Memorandum in Support of Judge Wood's Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint of the Legislative Black Caucus and Strike Its Intervention

    PorRTER & CLEMENTS 
: hy f= R 

FIRST REPUBLICBANK CENTER mirdi i b= C—O 

700 LOUISIANA, SUITE 3500 

ATTORNEYS HOUSTON, TEXAS 77002-2730 

A PARTNERSHIP INCLUDING 

PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS 
TELEPHONE (713) 226-0600 

TELECOPIER (713) 228-1331 

J. EUGENE CLEMENTS, P.C. TELECOPIER (713) 224-4835 

PARTNER TELEX 775-348 

1713) 226-0606 

  

  

May 6, 1989 

Clerk, 'U.8. District Court 
P, O. Box 10708 

Midland, Texas 79702 

Re: No. MO0O88-CA-154; League of United Latin American 

Citizens (LULAC), et al. v. James Mattox, Attorney 

General of Texas, et al.; In the United States District 

Court for the Western District of Texas, Midland-Odessa 

Division 

Dear Sir: 

Enclosed for filing in the above-referenced «case is 

Memorandum in Support of Harris County District Judge Wood's 

Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint of the Legislative 

Black Caucus and Strike Its Intervention of the Legislative Black 

Caucus and Order. 

Please verify filing by placing your stamp in the margin of 

the enclosed extra copy of the Memorandum and Order and return 

same to me in the enclosed self-addressed stamped envelope. 

By copy of this letter, all counsel are being served a copy 

of this filing by first class United States Mail, postage 

prepaid. 

Sincerely yours, 

SR 
P.C. 

  

JEC/em 

Enclosures 

cc: Mr. William L. Garrett 
Ms. Brenda Hall Thompson 
Garrett, Thompson & Chang 
Attorneys at Law 

8300 Douglas, Suite 800 
Dallas, Texas 75225  



  

Clerk, U.S. District Court 
May 6, 1989 
Page -2- 

CC: 

, 

Mr. Rolando L. Rios 
Southwest Voter Registration & 

Education Project 
201 N. St. Mary's, Suite 221 
San Antonio, Texas 78205 

Ms. Susan Finkelstein 
Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc. 
201 N. St. Mary's, Suite 600 
San Antonio, Texas 78205 

Mr. Julius Levonne Chambers 

Ms. Sherrilyn A. Ifill 
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. 
99 Hudson Street, 16th Floor 

New York, New York 10013 

Ms. Gabrielle K. McDonald 

Matthews & Branscomb 

301 Congress Ave., Suite 2050 
Austin, Texas 78701 

Mr. Jim Mattox, Attorney General of Texas 

Ms. Mary F. Keller, First Assistant Attorney General 

Ms. Renea Hicks, Spec. Assistant Attorney General 

Mr. Javier Guajardo, Spec. Assistant Attorney General 

P. O. Box 12548 
Capitol Station 
Austin, Texas 78701 

Mr. Edward B. Cloutman, IIT 

Mullinax, Wells, Baab & Cloutman, P.C. 

3301 Elm Street 
Dallas, Texas 75226-1637 

Mr. E. Brice Cunningham 
777 So. R.L. Thornton Freeway, Suite 121 
Dallas, Texas 75203 

Mr. Ken Oden 

Travis County Attorney 
P. O. Box 1748 

Austin, Texas 78767 

PorTER & CLEMENTS 

 



  

Clerk, U.5. District Court 
May 6, 1989 
Page -3- 

cc: Mr. David R. Richards 
Special Counsel 
600 W. 7th Street 

Austin, Texas 78701 

Mr. Mark H. Dettman 

Attorney at Law 

P. O. Box 2559 

Midland, Texas 79702 

Mr. Robert BH. Mow, Jr. 

