Maxwell v. Dawson County, TN Board of Education Appendix to Appellants' Brief
Public Court Documents
January 1, 1961
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Maxwell v. Dawson County, TN Board of Education Appendix to Appellants' Brief, 1961. 0a9cac38-bd9a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/0f85aed3-7a79-4662-9855-6de2874f21a2/maxwell-v-dawson-county-tn-board-of-education-appendix-to-appellants-brief. Accessed November 01, 2025.
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In t h e
Htttfrii Btn&B GImtrt nf Appeals
F ob the Sixth Circuit
No. 14,607
H enry C. M axwell, Jr., et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
—-vs.—
County B oard oe E ducation or
D avidson County, T e n n ., et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE, NASHVILLE DIVISION
____________________________ _______________ ___
APPENDIX TO APPELLANTS’ BRIEF
Z. A lexander L ooby
A von N. W illiams, Jr.
327 Charlotte Avenue
Nashville 3, Tennessee
T hurgood M arshall
Jack Greenberg
James M. Nabrit, III
10 Columbus Circle
Suite 1790
New York 19, N. Y.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants
'Of Counsel:
N orman C. A maker
I N D E X
PAGE
Complaint .............................. 7a
Motion for Temporary Restraining O rder................. 26a
Motion for Preliminary Injunction ............................. 27a
Order to Show Cause .................................................... 28a
Motion to Dismiss ................................. 29a
Affidavit of J. E. Moss .................................................. 31a
Exhibit “ A ” to Affidavit ...................................... 36a
Exhibit “ B ” to Affidavit ........................................ 37a
Affidavit of Frank White ............................................ 38a
Affidavit of Melvin B. Turner...................................... 40a
Motion to Strike Certain Portions of the Complaint.. 42a
Answer .............................. ...... -....................................... 43a
Excerpts from Transcript of Hearing, September 26,
1960 ............................................................................... 52a
J. E. Moss ................................................................ 52a
Melvin B. Turner.................................................... 54a
J. E. Moss ................................................................ 55a
Order, October 7, 1960 .................................................. 61a
Relevant Docket Entries ............................................ la
11
PAGE
Report of the County Board of Education................. 64a
Exhibit “ A ” to Report ......... 65a
Plan ............................................................................ 69a
Specification of Objections to Plan ........................... 72a
Excerpts from Transcript of Hearing, October 24,
1960 ............................................................................... 77a
J. E. Moss ................................................................ 77a
Dr. Eugene W einstein............................................ 94a
Annie P. D river........................................................ 108a
Henry C. Maxwell .................................................. 110a
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment
November 23, 1960 ...................................................... 114a
Judgment .................................................................. 131a
Order, November 29, 1960 .............................................. 134a
Motion for New Trial and for Appropriate Relief .. 136a
Motion of Plaintiffs for Further Relief ................... 139a
Exhibit “A ” to Plaintiffs’ Motion ....................... 142a
Supplemental Answer ..................................................... 146a
Excerpts from Transcript of Hearing, January 10,
1961 .............................................. 149a
Joseph R. Garrett ...... 149a
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment 171a
Judgment .................................................................. 175a
Notice of Appeal ............................................................ 177a
A P P E N D I X
Relevant Docket Entries*
Civil Docket 2956
H e n r y C. M a x w e l l , Jr., et al.
—vs.—
C o u n t y B o ard o f E d u c a t io n o f
D a v id s o n C o u n t y , T e n n ., et al.,
9-19-60 Complaint filed.
9-19-60 Motion for Temporary Restraining Order-filed
by the Plaintiffs.
9-19-60 Motion for Preliminary Injunction—filed by the
Plaintiffs.
9-19-60 Order to Show Cause Why Temporary Restrain
ing Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Should
Not Issue—entered by Judge William E. Miller.
It is Ordered that the Defendants named herein
shall appear at 9 :00 A.M. on September 26, 1960
before Judge William E. Miller in U. S. District
Courtroom to show cause, etc. * * *
9-26-60 Motion to Dismiss filed by defendants. * * #
9-26-60 Affidavit of J. E. Moss filed by defendants in sup
port of Motion to Dismiss.
9-26-60 Affidavit of Frank White filed by defendants in
support of Motion to Dismiss.
Entries not relevant to this appeal have not been printed.
2a
9-26-60 Affidavit of Melvin B. Turner filed by defendants
in support of Motion to Dismiss.
9-26-60 Motion to Strike certain Portions of the Com
plaint filed by defendants. * * *
9- 26-60 Answer of defendants filed. * * *
10- 7-60 Order relative to hearing had on September 26,
1960, (1) Motions of plaintiffs for temporary re
straining order and/or preliminary injunction be
and the same is withheld at this time (2) defen
dants directed to file with the court, not later
than Oct. 19, 1960 a complete and substantial
plan which will accomplish complete desegrega
tion of public school system of Davidson County,
Tennessee (3) the plaintiffs will be furnished by
defendants with a copy of said plan and may file
objections thereto not later than October 21,
1960, the plaintiffs except to the action of the
Court in withholding action on their motions for
temporary restraining order and preliminary in
junction.
10- 19-60 Beport of the County Board of Education of
Davidson County, Tennessee, with Exhibit “A ”—
Beport of the Special Committee of the Davidson
County Board of Education,—attached, filed by
the Defendants. * * *
10- 21-60 Specification of Objections to Plan filed by
County Board of Education of Davidson County,
Tennessee, * * * , filed by the plaintiffs.
11- 9-60 Transcript of the Court’s Statement from the
Bench and of Proceedings Thereafter on Motion
of Defendants to Strike,—filed.
Relevant Docket Entries
3a
11-23-60 F indings of F act, Conclusions of L aw and
J udgment— entered by Judge William E. Miller.
It is accordingly Ordered, Adjudged and De
creed as follows:
(1) That the plan submitted by the County Board
of Education of Davidson County, Tennessee is
approved, except in the following particulars:
(a) Compulsory segregation based on race
is abolished in grades One through Four of
the Davidson County Schools for the Second
Semester of the 1960-61 school year begin
ning January 1961, and thereafter for one
additional grade beginning with each subse
quent school year, i.e., for Grade Five in
September 1961, Grade Six in September
1962, etc.
(b) As respects the summer classes attended
by outstanding students, there will be no
segregation based on races, and notice of
such will be immediately given by the School
Board to all teachers in the Davidson County
School system, both Negro and white, of the
availability of these classes.
(c) The Davidson County School Board will,
prior to the beginning of the Second Semes
ter of the 1960-1961 school year, and prior
to the beginning of each school year there
after, give specific notice to the parents of
all school children of the zone in which their
children fall for the purpose of attending
classes.
Relevant Docket Entries
4a
(2) The prayer of the plaintiffs for injunctive re
lief be, and the same is hereby denied, except
with regard to those matters as to which judg
ment is hereinafter reserved.
(3) Jurisdiction of this case is retained by the
Court throughout the period of transition.
(4) Judgment is reserved on the question of the
motion to strike and those portions of the mo
tion to dismiss not hereinbefore overruled, and
on the matters raised in the complaint which are
involved in said motions.
To the foregoing action of the Court in approving
the plan submitted by defendants and in denying
plaintiffs’ prayer for injunctive relief, the plain
tiffs except. * * *
11- 29-60 Order entered by Judge William E. Miller,
Ordering that the Defendants’ Motions to Strike
and to Dismiss those portions of the Complaint
relating to teacher and personnel assignment be
and they are hereby overruled, and that the de
fendants be and they are hereby allowed twenty
days from date in which to further plead to the
Complaint. The Court reserves judgment as to
the substantive questions involved, including the
questions of granting injunctive relief, pending
a further hearing after the issues have been fully
joined between the parties. * # *
12- 2-60 Motion for New Trial and for Appropriate Re
lief filed by the Plaintiffs.
12-12-60 Motion of plaintiffs for further relief filed. * * *
Relevant Docket Entries
5a
12-13-60 Supplemental Answer, pursuant to the Court
Order entered November 29, 1960,—filed by the
Defendants. * * *
1-18-61 Transcript of the Court’s Statement from the
Bench, on January 10, 1961 at Nashville, Tennes
see—filed by the 0. C. R. * * *
1-24-61 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judg
ment entered. * * # Ordered that: (1) Relief
prayed for in the motion for further relief filed
by plaintiffs be and the same is denied, with the
exception that the form of the notices to parents
in the future are directed to be mailed by defen
dants to counsel for plaintiffs in advance of mail
ing, so as to give them sufficient time to file with
the Court objections to the form of said notices.
(2) The aforesaid notices to parents will be given
to those who are affected by said plan of
desegregation heretofore approved by the
Court and not to anyone else.
(3) The Motion for a New Trial and for appro
priate relief filed by .Plaintiffs is overruled
and denied.
(4) Injunctive relief with respect to the issues
heretofore reserved by the Court concerning
assignment of teachers, principals and sus
taining personnel in the schools on basis of
race is denied at this time; and the Court
further reserves ruling with respect to the
assignment of teachers, etc., including the
right of school children or their parents to
raise such question.
Relevant Docket Entries
6a
(5) This case will remain on the docket of the
Court and the Court will retain jurisdiction
during the period of transition, etc.
(6) The Motion to intervene filed in this cause by
Porter Freeman is overruled and denied.
To the foregoing action of the Court in denying
their motion for further relief and their motion
for new trial and for appropriate relief, and in
denying the relief prayed for in the complaint
with respect to said issues heretofore reserved by
the Court, the plaintiffs respectfully except.
2-20-61 Notice of Appeal filed by the Plaintiffs. * * *
2- 20-61 Appeal Cost Bond filed by the Plaintiffs. * * *
3- 28-61 Order extending time to file record on appeal
to and including May 21, 1961, entered.
5-25-61 Order received for entry from the U. S. Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit extending time
to file record on appeal to and including May 31,
1961.
5-30-61 Transcript of Proceedings, filed (four Volumes)
Relevant Docket Entries
7a
Filed: September 19, 1960
I n the
DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
F or the M iddle D istrict oe T ennessee
N ashville D ivision
Civil Action No. 2956
C om p lain t
-,--------
H enry C. M axwell, Jr., and B enjam in Grower M axwell,
infants, by Rev. Henry C. Maxwell, Sr., and Mrs. Flora
Maxwell, their father and mother and next friends,
Cleophtjs D river, Christopher C. D river and D eborah D.
D river, infants, by Mrs. Annie P. Driver, their mother
and next friend,
D eborah R uth Clark, an infant, by Joe E. Clark and Mrs.
Floy Clark, her father and mother and next friends,
Jacqueline D avis, Shirley D avis, George D avis, Jr., R ob
ert Davis and R ita Davis, infants, by George Davis, Sr.,
and Mrs. Robbie Davis, their father and mother and
next friends,
R obert R ickey T aylor, an infant, by Robert Taylor and
Mrs. Stella Taylor, his father and mother and next
friends,
and
R ev. H enry C. M axwell, Sr., M rs. F lora M axwell, M rs.
A nnie P. D river, Joe E. Clark, M rs. F loy Clark,
George D avis, Sr., M rs. R obbie D avis, R obert T aylor,
M rs. Stella T aylor,
Plaintiffs,
8a
versus
County B oard of E ducation of D avidson County, T en
nessee, and F rank W hite, S. L. W right, Jr., E. K.
H ardison, Jr., F erriss C. B ailey, E. D. Chappell, A u
brey M axwell and Olin W hite , Board Members, who
together, as such Board Members, constitute the County
Board of Education of Davidson County, Tennessee;
and
J. E. Moss, County School Superintendent and/or Super
intendent of Public Instruction of Davidson County,
Tennessee,
Defendants.
Complaint
1. (a) The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under
Title 28, United States Code, Section 1331. This action
arises under Section 1 and also the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States; and under the Act of May 31, 1870, Chapter
14, Section 16, 16 Stat. 144, (Title 42, United States Code,
Section 1981), as hereinafter more fully appears.
The matter in controversy exceeds, exclusive of interest
and costs, the sum or value of Ten Thousand ($10,000.00)
Dollars.
(b) The jurisdiction of this Court is also invoked under
Title 28, United States Code, Section 1343. This action is
authorized by the Act of April 20, 1871, Chapter 22, Sec
tion 1, 17 Stat. 13, (Title 42, United States Code, Section
1983) to be commenced by any citizen of the United States
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to redress
the deprivation, under color of a state law, statute, ordi
nance, regulation, custom or usage, of rights, privileges
9a
and immunities secured by Section 1, of the Fourteenth
Amendment, or any other provision of the Constitution
of the United States, and by the Act of May 13, 1870, Chap
ter 14, Section 16, 16 Stat. 144, (Title 42, United States
Code, Section 1981), providing for the equal rights of citi
zens and of all persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States, as hereinafter more fully appears.
2. This action is a proceeding under Title 28, United
States Code, Sections 2201 and 2202, for a judgment de
claring the rights and other legal relations of plaintiffs
and all other persons, similarly situated, eligible to attend
elementary and secondary schools owned, maintained and
operated by the County Board of Education of Davidson
County, Tennessee, in and for said County and State, and
demanding an injunction, for the purpose of determining
and redressing questions and matters of actual contro
versy between the parties, to-wit:
(a) Whether the custom, policy, practice or usage of
defendants in excluding plaintiffs and other persons simi
larly situated, from elementary and secondary schools
owned, maintained and operated by the County Board of
Education of Davidson County, Tennessee, solely because
of their race or color, and in operating a compulsory racially
segregated school system in and for said County and State,
pursuant to Sections 49-3701, 49-3702, and 49-3703, Ten
nessee Code Annotated, 1955, and that portion of Section
12 of Article 11 of the Tennessee Constitution which makes
it unlawful for white and colored persons to attend the
same school, and pursuant to any other law, custom, policy,
practice, or usage, violates the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Con
stitution of the United States.
Complaint
10a
3. Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to Rule 23, (a)
(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a class action
for themselves and on behalf of all other persons similarly
situated, who are so numerous as to make it impracticable
to bring them all before the Court and who seek a common
relief based upon common questions of law and fact.
4. Plaintiffs are Negroes and are citizens of the United
States and of the County of Davidson and State of Ten
nessee. All adult plaintiffs are parents and/or guardians
of the infant plaintiffs, and reside with the infant plain
tiffs, in Davidson County, Tennessee. All of the infant
plaintiffs are school children, eligible to attend the public
schools of Davidson County, and have been attending said
schools, and can satisfy all requirements for admission to
the public schools maintained and operated by the defen
dant, County Board of Education, in and for Davidson
County, Tennessee, including the schools to which they
respectively applied as hereinafter shown.
5. (a) The defendant, County Board of Education of
Davidson County, Tennessee, is composed of the following
Board Members, the defendants, Frank White, S. L.
Wright, Jr., E. K. Hardison, Jr., Ferriss C. Bailey, E. D.
Chappell, Aubrey Maxwell, and Olin White, who, together,
constitute the County Board of Education of Davidson
County, Tennessee, and who are hereinafter referred to as
defendant, County Board of Education.
(b) Said defendant, County Board of Education, exists
pursuant to the Constitution and laws of the State of Ten
nessee as an administrative department or agency of the
State of Tennessee, discharging governmental functions,
and is by law, a body corporate or a continuous body or
Complaint
11a
entity, and is being sued herein as such corporate or con
tinuous body or entity.
(c) All of said defendants, above named as Board Mem
bers of defendant County Board of Education, are citizens
and residents of the State of Tennessee, and are being sued
herein in their official capacities as such Board Members,
and are also being sued herein as individuals.
(d) Defendant, J. E. Moss, is County School Superin
tendent or Superintendent of Public Instruction of David
son County, Tennessee and holds office pursuant to the
Constitution and laws of the State of Tennessee as an
administrative officer of the free public school system of
Tennessee. He is a citizen and resident of the State of
Tennessee, and is made defendant herein and sued in his
official capacity as stated hereinabove, and is also being
sued herein as an individual.
6. The State of Tennessee has declared public education
a State function. The Constitution of Tennessee, Article
11, Section 12, provides:
“ Knowledge, learning, and virtue, being essential to the
preservation of republican institutions, and the dif
fusion of the opportunities and advantages of educa
tion throughout the different portions of the State,
being highly conducive to the promotion of this end,
it shall be the duty of the General Assembly, in all
future periods of this Government, to cherish liter
ature and science.”
Pursuant to this mandate the Legislature of Tennessee
has established a uniform system of free public education
in the State of Tennessee according to a plan set out in the
Complaint
12a
Tennessee Code Annotated, 1955, Sections 49-101 through
49-3806, and supplements and amendments thereto. The
establishment, maintenance and administration of the pub
lic school system of Tennessee is vested in a Commissioner
of Education, a State Board of Education, County Super
intendents of Public Schools, and County and City Boards
of Education.
7. The public schools of Davidson County, Tennessee
are under control and supervision of defendant, County
Board of Education and defendant, J. E. Moss, acting as
an administrative department, division or agency, and as
an agent of the State of Tennessee. Said County Board of
Education is charged and vested with the administration,
management, government, supervision, control and conduct
of public schools within said County, and is vested with
all powers and duties pertaining to, connected with, or in
any manner incident to the proper conduct and control of
the public schools of said County. Said County Board of
Education is under a duty to enforce the school laws of the
State of Tennessee; to maintain an efficient system of public
schools in Davidson County, Tennessee; to determine the
studies to be pursued, the methods of teaching, and to
establish such schools as may be necessary to the complete
ness and efficiency of the school system. Defendant, J. E.
Moss, as Superintendent, has the immediate control of the
operation of the public schools of said County and is the
administrative agent for the defendant, Board of Educa
tion, and serves as a member of its executive committee.
8. Plaintiffs allege that the defendants herein, acting
under color of the laws of the State of Tennessee and
County of Davidson, have pursued and are presently pursu
ing a policy, custom, practice and usage of operating a com-
Complaint
13a
pulsory racially segregated school system in and for the
County of Davidson, State of Tennessee. The racially segre
gated school system operated by defendants consists of
a primary system of elementary, junior high, and high
schools limited to attendance by white children of the
County of Davidson. Said schools are staffed by white
teachers, white principals and white sustaining personnel.
Said white schools are located in various parts of the
County and, regardless of location, these schools may be
attended by white children only. The defendants also main
tain a secondary system of “ colored schools” or “Negro
schools” limited to attendance by Negro children. These
schools are likewise located in various parts of the County
and, regardless of location, are limited to attendance by
Negro children. These schools are staffed entirely by Negro
personnel; the teachers are all Negroes; the principals are
all Negroes; and the sustaining personnel are all Negroes.
This compulsory racially segregated school system is based
solely upon race and color; attendance at the various
schools is determined solely upon race and color and the
assignment of personnel is determined solely upon the
race and color of the children attending the particular
school and the race and color of the personnel to be as
signed. A dual set of school zone lines is also maintained.
These lines are based solely upon race and color. One set
of lines relates to the attendance areas for the Negro
schools and one set to the attendance areas for the white
schools. These lines overlap where Negro and white school
children reside in the same residential area. For many
years the defendants have adopted, maintained and en
forced, and they still maintain and enforce this custom,
policy, practice or usage of compulsory racial segregation
in the schools of Davidson County, Tennessee pursuant to
Complaint
14a,
which they have required and are still requiring all Negro
children, including the infant plaintiffs, to attend said
schools designated exclusively for Negro children.
9. From time to time since 1954 or 1955, Negro citizens
and residents of Davidson County have requested defen
dants to cease operating a compulsory racially segregated
public school system in Davidson County, Tennessee, and
to comply with the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in the School Segregation Cases. Defendants have
continued, however, to pursue the policy, practice, custom
and usage of operating a compulsory racially segregated
school system in Davidson County, Tennessee, and have
failed and have refused to formulate or adopt any plan
for desegregating the public school system of Davidson
County.
10. At the beginning of the school term, that is, to-wit;
on 2 September, 1960, the infant plaintiffs, Henry C. Max
well, Jr., and Benjamin Grover Maxwell, presented them
selves with their parents, and made proper and timely
applications for admission to G-lencliff Junior High School
and/or Antioch High School, but they were denied admis
sion by defendants to said said schools, solely on account
of plaintiffs’ race or color. On the same date, the infant
plaintiffs, Cleophus Driver, Christopher C. Driver, and
Deborah D. Driver, presented themselves, together with
their mother, and made proper and timely application for
admission to the Bordeaux Elementary School. In addi
tion, the plaintiff, Joe E. Clark, father of Deborah Ruth
Clark, also presented himself at that time and made proper
and timely application for admission of his daughter, the
infant plaintiff, Deborah Ruth Clark, to the Bordeaux E le-
Complaint
15a
mentary School. All of said plaintiffs were refused and
denied admission by defendants to the said Bordeaux Ele
mentary School, solely on account of plaintiffs’ race or
color. All of said infant plaintiffs reside in the zones of
the respective schools to which they applied, and would
have been admitted had they been white children. The
plaintiffs, Reverend & Mrs. Henry C. Maxwell, Sr. were
accompanied by the plaintiff, Mrs. Robbie Davis, whose
five minor children, the infant plaintiffs, Jacqueline Davis,
Shirley Davis, George Davis, Jr., Robert Davis, and Rita
Davis, are presently residing closer to a school designated
by the defendants as a “ Negro” school. However, Mrs.
Davis accompanied Reverend & Mrs. Maxwell, and she and
her husband, George Davis, Sr., and their minor children,
as well as the plaintiffs, Robert Taylor and wife, Stella
Taylor and their minor child, Robert Rickey Taylor, who
also is in the zone of and attends a “Negro” school, join
in this action for the reason that their said children are
being denied their right to enjoy a non-discriminatory
public education by reason of the compulsory racially
segregated public school system wdiich the defendants are
maintaining and operating in and for Davidson County,
Tennessee, as more fully shown hereinafter.
(a) Defendants’ requirement of compulsory racial segre
gation imposes unreasonable burdens upon the infant
plaintiffs and other Negro children similarly situated, who
live near and in the zone of readily accessible schools
Avhich white children living in the same area are permitted
to attend, but plaintiffs and all other Negro children are
refused admission to these schools and required to travel
great distances to “ Negro” schools, solely because of their
race or color. For instance, the infant plaintiffs, Henry
C. Maxwell, Jr., and Benjamin Grover Maxwell, who are
Complaint
16a
just entering Junior High School this year, reside within
a radius of two or three miles of Glencliff Junior High
School and Antioch High School, to either of which they
would be admitted if they were white, but because they
are Negroes, they and other Negro children similarly situ
ated, must walk a half mile or more each morning to a
school bus pick-up point, where they are picked up and
transported twelve miles all the way across town to a
“ Negro” school, and must make the return trip each eve
ning, arriving home at dusk. Similarly, the Driver and
Clark children named hereinabove as infant plaintiffs, and
all other Negro children, similarly situated, who reside in
their neighborhood, are within walking distances of the
Cumberland Junior High School and the Bordeaux Ele
mentary School, which latter school was destroyed by fire
on 9 September 1960, as hereinafter shown; but these chil
dren and all other Negro children similarly situated, are
required to travel by bus a distance of five or six miles or
more to Haynes School, designated by defendants as a
“ Negro” school. This unnecessary burden imposed upon
the infant plaintiffs, and other Negro children similarly
situated, solely because of race or color, subjects said chil
dren to unwarranted physical and health hazards, depriv
ing them in many instances of opportunities for athletic
and cultural development, and reduces their opportunities
for educational instruction and study. In addition, it places
an unwarranted burden upon the parents of the infant
plaintiffs and other Negro children, requiring them to arise
in the early hours of the morning in order to get them off
to school and depriving said parents, in many instances,
of their companionship and services in the afternoon, by
reason of the fact that many of them, particularly those
residing in the area of the Maxwell children, do not reach
Complaint
17a
home until late in the evening. Defendants refuse to admit
the infant plaintiffs to the schools as aforesaid, solely on
account of their race or color, the defendant, J. E. Moss,
having stated explicitly to one or more of the adult plain
tiffs that they were denied admission for this reason, and
that the Board of Education is committed to a policy of
compulsory segregation. As a matter of fact, the defen
dant, Board of Education, has officially stated its policy
of compulsory racial segregation by a motion passed and
entered upon the minutes of the Board at a meeting held
on 8 September, 1960, which reads substantially as fol
lows :
“We have fully considered the request of certain
Negro citizens who are parents of children in the
Davidson County School System to admit 4 children
as students in the Bordeaux Elementary School and 2
students to be admitted to Gleneliff High School.
Heretofore, numerous substantial Negro citizens of
this county have expressed their desire that their chil
dren attend Negro schools; and they also expressed
their pride in their own schools and confidence in their
teachers.
The Negro schools in Davidson County are in excel
lent condition and most of the schools have been built
within the last 10 years and the Negro schools are
equal in every respect to the white schools.
The request has been made by the parents of six
children from three Negro families. This request was
made after the current school year had started and
after all plans for transportation, zoning of students,
distribution of school books, etc., had been fully com
pleted for the county-wide system.
Complaint
18a
It is therefore moved that the Davidson County
Board of Education decline the request so made and
in making this motion, it is our feeling that we are act
ing in the best interest of the six Negro children men
tioned above.”
Plaintiffs aver that the class work in the Davidson
County School System, contrary to the foregoing statement
of the defendants, began on Tuesday, September 6, 1960,
some four days after the plaintiffs had presented them
selves and made application to the defendants for admis
sion to the schools requested, and were denied. Plaintiffs
further aver that some of the adult plaintiffs appeared at
the office of the defendant, J. E. Moss, on 31 August, 1960,
approximately two days prior to registration on 2 Sep
tember 1960, and sought an interview with the defendants,
at which time, one of the adult plaintiffs stated explicitly
that they were there requesting integration of the David
son County School System. Plaintiffs were informed by
said office that they would be given an appointment with the
defendant, J. E. Moss, for that purpose on Thursday, 1
September 1960. However, on the last mentioned date,
they were further informed by said defendant’s office, that
he would not see them until Tuesday, 6 September, 1960.
Plaintiffs thereupon presented themselves to the respec
tive schools for admission on registration day, 2 September,
1960, as aforesaid.
On the morning of 9 September, 1960, following said
action by the Board on 8 September, 1960, the Bordeaux
Elementary School was destroyed by fire. Although defen
dants have not made any public announcement as to the
disposition of the exclusively white school population of
said school, it is apparent from the defendants’ foregoing
Complaint
19a
policy, that they will continue to operate a compulsory
racially segregated school system and that new re-assign
ment of the students in said school will be made on this
basis.
(b) Plaintiffs aver that while some of them sought and
seek admission of their children to the respective schools
to which they applied as aforesaid, same being within their
zones, all of the plaintiffs further insist that the operation
of a compulsory racially segregated school system in David
son County violates rights of the plaintiffs and members of
their class which are secured to them by the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Federal Constitution. The compulsory racially segre
gated school system is predicated on the theory that
Negroes are inherently inferior to white persons and, con
sequently, may not attend the same public schools attended
by white children who are superior. The plaintiffs, and
members of their class, are injured by the policy of assign
ing teachers, principals and other school personnel on the
basis of the race and color of the children attending a
particular school and the race and color of the person to be
assigned. Assignment of school personnel on the basis of
race and color is also predicated on the theory that Negro
teachers, Negro principals and other Negro school person
nel are inferior to white teachers, principals and other
white school personnel and, therefore, may not teach white
children. Thus all of the plaintiffs are affected and injured
by defendants’ aforesaid policy, practice, custom, or usage,
whether they are thereby excluded from a white school
nearer their homes, or whether, on the other hand, they
are required to attend a school nearer their homes but
which is designated and stigmatized as a “ Negro” school,
Complaint
20a
from which all children of other racial extractions are
excluded.
