v. Board of Commissioners of Mobile County, 402 
U.S. 33 (1971) at page 37 where the Court said: “These 
figures are derived from a report of the school board to the 
District Court; they were brought to our attention in a 
supplemental brief for petitioners filed on October 10, 1970, 
and have not been challenged by respondents.” Thereafter 
the Court said, page 37, “The measure of any desegregation 
plan is its effectiveness.”

Because of the significance of these three affidavits in our 
presentation of our case we have attached them to this brief 
as Appendix D.

The enrollment figures for that same district on Sep­
tember 15, 1970, were Black 7716 (84.3%) and White 
1446 (15.7%). (Overman affidavit—App. 100). The en­
rollment figures for the same district on October 14, 1971, 
were Black 7585 (85.8%) and White 1255 (14.2%). (Over­
man affidavit App. 1153) (Added to record by stipulation of 
the parties). In the 26 months from the signing of the injunc­



17

tion to October, 1971, 1102 white pupils (46.7%) and 611 
black pupils (7.5 % ) had disappeared from the district schools 
(computation from Table I, App. E).

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The law decisive of the issue here is declared in the Brown 

cases, the Green case, and the Swann case. The Brown cases 
(1954, 1955) struck down all laws requiring segregation in 
the public schools.

The Green case (1968) required that there be dismantled 
every identified remaining vestige of law imposed segrega­
tion. It spoke of the uprooting of the causes for the failure of 
freedom of choice to work. It warned of the variety of condi­
tions to be and of their complexity. It ordered flexi­
bility of treatment and the exercise of discretion and realism.

The Swann case (1971) reflected experience under the 
Green case. It declared that the jurisdiction of the Court in 
this vestige uprooting process was equitable in nature; that 
jurisdiction in a specific case must be based on the identifica­
tion of the vestige; that any Court-directed pupil assign­
ment, made on the basis of race is “ . . .  an interim corrective 
measure.” It was made plain that such interim corrective 
measure was to be directed to the uprooting or removal of 
the causes of such remaining vestige.

The only identification, in this case, of a remaining vestige 
of law imposed segregation was that nearly all of the black 
pupils resident in the Scotland Neck City limits had failed 
to exercise a choice to go to the Scotland Neck school and 
that many white pupils residing in rural areas outside of 
Scotland Neck had chosen to attend the Scotland Neck school.

Admittedly some “interim corrective measure” was indi­
cated if the requirements of this Court were to be met.

Any such measure must be fashioned in a manner to tend 
to correct the causes of failure of the pupils of each race to 
exercise normal and race-oblivious choice of schools.



18

Before fashioning any such corrective measure there must 
be a careful search for those causes.

Here is the heart of this case.

Obviously the most proximate cause of the failure of 
pupils resident in the Scotland Neck area to exercise freedom 
of choice was the reluctance of those pupils, of each race, 
to attend a school in which the pupils of another race are 
heavily predominant in numbers.

So, a search must be made for the causes of such re­
luctance.

The readily apparent cause is the feeling or fear that a 
small minority group of students, black or white, would face 
isolation, hostility, danger of physical injury, and an educa­
tion not fashioned properly for that small minority group.

Any realistic interim corrective measure must be directed 
toward removing or abating those fears on the part of the 
people of each race.

The Scotland Neck Plan would have the following favor­
able forces working for it:

1. The school attendance zone follows a natural resi­
dential patern.

2. The students resident in that district are very nearly 
evenly divided racially.

3. There would be special tax money for the making 
of a better school.

4. There would be strong neighborhood support for 
the well balanced school.

5. The balanced condition of the races would tend to 
deter flight from the public schools of the district ^  
by both whites and blacks.



19

6. The Scotland Neck school has the realistic aspect 
of working now and of being permanent.

7. A successful school in Scotland Neck could become 
an observed success and tend to abate racial distrust 
through the local area, through the Halifax District and 
beyond.

On the other hand, the Court enforced plan which it put 
into effect would have marked disadvantages in each of those 
seven fields.

1. It does not follow a natural residential patern.

2. It does not achieve one school in which there would 
be a nearly even white-black ratio.

3. There would not be generated any additional 
money for the improvement of any school.

4. It weakens rather than strengthens the neighborhood 
support.

5. It would tend to increase both white and black 
flight from the schools.

6. It does not reflect a realistic approach and does not 
have any aspect of permanence.

7. It could not succeed and its failure would increase 
racial distrust in the whole district rather than abate it.

The experience of the Court-adopted plan proves the 
defects which we have listed above. In the 26 months follow­
ing the August 26, 1969, injunction issued by the District 
Court 46.7% of the white pupils and 7% of the black pupils; 
disappeared from the Halifax County School District. (Com­
putation made from the figures taken from Table I, 
App. E).



20

ARGUMENT

I .

FOUR LEADING CASES ON DISMANTLING CON­
TROL DISPOSITION OF THIS CASE AND THOSE
CASES SUPPORT THE MAJORITY OPINION OF
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

This case is unique on its facts. We know of no other 
similar case which has been decided by this Court.

It is our contention that the issues in this case are controlled 
by what this Court has said in the four leading cases on 
dismantling and that those cases indicate an affirmation of 
the opinion of the Court below. Those cases are:

Brown v. Board of Education,. 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
(Brown I)

Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 298 (1955)
(Brown II)

Green v. School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S.
430 (1968)

Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,
402 U.S. 1 (April 20, 1971)

A. THE BROWN  CASES

The Brown cases struck down the bar of all state-imposed 
racial discrimination, discussing at length the problem of 
desegregation of the public schools. Much was said about 
the complexity of the desegregation problem, the equitable 
nature of the remedy and the need of flexibility in the ap­
plication of the equitable remedy. It was made clear that 
there was no rigid formula for desegregation and that dis­
cretion should be left to the decision of the administrative



21

bodies and the lower courts. The Brown cases made it clear 
that the Court had jurisdiction to desegregate but that it 
had no jurisdiction to integrate, to mix the races for the sole 
purpose of achieving some desired balance. The Court was 
very careful in those two decisions to confine its opinion and 
mandate to desegregation. It spoke only of desegregation.

B. THE GREEN  CASE

Green v. School Board of New Kent County, 391 
U.S. 430 (1968), marked the pronouncement of a new and 
difficult concept. The Court said that Freedom of Choice 
had failed to accomplish the desired desegregation in many 
instances. The Court held that it was not sufficient to 
destroy the laws requiring or supporting segregation. It 
held that the Court had the duty and that it had the equitable 
power to require that discriminatory conditions caused by 
law imposed segregation be undone.