Hughes & Luce 

2800 Momentum Place 

1717 Main Street 
Dallas, Texas 75201 

PoRTER & CLEMENTS 

 



  

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

MIDLAND-ODESSA DIVISION 

LULAC, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

Vv. NO. MO-88-CA-154 

MATTOX, et al., 

Defendants. Wh
 
D
W
 

Wh
 
W
W
 

D
W
 

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF HARRIS COUNTY DISTRICT 

JUDGE WOOD'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE FIRST AMENDED 

COMPLAINT OF THE LEGISLATIVE BLACK CAUCUS AND 

STRIKE ITS INTERVENTION OF THE LEGISLATIVE BLACK CAUCUS 

  

  

  

  

Defendant Harris County District Judge Sharolyn Wood 

("Defendant Wood") files this Memorandum in Support of her Motion 

to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint of the Legislative Black 

Caucus and Strike Its Intervention and would respectfully show 

the Court the following: 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 
  

  

Te CINTRODUCTHION 0 0 v0 sid ei nin a Pun a. 0 alin mint oi win 2 

IX. PACTS oles ale vi sliieiin io win. 's stele inside »im wiie 4 

IJ11. ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES vo a o's so uo so oo. ieiiwiie ow 6 
  

A. THE LEGISLATIVE BLACK CAUCUS HAS NO RIGHT TO 

INTERVENE 25 AN ENTITY. «ei oie. ole ov sim.» win a 4 6 

B. THE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION OVER THE AMENDED 
COMPLAINT OF THE LEGISLATIVE BLACK CAUCUS . «¢ + 'v 7 

1. The Legislative Black Caucus Lacks Standing to 
Assert Its Own Rights as an Entity. « « '¢ « 4» 7 
  

  

2. The Legislative Black Caucus Lacks Standing to 
Assert the Voting Rights of Its Members . . . . 8 
  

  

 



  

a. The Members of the Legislative Black 
Caucus Lack Standing to Assert in Their 
Own Right the Illegality of the Entire 
Texas System for Electing State District 
JUAGEOS ie tie aie ee el Ee ee se 9 

b. The Interests the Caucus Seeks to 

Protect Are Not Germane to Its 

PUTDOSE sh: i cota 0 fein vn win wie viweiniTeiinlise 9 

¢c. Both the Global Vote Dilution 
Claims Asserted by the Legislative 
Black Caucus and the Relief Requested 
Require the Participation of 
Individual Voters in This lawsuit '. . . . «. 10 

C. THE LEGISLATIVE BLACK CAUCUS LACKS STANDING 

TO ASSERT THE RIGHTS OF BLACK VOTERS WHO ARE 

NOT MEMBERS OF THEICAUCUS iis 4 iu niie wisn au wo wii 713 

IV.  CONCUUSION ois ein iv tive "nies vie Tak mite iivises mw vw vw ne a. 13 
  

1. INTRODUCTION 
  

The intervention of the Legislative Black Caucus ("Caucus") 

into this case has dramatically changed the entire focus of the 

case from one with limited concerns to one with sweeping claims 

which the Caucus does not have standing to advance. The case was 

brought by the League of United Latin American Citizens ("LULAC") 

statewide, two of LULAC's local local councils, and several black 

and Hispanic individuals who claim that their votes as protected 

minorities are diluted by the operation of Texas' at-large system 

for electing state district judges in certain target counties in 

Texas. The. Caucus, alone among all ‘the Plaintiffs .and 

Plaintiff-Intervenors in this case, is alleging that Texas’ 

entire at-large system for electing state judges from the 

district court level through the Texas Supreme Court level is 

unconstitutional because it operates to dilute black votes in 

 



  

violation of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 

U.S.C. § 1973, and intentionally discriminates against blacks in 

violation of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments to the 

United States Constitution. 