11. The defendants rely on the following provisions of
the Tennessee Constitution and Statutes, which read as
follows:
Constitution of 1870, Act 11, Sec. 12:
“ . . . No school established or aided under this section
shall allow white and negro children to be received as
scholars together in the same school.. . . ”
Tennesse Code, 1955, Sections:
“ 49-3701. Interracial Schools prohibited.—It shall be
unlawful for any school, academy, college, or other
place of learning to allow white and colored persons
to attend the same school, academy, college, or other
place of learning. (Acts 1901, ch. 7, sec. 1; shan., sec.
6888a 37; Code 1932, sec. 11395).
“ 49-3702. Teaching of mixed classes prohibited,—It
shall be unlawful for any teacher, professor, or educa
tor in any college, academy, or school of learning, to
allow the white and colored races to attend the same
school, or for any teacher or educator, or other per
son to instruct or teach both white and colored races
in the same class, school, or college building, or in any
other place or places of learning, or allow or permit
the same to be done with their knowledge, consent, or
procurement, (Acts 1901 ch. 7, sec 2; shan., sec 6888a
38; Code 1932, sec 11396.)
“49-3703. Penalty for violations.—Any person violat
ing any of the provisions of this chapter, shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction, shall
Complaint
21a
be fined for each offense fifty dollars ($50.00), and im
prisonment not less than thirty (30) days nor more
than six (6) months. (Acts 1901, ch. 7, sec 3; shan.,
sec 6888a39; mod. Code 1932, sec 11397.)”
12. The infant plaintiffs and all other persons similarly
situated, in Davidson County, Tennessee, are thereby de
prived of their rights guaranteed by the Constitution and
laws of the United States.
Plaintiffs aver that the said constitutional and statutory
provisions and all other laws, customs, policies, practices
and usages of the State of Tennessee requiring or per
mitting segregation of the races in public education, fall
within the prohibited group which the Supreme Court of
the United States holds must yield to the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, and
are of no force and effect.
Plaintiffs therefore aver that the said custom, policy,
practice or usage of defendants in excluding plaintiffs and
other persons, similarly situated, from elementary and
secondary schools, owned, maintained and operated by the
County Board of Education of Davidson County, Ten
nessee, solely because of their race or color, and in operat
ing a compulsory racially segregated public school system
in and for said County, pursuant to said constitutional and
statutory provisions and any other law, custom, policy,
practice or usage of the State of Tennessee requiring or
permitting segregation of the Negro and white races in
public education, deprives plaintiffs and all others simi
larly situated of the equal protection of the laws in viola
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States, and is therefore unconstitutional and
void and affords defendants no legal excuse to deprive
plaintiffs of their rights herein prayed.
Complaint
22a
13. Plaintiffs and those similarly situated and affected,
on whose behalf this suit is brought, are suffering irrep
arable injury and are threatened with irreparable injury
in the future by reason of the acts herein complained of.
They have no plain, adequate or complete remedy to re
dress the wrongs and illegal acts herein complained of,
other than this suit for a declaration of rights and an in
junction. Any other remedy to which plaintiffs and those
similarly situated, could be remitted would be attended
by such uncertainties and delays as to deny substantial
relief, would involve multiplicity of suits, cause further
irreparable injury and occasion damage, vexation and in
convenience, not only to the plaintiffs and those similarly
situated, but to defendants as governmental agencies.
Plaintiffs aver that as of the date of this complaint, the
classes in the public schools of Davidson County have been
in session only three days and that there is no reason why,
in view of the foregoing circumstances, their children should
not be immediately admitted to the said schools on a non-
discriminatory basis this school term. They further aver
that they will suffer irreparable injury in the future, un
less defendants are restrained by the temporary restrain
ing order and injunction of this Court for the reasons set
out hereinabove, and also, for the reason that, as aforesaid,
the defendants have explicitly indicated that they intend
to continue their compulsory segregation policy; and if the
plaintiffs and other Negro children similarly situated, are
not granted immediate relief now, they will be subjected
to the inherent evil and inequality of compulsory racial
segregation in the public schools for an indefinite period
of time, and immediate and lasting harm and damage will
result not only to them, but also to white children who
are thereby being indoctrinated daily with concepts of
themselves as a master or superior race while infant plain-
Complaint
23a
tiffs will be subjected daily to the said indoctrination clas
sifying them as an inferior race.
14. There is between the parties an actual controversy
as hereinbefore set forth.
W herefore, Plaintiffs respectfully pray:
The Court issue forthwith a temporary restraining order
against the defendants, immediately restraining and en
joining them and each of them, their agents, employees,
servants or attorneys, from refusing to admit the infant
plaintiffs to the said Glencliff Junior High School, Antioch
High School, and Bordeaux Elementary School, according
to their respective applications as set out hereinabove,
or any other public school operated by defendants in and
for Davidson County, Tennessee, on account of plaintiffs’
race or color, pending further orders of the Court.
The Court issue a preliminary injunction, restraining and
enjoining defendants and each of them, their agents, em
ployees, servants or attorneys, from refusing to admit
plaintiffs, and other persons similarly situated, to Glen
cliff Junior High School, Antioch High School, and Bor
deaux Elementary School, according to their respective
applications as set out hereinabove, or any other public
schools maintained and operated by defendant County
Board of Education in and for Davidson County, Ten
nessee, because of their race or color, pending further or
ders of the Court.
The Court adjudge, decree and declare the rights and
legal relations of the parties to the subject matter here
in controversy in order that such declaration shall have
the force and effect of a final judgment or decree.
The Court enter a judgment or decree declaring that the
custom, policy, practice or usage of defendants in main-
Complaint
24a
taining and operating a compulsory racially segregated
public school system in Davidson County, Tennessee, and
in excluding plaintiffs and other persons, similarly situ
ated, from Gleneliff Junior High School, Antioch High
School, and Bordeaux Elementary School, according to
their respective applications as set out hereinabove, or any
other public schools maintained and operated by defen
dant County Board of Education in and for Davidson
County, Tennessee, solely because of race, pursuant to the
above quoted portion of Article 11, Section 12 of the Con
stitution of Tennessee, Sections 49-3701, 49-3702, and
49-3703 of the Tennessee Code, 1955, and any other law,
custom, policy, practice and usage, violates the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, and is there
fore unconstitutional and void.
The Court issue a permanent injunction forever restrain
ing and enjoining defendants and each of them, their
agents, employees, servants or attorneys, from maintaining
or operating a compulsory racially segregated public school
system in and for Davidson County, Tennessee, and from
refusing to admit plaintiffs, and other persons similarly
situated, to Gleneliff Junior High School, Antioch High
School, and Bordeaux Elementary School, according to
their respective applications as set out hereinabove, or
any other public schools maintained and operated by defen
dant, County Board of Education in and for Davidson
County, Tennessee, because of their race or color.
In addition to the immediate and preliminary relief
prayed hereinabove in behalf of the named infant plain
tiffs individually, the plaintiffs pray that this Court also
expeditiously enter a decree directing defendants to pre
sent a complete plan, within a period of time to be deter
mined by this Court, for the reorganization of the entire
Complaint
25a
school system of Davidson County, Tennessee, into a uni
tary, nonracial school system which shall include a plan
for the assignment of children on a nonracial basis, the
assignment of teachers, principals and other school per
sonnel on a nonracial basis, the drawing of school zone
lines on a nonracial basis, the allotment of funds, the con
struction of schools, the approval of budgets on a nonracial
basis, and the elimination of any other discriminations in
the operation of the school system or in the school cur
riculum which are based solely upon race and color. Plain
tiffs pray that if this Court directs defendants to produce
a desegregation plan that this Court will retain jurisdiction
of this case pending Court approval and full and complete
implementation of defendants’ plan.
Plaintiffs further pray that the Court will allow them
their costs herein and such further, other or additional
relief as may appear to the Court to be equitable and just.
Z. A lexander L ooby and
A von N. W illiams, Jr.
327 Charlotte Avenue
Nashville 3, Tennessee
T hurgood M arshall and
Jack Greenberg
10 Columbus Circle
Suite 1790
New York 19, N. Y.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Complaint
(Duly verified.)
26a
Filed: September 19,1960
Come the plaintiffs, named in the caption hereinabove,
and move the Court to issue forthwith a temporary re
straining order against the defendants in this cause, im
mediately restraining and enjoining them and each of
them, their agents, employees, servants, or attorneys, from
refusing to admit the infant plaintiffs to Glencliff Junior
High School, Antioch High School, and Bordeaux Ele
mentary School, according to their respective applications
as set out in the complaint, or any other public school or
schools operated and/or maintained by said defendants
in and for Davidson County, Tennessee, on account of
plaintiffs’ race or color, pending further orders of the
Court.
And for grounds of said motion, the said plaintiffs
specify the matters and things alleged in their Complaint
filed herewith, all of which are incorporated herein by
reference and made a part of this motion.
Respectfully submitted,
Z. A lexander L ooby and
A von N. W illiams, Jr.,
327 Charlotte Avenue
Nashville 3, Tennessee
T hurgood M arshall and
Jack Greenberg
10 Columbus Circle
Suite 1790
New York 19, New l rork,
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
M o tio n fo r T em p o ra ry R estraining O rd er
27a
Filed: September 26, 1960
Come the plaintiffs, named in the caption hereinabove,
and move the Court to issue a preliminary injunction
against the defendants in this cause, restraining and en
joining said defendants and each of them, their agents,
employees, servants or attorneys, from refusing to admit
the plaintiffs and other persons similarly situated, to Glen-
cliff Junior High School, Antioch High School, and Bor
deaux Elementary School, according to their respective ap
plications as set out in the complaint, or any other public
school or schools maintained and operated by the defen
dant County Board of Education of Davidson County,
Tennessee, in and for said County and State, because of
their race or color, pending further orders of the Court.
And for grounds of said motion, the said plaintiffs
specify the matters and things alleged in their complaint
tiled herewith, all of which are incorporated herein by
reference and made a part of this motion.
Respectfully submitted,
Z. A lexander L ooby and
A von N. W illiams, Jr.,
327 Charlotte Avenue
Nashville 3, Tennessee
T hurgood M arshall and
Jack Greenberg
10 Columbus Circle
Suite 1790
New York 19, New York
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
M o tio n fo r P relim in ary In ju n ction
28a
Order to Show Cause Why Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Preliminary Injunction Should Not Issue
Filed: September 26, 1960
In the above cause the plaintiffs having filed their verified
complaint together with Motions for a temporary restrain
ing order and a preliminary injunction against the defen
dants, for the purpose of immediately restraining and en
joining them and each of them, their agents, employees,
servants or attorneys, from refusing to admit the infant
plaintiffs, and other persons similarly situated, to Gflen-
cliff Junior High School, Antioch High School, and Bor
deaux Elementary School, according to their respective
applications as set out in the complaint, or any other pub
lic school or schools maintained and operated by the said
defendants in and for Davidson County, Tennessee, on ac
count of plaintiffs’ race or color, pending further orders of
the Court; and said motions being supported by the al
legations contained in the complaint properly referred to
and made a part thereof.
It is therefore Ordered that the defendants named in
the caption of the complaint in this cause, and each of them,
appear before the Honorable William F. Miller, H. S. Dis
trict Judge, at 9 :00 A.M., on Sept. 26, 1960, in U. S. Dis
trict Courtroom, Nashville, Tennessee, and show cause
why the aforesaid temporary restraining order and/or pre
liminary injunction should not issue.
W m. E. M il l e r
XJ. 8. District Judge
Vol. 23. Page 997September 19, 1960.
29a
Filed: September 26, 1960
The defendants jointly move to dismiss the complaint
filed against them in this cause upon the following grounds:
1. The complaint seeks extraordinary relief and pur
ports to be sworn to, but the jurat of the Notary Public
fails to contain any notarial seal, all as required by law.
2. The complaint seeks to attack and have declared un
constitutional and void Article II, Section 12, of the Con
stitution of Tennessee, and Sections 49-3701 through 49-
3703 of the Tennessee Code of 1955, without either the
State of Tennessee or its representative, the Attorney
General of the State of Tennessee, being made a party
thereto.
3. The complaint purports to be brought as a class
action by certain infant school children on behalf of all
other persons similarly situated without any showing that
there are other persons similarly situated who seek to at
tend any of the public schools of Davidson County, Tennes
see, which they are not now attending, or who would be
qualified to attend any such schools.
4. The complaint seeks to obtain a reorganization of
the entire school system of Davidson County, Tennessee,
insofar as teachers, principals and other school personnel
are concerned; whereas, no such persons are parties to the
complaint.
And the Defendants, and All of Them, Further Move to
Dismiss the Complaint Insofar as Extraordinary Relief
By Way of Temporary Restraining Orders and/or Pre
liminary Injunctions for the Reasons That:
1. These plaintiffs are seeking equitable relief of an
extraordinary nature and by their own admission have
M o tio n to D ism iss
30a
been guilty of laches in failing to make any application for
admission to the schools of Davidson County, Tennessee,
which they seek to attend until after all pupil assignment,
school zones, transportation facilities and the like had been
determined for the school year 1960-1961.
2. These plaintiffs are seeking equitable relief of an
extraordinary nature and have been guilty of laches over
the past several years in failing to seek admission to the
schools of Davidson County, Tennessee, which they seek to
attend and now seek to obtain such admission by means of
the exercise of such extraordinary relief through this Hon
orable Court.
And the Individual Defendants Move to Dismiss the Com
plaint Insofar as the Same is Filed Against Them
Individually for the Reason:
1. No action on the part of these defendants as in
dividuals has been recited in the complaint as the basis
for a complaint on the part of the plaintiffs, and, on the
contrary, such action as is complained of is under the
allegations of the complaint the official action of such
defendants.
Shelton L uton
County Attorney for
Davidson County, Tennessee
Davidson County Courthouse
Nashville 3, Tennessee
H aelan D odson, Jb.
1106 Nashville Trust Building
Nashville 3, Tennessee
Attorneys for Defendants
Motion to Dismiss
31a
Filed: September 26, 1960
J. E. Moss, being first duly sworn, deposes as follows:
That he is sixty-one (61) years of age and is a resident
of Davidson County, Tennessee, and has been superin
tendent of Davidson County Schools since 1949. That as
such he is the administrative head of the public schools of
Davidson County, Tennessee, and acts under the supervi
sion of the Davidson County School Board.
That the public schools of Davidson County have,
throughout his lifetime, been operated on a segregated
basis with separate schools for white and negro students.
That neither prior to nor since the decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States in 1955 in the case of Brown v.
The School Board has any request been made to him or of
him by any negro pupil or the parents of any negro pupil
in Davidson County, Tennessee, for the operation of the
schools of Davidson County on an integrated basis prior to
September 2, 1960. That neither has any group of negroes
or whites, by petition, letter, verbal communication or
otherwise, requested of the Davidson County School Board
that the schools of Davidson County be operated on an in
tegrated basis insofar as he is advised and that, in the event
any such request had been made, such would have in the
normal course of the operation of the School System been
communicated to him. That, on the contrary, on more than
one occasion delegations of negro pupils, or the parents of
negro pupils, have requested, either verbally or in writing,
that the School System of Davidson County be continued
on a segregated basis. That in September of 1955 the
County Board of Education of Davidson County was pre
sented with a petition for a new school building in the
Goodlettsville, Tennessee, area, which petition was signed
by the officers and practically all members of the Good-
A ffidavit o f J. E. M oss in S u p p o rt o f M otion
32a
lettsville Colored P. T. A. That this request contained the
express statement, “ We do not want integration in Good-
lettsville.” A copy of this said petition is attached hereto
as Exhibit “ A ” to this affidavit and the original of the same
is on file in the office of the Davidson County School Board.
That, pursuant to the request contained in said Exhibit
“A ” and in keeping with the over-all plans of the David
son County School Board, a new school was constructed in
the Goodlettsville, Tennessee, area serving the areas of.
Ridgetop and Goodlettsville. That in May of 1954, the
Davidson County School Board had under consideration
the construction of a consolidated school for negroes either
in the Neeley’s Bend area in the Eleventh Civil District
of Davidson County, or in the Hermitage area in the Fourth
Civil District of said County. At that time a large delega
tion of negroes from the Neeley’s Bend area appeared be
fore the School Board requesting that the school be built
in the Neeley’s Bend community and, when they were ad
vised by the School Board that a new white school had just
been built in that area, the group responded, in substance,
that they did not want their children to go to school at a
white school, but wanted a negro school on a completely
segregated basis. That, in other instances, various groups
of negroes and individual negroes have stated to affiant
and to others in affiant’s presence that they did not de
sire integrated schools, but, rather, wanted the schools
continued on a segregated basis.
Affiant further states that the data set forth on the at
tached sheet as Exhibit “ B” to this affidavit correctly re
flects the information contained thereon as reflected by the
records of the Davidson County Board of Education.
Affiant further states that negro children are housed in
better and more modern buildings than white children,
Affidavit of J. E. Moss in Support of Motion
33a
since, for the most part, they are in new units. All of the
school buildings housing negro children have been built
within the past twelve (12) years excepting the Early
School in the Eighth Civil District of Davidson County and
a portion of Haynes High School located in the Twelfth
Civil District. These latter two units, however, have been
modernized and are above average in the County for
schools. Affiant further states that all of the facilities
in both the negro and white schools are modern and com
parable. Affiant further states that negro schools operate
on the same fiscal policy as white schools in that the alloca
tion of funds is on a per pupil basis with both races receiv
ing funds under the same formula and that equal opportuni
ties are afforded as to courses of study, text books, instruc
tional material and equipment. Affiant further states that
the teacher-pupil ratio for the negro pupils is 29.35 pupils
per teacher and the ratio in the white schools is 28.92 pupils
per teacher.
Affiant further makes oath that, in the spring of each
year before the conclusion of the school year, a pre-school
spring registration is held in order to give information
as to the number of students and location of the same for
the next school year. That Henry C. Maxwell, Jr. and Ben
jamin Grover Maxwell, both of whom are plaintiffs in the
instant suit, completed their elementary schooling in the
spring of 1960 at the Providence Public School. That dur
ing the spring registration in 1960 both of these pupils
registered at Haynes High School for attendance there
during the school year 1960-1961. That Cleophus Driver,
Christoper C. Driver and Deborah D. Driver, plaintiffs in
the instant case, were students at Haynes Elementary
School during the school year 1959-1960 and, having re
ceived no advice of their intention to move or change their
Affidavit of J. E. Moss in Support of Motion
34a
schools, their names were carried forward as expected to
be in attendance at Haynes Elementary School during the
school year of 1960-1961. That the same situation with
respect to Deborah Ruth Clark existed as with the Driver
children. That the method of anticipation of attendance
during the school year 1960-1961 was the same for the
children listed as plaintiffs in the instant case as it was
for all of the other children in Davidson County, Tennessee,
similarly situated. That, in the spring of each year, the
principals of each of the schools make their requests or
requisitions to the School Board for the books which they
will need during the ensuing year and, at that time, make
their requests for rooms, temporary housing facilities, when
needed, and for their teachers, all for the next school year
and, based upon these requests, the Board of Education pre
pares and submits its request to the County Court for
school funds for the next year. Of course, there are in
stances where students, for various reasons, change from
one school to another, but such is not permitted by affiant
or the School Board without some justification and any
alteration of the planning and programming by any sub
stantial group of students changing schools would com
pletely disrupt and disorganize the school system. Affiant
further states that any attempt on his part, or on the part
of the Davidson County School System, to change from a
segregated school system to an integrated school system
on August 31, 1960, or thereafter, without substantial pre
liminary planning, would have been chaotic in the adminis
tration of the school system.
That since the unfortunate incident of the burning of
the Bordeaux Elementary School on September 9, 1960,
your affiant and the School Board have been making every
effort, through the use of makeshift classrooms, repair
Affidavit of J. E. Moss in Support of Motion
35a
work, use of temporary facilities such as churches and the
like, and transportation of pupils to schools operated by
the City of Nashville, to furnish facilities for the student
body of this school. This situation has created and is con
tinuing to create great confusion, hardship and difficulty
on pupils, parents and school officials, and any further
problems in the operation and administration of this school
at this time would be highly undesirable.
Further this affiant saith not.
J. E. Moss
Affidavit of J. E. Moss in Support of Motion
Sworn to and subscribed before me, this 26th day of
September, 1960.
H elen M. H utchison
Notary Public.
My commission expires:
Oct. 19, 1960
(Seal)
36a
EXHIBIT “A ” TO AFFIDAVIT OF J. E. MOSS
Agenda Goodlettsville, Term.
Sept. 12,1955
County Broad of Ed.
We the parents want a better and more comfortable
school in Goodlettsville. We want a consolidated school
with Bidgetop, Amqui, & Edenwold communities.
We do not want Integration in Goodlettsville.
We need a janitor for at least five months, since there is
not a child in school old enough for the responsebility of
the job.
We want cool water in summer months.
We need a new school because it’s impossible for one
teacher to teach (8) eight grades under present conditions
and give our children the attention and justice they deserve
Signed by Goodlettsville Colored P. T. A.
Mrs. Alice Cantrell—pres.
Mrs. Beulah Cartwright—Asst. Sec.
Mrs. Mattie Cartwright Sec.
Mrs. Beatrice Vaughn
Mrs. Lula Joyner
Mrs. Jessie H. Jones
Mrs. Bessie Patton
Mrs. Mamie Washington
Mrs. Bobbie Washington
Mrs. Sadie Bell Cartwright
Mrs. Ester Louise Matthews
Mrs. Mary Elizabeth Mathews
Mrs. Hattie M. Stanton
Mrs. Mary Sue Cantrell
Mrs. Rizzie Mae Joyner
Mrs. Willie Johnson
Mrs. Maud Joyner
Ernest Matthews
37a
EXHIBIT “ B” TO AFFIDAVIT OF J. E. MOSS
Data on D avidson County S chools
Total number of white children 44,415
Total number of negro children 2,348
Total number of County students 46,763
Total number of negro elementary schools 7
Total number of negro high schools 1
Total number of white elementary schools 62
Total number of white high schools 16
Percentage of white children 95
Percentage of negro children 5
Number of white teachers 1,536
Number of negro teachers 80
Number of white central office supervisors 20
Number of negro central office supervisors 1
Percentage of negro central office supervisors 5
Trend of population for the last five years:
White Negro Total
1956 35,270 2,001 37,271
1957 37,551 2,032 39,583
1958 40,152 2,089 42,241
1959 42,614 2,281 44,895
1960 44,415 2,348 46,763
Percentage increase in the last five years-—white 26
Percentage increase in the last five years-—negro 17
Average salary 1959-60
Negro women
White women
Negro men
White men
$4,665.30
$4,380.97
$4,849.96
$4,529.35
* Taken from annual report to State Department
38a
Filed: September 26, 1960
Frank White, being duly sworn, deposes and says:
That he is a resident of Davidson County, Tennessee,
and has been all his life ; that he served as Chairman of the
Davidson County School Board from September of 1958
until September 22, 1960, and has served as a member of
the Davidson County School Board for more than twenty
years.
That at no time prior to September 2, 1960, was any re
quest ever communicated to the Davidson County School
Board to his knowledge, either formally or informally, for
a desegregation of the Public School System of Davidson
County, and that if such had been communicated he would
probably have known of it and, during the last two years
as Chairman of the School Board, would have been the
person on the School Board to whose attention such would
have been directed. That plans for the assignment of
teachers, pupils, books, transportation facilities and hous
ing facilities for a school year are made in the spring next
preceding the school year and that any attempt to make a
complete change in the same at the beginning of the school
year as would be necessitated by desegregation of the
schools would be practically impossible without a complete
disruption of the entire school program.
That rather than there being requests for desegregation
of the School System, the only communications which have
been addressed to the School Board by either negroes or
whites have been requests for a continuation of segregated
schools. That two specific instances of such requests were
in connection with the request of the Neeley’s Bend group
of negroes and the Goodlettsville Colored P. T. A., both
A ffidavit o f F ran k W h ite in S u p p ort o f M otion
39a
of which are correctly reflected in the affidavit of J. E.
Moss, which is adopted as to these particulars by affiant.
Affiant further makes oath that any attempt to evolve
a plan of desegregation of the Davidson County Public
School on an orderly basis would require substantial plan
ning, data accumulation and the like by the School Board
and its staff and would consume a several months’ period
of time.
Further affiant saith not.
F rank P. W hite
Affidavit of Frank White in Support of Motion
Sworn to and subscribed before me, this 26th day of
September, 1960.
H elen M. H utchison
Notary Public.
My commission expires:
Oct. 19,1960
( S e a l )
40a
Filed: September 26,1960
Melvin B. Turner, being duly sworn, deposes and says:
That he is forty-five (45) years of age, is a resident of
Davidson County, Tennessee, and is transportation super
visor for the Davidson County Schools. That as such it is
his duty and responsibility to provide public school bus
transportation for all pupils attending Davidson County
Public Schools who are eligible for or require such public
transportation. That the Davidson County School System
operates ten (10) routes serving negro school children
and eighty-seven (87) routes serving white school children.
That the percentage of negro children transported by public
school buses of the Davidson County system is 55% and
that of white children transported by such system is 48%
of the total respective enrollments.
Affiant, further states that, by reason of the minimum
distance requirement for public school bus transportation,
children living several miles from school have an advan
tage over those living near the school in that a child living-
less than one and one-quarter miles from school must
walk or furnish his own transportation while those living
farther than said distance are furnished public transporta
tion by the County School System. That a child living ten
or twelve miles from school is delivered in a safe, modern
bus in approximately the same time it would take a child
living a mile from school to walk the distance; that the
child on the bus is protected from the traffic hazards to
which the pedestrian child would be subjected.
That affiant knows where the plaintiffs Maxwell reside,
which residence is approximately four-tenths of a mile
from Nolensville Road and up a dead-end street; that the
Affidavit o f M elv in B . T u rn e r in S u p p o rt o f M otion
41a
County public school bus which transports white students
to Antioch High School would use the same pick-up point
were there any white students to pick up at this corner
where infant plaintiffs Maxwell take the negro school bus.
That even though the distance from plaintiffs Maxwells’
said residence to Haynes High School is greater than that
to Antioch High School, the actual time consumed en route
by bus is approximately the same; that this results from
the fact that the route travelled by the bus to Haynes
High School is more direct and requires fewer stops than
that to Antioch High School.
That the infant plaintiffs Driver and Clark live approxi
mately one mile from Bordeaux Elementary School, which
fact would preclude them from being eligible for public
school bus transportation; that said infant plaintiffs Driver
and Clark, in riding the County School System bus from
their home to Haynes High School, as they have been
doing, consume no more than the amount of time which it
would take them to walk from their said residence to Bor
deaux Elementary School.