Again the Court made it very plain that the jurisdiction 
of the Court was founded on illegal segregation, and that 
its action was limited to requiring the correction of conditions 
resulting from illegal segregation. The Court described spe­
cifically its field of action as the undoing of the remaining 
vestiges of condemned segregation.

Again the Court emphasized the variety of possible reme­
dies, the necessity of flexibility, the discretion to be left to 
local administrative authorities and to the lower courts. It 
even spoke of trial and error methods. It strongly com­
manded realism in judgment and the search for a plan “that 
promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to 
work now.” 391 U.S. at 439.

The Court said at page 439 :

The obligation of the District Court, as it always has
been, is to examine the effectiveness of a proposed plan



22

in achieving desegregation. There is no universal answer 
to complex problems of desegregation; there is obviously 
no one plan that will do the job in every case . . . More­
over, whatever plan is adopted will require evaluation in 
practice, and the Court should retain jurisdiction until 
it is clear that state-imposed segregation has been com­
pletely removed.

In footnote 6 at page 442 the Court pointed out that the 
Kent County problem could be solved by geographic zoning. 
In that respect the facts of Green are similar to the facts 
in the Scotland Neck case.

The Court in Green, as in Brown I  and Brown II, was 
careful to speak of desegregation rather than of integration.

C. THE SW ANN  CASE

Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 
402 U.S. 1 (April 20, 1971) applied, with elaboration, the 
pronouncements of the Brown cases and of the Green case. 
It applied those principles to reasonable busing of students 
to achieve the dismantling of a law imposed segregated struc­
ture. Again the Court spoke carefully of desegregation and 
avoided the term integration. It adhered to and emphasized 
the pronouncement that jurisdiction was founded on the need 
for dismantling a remaining vestige of law imposed segrega­
tion.

With respect to flexibility of a remedy the opinion in 
the Swann case quoted from Brown I  as follows:

In fashioning and effectuating the decrees, the Courts 
will be guided by equitable principles. Traditionally, 
equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility in 
shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting and 
reconciling public and private needs. 402 U.S. 1 at 12.



23

On page 15 the Court said “ . . . the scope of a district court’s 
equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth 
and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies.”

In the Swann decision the Court said:
The District Court held numerous hearings and received 
voluminous evidence. In addition to finding certain 
actions of the school board to be discriminatory, the 
Court also found that residential patterns in the city 
and county resulted in part from federal, state,, and local 
government action other than school board decisions. 
(emphasis added) 402 U.S. 1 at 7.

Again we think it important here to emphasize the fact 
that the District Court in the Scotland Neck case did not 
make any such finding. Furthermore the Court of Appeals 
majority found “there is nothing in the record to suggest 
that the greater percentage of white students in Scotland 
Neck is a product of residential segregation resulting in part 
from state action”, 442 F. 2d 575 at 582. (App. 1115).

The Court in the Swann case approved the order of the 
District Court requiring busing of students to achieve a dis­
mantling result as action within the sound discretion of the 
District Court. It is most important here, we think, to point 
out that that approval was reached on the basis of a District 
Court Finding of Fact that the Charlotte residential patterns 
had resulted in part from state-imposed segregation.

On page 28 the Court made this important and entirely 
clear statement, “absent a constitutional violation there would 
be no basis for judicially ordering assignment of students on 
a racial basis.”

The Court said:
The District Judge went on to acknowledge that vari­
ation from that norm may be unavoidable. This contains



24

intimations that the “norm” is a fixed mathematical 
racial balance reflecting the pupil constituency of the sys­
tem. If we were to read the holding of the District Court 
to require, as a matter of substantive constitutional right, 
any particular degree of racial balance or mixing, that 
approach, would be disapproved and we would be obliged 
to reverse. The constitutional command to desegregate 
schools does not mean that every school in every com­
munity must always reflect the racial composition of the 
school system as a whole. 402 U.S. 1 at 23-24.

As we view the Swann case it held plainly that the con­
stitution does not require the same ratios in all areas of a 
district and the constitution does not require assignments 
out of a residential area in the absence of a distortion of 
residential patterns caused by state-imposed segregation. As 
we understand it, the principal point in the Swann case is 
that the constitutional powers of assignment out of residen­
tial areas cannot be supported by a mere desire for mixing; 
it can only be supported by the necessity to dismantle some 
remaining part of a segregated structure.

Since residential patterns in Scotland Neck were not 
caused in any respect by state-imposed segregation, no vestige 
of the segregated structure would remain in the Scotland 
Neck District.

II.
THE JURISDICTIONAL PREREQUISITE FOR 
THE ASSIGNMENT OF PUPILS TO A SCHOOL 
BECAUSE OF RACE IS THE FINDING OF FACT 
THAT THERE IS A REMAINING VESTIGE OF 
SEGREGATION IN THE SITUATION

At the very outset of the consideration of the merits of 
the issue in this case we are faced with a confusing paradox.

The wrong to be remedied was school segregation based 
only on race.



25

So there is the appearance of correcting one wrong by the 
imposition of another wrong.

About this situation the Court said this in Swann under its 
subheading “ (3) Remedial Altering of Attendance Zones.” 
“As an interim corrective measure, this cannot be said to be 
beyond the broad remedial powers of a Court. Absent a 
constitutional violation there would be no basis for judicially 
ordering assignment of students on a racial basis.” 402 U.S. 
at 27-28 (1971).

So, we look to see what, in the Scotland Neck case is a 
remaining vestige of law imposed segregation which must 
be corrected.

III.

THE ONLY VESTIGE OF SEGREGATION TO BE 
DISMANTLED HERE IS AN ATTITUDE, A 
RELUCTANCE TO EXERCISE FREEDOM OF 
CHOICE; AND BOTH W HITE FLIGHT AND 
BLACK FLIGHT MUST BE DETERRED IN ORDER 
TO CORRECT THIS ATTITUDE

Before the statute in this case was enacted there was 
visible a remaining vestige of law imposed segregation in the 
Scotland Neck District. With a residential black student 
population of about 299 only 40 had chosen to go to the 
Scotland Neck school. (App. 732). Further, a large number 
of white students living beyond the borders of Scotland Neck 
had seen fit not to attend the rural school near to them, but 
had chosen to attend the Scotland Neck school.

To correct that situation temporarily would be simple, by 
assigning all students resident in Scotland Neck to the Scot­
land Neck School and to control the transfers of nonresident 
white students seeking to enter the Scotland Neck School.

Whether that would be acceptable as a proposed dis­



26

mantling would seem to necessitate inquiry as to the root 
cause of the situation to be corrected. That raises the question 
why Freedom of Choice had failed to work in that area.

To discuss that question with clarity it is necessary to 
take a long, hard and realistic look at the situation in order 
to try to find what remnant or root of segregation is the 
focal point for the dismantling procedure.