Defendant Wood contends that this Court lacks jurisdiction 

over the Caucus' First Amended Complaint ("Amended Complaint"), 

in which the Caucus for the first time makes it clear that it 

proposes, as a self-described "statewide organization," to 

challenge the entire Texas judicial election system on its own 

behalf, and on behalf of its members. The Caucus lacks standing 

to advance such claims because (1) voting rights are 

quintessential individual rights that cannot be asserted by an 

organization on its own behalf; (2) an organization to which most 

black voters cannot belong and without any agenda of its own, but 

which is simply a social organization composed of black state 

legislators from 6 of the 254 counties in Texas, does not have 

standing to challenge the validity of the entire Texas judicial 

election system on behalf of its members; and (3) the Caucus 

lacks standing to advance the voting rights of black voters in 

Texas 1n general. For all these reasons, the Caucus lacks 

standing to prosecute the claims set forth in the Amended 

Complaint. 

When a Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue his claims, the 

Court has no case or controversy within the meaning of Article 

III of the United States Constitution to adjudicate. Therefore, 

the Court lacks jurisdiction over all claims advanced by the 

 



  

Caucus and they should be dismissed. Moreover, since the Caucus’ 

intervention rests entirely upon its standing to put forward as 

an organization the global vote dilution claims it has made in 

the case, and the Caucus lacks standing to make those claims, its 

intervention should be stricken. 

IL. PACTS 

This suit was brought by the statewide League of United 

Latin American Voters ("LULAC"), the local LULAC councils in 

Midland and Ector Counties, and several named black and Hispanic 

individuals, alleging that the application of the at-large system 

for electing state district judges in certain target counties in 

Texas violates the voting rights of blacks and Hispanics by 

violating their votes in violation of Section 2 of the Voting 

Rights ‘Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, and the fourteenth and fifteenth 

amendments to the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs 

initially targeted 47 counties but subsequently trimmed the 

l/ 
number to 15.— A number of individuals and organizations have 

sought to intervene in this case. The Court has permitted the 

intervention of the Houston Lawyers' Association, certain 

individual residents of Dallas County (the "Dallas County 

Plaintiffs"), and the Legislative Black Caucus as Plaintiffs. It 

  

l/ The target counties are Harris, Dallas, Ector, McLennan, 

Tarrant, Midland, Travis, Jefferson, Galveston, Lubbock, 
Fort Bend, Smith, Culberson, El Paso, and Hudspeth. 

 



  

has also permitted the intervention of the Travis County District 

Judges, Harris County District Judge Sharolyn Wood, and Dallas 

County District Judge Harold Entz as Defendants. In each case, 

intervention was permitted so that the intervenors might advance 

their own individual rights. The Court denied intervention to 

Midland County, which wished to intervene as a Defendant in its 

official capacity. It also denied the Travis County District 

Judges permission to modify their intervention to permit Defen- 

dants to intervene in their official capacities. 

The Caucus has now attempted to do by fiat what the Court 

refused to permit the Travis County District Judges to do within 

the rules, namely, modify its pleadings to assert claims in its 

official capacity only. As modified, the pleadings no longer 

list both the Caucus and its individual members as parties; but 

only the Caucus itself. By thus amending its petition, the 

Caucus is clearly claiming that it has the right to intervene as 

an organization to advance its own interests and those of its 

members without the necessity of involving those members as 

parties. For reasons set forth below, the Caucus has no such 

rights and is in no different position from other organizations 

which have been denied the right to intervene because as orga- 

nizations they lacked an interest in this case. The intervention 

of the Caucus should therefore be stricken. 

Quite apart from the above, the Caucus has clarified its 

pleadings in amending them so that it is now evident that the 

 



  

Caucus is claiming -- in contradistinction to all of the other 

Plaintiffs -- that Texas' entire system for electing state 

district judges is unconstitutional throughout the State of 

Texas, not merely unconstitutional as it is applied in target 

counties, and not merely unconstitutional only with respect to 

district judge elections. 

III. ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES 
  

A. THE LEGISLATIVE BLACK CAUCUS HAS NO RIGHT TO INTERVENE AS 

AN ENTITY. 

