Diamond v. Louisiana Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Louisiana

    ĵ upmnp GImtri nt tip Unitpfr States
October Term, 1962 

No................

In the

D ion T ybone D iamond,

Petitioner,

— y.—

State oe L ouisiana.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE 
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

J ack Greenberg 
J ames M. Nabr.it, III 

10 Columbus Circle 
New York 19, New York

J ohnnie A. J ones
530 South 13th Street 
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
Attorneys for Petitioner



I N D E X
PAGE

Citation to Opinions Below .............. ..........................  1

Jurisdiction ...................................................................  2

Question Presented ............................   2

Statutory and Constitutional Provisions Involved .... 2

Statement .....................................................    4

How the Federal Questions Were Presented ............  11

Reasons for Granting the Writ .................................  17

Conclusion ...........................................................................  24

A ppendix .................................   la

T able op Cases

Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 .................. 17,18, 21
Chaplinski v. New Hampshire, 315 IT. S. 568 ........... 22
Cramer v. United States, 325 U. S. 1 .........................  23

Edwards v. South Carolina, —— U. S. — —, 9 L. ed.
2d 697 .....................................................................17,18, 21

Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U. S. 157 .............. 18,19, 20, 21, 22

N. A. A. C. P. v. Button,------U. S. ------- , 9 L. ed.
2d 405 ..........................................................................  17

Ponchatoula v. Bates, 173 La. 824,138 So. 851...........  21



11
PAGE

State v. Sanford, 203 La. 961, 14 So. 2d 778 ..............  21
Stromberg y. California, 283 U. S. 359 .................. 17, 22, 23

Taylor v. Louisiana, 370 U. S. 154.............................  19
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1 .............................  21, 22
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516.................................  23, 24
Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U. S. 199........... 19
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 ..........................18, 21, 22

Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 387 ..................  23
Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507 .........................  17

Yates v. United States, 354 U. S. 298 .......................... 23



In the

(tart itf %  Initrii States
October T erm, 1962 

No.................

D ion Tyrone D iamond,

—v.—

State oe L ouisiana.

Petitioner,

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE 
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

Petitioner prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review 
the judgment of the Supreme Court of Louisiana entered 
in the above entitled case on January 3, 1963.

Citation to Opinions Below

The opinions below are not reported. The Nineteenth 
Judicial District Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge 
filed a series of per curiam opinions ruling upon the peti­
tioner’s bill of exceptions which were dated November 8, 
1962 (R. 23-41), and are printed in the appendix hereto at 
p. 3a.

The Supreme Court of Louisiana entered an order deny­
ing the applications for writs of certiorari, mandamus and 
prohibition (R. 206), which is unreported but is set forth in 
the appendix hereto, infra, p. 25a.



2

Jurisdiction

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Louisiana was 
entered January 3, 1963 (R. 206). The jurisdiction of this 
Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C., §1257(3), petitioner 
claiming rights, privileges and immunities under the Four­
teenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

Question Presented

Whether, where petitioner engaged in making speeches— 
an activity within the area of free expression protected by 
the Constitution—he was denied due process under the 
Fourteenth Amendment when punished under a state law 
containing general and indefinite prohibitions against dis­
turbing the peace which are not narrowly drawn to define 
and prohibit specific conduct?

Statutory and Constitutional 
Provisions Involved

1. This case involves Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment to the Constitution of the United States.

2. This case also involves Louisiana Revised Statute, 
14:103 which provides as follows:

§103. Disturbing the peace

A. Disturbing the peace is the doing of any of the 
following in such manner as would foreseeably disturb 
or alarm the public:

(1) Engaging in a fistic encounter; or

(2) Using of any unnecessarily loud, offensive, or 
insulting language; or



3

(3) Appearing in an intoxicated condition; or

(4) Engaging in any act in a violent and tumultuous 
manner by any three or more persons; or

(5) Holding of an unlawful assembly; or

(6) Interruption of any lawful assembly of people; 
or

(7) Commission of any other act in such a manner 
\ as to unreasonably disturb or alarm the public.

Whoever commits the crime of disturbing the peace 
shall be fined not more than one hundred dollars or 
imprisoned for not more than, ninety days, or both.

B. Any person or persons, providing however noth­
ing herein contained shall apply to a bona fide legiti­
mate labor organization or to any of its legal activities 
such as picketing, lawful assembly or concerted activity 
in the interest of its members for the purpose of ac­
complishing or securing more favorable wage stand­
ards, hours of employment and working conditions, 
while in or on the premises of another, whether that 
of an individual person, a corporation, a partnership, 
or an association, and on which property any store, res­
taurant, drug store, sandwich shop, hotel, motel, lunch 
counter, bowling alley, moving picture theatre or drive- 
in theatre, barber shop or beauty parlor, or any other 
lawful business is operated which engages in selling 
articles of merchandise or services or accommodation 
to members of the public, or engages generally in busi­
ness transactions with members of the public who shall:

(1) prevent or seek to prevent, or interfere or seek 
to interfere with the owner or operator of such place 
of business, or his agents or employees, serving or 
selling food and drink, or either, or rendering service



4

or accommodation, or selling to or showing merchan­
dise to, or otherwise pursuing his lawful occupation or 
business with customers or prospective customers or 
other members of the public who may then be in such 
building, or

(2) prevent or seek to prevent, or interfere or seek 
to interfere with other persons who are expressly or 
impliedly invited upon said premises, or with prospec­
tive customers coming into or frequenting such prem­
ises in the normal course of the operation of the busi­
ness conducted and carried on upon said premises, shall 
be guilty of disorderly conduct and disturbing the 
peace, and upon conviction thereof, shall be punished 
by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars or by 
imprisonment in the parish jail for not more than six 
months, or by both such fine and imprisonment. (As 
amended Acts 1960, No. 70, §1.)

Statement

Petitioner, Dion T. Diamond, seeks review of his con­
viction of the crime of “disturbing the peace” in the Nine­
teenth Judicial District Court of Louisiana, Parish of East 
Baton Kouge. Petitioner was charged in that Court by an 
information (R. 1) filed March 8, 1962, in case No. 42,917 
which alleged that on January 30 and 31,1962, he:

. . . unlawfully did violate L.E.S. 14:103 in that he, 
not a student of Southern University, did enter upon 
the premises of Southern University and there engage 
in and encourage students of Southern University to 
hold unruly, unauthorized demonstrations on the 
Campus and did lead and encourage said students to 
march through the University buildings while classes 
were being conducted and did encourage said students



5

to boycott and leave the classes in such manner as 
would foreseeably disturb and alarm the public . . .

Petitioner was arraigned and he entered a plea of not 
guilty March 8, 1962 (E. 42). On March 12, 1962, the trial 
court entered an order, over petitioner’s objection, grant­
ing the State’s motion to consolidate this case for trial with 
five other separate changes then pending against petitioner 
(E. 42). But, eventually) case'No. 42̂ 917 was tried sepa­
rately (cf. E. 59), petitioner was convicted only on this 
charge, and the present petition thus involves only the 
charge quoted above. Petitioner has not been brought to 
trial on the other informations, which included allegations 
that he violated LSA-E.S. 14:103 by holding unlawful as­
semblies and also by interrupting lawful assemblies.1

Before trial petitioner filed an application for a bill of 
particulars (E. 9) and a motion to quash the information 
(E. 3), both of which were overruled (E. 44). /Trial was 
held Mav 8. 1962. and petitioner was found “guilty as 
charged” (E. 44) by the Court sitting without a jury. A 
motion for new trial (E. 12) was overruled May 24, 1962 
(E. 45). In the motion to quash and the motion for new 
trail petitioner raised federal constitutional objections as­
serting that the statute as applied to him was unconstitu­
tionally vague and that it violated his rights to free speech

1 Copies of 3 of the 5 other informations appear in this record 
(R. 6-8), having been filed in connection with petitioner’s motion 
to quash. Case No. 42,615 alleged that petitioner violated LSA-R.S. 
14:1Q3 by holding unlawful assemblies, and No. 42,616 alleged a 
violation of the same statute by interrupting lawful assemblies. 
Case No. 42,612 charged that petitioner violated LSA-R.S. 14:103.1, 
by refusing to leave the premises of Southern University when 
requested to do so by authorized University personnel. All three 
informations related to the period January 29 through February 1, 
1962. Other pending informations charged petitioner with va­
grancy under LSA-R.S. 14:107 and with trespass under LSA-R.S. 
14:63.



