Alexander v. Dennis Appellees' Response to Second Supplemental Briefs of Appellants

    ot5
U)F

IN THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

Nos. 75-177S, 75-2097,
75-2098, 75-2099

RAMSEY ALEXANDER and ROBERT F. NEWMAN,

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

and

RAYMOND L. DENNIS and WARNER McCREARY,

Intervenors-Appellees, 

vs.
AVCO CORPORATION - AEROSPACE STRUCTURES 
DIVISION, Nashville, Tennessee and AERO 
LODGE NO. 735, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION 
OF MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS, 
AFL-CIO,

Defendants-Appellants.

On Appeal from the United States District 
Court for the Middle District of Tennessee

APPELLEES’ RESPONSE TO SECOND 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFS OF APPELLANTS

JACK GREENBERG
O. PETER SHERWOOD 

10 Columbus Circle 
New York, New York 10019

MORRIS J. BALLER 
145 Ninth Street 
San Francisco, Calif. 94103

Attorneys f

AVON N. WILLIAMS, JR.
1414 Parkway Towers
404 James Robertson Parkway
Nashville, Tennessee 37219

RUSSELL C. B. ENNIX, JR. 
Morris Memorial Building 
330 Charlotte Avenue 
Nashville, Tennessee 37201

: Appellees



IN THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

Nos. 75-1776, 75-2097, 
75-2098, 75-2099

RAMSEY ALEXANDER and ROBERT F. NEWMAN,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

and

RAYMOND L. DENNIS and WARNER McCREARY,

Intervenors-Appellees,

vs.
AVCO CORPORATION - AEROSPACE STRUCTURES 
DIVISION, Nashville, Tennessee and AERO 
LODGE NO. 735, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION 
OF MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS, 
AFL-CIO,

Defendants-Appellants.

On Appeal from the United States District 
Court for the Middle District of Tennessee

APPELLEES' RESPONSE TO SECOND 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFS OF APPELANTS

Appellants Avco and Aero Lodge 735 have each moved to 

file supplemental briefs in this matter raising additional 

argument based on decisions of the Supreme Court in June, 1977.



Appellees hereby reply to those supplemental briefs. Because 

the issues argued in the two supplemental briefs substantially 

overlap, and because the Aero Lodge 735 brief is little more 

than a summary of Avco's brief, we respond to both in a single 

argument.

I.

APPELLANTS DISTORT OR IGNORE PERTINENT 
FINDINGS OF THE DISTRICT COURT

Appellants' briefs would hold up to this Court, for reexami­

nation in light of recent Supreme Court decisions, a wholly 

hypothetical district court decision. The decision which they 

urge must now be reversed bears only slight resemblance to the 

one entered by the court below.

1. Both defendants would characterize that decision as one 

in which a bona fide seniority system with unintentionally dis­

criminatory side-effects was the primary Title VII violation.

(See Avco Br. at 2-3; Aero Lodge 735 Br. at 2-3). But a review 

of Judge Morton's decision will demonstrate that seniority was 

only one of a panoply of intentionally discriminatory practices

identified and enjoined, see Appellees' Brief filed February 19,
1/ '

1976, at 16-19. In fact, the other discriminatory practices —  

including deliberately discriminatory abuse of a word of mouth

1/ This brief is hereafter cited as "Main Br.".

2



recruitment system, deliberately discriminatory and subjective 

supervisory evaluations of employee qualifications, deliberately 

discriminatory refusal to afford black employees equal training 

opportunities, overt supervisory bias and Avco's deliberate 

failure to correct it, and deliberately discriminatory manipu­

lation of personnel records form the great bulk of the Title VII 

violations identified by the District Court. (See Main Br. at 

16, A. 1385-87, A. 1410.) Both defendants also persist in 

characterizing the Globe-Wernicke incident as the racially neu­

tral application of a bona fide seniority system within the 

meaning of Title VII’s §703 (h), 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2 (h), as now 

construed by the Supreme Court in Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters 

v. United States. 45 U.S.L.W. 4506 (May 31, 1977). See Avco 

Br. at 3, Aero Lodge 735 Br. at 2. That distortion of the 

plain facts as found by the court below —  which are that 

appellants actually subverted and manipulated the seniority 

rights of black employees in a deliberate effort to deprive 

them of the fruits of their bona fide seniority position, see 

Main Br. at 19-21, 50-55, A. 1388-1390 —  cannot be condoned.