The Caucus, in amending its pleadings to exclude its 

members as parties, is now claiming the right to intervene by 

itself without involving any of its members as partners in this 

suit. However, in denying the right of Midland County to 

intervene as a party Defendant, this Court has expressly held 

that "a movant must have a direct, substantial, and legally 

protectable interest in the property or transaction which is the 

subject of this suit." Order at 2-3. The Court quoted with 

approval, 

What is required is that the interest be one which substan- 
tive law recognizes as belonging to or being owned by the 
applicant. 

Order at 3 (quoting New Orleans Public Service v. United Gas 
  

Pipeline, 702 F.2d 452, 463-66 (5th Cir. 1984). The Legislative 
  

Black Caucus has no interest of its own to advance in this case 

because it does not vote and it is not an organization formed to 

advance black civil rights. Nor does the Caucus satisfv the test 

which would allow it to sue on behalf of its members, as shown 

 



below. Therefore, the Caucus' intervention under the terms it 

proposes for itself is improper and should be stricken. 

B. THE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION OVER THE AMENDED COMPLAINT OF 
THE LEGISLATIVE BLACK CAUCUS. 

1. The Legislative Black Caucus Lacks Standing to Assert 
Its Rights as an Entity. 
  

  

The Caucus has no voting rights as an entity. Therefore, 

the Caucus does not have the right to assert voting rights on its 

own behalf. In NAACP v. Button, the United States Supreme Court 
  

addressed the issue of the scope of an organization's right to 

assert civil rights claims on its own behalf. The Court stated, 

[Pletitioner claims that [Chapter 33 of the Virginia Acts 
of Assembly regulating the solicitation of legal business] 
infringes the right of the NAACP and its members and 
lawyers to associate for the purpose of assisting persons 
who seek legal redress for infringements of their constitu- 
tionally guaranteed and other rights. We think petitioner 
may assert this right on its own behalf, because through a 
corporation it is directly engaged in those activities, 
claimed to be constitutionally protected, which the statute 
would curtail. 

  

  

  

  

  

371 v.s., 415, 428 83 Ss. Ct. 328, 335 (1963) {emphasis added). In 

the instant case, by contrast, there is no precedent and no 

ground for permitting the Caucus to intervene to assert voting 

rights on its own behalf since the Caucus itself is not engaged, 

directly or indirectly, in exercising or advancing constitution- 

ally protected voting rights which the at-large Texas judicial 

election system would curtail. Membership in the Caucus is not 

even open to black voters. The Caucus is simply a loose asso- 

ciation composed of black members of the Texas Legislature that 

was formed to discuss political issues. A social organization's  



  

interest in political issues affecting blacks does not endow that 

organization with standing to assert civil rights. 

2. The Legislative Black Caucus Lacks Standing to Assert 
the Voting Rights of Its Members. 
  

  

The Supreme Court has consistently held that an organization 

has standing to assert the rights of its members only in certain 

circumstances. See, e.g., International Union, United Automo- 
    

bile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America v. 
  

Brock, uv.S. vr. -106. S.Ct. 2523, 2528 (1986) accord, 
  

O'Hair v., White, 675 F.2d 680, 691 (5th Cir. 1982) (pointing out 
  

that no Supreme Court cases have created "a per se rule granting 

an organization standing to sue on behalf of any of its members 

For: any injury"). Rather, the Court has devised a three-part 

test for determining whether an organization has standing to sue 

on behalf of its members. Under this test, 

"[A]ln association has standing to bring suit on behalf 
of its members when: (a) its members would otherwise 
have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the 
interests it seeks to protect are germane to the 
organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim 
asserted nor the relief requested requires the par- 
ticipation of individual members in the lawsuit. 

Id. at 2529 (quoting Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising 
  

gonm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343, 97-S.Ct. 2434, 2441 {(1977)). An 

organization such as the Caucus has standing to bring suit on 

behalf of its members only if all three parts of the Washington 
  

State Apple test are met. The Caucus, however, fails not just 
  

one, but all three parts of the Washington Apple test. Since it 
  

cannot pass that test in any respect it cannot claim standing to 

challenge Texas' entire judicial system on behalf of its members. 