We look closely at the controlling case, Green v. School 
Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968). What 
was the root cause of the situation which gave the Court 
such concern there? It was a mental attitude.

In New Kent County as in Scotland Neck, it had been 
made plain that Black students were not going to exercise 
their freedom of choice to go to a heavily predominant 
white school. It is just as plain that white students were 
not going to exercise their freedom of choice to go to a 
heavily predominant black school. So, Freedom of Choice 
failed to work effectively because of the mental attitude of 
people, the black and white students and their parents, be­
cause of their reluctance to exercise that freedom.

We have not found that this Court has ever undertaken 
to make any statement as to precisely what was the feeling 
concerning that reluctance.

Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals nor 
the petitioners in this case have undertaken to analyze the 
causes of that mental attitude, the causes of that reluctance 
to exercise Freedom of Choice.

However, the Green case approached the problem in a 
footnote (Green v. School Board of New Kent County, 391 
U.S. 430 at 440 N. 5). That footnote indicated the nature and 
some possible causes of that reluctance.

We do not undertake, and we are not qualified to under­



27

take, a thorough analysis of mental attitudes. However some 
significant conclusions seem to be clear.

We submit that it is demonstrated by the record in this 
case and by the opinion in the Green case that both the Black 
students and the White students, and their parents, hold the 
following firm mental apprehensions or fears, whether justi­
fied or not:

That a small minority group of students, Black or White, 
would face isolation, hostility, danger of physical injury 
and an education not fashioned properly for that small 
minority group.

It is certain, we submit, that each of those fears or 
thoughts has been created or intensified by the law imposed 
segregation of the past.

To be realistic, we submit that those mental conditions or 
fears constitute a plank or a rafter or a root of segregation 
structure which the Green case and this case seek to dis­
mantle.

An attitude cannot be changed by mandate or by compulsion 
to action. Either provokes resistance. A change of attitude 
can come only from experience and/or observation.

So, the courts in the Green case and its companion cases 
have gone to the extreme length of assigning children to 
schools because of their race in order that experience and 
observation may correct the mental attitude, may eliminate 
the reluctance to exercise Freedom of Choice.

The dissolving of the fears we have mentioned can be 
accomplished only by experience and/or observation. The 
students, of each race must learn that whites and blacks can 
associate in schools with profit, that they can achieve mutual 
respect and dignity and a desire to cooperate in securing 
quality education.



28

We submit that “any interim corrective measure” directed 
toward resolving those fears or prejudices, must be directed 
to the children and parents of both races. The “reluctance” 
which we have mentioned is as objectionable in the mind of 
the white child as it is in the mind of a black child. To 
attempt to correct it in the black mind without giving any 
consideration to correction in the white mind will certainly 
cause the corrective measure to fail of its purpose.

We submit that in any realistic appraisal of the chances 
for success of a proposed corrective measure, consideration 
must be given the potential result of such corrective measure 
on white or black flight from the schools.

The “flight” from the public schools for a substantial 
number of white or black students to avoid the impact of 
a proposed corrective measure, will augment rather than 
diminish the racial distrust which constitutes the “remaining 
vestige of law imposed segregation” in the Scotland Neck 
area.

The massive flight of white students from a school is 
certainly going to cause an increase of racial fears, distrust 
and animosities. That will surely threaten the achievement 
of the desired dismantling and impair the quality of the edu­
cation.

A consideration to deter threatened white or black flights 
is a good consideration and not an evil consideration. If 
there is a realistic threat of any such “flight” it cannot be 
ignored.

In the District Court it was not ignored. It was the basis 
for the erroneous condemnation of the statute by that District 
Court. We submit, as the Court of Appeals found, that that 
basis was entirely unsound. That was the crucial error made 
by the District Court.

In the opinion of the majority of the judges on the



29

Court of Appeals the prospective “white flight” was not 
ignored. It was a cause for great concern to that majority.

In the dissenting opinions in the Court of Appeals the 
white flight was ignored.

In the briefs for both the petitioners the negative effects of 
white flight on dismantling and on quality education have 
been ignored.

Each petitioner takes completely inconsistent positions.

In both briefs the petitioners applaud the dissenting opinions 
of the Court of Appeals Justices who condemned the statute 
because it would keep approximately 400 white students in 
their home school in Scotland Neck (a 50% white ratio) 
rather than distributing approximately 300 of those white 
Scotland Neck students to “black schools” to raise the ratio 
in those schools about 3 points. They spent scores of pages 
on that argument. They base their whole case upon the 
prospective, corrective effect on the district, of assigning 
300 white students to schools beyond the borders of Scotland 
Neck. Their total argument is based on the value to the 
unitary movement which will come from the addition of those 
300 white students to the Halifax County School District.

With complete inconsistency they shut their eyes to the 
loss from the Halifax County District schools of 1,102 
white students who fled from the district schools following 
the preliminary injunction and later the permanent injunction, 
a loss which increased the black ratio in the district to 
85.8%. (Table I, App. E).

IV.

THE STATUTE DOES NOT DETER DISMAN­
TLING. IN FACT IT  HAS UNIQUE MERIT AS A 
TOOL FOR DISMANTLING, NAMELY OVERCOM-



30

ING THE MENTAL ATTITUDE W HICH OB­
STRUCTED FREEDOM OF CHOICE

To support the validity of the Statute it is only necessary 
to find that the statute does not go beyond the limits of the 
sound discretion vested in the initial administrative policy 
making body, here the Legislature.

We do not contend that the dismantling of segregation 
was a primary motive behind the Legislative action.

In actual fact the primary motive of the Legislature was 
better schools, to be secured by more money, local super­
vision and support, and the deterring of the movement of 
students to private schools.

But the Legislature, necessarily reached a conclusion that 
the Statute did meet the requirements announced in the Green 
case. So, we take a close look at the statute in the light of 
the Green case.

Possibly the best way to prove the acceptability of the 
statute is to compare its dismantling features with those of 
the District Court plan put into effect after operation under 
the statute was enjoined.

First we set forth what we submit are the major points of 
dismantling found in the Scotland Neck Statute.

a. The statute follows the lines of a natural residential 
pattern. The basic natural preference of a child is to 
attend a school in the neighborhood in which he lives,. An 
unnatural reluctance to attend such local school can be 
overcome more quickly and more permanently if the 
effort is made in the home neighborhood. The attack 
should be concentrated locally.

b. A nearly even division of students between blacks 
and whites avoids any possible contention that such a



31

division embraces any assertion of superiority of either 
race. Such even division would lessen the fears of bodily 
harm by a small minority and would overcome the in­
evitable reaction of a small minority toward aggressive 
and violent self-assertion.

c. The school in Scotland Neck will receive unusually 
strong neighborhood support. That will help to assure 
the success of the dismantling process.

d. The Scotland Neck District offers the opportunity 
of a helpful demonstration of the achievement of peace 
and educational progress by cooperation in school work 
between blacks and whites.

e. The Scotland Neck District tends to deter the 
movement of students to private schools.

f. The Scotland Neck District has an aspect of per­
manence.