6

and assembly, as is set forth in more detail below, p. 11, 
et seq.

Petitioner was ̂ sentenced to pay a fine of  $100 and costs, 
or in default of the fine, to be confined in the parish jail 
for 30 days, and, in addition, to be confined in the parish 
jail for 60 days (E, 45).

On November 8, 1962, the trial court filed a series of per 
curiams to petitioner’s bills of exceptions (E. 23-41). 
Thereafter, on or about November 21, 1962, petitioner ap­
plied to the Supreme Court of Louisiana for writs of 
certiorari, mandamus and prohibition seeking to invoke 
the court’s supervisory powers (E. 195). The writs were 
denied January 3, 1963, in an order by the Supreme Court 
of Louisiana stating (E. 206) :

The application is denied. We find no error in the 
rulings complained of.

Execution of the judgment was stayed for 90 days on 
January 10, 1963, to allow petitioner to seek review in 
this Court (E. 209).

The events leading to petitioner’s arrest were as follows. 
Southern University in East Baton Eouge Parish Louisiana 
is a school having about 4400 students (E. 128). The school 
had been the scene of a series of demonstrations and meet­
ings by students from abouty December 15, 1961 until the 
time of petitioner’s arrest on February 1, 1962 (E. 89). 
Some students at Southern were boycotting classes until 
the situation of students who had been arrested in anti­
segregation demonstrations was resolved with the school 
(E. 130, 133, 134). Dion T. Diamond, who was not a student 
at Southern University, was first observed on the campus 
by the State’s witnesses (University employees) on Janu­
ary 30, 1962. The evidence at the trial related to a series



7

of speeches made by Diamond to students in a quadrangle 
on the campus on January 30 and 31, 1962. There was also 
evidence as to the circumstances of his arrest on February 
1, 1962. phere was no evidence that petitioner was ever 
ordered not'“fo enter the campus, or to leave it, and no 
evidence’thaf he was ever told that he could not make 
speSeE^tortir^eaMpus or that he_needed any permission 
£o~dro su. The UlirvergtfyTeglstrar testified that the school 
was a' public institution, and that “ anyone may come there 
who wishes” (E. 7).

1. Events of January 30, 1962.

Between 9 :30 and 10:00 A.M. Diamond was seen by the 
Dean of Students Marvin Harvey (R. 113). Diamond was 
talking to three to four hundred students in a quadrangle 
near the student union building (R. 113). Dean Harvey 
said that Diamond was “talking about the importance of 
demonstrating and staying out of classes” (R. 113). After 
about 15 minutes the meeting broke up and the students 
went in various directions (R. 114). The Dean stated that 
during the speech the students were listening, clapping 
and indicating “ expressions of approval” (R. 115). The 
Dean said that he had not authorized Diamond to have a 
meeting (R. 115).

That afternoon at about 1:00, Dean Harvey observed 
about 40 students walking around the campus with signs 
(R. 115-116).2

2 A defense witness, Jeanette Gilliam, a former student at 
Southern, said that she was present at a speech made by Diamond 
in the same area at about 12 :00 noon on the 30th. None of the 
State’s witnesses mentioned this speech. Miss Gilliam stated that 
Diamond asked students to stay out of classes, but that he did not 
advocate students going into classrooms and taking students out 
of classes (R. 179-181).



8

2. Events of January 31, 1962— morning.

Diamond made another speech at the same place at a 
time variously estimated at 9 :15 to 9 :45 A.M. before a 
group estimated by the school’s chief security officer Wil­
liam Pass at two to three hundred (R. 66) and estimated 
by Dean Harvey at four to five hundred (R. 116). Pass 
stated that this was a regular school day, but that students 
at that time had been boycotting classes on the campus for 
three or four days (R. 66; 96). In his speech Diamond told 
the students not to go to classes; that the faculty was sup­
porting them and had signed some type of petition; and 
that they should show their gratitude by not going to 
classes (R. 68). Dean Harvey said that the tenor of the 
speech was the same as that of the previous day (R. 117); 
that he had not authorized the meeting (R. 117); that it 
lasted between 15 and 20 minutes (R. 117); and that he 
started toward Diamond to inform him that he did not have 
permission to hold the meeting, but that Diamond ceased 
speaking and the group dispersed before he got there (R. 
116-117).

3. Events of January 31, 1962— afternoon.

Security officer Pass and his assistant Willie Harris 
testified about a speech Diamond made during the noon 
hour on January 31. Harris estimated that five to six 
hundred students were there (R. 149); Pass stated there 
were about the same number or possibly more than were 
at the morning speech, e.g., two to three hundred (R. 69). 
Pass stated that “Diamond told the students that we will 
go through the classrooms and if necessary wrn will put 
them out of the classrooms” (R. 71). Harris said that Dia­
mond was pleading for more followers from the student 
body (R. 155); that he urged the students to stay out of 
classes and was calling for at least fifty percent of the stu­



9

dents to support him (E. 155); and that Diamond told the 
students “let’s go through the classrooms” (E. 156). Dean 
Harvey described this speech by saying that it “ concerned 
principally the boycotting of classes” (E. 118).

According to Dean Harvey, about one hour after this 
speech he observed at least a hundred students begin to go 
from one classroom building to another carrying signs; 
that this was a noisy procession which disturbed people 
in the buildings where classes were being conducted at the 
time; and that this lasted over half an hour (E. 118-119). 
Mr. Pass said that the students were walking on the campus 
and through the classrooms singing and stomping in a 
very loud manner which caused a disturbance for over an 
hour (E. 71-72); that they carried signs (E. 73-76); and 
that classes in progress were disturbed (E. 72-73). His 
assistant, Harris, also recounted this event saying that the 
students were “pulling on doors, stomping on the halls” 
(E. 155); and that they were disturbing the classes (E. 
155). No witness testified that anyone was actually “pulled” 
from any classroom. Pass testified that no one was injured 
and that there were no fights (E. 110).

None of the witnesses testified that Diamond did any­
thing but make the speeches mentioned above. No witness 
testified that Diamond entered any University building. 
Pass and Harris both stated that they did not see Diamond 
in any of the buildings (E. 92; 156). No witness testified 
that Diamond carried any signs or participated in making 
them (cf. E. 88). On cross examination Pass was asked 
(E. 95):

Q. Now, what did the accused do other than to make 
a speech? A. That is all I witnessed him doing. He 
just made a speech.



10

4. Events of January 31, 1962— evening.

At about 6:00 P.M. on January 31 an official meeting of 
the student senate was held in the “ old gymnasium”, at 
which Dean Harvey announced that this was the only au­
thorized student meeting, and the president of the student 
senate, Murphy Jackson, spoke urging the students to go 
to classes. Murphy Jackson testified that Diamond sought 
permission to speak, but when this was refused Diamond 
left the meeting without causing any trouble (R. 174); that 
Diamond asked students who wanted to have an “ outcry” 
not to disturb the meeting and to be quiet or to leave 
(R. 175). Dean Harvey said that when Diamond left the 
meeting about 125 students also left (R. 124). Shortly 
afterwards there was an impromptu outdoor gathering out­
side the “new gymnasium” at which Diamond and a number 
of students spoke (R. 124-125, 186). Defense witnesses tes­
tified that on this occasion Diamond reprimanded the stu­
dents for reportedly having gone through the classroom 
buildings that afternoon (R. 181, 183, 186-187).

5. Events of February 1, 1962.

On the morning of February 1, Diamond arrived on the 
campus in a taxicab with several other persons (R. 188- 
189). As soon as he got out of the taxicab he was placed 
under arrest by Willie Harris, the assistant security officer 
who was also a deputy sheriff (R. 87, 107-108, 144). Harris 
was accompanied by Chief Security Officer Pass who drove 
the two of them to Raton Rouge jail. Pass and Harris 
both stated that on this occasion they merely observed 
Diamond getting out of the taxicab and that Harris imme­
diately placed him under arrest. Harris had no arrest 
warrant (R. 145). Harris stated that he had wanted to 
arrest Diamond on the previous day during the noon 
speech, but had been unable to reach him because of the



11

crowd (E. 153). He stated that he arrested Diamond for 
“holding an unlawful assembly” the previous day (E. 148); 
and that no one told him to make the arrest (E. 153). Pass 
denied having ordered or requested Harris to make the 
arrest, or having made the arrest himself (E. 106).