 



  

a. The Members of the Legislative Black Caucus Lack 
Standing to Assert in Their Own Right the 
Illegality of the Entire Texas System for Electing 
Judges 

The entire membership of the Caucus, as set forth in its 

pleadings, consists in black legislators from only six Texas 

counties. This limited membership does not make the Caucus a 

statewide organization of black voters. If the Caucus sought -- 

as it does not -- to challenge only the district court election 

system in those six counties in which it has members, it might be 

able to claim that its members had standing to sue in their own 

right. However, the Caucus' claims are exclusively global 

without reference to any particular counties or even any parti- 

cular type of judicial office; and the members of the Caucus do 

not have the right to assert global voting rights claims. 

Therefore, the Caucus fails the first part of the Washington 
  

Apple test of an organization's right to sue on behalf of its 

members. Even if if could pass this part of the test, however, 

it would still fail the other two parts. 

b. The Interests the Caucus Seeks to Protect Are Not 

Germane to Its Purpose. 

In contrast to the NAACP, which was permitted to intervene 

in Button to advance the rights of voters under the Constitution, 

the Caucus 1s an organization composed of black Texas state 

senators and representatives. It is not an organization devoted 

to advancing voting rights; nor is it an organization which can 

purport to represent black voters in general. It is an honorary 

 



  

organization whose purpose is to unite black Texas state legisla- 

tors for fellowship and political discussion. Therefore, this 

suit is not germane to the Caucus' purpose and the Caucus fails 

the second prong of the Washington Apple test of the right of an 
  

organization to sue on behalf of its members. 

c. Both the Global Vote Dilution Claims Asserted by 
the Legislative Black Caucus and the Relief 
Requested Require the Participation of Individual 
Voters in This Lawsuit 

The three essential factors necessary to establish a vote 

dilution claim under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 

U.5.C. §1973, were set out by the United States Supreme Court in 

Thornburg v. Gingles: 
  

First, the minority group must be able to demonstrate 
that it is sufficiently large and geographically 
compact to constitute a majority in a single-member 
district. I£ it is not, as would be the case in a 
substantially integrated district, the multi-member 
form of the district cannot be responsible for minority 
voters' inability to elect its candidates..... Second, 

the minority group must be able to show that it is 
politically cohesive. If the minority group. is not 
politically cohesive, it cannot be said that the 
selection of a multimember electoral structure thwarts 
distinctive minority group interests.... Third, the 
minority must be able to demonstrate that the white 
majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it -- 
in the absence of special circumstances, such as the 
minority candidate running unopposed, see, infra, at 

-- usually to defeat the minority's preferred 
candidate. 

L.S. r 106. 8, Ct. 2752, 2766. 67 (1986) (emphasis 

in original; citations omitted). 

The Gingles factors all look to the specific results of 

at-large election districts on the voting rights of protected 

minorities within the district in order to determine whether or 

 



  

not the effect of using the at-large election system is to dilute 

the voting rights of the protected minorities "within the 

districts.—2/ Each prong of the Gingles test is thus a highly 

fact-intensive, results oriented inquiry which requires the 

participation of individual voters in each challenged district 

who can show (1) that they are part of a minority group in that 

district which is sufficiently large and geographically compact   

to constitute a majority in a single-member district; (2) that 

the group to which they belong is politically cohesive; and (3) 

that the group votes as a racial bloc against a white majority 

which also votes as a racial bloc. In other words, the success 

of a vote dilution claim depends upon the ability of voters 

within each challenged district to show that under the specific 

circumstances prevailing in their district they are harmed by the 

dilution of their votes and they will be given relief if the 

system is changed. 

Moreover, in New York State Club Ass'n. v. City of New York, 
  

the United States Supreme Court held that in order to prevail in 

a suit on a statute -- as the Caucus is attempting to do -- the 

Plaintiff must show that the law could never be validly applied. 