Further this affiant saith not.
M elvin B. T urner
Affidavit of Melvin B. Turner in Support of Motion
Sworn to and subscribed before me, this 26th day of
September, 1960.
My commission expires:
Oct. 19,1960
(Seal)
H elen M. H utchison
Notary Public.
42a
Motion to Strike Certain Portions of the Complaint
Filed: September 26, 1960
The defendants, and each of them, move to strike cer
tain portions of the complaint as follows:
1. The defendants move to strike that portion of Para
graph 10 of the complaint which reads as follows:
“ The plaintiffs, and members of their class, are injured
by the policy of assigning teachers, principals and
other school personnel on the basis of the race and
color of the children attending a particular school and
the race and color of the person to be assigned. As
signment of school personnel on the basis of race and
color is also predicated on the theory that Negro
teachers, Negro principals and other Negro school per
sonnel are inferior to white teachers, principals and
other white school personnel and, therefore, may not
teach white children.”
2. The defendants move to strike that portion of the
complaint set forth as a part of the sixth ground of relief
asked and specifically being that part reading as follows:
“ which shall include . . . the assignment of teachers,
principals and other school personnel on a nonracial
basis.”
Shelton L uton
County Attorney for
Davidson County, Tennessee
Davidson County Courthouse
Nashville 3, Tennessee
H arlan D odson, Jr.
1106 Nashville Trust Building
Nashville 3, Tennessee
Attorneys for Defendants
43a
Filed: September 26,1960
The defendants, and each of them, for answer to the
complaint filed in this cause and answering say:
1, 2 and 3.
The defendants admit the averments of Sections 1, 2 and
3 of the complaint.
4.
Defendants assume that the allegations of Section 4 of
the complaint are true, but neither admit nor deny the
averments since they are without sufficient information to
respond thereto.
5.
These defendants admit the allegations of Section 5 of
the complaint.
6.
These defendants admit the factual averments of Sec
tion 6 of the complaint, but neither admit nor deny the
plaintiffs’ conclusions based thereon.
7.
These defendants admit the allegations of Section 7 of
the complaint.
8.
These defendants admit that they are and have been
operating racially segregated schools as the school system
of Davidson County, Tennessee, but they deny that the
Negro schools are a secondary system of schools. Subject
A n sw er
44a
to the explanations and exceptions hereinafter set forth,
these defendants admit the other allegations of Section 8
of the complaint.
9.
These defendants expressly deny the allegations of the
first sentence of Section 9 of the complaint, and, on the con
trary, would show to the Court that the requests which
they have had from Negro citizens and residents of David
son County prior to September 2, 1960, have been for a
continuation of racially segregated schools.
10.
These defendants admit that on September 2, 1960, the
infant plaintiffs, Henry C. Maxwell, Jr., and Benjamin
Grover Maxwell, presented themselves with their parents
and made application for admission to the Gleneliff Junior
High School, but these defendants deny that such applica
tion was made timely or that it was made to the Antioch
High School and deny that they could have been admitted
to the Gleneliff Junior High School, whether white or
Negro, but admit that they were denied admission to the
Gleneliff Junior High School by reason of race or color.
These plaintiffs were seeking admission to the ninth grade
of Gleneliff Junior High School. These defendants further
admit that the infant plaintiffs, Cleophus Driver, Chris
topher C. Driver and Deborah D. Driver, presented them
selves with their mother and made application for admis
sion to the Bordeaux Elementary School, Cleophus Driver
seeking to enter the sixth grade, Christopher C. Driver
seeking to enter the fourth grade and Deborah D. Driver
seeking to enter the second grade, but they deny that such
application was timely. These defendants further admit
Answer
Answer
that the plaintiff, Joe F. Clark, presented himself at the
Bordeaux Elementary School and sought admission of his
daughter, Deborah Ruth Clark, to the fifth grade thereof,
but they deny that this application was timely. These de
fendants are not advised as to the children of the plaintiff,
Mrs. Robbie Davis, or as to the child of Rebert Taylor
and wife, Stella Taylor, but insofar as they are advised
none of these said parties have made any application or
request to attend any of the public schools of Davidson
County, other than those which they are now attending.
In this connection these defendants would show to the
Court that at the schools referred to herein, as well as
other schools in the Davidson County School System, there
is a preschool registration in the Spring of each year be
fore the conclusion of the school year, and that the purpose
of the same is to afford the school authorities data on which
to complete the formulation of their plans for assignment
of teachers, classrooms, pupils, books and the like for the
next ensuing year. Any or all of these plaintiffs could have
made application at the time of such preschool registra
tion, and while these defendants admit in all frankness
that they would not have been admitted to the so-called
white schools on an integrated basis, they would show to
the Court that it would have given to these defendants an
opportunity to make orderly plans for the assignment of
such pupils as it became necessary.
Further answering the allegations of this Section of the
complaint, these defendants deny the fanciful allegations
that compulsory racial segregation imposes unreasonable
burdens upon the infant plaintiffs and other Negro chil
dren similarly situated in that they are subjected to unwar
ranted physical and health hazards, are deprived of oppor
tunities for athletic and cultural development, that their
46a
opportunity for educational instruction and study is re
duced or otherwise. On the contrary and specifically, these
defendants would show to the Court that if the plaintiffs,
the Maxwell children, were attending Antioch High School
they would still have the same walk each morning to the
school bus pick-up point, and in like manner since the school
bus transportation afforded them presently is direct trans
portation without the necessity of frequent stops, they
leave home and arrive home at approximately the same
time as white children attending Antioch High School. In
similar manner, the Driver and Clark children named as
infant plaintiffs would be deprived of school bus trans
portation if they attended Bordeaux Elementary School,
and rather than imposing unnecessary burdens upon these
plaintiffs, they are presently afforded safe transportation,
free from the hazard of walking along heavily traveled
thoroughfares, and actually in most instances requiring less
transportation time.
These defendants do not admit the conclusion stated by
the plaintiffs as respects the interpretation of the policy
set forth in the minutes of the Board of Education of
September 8,1960, but do admit that the Board has followed
and is following a policy of racial segregation for the rea
son that such has been the requests of all Negroes who
have made their wishes known to the Board prior to Sep
tember 2, 1960. While these defendants admit that class
work was not commenced in the school system until Sep
tember 6, 1960, they deny that the statement of the Board
set forth in its quoted minutes is incorrect, and would show
to the Court that the current school year had commenced
with the registration on September 2, 1960, and that plans
for transportation, zoning of students, distribution of
school books and the like for the county-wide system is
Answer
47a
done in the Spring of the year; at which time each school
principal makes his request for books and his requests for
rooms, teachers and other facilities and at which time
plans are prepared for student transportation, all of which
would have been completely disorganized if the plan of
school segregation were suddenly discontinued on Septem
ber 2, 1960, and these defendants would show to the Court
that such action by either the defendant, J. E. Moss, or the
School Board, at that time would have resulted in chaos.
These defendants admit that insofar as they are ad
vised by the office personnel of the Board of Education an
attempt was made by some persons, including some of the
adult plaintiffs, to see the defendant, J. E. Moss, on Au
gust 31, 1960, and/or September 1, 1960, but at that time
the defendant, J. E. Moss, was so busily engaged in service
training organization for all teachers and other administra
tion duties necessary to the commencement of school that
it was impossible for him to see such persons at that time.
These defendants further admit that on the morning of
September 9, 1960, a major portion of the Bordeaux Ele
mentary School was destroyed by fire, and these defendants
would show to the Court that such has caused great dis
ruption in the operation of the Bordeaux Elementary
School, but they have managed to use the remaining facili
ties and some repairs thereon to house some of the stu
dents, that others are being sent to other schools and that
any further imposition of a change in the orderly operation
of this school at this time would only increase the chaos and
disruption resulting from this unfortunate incident.
These defendants further admit that teachers, principals
and other school personnel have been assigned in accord
ance with what the School Board deemed would be in the
best interest of the Board, the teachers, the schools and
Answer
48a
Answer
the pupils, but they deny that such assignments have been
based on any principle of superiority and inferiority, as
evidenced by the fact that the average salary for Negro
women in the Davidson County School System during the
school year 1959-1960 was $4,665.30, as contrasted with that
of white women of $4,380.97; and during the same period
the average salary for Negro men in the School System
was $4,849.96, while that for white men was $4,529.35; all
of which appears on the records on file with the State De
partment of Education of the State of Tennessee.
11.
These defendants admit the allegations of Section 11 of
the complaint.
12.
These defendants deny the arguments and conclusions
of the pleader set forth in Section 12 of the complaint, but
admit that it is proper and wmuld be proper for this Court
to require of these defendants, as it has of other defen
dants similarly situated, the presentation of a plan for
orderly pupil desegregation of the Davidson County School
System where desired by Negro students.
13.
These defendants deny the allegations of Section 13 of
the complaint.
14.
These defendants admit the allegations of Section 14 of
the complaint insofar as it pertains to some of the parties
plaintiff but denies that there is an actual controversy as
between all parties plaintiff and the defendant and denies
49a
that there is an actual controversy as to all matters set
forth in the complaint.
15.
These defendants aver, as heretofore set forth, that prior
to September 2, 1960, they had had no request for school
desegregation in the county system of Davidson County,
and, on the contrary, as heretofore set forth, aver that
their requests have been to the contrary. Now that they
have been faced with a request for such pupil desegrega
tion, they aver that they are and will proceed in good faith
and with all reasonable promptness to implement the princi
ples announced by the Supreme Court of the United States
in May of 1955 in the case of Brown v. Board of Education
of Topeka, Kansas. These defendants aver that this deci
sion recognized as a fact that there are complexities and
obstacles demanding that the situation be studied and an
intelligent plan formulated consistent with the various pub
lic and private interests involved. They aver that they and
their predecessors in office have created and established and
are presently maintaining a public school system of high
quality with facilities afforded Negro pupils equal to or
better than those afforded white pupils. Presentely there
are 44,415 white children attending the Davidson County
public schools and 2,348 Negro children attending such
schools; presently there are 7 Negro elementary schools and
one Negro high school and 62 white elementary schools and
16 white high schools; there are 1,536 white teachers and 80
Negro teachers, 20 white central office supervisors and one
Negro central office supervisor. The percentage of white
children is approximately 95, as contrasted with only 5 per
cent Negro children, and the percentage of white teachers
Answer
50a
is 95, as contrasted with 5 per cent Negro teachers, and the
percentage of white central office supervisors is 95, as con
trasted with 5 per cent Negro central office supervisors.
There are 10 bus transportation routes serving Negro
children and 87 such routes serving white children, with
the result that approximately 10 per cent of the bus trans
portation routes serve Negro children. Negro pupils are
housed in better and more modern buildings than white
children, since for the most part the Negro school buildings
are new, and all of the cafeterias in both the Negro and
white schools are modern and comparable; further school
funds are allocated on the same per pupil basis to both
Negro and white schools, both races receiving funds under
the same formula and both races have equal opportunity
as to courses of study, text books, instructional material
and equipment.
W herefore, these defendants aver that there is no emer
gency situation existing requiring the exercise of any
extraordinary relief from this Court, but, on the contrary,
these proceedings should be handled in the deliberate man
ner heretofore recognized by the courts as being in compli
ance with the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court
of the United States.
Answer
16.
Any allegations of the original complaint not herein
before admitted, explained or denied are here and now
expressly denied.
51a
And now having fully answered, these defendants pray
that they be hence dismissed, or in the alternative for
further orders of the Court consistent with the equities of
the case and the laws of the United States and the State
of Tennessee.
Answer
Shelton L uton
County Attorney for
Davidson County, Tennessee
Davidson County Courthouse
Nashville 3, Tennessee
H arlan D odson, Jr.
1106 Nashville Trust Building
Nashville 3, Tennessee
Attorneys for Defendants
52a
Excerpts From Transcript of Hearing,
September 26, 1960
J. E. Moss, called as a witness by the plaintiffs for cross-
examination on his affidavit, being first duly sworn, was
examined and testified as follows:
Cross Examination on Affidavit by Mr. Williams:-A' "a~ ~n~
— 52—
* * * * *
Q. Mr. Moss, you do have complete segregation through
out, do you not? A. Yes, sir.
— 53—
Q. You do designate White schools and Negro schools?
A. Yes.
Q. You have White teaching personnel in White schools
and White supervisory personnel in White schools and
Negroes in Negro schools? A. Yes.
Q. Is that right? A. That’s correct.
Q. You wouldn’t place a Negro teacher in a White school,
would you? A. We haven’t.
Q. It would be against the policy of the Board to do
that, wouldn’t it? A. It would.
Q. Why, sir? A. Because we have been operating on a
segregated basis.
# * # # #
— 56—
* # # # *
Q. If they had moved farther away from that school,
closer to another, they would have been transferred,
wouldn’t they? So that the fact that they were registered
out at Haynes had nothing to do with their denial of ad
mission. It was the policy of segregation that caused it?
- 3 7 -
53a
A. The two children; no, sir. Substantial registration would
have, of course, brought trouble.
Q. Yes, sir; but nobody presented themselves there but
the Maxwells. That’s correct, is it not? A. All the Eighth
Grade from Providence were carried to Haynes on spring
— 57—
registration.
Q. I am talking about on September the 2nd, the Max
well’s were the only Negro children who presented them
selves at Glencliff? A. That is correct.
Q. You knew, Mr. Moss, that they were actually regis
tered out there by the principal, did you not, sir? A. I
didn’t know that.
Q. You didn’t know that they were actually registered?
A. He talked to them, but I don’t think that he actually
registered them.
Q. Of course, you don’t know that? A. I don’t know
that.
Q. You don’t know that. I see. Now, Mr. Moss, if in
the spring of the year—I mean, if on this date, September
the 2nd, the date that administrative transfers are made, a
pupil has moved or something and you all have granted
transfer for administrative reasons, you wrould still have
the same problems with regard to books, and so forth, that
you would have had if the Maxwells had been admitted?
A. The two children wouldn’t have demoralized the school,
of course, from that standpoint.
Q. And the four children at Bordeaux wouldn’t have
demoralized the school, either, would they? A. We are
talking about substantial transfers.
— 58—
Q. Yes. If they had just let the six in, there wouldn’t
have been any great administrative problem? A. Not from
the standpoint of books or teachers, no.
* # # # #
J. E. Moss—for Plaintiffs—Cross
54a
Melvin B. Turner—for Plaintiffs—Cross
—59—
̂ ̂ ^
Q. Mr. Moss, if these children were admitted to these
schools now, if the Maxwell children, who have been out of
school, were admitted to Glencliff or Antioch now, they
would have the same time to make up that they would if
they were admitted to Haynes, would they not? A. Yes,
they would.
Q. There wouldn’t be any administrative problem about
that, would there? A. I wouldn’t say there wouldn’t be any
administrative problem. If we had our children and teach
ers ready to accept them, maybe there wouldn’t be too much
of a problem.
* * * * *
—66—
* * * * *
M elvin B. T urner, called as a witness by the plaintiffs
for cross-examination on his affidavit, being first duly sworn,
was examined and testified as follow s:
Cross Examination on Affidavit by Mr. Williams:
* * * * *
—67—
Q. Isn’t it true, Mr. Turner, that there are Negro chil
dren in Davidson County that have to travel as much as
100 miles a day in order to go to school? A. That is true,
and Whites also.
Q. But these Negro children pass White schools en route,
don’t they, many of them? A. Many of them do.
Q. Yes, sir. And there is no question but that the Max
well children have to get up early in the morning and that
they don’t get home until about dusk? A. Yes.
55a
Q. Riding 24 miles a day? A. It’s about 7 :30 in the morn
ing and they are home before five in the afternoon, which
is a little later than the average but not as late as a whole
lot of people.
Q. Yes, sir. But they have to walk that half mile home
after they are dropped off the bus there, don’t they? A.
We don’t go up any dead-end road for less than a half-
a-mile distance.
J. E. Moss—for Plaintiffs—Recalled—by the Court
—69—
* * * * *
Q. Mr. Turner, as a matter of fact, the White Schools
throughout this county are scattered all over the county
and are well placed so that, by and large, no White child
has to ride these—very few White children have to ride
these great distances that the bulk of the Negro children
have to ride, isn’t that true? A. It is true that the Negro
children to high school ride more distances on the average,
considerably more; yes, sir.
* * * * *
—114—
* * * * *
J. E. Moss, recalled as a witness by the Court, being pre
viously duly sworn, was examined and testified further as
follows:
Examination by the Court:
Q. Now, Mr. Moss, you have heard the statements made
here in court today about these young children, and I
— 115—
would like to ask you if the Maxwell children, the Driver
children, and the Clark girl were allowed to attend the
schools that they have applied to attend, would that or
56a
not create any administrative problems of any kind? A.
Yes, sir; I think it would.
Q. Without any further relief, you understand! In other
words, just limited to those particular children, would that
create any problems? A. Your Honor, I wouldn’t want to
say that six children would overload the system, I am not
saying that. Of course, Bordeaux, as has been brought out
in the affidavit, is a pretty bad situation.
And, too, if I may, I would like to make this point: They
are saying that there is an emergency, a hardship. Most
of the hardships in our county system are caused by lack
of buses rather than of buses. For instance, I would rather
my child would ride a safe bus ten miles to school as to
have to walk over these highways one mile. So the emer
gency doesn’t exist, as I see it.
* # * * *
—116—
* # # * #
J. E. Moss—for Plaintiffs—Recalled—by the Court
By the Court:
Q. Are there any other problems that you think of that
this would create? If there are any, I would like to hear
what they are, considering the County system as a whole,
taking it as a unitary system. A. Well, I certainly think
there would be a good deal of friction in the high school
if these children were entered in high school at this time.
Q. That would apply to which children? A. Maxwell.
Q. The Maxwell children? Would that apply to the other
children? A. Well, there might be some friction in the
other schools, I mean, where the larger children were in
volved.
Q. You do not anticipate any serious problem if some
sensible, workable plan were formulated to desegregate
57a
these schools, do you, from the standpoint of friction? A.
— 117—
I think the Board can work out a sensible plan, if given
time.
Q. What do you have to say about the time required to
work out a plan? Do you have any ideas on that? A. I
wouldn’t want to be too specific on that. I think Your
Honor would know more of what would be a reasonable
time than we would.
The Court: Any further questions of Mr. Moss?
Further Cross Examination by Mr. Williams:
Q. Mr. Moss, you say you think there would be friction.
How many children are in Antioch High School? A. I be
lieve in the high-school part, there are about 900.
Q. And you say that you think there will be friction if
these two little boys are admitted to school there? A. I
am thinking of what children will do, one to another. I am
thinking about Little Bock. I am thinking what has hap
pened in other schools where larger children are entered.
Q. Well, don’t you have friction there among children
occasionally? A. I believe there would be a different type
friction here, though.
Q. Well, you wouldn’t help to stir up the friction, would
—118—
you, Mr. Moss? A. I wouldn’t help to stir up—
Q. You wouldn’t want to help to stir up the friction,
would you? A. No, sir. I do not want to stir up any more
friction than I can help.
Q. Well, wouldn’t you think that your statement ahead
of time that there would be friction would help to stir up
the friction? A. Well, I think we have a precedent for that.
J. E. Moss—for Plaintiffs—Recalled—Further Cross
58a
Q. Yes, sir. You have the Little Rock precedent for
that, don’t you, sir? A. I know no other school where—
where—where they’ve started in high school besides Little
Rock. At least, I don’t have—
Q. (Interrupting) Little Rock is the only one that has
interested you? A. No. Little Rock is the one I have in
mind that started in high school as far as high-school age
is concerned.
Q. Well, on what facts do you predicate your thought
that there would be friction, Mr. Moss? A. Well, Mr. Wil
liams, in the beginning, we started out to—in a sincere way
to get a committee to work out a plan of integration. We
saw it coming. And I went to meetings with White parents
—lig
and Negro parents, and I could not find any White parents
that would go along with me or would sit down with me
and talk about it, and I couldn’t find any Negro parents
that would do it.
Now, the NAACP, your group, of course, I knew was
interested in integration, but I couldn’t get my parents,
White or Colored, to sit down and talk to me about it.
Q. How many parents did you see, Mr. Moss? A. Well,
numerous, numerous, numerous.
Q. Mr. Moss, did you ever appoint a committee composed
of parents? A. We had a committee. Yes, sir. We had a
committee.
Q. Did you ever appoint a committee composed of Negro
and White parents, Mr. Moss? A. No. No. I couldn’t get
that far along.
Q. You say you couldn’t get that far along? A. I
couldn’t get that far along.
Q. Why couldn’t you get that far along? A. We first
tried to start by having a staff committee of principals
and teachers and— of—of both races together.
J. E. Moss—for Plaintiffs—Recalled—Further Cross
59a
Q. Mr. Moss, as a matter of fact, your statement to the
Court that you think there might be friction, that is not an
administrative problem. That is your thought based on
your own prejudice and what you think is the prejudice of
— 120—
the community, isn’t it! A. I ’m not going to admit that I
have a prejudice.
Q. You have no prejudice whatsoever? A. I think there
would be trouble, yes.
Q. You say you have no racial prejudice whatever? A.
No. I have none.
Q. Then you would work and instruct your supervisory
staff and your teaching personnel so as to eliminate any
friction, wouldn’t you, Mr. Moss? A. I would try to, yes.
Q. Well, you have been successful in everything else
you have done, pretty much, in the School System, haven’t
you, sir? A. No.
Q. Well, Mr. Moss, when these people as you say, came
over wanting segregated schools, you were able to get the
Board to go along with them on that, weren’t you, sir? A.
Well, there wasn’t any change there.
Q. Yes, sir. Well, you frequently have problems where
the parents come in and teachers and pupils come in com
plaining about things, don’t you, sir? A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you have been able to handle that all right ad
ministratively, have you not, Mr. Moss? A. Well, they
have been handled—
—121—
Q. Yes, sir. A. —one way or another.
Q. As a matter of fact, isn’t it true that the newspapers
have tried to get the County Board to do something about
desegregating the County Schools ?
J. E. Moss—for Plaintiffs—Recalled—Further Cross
60a
Mr. Dodson: I object to that, if the Court please.
The Witness: Not to my knowledge.
The Court: Sustained.
Mr. Williams: All right.
By Mr. Williams:
Q. Mr. Moss, what do you think this friction would in
volve? A. I think there would be some bloodshed, fights
maybe.
Q. You think there would be some bloodshed? A. Yes.
Q. Well, do you think there is sufficient police and law-
enforcement authorities in Davidson County to handle any
breaches of the peace? A. Well, they might handle it on
one school or a small number, but—
Q. Yes, sir. They could be handled very well on one
school, couldn’t they? A. I don’t see how we can enter
— 122—
these two children without entering others. Our Board
works on a policy that all have the same right.
Q. Well, if the Court required you to enter these two
and directed that, for the time being, no others would be
admitted pending your submission of a complete plan, then
that could be done, couldn’t it, Mr. Moss? A. We would
try, if the Court says that, of course.
Q. You have been willing for six years to try anything
that you were ordered to do, haven’t you? A. My Board
of Education tells me what to do.
# # # * #
J. E. Moss—for Plaintiffs—Recalled—Further Cross
61a
Order
Filed: October 7,1960
This cause came on to be heard the 26th day of Septem
ber, 1960 before the Honorable William E. Miller, District
Judge, on the entire record and especially upon the mo
tions tiled by defendants to dismiss and to strike certain
portions of the complaint, the affidavits and exhibits filed
with said motions, the testimony of witnesses heard in open
court, and upon argument and statements of counsel there
on, from all of which the Court finds, holds and orders as
follows:
1. The first ground of the motion to dismiss relating
to omission of notarial seal on the verification of the com
plaint is well taken, but the notary public being Avon N.
Williams, Jr., one of the attorneys for plaintiffs, who stated
to the Court in open court that omission of said seal was
inadvertent, therefore, upon application of said attorney,
the complaint was and is hereby allowed to be amended,
and said defect cured, by said attorney affixing his official
notarial seal forthwith to the verification on the original
complaint filed in this cause.
2. All other grounds of defendants’ said motion to dis
miss, except the fourth ground thereof, are not well taken
and should be and the same are hereby overruled.
3. It is unnecessary at this time to rule upon the said
fourth ground of defendants’ motion to dismiss and upon
their motion to strike certain portions of the complaint;
and the Court therefore reserves judgment upon said
matters.
(Seal)
October 7, 1960 Vol. #24 Page 2
62a
Order of October 7,1960
Thereupon the cause came on to be further heard by the
Court upon the verified complaint as amended, the motions
filed by the plaintiffs for a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction against the defendants, the order
heretofore entered by the Court directing the defendants
to appear and show cause why said temporary restraining
order and/or preliminary injunction should not issue, the
testimony of witnesses heard in open court, the statements
and argument of counsel, and the entire record, from all of
which the Court finds, holds and orders as follows:
1. That action by the Court upon the motions of plaintiffs
for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary in
junction against the defendants, should be and the same
is withheld at this time.
2. That the defendants should be and they are hereby
directed to file with the Court, not later than October 19,
1960, a complete and substantial plan which will accom
plish complete desegregation of the public school system of
Davidson County, Tennessee in compliance with the re
quirement of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitu
tion of the United States.
3. The plaintiffs will be furnished by defendants with a
copy of said plan, and may file any objections thereto not
later than October 21, 1960; and hearing on such objec
tions will be held before this Court at 9 :00 A.M. on October
24,1960.
63a
Order of October 7,1960
The plaintiffs except to the action of the Court in with
holding action on their motions for temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction.
W m. E. M iller
District Judge
Approved as to form :
Z. A lexander L ooby
A von N. W illiams, Jr.
Some of Attorneys for Plaintiffs
S helton L uton
H arlan D odson, Jr.
Attorneys for Defendants
Attest: A True Copy
John O. A nderson, Clerk
IT. S. District Court
Middle District of Tennessee
By K. D. H ace D. C.
(Seal)
October 7, 1960 Yol. #24 Page 3
64a
Report of the County Board of Education of
Davidson County, Tennessee
Filed: October 19,1960
The defendants herein file this report pursuant to the
order of this Court of September 26, 1960:
1. The defendant, County Board of Education of David
son County, Tennessee, appointed a special committee of
its membership, to-wit, Ferris C. Bailey, Frank White and
S. L. Wright, Jr., to work in conjunction with the staff
of said Board of Education in compiling a complete and
substantial plan to accomplish complete desegregation of
the public schools system of Davidson County, Tennessee;
and this said committee, in conjunction with the staff, made
such study, compiled such plan and presented the same to
the County Board of Education of Davidson County, Ten
nessee, on October 18, 1960.
2. After due consideration, the said County Board of
Education of Davidson County, Tennessee, adopted said
plan as presented by its special committee on October 18,
1960, and presents the same to this Honorable Court as its
plan, in compliance with the order of this Court.
3. A copy of said report as adopted by the County
Board of Education of Davidson County, Tennessee, is at
tached herewith as Exhibit A to this report and made a
part hereof just the same as if fully copied therein.