How the Federal Questions Were Presented

The federal questions sought to be reviewed here were 
raised in the trial court on March 23, 1962, by petitioner’s 
Motion to Quash the information (E. 3-5). In this motion 
petitioner objected that the statute under which he was 
charged was unconstitutionally vague and that it infringed 
his right of free speech in violation of the Constitution of 
the United States asserting, inter alia:

2. That LSA-E.S. 14:103 of 1950, as amended, should 
be declared void for vagueness, in that, said Statute 
is so vague on its face that one can not reasonably be 
expected to know what conduct is prohibited which 
could form the basis for a criminal prosecution.

3. That said Statute is so vague in its application 
as to violate the due process clause to the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of 
America.

# *  *  #  #

7. That the said Bill of Information is insufficient 
to charge a crime under the provisions of LSA-E.S. 
14:103 of 1950, as amended, except that the Statute be 
unconstitutional under the Constitution of the State of 
Louisiana and, as applied, violative of freedom of 
speech and assembly guaranteed to defendant by the 
First Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States of America and a denial of due process and 
equal protection of the laws clauses as guaranteed to



12

defendant by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Con­
stitution of the United States of America, of which he 
is a citizen (R. 3-4).

The motion was argued, submitted and denied on April 9, 
1962 (R. 44).

At the conclusion of the trial petitioner was found guilty 
as charged (R. 44). Thereafter, on May 23, 1962, petitioner 
filed a Motion for New Trial (R. 12-16). In the Motion for 
New Trial petitioner again objected that his conviction un­
der “a general disturbing of the peace statute” violated his 
rights of free speech as protected by the Fourteenth Amend­
ment to the Constitution. In the Motion for New Trial 
petitioner asserted, inter alia:

2. That the said verdict is contrary to the law and 
evidence in that the evidence adduced on the trial of 
this cause clearly establishes that the defendant, on 
January 30 and 31, 1962, merely made speeches in 
protest of racial segregation to a small group of college 
students assembled in front of the Student Union Build­
ing on the campus of Southern University whereby he 
encouraged the students to stay out of classes in sup­
port of the freedom movement protesting racial segre­
gation in the Baton Rouge community, the activity 
being not proscribed by a general disturbing of the 
peace statute, except depriving the defendant of his 
constitutional protections guaranteed by the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the 
United States of America.

4. That the said verdict is contrary to the law and 
evidence in that the evidence adduced on the trial of 
this cause clearly .establishes that the defendant, as 
did others, between ^December 15, 1961 and February 1,



13

1962, made many speeches or public addresses on the 
campus of Southern University and to its student body 
urging or encouraging the students of said University 
to stay out of classes in protest of racial segregation 
and in support of the freedom movement in which 
students of the various Negro colleges and universities 
throughout the nation and particularly in the Southern 
States were participating; and that, to sustain a verdict 
of guilty in such case made and provided violates the 
defendant’s freedom of speech accorded by the First 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of 
America and, furthermore, denies him due process of 
law and equal protection of the laws guaranteed by 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States, the evidence being such that it is im­
practicable to determine specifically who was respon­
sible for the actions of the students of Southern Uni­
versity who participated in the freedom movement 
demonstrations. The defendant being not charged with 
conspiracy can not be held accountable for malicious 
acts of others, if there were any such acts.

# # # # #
6. That the said verdict is contrary to the law and 

evidence in that the evidence adduced on the trial of 
this cause clearly establishes that the defendant did not 
conduct himself in any way which disturbed or tended 
to disturb the peace. However, the defendant, on Janu­
ary 30 and 31, 1962, did make speeches in front of the 
Student Union Building on the campus of Southern 
University encouraging the students of Southern Uni­
versity, a segregated institution for Negro college stu­
dents, to protest (as a unified student body) racial seg­
regation in the Baton Rouge community; that such 
activities in which the defendant engaged does not con­
stitute a violation of a disturbing the peace Statute,



14

except depriving defendant of freedom of speech, due 
process of law and equal protection of the laws guaran­
teed the defendant, a citizen of the United States, by 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Consti­
tution of the United States of America.

#  # # # #

8. That the said verdict is contrary to the law and 
evidence in that it is repugnant to and in violation of 
Article 1, Sections 2 and 3 of the Constitution of Louisi­
ana of 1921, and also repugnant to and in violation of 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Consti­
tution of the United States of America; that said ver­
dict deprives the defendant of his freedom of speech, 
liberties, privileges, immunities, due process and equal 
protection of the laws as guaranteed by the provisions 
of the Constitution of the State of Louisiana and of the 
United States of America, respectively (R. 12, 13, 14, 
15).

The Motion for New Trial was overruled May 24, 1962 
(R. 45).

Petitioner filed a Bill of Exceptions (R. 17-22) objecting 
to the overruling of the Motion to Quash (Exception No. 1) 
and the overruling of the Motion for New Trial (Exception 
No. 9). The trial court wrote a per curiam to Bill of Excep­
tion No. 1 (R. 23-26). A portion of the per curiam dealing 
with the petitioner’s vagueness objection is as follows 
(R. 24-25):

In Paragraph 2 of the motion to quash defendant 
urges that the statute (LSA-R.S. 14:103, as amended) 
should be declared void for vagueness, in that no one 
could reasonably be expected to know what conduct is 
prohibited. The statute sets forth six different specific 
acts, disjunctively, any one of which, if done in such a



15

manner as foreseeably would disturb or alarm the 
public, constitutes the crime. Sub-section 7 covers the 
commission of any other act in such a manner as to 
unreasonably disturb or alarm the public. The Supreme 
Court of Louisiana in the case of Town of Ponehatoula 
v. Bates, et al., 173 La. 824, 138 So. 851, upheld the 
constitutionality of a town ordinance denouncing the 
crime of disturbing the peace which read in part: “ It 
shall be unlawful for any person within the corporate 
limits of the Town of Ponehatoula to engage in a fight 
or in any manner disturb the peace.” The court held 
that it was not necessary that the ordinance define the 
offense for the reason that no better definition for the 
offense could be found than that contained in the ordi­
nance itself. The Supreme Court of Louisiana cited 
this case in denying writs in the case of Louisiana v. 
Jannette Hoston, et ah, No. 35,567 on the Criminal 
Docket of the Nineteenth Judicial District Court and 
the two cases consolidated with it. See also these cases 
reported in 82 Supreme Court Reporter 248 wherein 
the court did not pass upon the constitutionality of the 
statute involved.

Paragraph 3 of the motion to quash alleges that the 
statute is so vague in its application as to violate the 
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the Constitution of the United States of America. On 
the hearing on the motion no evidence was introduced 
by the defendant to show that the statute was being 
applied in such an alleged unconstitutional manner.

The portion of the opinion rejecting petitioner’s free 
speech objection was as follows (R. 26):

Article 7 of the motion to quash alleges that the bill 
of information is insufficient to charge a crime under 
LSA-R.S. 14:03 of 1950, as amended, “ except that the



16

Statute be unconstitutional under the constitution of 
the State of Louisiana” and, as applied, is violative of 
freedom of speech and assembly guaranteed to defen­
dant by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
Constitution of the United States of America. This 
court felt that the bill of information as drawn did 
sufficiently charge the commission of a crime under the 
statute and that the statute was constitutional. As to 
the manner in which it was being applied no proof was 
introduced by the defendant at the hearing on the 
motion to show that it was being applied in any un­
constitutional manner.

In overruling petitioner’s Motion for New Trial the court 
stated with respect to petitioner’s constitutional objections 
that “ This Court was also satisfied that the statute denounc­
ing the crime is constitutional”  (R. 40). Petitioner again 
asserted his constitutional objections in the “Applications 
for Writs of Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition,” etc. 
filed in the Supreme Court of Louisiana (R. 195-202). Peti­
tioner asserted, inter alia:

5. That the Honorable Court aquo erred in over­
ruling relator’s Motion for New Trial; that the evi­
dence adduced on the trial of this cause clearly estab­
lishes that relator, on January 30 and 31, 1962, merely 
made speeches in protest of racial segregation to a 
small group of college students assembled in front of 
the Student Union Building on the campus of Southern 
University whereby he encouraged the students to stay 
out of class in support of the freedom movement pro­
testing racial segregation in the Baton Rouge commu­
nity, the activity being not proscribed by a general 
Disturbing of the Peace Statute, except depriving re­
lator of his constitutional protections guaranteed by



17

the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Consti­
tution of the United States of America (R. 196-197).