2. Avco strenuously argues the case as if the district 

court has only made findings of initial discrimination (sub­

sequently perpetuated by neutral practices) founded solely on 

statistical evidence with respect to the pre-Title VII period. 

See Avco Br. at 2-3, 6-7. But, in fact, the statistical

3



evidence relied on by Judge Morton comprised only one element 

of a massive array of findings of deliberately discriminatory 

acts and their effects. The list of discriminatory practices 

engaged in by appellants and found by the court below, see 

Main Br. at 16-23, A. 1379-1410, includes intentional prac­

tices of overt racism. This is not a subtle, purely statis­

tical case in which discriminatory purpose or effect must be 

inferred from dry workforce breakdowns. Moreover, the statis­

tical and other evidence of discrimination does not rest solely 

on findings of pre-1965 discrimination and post-1965 perpetua­

tion by neutral practices. Both Avco and Aero Lodge 735 con­

tinued their active program of discrimination for years after 

Title VII became effective. See Main Br. at 16, A. 1385-87, 

1410. The statistical indicia of discrimination found by the 

District Court include many findings of discrimination after 

1965 in hiring and promotions. See, e.g., A. 1383 (Black 

employment declined dramatically after January 1970, and black

2/ All these discriminatory practices continued in effect long 
after the filing of EEOC charges by plaintiff class representa­
tive Alexander and Newman on September 9, 1965 and May 2, 1966, 
respectively, A. 1374. Those charges were sufficient to allow 
appellees to raise in litigation, the broad class claims in­
volved here. See A. 1374. There is, therefore, no question of 
the timeliness of the class claims or the actionability appel­
lants' practices of classwide discrimination, cf. United Air 
Lines v. Evans, 45 U.S.L.W. 4566 (May 31, 1977).



women were never hired until after October 1968), A. 1384 

(only 9 of 734 salaried employees were black as of July 9,
3/

1971, and Avco had no black mechanics and had never had a 

black superintendent as of the same date).

3. Both appellants stubbornly deny the typicality and 

basic nature of the named plaintiffs' discrimination problems 

and of their claims. See Avco Br. at 4-6, Aero Lodge Br. at 3-5. 

The facts about the individual claims as largely found below, 

are fully set forth at Main Br. 56-64 (See esp. facts re 

Alexander and Newman). That narrative makes it clear that the 

individual claims are in multiple respects protypical of the 

class-wide discrimination practices of both Avco and Aero Lodge 

735. There is no need to reiterate those facts here; we simply 

note that the distorted and disingenuously narrow characteriza­

tion of what happened to the plaintiffs and what kinds dis­

crimination they complained about bear little relation to 

reality and have no foundation in the record.

II.

THE RODRIGUEZ DECISION DOES NOT AFFECT THE 
DISTRICT COURT'S PROPER DETERMINATION THAT 
APPELLEES WERE APPROPRIATE CLASS REPRESEN­
TATIVES

Both appellants argue that under East Texas Motor Freight

3/ This disparity reflects post-1969 hiring discrimination, see 
Main Br. 14, A. 1149, not ancient history.

5



v. Rodriquez, 45 J.S.L.W. 4525 (May 31, 1977), appellants were

not appropriate class representatives (Avco Br. at 4, Aero 

Lodge 735 Br. at 3). Their arguments rest largely on the 

fallacious presumption that the individual plaintiffs1 discrimi­

nation problems had nothing to do with the patterns of across- 

the-board employment discrimination found by the District Court. 

Since the presumption is wrong, see 1.3 supra, the argument fails 

without further analysis. But it is nevertheless worth consider­

ing briefly how Rodriguez differs from the instant action.