We compare the District Court Plan in the light of features 
stated above.

V.

THE PLAN ADOPTED BY THE DISTRICT COURT 
DOES NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENT OF REA­
SONABLENESS AND REALISM

a. The District Court Plan departs radically from a 
natural residential pattern. Of the 400 white school chil­
dren resident in Scotland Neck the District Plan and the 
petitioners would assign approximately 250 students out­
side of the Scotland Neck limits (if those students did not 
move out of the public school system). (App. 681, &&2). 
They would be so assigned solely on the basis of race. 
That would be a cause of continued discontent, dissention 
and rebellion as long as it lasts.



32

b. The District Court Plan of assignment out of a 
residential neighborhood against the wishes of the as­
signed students would be a continual emphasis of race. 
The objective of increasing to 22% the ratio of white 
students in outlying districts invites the charge that it is 
an assertion of racial superiority. It adds fuel to the 
fire of racial antagonism.

c. The District Court Plan would not assure neigh­
borhood support of schools. It would alienate that sup­
port.

d. The District Court Plan would offer no opportunity 
for any school in the district to demonstrate the achieve­
ment of peace and better education by cooperative effort. 
There would be only heavily dominant black schools. 
There would be no proof of satisfactory cooperation 
between blacks and whites in a district school. There 
would be no real working together on even terms.

e. The District Court Plan would not deter the move­
ment of students to private schools. In fact it would 
accelerate and stimulate that movement, as experience 
has shown (See Tables I & II, App. E). Such a continued 
movement of white students to private schools will 
greatly intensify racial and class animosities.

f. The District Court Plan has no aspect of perma­
nence. Rather, it has an open and plain aspect of a tem­
porary unrealistic expedient.

This Court said on April 20, 1971, in Davis v. Board of 
School Commissioners of Mobile County, 402 U.S. 33 
at 37.

“The measure of any desegregation plan is its effec­
tiveness.”



33

When so measured, the District Court plan is proved in­
effective. We point to the actual experience.

We compare below the enrollment record in the Halifax 
County School District for the school year immediately preced­
ing the August 26, 1969 District Court temporary injunction 
with the enrollment of 1971. The figures for 1968-69 are 
taken from the Overman deposition, (App. 219-220), and 
from plaintiff’s Exhibit #13 (App. 727-745). The figures 
for October 1971 are taken from the Overman affidavit, 
(App. 1153) (App. D). Both sets of figures reflect actual 
enrollment.

ENROLLMENT IN HALIFAX COUNTY SCHOOL
DISTRICT 1968-69 AND OCTOBER 1971

White Black % Black
1968-69 2357 8196 77.7
1971-72 1255 7585 85.8

In that total Halifax County District the Black ratio rose 
8.1 points in 26 months.

From that District, 1102 (46.7%) of the white pupils 
had disappeared.

From that District, 611 (7%) of the black pupils had 
disappeared.

The Petitioners center their attack on a geographical area 
in the Southeastern portion of Halifax County winch they 
call District I. They refer to it as the^^Sm ^B rfw ley  at­
tendance zone. In that smaller area, chosen for discussion 
by the Petitioners, the flight experience of both white and 
black pupils was much worse than in the district as a whole. 
That is shown by the actual enrollment figures taken from 
the Overman deposition and the Overman affidavit of 
October 1971. Those figures are as follows:



34

ENROLLMENT IN THE SO-CALLED DISTRICT I 
OF THE HALIFAX COUNTY SCHOOL 

DISTRICT 1968-69 and OCTOBER 1971
White Black % Black

1968-69 786 2516 76.0
1971-72 322 2261 87.5 .

In that Southeastern section (so-called District I) of the 
Halifax County School District the black ratio had risen 
during the 26 months experience period by 11.5 points.

From that sub-district, 464 (59%) of the white pupils 
had disappeared.

From that sub-district, 255 (10.1 % ) of the black pupils had 
disappeared.

The white pupil disappearance in that sub-district was 
45.7% greater than in the remaining Districts II and III, 
namely a disappearance of 59% rather than 40.5%.

In that sub-district the black pupil disappearance was 
60.3% greater than in the remaining Districts II and III, 
namely a disappearance of 10.1% rather than 6.3%.

A substantial disappearance of the white pupils was pre­
dictable. Such disappearance had been predicted as was shown 
by the record in this case. In fact the District Court an­
ticipated substantial disappearance but erroneously observed 
that it could not give it consideration as a factor in a de­
segregation plan.

• w  " H

It was also predictable that the disappearance in the 
immediate Scotland Neck area would be more severe than 
in the remaining Halifax County District.

Experience has now added a factor which was not pre­
dicted by any witness, that is, the substantial disappearance



35

of black pupils. That could be a very significant matter. 
The fact that the black pupil disappearance was 60.3% 
greater in the Scotland Neck area than in the remaining 
Halifax County School District (consisting of Districts II 
and III) plainly points to the influence of the injunction 
on the black pupil disappearance. It must be true that the 
black pupil disappearance was caused in large part by a 
loss of confidence in the prospective quality of the education 
under the court plan.

It seems clear that a prospective flight of both white and 
black students is an element which must be considered in 
fashioning a plan for the correction of the reluctance of 
black and white pupils to exercise their freedom of choice.

VI.

REPLY TO SOME SPECIAL POINTS IN THE 
BRIEFS OF PETITIONERS

The foregoing brief is the primary reply to briefs of the 
petitioners. There are only a few special features to which 
we reply additionally.

Petitioners deal with integration rather than desegrega­
tion, with mixing rather than with dismantling an identified 
remaining vestige of law imposed segregation. They seek 
forced assignments by race, in order to remove “substantial 
disproportion” in the racial composition of the several schools 
in the district. They would make substantial racial dis­
proportion between schools a condition which must be cor­
rected, regardless of the natural racial composition of the 
neighborhoods in which the schools are located. We under­
stand the Swann decision to condemn such an objective.