U.S. / 108 8. Ct. 2225, 2233 (1988)... Therefore,     

in order to prove that Texas' at large judicial election system 

  

=f The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that at-large election 
districts are not intrinsically illegal. See White wv. 
Regigter, 412 U.S. 755, 766, 93 Ss.Ct, 2332, 2339 (1973); 
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 142, 91 S.Ct, 1858, 1868 

  

  

  
(1971). 

 



  

at all levels violates the Voting Rights Act and/or the United 

States Constitution throughout the State of Texas, the Caucus 

would have to prove that the system results in vote dilution in 

violation of Gingles in every judicial election district in 

Texas. This proof would necessarily depend upon the ability of 

individuals in each district to show that they were harmed by the 

vote-diluting effect of the at-large election system and that 

they would gain relief from the abolition of that system and its 

replacement by single-member districts. The Caucus clearly lacks 

standing to make a general claim that Texas' at large judicial 

election system is illegal when, in fact, its own members will be 

affected by the results of such a finding with respect to only 

six counties and numerous unrepresented persons will be affected 

by the results of such a finding with respect to the other 248 

Texas counties. 

Since the vote dilution claims advanced by the Caucus cannot 

be advanced by an organization but are dependent upon the 

participation of individual voters who can claim that they have 

been harmed and they will gain relief from the successful 

prosecution of their claims, the Caucus fails the third prong of 

the Washington State Apple test of the right of an organization 
  

to sue on behalf of its members. In sum, the Caucus fails all 

these prongs of the Washington State Apple test, and therefore it 
  

lacks standing to sue on behalf of its members. 

 



C. THE LEGISLATIVE BLACK CAUCUS LACKS STANDING TO ASSERT THE 

RIGHTS OF BLACK VOTERS WHO ARE NOT MEMBERS OF THE CAUCUS. 

The mere fact that an organization is composed of black 

members of the Texas legislature does not give that organization 

the derivative right to claim -- as the Caucus claims -- to 

represent the voting rights interests of all of the members’ 

constituents. Instead, that organization represents, at best, 

the rights of the members themselves -- the state legislators who 

constitute the Caucus. Defendant Wood is aware of no case in 

which any court has held that an organization has standing to 

represent the individual rights of persons who form the policial 

constituency of the members of the organization, no matter what 

those rightly are and no matter what the purpose of the organi- 

zation and its membership requirements are. The relationship 

between the rights of the members of the Caucus and the voting 

rights of the persons who elected to political office the persons 

who formed the Caucus is far too attenuated to permit the Caucus 

to claim standing to press the individual rights of the persons 

who elected its members. 

CONCLUSION   

The Legislative Black Caucus, in making clear its position 

in its Amended Complaint, has dramatically shifted the focus of 

this entire case by asserting global claims that challenge the 

entire Texas at large judicial election system in contract to the 

Plaintiffs in this case, who brought this suit to challenge the 

at large state district judge election system, in only certain 

target counties. In its Amended Complaint the Caucus asserts  



  

blanket claims -- and only blanket claims -- which it entirely 

lacks standing to bring on its own behalf or on behalf of its 

members, much less on behalf of all black voters in Texas. Since 

standing imparts jurisdiction, this Court has no jurisdiction 

over the Caucus' claims, and the Caucus' Amended Complaint should 

be dismissed. 

The Caucus has also amended its pleadings to subtract as 

parties the very members whose assertion of its rights it depends 

on for jurisdiction over this case. Intervention to advance the 

rights of an organization as an organization rather than the 

rights of its members has been consistently denied by this Court 

where the organization cannot show that it has a legally protect- 

able interest in this case. As NAACP v. Button establishes, the 
  

Caucus has no right or interests which it has standing to assert 

in this case since it is not directly -- or even indirectly -- 

engaged in activities which are infringed by Texas' at large 

judicial system. And by removing its members as parties, the 

Caucus has, in effect, claimed that their individual rights, 

interests, and experiences are irrelevant to this case. Thus the 

Caucus fails the test set out in Button which determines whether 

an entity has standing and can assert civil rights in its own 

behalf. As a result, no right to intervene in this case, and its 

pleadings should be dismissed and its intervention stricken. 