The crux of the Rodriguez decision was that the specific 

facts present in that records showed that the district court 

was not clearly in error in finding those plaintiffs inadequate
4/

class representatives. On each of these specific factual points, 

the case at bar differs dramatically. In Rodriguez, the 

plaintiffs did not pursue their case as a class action at trial 

but attempted to resurrect it on appeal, see 45 U.S.L.W. at 

4526, n. 6 and accompanying text. Here, plaintiffs explicitly 

pursued, see Main Br. at 2-3, and at trial massively documented 

their class claims. The Rodriguez plaintiffs were not members 

of their class because "they suffered no injury as a result of 

the alleged discriminatory practices," see 45 U.S.L.W. at

4/ The Supreme Court at the same time reiterated the principle 
that "suits alleging racial or ethnic discrimination are often 
by their very nature class suits involving classwide wrongs. 
Common questions of law or fact are typically present." 45 
U.S.L.W. at 4527.

6



4526-27. Here the district court correctly found that three 

named plaintiffs had suffered injury due to discriminatory 

treatment typical of that inflicted on all black employees,
5/

see Main Br. at 22-23, 55-64. Whereas the Rodriguez plaintiffs 

stipulated that they had not been discriminatorily hired on 

initially assigned, see 45 U.S.L.W. at 4527, the plaintiffs 

here never conceded anything and moreover, proved their allega­

tions that they became and remained laborers for racial reasons, 

see Main Br. at 55-64. The Supreme Court also doubted the 

Rodriguez plaintiffs' ability to represent the class because they 

had failed to move for certification prior to trial and because 

the record indicated substantial opposition by class members to 

the plaintiffs' litigation goals, see 45 U.S.L.W. at 4527. But 

in the case at bar, appellees did move before trial for certi­

fication, see Main Br. at 2-3, and they were recognized as 

leaders and spokesmen by all of Avco's black workers, see Main 

Br. at 22-23. Appellants' arguments that Rodriguez makes

5/ Even if the district court's judgment for appellees on their 
individual claims were erroneous, Rodriquez would still support 
affirmance of the holding that appellees were proper class 
representatives since this case was fully tried as a class action. 
See 45 U.S.L.W. at 4527, n. 12.

7



§/
appellees improper class representatives is frivolous.

III.

NOTHING IN THE TEAMSTERS DECISION ON SENIORITY 
UNDERCUTS THE DISTRICT COURT'S CORRECT FINDINGS 
AND CONCLUSIONS

Both Avco and Aero Lodge 735 argue that the Supreme Court's 

decision in Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,

45 U.S.L.W. 4506 (May 31, 1977) supports their position here. 

Both are wrong.

Appellants' main thrust based on Teamsters urges that since 

the Supreme Court held bona-fide seniority systems immune under 

Title VII, the district court's findings of discriminatory prac­

tices must be reversed. These arguments are both inapplicable

6/ No court, including the Supreme Court in Rodriguez, has ever 
held that the representative's individual claims must be in 
every respect identical to the class claims. A general congru­
ence in the nature of the claims suffices, e.g., see Gibson v. 
Local 40, Supercargoes & Checkers (ILWU), 543 F.2d 1259, 1264 
(9th Cir. 1976), and appellees abundantly meet that standard.
Aero Lodge 735's argument that the Globe-Wernicke incident is 
rendered unactionable because no named plaintiff was directly 
affected misses this point; the manipulation of job opportuni­
ties for the benefit of white employees and to the detriment of 
black employees which occurred in the Globe-Wernicke incident is 
the prototype of other practices that displaced or deprived 
appellees of jobs they held or sought. See especially Main Br. 
at 61 and n. 91a, and td. at 57-58. Likewise, the Lodge's 
assertion that there was no union-caused discrimination against 
any named plaintiff is either a flight of fantasy or a calculated 
effort to ignore the facts as found by the court below, see A. 
1393-94, 1398, 1399, cf. 1390, 1380-81. In Rodriguez the Supreme 
Court merely cautioned that commonality is not the only require­
ment of Rule 23(a) that must be met. Numerosity, typicality and 
adequacy of representation must be present as well. All of the 
requirements of Rule 23(a) and b(2) are satisfied in this case.