We note in each brief for petitioners the strong emphasis 
on what they call the pre-Brown Scotland Neck-Brawley Uni­
ty. They argue that where law imposed segregation was



36

made easier by such unity (they call it disregard of lines) 
that unity should be continued in the desegregating process. 
It would seem that precisely the contrary should be sought. 
The best way to uproot the racial reluctance fostered by the 
old Scotland Neck-Brawley “unity” is to dismantle that unity 
“root and branch”. The Scotland Neck Statute severs all 
unity with Brawley by adopting the natural residential lines 
of the city limits. The Scotland Neck black and white students 
would be held in the Scotland Neck school. The petitioners’ 
plan would force about half of the Scotland Neck black 
pupils and nearly all of the Scotland Neck white pupils into 
the Brawley school. Such perpetration of the Scotland Neck- 
Brawley “unity operation” would increase rather than abate 
racial discord.

Petitioners speak of the “hole in the doughnut”, even 
though there is such a situation wherever there are city 
schools and county schools. Surely the division between 
municipal and rural schools is not of itself discriminatory.

Petitioners’ briefs refer again and again to the Scotland 
Neck plan as creative of a “dominant white majority”. That 
is a misuse of that word dominant. As a matter of fact the 
realistic prediction for the Scotland Neck plan is a practically 
even division between blacks and whites. However, even if 
there should be a 57% white resultant proportion that would 
be a majority but surely not a dominant one. To dominate 
means to rule, to govern. Domination could and probably 
would be achieved by a 80% racial ratio. Surely 57% school 
pupils could not be called dominant.

Again and again the briefs of petitioners speak of the 
creation of the Scotland Neck District as a secession. We 
do not see fit to answer that mischievous charge. We do 
deplore it as not being conducive to an atmosphere which 
must be sought if the turmoil in our schools is to be resolved.

We note the argument made by petitioners that the statute 
invites whites to move into Scotland Neck. We had under­



37

stood the Swann decision to refuse to consider speculation as 
to future residential patterns. However, it is clear that it 
would be the strong objective of the defendant Scotland 
Neck City Board of Education and of the community of 
Scotland Neck to achieve such a high quality school that it 
would attract new residents to the city, blacks and whites;, 
and not only from the County of Halifax but from abroad. 
It is possible, even probable, that the Scotland Neck school 
operation would attract as many new black residents as new 
white residents.

CONCLUSION

The most significant feature of this case is this: starting 
with the promotion of the Statute and running through its 
enactment, through the December 1969 announced plan of 
the Scotland Neck City Board of Education, through portions 
of the opinion of the District Court, and through the opinion 
of the majority of the Court of Appeals, there is a current 
of concern about the quality of education in the public 
schools. A definite part of that concern for quality education 
is anxiety about the prospective flight of white students to 
the private schools and the consequent impairment of public 
education.

Those concerns carry with them the hopeful thought that 
the public and the courts are now recognizing that the dis­
mantling of remaining vestiges of law imposed segregation 
is a matter in which whites as well as blacks have a vital 
interest and that both will be considered in the planning 
of schools for all of our children.

The next moslt important feature of this case is the en­
visioned potential of achieving federal, state and local co­
operation in the process of providing interim corrective 
measures for the dismantling of the racial reluctance to 
exercise freedom of choice.

Without that hope and without that potential of coopera­



38
^ j ip F tu c tr  T,it. b ortion the path ahead would look very dtfAmnt. For the 

foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted.

C. K itc h in  J osey 
Scotland Neck, North Carolina
W illiam  T. J oyner 
Joyner & Howison 
Box 109
Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 
Attorneys for Respondent Scotland 

Neck City Board of Education
Hon. R obert M organ 
Attorney General 
Hon. Ra lph  M oody 
Deputy Attorney General 
Raleigh, North Carolina 
On Behalf of Respondent State of 
North Carolina



A P P E N D I X



39

FIRST FURTHER ANSWER OF DEFENDANT 
SCOTLAND NECK CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION1

8. It is the present intention of this Defendant, and this 
Defendant makes this continuing representation, that, if and 
when there is removed the temporary injunction barrier pre­
venting operation under the Statute, Defendant will confine 
its student body to those students residing within the geo­
graphical limits of the town of Scotland Neck, plus or minus 
such student transfers as may be in conformity to the law 
and/or Court order or orders applicable to Defendant, and 
in conformity to a plan of limitation of transfers to be pre­
pared by Defendant and submitted to this Court.

WHEREFORE, this Defendant respectfully prays that:

1. The Court declare to be constitutional Chapter 31 of 
the 1969 Session Laws of North Carolina;

2. The Court dissolve the temporary injunction hereto­
fore issued in this cause on the 25th day of August, 1969;

3. The Court retain jurisdiction of this cause for the 
receipt of a plan of transfer to be submitted by the De­
fendant to the Court and for the hearing of any objection 
that may be filed thereto.

APPENDIX A

C. Kitchin Josey 
William T. Joyner 
Walton K. Joyner 
Attorneys for the defendant, 
Scotland Neck City Board of 
Education, a body corporate.

JT a k e n  f ro m  A pp. 796.



40

ADVERTISEMENT APPEARING IN SCOTLAND 
NECK COMMONWEALTH

October 10, 1969
Defendant’s Exhibit #4

THE SCOTLAND NECK CITY BOARD OF EDU­
CATION REQUESTS FINANCIAL AID IN 

DEFENDING ITS POSITION IN COURT

We are defendants in a lawsuit which seeks to destroy 
our Board. Under order of the Federal Court we may not 
use any public funds for the conduct of our defense. We 
are here requesting from the citizens of Scotland Neck 
donations of money for the conduct of our defense in the 
Court case and to refund tuition fees.

We shall state here facts of interest to you.

THE PRESENT POSTURE OF OUR LAWSUIT

On the 3rd day of March, 1969, the Legislature of 
North Carolina responded to the expressed desires of the 
people of Scotland Neck for a special school district and 
a special school tax to permit achievement of better schools. 
The Legislature created a special school district confined 
to the boundaries of the City of Scotland Neck and to be­
come effective only if and when the people of Scotland 
Neck approved the formation of the special district and 
the special tax of 50 cents on the $100.00 of property 
valuation in the City.

On April 8, 1969, in a special election the people voted 
for both the special district and the special tax.

This Board was formed and engaged a superintendent

APPEN D IX  B



41

of schools and an expanded staff of teachers and made 
plans for the conduct of schools which, because of the 
availability of special funds, promised to be better than 
the schools heretofore afforded to the City.

On Saturday, August 16, 1969, our Board was notified 
that it had been made a party to a suit then pending in 
the Federal District Court before Judge John D. Larkins, 
Jr. That suit was brought by the Department of Justice 
of the United States on behalf of the United States. The 
suit challenged the constitutionality of the Statute under 
which our school board was created and expected to oper­
ate.