Petitioner made similar constitutional objections raising the 
free speech defense in paragraphs 6, 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the 
petition.

The Supreme Court of Louisiana denied this application 
on January 3,1963 (R. 206).

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

The Decision Below Conflicts With Decisions o f This 
Court in That Petitioner Was Convicted for Engaging in 
His Constitutionally Protected Right o f Free Speech 
Under a Law Too Vague and Indefinite to Conform to the 
Fourteenth Amendment’ s Requirements o f Due Process.

This Court has demanded strict standards of statutory 
specificity when criminal laws touch upon the area of free 
speech and expression, because “ First Amendment freedoms 
need breathing space to survive.” N.A.A.C.P. v. Button,
------U. S. ——, 9 L. ed. 2d 405, 417-418; Winters v. New
York, 333 U. S. 507; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296,
311; Edwards v. South Carolina,------U. S .------- , 9 L. ed. 2d
697, 702-704; Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, 369. 
The statute under which petitioner was convicted sweeps 
within its ambit and punishes a great variety of conduct, 
including the constitutionally protected area of speech and 
expression, “under a general and indefinite characteriza­
tion, . . . leaving to the executive and judicial branches too 
wide a discretion in its application,” Cantwell v. Connecti­
cut, supra (310 U. S. at 308). If conduct, such as petition­
er’s series of speeches to student groups on the Southern 
University campus, can be regulated and punished at all, it 
can only be reached under a law “narrowly drawn to define



18

and punish specific conduct as constituting a clear and pres­
ent danger to a substantial interest of the State.” Cantwell 
y . Connecticut, supra (310 U. S. at 311); Edwards v. South 
Carolina, supra; Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U. S. 157, 202 
(concurring opinion); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 
105./Since nothing in the statute under which petitioner was 
convicted (LSA-E.S. 14:103) represents a legislative judg­
ment that the specific conduct of petitioner alleged in the 
bill of information or proved at the trial should be pro­
hibited, the conviction offends due process under the prece­
dents cited above./

It is readily evident that the entire case against petitioner 
hinges upon things that he said rather than upon any non­
verbal act. This is clear from the information which charges 
a series of activities, each of which includes a component of 
speech. It is charged that petitioner did “ engage in and 
encourage students . . .  to hold unruly, unauthorized dem­
onstrations,” and did “ lead and encourage . . . students to 
march . . . ”  etc., and did “ encourage . . . students to boycott 
and leave the classes . . . ” (R. 1; emphasis supplied). And 
both the evidence and the court’s statement of the basis of 
the finding of guilt make clear that the conviction rests on 
petitioner’s speeches.3 Although the information charged

3 In ruling upon Bill of Exception No. 7 relating to the over­
ruling of defendant’s motion for a directed verdict, the court de­
scribed the basis of its finding of guilt as follows (R. 37) :

“ The court overruled the motion for the reason that the 
state, in the opinion of the court, had sustained its burden of 
proving the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Reliable, competent evidence offered by the state showed that 
the defendant, a non-student, was present on the campus of 
Southern University on the dates alleged in the bill of in­
formation, and while there did, in speeches made by him in 
meetings not authorized by those in charge of such matters, 
encourage and exhort Southern University students to boycott 
classes and to march into the classrooms while classes were in 
session and to disrupt the classes, even to the extent of pulling 
the students from the classrooms, in such a manner as would 
foreseeably disturb and alarm the public.”



19

that petitioner did “ engage in” and “ lead” as well as “ en­
courage” the demonstrations and the march through the 
University buildings, the trial court regarded petitioner’s 
speeches as sufficient to sustain the charge, on the theory 
that counseling others to do an act was equivalent to doing 
it personally (R. 34). Certainly the conviction cannot val­
idly rest on the premise that petitioner did anything beyond 
speaking—for there is no evidence of any such acts. Thomp­
son v. City of Louisville, 362 U. S. 199; Garner v. Louisiana, 
368 U. S. 157; Taylor v. Louisiana, 370 U. S. 154.

The statute, therefore, must be measured against the 
strict standards of permissible vagueness which are ap­
plicable in the area of free speech. The inquiry in the 
present case is complicated by the fact that the record does 
not indicate what part or parts of LSA-R.S. 14:103 peti­
tioner was found to have violated. Neither the prosecution 
nor the trial court expressly indicated which part of the 
law was relied upon for the charge or the conviction (R. 23). 
But defense counsel assumed, with reason, that the charge 
was pursuant to LSA-R.S. 14:103A(7).4 This assumption 
was made explicit in the motion for new trial and the court’s 
per curiam did not state that it was erroneous.5 * The as­

4 Section 14:103A(7) provides as follows:
“ 103. Disturbing the peace

A. Disturbing the peace is the doing of any of the following 
in such manner as would foreseeably disturb or alarm the 
public:

(7) Commission of any other act in such a manner as to 
unreasonably disturb or alarm the public.”

5 The motion for new trial asserted that the verdict was “con­
trary to the law and the evidence” in that petitioner did not “ en­
gage in any activity that had been denounced as a crime by 
LSA-R.S. 14:103(7) of 1950, as amended, the Statute under which 
the defendant was charged” (R. 12). The per curiam stated 
(R. 40) :

“ The motion for a new trial alleges that the verdict is contrary 
to the law and the evidence. The Court heard all the evidence 
on the trial of the case and was convinced of the guilt of the 
accused beyond a reasonable doubt.”



20

sumption that §14:103A(7) is the basis of the charge is 
reasonable because none of the matters charged in the in­
formation are readily identifiable as relating to any sub­
section of the statute other than this “ catch-all” provision. 
Subsections A (l) , A (3) and the entire subsection B are 
quite obviously not involved since nothing in the charge or 
the evidence is even remotely related to the activities men­
tioned therein.6 There is almost equally scant reason to 
think that the conviction was founded upon any of the 
remaining subsections—A (2), A (4), A (5) or A (6)—since 
there was no allegation or evidence of “ loud, offensive or 
insulting language” or of “violent and tumultuous” conduct 
by petitioner, and since whatever is meant by “holding . . . 
an unlawful assembly” and “ interruption of any lawful as­
sembly,” separate informations charging these offenses 
were, and still are, pending against petitioner. However, 
because there may be some basis, however slight, for a 
tenuous contention that one or more of these subsections 
is involved, this possibility is dealt with in the subsequent 
part of this argument below at pp. 23-24. For the present, 
the argument is addressed to the far more likely possibility 
that the trial court regarded the case, as petitioner did, 
i.e., as founded upon LSA-R.S. 14:103A(7).

This provision is the same law which was considered by 
this Court in Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U. S. 157.7 The ma­
jority in Garner, supra (368 U. S. at 162, 163, 166, note 13) 
found it unnecessary to decide the vagueness and free 
speech claims, but these claims were fully discussed in and

6 Subsections A ( l )  and A (3) deal, respectively, with fistic en­
counters and intoxicated persons. Subsection B relates to inter­
ferences with certain types of businesses.

7 LSA-R.S. 14:103 was amended in 1960 after the trial in 
Garner, to add what is now part B, but the law considered by 
this Court in Garner, Sec. 14:103(7) remains and is the same as 
the present Sec. 14:103A(7).



21

formed the basis of, the concurring opinion by Mr. Justice 
Harlan (368 U. S. at 196, et seq.). In Justice Harlan’s 
view, this law was unconstitutionally vague as applied in 
all three of the factual situations presented in Garner and 
the cases consolidated with it (368 U. S. at 205). As that 
opinion made clear, the catch-all provisions of this law 
prohibiting “ any other act [done] in such a manner as to 
unreasonably disturb of alarm the public,” gives a defen­
dant “no warning as to what may fairly be deemed to be 
within its compass” (368 U. S. at 207).