Shelton L uton
County Attorney for
Davidson County, Tennessee
Davidson County Courthouse
Nashville 3, Tennessee
H arlan D odson, Jr.
1106 Nashville Trust Building
Nashville 3, Tennessee
Attorneys for Defendants
65a
EXHIBIT “ A ” TO REPORT OF BOARD
R eport op the Special Committee op the D avidson
County B oard op E ducation
The special committee of the Davidson County Board
of Education appointed to study and present to the Board
a feasible plan for the orderly integration of the public
schools of Davidson County, Tennessee, under the juris
diction of the Davidson County Board of Education makes
the following report:
1. This committee has consulted with the members of
the staff who have made available to it all the research
data which they were able to accumulate within the time
allowed. In addition, the members of the committee, as
well as the members of the staff, both since the date of
the hearing in the United States District Court and prior
thereto, have discussed with parents and teachers various
approaches which might be made to the problem. Further,
your committee has met with and consulted with its legal
counsel and discussed with its legal counsel all various
possible plans for such integration.
2. Among other plans which the committee has con
sidered is the so-called Nashville Plan, which to date has
worked with a minimum of difficulties since being approved
by the United States District Court for the Middle District
of Tennessee. The Nashville Plan has likewise been ap
proved in other courts and other communities where it has
been employed. Other plans calling for more expeditious
integration, or integration at higher levels at the com
mencement of the plan, have resulted in community dis
turbances, disciplinary problems, property loss and multiple
administrative difficulties. This committee from its study
has recognized that in many respects the problem of effec-
66a
tuating a satisfactory plan is more difficult in the David
son County school system than it was in the school system
of the City of Nashville. Some of the factors which bring
this about are that in the City of Nashville there was a
great concentration of Negro population around the schools
in the City of Nashville serving only Negroes prior to the
adoption of the plan, whereas in Davidson County the vari
ous areas primarily populated by Negroes are greatly scat
tered and are not necessarily located near to a school which
has been used for the purpose of serving only Negro stu
dents in the past. As a result of this factor, a greater per
centage of the schools of the Davidson County system will
be affected than was true in the City of Nashville system.
Another highly important factor which makes the prob
lem more difficult in the County system than in the system
of the City of Nashville is the fact that there has been a
tremendous increase of the school population in Davidson
County over the past several years, with the result that
all or practically all of the facilities in the County sys
tem are crowded or overcrowded and more than 70 portable
buildings are presently in use in order to accommodate the
pupil population; even though several new schools have
been opened each year for a period of fifteen years. Such
a situation was not true in the City system at the time
an attempt was made to integrate the schools so that the
assignment of students was not complicated by the lack of
physical facilities. Similarly, the teacher load in the County
system in all of the schools is at a peak, which situation was
not true in the City system, and this further complicates
the assignment of pupils.
The County school system has operated a transportation
system for all students living as much as IVi miles away
from the school attended. Such has never been true in the
Exhibit “A ” to Report of Board
67a
City system. Most of the buses operating in the County
transportation system are presently operating at peak
capacity, with the buses averaging about three trips per
day. The bus driver is charged with the responsibility, not
only of driving the bus safely in crowded traffic, but of see
ing to the safety of the students as they enter or are dis
charged from the bus, and likewise is charged with all
discipline on the bus. Any factor which creates a greater dis
ciplinary problem makes more hazardous the operation of
the bus by the one driver and thus the problem of transi
tion from a segregated to an integrated system is further
complicated in the County system.
Your committee also gave consideration to the emo
tional impact upon the children of both races and concluded
from its observations, studies and contacts with others that
the emotional impact would be greater upon the pupils
of both races in the County system than it was in the City
system because in the City the two races have lived closer
together and been associated together because of such
proximity of residences than was true in the County, where
the population is scattered.
In spite of the various factors making it more difficult
to apply the Nashville Plan in the County system, your
committee after giving consideration to all possible plans,
concluded that such was probably the only plan which
would work. Such a plan would permit the young students
to adjust themselves to one another at an age where there
is no resentment or little resentment. Discipline is a greater
problem with older children in any case and to begin at
higher grade levels than the first grade would cause disci
plinary problems difficult of solution and probably would
even lead to violence. Further, since transportation is in
volved in the County system, there ’would be less chance
Exhibit “A ” to Report of Board
68a
of disturbance on the school buses with the first grade
students than with older children while in route to and
from school, and this would permit the bus driver, who has
the great responsibility of watching out for the safety of
the students while loading and unloading and also coping
with the traffic problems that face him on the crowded
highways, to be required to devote less time as a peace
officer while attempting to carry out the other duties.
Your committee further gave consideration and made
study of when the plan should be commenced and con
cluded, based upon all factors, that certainly it should not
commence prior to September 1, 1961. The school system
is now approximately two months under way in the 1960-61
school year and is operating on a segregated plan, as it
has historically done. Any change of organization or plan
at this time would cause confusion and disruption of classes,
together with a loss of valuable teaching time. In addition,
it is the policy of the system not to force first grade stu
dents to change schools, even after the first month of the
term, although the family moves the residence to another
zone because of the emotional impact of changing schools
during a school year, which fact has even been recognized
by the Legislature of the State, and frequently recognized
by the school personnel and the parents in cases not involv
ing the segregation question. In addition, the change to
an integrated system will necessarily cause some anxiety
on the part of parents and students and a period of several
months will be needed to institute a program of orientation
to this change.
From a study of the situation in the City of Nashville
and elsewhere, it has been found that under the plan re
quests for transfer are to be anticipated, which requests
require time to screen and process, and this can be done
Exhibit “A” to Report of Board
69a
more efficiently and in less time and with less confusion be
tween the Spring registration and the beginning of the
Fall Term in September of 1961.
Two other factors in this connection were considered of
major importance. One was that the school at Bordeaux,
one of the schools where Negro children made application
for enrollment, has since been destroyed by fire, and the
community is being cared for in a makeshift way until a new
building can be constructed. This is an additional burden
on the physical facilities of the system, including the trans
portation system, during this emergency period. The An
tioch School, at which application has been made, is the
most overcrowded school in the entire system, and at this
time the addition of other students to that school would for
all practical purposes be a physical impossibility. This com
mittee gave consideration to the fact that the children who
are applying are not the victims of hardship because the
time consumed in traveling to Antioch by bus is as much
as the time consumed presently by such applicants in going
to Haynes High School because of the necessary stops made
on the Antioch route, whereas the bus makes fewer stops
and follows a more direct route to Haynes School.
Considering all of these factors, your committee recom
mends the following plan:
Exhibit “A ” to Report of Board
P L A N
1. Compulsory segregation based on race is abolished in
Grade One of the Davidson County Schools for the
scholastic year beginning in September 1961, and
thereafter for one additional grade beginning with
each subsequent school year, i.e., for Grade Two in
September 1962, Grade Three in September 1963,
Grade Four in September 1964, etc.
70a
2. A plan of school zoning based upon location of school
buildings, transportation facilities and the most re
cent scholastic census, without reference to race, will
be established for the administration of the first grade,
and other grades as they are desegregated according
to the gradual plan.
3. Students entering the first grade will be permitted to
attend the school designated for the zone in which he
or she resides, subject to regulations that may become
necessary in particular cases.
4. Application for transfer of first grade students, and
subsequent grades according to the gradual plan, from
the school of their zone to another school will be given
careful consideration and will be granted when made
in writing by parents, guardians, or those acting in
the position of parents, when good cause therefor is /
shown and when transfer is practicable and consistent
with sound school administration.
5. The following will be regarded as some of the valid
conditions for requesting transfer :
a. When a white student would otherwise be required
to attend a school previously serving colored stu
dents only.
b. When a colored student would otherwise be re
quired to attend a school previously serving white
students only.
c. When a student would otherwise be required to
attend a school where the majority of students in
that school, or in his or her grade, are of a different
race.
Exhibit “A ” to Report of Board
71a
6. A plan of pupil registration to be held each Spring
to aid in formulating necessary arrangements for the
opening of schools in the Fall, such as available room,
teaching aids, textbooks, pupil immunizations, zoning,
and transportation facilities, will be continued.*
7. Transportation will be provided to all students that
are eligible for bus service.*
Exhibit “A ” to Report of Board
This has been done for years.
72a
Filed: October 21,1960
The plaintiffs, Henry C. Maxwell, Jr., et ah, respectfully
object to the plan filed in the above entitled cause on or
about the 19th day of October, 1960, by the defendant,
County Board of Education of Davidson County, Tennes
see, and specify as grounds of objection the following:
1. That the plan does not provide for elimination of
racial segregation in the public schools of Davidson County
“with all deliberate speed” as required by the due process
and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States.
2. That the plan does not take into account the period
of over six (6) years which have elapsed during which the
defendant, County Board of Education of Davidson Coun
ty, has completely failed, neglected and refused to comply
with the said requirements of the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States.
3. That the additional twelve (12) year period provided
in said plan is not shown to be “necessary in the public
interest” and “ consistent with good faith compliance at the
earliest practicable date” in accordance with the said re
quirement of the due process and equal protection clauses
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States.
4. That the defendants have not carried their burden of
showing any substantial problems related to public school
administration arising from:
S pecification o f O b jection s to P lan F iled by County
B oard o f E du cation o f D avid son County
73a
a) “ the physical condition of the school plant” ;
b) “ the school transportation system” ;
c) “ personnel” ;
d) “revision of school districts and attendance areas
into compact units to achieve a system of determining-
admission to the public schools on a nonraeial basis” ;
e) “ revision of local laws and regulations which may be
necessary in solving the foregoing problems” ;
as specified by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of
Education (May 31, 1955) 349 US 294, 75 S Ct 753, 99
L Ed 653, which necessitate the additional time contem
plated by their plan for compliance with the constitutional
requirement of a racially unsegregated public educational
system.
5. That the plan is manifestly a substantially exact copy
of the “ Nashville Plan” adopted by defendants without
reference to the local conditions in Davidson County as a
minimum plan predicated on subjective and mental fears
of the defendants as to possible community hostility or
friction among students, and is not supported by a showing
of any objective administrative conditions or problems
which legally justify its complete deprivation of the con
stitutional rights of plaintiffs and all other children now
in school to an integrated education by projecting the bar
of segregation into the next twelve years.
6. That the plan forever deprives the infant plaintiffs
and all other Negro children now enrolled in the public
schools of Davidson County, of their rights to a racially
Specification of Objections to Plan Filed by
County Board of Education of Davidson County
74a
unsegregated public education, and for this reason violates
the due process and equal protection clauses of the Four
teenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
7. That the plan wholly ignores and fails to comply
with the statement of this Court from the Bench on 26
September, 1960, holding that the individual plaintiffs
“ have been denied their constitutional and legal rights” ,
and suggesting that they be accorded these rights by defen
dants voluntarily rather than by court order, in that under
the plan the individual plaintiffs can never be admitted to
an integrated school and are forever deprived of their
rights to a racially integrated public education in Davidson
County.
8. That the plan fails to take into account recent an
nexation by the City of Nashville of a large area of sur
rounding Davidson County resulting in the public schools
of said County becoming a part of the City of Nashville
School System, which latter School System is now desegre
gated from the first through the fourth grades.
9. That the plan fails to take into account the rights of
the infant plaintiffs and other Negro children similarly
situated and forever deprives them of their rights to enroll
in and attend any technical or other special or vocational
schools, summer courses and educational training of a
specialized nature as to which enrollment is not based on
location of residence.
10. Paragraph five (5) of the plan violates the due
process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States in that
Specification of Objections to Plan Filed by
County Board of Education of Davidson County
75a
said paragraph provides racial factors as valid conditions
to support requests for transfer, and further in that the
racial factors therein provided are manifestly designed
and necessarily operate to perpetuate racial segregation.
11. That the plan contemplates continued maintenance
and operation by defendants of “ Negro” and “white”
schools substantially designated bj7 race, in violation of the
due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, in
that it fails to make any provision for the reorganization
of the entire County School System into a unitary, non-
racial school system so as to include a plan for the assign
ment of teachers, principals and other school personnel, as
well as school children, on a nonracial basis; for the allot
ment of funds, construction of schools and approval of
budgets on a nonracial basis; and for the elimination of all
other discriminations in the operation of the school system
or in the school curriculum which are based solely on race
and color.
W herefore, the plaintiffs pray:
1. That the Court grant their motions for temporary re
straining order and preliminary injunction so as to require
the immediate admission by defendants of the individual
plaintiffs to the public schools of Davidson County, Ten
nessee on an unsegregated basis.
2. That the declaratory and permanent injunctive relief
prayed for in their complaint be granted, said injunctive
relief to be effective not later than the beginning of the
Spring Semester or Term of the public schools of Davidson
County in January, 1961.
Specification of Objections to Plan Filed by
County Board of Education of Davidson County
76a
3. That the defendants be required by the Court to re
organize the entire County School System of Davidson
County, Tennessee into a unitary nonracial school system,
including all of the matters prayed for in the sixth prayer
of the complaint filed in this cause.
Respectfully submitted,
Z. A lexander L ooby and
A von N. W illiams, Jr.
327 Charlotte Avenue
Nashville 3, Tennessee
T hurgood M arshall and
Jack Greenberg
10 Columbus Circle
Suite 1790
New York 19, New York
Attorneys\ for Plaintiffs
Specification of Objections to Plan Filed by
County Board of Education of Davidson County
77a
Excerpts From Transcript of Hearing,
October 24, 1960
# * # * *
—30—
J. E. Moss, called as a witness in behalf of the defen
dants, being first duly sworn, was examined and testified
as follows:
Direct Examination : JL. 42. .££.TT w •?> "Jv* 'Tt'
—53—
By the Court:
Q. How many colored students are there? A. Twenty-
four hundred roughly.
Q. As compared with how many Whites ? A. It's 47,000
- 5 4 -
all together. That would be about 45,000 Whites.
Q. About 45,000.
By Mr. Dodson:
Q. It constitutes approximately what per cent? A. Five
per cent; five per cent Negro.
By the Court:
Q. And how many Colored schools? A. Seven Negro
schools.
^ ^
— 68—
# * # * *
Cross Examination by Mr. Williams:
Q. Mr. Moss, if the Court were to order the Board to
adopt a nonracial school zone plan in Davidson County
immediately—
78a
Mr. Dodson: I didn’t get the first part of that
question.
By Mr. Williams:
Q. If the Court were to order the Board to adopt a non-
racial school zoning and attendance plan in Davidson
County immediately, would you please tell me, sir, how
many Negro students would be assigned to what schools
that have been formerly white? A. If there were complete
desegregation?
Q. Yes, sir. A. I believe that’s something more than
40 schools and would involve more than a thousand stu
dents.
Q. No, what I am asking you, sir, is— A. All right.
Q. —what schools would have how many Negro pupils
and how many White pupils ? A. Let me answer that this
way: If we integrated the first grade, there would be about
- e o -
os. If we go four grades, there would be 350. If we went
all grades, there would be a thousand and something. Now,
I couldn’t tell you, Mr. Williams, how many White children
and Colored children would be in each zone, because I don’t
even know how much is in each school now. I can’t carry
those figures in my mind.
Q. Well, what I am asking you, sir, is this: Does the
Board have any information available to it as to how many
Negro students will be in any one of those 40 schools?
A. Oh, yes, sir.
Q. Where is that information, sir? A. The boys that
are coming up on attendance will have that.
Q. They will furnish that information as to how many
Negroes there will be in each school? A. Yes. They can
tell you how many are eligible to go to each school.
J. E. Moss—for Defendants—Cross
79a
Q. But you do not know that yourself! A. If you will
give me time to look at my figures, I can work it out, but
I don’t have it from memory where I could quote it.
Q. Well, sir, can you give me this information: What is
the largest number of Negroes who would be in any one
of those 40 schools under total integration. A. Total in
tegration. Well, I judge that would be— Cumberland High
—7 0 -
School, I expect would have the largest number.
Q. That is out in Bordeaux! A. That’s near Bordeaux,
yes.
Q. And approximately what would that number be, sir!
A. There is about 800 there now. It would go up above a
thousand.
Q. You would think there would be 200 Negro pupils
in Cumberland High School! A. I wouldn’t be surprised
if there wouldn’t be that many.
Q. That is just a guess on your part! A. That is an
estimate, and of course I could—-
Q. And your figures that your attendance— A. I think
our attendance people could give you a better answer on
that, if you will wait.
Q. All right, sir. But if you integrated four grades, you’d
just have 350 Negro pupils who would be eligible for in
tegration among 40 schools! A. That’s correct.
Q. An average of less than ten children per school! A.
That’s correct.
* # # # #
—107—
# # * * *
Q. All right. Now, Mr. Moss, what schools have been
built in the county in the past five years! A. Which—
J. E. Moss—for Defendants—Cross
80a
Q. What schools? A. What schools in the last five
years?
Q. Yes. A. Are you talking about White schools, now,
or Colored?
Q. I would like to have the White ones and the Negro
- 1 0 8 -
schools. A. In the last five years?
Q. Yes, sir. A. That would be impossible to give it to
you accurately, because we built about—I can give you
the five we built last year. Gra-Mar—
Q. Gra-Mar? A. And King’s Lane.
Q. King’s Lane. A. Two Rivers.
Q. Two Rivers. A. West Meade.
Q. West Meade. A. And the fifth one— And a school
we call Norman Binkley now.
Q. Norman Binkley. All right, sir. How expensive were
they? How much did Gra-Mar cost, roughly? A. All of
them cost around $200,000, except Two Rivers, which cost
about $600,000.
Q. $600,000. All right, sir. And they were all built last
year? A. (The witness did not reply, but nodded his
head.)
Q. When were they started? A. They— We entered
them the first time this fall, and they were started about
August or September of last year.
—109—
Q. August or September of ’59, and they were entered
September ’60. Is that correct, sir? A. That’s correct.
That’s approximately correct. I am not—I can’t remember
the exact date.
Q. I believe you employed new teaching staffs for those
schools, or did you, sir? A. Yes.
Q. How many teachers were involved in that? A. This
is an estimate.
J. E. Moss—for Defendants■—Cross
81a
Q. It’s subject to correction. If you subsequently want
to submit a written list or brochure showing* the accurate
figures, that’s all right with me, sir. A. Well, there’d be
somewhere between 8 and 10 in the four schools. The four
schools were elementary. Two Rivers is the only high
school. That had about—approximately-—started off with
about 15 teachers.
Q. And 8 or 10 each in the others ! A. In that neighbor
hood, 8, 9, or 10 or something in that proximity.
Q. I take it you have built several other White schools
since 1955, have you not, sir! A. Yes, and we have built
some Negro schools, too, sir.
Q. I am going to get to that. Approximately how many
White schools other than these five that you built last year
— 110—
would you say you built since 1955! A. Well, we—I
couldn’t give you those by memory. I ’m afraid I might be
wrong.
Q. Approximately, sir. A. We built three or four each
year.
Q. Built three or four schools each year! A. Yes.
Q. Three or four White schools each year! A. Well,
three or four schools. We—
Q. Three or four schools! A. Year before last I think
we had two Negro schools.
Q. All right, sir. Now, how many Negro schools have
you built since 1955! A. Well, I believe two is all we have
built in the last five years.
Q. What two was that! A. In the last 12 years, we
have built all of them except a portion of Haynes and Early.
Q. What are the two that you have built in the past five
years, sir! A. Bellevue and Charles S. Johnson.
^
J. E. Moss—for Defendants—Cross
82a
J. E. Moss—for Defendants—Cross
—114—
Q. Now, Mr. Moss, you stated yesterday on direct exam
ination that the White people had been leaving the city and
coming to the county and that this made the schools over
crowded. Is that correct, sir? A. That is right,
Q. So that the Board has now taken the position that
White children who leave the city and come to the county
are entitled to crowd out Negro children who have been
living in the county all their lives ? Is that the position you
are taking, sir ? A. Oh, no. We—
Q. Is it your defense for the admission of these six
plaintiffs that Antioch and Bordeaux are overcrowded?
— 115—
A. Well, they are very crowded situations, yes.
Q. And no doubt they contain some of the White people
who have been fleeing integration in the city. Isn’t that
true, sir? A. These six children would not be the prob
lem. We can accept those six children as far as room is
concerned.
Q. I am glad to hear that, sir. A. But, under our policy,
we can’t accept two ninth-graders or two any other grade
without accepting all the others that come.
Q. Mr. Moss, if the Court ordered you to, you could,
couldn’t you? A. W e’d try our best.
—116—
# # # # #
Q. So that wouldn’t it be true, Mr. Moss, that you would
—117—
eliminate some of your transportation problems, at least
with regard to Negro children if they were permitted to
attend the White school right there in their neighborhood,
83a
rather than travel to the consolidated school? A. There
would be some transportation saved.
Q. There would be quite a bit of that, wouldn’t there?
A. We would lose, though, in other areas.
Q. In what areas, Mr. Moss? A. Well, we, for instance,
would have a lot of vacant rooms if all of the Negro chil
dren elected to go to the nearest school. There would be
some vacant rooms. Quite a few.
Q. There would be some vacant rooms in the Negro
schools? A. Yes. That’s the reason we are asking for a
gradual plan, Mr. Williams.
Q. And this has been occasioned by your pqlicy of con
tinued building of schools in an attempt to serve the Negro
population on the one hand and the White population on
the other? That’s correct, isn’t it? A. That is right.
Q. And that was continued following the Supreme Court
decision. You have built at least two schools and possibly
three, by your own testimony since that time? A. Two is
—1 1 8 -
all I am sure about.
Q. Negro schools. A. And that’s when the people came
in and asked us to build them, and they didn’t want to
integrate.
Q. You have built more than five White ones, though,
since that time ? A. Yes.
Q. You say you built these schools because the people
came in and asked you to build them? Sir? A. Yes, sir.
Q. But you knew at that time about the Supreme Court
decision, did you not? A. Yes.
Q. And you knew that if a single Negro child wanted
to attend an integrated school that some arrangements
would have to be made, did you not, sir? A. Yes.
J. E. Moss—for Defendants—Cross
84a
Q. And yet you continued building segregated schools!
A. We built the two small ones, yes. I would like to say
this in our defense, that those schools can be used as the
community grows.
Q. Yes, sir, but they weren’t built for maximum use in a
county school system which is operated without regard to
race or color? That is true, isn’t it? They were built for
maximum use under a segregated system? A. Yes.
— 119—
Q. And this was going on while the Board knew that it
had told the Negro community that it was trying to work
this matter out to comply with the Supreme Court decision?
Is that correct, sir? A. Mr. Williams, we work for the
people, and we have to go along with them. You can only
go as fast as the people will go with you.
̂ ^
— 135—
# # # # *
Q. Mr. Moss, with regard to spring registration, don’t
you have transfers during the year? A. Yes.
Q. How many transfers would you say you have had
since school began? A. I couldn’t even estimate that. We
have had several.
Q. You couldn’t even estimate it? A. We have had sev
eral, of course.
Q. It doesn’t throw the whole school system into an
uproar when you have those transfers, does it, sir? A.
Well, it’s some disorder, but it doesn’t throw the whole
system out of kilter, no.
Q. It isn’t the reason why you should stop the school
system for 12 years until we get these transfers done?
A. We have been on a plan of registration in the spring,
and if we have any large amount of registration any other
J. E. Moss—for Defendants—Cross
85a
time it involves a lot of time and breaking into the program
and schedules, and so forth.
Q. But you don’t stop the school system and send any
children home to wait for 12 years so you can get these
transfers effected, do you? A. We have never sent any
- 1 3 6 -
child home for 12 years; no, sir.
Q. You don’t send them home for as much as a week
so you can get a transfer effected, do you, Mr. Moss? A.
I f a child moves in here from out of the county or out of the
state, of course, we have to accept his transfer.
Q. But what I am talking about is this: If a child at
Gra-Mar, for example, wants to transfer to another White
school in the county, he doesn’t have to wait for a month in
order to get that transfer effected, does he? A. His rec
ords will be sent— He will tell a school where he is, and his
records will be sent— A list of names will be sent to the
school he is going to transfer to in the spring.
Q. Yes, s ir ; but if he wants to transfer in the middle of
the year, he doesn’t have to wait a month. If he has a sound
administrative reason for that transfer, he doesn’t have
to wait a month for that transfer? A. No.
Q. Not even as much as a week? A. Oh, no. No.
Q. He can do it right away, can’t he? A. Yes.
* # # * #
—137—
# * # # #
Q. As a matter of fact, Mr. Maxwell was so concerned
that he came to your office several times on the day that you
—138—
had set aside for transfers, or before that time, in an
effort to try to get some satisfaction out of you on that
J. E. Moss—for Defendants—Cross
86a
question. Isn’t that true? A. He only came once to see
me, to my knowledge, about entering the schools.
Q. And there is no question but that September the sec
ond was the day set aside for pupils who wanted to trans
fer in the county school system? A. As far as the date is
concerned, we could have accepted those two children then,
yes.
Q. Yes. And— A. But we have a general plan of regis
tering in the spring that we like to follow.
Q. Yes, sir, but wasn’t it published in the newspaper at
your behest that September second would be the day for
transfers? A. Yes.
Q. What is the condition of Glencliff School with refer
ence to overcrowding or undercrowding? A. It’s crowded
but not as much so as Antioch.
Q. You have room over there for transfer students. If
you had a White student who wanted to transfer from
another school, room could be made for him over there? A.
One or two students would make but little difference. That’s
right.
—139—
Q. As a matter of fact, do you know that Reverend and
Mrs. Maxwell’s children were actually accepted over there
and registered by the principal before this question came
up about zoning? A. No.
Q. You didn’t know that? A. They went to the school
and the principal took their names, but I don’t believe he
actually—
Q. Do you know that they live closer to Grlencliff than
they do to Antioch, Mr. Moss, or substantially the same
distance, anyway? A. Not much difference.
Q. And there is no reason why they couldn’t go to Glen-
cliff if they were White students? A. No, they couldn’t go
to Glencliff where they live, if White.
J. E. Moss—for Defendants—•Cross
87a
Q. If they were White students, would they go to An
tioch? A. I f they were White, they would go to Antioch,
yes.
Q. Regardless of how much the walls are bulging over
there (I think that was the expression used), they.would
go to Antioch? A. (The witness nodded his head in re
sponse.)
Q. Well, that’s self-evident. A. Unless there was some
— 1 4 0 -
special reason, then we would let them go to—
Q. Well, if, as a matter of fact, what you all have said
were true and it were just physically impossible for them
to go to Antioch, then you would send them to Gleneliff if
they were White children? A. No, not— Let me clear that.
Sometimes a subject offered at one school is not offered (in
high school) in another, and we permit them to go on that
basis.
Q. Oh, then, what you are saying is that under the policy
of the Board, it would not send them to Gleneliff, it would
make room for them at Antioch. Is that it? A. Two chil
dren out of 1400 or 1200 is not a large number.
Q. You would make room for them. All right. A. But
we can’t accept two without accepting all the rest in that
same class.
Q. When was the Bordeaux School burned down— I
mean partially burned? A. Let’s see. That exact date I
could not give.
Q. It was about September the 8th? A. Somewhere
around the early part of September.