Preliminary the suit sought a temporary stay of all of 
our operations until there could be a final determination of 
the merits of the case. On August 21, 22, and 23, 1969, a 
hearing was held on the temporary injunction, together with 
a Warrenton School case and a Littleton School case before 
Judges Algernon L. Butler and John D. Larkins, Jr.

On Monday, August 25, 1969, both judges entered or­
ders granting the temporary restraining order sought by the 
plaintiff, but did not rule on the constitutionality of the 
Statute. The order in our case restored the status which had 
existed prior to the adoption of the Statute, suspending the 
effectiveness of the Statute until the case could be finally 
determined on its merits. Precisely the order in our case said 
“that the defendant Scotland Neck City Board of Education 
and its officers, agents, employees and successors are hereby 
enjoined from giving any force or effect to the provisions 
of Chapter 31 and from taking any action pursuant to the 
provisions of Chapter 31 pending a final determination on 
the merits of the issues raised in the present action; . . .”

Under the interpretation by the court we may not use any 
public funds, not even the proceeds of the special tax, for 
the defense of our case. However, we are permitted to de­



42

fend the case with funds contributed by individuals for that 
purpose.

So, we are here asking for contributions for our defense.

There is contemplated a defense in the trial yet to be held 
before the Federal District Court. If we lose there, it is con­
templated that we would appeal the case to the Circuit 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. If we lost there, 
it is contemplated that we will appeal the case to the Su­
preme Court of the United States. We are convinced that 
we have a strong case and that it should be defended vigor­
ously through all three courts, if that becomes necessary.

THE NATURE OF OUR EXPECTED SCHOOL 
OPERATIONS

Simply stated, it has been at all times and it is still our 
expectation that unless permanently restrained by court or­
der we will achieve schools which are superior to those here­
tofore enjoyed in Scotland Neck. It has been our purpose, 
as was stated in the Statute to “improve and provide public 
schools of a higher standard for the residents of Scotland 
Neck.” That is precisely what we ask the Legislature for 
authority to do.

That is precisely what the Legislature said it was author­
izing.

That is precisely and only what we expect to do. As an 
example, in the short four months in which we functioned, 
the school faculty we employed had the highest percentage 
of standard certificates of any Scotland Neck School faculty 
in the past number of years.

Our expectation of success, both in this litigation and in 
the conduct of the schools, are based primarily on the 
foundation that we have a situation very unusual in all aspects



43

and completely unprecedented in some. Here are some of 
the facts which make our situation unusual, even unique:

1. The special act sets up a special school district with 
lines which are just the same as those of the long existing 
city limits. There is no change in the lines.

2. The district embraces all children of school age living 
in our Scotland Neck Community. It is contemplated by the 
Statute, it is required by law, it is the intent of this Board 
that every child living in this community shall be treated just 
the same, regardless of race, creed or color. There will be 
no segregation under our operation.

3. The basic school population of our community, would 
be approximately 57% white and 43% negro. We do not 
know of any complaint which has ever been made anywhere 
of such a ratio.

4. Transfers out of or into the Scotland Neck Schools would 
be made in accordance with a plan or plans of transfer to be 
prepared by our board and filed with the Court, in order 
that any objections to such plans could be made to the Court 
and heard by it.

5. Every operation of our Board would be in the plainest 
kind of a spotlight, in the spotlight of public opinion and the 
spotlight of Court observation.

6. It is the firm intent of our Board, and the firm intent 
of the people of Scotland Neck, to make our new School Dis­
trict work, to make ours an outstanding school, not a “segre­
gated school,” not an “integrated school,” but just a school 
“for all our children without regard to race, creed or color.” 7

7. It is our firm conviction that the successful operation 
of “just a school” would be good for our community of 
Scotland Neck, good for our County of Halifax, good for



44

our State and good for our Nation. The welfare of Scotland 
Neck, and possibly its survival, depends upon the success of 
just such a school.

WHAT ARE THE PROSPECTS OF SUCCESS?
First, our success in the litigation is not certain. In nearly 

every case in the Supreme Court of the United States in 
which an objector has contested a locally proposed plan of 
school operation the objection has been successful. However, 
we believe that our case is sufficiently different from all other 
cases so that when thoroughly understood, our District will 
be saved. We really believe that we can win. We are certain 
that we should try to win.

Second, if permitted to operate can we make the School a 
success ?

Of that we are very certain, because of what we believe is 
an honest and enthusiastic determination of the people of 
our community to make it work.

So, we ask for your aid in presenting our case. We urge 
every citizen of the community to contribute to that cause, to 
contribute not less than the amount that his special school tax 
would have been this year. In cases of those able to do so 
we urge a larger contribution. The expense necessary to carry 
this case possibly through three courts will be very large.

Please make contributions to the Scotland Neck City Board 
of Education.

Frank P. Shields, Chairman 
Martha H. Holloman 
Walter T. Anderson 
Aubrey Powell 
Albert Burke

Send contributions to:
Scotland N eck  C ity Board of E ducation 
c/o Mrs. Martha H. Holloman, Treasurer 
P. O. Box 340
Scotland Neck, North Carolina 27874



45

FRANK P. SHIELDS, called as a witness by the defend­
ant Scotland Neck City Board of Education, having been 
duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

DIRECT-EXAMINATION 

BY MR. JOSEY:

Q. I believe you are Mr. Frank P. Shields, and you are 
Chairman of the Scotland Neck City Board of Education; 
is that correct?

A. Yes, sir.

[72] Q. Now, Mr. Shields, I believe your deposition has been 
taken by the Government or the plaintiff in this action back 
in, oh, July of 1969; is that correct?

A. Yes, sir.

MR. JOSEY: If your Honor please, I would like to an­
nounce at this time that we do not propose to go into any­
thing here, but mainly two things that have occurred since 
that time.

JUDGE LARKINS: All right. When was that deposi­
tion taken, Mr. Kennedy?

MR. KENNEDY: July 24, 1969, your Honor.

JUDGE LARKINS: Very well. You may proceed.

BY MR. JOSEY:

Q. Now, Mr. Shields, I show you here what purports to 
be a copy of the defendant Scotland Neck City Board of 
Education’s FIRST FURTHER ANSWER that was filed

APPENDIX C1

JT ak en  fro m  th e  T ra n s c r ip t  of th e  D ecem ber 17, 1969 H earing : on th e  M e rits  
(A pp. 961).



46

sometime in September, I believe. Would you look at that, 
please, and be sure that is a copy of it.