In this case (R. 25), as in Garner, the Louisiana courts 
have referred only to the definition of disturbing the peace 
given in an earlier case, Ponchatoula v. Bates, 173 La. 824, 
827, 138 So. 851, 852, where it was said to include “any act 
or conduct of a person which molests the inhabitants in the 
enjoyment of that peace and quiet to which they are entitled, 
or which throws into confusion things settled, or which 
causes excitement, unrest, disquietude, or fear among per­
sons of ordinary normal temperament.” Indeed, to support 
its holding on the vagueness issue, the trial court even relied 
upon the Louisiana Supreme Court’s ruling in Garner and 
its companion cases (R. 2 5 ) It is obvious, then, that this 
case does involve’~a“vague"’and generalized conception of 
“disturbing the peace” ; that the law has not been limited by 
construction ;s and that the law is applied here as it was in 
Garner to conduct within the area of speech and expression, t 
This Court’s opinions teach that such convictions deny due 
process. Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra; Thornhill v. Ala­
bama, supra; Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1; Edwards 
v. South Carolina, supra. 8

8 The Louisiana Supreme Court itself questioned the validity of 
an earlier general “ disturbing the peace” law applied to religious 
expression on vagueness grounds in State v. Sanford, 203 La. 961, 
14 So.2d 778.



22

\
</'it is submitted that petitioner’s advocacy that students 
voluntarily attending a public University refuse to attend 
classes as a form of protest was a form of speech on public 
issues which a state cannot prohibit, whatever may be one’s 
view of the social utility of such a speech.9 T-erminiello v. 
Chicago, supra. The information and the court’s per curiam 
(E. 37) make it clear that petitioner was charged and con­
victed for this lawful advocacy and for allegedly urging 
that students march into classroom buildings and disrupt 
classes. Cf. Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359. But 
even if some or all of petitioner’s speech could validly be 
prohibited by the State, it cannot be punished under a vague 
and general law such as LSA-R.S. 14:103A(7), which is as 
readily applicable to protected speech as it is to that which 
is not within the bounds of lawful advocacy, as, for example, 
“ fighting words” (see Chaplinski v. New Hampshire, 315 
U. S. 568). The law denies due process because “by its 
terms [it] appears to be as applicable to ‘incidents fairly 
within the protection of the guarantee of free speech,’ 
Winters v. New York, supra (333 U. S. at 509), as to that 
which is not within the range of such protection.” Garner 
v. Louisiana, 368 U. S. at 207 (concurring opinion). Peti­
tioner need not bear the burden of showing that the State 
could not have passed another, more specific, law to reach 
his conduct. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 97, 98.

Previously, in the petition, we adverted to the possibility 
that the conviction might be attempted to be justified under 
some portions of the statute other than subsection A(7). 
Actually, each of these other subsections is equally vague 
and indefinite as applied to petitioner’s conduct, giving no

9 The reasons for the student boycott of classes are not explained 
in the record except for a reference to “certain situations” con­
cerning other students “who had been arrested several weeks pre­
viously” for “ taking part in antisegregation demonstrations” 
(R. 130-133).



23

specific warning that this type of speech is prohibited in 
the circumstances of the case. To the extent that the law 
touches on the subject of expression, i.e., in terms of “un­
necessarily loud, offensive or insulting language” and acts 
done in a “violent or tumultuous manner by three or more 
persons,” there is no fair warning that petitioner’s speech 
could be so regarded. But given the vagueness of subsec­
tion A (7), and the obvious possibility that it was the basis 
of conviction, a consideration of the vagueness of these 
other portions of the law may well be pretermitted.

Under the doctrine of Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 
359, 368, if it cannot be known from the record whether 
or not a defendant was convicted under an unconstitution­
ally vague portion of a law7 affecting free speech, the con­
viction cannot stand because of the indeterminate possibility 
that it was premised on another portion of the law not 
subject to the same infirmity. In Stromberg the Court, 
noting that the defendant had been convicted under a gen­
eral jury verdict which did not specify which of three statu­
tory clauses it rested on, concluded that “ if any of the 
clauses in question is invalid under the Federal Constitu­
tion, the conviction cannot be upheld” (283 U. S. at 368). 
The principle wras followed in Williams v. North Carolina, 
317 U. S. 387, 292, where the Court said:

To say that a general verdict of guilty should be upheld 
though we cannot know that it did not rest on the 
invalid constitutional ground on which the case was 
submitted to the jury, would be to countenance a pro­
cedure which would cause a serious impairment of 
constitutional rights.

See also Cramer v. United States, 325 U. S. 1, 36, note 45; 
Yates v. United States, 354 U. S. 298, 312; Thomas v. Collins, 
323 U. S. 516, 529. Here as in Stromberg, supra, there is



24

a clear and obvious possibility that the conviction was based 
upon an impermissibly vague portion of the law. Neither 
the accusation, the verdict, nor anything else in the record 
makes it certain that this conclusion is erroneous. The 
fact that the trier of the facts in Stromberg was a jury 
and in this case was a judge does not represent a significant 
distinction, as Thomas v. Collins, supra, demonstrates. 
Since petitioner was charged with violation of LSA-R.S. 
14:103, and given a single penalty for violating the law, 
which was upheld in its entirety, it follows that a deter­
mination that any part of the law denies due process must 
impair the entire conviction.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted 
that the writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

J ack Greenberg 
James M. Nabrit, III 

10 Columbus Circle 
New York 19, New York

J ohnnie A. J ones
530 South 13th Street 
Baton Rouge 2, Louisiana

Attorneys for Petitioners



APPENDIX



APPENDIX

Minutes o f Court Dated May 8, 1962

NINETEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
Criminal Section 

No. 42,917

[ same tit l e ]

Honorable Fred S. LeBlanc, Judge presiding, was opened 
pursuant to adjournment.

This case came on for trial in accordance with previous 
assignment, the accused, charged with violation of L.R.S. 
14:103, being present in court represented by counsel. On 
motion of counsel for the accused, the court ordered a 
sequestration of witnesses in this case. Evidence was intro­
duced, the case argued and submitted, and the court, for 
oral reasons assigned, found the accused guilty as charged, 
to which verdict counsel for the accused excepted and asked 
that a formal bill be reserved. Counsel for the accused gave 
notice in open court to the court and opposing counsel of 
his intention to apply to the Supreme Court of Louisiana 
for writs of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition.

The court denied the request of counsel for the accused 
to release the accused on his old bond, and set a new bond 
for the accused pending sentence in the amount of $700.00.

Sentence deferred until May 24, 1962.



2a

Minutes o f Court Dated May 24, 1962

NINETEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

Criminal Section

[ same tit l e ]

Honorable Fred S. LeBlanc, Judge presiding, was opened 
pursuant to adjournment.

The motion for new trial previously filed herein was 
argued, submitted, and the court, for oral reasons assigned, 
overruled the motion for new trial, to which ruling of the 
court counsel for the accused excepted and asked that a 
formal bill be reserved.

The accused, having previously been tried for violation 
of L.R.S. 14:103 and found guilty of said violation, was 
present in court represented by counsel. The accused was 
brought before the bar for sentence. Whereupon, the court 
sentenced the accused to pay a fine of $100.00 and costs, 
or in default of payment thereof to be confined in the parish 
jail for thirty days, and in addition thereto to be confined 
in the parish jail for sixty days, to which sentence counsel 
for the accused excepted and asked that a formal bill be 
reserved.

Counsel for the accused gave notice to the court and to 
the Assistant District Attorney in open court of his inten­
tion to apply to the Supreme Court of Louisiana for writs 
of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition, and requested that 
the accused be released on his present bond. The court 
ordered the accused released on his present bond, and 
granted counsel for the accused until June 22, 1962 during 
which to apply to the Supreme Court for writs.



3a

19TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 

P arish of E ast Baton R ouge 

State of L ouisiana

Per Curiam to Bill of Exception No. 1

[ same  title ]
--------------------— ---------------------

Tlie application for a bill of particulars was denied by 
the court for the reason that the information sought by 
the defendant did not pertain to the nature of the charge. 
LSA-R.S. 235. It will be noted that the defendant in his 
application did not call upon the district attorney to spe­
cify under which sub-section of LSA-R.S. 14:103 he was 
proceeding. The bill of information charges a violation of 
R.S. 14:103 and sets forth all the facts upon which the 
state was relying for a conviction. The state is not re­
quired to furnish to the defendant the evidence it intends 
to introduce to obtain a conviction. Likewise, the law does 
not require the state to supply the names of any witnesses 
to the defendant.