Q. Yes, sir. Now, how many classes do you have operat
ing in the two classrooms that remain and the cafeteria
now? A. Let’s see. I believe there are two classes in the
J. E. Moss—for Defendants—Cross
88a
J. E. Moss—for Defendants—Cross
—1 4 1 -
remnants of the Bordeaux building, and I believe there’s
about two in the church next door.
Q. And you all had approximately how many students
in that school, Mr. Moss? A. There was approximately
500 when it burned.
Q. And 20 rooms? A. Something in that proximity, may
be 18.
Q. And approximately 20 teachers? A. Yes.
Q. Sir? A. Eighteen or 20 teachers.
Q. And you made arrangements to accommodate those
children at various places, at other schools— A. That’s
correct.
Q. —a church next door, at what remained of the school;
and I take it this was done with regard to their residence?
In other words, the children who lived closest to Bordeaux
School were the ones which were retained in the school and
in the church next door, I would assume? A. Yes, sir.
Q. The children who lived closest to King’s Lane were
those who were sent over there, et cetera? A. That is cor
rect.
Q. And arrangements had to be made, I suppose, with
these church people to use the church facilities? A. That
—142—
is correct.
Q. Arrangements had to be made to transfer these stu
dents to King’s Lane and to the other schools where you
sent them. Is that correct, sir? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Arrangements also had to be made to transfer teach
ers to these schools? A. Yes, sir.
Q. To arrange the physical facilities to accommodate
them? A. That’s correct.
89a
Q. I presume that you may have had achievement-level
problems in grouping these children when they got to these
schools where they had never been before so as to fit them
into the curriculum of that school! A. That’s possible.
Q. How long did it take to do that! A. It seems to me
that the school burned on Wednesday night or Thursday,
and we had them pretty well in school by the first of the
week.
Q. Four days! A. Four days, yes. But that doesn’t mean
that they were all settled down and organized. It just means
that we had them at the schools and ready to reorganize and
re-plan and re—
—143—
Q. There may have been a little emotional instability as
in the case of this little Negro child in the integrated school
in the City that you were talking about yesterday! A.
Children always have some emotional disturbance when
they move, yes.
Q. Yes, but they will settle down, they are probably most
of them over that now! Wouldn’t you say that! A. They
will get over it if they aren’t.
Q. Yes, they will get over it. It won’t have a lasting per
manent effect on their educational progress, will it! A. I
hope not.
Q. As an educator, do you think it will! A. I think that
they will forget all about it in time.
# # # # #
—144—
* # # # #
Q. And you were able to do it! Now, Mr. Moss, are you
familiar with the National Defense Education Act of 1958!
J. E. Moss—for Defendants—Cross
Mr. Dodson: What!
90a
Mr. Williams: National Defense Education Act of
1958—
By Mr. Williams:
Q. —providing for Government aid to schools to enable
them to enrich and up-grade their programs in science,
mathematics, and foreign languages? A. Yes.
Q. In Title III of that Act, and then they had various
other titles dealing with vocational education. A. I know
what you are talking about; yes, sir.
Q. Has the county taken advantage of that at all? A.
Yes, sir.
Q. Has the County submitted projects? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Are you familiar with the projects that the County
has submitted under that Act? A. Yes, sir.
Q. What projects have they submitted?
The Court: Let’s see, now, what bearing does this
- 1 4 5 -
have on this case?
Mr. Williams: If Your Honor please, this, in
effect, defeats my purpose to have to explain it, but
I will explain it, since Your Honor is interested in it.
The Court: I am not interested in it unless it
bears on this case.
Mr. Williams: It does bear on this case. I will
state that to Your Honor. I am trying to show what
the County School System has done in terms of de
veloping—this desegregation, in effect, constitutes a
development of the County School System, if Your
Honor please.
The Court: Yes.
J. E. Moss—for Defendants—Cross
91a
Mr. Williams: And they are asking for time,' if
Your Honor please. They are talking about admin
istrative problems. Now, I am trying to find out
how much time they have taken to deal with other
administrative problems.
The Court: I don’t think that is relevant at all.
That is entirely different. You would have to in
vestigate different factors. That would be, in effect,
trying another lawsuit. What they did under some
act of Congress that would up-grade all schools, it
has nothing to do with segregation or integration.
# # # # * _______------
—157—
# # # * #
Q. That under this provision in paragraph 5 of the plan, V1-
—1 5 8 -
setting forth these racial conditions based on a minority-
race transfer, the effect of it is to permit a child to choose
segregation outside of his zone but not to choose integra
tion outside of his zone! That is true, isn’t it? A. The
child and his parents can choose, yes.
The Court: Is this identical to the City’s provi
sion?
The Witness: I think so.
Mr. Dodson: Verbatim.
Mr. Williams: It is substantially identical to the
City provision, if Your Honor please, but it was
not brought to this Court’s attention at the time that
the City provision was approved, exactly how the
City provision operates, as Mr. Moss has described.
It has been operated so that instead of going to the
school in his zone and there seeking a transfer, no
J. E. Moss—for Defendants-—Cross
92a
White child in the City has ever seen one of the al
legedly integrated schools to which he was assigned,
no Negro child who didn’t affirmatively seek a trans
fer to an integrated school has ever seen the inte
grated school to which the Nashville Board led this
Court to believe he was assigned. So that this pre
sents a little different, a little more than was before
the Court in that case.
The Court: All right, go ahead.
— 159—
By Mr. Williams:
Q. And that is true, what I have stated, isn’t it, Mr.
Moss! That’s the way the plan operates in the City and
that’s the way you intend to operate it! A. That is correct.
* # # # #
— 160—
* * # * *
Q. Now, you have testified that if you integrated the
first grade, you’d have 98, or 98 Negroes as against some
50,000 Whites! A. Forty-five thousand.
Q. Forty-five thousand, all right. If you integrated all
through the fourth grade, you would have 350 as against
this 45,000! A. That’s right.
Q. And if you integrated all the grades, you would only
have a thousand! Is that correct! A. That is correct.
— 161—
Q- And if the experience in Nashville is valid, then, actu
ally, if you integrated all at once, you would have less
than a hundred Negroes spread among 40 schools in the
county! Isn’t that true, Mr. Moss! A. First grade, yes.
Q. An average of approximately two and a half pupils in
In the first grade, true.
J. E. Moss—for Defendants—Cross
93a
approximately half of your schools which have been White!
A. That is correct.
Q. Yes, sir. Now, that doesn’t create any great teaching
problem, does it! A. That would be the least problem, yes,
that we’d have.
Q. Yes, sir, that would be the least problem. What prob
lem would be greater than the teacher problem! A. The
greatest problem would be to desegregate all the way, of
course.
Q. No, sir, I mean, assuming we segregated. W e’ve got
it segregated all the way now, based on the experience.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. W e’ve got a hundred or less than a hundred Negro
students in 40 schools in the County! A. Yes.
Q. I think you have got about 90-something, haven’t you!
A. Eighty-some-odd.
—162—
Q. Eighty-some-odd. And that’s an average of approxi
mately two and a half Negro pupils per school! A. (Nod
ding affirmatively.)
Q. What kind of problem does that create, Mr. Moss!
A. That would only create a problem with the parents and
students, and I think it is a problem that we could handle.
Q. That would be a problem that you could handle! A.
Yes.
Q. All right, sir. Mr. Moss, you don’t have any evidence
that integration in your higher grade levels would lead to
violence, do you! A. Not based on personal experience.
Q. Well, you don’t have any scientific evidence based on
social studies that it would lead to violence! A. Just re
ports I have read of other systems.
Q. Well, you read Southern School News, don’t you!
A. I have read it.
J. E. Moss—for Defendants—Cross
94a
Q. Do you know that there are several hundred school dis
tricts in the State of Kentucky that have been desegregated
and they have had violence in only two of them? You know
that? A. I didn’t know that. I didn’t have that data.
Q. You aren’t insisting that— Of all 768 school districts
in 12 states of the South and District of Columbia which
- 1 6 3 -
have been desegregated, you aren’t insisting that there has
been any violence in any substantial number of them? A.
There has been substantial violence. I don’t know about
the violence in substantial numbers.
Q. Do you know of any violence or any studies of vio
lence in other than the first year of the Nashville case,
the Clinton case, and the Little Eock case and a couple of
counties up in Kentucky? A. Those would be the major
cases I have read about.
Q. And the Little Eock case was a gradual plan of inte
gration, wasn’t it? A. It started at the wrong end, though.
Q. Well, the Nashville case was a gradual plan starting
at the right end, according to you? A. I think so, yes.
Q. But they had violence there? Sir? A. I don’t know
whether the violence was because of starting with the first
grade or not. I think not.
# # # * #
—374—
# * # # #
D r. Eugene Weinstein, a witness called on behalf of the
plaintiffs, being first duly sworn, was examined and testified
as follows:
Direct Examination by Mr. Williams:
Q. This is Dr. Eugene Weinstein? A. Yes.
Q. Dr. Weinstein, that speaker doesn’t operate as a loud-
Dr. Eugene Weinstein—for Plaintiffs—Direct
95a
speaker. Speak loud enough so that everybody can hear
you. A. They will.
Q. Dr. Weinstein, you live here in Nashville, do you not?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How long have you been in this locality, sir? A. A
little over two years.
Q. Where are you employed, sir? A. Vanderbilt Uni-
—375—
versity.
Q. In what capacity? A. I am Associate Professor of
Sociology.
Q. Dr. Weinstein, where did you receive your education?
A. I got my bachelor’s degree from the University of
Chicago, my master’s degree from Indiana University, and
my Ph.D. from Northwestern University in 1954.
Q. And was your Ph.D. in the field of— A. In the field
of sociology, specializing in social psychology.
Q. Now, Dr. Weinstein, after your acquisition of a doc
torate, did you do any further postgraduate study or re
search? A. Research. I spent the years prior to coming
to Vanderbilt in research and doing research in the general
area of child development. I spent the immediate period of
three years as a research analyst for the Children’s Bureau
of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.
Q. In Chicago? A. No, in Washington.
Q. In Washington, D.C.? A. That’s right.
Q. Then I take it that you would consider yourself rea
sonably an expert on the subject of child development?
—376—
A. Reasonably well versed, yes.
Q. Dr. Weinstein, have you done any recent study or
a recent study on the subject of desegregation in Nashville?
A. Yes, I have.
Dr. Eugene Weinstein—for Plaintiffs—Direct
96a
Q. Has there been any other study of the same type that
you have done, made by any social scientists as far as you
know? A. As far as I know, no. This is the first study of
its kind.
Q. Will you explain, sir, just what this study was, what
it consisted of, and what your findings were? A. That
would take a great deal of time, as far as defining it is
concerned.
Q. Well, if you will explain what it was and what it
consisted of, I think I can focus the particular findings that
we would like to bring out. A. This was a study of the
general area of Negro attitudes and decision-making re
garding desegregation. Roughly, the outlines of the study
are this: given the grade-a-year plan and system of eli
gibility under the Nashville plan, two groups of Negro
parents are created, a group which has chosen to exercise
their option and attend a desegregated school, a formerly
all-White school, and a group which has the same option
but has chosen to send their children to segregated schools,
to the historically Negro schools.
—377—
The study was concerned with— Well, actually, there is
a third group of parents who send their children to de
segregated schools and then, subsequently, for one reason
or another, withdraw them.
The study was concerned with identifying the factors
which were related to the choice. It was concerned with
the decision to segregate or to desegregate made by the
involved Negro families. Some 88 families, mothers for
the most part, were intensively interviewed in the course
of the study.
Q. And were these findings, then, systematically accumu
lated, analyzed, and conclusions reached on the basis of
that? A. Yes.
Dr. Eugene Weinstein—for Plaintiffs—Direct
97a
Q. Now, Dr. Weinstein, based on— I should ask you when
this study was made. I don’t believe you stated that. A.
The bulk of the interviewing was done this past summer
between the months, roughly, of about May and September.
I might also add that the interviewing was done not by
myself but by a trained Negro interviewer.
Q. Why did you use a Negro interviewer, Dr. Weinstein!
A. This is common practice in research of this kind, to use
interviewers who are most likely to be able to establish
—3 7 8 -
rapport, get easy, frank responses from respondents. It
has been discovered, in this area especially, that Negro
interviewers are more effective in interviewing Negroes.
Q. Now, Dr. Weinstein, getting down to some of the
findings of your study, with particular reference to the
group of families who did not send their children to inte
grated schools, will you state what your findings were with
regard to the attitudes and the reasons of the parents for
that? A. The single most frequent reason given, given in
roughly 40 per cent of the cases, was the difficulty or in
advisability or lack of willingness on the parents’ part
to separate children. Under the grade-a-year plan they
would have—they had older children who were not eligible
to attend the desegregated school. In order to take ad
vantage of the eligibility of the younger child, they would
have to split their families, split their children and send
them to two different schools. This was in 19. This was
mentioned as the primary reason of 19 of the 50, or roughly
40 per cent of the cases. It was a factor involved in roughly
60 per cent of the cases. Twenty-nine out of the 50 would
have to split children.
Q. And this was, then, according to your findings, the
Dr. Eugene Weinstein—for Plaintiffs—Direct
98a
Dr. Eugene Weinstein—for Plaintiffs—Direct
- 3 7 9 -
major reason? A. This was the most frequent single fac
tor, yes.
Q. Now, with specific reference to fear of friction or of
violence or anything of that nature, what were your findings
with regard to that? A. For the whole sample, over 90
per cent, for the whole sample, expected no difficulties.
The only difficulties that were reported in the desegregated
group were occurrences which had experiences which they
had had in the initial weeks of desegregation back in 1957.
In eight cases they did mention the telephone calls, the
cars parading back and forth in front of their homes on the
street, strange cars. Only four of the 50 desegregated—
rather, segregated families indicated that they expected or
could think of any groups or persons who might be out to
make trouble for them.
Q. You mean only four out of 50? A. Only four out
of the 50 indicated—•
Q. Of those who actually didn’t send their children? A.
Actually didn’t, that’s right.
Fear, I would say, fear of violence or difficulty or of
economic threat (we also asked them about losing their
job) was a minor factor in the decision-making process.
Q. I would ask you what were the findings with regard
to the feeling that the children would or would not do
better in integrated schools with regard to the parents
—380—
who sent their children to integrated schools? A. Of the
27 families who we interviewed, sent their children to inte
grated schools, were asked the following questions. One
of the questions they were asked was: Do you think your
child would learn more quickly, less quickly, or about the
same in the integrated school? Fourteen of the 27 thought
99a
that the child would learn more quickly. The rest either did
not know or felt it would make no difference. There were
no cases in which it was felt the child would learn more
slowly.
Q. So that the overwhelming majority of these parents
either felt that the child would do better in school or did not
know? A. Or thought that it would make no difference.
Q. Or thought that it would make no difference. A. But
the most frequent response was that.
Q. The most frequent response was, approximately half
of them said that they felt they would do better! A. They
felt that their children are doing better.
Q. Are doing better! A. Are doing better, yes. They
have had the experience.
Q. Dr. Weinstein, are there any other findings that you
think are material on this, of your study that you think
are material on the question of the advisability of this
—3 8 1 -
plan, before we get into the conclusions? A. There are
one or two that have, I think, an incidental bearing, at
least. One is the source of information regarding their
eligibility that was reported by the parents.
Q. Yes, sir. A. Newspapers and TV were reported in
somewhat over half of the 88 cases. The single most fre
quent source of information, interestingly, was a visit by
members of some civic organization, interested in encourag
ing parents to take advantage of their eligibility, informing
the parent of their eligibility.
There were surveys, door-to-door surveys during 1958,
then again last summer, in which for the first time—in
roughly 40 per cent of the cases, this was the initial main
source of information, people coming around, members of
these organizations, a part of this program, coming around
Dr. Eugene Weinstein—for Plaintiffs—Direct
100a
telling these children, or the parents, rather, that they
have an eligible child. This, I think has some bearing on
the current situation.
Q. So that your report would tend to indicate that the
parents in the City of Nashville, the majority of them were
not notified by the Board of Education as to where their
children should report? A. We had 13 out of the 88 cases
—382—
reported that they found out about their eligibility from the
school.
Q. Thirteen out of eighty-eight? A. This was upon mak
ing inquiry at the school.
Q. Now, let me ask you if this second point you have
in mind, is there anything in your study to indicate whether
parents who sent their children to integrated schools felt
that they were emotionally upset, or isolated? A. In 24
out of 27 cases, the response was, No. In one the parent
couldn’t tell. There were two instances in which the parent
said that there were difficulties at first. Two out of the 27
cases reported some adjustment difficulties in the begin
ning.
Q. Now, Dr. Weinstein, was there anything else? Was I
correct in assuming that that was the second point that you
felt was relevant to this plan? A. Yes; yes.
Q. Based on the findings of this survey or research, what
would be some conclusions, in your opinion as an expert,
that might validly be reached with regard to the grade-a-
year plan which has been proposed by the Davidson County
Board of Education and which I have allowed you to read?
A. Well, we must distinguish between data and conclusion,
data and inference. However, in experience of these par
ents, one inference we might draw, I think reasonably,
plausibly, is that the grade-a-year plan does impose a hard-
Dr. Eugene Weinstein—for Plaintiffs—Direct
101a
Dr. Eugene Weinstein—for Plaintiffs—Direct
—3 8 3 -
ship or does impose a factor on a number of Negro families,
makes it difficult for them, in a sense discourages them to
take advantage of their eligibility. This is the factor of
having to split children, separate children, send them to
different schools, which is purely a product of the grade-
a-year system.
Q. I might ask you something in regard to this. Is there
something involved in this factor other than mere incon
venience! Is there also a factor of fear for safety and
that sort of thing! A. Not so much fear for safety, but
parents did express the fact that they would like to be able,
or expressed the opinion that they would like to be able
to send their children together to the new situation. They
would feel more comfortable if both children could go into
this new kind of situation, which actually is psychologically
a sound approach on the part of these parents.
Q. Yes. Now, I would like to ask you this: If the pur
pose of a desegregation plan is to achieve a racially non-
discriminatory school system in which race is not a factor,
what, in your opinion, would be the effect of the transfer
provision in this plan, based on—predicated on racial fac
tors, in the light of achieving that end? A. Here we move,
not only with the implications of this study, so that it makes
it easy for Negro families who don’t want to, to discourage
—384—
them actually. The transfer system in combination with
the grade-a-year plan has an important effect on this
family separation issue.
The Nashville experience (I have some familiarity with
the Nashville experience, studying it rather carefully, what
information was available in preparation for the current re
search) would indicate mass transfers, mass paper trans-
102a
fers of Whites back into what is historically the White
school, of Negroes remaining in what is historically the
Negro school. I would say that the transfer provisions tend
—in my opinion, tend to keep the system oriented toward
a segregated system with token desegregation. This would
be the major thrust, the major orientation system.
Q. Then I believe you would agree with Dr. Long’s tes
timony yesterday that the transfer provision in this plan
is weighted and also the grade-a-year aspects of it are
weighted towards officially maintaining segregation in the
school system? A. Yes. For many of the same reasons
that Dr. Long indicated and for reasons indicated by the
current research.
Q. Now, with regard to this question of emotional ad
justment and disciplinary problems among older children,
are you familiar with any scientific studies which have been
made which are relevant to the effects of change from
—3 8 5 -
segregation to integration on young adult behavior? A. I
could indicate two in particular. One is a doctoral dis
sertation currently being written under my supervision
on the Oak Ridge High School desegregation situation,
comparing the attitudes of the White children in the de
segregated high schools subsequent to desegregation with
the attitudes of their parents.
Q. I believe the high school in Oak Ridge, Tennessee,
has been integrated since very shortly after the Supreme
Court decision, has it not? A. Yes. These data— Students
will sometimes take a while in getting their dissertation
written, so the data were actually drawn shortly after the
Oak Ridge high school was desegregated.
The major finding of this study is that the attitudes of
the children, the high school students in the desegregated
Dr. Eugene Weinstein—for Plaintiffs—Direct
103a
situation, the White students, are significantly more favor
able to desegregation than those of their parents on, not
only their general attitudes, but there was listed point by
point such things as eating in the cafeterias, attending
dances together, joint use of the swimming pool, and that.
And, oh, some 20-odd specific areas of desegregation rele
vant to the high school situation. This is one piece of
research.
There is another, a very large scale research conducted
—386—
during World War II, reported in the monumental work,
The American Soldier, attempting to assess the influence
of desegregation under combat conditions, the influence of
desegregation, of experimental integration of Negro pla
toons into White companies on White attitudes, on preju
dice, or attitudes toward the Negro; and it was found that
White companies who had integration experience— And
these were matched on all kinds of significant variables.
The general tenor of the findings was that the greater the
degree of contact with Negro troops—the greater the de
gree of integration in the company, rather, the more favor
able were the attitudes of the Whites toward integration
in that company.
From this study, from general studies of the relationship
of contact to attitudes and prejudice, the general conclusion
has been drawn that contact under conditions of equality,
so that a master-servant relationship will not affect— This
is contact, but it doesn’t affect attitude. But contact under
conditions of equality and a common task tends to have the
effect of reducing intergroup prejudice.
Q. Dr. Weinstein, I believe you said you had done con
siderable research on child development? A. Yes. I pub
lished numerous papers, two books.
Dr. Eugene Weinstein—for Plaintiffs—Direct
104a
Q. You have written two books on the subject! A. Yes.
—387—
One currently in preparation. I have had some experience
in this area.
Q. Yes. In your opinion, would it be possible in an edu
cational situation to evaluate whether or not a child could
achieve competently on any given level on the basis of six
weeks or two months, on the basis of the examination of
his records for a period of six weeks to two months, as
has been testified here by Mr. Moss! A. No. Spelling
tests, arithmetic tests, tests of this nature, which are highly
variable, even more variable than achievement-level tests
which account for a much broader range, I think it would
be extremely difficult to make a reliable prediction on the
basis of future progress with regard to either educational
or emotional adjustment on the basis of this kind of
information.
Q. Based on your experience and training as a social
psychologist— A. Yes.
Q. —also, would it be your opinion that a child who had
been in a racially segregated school, and had transferred
to a racially integrated school would undergo some period
of emotional adjustment! A. Yes. One would think it’s
likely.
Q. Would he undergo some period of perhaps scholastic
adjustment if there were a history of lower achievement
- 3 8 8 -
levels in the— A. Yes.
Q. Among the Negro schools? A. I think Mr. Pettie in
dicated, and I would agree wholeheartedly, that there is a
usual correlation between emotional problems and educa
tional problems.
Dr. Eugene Weinstein—for Plaintiffs—Direct
105a
Q. Would this period of emotional adjustment be a
permanent thing, necessarily? A. Not necessarily. It de
pends upon the child and upon the reasons for the emotional
problem. If you had a child, for example, whose personality
structure was weak, if he found it difficult to adjust in
general to new situations, this might be long-range. For a
normal, healthy child, it would be less likely, probably
would not be a long-range problem. Unlikely would be, I ’d
say.
Q. Would a period of six weeks to two months be an
adequate time within which to base a sound evaluation of
whether or not that child would succeed in the adjustment
to the situation ?
Mr. Dodson: I take it he is asking for an opinion.
Mr. Williams: Yes, sir.
By Mr. Williams:
Q. In your opinion? A. In my opinion, I would cer-
—389—
tainly hesitate to bet anything on the results of such an
evaluation. I don’t think it’s sufficient,
Q. One final question, unless you have something else,
some other comment you wish to make about the plan:
Dr. Weinstein, in your opinion as a sociologist or social
psychologist and having lived in this community for over
two years, is it, in your opinion— You have sat here
throughout this trial. Have you heard any evidence given
here by the defendants which, in your opinion, would pre
vent the School Board of Davidson County from desegre
gating the schools within one year’s time? A. Well, my
opinion, in response to this question, would have to be based
on the information that is available and is in my knowledge
Dr. Eugene Weinstein—for Plaintiffs—Direct
106a
regarding the experience of desegregation in this com
munity and in other communities, the kinds of problems
which have been raised, the success or lack of success in
coping with these problems, and the extent to which the
problems raised by the school board have been comparable
to those raised at the time in desegregating other systems.
I would not regard, in my opinion (let’s take it point by
point) the problems of school discipline on the school bus
or increased discipline on the school bus as in itself suf
ficient objection. The experience of West Virginia in de
segregating its total school system has given no such indica
tion, and in Kentucky as well, that school buses have turned
- 3 9 0 -
out to be a problem.
The evidence on the achievement gap, of course, is fairly
conclusive in some respects that Negroes tend to catch up
quicker in a desegregated situation than they do in a segre
gated situation. This is the experience in Washington,
I). C. It’s the experience in Louisville, Kentucky, where the
major systematic research has been done.
The issue of scatter, I would think, would be favorable.
Q. You mean by that the scatter of population? A. The
scatter of school population, in that the numbers of children
affected, the numbers of children involved in any one
school— No one school would be likely to be affected, have
its racial composition, for example, seriously overturned.
It would not be a focusing of the problem on one or two
schools, either of the educational problems— The absorp
tion capacity of each school would not be taxed to the utmost
in terms of, not numbers of children perhaps, but educa
tional problems by having these distributed more widely.
These seem to me to be grounds— on the basis of these
grounds and on grounds that I—and other grounds I would
think— Well, let me make one other point with respect to
Dr. Eugene Weinstein—for Plaintiffs—Direct
107a
this, and that is the relationship of gradualism to grade-a-
year type plans, to community disturbance and disruption.
There the experience is that there is no relationship. They
- 3 9 1 -
are as likely or as unlikely to have disruption with a
gradual plan as with not, have the community upset.
The Little Rock case and the Nashville incidents are
examples of gradual programs which still involve, in the
beginning, considerable community upset.
So that in some, for these reasons— I hate to be so long-
winded about this answer, but for these reasons I would
think that complete desegregation would be feasible, in my
opinion, for Davidson County.
Q. Within one year’s time ? A. Within one year’s time.
Q. Now, there is one factor that the defendants are rely
ing on that you didn’t mention, and I want to ask you if you
took that into consideration. They say that first-grade
children adjust better than older children and that you have
more disciplinary problems with the older children, I think
you have covered this in your—
The Court: If he has covered it, don’t ask him
again. The time is slipping away.
Mr. Williams: All right.
By Mr. Williams:
Q. You did take those factors into consideration— A.
Yes.
Q. —in making your opinion, didn’t you, and you con-
—392—
sidered the factors which you had previously discussed in
considering those factors and reaching your opinion? A.
Yes, sir.
Dr. Eugene Weinstein—for Plaintiffs—Direct
# # # # #
108a
Annie P. Driver—for Plaintiffs—Direct
—408—
* # * # #
A nnie P. D river, a witness called on behalf of the plain
tiffs, being first duly sworn, was examined and testified as
follows:
Direct Examination by Mr. Williams:
Q. This is Mrs. Annie P. Driver? A. Yes.
Q. You are one of the plaintiffs in this lawsuit, are you
—409—
not? A. Yes, I am.
Q. I believe you reside out on Hyde’s Ferry Road? A.
Ido.
Q. You have three children who are now in school? A.
Yes.
Q. What are their names and ages? A. Cleophus, Chris
topher, and Deborah.