A. Yes.

Q. Now, Mr. Shields, although that was not verified, it 
was filed by your attorneys. I ’ll ask you if in fact you and 
other members of the school board, prior to the time that 
this First Further Answer was filed, met and discussed this 
First Further Answer, and you and the school [73] board 
agreed that these were the facts, and that the representations 
made there were in fact true, and that you would abide by 
them; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And that you stated there that, “Within the geographic 
boundaries of the Town of Scotland Neck there now reside 
approximately 751 students of school age; 56.86 percent 
of which are white and 43.14 percent of which are Negro.” 
Aren’t those the figures that this school board is cognizant 
of?

A. Yes.

Q. And you also stated there that, “The resident school 
population is sufficient to constitute an efficient separate 
school administrative unit, and the special tax funds will 
enable the Defendant to offer to its resident students an 
education system which is greatly superior to that hereto­
fore enjoyed by them and superior to that which would be 
available to them if there were no such tax.” And that, “De­
fendant made arrangements to operate such an improved 
school system in Scotland Neck for the school year 1969- 
1970.” And you do now swear that that is the intention of the 
board, and that the board is cognizant of that fact?

A. Yes.

Q. And I ’ll ask you if this statement is true and [74] was



47

discussed with the board and is still yours and the board’s 
representation to the Court:

“It is the present intention of this Defendant, and this 
Defendant makes this continuing representation, that, if and 
when there is removed the temporary injunction barrier pre­
venting operation under the Statute, Defendant will confine 
its student body to those students residing within the geo­
graphical limits of the Town of Scotland Neck, plus or minus 
such student transfers as may be in conformity to the law 
and/or Court order or orders applicable to Defendant, and 
in conformity to a plan of limitation of transfers to be pre­
pared by Defendant and submitted to this Court.”

I ask you if that wasn’t in fact discussed with this board, 
and that the board agreed that that was what they are will­
ing to represent to the Court and do so at this time?

A. Yes.

Q. And didn’t you also ask that, “The Court retain juris­
diction of this cause for the receipt of a plan of transfer to 
be submitted by the Defendant,” or the Scotland Neck City 
Board of Education, “to the Court and for the hearing of 
any objection that may be filed thereto” ?

A. Yes.

Q. Didn’t you also as a city board of education— [75] will 
your Honor give me just one minute?

JUDGE LARKINS: Yes, sir.

BY JUDGE LARKINS:

Q. May I inquire, Mr. Shields, what is the capacity of 
the Scotland Neck facilities to which you say there is being 
projected an enrollment of 751 students?

A. I couldn’t say exactly, Judge Larkins, but there are



48

now in attendance there about—somewhere between 830 and 
850 students. And I would say it would accommodate up to— 
well, in the permanent classrooms probably 900.

JUDGE LARKINS: You may proceed.

BY MR. JOSEY:

Q. I show you here the defendant Scotland Neck’s Exhibit 
4 and ask you if that is in fact a copy of a newspaper ad­
vertisement which you and the members of this school board 
ran for two separate weeks in the Scotland Neck Common­
wealth in the early part of October of this year?

A. Yes.

MR. KENNEDY: Your Elonor, we have no objection 
to the authenticity. We admit the authenticity of all of these 
exhibits.

JUDGE BUTLER: Has that been marked and identi­
fied?

[76] MR. JOSEY: Yes, sir, it has already been introduced. 
This is just another—

JUDGE BUTLER: What is the exhibit number?

MR. JOSEY: No. 4.

JUDGE BUTLER: That’s Defendant’s Exhibit 4?
MR. JOSEY: Yes, sir.
Q. What I would like to ask you is if in that advertise­

ment did you notify the entire population of the Town of 
Scotland Neck that the district of this city administrative 
unit, the Scotland Neck School, “embraces all children of 
school age living in our Scotland Neck Community. It is 
contemplated by the Statute, it is required by law, it is the



49

intent of this Board that every child living in this community 
shall be treated just the same, regardless of race, creed or 
color. There will be no segregation under our operation.

“The basic school population of our community would be 
approximately 57% white and 43% Negro. We do not 
know of any complaint which has ever been made anywhere 
of such a ratio.

“Transfers out of or into the Scotland Neck Schools 
would be made in accordance with a plan or plans of trans­
fer to be prepared by our board and filed with the Court, 
in order that any objections to such plans could [77] be made 
to the Court and heard by it.

“Every operation of our Board would be in the plainest 
kind of spotlight, in the spotlight of public opinion and the 
spotlight of Court observation.

“It is the firm intent of our Board, and the firm intent 
of the people of Scotland Neck, to make our new School 
District work, to make ours an outstanding school, not a 
‘segregated school,’ not an ‘integrated school,’ but just a 
school ‘for all of our children without regard to race, creed 
or color.’

“It is our firm conviction that the successful operation of 
‘just a school’ woudl be good for our community of Scotland 
Neck, good for our County of Halifax, good for our State 
and good for our Nation. The welfare of Scotland Neck, 
and possibly its survival, depends upon the success of just 
such a school.”

Isn’t that what you published in the paper, you and mem­
bers of the board?

A. Yes,

Q. And is that your present intention, and do you represent 
that to the Court at this time under oath?



50

A. Yes, that is my intention and as far as I understand 
it is the intention of every member of the board.

Q. And all members are here with you at this time?
A. All members are present.

[78] Q. And what is your present appraisal of the sentiment 
in the community of Scotland Neck in accepting and operating 
the school as you and the board have set forth?

A. I feel that the community wants it. I feel that they 
are willing to accept the plan as outlined. I think they are 
willing to support the school, and their purpose is that they 
want a better education for their children there in Scotland 
Neck.

MR. JOSEY: All right, sir. Your witness.

MR. KENNEDY: No questions, your Honor.

BY JUDGE LARKINS:

Q. Did you receive any response to this?
A. Yes, sir. It was an appeal for donation of funds to 

finance our fight here in court, and we have received a good 
response I think from it.

JUDGE LARKINS: Very well. Call your next witness.

MR. JOSEY: I would like at this time, your Honor to—

If these members of the board agree with what Mr. Shields 
has said, hold up your hand.

I would like for the record to show that each member of 
the board held up his hand. I

I would like to tender those other four witnesses, the



51

members of the Scotland Neck [79] School Board to this. 
Court and to the Department of Justice.

MR. KENNEDY: No questions.

JUDGE BUTLER: Take a recess until 2:30.