The foregoing arguments and authorities show that there are 

compelling grounds for dismissing the Amended Complaint of the 

 



  

Legislative Black Caucus for lack of jurisdication and for 

striking the Caucus' intervention. 

Respectfully submitted, 

   
   

  

  

Eugene Clements 
torney in Charge for Defendant 

aris County District Judge 
Sharolyn Wood 
700 Louisiana, Suite 3500 
Houston, Texas 77002-2730 

(713) 226-0600 

OF COUNSEL: 

PORTER & CLEMENTS 

John E. O'Neill 
Evelyn V. Keyes 
700 Louisiana, Suite 3500 
Houston, Texas 77002-2730 
(713) 226-0600 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
  

I hereby certify that on the Le day of May, 1989, a true 
and correct copy of the above and foregoing Defendant Harris 
County District Judge Wood's Motion to Dismiss the First Amended 
Complaint of the Legislative Black Caucus was served upon counsel 
of record in this case by first class United States mail, postage 

prepaid, addressed as follows: 

Mr. William L. Garrett 
Ms. Brenda Hull Thompson 
Garrett, Thompson & Chang 
Attorneys at Law 

8300 Douglas, Suite 800 
Dallas, Texas 75225 

Mr. Rolando L. Rios 
Southwest Voter Registration & 

Education Project 
201 N. St. Mary's, Suite 221 
San Antonio, Texas 78205 

 



  

Ms. Susan Finkelstein 
Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc. 
201 N. St. Mary's, Suite 600 
San Antonio, Texas 78205 

Mr. Julius Levonne Chambers 
Ms. Sherrilyn A. Ifill 
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. 

99 Hudson Street 
l6th Floor 

New York, New York 10013 

Ms. Gabrielle K. McDonald 
Matthews & Branscomb 
301 Congress Ave., Suite 2050 
Austin, Texas 78701 

Mr. Jim Mattox, Attorney General of Texas 
Ms. Mary F. Keller, First Assistant Attorney General 
Ms. Renea Hicks, Spec. Assistant Attorney General 
Mr. Javier Guajardo, Spec. Assistant Attorney General 

P.O. Box 12548 
Capitol Station 
Austin, Texas 78701 

Mr. Edward B. Cloutman, III 

Mullinax, Wells, Baab & Cloutman, P.C. 
3301 Elm Street 

Dallas, Texas 75226-1637 

Mr. E. Brice Cunningham 
777.80. R.L. Thornton Freeway 
Suite 121 
Dallas, Texas 75203 

Mr. Ken Oden 

Travis County Attorney 
P. O. Box 1748 

Austin, Texas 78767 

Mr. David R. Richards 
Special Counsel 
600 W. 7th Street 

Austin, Texas 78701 

Mr. Mark H. Dettman 

Attorney at Law 

P.O. Box 2559 
Midland, Texas 79702 

 



  

Mr. Robert H. Mow, Jr. 

Hughes & Luce 
2800 Momentum Place 

1717 Main Street 

Dallas, Texas 75201 

[ey — 
To CS A AR hn 

J.| Eugene Clements 
  

WO002/04/cdf 

 



  

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

MIDLAND-ODESSA DIVISION 

LULAC, et al., § 

Plaintiffs, : 

Vv. E NO. MO-88-CA-154 

MATTOX, et al., : 

Defendants. 2 

O'RBRD PER 
  

The Court having considered Harris County District Judge 

Wood's Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint of the 

Legislative Black Caucus and Strike Its Intervention; and having 

concluded that such Motion is well taken, it is hereby GRANTED. 

SIGNED this day of , 1989, 
  

  

FEDERAL DISTRICT JUDGE 

W0002/06