Blytheville School District No. 5 v. Harvell Respondents' Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari

    No. 95-1351

In The

Supreme Court of tfce Unite!) States
October Term, 1995

Shirley Harvell, ei ai,
Respondents.

On Petition For A Writ of Certiorari 
To The United States Court of Appeals 

for the Eighth Circuit

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

. John W, Walker Elaine R. Jones
Mark Burnette Director-Counsel
John W. Walker, P.A.
1723 Broadway THEODORE M. SHAW
Little Rock, AR 72206 Norman J. Chachkin
(501) 374-3758 NAACP Legal Defense &

* Penda D. Hair 
NAACP Legal Defense & 
Educational Fund, Inc. 
1275 K Street, N.W.,
Suite 301
Washington, D.C. 20005 
(202) 682-1300

Educational Fund, Inc.
99 Hudson Street, 16th FI. 
New York, NY 10013 
(212) 219-1900

*Counsel o f Record



1

QUESTIONS PRESENTED 

I .

Whether the Court of Appeals correctly interpreted 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, consistent with the 
well-settled principles announced by this Court in 
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), and applied by 
other federal circuits in numerous cases, in holding that 
minority candidates who received "overwhelming support" 
from minority voters were the candidates of choice of 
minority citizens, notwithstanding a decline in the number 
of votes cast for minority candidates after adoption of a 
majority vote, runoff requirement to replace the previous 
plurality system?

II.

Whether the Court of Appeals correctly interpreted 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in holding that 
roughly proportional representation by minority 
candidates under the prior plurality system did not defeat 
respondents’ challenge to the currenl majority vote 
electoral structure under which, in eight different 
elections, the only minority candidate seated on the 
School Board was an incumbent running without 
opposition?



TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

QUESTIONS PRESENTED................   i

STATEMENT ........................................................... . 1

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT ............... 7

I. The Court of Appeals Correctly
Applied Settled Law Concerning the 
Definition of the Candidate of 
Choice of Minority V oters......... .. 8

II. The Court of Appeals Correctly
Addressed the Issue of Proportional 
Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13

CONCLUSION .................................................   17



Ill

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES PAGE

Clarke v. City of Cincinnati, 40 F.3d 807 
(6th Cir. 1994), cert, denied, 115 
S. Ct. 1960 (1995).............................. 9

Collins v. City of Norfolk, 883 F.2d 1232 
(4th Cir. 1989), cert, denied, 498 U.S.
938 (1990) ............................................ ............. .. 9

Gomez v. City of Watsonville, 863 
F.2d 1407 (9th Cir. 1988), cert, denied,
489 U.S. 1080 (1989)............................................ 11-12

Jenkins v. Red Clay Consol. Sch. Dist. Bd. 
of Educ., 4 F.3d 1103 (3d Cir. 1993), cert, 
denied, 114 S. Ct. 2779 (1994)....................... 8, 9

Johnson v. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647 (1994) . . . .  13

Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995) ................... 6

N.A.A.C.P. v. City of Niagara Falls, 65 F.3d 1002 
(2d Cir. 1995) . ..........................................................  14

Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986)......... passim

Uno v. City of Holyoke, 72 F.3d 973 (1st Cir.
1995)............................................................... 10, 11, 14



IV

STATUTES PAGE

Ark. Code Ann. § 6-13-631 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7

Ark. Code Ann. § 6-14-121 ......... .................... .. 1

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 
as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973, 1973c . . . . . .  passim



1

Respondents, Shirley Harvell, et al., respectfully 
submit this Brief in Opposition to the Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, filed on February 22, 1996. The Clerk of the 
Court extended the time for filing the Brief in Opposition 
to May 6, 1996.

STATEMENT

Minority voters and candidates brought this action 
in 1989 under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 
challenging the structure for electing representatives to 
the Blytheville, Arkansas School Board. The eight 
Blytheville School Board members are chosen in at-large 
elections, with numbered posts,1 staggered terms and, 
since 1987, a majority vote requirement.2 According to 
the 1980 census,3 the population of the School District 
was 64 percent white and 35 percent black, while the 
voting age population was 70 percent white and 29 
percent black.

xTwo members are elected each year to numbered 
posts with four-year terms.