Q. What grades in school are they in? A. Cleophus is
in the sixth grade, and Christopher is in the fourth, and
Deborah is in the second.
Q. Now, Mrs. Driver, what school are your children at
tending? A. They are now attending Haynes school.
Q. And approximately how far is Haynes from your
home? A. I would say about five or six miles.
Q. How far is Bordeaux Elementary School from your
home? A. Oh, less than a mile.
Q. How far is Cumberland High School, if you know,
Junior High? A. Oh, Cumberland High is only a few
blocks.
Q. Only a few blocks? A. Yes.
Q. Is it within walking distance? A. Oh, yes.
—410—
109a
Q. Mrs. Driver, did you make application this past Sep
tember for your children— A. Yes, I did,
Q. —to attend Bordeaux Elementary School! A. Yes,
I did.
Q. And you seriously and sincerely want your children
to go there! A. Yes, I do.
Q. Why do you want your children to go to Bordeaux
or to an integrated school! A. Bordeaux is closer. That’s
one thing. And then the other thing is that I want my child
to grow up without an inferior complex. For instance, now,
it’s always a question as to why they can’t go to this school
or why they can’t do this and do the other. And it’s quite
a problem to sit down and try to explain to a child that
he can’t do this or that because of his color. And I don’t
want them to be prejudiced or to have any inferior in life,
and I feel if they are now at this age able to enter into a
school which they desire to go to, that they sincerely want
to go to, that they will be better prepared in life as far
as society is concerned and in any other place and have a
better education than to be sent somewhere that they really
—4 1 1 -
are not interested in going.
There, in this community where we live, they play with
White children, and some of the closest—
Q. You mean in your neighborhood, there are White
children in the neighborhood! A. Yes.
Q. And they play with them! A. And as children, they
like to go where their friends are. Well, they consider them
as friends, I suppose, because they do play with them, and
if that is what they want, then personally, that is what I
want them to have, an integrated education. So that’s why
I applied for my child to go.
Annie P. Driver—for Plaintiffs—Direct
110a
Rev. Henry C. Maxwell—for Plaintiffs—Direct
By the Court:
Q. What grades are your children inf In second— A.
The second, fourth and sixth. And next year Cleophus will
be ready for junior high school, and I sincerely want him
to go to Cumberland High School, because that is where
he wants to go.
By Mr. Williams:
Q. Now, Mrs. Driver, do you feel that your children
would get a better education—well, will get the best educa
tion that they could get in a situation where the schools are
segregated by pupil assignment, where the teachers are seg
regated, and where everything is segregated throughout
—412—
the school system? A. Do I feel that they will get a bet
ter—
Q. Do you feel that, under this segregated system, they
will get the best education that they can get? A. No, I
don’t feel that way. In the first place, if it’s not what the
child wants, I don’t feel that he would have any incentive
to try to learn as much as he would being in a school where
he sincerely wants to be, or where he feels that he would
enjoy being. And for that— That is one reason that I don’t
feel that he would be as eager to learn in the first place.
Henky C. Maxwell, a witness called on behalf of the
plaintiffs, being first duly sworn, was examined and testi
fied as follows:
Direct Examination by Mr. Williams:
—413—
Q. This is Reverend Henry C. Maxwell? A. Yes.
Q. Reverend Maxwell, who are your two children? A.
H. C. Maxwell, Jr., and Benjamin Grover Maxwell.
111a
Q. These are two boys? A. Yes, sir.
Q. They are in junior high school this year? A. Yes,
sir. I might state I have more children than that, though.
Q. You have some younger children in grammer school?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Who are coming up? A. That’s right.
Q. And I believe you, at present, live near Providence
School, which has been designated by defendants as a seg
regated Negro school? A. I do.
Q. Elementary school? A. That is right.
Q. Reverend Maxwell, where do you want your two boys
to attend school, the two who are in junior high school,
first-year junior high school this year? A. I want them to
attend Glencliff.
Q. Glencliff School? A. I do.
—414—
Mr. Dodson: May it please the Court, do I under
stand that the record made here on the 26th will not
be any part of this record? The reason I ask, it
seems to me that we are going over some things in
that record.
Mr. Williams: I might ask that, too, Your Honor.
The Court: It should be a part of the record. It
can be treated as a part of the record if both parties
will agree.
Mr. Dodson: It seems to me it might expedite
things.
The Court: If both parties will agree that it may
be so treated.
Mr. Williams: Then that will cut this short, if
Your Honor please.
The Court: It may be made a part of the record
here.
Rev. Henry C. Maxwell—for Plaintiffs—Direct
112a
Mr. Dodson: Yes, sir.
The Court: All right.
By Mr. Williams:
Q. Reverend Maxwell, do you feel that your two boys
will get the best education that they can get under a segre
gated school system with the children and the teachers and
everybody else segregated according to race? A. Truth
fully, I do not.
—415—
Q. Is that one of the reasons and the major reason why
you want your children to attend an integrated school?
A. That’s the major reason.
Q. I believe on this distance, did we cover that the last
time you were up here? A. We did.
Q. Well, we won’t go into that. I would like to bring
this out. You are a farmer, are you not? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you have chores for your boys there on the farm?
A. I didn’t understand.
Q. Do your chores, jobs for your boys to do there on the
farm helping you? A. From five years old through 16,
they have a task.
Q. Does every minute of their afternoon time count in
doing those chores? A. It do, in the interest of them and
me.
* # # # #
—416—
# # * # #
Mr. Williams: May it please the Court, I under
stand that it is stipulated that, if Mrs. Clark were
here, she would testify with regard to the admission
of her child. She has been here for yesterday and
today.
Rev. Henry C. Maxwell—for Plaintiffs—•Direct
113a
Colloquy
The Court: She would testify to what!
Mr. Williams: With regard to the application for
her child to go to Bordeaux.
Mr. Dodson: Is she a party plaintiff?
Mr. Williams: Yes, sir.
Mr. Dodson: I think the bill speaks for that.
The Court: I think so. So there is no attack on
that.
# * # * #
114a
Filed: November 23,1960
This cause came on to be heard before the Honorable
William E. Miller, District Judge, on October 27, 1960, and
prior days of the term, upon the entire record, oral testi
mony and exhibits without the intervention of a jury, brief
and arguments of counsel, from all of which the Court
finds and holds as follows:
Findings of Fact
1. The plaintiffs, all of whom are Negro school children
and their parents and are citizens and residents of David
son County, Tennessee, filed this action on 19 September,
1960, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against
enforcement of the custom, practice and policy of the de
fendant, County Board of Education of Davidson County
and its Superintendent of Schools, J. E. Moss, requiring
racial segregation in the County Schools and refusing to
admit certain of the plaintiffs to certain schools solely
because of their race or color. Plaintiffs also prayed for
an order requiring defendants to submit a plan for re
organization of the entire County School System into a
unitary nonracial school system, including plans for elim
ination of racial segregation in teacher and other personnel
assignments, school construction, and the elimination of any
other discrimination in the operation of the school system
or in the school curriculum which are based solely upon
race or color.
2. The defendants, Frank White; S. L. Wright, Jr.;
F. K. Hardison, Jr.; Ferriss C. Bailey; E. D. Chappell;
Aubrey Maxwell; and Olin White, together comprise all the
duly elected members of the defendant County Board of
Education of Davidson County, Tennessee, and are sued
Findings o f Fact, C onclusions o f Law and Judgm ent
115a
in their individual and official capacities together with said
Board of Education, which is sued as a continuous body or
entity. Defendant, J. E. Moss, is the duly elected or ap
pointed County School Superintendent and/or Superin
tendent of Public Instruction of Davidson County, and is
sued in both his individual and official capacity. The Board
of Education is vested with the administration, manage
ment, government, supervision, control and conduct of the
public schools of said County, and defendant, J. E. Moss,
as administrative agent for the Board, has immediate
control of the operation of the County Schools, and serves
as a member of the Executive Committee of the Board.
3. The defendants, acting under color of the laws of the
State of Tennessee and County of Davidson, have pursued
for many years and are presently pursuing a policy, custom,
practice and usage of operating a compulsory racially
segregated school system in and for said County. The
racially segregated school system operated by defendants
consists of a system of elementary, junior high, and high
schools, limited to attendance by white children and negro
children, respectively, of the County of Davidson. Attend
ance at the various schools is determined solely upon race
and color. A dual set of school zone lines is also maintained.
These lines are based solely upon race and color. One set
of lines relates to the attendance areas for the Negro
schools and one set to the attendance areas for the white
schools. These lines overlap where Negro and white school
children reside in the same residential area.
4. At the beginning of the September 1960, school term,
the infant plaintiffs, Henry C. Maxwell, Jr., and Benjamin
Grover Maxwell, made application individually and/or
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Judgment, November 23,1960
116a
through their parents to defendants for admission or trans
fer to Glencliff Junior High School and/or Antioch High
School, same being “ white” schools which are nearer to
their residence than Haynes High School, the “ Negro”
school they are required to attend, and were refused said
admission or transfer solely on account of their race or
color. At the same time, the infant plaintiffs, Cleophus
Driver, Christopher C. Driver, Deborah Driver, and
Deborah Ruth Clark, made application individually and/or
through their parents for admission or transfer to Bor
deaux Elementary School, a “ white” school which is nearer
to their residence than Haynes School, the “Negro” school
they are recpiired to attend, and were refused admission or
transfer by defendants, solely on account of their race or
color. Had these infant plaintiffs been white children, they
would have been admitted or transferred to the said “white”
schools to which they applied.
5. The infant plaintiffs, Jacqueline Davis, Shirley Davis,
George Davis, Jr., Robert Davis, Rita Davis, and Robert
Rickey Taylor, reside nearer to a Negro school which they
have been attending, but some of them accompanied the
other plaintiffs when they made application for admission
to said “white” schools, and all of them join in this action
because they allege that they are being denied their right
to enjoy a nondiscriminatory public education by reason
of the compulsory racially segregated public school system
which defendants are maintaining and operating in and for
Davidson County.
6. At a preliminary hearing on 26 September, 1960, this
Court reserved judgment on motions by defendants to
strike and/or dismiss those portions of the complaint com
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Judgment, November 23,1960
117a
plaining of segregated teacher and personnel assignment,
but ordered the defendants to submit a complete and sub
stantial plan which will accomplish complete desegregation
of the public school system of Davidson County, Tennessee
in compliance with the requirement of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
7. Pursuant to said order of the Court, the defendants
subsequently tiled with the Court the following plan for
desegregation of the school system :
P l a n
1. Compulsory segregation based on race is abolished
in Grade One of the Dhvidson County Schools for
the scholastic year beginning in September 1961,
and thereafter for one additional grade beginning
with each subsequent school year, i.e., for Grade Two
in September 1962, Grade Three in September 1963,
Grade Four in September 1964, etc.
2. A plan of school zoning based upon location of school
buildings, transportation facilities and the most re
cent scholastic census, without reference to race,
will be established for the administration of the first
grade, and other grades as they are desegregated
according to the gradual plan.
3. Students entering the first grade will be permitted to
attend the school designated for the zone in which
he or she resides, subject to regulations that may be
come necessary in particular cases.
4. Application for transfer of first grade students, and
subsequent grades according to the gradual plan,
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Judgment, November 23,1960
118a
from the school of their zone to another school will
be given careful consideration and will be granted
when made in writing by parents, guardians, or those
acting in the position of parents, when good cause
therefor is shown and when transfer is practicable
and consistent with sound school administration.
5. The following will be regarded as some of the valid
conditions for requesting transfer:
a. When a white student would otherwise be re
quired to attend a school previously serving
colored students only.
b. When a colored student would otherwise be re
quired to attend a school previously serving white
students only.
c. When a student would otherwise be required to
attend a school where the majority of students in
that school, or in his or her grade, are of a differ
ent race.
6. A plan of pupil registration to be held each Spring
to aid in formulating necessary arrangements for the
opening of schools in the Fall, such as available
room, teaching aids, textbooks, pupil immunizations,
zoning, and transportation facilities, will be con
tinued.*
7. Transportation will be provided to all students that
are eligible for bus service.*
8. Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed the following specifica
tions of objections to said plan:
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Judgment, November 23,1960
This has been done for years.
119a
Specification of Objections to Plan Filed by
County Board of Education of Davidson County
The plaintiffs, Henry C. Maxwell, Jr., et al., respect
fully object to the plan filed in the above entitled cause
on or about the 19th day of October, 1960, by the de
fendant, County Board of Education of Davidson
County, Tennessee, and specify as grounds of objection
the following:
1. That the plan does not provide for elimination
of racial segregation in the public schools of Davidson
County “with all deliberate speed” as required by the
due process and equal protection clauses of the Four
teenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States.
2. That the plan does not take into account the
period of over six (6) years which have elapsed during
which the defendant, County Board of Education of
Davidson County, has completely failed, neglected and
refused to comply with the said requirements of the
due process and equal protection clauses of the Four
teenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States.
3. That the additional twelve (12) year period pro
vided in said plan is not shown to be “necessary in the
public interest” and “ consistent with good faith com
pliance at the earliest practicable date” in accordance
with the said requirement of the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States.
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Judgment, November 23,1960
120a
4. That the defendants have not carried their burden
of showing any substantial problems related to public
school administration arising from:
a. “ the physical condition of the school plant” ;
b. “ the school transportation system” ;
c. “personnel” ;
d. “ revision of school districts and attendance areas
into compact units to achieve a system of deter
mining admission to the public schools on a non-
raeial basis” ;
e. “ revision of local laws and regulations which may
be necessary in solving the foregoing problems” ;
as specified by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board
of Education (May 31, 1955) 349 U. S. 294, 75 S. Ct.
753, 99 L. Ed. 653, which necessitate the additional time
contemplated by their plan for compliance with the
constitutional requirement of a racially unsegregated
public educational system.
5. That the plan is manifestly a substantially exact
copy of the “ Nashville Plan” adopted by defendants
without reference to the local conditions in Davidson
County as a minimum plan predicated on subjective
and mental fears of the defendants as to possible com
munity hostility or friction among students, and is not
supported by a showing of any objective adminis
trative conditions or problems which legally justify its
complete deprivation of the constitutional rights of
plaintiffs and all other children now in school to an
integrated education by projecting the bar of segrega
tion into the next twelve years.
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Judgment, November 23, 1960
121a
6. That the plan forever deprives the infant plain
tiffs and all other Negro children now enrolled in the
public schools of Davidson County, of their rights to a
racially unsegregated public education, and for this
reason violates the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitu
tion of the United States.
7. That the plan wholly ignores and fails to comply
with the statement of this Court from the Bench on
26 September, 1960, holding that the individual plain
tiffs “ have been denied their constitutional and legal
rights” , and suggesting that they be accorded these
rights by defendants voluntarily rather than by court
order, in that under the plan the individual plaintiffs
can never be admitted to an integrated school and are
forever deprived of their rights to a racially integrated
public education in Davidson County.
8. That the plan fails to take into account recent
annexation by the City of Nashville of a large area of
surrounding Davidson County resulting in the public
schools of said County becoming a part of the City of
Nashville School System, which latter School System is
now desegregated from the first through the fourth
grades.
9. That the plan fails to take into account the rights
of the infant plaintiffs and other Negro children sim
ilarly situated and forever deprives them of their rights
to enroll in and attend any technical or other special
or vocational schools, summer courses and educational
training of a specialized nature as to which enrollment
is not based on location of residence.
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Judgment, November 23, 1960
122a
10. Paragraph five (5) of the plan violates the due
process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States in
that said paragraph provides racial factors as valid
conditions to support requests for transfer, and fur
ther in that the racial factors therein provided are
manifestly designed and necessarily operate to per
petuate racial segregation.
11. That the plan contemplates continued mainte
nance and operation by defendants of “Negro” and
“white” schools substantially designated by race, in
violation of the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Consti
tution of the United States, in that it fails to make any
provision for the reorganization of the entire County
School System into a unitary, nonracial school system
so as to include a plan for the assignment of teachers,
principals and other school personnel, as well as school
children, on a nonracial basis; for the allotment of
funds, construction of schools and approval of budgets
on a nonracial basis; and for the elimination of all
other discriminations in the operation of the school
system or in the school curriculum which are based
solely on race and color.
W hereof, the plaintiffs pray:
1. That the Court grant their motions for tempo
rary restraining order and preliminary injunction so
as to require the immediate admission by defendants of
the individual plaintiffs to the public schools of David
son County, Tennessee on an unsegregated basis.
Findings of Fad, Conclusions of Law and
Judgment, November 23,1960
123a
2. That the declaratory and permanent injunctive
relief prayed for in their complaint he granted, said
injunctive relief to be effective not later than the begin
ning of the Spring Semester or Term of the public
schools of Davidson County in January 1961.
3. That the defendants be required by the Court to
reorganize the entire County School System of David
son County, Tennessee into a unitary nonracial school
system, including all of the matters prayed for in the
sixth prayer of the complaint filed in this cause.
9. At the hearing on said plan on 24 October 1960, the
defendants offered, in support of the plan, the testimony
of Mr. Ferriss C. Bailey, Chairman of the Special Commit
tee of the Board charged with preparing the plan, who
had been a member of the Board for several years and
previously had been a member of the City of Nashville
Board of Education, and who testified that the plan was
prepared by the Staff, and that the Board accepted and
approved the plan and that he thought it a wise plan. Mr.
J. E. Moss, the County Superintendent for many years,
testified as an expert that he believed the plan to be a wise
and workable one; Mr. W. H. Oliver, Superintendent of
Schools of the City of Nashville, testified as an expert that
the Nashville grade a year “ stair-step” plan initiated under
Court order in 1957 had proved a wise and workable one
for Nashville. In addition, the Attendance Officer, Psy
chologist and Transportation Officer of the County Schools,
testified as to data relating to school population, pupil
achievement levels and school bus transportation respec
tively, in the County School System. Defendants also in
troduced a zoning map and attendance schedule showing
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Judgment, November 23, 1960
124a
the projected maximum expected distribution of Negro
school children in presently white County Schools under
nonracial zoning. All of said staff members had several
years experience in their respective positions in Davidson
County, and were intimately acquainted with conditions in
that county and all problems involved in desegregation
therein.
10. In opposition to the plan, plaintiffs introduced the
testimony of Dr. Herman Long, Director of the Depart
ment of Race Relations, American Missionary Association
of the Congregational Church, and teacher of Sociology
in Fisk University, Nashville, Tennessee, for several years,
an expert in the field of race relations in the United States;
Dr. Eugene Weinstein, Assistant Professor of Sociology
in Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee, an expert
in the field of child development, who has conducted a
recent research study of attitudes of Negro parents in
volved in public school desegregation in the City of Nash
ville, located within Davidson County, Tennessee; Dr. J.
Masuouka, Professor of Sociology and Chairman of the
Department of Social Science at Fisk University, Nashville,
Tennessee for several years, an expert in the field of race
relations among peoples of the world; and the plaintiffs,
Henry C. Maxwell, Sr., Mrs. Annie P. Driver, and Mrs.
Floy Clark (the latter by stipulation). The plaintiffs tes
tified that they objected to the plan because it would pre
vent their children now in school from enjoying their con
stitutional rights to a nonraeially discriminatory public
education, that their children wanted to enjoy such an edu
cation now, and that they feel their children are being-
injured by the racially segregated education they are now
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Judgment, November 23,1960
125a
receiving. The plaintiffs’ aforesaid expert witnesses were
of the opinion that desegregation could reasonably be ef
fected in the Davidson County School System within one
year; and that the pupil transfer provision contained in the
proposed plan, as drafted, would necessarily tend to per
petuate segregation. However, these witnesses, although
expert witnesses and outstanding men in their respective
fields, have had no actual experience with or responsibility
for the administration of the schools in Davidson County
and lack the same intimate knowledge of local conditions
possessed by defendants’ witnesses.
11. This Court approved in the case of the City of Nash
ville a plan of gradual desegregation after considering the
particular facts which prevailed in that case. This plan of
gradual, desegregation, according to the testimony in this
case, has worked well in the City of Nashville and has
proved to be a workable and a feasible plan of desegrega
tion. It has proved to be, in the opinion of the Superinten
dent of City Schools, a very wise plan for this community.
12. As stated, the school authorities of Davidson County,
including the members of the staff, are close to the situa
tion in Davidson County, are more intimately acquainted
with them and have more knowledge about them than any
one else could possibly possess and the primary respon
sibility rests with these authorities, whose perogatives and'
rights should not be usurped by the Courts.
13. From the testimony in this case it is evident that:
a. A plan of gradual desegregation works with a
minimum of difficulties in this community.
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Judgment, November 23,1960
126a
b. Practically all of the schools of Davidson County
are or may be affected by a plan of desegregation for
the reason that the areas populated by Negroes are
greatly scattered throughout the County.
c. There has been a tremendous increase in the
school population in Davidson County over the past
several years, with the result that practically all of
the school housing facilities are crowded or over
crowded and the teacher-pupil load is at a peak in the
system.
d. The County school system operates a transporta
tion system, which system is presently operated at
peak capacity, and the bus drivers are solely charged
with maintaining discipline on the bus, in addition to
their other duties, so that any factor which increases
or tends to increase disciplinary problems on the buses
likewise increases the hazards to the safety of the
pupils. Discipline among the pupils on the buses is in
creased with a mixing of the races, especially when
such is commenced at grade levels above the first and/
or first and second grades.
e. Because the children of the two races have not
been intimately associated due to proximity of resi
dences in the County, a great emotional impact will be
experienced by the children of both races following
desegregation of the schools.
f. Negro children in the higher grade levels who
have not previously attended desegregated schools have
an achievement level substantially below that of white
children, and such disproportion in achievement level
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Judgment, November 23,1960
127a
increases in direct proportion to the grade of the child
so that any complete desegregation, except upon a
graduated basis, would create additional difficulties for
the children of both races.
g. Any change of organization or plan in the school
system, other than at the end of a school year or a
school semester, would cause confusion and disruption
of classes with an accompanying loss of teacher time
and student time.
14. The school in the Bordeaux community, one of the
schools where the plaintiffs have made application for en
rollment, has been partially destroyed by fire, and the school
population there is presently being cared for on a make
shift basis, with all existing facilities overtaxed. The
Antioch School, one of the schools where plaintiffs made
application for enrollment, is the most overcrowded school
in the entire system, and the time consumed in traveling to
the Antioch School by bus from the residence of these
plaintiffs is as great as the time consumed by such plain
tiffs in traveling by bus to the Haynes High School, to which
they are presently assigned.
15. It is particularly desirable to have the school system
of the City of Nashville and that of Davidson County
operating on a parallel basis.
Conclusions of L aw
1. This Court has jurisdiction of the parties and of this
action, which is filed pursuant to Title 28, United States
Code, Sections 1331, 1343, 2001 and 2202, and Title 42,
United States Code, Section 1983, for injunctive and de
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Judgment, November 23, 1960
128a
claratory relief to redress rights of the plaintiffs secured by
the equal protection and due process clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States and by the Act of May 13, 1870, Chapter 14, Section
16, 16 Stat. 144 (Title 42, United States Code, Section
1981).
2. This is a class action brought not only by the plaintiffs
for their own benefit but also on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated.
3. The Court at the outset considers the case with the
established principle that compulsory racial segregation is
unconstitutional and that the plaintiffs and those they
represent are entitled to have their rights declared and
enforced accordingly.
4. In approving a plan of gradual desegration in the
case of the City of Nashville, after considering the par
ticular facts which prevailed in that case, the Court made
the statement in substance that each case must be deter
mined on its own facts and that a decision elsewhere in the
United States may or may not be revelant depending upon
the conditions, whether or not they were comparable to the
situation which prevailed here, and that, after all, this was a
problem which must be determined locally and in accordance
with local conditions. That case was appealed to the Court
of Appeals of this Circuit, and was affirmed in a unanimous
decision of that court. Thereafter at a later date the Su
preme Court of the United States refused to review it by
denying certiorari, which left, insofar as this Court is
concerned, the decision of the Court of Appeals in full
force and effect as stating correct legal principles.
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Judgment, November 23, 1960
129a
5. This Court does not hold that automatically the Nash
ville Plan constitutes the plan which should be applied to
Davidson County. The pertinent factors must be weighed
and assessed, and if the factors are substantially similar,
then the precedent of that case should guide the Court in
the decision of this case. If they are materially dissimilar,
then that case would not apply. Considerable flexibility is
involved in applying the controlling legal principle.
6. The Court must decide the case in accordance with
what it thinks is a realistic plan for the community itself,
considering all of the conditions and circumstances in
volved, the administrative problems, the personnel prob
lems, and any other relevant and pertinent factors, one
of the important ones of which is the efficient and har
monious operation of the school system itself. The Court
must not disrupt and destroy the school system. That fact
must be kept in mind always.
7. The Supreme Court has recognized the principle that
the primary responsibility in assessing and weighing these
factors rests with the constituted school board and author
ities.
8. The Court does not have any doubt that the School
Board has acted in good faith, and has fully carried the
burden of proof to show the feasibility of the principal
features of the proposed plan.
9. The plan presented by the defendant County Board
of Education should be approved by the Court with the
following exceptions and modifications:
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Judgment, November 23,1960
130a
a. Instead of the first grade being desegregated,
as contemplated by said plan, the Court is of the opin
ion and holds that the first four grades should be de
segregated at one time. This will equalize the plan
with the City of Nashville Plan. It is particularly
desirable to have the grades of the two systems opera
tion on a parallel basis.
b. In view of the delay which has already occurred
in regard to desegregation, the plan should be effec
tive and should be put into operation (that is, the first
four grades should be desegregated) at the beginning
of the next school semester beginning January 1961,
rather than the next school year; and the first five
grades will be desegregated beginning September 1961.
c. A specific provision should be included in the
decree for the complete elimination of any possible
discrimination with respect to the summer classes
which are attended by outstanding students. In other
words, facilities on a nondiscriminatory, desegregated
basis will be provided for students of this type, and
provision will be made to notify all teachers in the
system, both colored and white, of the availability of
these classes, so that there will be no doubt about the
colored students having knowledge of the opportu
nities made available in this respect.
d. Specific notice will be given to all parents of the
zone in which their children live. In other words, before
the beginning of the school year, the parents of all
children will receive specific notice of the zone in which
their children fall for the purpose of attending classes
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Judgment, November 23,1960
131a
in order that there may be removed any possible donbt
about some people not having full information.
e. The Court will retain jurisdiction of this case
throughout the period of transition.
10. The legal rights of all plaintiffs are recognized and
declared but they are enforced in accordance with the
provisions of the plan with the above modifications. Said
plan is not a denial of the rights of the individual plain
tiffs, but is a postponement in enforcement of the rights
of some of the plaintiffs in the interest of the school sys
tem itself and the efficient, harmonious, and workable tran
sition to a desegregated method of operation.
11. Judgment should again be reserved, for the present,
on defendants’ motions to strike and to dismiss certain
portions of the complaint relating to segregated teacher
and personnel assignment, and on the matters raised in
the complaint which are involved in said motions, pending
submission of further memoranda and argument of counsel.
12. The prayer of the plaintiffs for injunctive relief
should be denied, except for the matters as to which judg
ment is reserved.