When the court rendered judgment denying defendant’s 
application for a bill of particulars defendant objected to 
the ruling of the court and reserved a “ formal” bill of 
exception, “ and asked that the motion, the bill of informa­
tion all be made a part of the record * * *. ” Defendant did 
not request that the ruling of the court be made a part of 
the Bill of Exception. Moreover, he did not specify the 
ground of his objection and did not make that ground a 
part of his Bill of Exception. Defendant’s Bill of Excep­
tion does not have incorporated within it any of these mat­



4a

ters and there is nothing attached to it. LSA-E.S. 15:498- 
499.

In objecting to the ruling of the court counsel for the 
defendant in reserving his Bill of Exception asked that the 
motion for a bill of particulars and the bill of information 
be made a part of the “ record”—not a part of the Bill of 
Exception. The bill of information and the application for 
a bill of particulars were already part of the record. No 
part of the record becomes a part of the Bill of Exception 
unless it is incorporated therein or attached thereto and 
made a part thereof.

The motion to quash the bill of information was over­
ruled by the court. In Paragraph 1 of the motion to quash 
defendant contends that the bill of information amounts 
to a multiplicity of charges growing out of the same inci­
dent or occurrence, yet he does not claim that the bill of 
information is faulty on the ground of duplicity. In fact, 
he alleges “ that said alleged acts could only constitute a 
single crime * * *. ” The state contended that under the 
authority of LSA-E.S. 15:222 it had the right to cumulate 
the acts of the defendant in one count, since it was ap­
parent that they were connected with the same transaction 
and constituted but one act and that it had charged them 
conjunctively in the bill of information. Defendant, as 
pointed out above, conceded that the acts of the defendant 
constituted but one crime. This court was of the opinion 
the state’s position was correct. State v. Morgan, 116 So. 
(2d) 682, 238 La. 829; State v. Amiss, 89 So. (2d) 877, 
230 La. 1003. Accordingly, the court overruled the motion 
to quash the bill of information on this ground of attack.

In Paragraph 2 of the motion to quash defendant urges 
that the statute (LSA-E.S. 14:103, as amended) should be

Per Curiam to Bill of Exception No. 1



5a

declared void for vagueness, in that no one could reason­
ably be expected to know what conduct is prohibited. The 
statute sets forth six different specific sets, disjunctively, 
any one of which, if done in such a manner as foreseeably 
would disturb or alarm the public, constitutes the crime. 
Sub-section 7 covers the commission of any other act in 
such a manner as to unreasonably disturb or alarm the 
public. The Supreme Court of Louisiana in the case of 
Town of Ponchatoula v. Bates, et al., 173 La. 824, 138 So. 
851, upheld the constitutionality of a town ordinance de­
nouncing the crime of disturbing the peace which read in 
part: “ It shall be unlawful for any person within the cor­
porate limits of the Town of Ponchatoula to engage in a 
fight or in any manner disturb the peace.” The court held 
that it was not necessary that the ordinance define the 
offense for the reason that no better definition for the 
offense could be found than that contained in the ordinance 
itself. The Supreme Court of Louisiana cited this case in 
denying writs in the case of Louisiana v. Jannette Hoston, 
et al., No. 35,567 on the Criminal Docket of the Nineteenth 
Judicial District Court and the two cases consolidated with 
it. See also these cases reported in 82 Supreme Court 
Reporter 248 wherein the court did not pass upon the con­
stitutionality of the statute involved.

Paragraph 3 of the motion to quash alleges that the 
statute is so vague in its application as to violate the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Con­
stitution of the United States of America. On the hearing 
on the motion no evidence was introduced by the defendant 
to show that the statute was being applied in such an 
alleged unconstitutional manner.

Article 4 of the motion to quash alleges as a fact that 
there was no disturbance of the peace by the defendant

Per Curiam to Bill of Exception No. 1



6a

within the definition of the crime. This court took the posi­
tion that the bill of information charged a crime under the 
statute and that it would not be known whether the defen­
dant committed the crime charged until after the state had 
put on its case.

Article 5 of the motion to quash alleges that the statute 
was being unconstitutionally applied because the defendant, 
a member of the Negro race, has been heretofore engaged 
in activities protesting racial segregation and had lately 
come to Southern University to resume Ms collegiate work 
there as a student; that when he attempted to speak out in 
the cause of justice and freedom he was arrested and jailed. 
On the trial of the motion to quash the defendant offered 
no proof to establish these alleged facts.

Article 6 of the motion to quash sets forth a conclusion 
to the effect that the use of the criminal processes of the 
State of Louisiana in the manner described in paragraph 5 
of the motion denies and deprives the defendant of his 
rights, privileges, immunities and liberties guaranteed to 
him by the due process and equal protection of the law 
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States of America. In this connection, the 
defendant on the hearing of the motion offered no proof 
to show that defendant’s constitutional rights had been 
violated in the manner described.

Article 7 of the motion to quash alleges that the bill of 
information is insufficient to charge a crime under LSA- 
R.S. 14:03 of 1950, as amended, “ except that the Statute 
be unconstitutional under the constitution of the State of 
Louisiana” and, as applied, is violative of freedom of 
speech and assembly guaranteed to defendant by the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the 
United States of America. This court felt that the bill of

Per Curiam to Bill of Exception No. 1



7a

information as drawn did sufficiently charge the commis­
sion of a crime under the statute and that the statute was 
constitutional. As to the manner in which it was being 
applied no proof was introduced by the defendant at the 
hearing on the motion to show that it was being applied in 
any unconstitutional manner.

Respectfully submitted at Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this 
8th day of November 1962.

Per Curiam to Bill of Exception No. 1

F red S. L eB lanc

Judge, 19th Judicial District Court

Filed Nov. 8 1962
(Signed) Betty B ady 

Dy. Clerk

A True Copy Nov. 8, 1962

(Signed) B etty B ady 
Dy. Clerk



8a

19TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 

P arish of E ast B aton R ouge 

State of L ouisiana

Per Curiam to Bill of Exception No. 2

[ sam e  t it l e ]

This Bill of Exception was reserved to the ruling of the 
court overruling defendant’s objection to the testimony in­
corporated in the Bill of Exception. The basis of the ob­
jection was that the testimony of this witness should not 
be considered by the court because no explanation had 
been made as to wliat a security officer is, as to whether or 
not he is a peace officer or sheriff. The court considered 
the objection to be premature, and informed counsel for 
the defendant that he could develop this point on cross- 
examination. As a matter of fact, the witness on direct 
examination later explained that he was not a peace officer 
and that his duties as security officer consisted of maintain­
ing the safety of the faculty staff, the administrative body 
and students of Southern University, as well as the prop­
erty of the university.

I wish to point out that counsel for the defendant in 
resserving his Bill of Exception used these words: “ To 
which ruling, Your Honor, I except and ask that a formal 
bill be reserved.” Counsel did not at that time request that 
the facts upon which the objection and ruling were based 
be made a part of the Bill of Exception, nor did he move 
that the objection, the ruling and the reasons for the ruling 
be made a part of the Bill of Exception. It is the judgment



9a

of this court that the Bill of Exception was improperly re­
served. LSA-R.S. 15:499-500.

Respectfully submitted at Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this 
8th day of November 1962.

Per Curiam to Bill of Exception No. 2

F eed S. LeB lanc
Judge, 19th Judicial District Court

Filed Nov. 8, 1962

(Signed) B etty B ady 
Dy. Clerk

A True Copy Nov. 8, 1962

(Signed) Betty B ady 
Dy. Clerk



10a

19TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 

P arish or E ast B aton R ouge 

State op L ouisiana

Per Curiam to Bill of Exception No. 3

[ same t it l e ]

After the state’s witness, William Pass, answered the 
question set forth in this Bill of Exception, counsel for the 
defendant objected to any testimony about the signs “be­
cause there is nothing on those things to identify that the 
accused had the placards made or that he had anything to 
do with them, those could be anybody’s signs.” The court 
overruled the objection as being premature, taking the 
position that this witness could testify about his familiarity 
with the signs. The signs at this juncture were not being 
offered in evidence by the state. It was the position of the 
court that it would give the state the opportunity to show, 
if it could, that there was some connection between the 
signs and the defendant in this case. Later, the state was 
able to show by the testimony of this witness that he ob­
tained some signs on the date of the alleged offense from 
Barracks B on the campus of Southern University and that 
a group of students from the university were carrying 
those signs, or similar signs, when they were marching on 
the campus and into four buildings thereon where classes 
were in progress after being encouraged by the defendant 
to go into the classrooms and disrupt the classes.