2Until 1987, elections were by plurality vote. In 1987, 
however, the Arkansas legislature enacted legislation 
requiring that all school board members be elected by 
majority vote. See Ark. Code Ann. § 6-14-121.

3The 1990 census, which was not available at the time 
of trial, reported the School District’s population as 62 
percent white and 37 percent black. App. 3 n.l.



?

In its initial decision in 1991, the district court 
found that "the black population in the School District is 
geographically compact and located on the south side of 
the City of Blytheville." App. 89. The district court also 
found that "voting in the School District is racially 
polarized," App. 91, and that "[t]he black population in 
the School District is a politically cohesive group," App. 
89. The court found that, as of the date of decision, 
there had been two black members on the Board 
continuously since 1975, and that such sustained electoral 
success was inconsistent with a Section 2 violation. App. 
95-96. The district court thus dismissed the Complaint. 
App. 97.

On the first appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed 
and remanded for further findings. The Court noted 
that, since the change to a majority vote, runoff 
requirement, the only successful black candidate had been 
an incumbent running unopposed. App. 84. The Court 
indicated: "We agree with plaintiffs that successes prior 
to the 1988 majority vote requirement do not necessarily 
reflect the black voters’ present ability to elect 
representatives of their choice under the current election 
scheme." Id.

On remand, the district court entered
supplemental findings of fact. The court reiterated its 
earlier finding that voting in the Blytheville School 
District is racially polarized, and found that the majority 
vote requirement adopted in 1987 "may enhance the 
opportunity for discrimination against African-American 
voters." App. 67. Looking at elections since 1988, the



3

court found that the only successful black candidate had 
been an incumbent who ran unopposed. The court 
concluded that "the School Board no longer
proportionally represents the racial makeup of this 
district," App. 72, and that "the successes enjoyed by 
black candidates since 1988 fall within the ‘special 
circumstances’ articulated in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 
U.S. 30, 57 n.25 (1986)," App. 70.4

The district court set out election results showing 
that between 1988 and 1992, eight African-American, 
non-incumbents had sought election to the School Board 
and all had lost. App. 68-71. In 1991, the year the 
second African-American Board member retired, two 
African-American candidates ran and lost. Id. Yet, the 
court found, solely on the basis of a drop in total votes 
cast for African-American candidates after the majority 
vote requirement was enacted, that "none of the black 
candidates since 1988 ha[s] been the ‘preferred’ candidate 
of the black community." App. 71. The court stated its 
belief that black voters chose "not to vote rather than cast 
their vote for a candidate of the other race." App. 72. 
The court acknowledged that "other explanations could 
exists for the drop in support for black candidates," but

4Gingles indicates: "[T]he success of a minority 
candidate in a particular election does not necessarily 
prove that the district did not experience polarized voting 
in that election; special circumstances, such as the 
absence of an opponent, incumbency, or the utilization of 
bullet voting, may explain minority electoral success in a 
polarized contest." 478 U.S. at 57.



4

held that the plaintiffs had failed to establish that the 
white majority votes in such a manner as usually to defeat 
the preferred candidate of minority voters. Id.

On the second appeal, the Court of Appeals for 
the Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed the district 
court. Reviewing the district court’s application of the 
analysis set out by this Court in Thornburg v. Gingles and 
other cases, the en banc Court found no dispute as to the 
first two of Gingles’ three preconditions. See 478 U.S. at 
50-51. "The district court found that Harvell established 
the first two Gingles preconditions. The school district 
does not contest these findings of geographic 
compactness and political cohesiveness. We therefore 
accept them as established." App. 5.

With regard to the third factor — that the white 
majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it, in the 
absence of special circumstances, usually to defeat the 
minority’s preferred candidate — the Court of Appeals 
first noted that the district court’s finding of racially 
polarized voting in School Board elections was 
"undisputed," supported by the record and "weighs heavily 
in favor of finding the third Gingles precondition 
established." App. 5. The Court summarized the results 
of plaintiffs’ regression analysis which "strongly supports 
the conclusion that those black candidates who [ran] in 
elections from 1988-1992 were in fact the minority- 
preferred candidates." App. 6-7. The Court noted that 
"the school district does not contest this statistical 
evidence and offers no other evidence to contradict the 
statistical preference." App. 7. As to the district court’s



5

critical conclusion that the unsuccessful African-American 
candidates since 1988 were not the candidates of choice 
of black voters, the Court held that speculation about the 
causes of low voter turnout is an insufficient evidentiary 
basis on which to reject the strong showing of support 
among African Americans who did vote. App. 7.