AFTERNOON SESSION 
Wednesday, Dec. 17, 1969



APPENDIX D1
HALIFAX COUNTY SCHOOLS 
W. Henry Overman, Superintendent 

Halifax, N. C.
September 15, 1970 

NORTH CAROLINA 
HALIFAX COUNTY

W. Henry Overman, being duly sworn, says that:
1. He is Superintendent of Schools of the Halifax 

County School Administrative Unit, Halifax, N. C.
2. And that he has on September 15, 1970 received re­

ports from all principals of schools in the Halifax 
County School Administrative Unit giving the latest

52

enrollment of pupils by races as follows:
School and Grade White Negro Indian T otal
Aurelian Springs (K-8) 318 583 6 907
Bakers (1-8) 0 266 0 266
Brawley (1-9) 226 650 0 876
Dawson (1-8) 26 421 0 447
Eastman (8-12) 0 709 68 777
Enfield (9-12) 63 418 481
Everetts (1-8) 309 406 0 715
Hollister (1-7) 0 283 138 421
Inborden (1-8) 52 1130 0 1182
Mclver (1-8) 0 565 0 565
Pittman (1-7) 2 443 2 447
Scotland Neck (10-12) 91 524 0 615
Thomas Shields (1-8) 39 222 0 261
Tillery Chapel (1-8) 10 209 0 219
White Oak (1-7) 2 302 21 325
Wm. R. Davie (9-12) 302 585 0 887

1440 7716 9391
W. Henry Overman

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 15 day of Septem­
ber, 1970. Doris W. Netherland

Notary Public
My commission expires: 9-9-75

lT a k e n  f ro m  A pp. 1100, 1102 a n d  1153.



53

HALIFAX COUNTY SCHOOLS
W. Henry Overman, Superintendent 

Halifax, N. C. 27839 
December 2, 1970 

NORTH CAROLINA 
HALIFAX COUNTY

W. Henry Overman, being duly sworn, says that:
1. He is Superintendent of Schools of the Halifax 

County School Administrative Unit, Halifax, N. C.
2. And that he has on December 2, 1970 received re­

ports from all principals of schools in the Halifax
County School Administrative Unit giving the latest 
enrollment of pupils by races as follows:

School and Grade White Negro Indian T otal
Aurelian Springs (K-8) 324 562 6 886
Bakers (1-8) 0 266 0 266
Brawley (1-9) 212 670 0 882
Dawson (1-8) 23 419 0 442
Eastman (8-12) 0 690 62 752
Enfield (9-12) 66 423 0 489
Everetts (1-8) 333 385 0 718
Hollister (1-7) 0 270 151 421
Inborden (1-8) 54 1117 0 1171
Melver (1-8) 0 572 0 572
Pittman (1-7) 2 446 2 450
Scotland Neck (10-12) 93 538 0 631
Thomas Shields (1-8) 34 229 0 263
Tillery Chapel (1-8) 10 209 0 219
White Oak (1-7) 2 308 22 332
Wm. R. Davie (9-12) 300 636 0 936

1453 7740 243 9436
W. Henry Overman

WHO :ar
Sworn to and subscribed before me this 2nd day of De­

cember, 1970. Doris W. Netherland
Notary Public

My commission expires: 9-9-75



54

HALIFAX COUNTY SCHOOLS 
W. Henry Overman, Superintendent 

Halifax, N. C. 27839 
October 14, 1971 

NORTH CAROLINA 
HALIFAX COUNTY

W. Henry Overman, being duly sworn, says that:
1. He is Superintendent of Schools of the Halifax 

County School Administrative Unit, Halifax, N. C.
2. And that he has on October 7, 1971 received re­

ports from all principals of* schools in the Halifax 
County School Administrative Unit giving the latest 
enrollment of pupils by races as follows:

School and Grade White Negro Indian Total
Aurelian Springs (K-8) 333 611 8 952
Bakers (1-8) 0 241 0 241
Brawley (1-9) 174 659 0 833
:Dawson (1-8) 32 405 0 437
Eastman (8-12) 1 686 70 757
Enfield (9-12) 34 433 0 467
Everetts (1-8) 264 415 0 679
Hollister (1-7) 1 264 151 416
Inborden (1-8) 48 1035 0 1083
Miclver (1-8) 
Northwest at

0 508 0 508

Wm. R. Davie (9-12) 249 632 0 881
Pittman (1-7) 1 421 2 424
Scotland Neck (10-12) 70 515 0 585
Thomas Shields (1-8) 37 227 0 264
Tillery Chapel (1-8) 9 214 0 223
White Oak (1-7) 2 319 23 344

1255 7585 254 9094
* One O rie n ta l s tu d e n t in c lu d ed  in  'W hite 

** O ne S p an ish  S u rn a m e d  A m erican  s tu d e n t in c lu d ed  in  W h ite
W. Henry Overman, Superintendent 

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 14th day of 
October, 1971. Doris W. Netherland

Notary Public
My commission expires: 9-9-75



55

APPENDIX E
TABLE I

PUBLIC SCHOOL ATTENDANCE IN 
HALIFAX COUNTY UNDER COURT ORDERED

PLAN1
White Black % Black

1968-69 2357 8196 77.7
1970,-71 1453 7740 84.2
1971-72 1255 7585 85.8
1. T h e  f ig u re s  fo r  th e  y e a r  1968-69 a r e  ta k e n  fro m  p la in tif f ’s  E x h ib i t  # 1 3 , 

(A pp . 726-745) a n d  fro m  th e  depo sitio n  o f W . H e n ry  O v erm an  (A pp. 218), 
w h ile  th e  f ig u re s  fo r  th e  y e a r s  1970-71 a n d  1971-72 a r e  ta k e n  f ro m  th e  
D ecem b er 2, 1970 a f f id a v it  a n d  th e  O ctober 14, 1971 a f f id a v it, re sp ec tiv e ly , 
o f  W . H e n ry  O v erm an  (A pp. D  a n d  A pp. 1102, 1153). T h e  l a s t  co lum n  in  
th e  ta b le  abo v e  g iv es  th e  p e rc e n ta g e  of th e  to ta l  o f th e  w h ite  a n d  b lack  
co lum ns. I f  th e  102 In d ia n s  re s id in g  in  D is tr ic t  I I  a n d  D is tr ic t  I I I  w ere  
ad d e d  to  th e se  f ig u re s , th e  p e rc e n ta g e s  w ou ld  be  s lig h tly  less.

TABLE II
PUBLIC SCHOOL ATTENDANCE IN 

DISTRICT I UNDER COURT ORDERED PLAN2
White Black % Black

1968-69 786 2516 76.0
1970-71 372 2331 86.2
1971-72 322 2261 87.5
2. T h e  f ig u re s  fo r  th is  ta b le  a re  ta k e n  fro m  th e  sa m e  so u rces  c ite d  in  N o te  1 

a b o v e ; how ever, h e re  th e  f ig u re s  a r e  o n ly  fo r  th e  s ix  sch o o ls  in d is t r ic t  I : 
S co tlan d  N eck, B raw ley , B a k e rs , T ille ry  C hapel, T h o m a s S h ie lds a n d  D aw son .