In reserving this Bill of Exception counsel for the defen­
dant did not comply with the requirements of the law. LSA- 
R.S. 15:498-15:499. He merely excepted to the ruling in the



11a

following words: “ To which ruling I except and ask that 
a formal bill be reserved.” Although the minute clerk at the 
time of the reservation of the Bill of Exception took down 
the facts upon which the objection and the ruling were 
based, together with the objection, the ruling and the rea­
sons for the ruling conformable to LSA-R.S. 15:499, coun­
sel for the defendant, as stated above, did not request that 
this be done.

Respectfully submitted at Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this 
8th day of November 1962.

Per Curiam to Bill of Exception No. 3

F eed S. L eBlanc
Judge, 19th Judicial District Court

Filed Nov. 8, 1962

(Signed) B etty B ady 
Dy. Clerk

A True Copy Nov. 8, 1962
(Signed) B etty B ady 

Dy. Clerk



12a

19TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 

P arish of E ast B aton R oijgb 

State of L ouisiana

Per Curiam to Bill of Exception No. 4

[ same title]

After the testimony recited in this Bill of Exception the 
state offered in evidence some of the signs which had been 
identified by the witness as being the signs, or similar signs, 
which the students carried with them as they marched on 
the campus of the university and into the classrooms while 
classes were in progress, after they were encouraged by 
the defendant to disrupt the classes. Counsel for the defen­
dant objected to the offering on the ground that the evidence 
was immaterial; secondly, that the witness had not testified 
that the defendant made the signs, or that the defendant 
had any knowledge of the signs being made, or that the 
defendant had instructed anybody to make the signs. The 
offering was also objected to on the ground that the defen­
dant was not being tried for conspiracy and that the de­
fendant was not responsible for what the students did, 
contending that all that the defendant did was to use free­
dom of speech. Objection was also made on the ground 
that the state had not laid a proper foundation for the 
introduction of the proffered evidence, in that the state 
had not accounted for the whereabouts of the signs from 
the date of the commission of the crime to the date of the 
trial and that it was possible that the signs could have been 
altered or changed.

The court permitted the signs (State-1, inscribed: “ This 
is a Freedom Line! Don’t Cross It” ; State-2, inscribed: 
“Let’s Twist Back to the Dorms. No Classes!!” ; State-3,



13a

inscribed: “ Please Stay Out!! Suppoi't Your Fellow Stu­
dents” ; and State-4, inscribed: “ No Class Today, Sorry” ) 
to be introduced in evidence. The reason for the ruling as 
stated verbatim by the court at the time was: “This is not 
a case of theft where property has to be identified with that 
degree of particularity. This witness has testified where 
he found the signs, the students were in the process of 
making them there, and he saw either those signs or similar 
signs being carried by the students after they had been 
exhorted to go into the classrooms and get the students 
out of the classrooms, pull them out if necessary. This 
accused is charged with engaging in and encouraging the 
students to hold unruly, unauthorized demonstrations. Now, 
in heeding his words of encouragement it is always admis­
sible to show what happened, that the students, being thus 
encouraged by the accused, proceeded to stamp and march 
and sing and carry these signs, even to the extent, to use 
the words of the accused himself, get them out of the class­
rooms, pull them out if necessary. Now, under the law there 
is a presumption that a man is presumed to know the nat­
ural consequences of his act, and I think that this accused, 
after so exhorting these students to swing into the class­
rooms, to march and to get the students out of there because 
the faculty is already behind them, and in effect if they 
refused to leave the classrooms to pull them out, and any­
thing that these students did thereafter after being en­
couraged by this accused to do would be admissible, the 
natural consequence.” * * * “ He has said that he either 
saw these signs or similar signs being carried by the stu­
dents, so I say it is not necessary in this type of case, be­
cause if we were trying these students for carrying signs 
which violated the law then that would be a different propo­
sition, but the students are not being tried, the accused is 
being tried for disturbing the peace by urging them to do

Per Curiam to Bill of Exception No. 4



14a

an unlawful thing, break up the classes, and, as I said, 
under 432 every defendant is presumed to intend the nat­
ural probable consequences of his act, and the law presumes 
that after he exhorts them to do what he did do or did tell 
them that they would resort to this type of activity, carry 
out his words of encouragement to break up the classes be­
cause the faculty was behind them and he was seeing to it, or 
going to see to it if he could, if the students would cooperate, 
to just break up the classes at Southern University so there 
wouldn’t be any classes. Now in going about that he pre­
sumed the natural consequences of his act, they might sing, 
they might march, they might stomp and they might carry 
signs, and as long as this witness can say that these are 
similar signs that is enough for the court in this type of 
procedure, so I overrule the objection.”

In reserving his Bill of Exception counsel for the defen­
dant did so in the following words: “ To which ruling we 
except and ask that a formal bill be reserved.” This, in 
the opinion of the court, did not meet the requirements 
of the law. The minute clerk did, however, at the time take 
down the facts upon which the Bill of Exception and the 
ruling were based, together with the objection, the ruling 
and the reasons for the ruling in compliance with LSA-R.S. 
15:499.

Respectfully submitted at Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this 
8th day of November 1962.

F red S. L eB laxc

Judge, 19th Judicial District Court

Filed Nov. 8, 1962 
(Signed) B etty B ady 

Dy. Clerk

A True Copy Nov. 8, 1962 
(Signed) B etty B ady 

Dy. Clerk

Per Curiam to Bill of Exception No. 4



15a

Per Curiam to Bill of Exception No. 5

19TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
P arish of E ast B aton R ouge 

State of L ouisiana

[ same title]

This Bill of Exception was taken by the defendant when 
the court overruled defendant’s objection to the testimony 
set forth in this Bill of Exception. The basis of the objec­
tion was that there had been no testimony that the defen­
dant conducted the procession of students on the campus 
and into the classrooms. The court overruled the objection 
for the reason that it -was up to the court (the court being 
the judge of the facts in the case) to determine whether or 
not the defendant conducted the procession.

The witness on the stand at the time was Marvin L. 
Harvey, Dean of Students of Southern University. As 
such, he testified it was his responsibility to grant or refuse 
permission for the holding of student meetings on the 
campus. He testified that he had not authorized the defen­
dant to hold any student meetings on the campus during 
the dates in the bill of information. Such unauthorized 
meetings were held, he testified, at which the defendant 
addressed the students. After the meeting held on the 
morning of January 30, 1962 this witness observed that 
approximately forty students ŵ ere walking around the cam­
pus carrying signs. This occurred about one o’clock that 
afternoon. On the following morning the defendant was 
addressing an unauthorized meeting of students, estimated



16a

by the witness to be between four and five hundred in num­
ber. There was another such meeting of students held be­
tween 12:30 and 1 o’clock on that same day, at which the 
defendant spoke to the students, and at about the hour of 
2 o’clock the same afternoon the students paraded through 
the classrooms in a noisy manner carrying signs. In one 
of the buildings this witness testified that some students 
left classes. The demonstrators numbered about one hun­
dred and the demonstration lasted more than thirty min­
utes.

When this objection was urged there was already testi­
mony in the record from Security Officer William L. Pass 
that he saw and heard the defendant speaking to a group 
of from two to three hundred students on the campus, at 
which meeting he heard the defendant tell the students not 
to attend classes, that they should show their gratitude by 
not going to classes since the faculty was behind them. At 
another meeting of about the same number of students he 
heard the defendant tell the group to go to the classrooms 
and pull the students therefrom.

Now, one of the meanings of the word “ conduct” is to 
“direct in action or course.” It was clear to the court that 
the defendant had conducted the procession and demonstra­
tion of the students on the campus and in the classrooms. 
Under LSA-B.S. 14:24 all persons concerned in the com­
mission of a crime, whether present or absent, whether they 
directly commit the offense, aid and abet in its commission, 
directly or indirectly counsel or procure another to commit 
the crime, are principals.

For the reasons given in the other per curiams, the court 
is of the opinion that this Bill of Exception was improperly 
reserved.

Per Curiam to Bill of Exception No. 5



17a

Respectfully submitted at Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this 
8th day of November 1962.