The Court of Appeals next considered whether 
"the historical fact of proportional or near proportional 
representation on the school board" precluded a finding 
of a Section 2 violation. App. 11. The Court rejected 
the School District’s reliance on historical proportional 
representation for two reasons. First, proportional 
representation was achieved prior to enactment of the 
majority vote requirement and "[njo black candidate has 
won a contested election since the change in the law." 
App. 12. The Court noted that if the majority vote 
requirement had been in place prior to 1988, proportional 
representation never would have been achieved. App. 12- 
13. Second, even prior to 1988, "most of the elections 
won by black candidates were done so as incumbents in 
the face of no opposition. This is precisely the type of 
special circumstance recognized in Gingles." App. 13.

Reviewing the district court’s "totality of the 
circumstances" analysis in light of these legal errors, the 
Court of Appeals reiterated that voting is "highly 
polarized" in school board elections and noted that 
"[tjhere has been only minimal success under the present 
scheme, with Dr. Nunn’s unopposed reseating as an 
incumbent in 1990 representing the only minority victory 
in nine attempts," App. 15. Regarding other factors



6

which Gingles indicates are "supportive of, but not 
essential to" a Section 2 claim, 478 U.S. at 48 n.15, the 
Court of Appeals found: 1) that the district court gave 
insufficient weight to the vestiges of a conceded "long 
history of racial discrimination in the electoral process in 
Arkansas," which impaired the ability of some African 
Americans in Blytheville to participate in the electoral 
process; and, 2) that the majority vote requirement 
adopted in 1987 enhanced the opportunities for 
discrimination against African-American voters. App, 16. 
The Court concluded that, under the totality of the 
circumstances, plaintiffs had demonstrated that the 
School Board election scheme diluted minority voting 
strength and thus had established a violation of Section 
2. The Court remanded for "entry of an appropriate 
remedial decree," cautioning the district court "to steer 
clear of the type of racial gerrymandering proscribed in 
Miller,5 while keeping in mind the need to vindicate the

sMillerv. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995). The district 
court’s finding that African-American voters in the 
Blytheville School District are "geographically compact" 
suggests that constructing a remedy plan that comports 
with Miller will not be difficult in this case.

Although the dissenting opinion implied, App. 30 
n.3, that a single-member districting remedy was 
unnecessary, and that the majority’s reference to such a 
remedy was therefore also unnecessary, in fact the 
Arkansas Legislature has required such a remedy in school 
districts with minority population of 10 percent or more, 
unless the district has been found not to be in violation

(continued...)



7

rights of minority voters," App. 18.

Five judges dissented, stating their view that the 
Court did not sufficiently account for white crossover 
voting in its analysis of racial bloc voting, that low black 
turnout meant that the post-1987 candidates supported by 
black voters were not really the candidates of choice of 
the black community, and that the pre-1987 success of 
black candidates and the election of the an unopposed 
black incumbent in 1990 established that the electoral 
scheme did not violate Section 2. App. 18-31.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

The Court of Appeals correctly stated and applied 
well-settled law to facts found by the district court and 
established by undisputed evidence in the record. There 
is no conflict in the circuits on any issue raised by the 
Petition. The Question Presented identifies no error of 
law made by the Court of Appeals, but simply asks this 
Court to determine whether the district court’s 
conclusions were "clearly erroneous." The basis for the 
ruling below was, however, legal error. The bulk of 
petitioners’ argument amounts to nothing more than a 
fact-specific disagreement with the Court of Appeals’

5(...continued)
of the Voting Rights Act. Ark. Code Ann. § 6-13-631. 
See App. 16 n.10. The enactment of this provision also 
indicates that any policy in support of at-large school 
board elections in Arkansas is weak.



8

application of black letter law to the uncontested facts of 
this case. The Petition presents no substantial question 
that warrants review by this Court.