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Judgment, November 23, i960
Judgment
It is accordingly ordered, adjudged and decreed as
follows :
1. That the plan submitted by the County Board of
Education of Davidson County, Tennessee, is approved,
except in the following particulars:
132a
a. Compulsory segregation based on race is abol
ished in Grades One through Four of the Davidson
County Schools for the Second Semester of the 1960-61
school year beginning January 1961, and thereafter for
one additional grade beginning with each subsequent
school year, i.e., for Grade Five in September 1961,
Grade Six in September 1962, etc.
b. As respects the summer classes attended by out
standing students, there will be no segregation based
on races, and notice of such will be immediately given
by the School Board to all teachers in the Davidson
County school system, both Negro and white, of the
availability of these classes.
c. The Davidson County School Board will, prior to
the beginning of the Second Semester of the 1960-1961
school year, and prior to the beginning of each school
year thereafter, give specific notice to the parents of
all school children of the zone in which their children
fall for the purpose of attending classes.
2. The prayer of the plaintiffs for injunctive relief be,
and the same is hereby denied, except with regard to those
matters as to which judgment is hereinafter reserved.
3. Jurisdiction of this case is retained by the Court
throughout the period of transition.
4. Judgment is reserved on the question of the motion
to strike and those portions of the motion to dismiss not
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Judgment, November 23,1960
133a
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Judgment, N ovem ber 23,1960
hereinbefore overruled, and on the matters raised in the
complaint which are involved in said motions.
To the foregoing action of the Court in approving the
plan submitted by defendants and in denying plaintiffs’
prayer for injunctive relief, the plaintiffs except.
This the 23rd day of November 1960.
W m . E. M iller
United States District Judge
134a
Order, November 29, 1960
Filed: November 29, I960
In this action the Court heretofore entered its Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment approving with
certain modifications a plan for the gradual desegregation
of the public schools of Davidson County, and for admis
sion of school children to the schools of the county system
without discrimination on account of race. At that time,
however, the Court expressly reserved judgment on the
defendants’ motions to strike and dismiss certain portions
of the complaint relative to segregated teacher and per
sonnel assignment, and on the matters raised in the com
plaint involved in said motions, including the question of
injunctive relief, pending submission of further briefs and
argument of counsel. Such briefs have now been submitted
and the Court has given full consideration to the questions
as to which judgment was reserved.
Upon full consideration of the briefs, applicable authori
ties, and the entire record, the Court is of the opinion that
the allegations of the complaint challenged by the motions
to strike and to dismiss raise issues of such character as
to require an investigation upon the merits, and that such
allegations should not be summarily stricken or dismissed
without a hearing. Motions to strike allegations in plead
ings are not favored and in case of doubt should not be
sustained.
It is, therefore, ordered that the motions to strike and
to dismiss those portions of the complaint relating to
teacher and personnel assignment be and they are hereby
overruled, and that the defendants be and they are hereby
allowed twenty days from date in which to further plead
to the complaint.
135a
Order, November 29, 1960
The Court reserves judgment as to the substantive ques
tions involved, including the question of granting injunctive
relief, pending a further hearing after the issues have been
fully joined between the parties.
W m. E. Miller
United States District Judge
136a
Filed: December2,1960
Come the plaintiffs and move the Court, pursuant to
Rule 59 (a) (2), (e), and Rule 60 (b) (5) or (6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for a new trial and for
appropriate relief from the operation of the judgment en
tered by the Court in the above cause on 23 November
1960, in the following particulars and upon the following
grounds:
1. Insofar as said judgment fails to accord specific in
dividual relief to the infant plaintiffs, Henry C. Maxwell,
Jr., Benjamin Grover Maxwell, Cleophus Driver, and Deb
orah Ruth Clark, by way of requiring their admission to
the respective schools to which they applied, the judgment
operates upon them inequitably and they should be granted
appropriate further relief for the reasons hereinafter
stated:
(a) The uncontradicted proof, given by plaintiffs at the
26 September 1960 hearing, shows that when the plaintiffs,
Henry C. Maxwell, Jr., and Benjamin Grover Maxwell
presented themselves for enrollment at Glencliff Junior
High School on 2 September 1960, they were routinely
enrolled by the administrative officials at said school and
assured by said officials that they wTere entitled to and
would be assigned either at Glencliff or at Antioch High
School, without any indication by said officials that their
admission would entail any special administrative problems.
(b) The proof does not show that any substantial ad
ministrative problems would arise by admission of the two
infant plaintiffs, Henry C. Maxwell, Jr., and Benjamin
Grover Maxwell, alone, to Glencliff Junior High School or
Antioch High School. Counsel for defendants stated to
the Court at the 26 September 1960 hearing as the only
reason for opposing said individual relief, that other Negro
children might then file suits seeking the same relief; which
M otion fo r New Trial and for A p p ro p riate R e lie f
137a
objection is merely speculative and insufficient to justify
deprivation of the rights here involved.
(c) Under the plan proposed by defendants and modified
and approved by this Court in said judgment, the infant
plaintiffs, Christopher C. Driver and Deborah D. Driver,
and other Negro children in or below the fourth grade, will
be entitled to attend Bordeaux School or one of the tem
porary facilities established for its enrollment pending its
repair, so that no substantial administrative problems
would arise by admission to that same school of the two
infant plaintiffs, Cleophus Driver and Deborah Ruth Clark,
who are in the sixth and fifth grades respectively, which
would not already exist by reason of the desegregation in
the first four grades throughout the entire school.
(d) Under said plan approved by the Court, the infant
plaintiffs, Christopher C. Driver and Deborah D. Driver,
will receive individual relief while their older brother, the
infant plaintiff, Cleophus Driver, who would ordinarily
attend the same school with them, is denied such relief
without substantial administrative necessity or reason.
(e) The defendants have not carried their burden of
showing that the deprivation of individual relief to said
four infant plaintiffs, Henry C. Maxwell, Jr., Benjamin
Grover Maxwell, Cleophus Driver, and Deborah Ruth Clark,
is substantially essential to the effective and feasible op
eration of the plan approved by the Court in its order
entered 23 November 1960.
(f) The defendants have not carried their burden of
showing that the deprivation of individual relief to said
four of the infant plaintiffs, Henry C. Maxwell, Jr., Ben
jamin Grover Maxwell, Cleophus Driver and Deborah Ruth
Clark, is either “necessary in the public interest” or “con
sistent with good faith compliance at the earliest practicable
Motion for New Trial and for Appropriate Belief
138a
date” , as required by the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States.
(g) The proof shows that it is feasible for said four in
fant plaintiffs who are deprived of individual relief by the
plan as approved by the Court, to be granted such relief
in addition to the operation of said plan approved by the
Court.
(h) Said four infant plaintiffs have a personal right
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States to individual relief in cases of this kind
where it is feasible to grant such relief.
Wherefore, plaintiffs respectfully move the Court that
they be granted a new trial and/or that the Court grant
them appropriate relief from the operation of said judg
ment, insofar as the judgment fails to grant individual re
lief to said four infant plaintiffs, Henry C. Maxwell, Jr.,
Benjamin Grover Maxwell, Cleophus Driver, and Deborah
Ruth Clark; to the end that the defendants be required
to admit said four infant plaintiffs to the respective schools
to which they applied as prayed in the complaint filed
in this cause.
Respectfully submitted,
Z. A lexander L ooby and
A von N. W illiams, Jr.
327 Charlotte Avenue
Nashville 3, Tennessee
T hurgood M arshall and
J ack Greenberg
10 Columbus Circle
Suite 1790
New York 19, N. Y.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Motion for New Trial and for Appropriate Belief
139a
Filed: December 12, 1960
The plaintiffs in the above entitled case, respectfully
move the Court for immediate further relief upon the
grounds and in the particulars as hereinafter stated:
1. That the defendants have not given “ specific notice
to the parents of all school children of the zone in which
their children fall for the purpose of attending classes” ,
as required by the order of this Court, filed 23 November
1960; but, on the contrary, defendants have merely fur
nished a form letter with an attached paper designated
“ Transfer Request” to some school children through their
teachers in some of the schools, with no assurance that
said letters or the attached paper will reach the parents
of said school children.
Two of said letters, addressed to the plaintiff, Mrs. Annie
P. Driver and her spouse, together with the attached
“ Transfer Requests” , are appended hereto and marked as
Collective Exhibits “ A ” to this motion.
2. That the aforesaid form letters and attached “ Trans
fer Requests” , are misleading and are manifestly designed
to mislead parents and to evade said order of this Court
approving a plan for general desegregation, in that:
(a) Nowhere in said letter or “ Transfer Request” is it
stated that parents are given notice “ of the zone in wdiich
their children fall for the purpose of attending classes” , as
provided in said order of the Court.
(b) The aforesaid letter states that a child may be “ trans
ferred January 20,1961 to the newly zoned school” , whereas
under the modified plan approved by the Court and the
order of the Court providing for general desegregation of
the first four grades on said date, it is not necessary for
children in these grades to be “ transferred” to the school in
which they “ fall for the purpose of attending classes” ; but,
M o tio n o f Plaintiffs fo r F urther R e lie f
140a
on the contrary, any application for transfer would and
should be made “ from the school of their zone to another
school” .
(c) The aforesaid design and effect of misleading parents
and encouraging continued maintenance of racial segrega
tion is further shown by the said “ Transfer Request” form,
which purports on its face not to be an application for
transfer to a school other than the school in which the
children “ fall for the purpose of attending classes” as or
dered by this Court, but rather purports to be a request to
be “ T ransferred” to the school for which the child is zoned.
Said misleading and evasive design and effect is emphasized
on said “ Transfer Request” form by capitalization and
underlining of the word “transferred” , as indicated above,
and by placing first on said form as an alleged “ choice” ,
the following: “ I request permission for this child to stay
Motion of Plaintiffs for Further Relief
(name of school)
3. Said letters of alleged notification are further mis
leading and evasive in that they tend to indicate to parents
of school children that they have no right to attend school
on a racially desegregated basis as provided in the plan
approved by this Court; but that, on the contrary, applica
tion for transfer to the newly zoned school must be made
on the attached “ Transfer Request” , which “ transfer” might
or might not be granted by the Board in its discretion.
4. The requirement that said “ Transfer Request” be re
turned to defendants “ within three days” , as contained in
the aforesaid letters, is both ambiguous and unreasonable,
and is designed to encourage and foster hasty action on
the part of parents whom said form letters and “ Transfer
Requests” reach.
141a
W herefore, plaintiffs respectfully move the Court that
they be granted immediate and further relief as follows:
(1) That the aforesaid letters and “ Transfer Requests”
sent out by the defendant Board of Education and Super
intendent of Schools to school children through school teach
ers employed by defendants, be declared by the Court to
be void and of no effect because same are not in compliance
with the aforesaid order of the Court, filed 23 November
1960 or the plan thereby approved by the Court.
(2) That the defendants be required by the Court to
prepare new notices which shall notify all parents directly
of the desegregation plan which has been approved by the
Court, and of the school in which their children fall for the
purpose of attending classes; and that if any form is en
closed therewith relating to application for transfer, that
the application specifically indicate that same is for trans
fer from the school zone in which the children fall for the
purpose of attending classes, to some other school.
(3) That before any such new form of notification or
for transfer application be sent out to the parents as afore
said, copy of same be furnished to counsel for plaintiffs
and approved by the Court after hearing if same be found
objectionable to the plaintiffs.
Z. A lexander L ooby and
A von N. W illiams, Jr.
327 Charlotte Av.
Nashville 3, Tenn.
T httrgood M arshall and
Jack Greenberg
10 Columbus Circle
Suite 1790
New York 19, N. Y.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Motion of Plaintiffs for Further Relief
142a
EXHIBIT “A ” TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION
(Letterhead of County Board of Education,
Davidson County)
December 5, 1960
Mr. & Mrs. Cleophas Driver
1626 Emerald Dr.
Nashville, Tennessee
Be: Christopher C.
Name
Grade: 1 2 3 (4)
Dear Parents:
The Davidson County Board of Education has been given
a court order to fix zones for all schools regardless of race.
You will note that the attached Transfer Request will indi
cate the school the child is now attending and the school
to which the child is zoned.
Please mark Transfer Request for either, (1) Permission
to remain in the school he is now attending or, (2) Be trans
ferred January 20, 1961 to the newly zoned school.
After you have signed the Transfer Request and marked
an X by your choice, return it to your child’s teacher within
three days.
Consideration will be given to your choice indicated on
the Transfer Request.
Sincerely yours,
/ s / J. E. Moss
J. E. Moss
Superintendent
J E M :mb
143a
TRANSFER REQUEST (GRADES 1-4)
Christopher C. Driver Date: Dec. 5, 1960 Grade: 4
Name of Student
1626 Emerald Dr.
A ddress
School now attending: Haynes
School zone in which yon live: Bordeaux
PLEASE CHECK ONE
□ I request permission for this child to stay at
Haynes
(name of school)
□ I request permission for this child to be T ransferred
on January 20, 1961 to Bordeaux
(name of school)
Exhibit “A ” to Plaintiffs’ Motion
S ignature of P arents
R emarks :
144a
(Letterhead of County Board of Education,
Davidson County)
December 5, 1960
Mr. & Mrs. Cleophas Driver
1626 Emerald Dr.
Nashville, Tennessee
Be: Deborah Darnell
Name
Grade: 1 (2) 3 4
Dear Parents:
The Davidson County Board of Education has been given
a court order to fix zones for all schools regardless of race.
You will note that the attached Transfer Bequest will indi
cate the school the child is now attending and the school
to which the child is zoned.
Please mark Transfer Bequest for either, (1) Permission
to remain in the school he is now attending or, (2) Be trans
ferred January 20, 1961 to the newly zoned school.
After you have signed the Transfer Bequest and marked
an X by your choice, return it to your child’s teacher within
three days.
Consideration will be given to your choice indicated on
the Transfer Bequest.
Sincerely yours,
/ s / J. E. Moss
J. E. Moss
Superintendent
Exhibit “A ” to Plaintiffs’ Motion
JEM :mb
145a
TRANSFER REQUEST (GRADES 1-4)
Deborah Darnell Driver Date: Dec. 5, 1960 Grade: 2
N ame of Student
1626 Emerald Dr.
A ddress
School now attending: Haynes
School zone in which yon live: Bordeaux
PLEASE CHECK ONE
□ I request permission for this child to stay at
Haynes
(name of school)
□ I request permission for this child to be T r a n s f e r r e d
on January 20, 1961 to Bordeaux
(name of school)
Exhibit “A ” to Plaintiffs’ Motion
S ignature of P arents
R emarks :
146a
Filed: December 13, 1960
The defendants, and each of them, for further answer
to the complaint filed in this cause against them and pur
suant to the order of Court entered November 29, 1960,
and answering say:
As respects the allegations set forth in Section 8 of the
complaint, these defendants admit that prior to the order
of the Court heretofore entered they had been operating a
compulsory racially segregated school system in and for
the County of Davidson, State of Tennessee, but would
further show to the Court that effective with the commence
ment of the Second Semester in January of 1961, and under
the plan heretofore submitted and approved as modified by
this Honorable Court, such school system will thereafter
cease to be a racially segregated school system on a gradual
or graduated basis. These defendants admit that the school
system operated by them has consisted of schools attended
by white children, staffed by white teachers and white prin
cipals and white sustaining personnel. These defendants
deny that they have maintained a “ secondary” system of
colored schools or Negro schools, but would show, if it be
pertinent, that such schools are not a secondary system
of schools, but a system wherein the curriculum, material,
facilities and personnel are selected with the same degree
of care as that used in the schools which heretofore have
been for white students only. These defendants admit that
such schools have been staffed entirely by Negro personnel.
As respects those portions of the complaint heretofore
filed set forth in Section 10 (b) not heretofore answered,
these defendants deny that the assignment of school per
sonnel on the basis of race and color is predicated on the
theory that Negro teachers, Negro principals and other
Negro school personnel are inferior to white teachers,
principals and other white school personnel, as charged in
S u p p lem en tal A nsw er
147a
the complaint, and, on the contrary, would show to the Court
that such Negro teachers, Negro principals and the like
are paid comparable wages to those of the white personnel
and that the average pay of such Negro personnel is
greater than that of the white personnel so that there is
not now and has never been any insistence on the part of
these defendants as respects the superiority or inferiority
of one group of teachers, principals and personnel as con
trasted with the other. On the contrary, these defendants
have, in accordance with good educational practices, as
signed all school teachers, school principals and other
school personnel on the basis of what was best for the stu
dents and the educational system of the County. In making
such assignments a multitude of factors are considered,
to-wit, educational training, family background, residence,
including rural and urban, personality, character, ability,
religious affiliations, parent-teacher relationship and those
intangible factors which in the judgment of the School
Board must be considered in order to promulgate the best
school system possible for the better education of all stu
dents, be they Negro or white. In addition to actual teach
ing, all school personnel must have the confidence of both
the children and the parents and must engage in any well-
rounded system in counselling and guidance with both the
students and their parents. To the extent that race has a
bearing upon these various factors aforesaid, such must be
considered in the assignment of school personnel.
These defendants further deny that the plaintiffs herein
have any right to appear before this Honorable Court as
respects the assignment of school personnel, no member of
the class constituting such personnel having voiced a com
plaint. These defendants further insist and would show to
the Court that the assignment of school personnel is one
which in the interest of a good educational system must be
Supplemental Answer
148a
left with the County Board of Education and that such is
true as respects both white and Negro students so that no
rights of the complainants or the class they represent,
either constitutional or otherwise, are affected or infringed
thereby.
These defendants would further show to the Court that
any attempt at this time by this Honorable Court, or any
other court, to usurp the functions of the school board in
the assignment of teachers would lead to a complete dis
ruption of the school system to the detriment of both Negro
and white students throughout the County, would adversely
affect the orderly integration of the school system in ac
cordance with the plan heretofore approved by this Honor
able Court and would work to the disadvantage of all
students in the public schools of the County.
These defendants adopt the allegations and statements
of fact set forth in their answer heretofore filed in this
cause, and all allegations of the original complaint not
hereinbefore admitted, explained or denied in this answer
or in the original answer heretofore filed are here and now
expressly denied.
And now having fully answered, these defendants pray
that they be hence dismissed, subject only to the previous
orders of this Court in this matter.
Shelton L uton
County Attorney
for Davidson County, Tennessee
Davidson County Courthouse
Nashville 3, Tennessee
H arlan D odson, Jr.
1106 Nashville Trust Building
Nashville 3, Tennessee
Attorneys for Defendants
Supplemental Answer
149a
Excerpts From Transcript of Hearing,
January 10, 1961
—70—
J oseph R. Garrett, called as a witness in behalf of the
defendants, being first duly sworn, was examined and testi
fied as follow s:
Direct Examination by Mr. Dodson:
Q. For the record, please state your name? A. Joseph
R. Garrett.
Q. Mr. Garrett, your age? A. Thirty-nine.
Q. Your residence? A. Davidson County.
Q. Your occupation? A. Attendance teacher in charge
of child welfare and attendance, Davidson County Board of
Education.
* # * # #
—71—
* * # # #
Q. Now, I want to get, then, to the question of the notice
following the decree of this Court and the adoption of the
—7 2 -
plan, what did you then do with respect to school zones and
what part did you plan in it? A. We followed the Court
order to establish zones. My assistant, Mr. Higgins and
with the cooperation of other staff members, Mr. Detchon,
of the research department, Mr. Turner, Director of Trans
portation was consulted, and we therefore set out to estab
lish these zones which had never been established around
the Negro schools.
Q. Were those zones established with regard to race or
without regard to race of the students?
The Court: There is nothing before the Court on
that.
150a
Mr. Dodson: Well, that is preliminary, really, to
my next question.
By Mr. Dodson:
Q. They were established in accordance with a directive
without regard to race ? A. That is right.
Q. All right. Now— A. Certainly.
Q. When that had been done, then what did you do with
respect to seeing what children were affected? A. We
immediately obtained the names of those children that would
be affected and started to work on notifying the parents of
these children.
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Q. How many did you find would be affected, approxi
mately? A. Two hundred and eighty-eight White children
and 405 Negro children of grades 1 through 4 became af
fected in this new zoning.
Q. Did you then attempt to do anything with respect to
notification of the parents of those affected ? A. Yes, sir,
we consulted with our attorneys and formulated notices and
letters to give these people information relative to their
zone that they are now in.
Q. And I believe the first letter that went out, dated
December 5, 1960, with the transfer request attached, was
the one that I went over with you in its entirety, changed
in some respects and approved and told you to send it. Is
that right, sir ? A. That’s right.
Mr. Dodson: If Your Honor please, I offer this.
The Court: Let it be exhibited and made a part
of the record.
Mr. Dodson: All right, sir, we file that as De
fendant’s Exhibit No. 2.
Joseph R. Garrett—for Defendants—Direct
151a
The Court: Hand that to me and I will mark it.
(The document referred to was received in evi
dence as Defendant’s Exhibit No. 2.)
By Mr. Dodson:
—74—
Q. Now, Mr. Garrett, that form that you used—do you
have one there in front of you so that you might refer to
it as we go along ? If you don’t, I will get you one. A. All
right, sir.
Q. That form that you used provides for it to— How
was it sent out, first, to the parents? A. It was sent out to
the— We had conferences with the principals and they, in
turn, had conferences with their teachers, and it wms sent
by the teachers to the parents—by the child to its parents.
Q. All right, sir. How do you send all other notices to
parents in the public school system? A. Of zone changes
and so forth, when they become necessary, it is usually indi
cated on their transfer ordinarily, which the child carries
to its next school.
Q. Well, I mean, how do you generally get messages,
general messages to parents? Is it by means of the chil
dren? A. Most every time. We have to use that system.
Q. It is a lot less expensive? A. That’s right.
Q. And a lot more complete, isn’t it? A. It facilitates
things, and it is more effective.
Q. Now, I notice you requested the parents to sign that.
Is that right ? A. That is correct.
—75—
Q. Why did you do that? A. We wanted to make sure
that every parent knew of their new school zone.
Q. All right, sir. Did that letter and notice set out what
Joseph B. Garrett—for Defendants—Direct
152a
the new school zone was? A. That’s right. We filled that
ont at our office.
Q. Now, this particular letter went only to those who
were affected by virtue of the zone changes. Is that cor
rect? A. That is correct.
Q. All right, sir. Now, it has two different places to
indicate an optional choice. Is that correct, sir? A. That
is right.
Q. All right, sir. What is the first one? What is it desig
nated for? A. Request permission for the child to remain
at the school it is now attending.
Q. In the absence of some request for the child to remain
in the school that it was then attending, what would have
happened? A. Will you please state that again?
Q. The child had now been zoned to another school. Is
that right? A. Right.
Q. Now, in the absence of some request from the parent
—76—
for the child to remain where the child was, what would
have happened to that child? A. That child would auto
matically become in that zone.
Q. Automatically come in the other zone? A. That’s
right.
Q. All right. So that had to do, then, with the request
for not being placed in the zone that you would otherwise
have to go to. Is that correct? A. That is correct.
Q. And I asked you that because I will get back to it in
a few minutes.
Now, the other one had to do with what? A. Request
permission for the child to be transferred on January 20,
1961.
Q. Now, the use of the word “ transfer” is there. What
does that word designate in the Davidson County and other
Joseph R. Garrett—for Defendants—Direct
153a
educational systems! A. Well, “ transfer” as required by
our state registers, and so forth, any child leaving one
school and going to another school is called a transfer and
must be so listed and so recorded in the state register.
Q. You have to advise the State Department of Educa
tion of a transfer, do you not? A. That is right.
—77—
Q. Regardless of the reason that the child goes from one
school to the other? A. That’s right.
Q. Whether it has anything to do with the Court order
or not? A. It is on that final report at the end of the
year how many transfers we had. Those are listed sepa
rately.
Q. Now, then, the second box has also the word “ per
mission” or something to that— What is the word used
there? A. “Request permission.”
Q. “ Request permission.” All right, sir, I want to know
why in our discussion out there, we used the words “ re
quest permission.” What happens, in other words, when a
child is transferred from one school to another during the
school year? What right do they have under the existing
law? A. They have to make some indication that they
want to move, either orally, or verbally, or written or other
wise. We have to know or have something to initiate this
move of this child.
Q. Suppose that under normal zoning, not having to do
with this case at all, a child is removed from one school
zone and placed in another school zone, does that child have
any right to hearings? A. Oh, yes.
—78—
Mr. Williams: I object to leading questions, if
Your Honor please, to have this gentleman testify
as to what the rights of the child are.
Joseph R. Garrett—for Defendants—Direct
154a
Joseph R. Garrett—for Defendants—Direct
By Mr. Dodson:
Q. Well, have you had any hearings about children being
moved? A. Yes, we have in the past.
Q. Long before this case got in this Court? A. Yes, sir.
Q. It had nothing to do with race or anything else for
that matter? A. That is right.
Q. All right, sir. Now, of those that were sent out, this
particular form, did you have any calls, or not, requesting
clarification from any of the parents as to what you meant?
A. There were calls, I think a few to the principals.
Q. All right, sir. A. They clarified it or they, in turn,
asked us and we then clarified it through them. I think it
is very clear, to start with.
Q. How many of these did you get back by virtue of using
this system? A. We got back every one except one.
—79—-
Q. All of them except one with an indication and a sig
nature? A. That’s right.
Q. Is that correct? A. That is correct.
Q. All right, sir. Now, do you recall who that was? A.
It was the Driver children. The Driver parents did not
return theirs.
The Court: How many were sent out in all?
The Witness: Two hundred and eighty-eight, plus
405.
The Court: Plus 405. All right.
By Mr. Dodson:
Q. Six hundred ninety-three? A. Six hundred ninety-
three.
Q. And you got back 692? A. That is correct.
155a
Q. Now, before you knew how many you were going to
get back, what had you planned as your next step as to
those that you didn’t hear from? A. We had planned to
notify them then by mail and by securing the addresses and
addressing the addresses on the envelope and mailing to
that particular parent.
Q. I want to ask you this: Out at the central office, do
you keep the parents’ names and addresses, or is that kept
—80—
at the schools, or where? A. All the current records are at
the school. We have the graduate records and maybe those
that are transferred out of the state, but we do not have a
complete record at our office.
Q. And then when you originally intended, your original
plan, to use the United States mail and then if you didn’t
hear, what were you going to do? A. We would then give
a special notice to that particular parent.
Q. All right, now, when you got back all except one, did
you go through the second step (that is, using ordinary
mail) or did you go on to the third step using registered
mail? A. We just went ahead and used registered mail,
since there was only one family involved, and we wanted to
make sure that family was notified. It wTas so few involved,
why, we used registered mail.
Q. And I want to ask you if there was then sent by
registered mail a letter to the Driver parents? A. Yes, sir;
it was.
Q. With the same sheet attached? A. (Nodding affirma
tively.)
Q. For both of the children of the Drivers? A. Yes,
sir.
—81—
Q. And did you get a United States return receipt for
the delivery of that letter? A. Yes, sir.
Joseph R. Garrett—for Defendants—Direct
156a
Q. So do you now have in your files either the signed
statement of the parents that they have gotten the notice
or this registered return receipt from everybody affected?