8



and incorrect. They are inapplicable because appellants' 

seniority —  discrimination practices constitute just a small 

part of the comprehensive scheme of illegal practices found by 

the court below, see p. , supra. Title VII1s §703 (h) —

the sole basis for the Teamsters seniority holding, see 45 

U.S.L.W. at 4512 —  and its interpretation in Teamsters relate 

only to seniority systems. All the other discriminatory prac-
’ u

tices of appellants are outside §703(h); the district court's
8/

holdings as to them are therefore not affected by Teamsters.

The Supreme Court's decision is further inapplicable to those 

practices because it dealt only with the legality of an other­

wise neutral seniority system which in the post-Title VII period 

perpetrates the effects of pre-Act discrimination, see 45 U.S.L.W. 

at 4512. Avco and Aero Lodge 735 continued to discriminate on 

a systematic basis long after Title VII became effective, see 

p. supra. Thus, this cas is one in which, as the Supreme 

Court took pains to note, "[p]ost-Act discriminatees . . . may

7/ These practices can in no sense be said to be a "bona fide. . . 
merit system," cf. §703(h), 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(h).

8/ See n. 11 infra. Aero's assertion, Br. at 2, that "[t]he 
only persons entitled to relief under Teamsters are the identi­
fied victims of post-Act hiring or transfer discrimination," 
badly misreads the Supreme Court's decision. Consistent with 
Teamsters, full relief must be awarded to all victims of all forms 
of employment discrimination, except that which consists solely 
of the post-Act effects of a racially neutral seniority system 
which perpetrates disadvantages rooted in pre-Act discrimination.

9



obtain full ’make whole' relief . . . without attacking the 

legality of the seniority system as applied to them," 45 USLW at
V4512.
Even if Teamsters did apply in some general sense to some of 

appellants' seniority practices, the seniority system shown on 

this record would not qualify for the limited immunity granted 
under §703(h) as construed in Teamsters. "To be sure, §703 (h) does 

not ummunize all seniority systems, it refers only to 'bona fide'

systems, and a proviso requires that any difference in treatment
10/

not be 'the result of an intention to discriminate', 45 USLW 

at 4513. The Avco seniority system simply cannot be viewed as 
bona fide. In Teamsters, the government had conceded that the 

seniority system was not devised or maintained in racial discrimi­
nation, see 45 USLW at 4514. Here, the record shows that racism 
permeated the operations of both parties who devised the seniority

9/ The only limitation on the availability of relief for post-Act 
seniority discrimination is one of ttimely filing of a discrimination 
complaint, see 45 USLW at 4512 n.30. This is not an issue here, see 
n.2, supra.
10/ in a post-Teamsters decision the Fifth Circuit succintly 
restated the holding Supreme Court's decisions:

"The principal import of those decisions for this case 
is the holding that "bona fide" seniority systems, 
that is, systems which are facially neutral, which did 
not have their genesis in racial discrimination, and 
which were negotiated and have been maintained free 
from any illegal purpose, do not violate Title VII 
even though they perpetuate the effects of an employ­
er's discrimination. Myers v. Gilman Paper Co. ____
F.2d ____ , (5th Cir. July 29, 1977) (Copy attached
for the convenience of the Court).

10



11/system, see Main Br. at 7-8. This case, therefore, is one

of those distinguished in Teamsters, on the grounds that "a 

seniority system that perpetrates the effects of pre-Act 

discrimination cannot be bona fide if an intent to discrimi­
nate entered into its very adoption," 45 USLW at 4511 and n.28. 
See also, 45 USLW at 4520 and n.3 (Marshall, J., concurring 

and dissenting opinion).
Equally compelling is clear evidence that the seniority 

system was maintained, manipulated, or subverted after 1965 in 
any way necessary to perpetuate white workers' advantage. After 

conversion to a modified plant seniority (by occupation) sys­
tem in 1968, Avco management, with union acquiescence, avoided 
the exercise of black workers' seniority rights by discrimina- 

torily finding them unqualified or denying them equal training 

opportunities, see Main Br. at 12-13, 41 n.62 and accompanying 
text and other citations contained therein, and see id. at 57 

(3) and 58. It is no coincidence that the assembler bench and 

jig job, into which most black employees were hired, see Main 
Br. at 20, 21, n.31 and accompanying text, was placed in a 
unique category as a separate seniority unit even though the 
occupation occurred in many different departments and units 

which would otherwise have been opened to further black

11/ Aero Lodge 735, for example, did not permit blacks to 
join as members until 1957, and then accepted only a few under 
degrading conditions, see Main Br. at 8.