I. The Court of Appeals Correctly Applied Settled
Law Concerning the Definition of the Candidate
of Choice of Minority Voters

The Petition raises no issue of law regarding the 
definition of the candidate of choice of minority voters, 
as used in the third Gingles precondition. See 478 U.S. at 
51. The record establishes that since enactment of the 
majority vote requirement, six different African-American 
candidates, running in a total of eight contested elections, 
received overwhelming support from African-American 
voters. App. 7, 9. The district court’s sole reason for 
failing to find that any of these candidates was a 
candidate of choice of African Americans was the drop 
in votes cast for African-American candidates in these 
elections, compared to pre-1988 contests.

The Eighth Circuit carefully rejected any 
"categorical" conclusion that "a candidate is the minority- 
preferred candidate simply because that candidate is a 
member of the minority." App. 6. The Court instead 
followed the other circuits in holding: "The preferences 
of the minority voters must be established on an election- 
specific basis, viewing all the relevant circumstances." Id. 
(citing Jenkins v. Red Clay Consol. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 
4 F.3d 1103, 1126 (3d Cir. 1993), cert, denied, 114 S. Ct. 
2779 (1994)).



9

Petitioners argue that the Court should grant 
review because the decline in African-American turnout 
after enactment of the majority vote, runoff law "provides 
substantial evidence of the African-American 
community’s dissatisfaction with these candidates." 
Petition at 22. Yet, as found by the Court of Appeals, 
there is no record evidence as to the cause of the decline 
in votes cast in favor of African-American candidates. 
Nothing suggests that a decrease in voter participation 
reflected dissatisfaction with these six candidates.

The federal Courts of Appeals consistently have 
concluded that the candidates of choice of minority voters 
are ordinarily determined on the basis of actual voting 
patterns in elections. The Sixth Circuit summarized: 
"courts generally have understood blacks’ preferred 
candidates simply to be those candidates who receive the 
greatest support from black voters." Clarke v. City of 
Cincinnati, 40 F.3d 807, 810 n.l (1994), cert, denied, 115 
S. Ct. 1960 (1995). This Court in Gingles described "the 
essence of a § 2 claim" as "an inequality in the 
opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect 
their preferred representatives." 478 U.S. at 47.° See 
also Jenkins v. Red Clay, 4 F.3d at 1126; Collins v. City of 
Norfolk, 883 F.2d 1232, 1238 (4th Cir. 1989) (minority 
candidate of choice is the "candidate who received the 
most black votes"), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990).

6See also id. at 48 (referring to impediment to "ability 
of minority voters to elect representatives of their 
choice"), 56 ("black voters’ ability")(emphasis added).



10

The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has 
noted that "[t]he cause of poor turnout is often difficult 
to detect." Uno v. City of Holyoke, 72 F.3d 973, 987 (1st 
Cir. 1995). Where low voter turnout results from the 
effects of past discrimination, depressed turnout may 
itself be probative of dilution. Id. at 986-987. The Court 
in the Uno case left open the possibility that "especially 
low turnout in a particular election may be evidence that 
factors other than racially based politics (say, poor 
political organization or lack of minority community 
support) were the cause of the minority community’s 
inability to elect its preferred candidate in that election," 
id. at 987 n.7. Similarly, the Eighth Circuit in this case 
recognized: "There may be situations in which voter 
apathy may be linked to disapproval of a particular 
candidate, but there is no indication that such is the case 
here." App. 7. The en banc Court reasoned:

The silence of the minority voters is not so 
deafening as to warrant a finding that they 
disapproved of six different minority candidates in 
light of the uncontroverted statistical evidence that 
supports a finding of overwhelming support from 
those blacks who did vote. Nor are the numbers 
so low as to reduce their statistical significance to 
a nullity...

... Under the school district’s proferred view, the 
black voters of Blytheville have gone five 
consecutive years, six candidates, and eight 
campaigns without stating a preference, a 
proposition we cannot accept.