Per Curiam to Bill of Exception No. 5

F red S. L eBlanc

Judge, 19th Judicial District Court

Filed Nov. 8, 1962

(Signed) B etty B ady 
Dy. Clerk

A True Copy Nov. 8, 1962

(Signed) B etty B ady 
Dy. Clerk



18a

Per Curiam to Bill of Exception No. 6

19TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 

P akish of E ast B aton R ouge 

State oe L ouisiana

[ same t it l e ]

This Bill of Exception was taken by the defendant after 
the testimony incorporated therein was given by the wit­
ness, Marvin L. Harvey, Dean of Students at the university. 
Counsel for the defendant, after ascertaining from the 
witness that unauthorized meetings on the campus had been 
held by students of Southern University on dates prior 
to the dates in the bill of information at which speeches 
were made, wanted to know from this witness what those 
speeches were about. The state objected. The court sus­
tained the objection for the reason that it made no dif­
ference in the case on trial as to whether the law had been 
violated by others prior to the date of the crime charged 
in the bill of information. The court felt that whether the 
university had taken action as to those offenders was imma­
terial in the case at bar. The court was also of the opinion 
that it made no difference in the instant case whether the 
unlawful processions and demonstrations of the students 
on the dates alleged in the bill of information were brought 
about solely by the encouragement and exhortation of the 
defendant made by him on those dates or whether these 
processions and demonstrations were due in part to 
speeches that the students had heard from other speakers 
on other occasions prior to the date of this offense. The 
court took the position that the statute was violated when



19a

the state proved that the defendant had committed the acts 
alleged in the bill of information in such a manner as would 
foreseeably disturb or alarm the public. Whether the stu­
dents who participated in the noisy processions and demon­
strations had been impressed by the defendant’s speeches 
encouraging and exhorting them to so act was, in the 
opinion of the court, immaterial for the reason that such 
speeches were of such a nature as to foreseeably disturb 
and alarm the public, regardless of the resulting action. 
The court had permitted the state to prove the resulting 
action for the reason that this defendant was presumed 
by law to intend the natural and probable consequences of 
his act. LSA-E.S. 15:432.

This court is of the opinion that this Bill of Exception 
was improperly reserved for the reasons given in the pre­
ceding per curiams.

Respectfully submitted at Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this 
8th day of November 1962.

F red S. L eBlanc
Judge, 19th Judicial District Court

Per Curiam to Bill of Exception No. 6

Filed Nov. 8, 1962
(Signed) B etty B ady 

By. Clerk

A Time Copy Nov. 8, 1962

(Signed) B etty B ady 
Dy. Clerk



20a

Per Curiam to Bill of Exception No. 7

19TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
P arish of E ast B aton R ouge 

State of L ouisiana

[ same  tit l e ]

This Bill of Exception was reserved to the action of 
the court overruling defendant’s motion for a directed 
verdict of acquittal after the state had rested its case in 
chief. In his motion counsel for defendant contended that 
the state had failed to prove its case, claiming that the 
evidence adduced by the state was insufficient to warrant 
and/or sustain a conviction of the defendant.

The court overruled the motion for the reason that the 
state, in the opinion of the court, had sustained its bur­
den of proving the guilt of the defendant beyond a rea­
sonable doubt. Reliable, competent evidence offered by the 
state showed that the defendant, a non-student, was pres­
ent on the campus of Southern University on the dates 
alleged in the bill of information, and while there did, in 
speeches made by him in meetings not authorized by those 
in charge of such matters, encourage and exhort Southern 
University students to boycott classes and to march into 
the classrooms while classes were in session and to dis­
rupt the classes, even to the extent of pulling the students 
from the classrooms, in such a manner as would foresee- 
ably disturb and alarm the public.

All of the testimony introduced by the state was tran­
scribed by the clerk, but counsel for the defendant in 
reserving his bill of exception to the court’s ruling did not 
request that the testimony be attached to or made a part



21a

of the bill. When the court overruled the motion for a 
directed verdict, counsel for the defendant reserved his 
Bill of Exception in the following words: “ To which rul­
ing I except and ask that a formal bill be reserved.”

This Bill of Exception does not have incorporated with­
in it the testimony offered by the state in chief, nor does 
it have that testimony attached to it or made a part thereof.

At the conclusion of the trial, after all the evidence was 
in, counsel for the defendant again moved for a directed 
verdict of acquittal. The court, being convinced of the 
guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, over­
ruled the motion.

All of the testimony introduced in the case by the 
state and the defendant was taken down and transcribed 
by the clerk. In reserving a Bill of Exception to the court’s 
ruling in overruling the last motion for a directed verdict 
of acquittal, counsel for the defendant did not request 
that all the testimony be made a part of the Bill of Ex­
ception. He merely excepted to the ruling and asked that 
“a formal bill be reserved.” The Bill of Exception does not 
have the testimony incorporated in it, nor does it have 
the testimony attached to it or made a part thereof.

Respectfully submitted at Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this 
8th day of November 1962.

F eed S. LeBlanc

Judge, 19th Judicial District Court

Filed Nov. 8, 1962 
(Signed) B etty Bady 

Dy. Clerk

A True Copy Nov. 8, 1962 
(Signed) B etty B ady 

Dy. Clerk

Per Curiam to Bill of Exception No. 7



22a

Per Curiam to Bill of Exception No. 8

19TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
P arish of E ast B aton R ouge 

State of L ouisiana 

No. 42,917

[ same title]

This Bill of Exception was reserved by the defendant 
to the court’s verdict finding the defendant guilty as 
charged. The court found the defendant guilty as charged 
because it was convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of 
his guilt. The court heard all the evidence. That evidence 
was taken down and transcribed, but it was not made a 
part of this Bill of Exception. Counsel for the defendant 
merely excepted to the verdict “and asked that a formal 
bill be reserved.”

Respectfully submitted at Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this 
8th day of November 1962.

F red S. L eBlanc

Judge, 19th Judicial District Court

Filed Nov. 8, 1962
(Signed) B etty B ady 

Dy. Clerk

A True Copy Nov. 8, 1962
(Signed) B etty B ady 

Dy. Clerk



23a

19TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
P arish of E ast B aton R ouge 

State of L ouisiana

-------------------- -------------------------
[ same  title ]

Per Curiam to Bill of Exception No. 9

This Bill of Exception was reserved to the court’s action 
in overruling defendant’s motion for a new trial. The 
motion for a new trial alleges that the verdict is contrary 
to the law and the evidence. The court heard all the evi­
dence on the trial of the case and was convinced of the 
guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. All of 
this evidence, although taken down and transcribed, was 
not incorporated in the motion for a new trial, nor was it 
attached to it or made a part of it. Counsel in reserving 
this Bill of Exception did not request that all the testi­
mony be made a part of his bill of exception.

This court was also satisfied that the statute denouncing 
the crime is constitutional.

Respectfully submitted at Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this 
8th day of November 1962.

F red 8. L eBlanc

Judge, 19th Judicial District Court

Filed Nov. 8, 1962
(Signed) B etty  B ady 

Dy. Clerk

A  True Copy Nov. 8, 1962

(Signed) B etty  B ady 
Dy. Clerk



24a

19TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
P arish of E ast B aton R oijgb 

State of L ouisiana

•---------------------- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[ same t it l e ]

Per Curiam to Bill of Exception No. 10

This Bill of Exception was reserved by the defendant 
to the sentence imposed by the court upon the defendant. 
A comparison of the sentence with the penalty provisions 
of the statute (LSA-R.S. 14:103) clearly shows it to be 
legal in every respect.

Respectfully submitted at Baton Rouge, Louisiana this 
8th day of November, 1962.

F red S. L eB lanc

Judge, 19th Judicial District Court

Filed Nov. 8, 1962

(Signed) B etty Bady 
Dy. Clerk

A True Copy Nov. 8, 1962
(Signed) Betty B ady 

Dy. Clerk



25a

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

New Orleans 

No. 46,454

Order Denying Petition for Writ of Certiorari

[ same t it l e ]

January 3,1963

In re: Dion Tyrone Diamond applying for writs of cer- 
tiori, mandamus and prohibition

The application is denied. We find no error in the rulings 
complained of.

JBF

JBH

FWH

EHMcC

WBH

JWS

FWS



o ^ H ? S >  3 8