A. That’s right.
Q. Do you need to retain this, or can you file this (show
ing document to the witness)? A. I can file it.
Mr. Dodson: We would ask, then, that this be
made Defendant’s Exhibit No. 3, may it please the
Court.
The Court: Let it be admitted.
Mr. Dodson: Letter to the Drivers dated Decem
ber 19, 1960, and return receipt attached.
(The document referred to was received in evi
dence as Defendant’s Exhibit No. 3.)
By Mr. Dodson:
Q. Now, Mr. Garrett, on all of those who requested that
their children be permitted to remain in the same school
so that, in effect, they would not be going to the school
to which they were zoned, did the Board of Education act
on those requests? A. Yes, they did.
—82—
Q- Were the parents advised of the action? A. They
have been advised that their transfer or request to remain
at that school has been approved.
Q. By letter, or how? A. By letter.
Q. And the date of the letter? A. The letter is January
the 6th.
Q. 1961? A. Yes.
Q. Do you have a form of that letter? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Will you file that, then, as Defendant’s Exhibit No. 4?
A. Yes.
Joseph B. Garrett—for Defendants—Direct
157a
Mr. Williams: May we see that?
Mr. Dodson: Yes, I will give you a copy, here. I
thought you had it.
The Court: Let it be admitted.
(The document referred to was received in evi
dence as Defendant’s Exhibit No. 4.)
By Mr. Dodson:
Q. Now, then, what did you do with respect to those who
wanted to go to the school in which they were zoned and
which, according to your records, would be transfers? Did
—83—
you give them any communication? A. Yes, we did. We
gave them a letter giving them more or less directions to
turn in their books and check, clear their textbook record
and whatever other materials that they needed to check
in at their particular school, so that they would get ready
to clear out January the 20th.
Q. Do you have a copy of that? A. (Handed document
to counsel.)
Q. Will you file that letter with the blanks ? The blanks
were filled in, of course? A. Oh, yes; they were filled in.
Q. All right. Will you file that letter as Defendant’s Ex
hibit No. 5? A. Yes.
The Court: Let it be admitted.
(The document referred to was received in evi
dence as Defendant’s Exhibit No. 5.)
By Mr. Dodson:
Q. Now, then, subsequently (I don’t know that it is sub
sequently, but in any event) I had first advised you, I be-
Joseph R. Garrett—for Defendants—Direct
158a
lieve, that these were all the letters we needed to send,
hadn’t I? A. That is correct.
Q. Did I change my mind about that? A. Yes, sir; you
did.
—84—
Q. And tell you you had to send them to everybody? A.
Yes, sir.
Q. Did you send them to everybody? A. Yes, sir. They
are in the process now. They have already left our office
and they are in the process of being—everyone being noti
fied, the remaining group.
Q. And that is going to the people who are still in the
same zone that the new zoning didn’t affect in the least?
A. That’s right.
Q. Does it serve any useful purpose that you know of?
A. No, I cannot see— In fact, I can see where it can act
ually hurt us, because—or hurt desegregation in the fact
that it may get some people aroused that are not affected
really.
The Court: This goes to everybody?
Mr. Dodson: Yes, sir, even though they are not
affected in the least.
By Mr. Dodson:
Q. Do you have a copy of that letter? A. (Handed docu
ment to Mr. Dodson.)
Q. Will you file that as Defendant’s Exhibit No. 6, and
I believe there are what, 45,000 or so of these that you have
—85—
to send? A. Forty-five, plus or minus. I couldn’t give you
an exact figure on that.
Joseph R. Garrett—for Defendants—Direct
159a
The Court: Let it be admitted as Defendant’s
Exhibit 6.
(The document referred to was received in evi
dence as Defendant’s Exhibit No. 6.)
The Court: Now, this was sent after this motion
was filed, wasn’t it! It is in the process of being
sent now?
Mr. Dodson: It is in the process of being sent now.
By Mr. Dodson:
Q. I believe the notification to you was before the mo
tion, was it not, or do you recall? A. I don’t recall, but
we—as soon as we could get to it. I would say that, we
had—
Q. You took care of the urgent ones first? A. We have
been working overtime now to even get the others.
The Court: It was sent January 10, 1961. It’s
dated January 10th?
Mr. Dodson: Dated January 10th.
By Mr. Dodson:
Q. Has it actually gone out from the schools, or do you
- 8 6 -
know? A. It is going out today.
Q. Going out today. Could you get to it any sooner? A.
No, we could not. We had the holidays, and schools were
closed, and we have had very few operating days, actually,
since that time.
Mr. Dodson: You may examine.
The Court: Cross-examine.
Joseph B. Garrett—for Defendants—Direct
160a
Cross Examination by Mr. Williams-.
Q. Mr. Garrett, you are familiar with the plan which was
proposed by the Board to this Court? A. I think so.
Q. You had a part in the preparation of that plan? A.
Well, I had a part, yes.
Q. Are you familiar with paragraph 1 of that plan which
states that compulsory segregation based on race is abol
ished in grade 1 of the Davidson County schools for the
scholastic year beginning September ’61, and so forth? A.
Yes, sir.
Q. Then, Mr. Garrett, why was it that this letter did not
inform the parents, even the affected parents that you sent
it to, that compulsory racial segregation was abolished and
that they, therefore, had the right to attend schools under
nonracial zoning?
# * * # #
—88—
* # # # #
Q. I will ask you, Mr. Garrett, why you did not, in your
letter, state that you were giving the parents specific notice
of the zone in which their children now fall for the purpose
of attending classes? A. I would think that my letter
states that.
Q. Will you refer me to some point in there where, ac
cording to your interpretation, your letter states that? It
certainly doesn’t state it literally. A. In our letters to
parents, we have found that you have got to be as brief as
possible.
Joseph R. Garrett—for Defendants—Cross
The Court: Let me see that first letter. I think
there is something in there, the one that had the
form attached to it.
161a
Mr. Dodson: Here it is. Exhibit No. 2.
—89—
Mr. Williams: I attached one as an exhibit to my
motion, if Your Honor please, the Drivers’.
The Court: Yes. What is your last question there,
why you did not do what ?
Mr. Williams: Counsel had stated that all that
they were trying to do was to follow the direction of
the Court to give specific notice to the parents of the
zone in which their children fall for the purpose of
attending classes. I think the language of the Court
was “ to the parents of all school children of the zone
in which their children fall for the purpose of at
tending classes.”
By Mr. Williams:
Q. Now, nowhere in this letter, Mr. Garrett, can I find
anything like that. And I am asking you, sir, if you will
point out to me some part of the letter that you construe as
being that! A. Do you understand that we filled these
forms in and stated Bordeaux School? We stated the
school.
Q. Is your answer to the question that the fact that you
attached a—this transfer request constitutes a compliance
with that order of the Court? A. Yes. It’s filled in prop
erly. It does. Of course, the blank form, no, but we filled
those in and stated very specifically the grade. We even
—90—
circled the grade, if you will note there at the top, which
indicates that grade 1, 2, 3, 4 had been desegregated, as
ordered by the Court.
Q. Mr. Garrett, was it your understanding that under the
plan and under the Court’s order that children who were
Joseph R. Garrett—for Defendants—Cross
162a
living in the zone in which they fall for the purpose of
attending classes under this plan would have a right to
attend that school? A. Yes, they would have a right.
Q. Well, will you kindly, then, if you please, sir, explain
why you have down in the final paragraph here, “ considera
tion will be given to your choice indicated on the transfer
request” ? A. Well, knowing that a lot of them, as you
stated even in the last hearing, a lot of them would request
not to be transferred, would request to attend the school
they are now in. So, therefore, we gave them that opportu
nity, and also this request form did more. It gave us an
opportunity to make—to get things ready, to organize, to
have conferences and hope for an orderly desegregation
January the 23rd. It was a study. You have to plan these
things.
Q. Well, now, Mr. Garrett, but you have it just
reversed, your forms, though. You have it so that a parent
would understand that he was transferring his child to the
zone in which his child falls for the purpose of attending
classes, and that you must approve that, do you not, sir, on
—91—
these two documents taken together?
Mr. Dodson: May it please the Court, I am going
to object to this line of examination. It is purely
argumentative. The papers speak for themselves.
Whether they are clear, whether they comply with the
Court’s order, or don’t comply with the Court’s order,
is not in the opinion of this man. It is in the opinion
of the Court. I have given my opinion about it, be
cause I was the one that approved it and thought in
fairness to the school staff and board they should not
be charged with it. But whether or not it does is a
Joseph B. Garrett—for Defendants—Cross
163a
decision for Your Honor, and what this man thinks
about whether it does, it seems to me, is totally im
material.
The Court: Of course, the Court has to finally
decide the question, but any enlightenment that he
might give the Court or any explanation about it
would be helpful, I ’d say.
Mr. Williams: That’s all I ’m asking him, if Your
Honor please. I would like his interpretation.
The Witness: Would you think that our letters
that we sent out, which w’e stated gave directions to
that parent that made a request to go to this White
school? We didn’t tell him he would have to get a
transfer. We told him to check his books in, but he
—92—
is still considered a transfer. Our state records or
register, if you are familiar with that, it requires
that child to be so-called a transfer and must be put
a “ W ” and a transfer on the re-entering register in
the same administrative unit.
By Mr. Williams:
Q. Mr. Garrett, directing your attention to the second
paragraph of your letter, in which you state, “ Please mark
a transfer request for either (1) permission to remain in
the school he is now- attending,” now, that refers to remain
ing in the segregated schools, doesn’t it? A. Yes, sir.
Q. “ or, (2) be transferred January 20, 1961, to the newly
zoned school.” Now, the newly zoned school refers to the
desegregated school, doesn’t it? A. We did not say “per
mission.” We just said, “be transferred.”
Q. Yes, sir. But now you want to change your statement,
do you not, sir, that you didn’t tell him he’d have to be
Joseph B. Garrett—for Defendants—Cross
164a
transferred? A. It is indicated as a transfer, yes, because
lie is leaving one school and going to another.
Q. Yes, sir. And in your final paragraph of that letter
you stated, “ consideration will be given to your choice in
dicated on the transfer request,” did you not, sir? A. Yes.
-—93—
Q. Would you, under your interpretation, construe that
as indicating to the parent that you would have to approve
either of these things? A. Well, we knew that more of
them would ask to remain, or at least we thought they
would, which it turned out that way.
Q. I am not asking as to your motive, but it is true that
this last paragraph of the letter indicates that you would
have to approve either of those things, doesn’t it? A. Not
official board approval. It’s just consideration, such as
planning, and so forth, and getting ready for that child
to enter this White school. We might need a teacher.
Q. Now, Mr. Garrett, will you cite me to the state law or
the state regulation which requires that on this notice that
you were ordered to give here by the Court you were re
quired to state to the child who was being rezoned that he
was being transferred to the rezoned school? A. Well, it’s
not a state directive, I suppose, but—I don’t suppose I can.
But he must be listed out— I don’t suppose I could cite him
any specific wording on that at this time.
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Q. And even if there were such a state administrative
directive, that would not require you in this letter to mis
lead the parent by making him think he was being trans
ferred.
Mr. Dodson: Object to the question, may it please
the Court.
Joseph B. Garrett—for Defendants—Cross
165a
Mr. Williams: All right, sir, I will withdraw the
question, if Your Honor please.
By Mr. Williams:
Q. Now, you are Director of Child Welfare and At
tendance? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Mr. Garrett, you have overcrowding at many, many,
many schools, do you not, in your school system? A. That
is true.
Q. Yes, sir. And where a transfer of a child is indicated
on account of some valid administrative reason, the fact
that a school is overcrowded does not necessarily mean
that he cannot possibly be admitted to that school, does it?
A. No, sir.
Q. Now, you said that you had several calls to principals
asking for explanation of these forms? A. Only a few, I
said.
—95—
Q. Only a few? A. I think one or two or three cases,
very few. I think this letter must have been rather clear.
Q. Well, how many Negro children stayed in the new
zone? How many Negro children under your provision
transferred to the newly zoned school? A. Fifty-one have
indicated that they would like to attend the White school
in their zone.
Q. Well, Mr. Garrett, how, then, can you be so sure that
your letter was clear? A. Well, as previous records indi
cate, about 10 per cent of those eligible usually attend
White schools, as you have indicated even in some state
ments before, so it figured out just about correct, about 10
per cent.
Q. Well, that 10 per cent figure came from Nashville
where they had an even worse system of notification than
Joseph R. Garrett—for Defendants—Cross
166a
you had, didn’t they? Sir? A. I don’t know anything—
I ’m not familiar with the Nashville system too well, but
that is their system of notification.
Q. And, as a matter of fact, presumably the Court
ordered this notification in an attempt to make sure that
that was correct. Is that true? A. I don’t know why they
did that.
Q. But you still felt like if you got the 10 per cent, that
made—that this notice was clear? A. Well, we got a little
- 9 6 -
over 10 per cent. Maybe we did a pretty good job there.
The Court: How many were there ?
The Witness: Fifty-one out of 405, which runs
about 12 to 15 per cent.
By Mr. Williams:
Q. Let me ask you, Mr. Garrett, why did you put first,
“ permission to remain in the school which you are now at
tending” and put second, “ be transferred to the newly
zoned school” ? A. Well, I think that is just a matter—
Either one could have been listed. I had that not in mind.
The people and different ones helped to formulate the letter.
Our lawyers approved it and helped with some of the word
ing. I don’t think that would have been a factor either way,
that is, which order they came in.
Q. That just fell naturally? A. Because it stated so
plainly what it was doing.
Q. All right, stated so plainly. It is your interpretation
that this letter “ advises any parent of his right to attend a
desegregated school” ? A. Yes, of those affected.
Q. Where is the word “ desegregated” in this letter, or in
the transfer request? A. Well, I am sure that the people
Joseph R. Garrett—for Defendants—Cross
167a
Joseph B. Garrett—for Defendants—Cross
—97—
that are living there will know that school will be desegre
gated.
Q. You just assume that? A. Surely.
Q. One more question, Mr. Garrett. Why is it that on
the transfer request directing your attention to the second
choice which you have designated as, “ I request permission
for this child to be transferred on January 20, 1961, to”
(Name of school). Why is it that you have the word “ trans
ferred” in capital letters underlined? A. Because that
child will— that child will become a transfer and must be
transferred on all registers and must be given said transfer
in order to clear books and grade placement. That teacher
might not know the grade that that child is in. He needs
something to take along with him to this new school.
Q. The parent wouldn’t be the one who would transfer
those books, would he? A. He would see that his child
turned them in at the proper school.
Q. Yes, sir; but it was your plan to send this second
letter, which you have sent, then, informing the parent that
it was necessary for his child to see the principal and have
his records transferred. Isn’t that correct, sir? A. I think
that is good administrative— We are trying to inform the
—9 8 -
people as to what direction to go in.
Q. Yes, sir. In view of that, however, it was unnecessary
to include the word—to magnify the word “ transferred” or
even include it in your original notification giving the
parent a choice of remaining in a zone to which he is
assigned and calling that a transfer. That wasn’t necessary,
was it, Mr. Garrett? A. Well, it could have been left out,
I assume, and have had the same weight.
168a
Q. Would you agree that it would have been much clearer
in terms of a choice if a parent were informed that under
your plan, segregation in these grades was abolished, that
he now had the right to attend the school in the zone in
which he fell for purposes of attending classes and that if
he wished, according to the terms of your plan, he could
make a transfer to the school that he is now attending? A.
I think the term “ transfer” there indicates even to the
average man on the street, that is, moving from one school
to the other, the reason we used the word “ transfer.” Even
the Negro child moving, they still speak of getting their
transfer from said school.
Q. And you plan or hope to follow the same notice in the
future in giving these notices at the beginning of the year,
I assume, Mr. Garrett. Is that correct? A. We will be
instructed by our Board of Education, I suppose, on that.
—99—
Q. Mr. Garrett, why did you tell the parent that he had to
return this within three days? A. Well, on—various
notices go out. We know if you say a week or ten days,
they will get in the wastepaper— We had a few lost as it
was and had to replace them. We know the quicker we can
get them back— They will lose them. We had to replace
some. And then, too, time was running short on us. We got
these things back, and then we had to do some study and
preparation. The other departments of the Board of Edu
cation, Mr. Wright and his department, I am sure had work
—or will work them here after we know how many are
coming.
Q. You plan to continue in the future requiring them to
be returned in three days? A. Well, time was an element
here; whereas, it may not be in the next case.
Q. Mr. Garrett, will you concede that of the some 250—
Joseph R. Garrett—for Defendants—Cross
169a
No. That would be some 340 Negro parents who, under
your representation to the Court, have now elected to re
main in the school in which they remain might very well
not ever know that the Court not only ordered rezoning, but
approved a desegregation plan? You will concede that that
might be true under these notices, won’t you? A. No.
— 100—
Q. You won’t concede that? A. No, sir.
Q. Tell me how you can be assured that these parents
know that? A. Because it stated the school zones to which
they were zoned in a very simple form, to me.
Q. I see. Did you have any calls from Negro parents, or
do you know? A. Well, of course, some calls come to our
office when we are out, as we are today, but to my knowl
edge, we have not.
Q. Now, this method of notification, you sometimes mail
notices directly to people, don’t you? A. Yes, when time is
Q. You didn’t feel this was of sufficient importance to
mail it directly to the parents? A. Well, we felt, too,
that we could—since time was an element, that we would
get our notices back and be ready to make preparation for
January 20th; whereas, some of those notices would be
trickling in even all the way up to the 23rd.
Q. You had card addresses on all the parents, didn’t you,
in the principals’ office?
—103—
# * # # #
Mr. Williams: What I am attempting to show is
that on September 2 ,1 believe it was, when Reverend
and Mrs. Maxwell took their two boys to Glencliff
High School, their children were registered there by
Joseph B. Garrett—-for Defendants—Cross
170a
Colloquy
the principal without any trouble at all, and they
were informed that the only question was whether
—104—
they would go to Clencliff or Antioch.
The Court: That is in the record without a doubt.
I remember that distinctly.
Mr. Williams: If it is positive that that is in the
record, I don’t need to call Reverend Maxwell.
The Court: Do you recall?
Mr. Dodson: I have heard it about ten times. I
don’t know who put it in and I don’t care, but I will
agree that that is what happened, if it has anything
to do with this case.
# * # # *
171a
This cause came on to be heard before the Honorable
William E. Miller, District Judge, without the intervention
of a jury, on January 10, 1961, upon the entire record, and
especially upon the motion for further relief and the motion
for new trial and for appropriate relief heretofore filed by
plaintiffs, upon the merits of the cause as to the issues
heretofore reserved by the Court, upon the motion to inter
vene in the cause filed by Porter Freeman, individually and
in behalf of others, the testimony of witnesses heard in
open court, and briefs and arguments of counsel, from all
of which the Court finds and holds as follows:
F indings of F act
1. With respect to the notices furnished by the defen
dants to parents of school children affected by the deseg
regation plan heretofore approved and the parents of all
other children attending the schools in Davidson County,
the Court finds that such notices are not confusing or mis
leading and further finds that there has been no showing
of any confusion or misleading as a result of the form of
the notices.
2. The Court finds that to grant the request of the four
individual plaintiffs, Cleophus Driver, Deborah Ruth Clark,
Henry C. Maxwell, Jr. and Benjamin Grover Maxwell to
be admitted to schools as exceptions to the plan approved
by the Court would in effect destroy the plan in this locality.
3. The Court finds that teachers and sustaining personnel
are assigned to the schools based upon their particular
aptitude, qualifications, background and other factors, all
F indings o f Fact, C onclusions o f Law and Judgm ent
Filed: January 24, 1961
172a
of which are considered by the Board, and that one of these
factors has been race.
4. The difficulties and problems which will be encoun
tered in making the transition from a segregated system to
a nonsegregated system would be enhanced and complicated
if the Court should at this time require the assignment of
teachers and supporting personnel in the schools of the
system on a basis different from that which has heretofore
been followed. It would in all probability lead to a situa
tion where a plan which would otherwise be successful and
would operate smoothly and harmoniously would be im
paired and rendered unworkable.
Conclusion's of L aw
1. The Board of Education acted in good faith in pre
paring the notices to parents under the desegregation plan
and in mailing and distributing them. The School Board
and the attorney representing the School Board and all
of the defendants acted in good faith in undertaking to
carry out the order of the Court and the Court holds that
they did so in substantial effect.
2. The notices to parents heretofore furnished by de
fendants to said parents under the desegregation plan
were adequate. The Court finds no objection to them.
3. The notices to parents should be given to those who
are affected by said plan of desegregation and not to any
one else, but the form of the notice in the future should be
submitted to opposing counsel in advance of its mailing,
giving them sufficient time to file objections with the Court;
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment,
January 24, 1961
173a
and the Court will impose that requirement, believing that
it is reasonable.
4. With respect to the request of the four individual
plaintiffs, Cleophus Driver, Deborah Ruth Clark, Henry C.
Maxwell, Jr., and Benjamin Grover Maxwell, to be ad
mitted to schools as exceptions to said desegregation plan,
the Court is of the opinion that to grant such exceptions
would be in effect to invite the destruction of the very plan,
which the Court has held is for the best interest of the
school system of Davidson County. It is not a plan which
is designed to deny the constitutional rights of anyone. It
is a plan which is designed to effect an orderly, harmonious,
and effective transition from a racially segregated system
to a racially nonsegregated system of schools, taking into
account the conditions existing in this particular locality.
And the Court cannot see how these individual plaintiffs
who brought this action are or would be entitled to any
different treatment from any other children who attend
the schools of Davidson County and are members of the
class represented by the plaintiffs.
5. With respect to the issue reserved by the Court on
the merits, as to whether or not there is any violation of
the rights of the plaintiffs or of those represented by the
plaintiffs where teachers are assigned in the County School
System on the basis of race or where race is used as a
factor in making assignments of teachers, the Court cannot
go so far as to agree with the argument that this question
has been finally settled by the decision in the Brown cases.
But the Court does entertain the view that this question is
a serious question under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Particularly is this true when
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment,
January 24, 1961
174a
the Court considers the fact that a plan has been approved
for Davidson County which includes a very liberal transfer
provision. When this provision, although it is on a volun
tary basis, is coupled with a policy (and the Court is not
now finding that this policy exists in Davidson County)
which would assign teachers on the basis of race, then a
serious question is presented to the Court as to whether
there is not actually being thereby perpetuated the very
condition which the Supreme Court said could not be per
petuated, and that is a segregated system of public schools.
The Court is required to view the matter in terms of the
entire school system, and in terms of the quality of educa
tion which the students are entitled to receive.
6. The Court finds that it is not necessary to determine
the question relative to the assignment of school teachers
and other personnel at this time for the reason that the
Court does not believe (even if it should now hold and de
clare that the plaintiffs do have the right to attend a school
system where race is not one of the factors considered in
the assignment of teachers) that an injunction should issue
at this time.
7. In the opinion of the Court, it is the better and wiser
course for the Court to follow, even if the foregoing rights
were declared as contended for by the plaintiffs, to with
hold the granting of an injunction until the plan has had
an opportunity to operate for a substantial period of time.
The school authorities should have the benefit of experi
ence in dealing with the operation of integrated schools.
For these reasons, in the exercise of the Court’s discretion,
the Court would deny injunctive relief in this respect at this
time.
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment,
January 24, 1961
175a
8. This case will remain on the docket of the Court, and
the Court will retain jurisdiction of the case during, the
jjeriod of transition ; and the question with respect to the
assignment of teachers, principals, and sustaining person
nel can be renewed by the plaintiffs at a later, date, and
will be taken up and considered at that time, after the plan
has had an opportunity to be operated for a substantial
period of time.
9. The motion to intervene filed by Porter Freeman in
dividually and in behalf of others, is not well taken for
the reasons, first, that it comes too late; second, that it
is contrary to the plan which the Court has already ap
proved; and third, that it contemplates putting into effect
a plan which has specifically been held to be unconstitutional
by this Court and by the Court of Appeals of the Circuit.
For these reasons the motion to intervene is not well taken
and will be denied.
Judgment
It is accordingly Ordered, A djudged and Decreed as
follows:
1. That the relief prayed for in the motion for further
relief filed by plaintiffs be and the same is denied, with
the exception that the form of the notices to parents in
the future are directed to be mailed by defendants to coun
sel for plaintiffs in advance of mailing, so as to give them
sufficient time to file with the Court objections to the form
of said notices.
2. The aforesaid notices to parents will be given to those
who are affected by said plan of desegregation heretofore
approved by the Court and not to anyone else.
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment,
January 24, 1961
176a
3. The motion for a new trial and for appropriate relief
filed by plaintiffs is overruled and denied.
4. Injunctive relief with respect to the issues heretofore
reserved by the Court concerning assignment of teachers,
principals, and sustaining personnel in the schools on the
basis of race is denied at this time; and the Court further
reserves ruling with respect to the assignment of teachers
and other school personnel, including the right of school
children or their parents to raise such question.
5. This case will remain on the docket of the Court,
and the Court will retain jurisdiction of the case during
the period of transition from a racially segregated to a
racially desegregated school system. The question with
respect to assignment of teachers, principals, and sustaining
personnel may be renewed by the plaintiffs at a later date.
It may be taken up and considered at that time after the
plan has had an opportunity to be put into operation for
a substantial period of time.
6. The motion to intervene filed in this cause by Porter
Freeman is overruled and denied.
To the foregoing action of the Court in denying their
motion for further relief and their motion for new trial
and for appropriate relief, and in denying the relief prayed
for in the complaint with respect to said issues heretofore
reserved by the Court, the plaintiffs respectfully except.
This the 24 day of January, 1961.
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment,
January 24, 1961
W m. E. Miller
United States District Judge
177a
Notice of Appeal
Filed: February 20, 1961
Notice is hereby given that the plaintiffs, Henry C. Max
well, Jr., and Benjamin Grover Maxwell, by next friend,
Reverend Henry C. Maxwell, Sr., and Mrs. Flora Max
well; Deborah Ruth Clark, by next friend, Joe E. Clark
and Mrs. Floy Clark; Jacqueline Davis, Shirley Davis,
George Davis, Jr., Robert Davis, and Rita Davis, by next
friend, Mrs. Robbie Davis; Robert Rickey Taylor, by next
friend, Robert Taylor and Mrs. Stella Taylor; Reverend
Henry C. Maxwell, Sr., Mrs. Flora Maxwell, Joe E. Clark,
Mrs. Floy Clark, Mrs. Robbie Davis, Robert Taylor, and
Mrs. Stella Taylor, hereby appeal to the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit from the judgment entered
in this action on the 23rd day of November, 1960, and from
the judgment denying plaintiffs’ motion for new trial and
appropriate relief, and denying other relief to plaintiffs,
entered in this action on the 24th day of January, 1961.
Z. A lexander L ooby and
A von N. W illiams, Jr.
327 Charlotte Avenue
Nashville 3, Tennessee
T hurgood M arshall and
J a c k Greenberg
10 Columbus Circle
Suite 1790
New York 19, New York
Attorneys for Plaintiff s-Appellants