11

App. 7, 9.7

As noted by the Uno Court, "even with a modest 
turnout, the actual votes cast may be probative if a 
sufficiently strong pattern emerges," 72 F.3d at 986. The 
Eighth Circuit properly concluded that mere speculation 
about the causes of low turnout is not sufficient to 
overcome a strong pattern of preference by those 
minority voters who actually vote.8 Accord Gomez v.

7The Court of Appeals correctly rejected the School 
District’s effort to characterize two of the six unsuccessful 
African-American candidates as militants who 
disenfranchised themselves from the African-American 
community. "There is no evidence in the record that the 
minority community viewed any of the six different 
candidates as in any way inadequate representatives of its 
interests." App. 11. The Petition blatantly takes 
testimony out of context in rearguing this point. See 
Petition 23 n.19. For example, Mrs. Harvell’s testimony 
that she "was thought of as a troublemaker" related to 
"white clerks at the polling place" who tried to intimidate 
a black voter. See TR 177-78. Petitioners fail to mention 
that the reason parents considered Mrs. Harvell 
ineffective, see Petition at 23 n.19, was because of the 
School Board’s unresponsiveness to the black 
community’s concerns. TR 164-65. Nothing in the 
record indicates that anyone in the minority community 
had negative views of any of the six unsuccessful African- 
American candidates.

Petitioners argue that the Eighth Circuit’s rule would 
mean that if only one African American votes in an

(continued...)



12

City of Watsonville, 863 F.2d 1407, 1415-16 (9th Cir. 
1988), cert, denied, 489 U.S. 1080 (1989)(in analyzing 
political cohesiveness, court should look "only to actual" 
voting patterns rather than speculating as to the reasons" 
for low minority turnout)(emphasis in original),

In addition, the Eighth Circuit identified powerful 
reasons to believe that a cause other than dissatisfaction 
with African-American candidates caused African- 
American voter participation to decline. White voter 
turnout also fell and "it stands to reason that when an 
external stimulus dampens the white turnout it may 
impact even more greatly on a group that has faced

8(...continued)
election and all the rest boycott the election because of 
dissatisfaction with all candidates, the one African- 
American vote would determine the candidate of choice 
of African Americans and the boycott would be 
irrelevant. Petition at 21. The Eighth Circuit’s holding 
is not so expansive. The Court of Appeals in this case 
found not just one vote in one election, but a pattern of 
"overwhelming support" for six different minority 
candidates. App. 7. If, as petitioners hypothesize, there 
had been a "boycott" or any evidence of minority 
dissatisfaction with these six candidates, petitioners had 
the opportunity to introduce such evidence into the 
record. The extent of the Eighth Circuit’s holding is that 
where the defendant offers no evidence about the cause 
of low voter turnout, "speculation" is "inappropriate." 
App. 7.



13

historic disadvantages." App. 10. The Court of Appeals 
also pointed out that "in 1990 the polling place known as 
a historic black voter stronghold was moved to a 
predominantly white area ... and the 1990 election 
produced a record low black turnout for that particular 
precinct." App. 10 n.5.

II. The Court of Appeals Correctly Addressed the
Issue of Proportional Representation

The Court of Appeals applied settled and 
unexceptional law when it concluded that proportional 
representation is "an important factor to consider" but 
that it "does not provide an absolute safe harbor." App. 
11. See, e.g., Johnson v. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647, 2660 
(1994) (rejecting an "inflexible rule" concerning 
proportional representation); id. at 2664 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) ("proportionality ... is always relevant 
evidence in determining vote dilution, but is never itself 
dispositive"). The Eighth Circuit found: "[T]he
proportional representation on which the school district 
relies rests on infirm grounds. The electoral success that 
black candidates achieved under the plurality system is no 
longer present. No black candidate has won a contested 
election since the change in the law." App. 12. As found 
by the Court of Appeals, proportional representation 
would never have been attained in the first instance had 
a majority vote requirement been in place prior to 1988. 
"Norvell Moore would have never won initially to enable 
him to serve multiple terms ... [and] Dr. Nunn’s 1982 
victory would have provided the only successful black



14

candidate in Blytheville history," App. 12-13.

The Petition identifies no error of law with regard 
to the Eighth Circuit’s analysis of proportional 
representation. The Court of Appeals simply ruled that 
the results under one election system are not dispositive 
of the legality of a new, different election system. This 
ruling is consistent with this Court’s teachings and with 
lower court precedent. The relevance of sustained 
proportional representation is as an indication of the 
"minority group’s ability' to elect its preferred 
representatives." Gingles, 478 U.S. at 77. Where
plaintiffs show that "persistent proportional
representation ... does not accurately reflect" that ability, 
this factor loses its probative value. Id.

The question in a vote dilution case is not whether 
the minority group has achieved proportional electoral 
success as a matter of hisloiy, but whether the system 
currently dilutes minority voting strength. "Elections held 
under a significantly different electorial structure ... may 
be less probative." N.A.A.C.P. v. City of Niagara Falls, 65 
F.3d 1002, 1012 (2d Cir. 1995). In Uno v. City of 
Holyoke, the First Circuit explained: "The court must 
determine whether the challenged electoral structure 
deprives a racial minority of equal opportunity to 
participate in the political process at present. Though 
past elections may be probative of racially polarized 
voting, they become less so as environmental change 
occurs. In particular, elections that provide insights into 
past history are less probative than those that mirror 
current political reality." 72 F.3d at 990.



15

Here, the "environmental change" is clearly 
apparent. When the majority vote requirement was 
enacted in 1987, the Blytheville School Board had two 
African-American members, which constituted rough 
proportional representation. Under the plurality system, 
this rough proportionality had been maintained for a 
number of years. However, under the prior plurality 
system, only once did an African-American candidate win 
her first election in a head-to-head contest with a white 
candidate. The others were initially elected with only a 
plurality of the vote.

After the majority vote requirement was enacted, 
African Americans lost electorally-achieved proportional 
representation on the School Board as soon as one of the 
two sitting incumbents decided not to run for re-election, 
in 1991.9 Representation by candidates of choice of

Petitioners’ argument that white crossover voting 
defeats a finding of legally significant racially polarized 
voting also is fatally flawed in that it relies solely on pre- 
1988 elections. From 1988-1992, in eight different 
contests, no candidate-of-choice of African-American 
voters received sufficient white crossover votes to be 
elected, although a longstanding African-American 
incumbent was reseated unopposed. Since 1988, it has 
been impossible for an African-American, non-incumbent 
to win election to the School Board.

The dissent below points only to two elections, 
Helen Nunn in 1982 and Norvell Moore in 1987, in which 
African-American candidates of choice arguably received

(continued...)



16

African-American voters fell from two to one. Even 
though six African-American, non-incumbents sought 
election to the School Board from 1988-1992, in eight 
contests, not a single one of these candidates won. Each 
was defeated by white bloc voting.10 These recent 
elections most accurately reflect current political reality in 
Blytheville.

9(... continued)
a significant white crossover vote, App. 22-23. Of these, 
Moore, a longstanding incumbent, still won by only 23 
votes. In essence, petitioners seek a ruling as a matter of 
law that these isolated examples compel a finding that 
more recent sustained losses, under a new majority vote 
system, by candidates overwhelmingly supported by 
African-American voters, cannot be attributed to white 
bloc voting. The petition identifies no legal error or 
conflict in the circuits on the Court of Appeals’ treatment 
of crossover voting.

10Although a second African American was appointed 
to the Board in 1993, while this case was pending in the 
Court of Appeals, there is no evidence as to whether this 
person is a candidate of choice of African-American 
voters. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the 
appointment of a second African American was not 
probative of the ability of African-American voters to 
elect the candidate of their choice. App. 14 n.8.



17

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari should be denied.

John W. Walker 
Mark Burnette 
John W. Walker, P.A.
1723 Broadway 
Little Rock, AR 72206 
(501) 374-3758

*Penda D. Hair 
NAACP Legal Defense & 
Educational Fund, Inc. 
1275 K Street, N.W.,
Suite 301
Washington, D.C. 20005 
(202) 682-1300

*Counsel o f Record

Elaine Jones 
Director-Counsel

Theodore M. Shaw 
Norman J. Chachkin 
NAACP Legal Defense & 
Educational Fund, Inc.

99 Hudson Street, 16th FI. 
New York, NY 10013 
(212) 219-1900

Attorneys for Respondents

Dated: May 6, 1996