11



penetration, see Main Br. at 12.

Of course, the most glaring and most recent example of 
how little appellants heed the "neutral" dictates of bona fide 

seniority is the Globe-Wernicke incident. There, they 
actually stripped black employees of seniority rights properly 

belonging to them, and modified the existing seniority system 

at their expense, to grant additional seniority benefits to 

white employees. See Main Br. at 19-21, 50-54. It is ironic 

indeed to read appellants' characterizations of the pre-Globe 
Wernicke seniority system and their modification of it as 
"bona fide"; for the neutral application of that "bona fide" 

system would have left the white Globe-Wernicke group on the 
street instead of giving them 52 black jobs to which they had 
no seniority rights.

What the Globe-Wernicke caper eloquently shows is that 
appellants stood ready to, and did, subordinate objective 

standards of seniority to unlawful considerations of race. 
Appellants' use and ab se of seniority —  both in Globe-Wernicke 
and generally —  can only be seen as intentionally discri­

minatory. Therefore §703 (h) imposes no bar to any finding of 

liability for discriminatory practices. Moreover, in the 
absence of a §703 (h) grant of immunity the sweeping remedial 

command of §703(g), 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(g) comes fully into 

play, see Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747 

(1976). See, e.g.. United Air Lines v. Evans, supra, 45 USLW 

at 4567-68. The District Court could therefore properly enter 
any practicable remedial measures necessary to make whole the

12



victims of discrimination, including full retroactive seniority-

relief. See, e.g., United States v. Trucking Employers, Inc. 
F.2d (D.C. Cir. Nos. 76-1521, 1577, June 29, 1977).

Avco also relies on Teamsters in connection with its 
argument against the district court's use of employment 

statistics, see Br. at 2-3. We treat that point in the next 
section.

12/ The Court in Trucking Employers, carefully reading the 
Teamsters decision, stated:

Unless the. . . employee could show discriminatory 
purpose in the very adoption of the seniority system, 
he would have no claim under Title VII, and no quest­
ion of waiver would arise. If, however, an employee 
could prove that the maintenance of the seniority 

_ system was a continuous act of intentional discrimi­
nation, the proposed release would not bar an action 
for post-decree damages. Similarly, the waiver would 
not preclude a suit arising from the post-decree 
operation of any neutral practice, other than the 
seniority system, that perpetuated the effects of the 
prior act of neutral discrimination. An employer 
cannot purchase a license to avoid its duty to elimi­
nate practices which perpetuate prior discriminatory 
acts any more than it can circumvent its responsibi­
lity for future acts of purposeful discrimination.
In both cases, the strictures of Title VII are absolute. 
United States v. Trucking Employers, Inc. F.2d
___, 14 EPD f (D.C. Cir. 1977).

13



IV.
THE SUPREME COURT’S CLARIFICATION OF 
STANDARDS FOR USE OF STATISTICAL 
EVIDENCE DOES NOT UNDERMINE THE DISTRICT 
COURT'S DECISION

In both Teamsters, supra, and Hazelwood School District 

v. United States, 45 U.S.L.W. 4882 (June 27, 1977), the 

Supreme Court clarified the principles governing use of 
statistical evidence as to work force composition in Title 

VII cases. Avco seizes on that clarification to urge reversal 

here, but in so doing overlooks or distorts both what the 

court below did and what the Supreme Court said.
Appellees proff in this case was not exclusively or even 

primarily statistical. Here as in Teamsters (where the Supreme 
Court affirmed the finding of hiring discrimination), "indivi­
duals who testified about their personal experiences with the 

company brought the cold numbers convincingly to life," 45

U.S.L.W. at 4509. The district court here did not, as Avco 
implies, cf. BR. at 3, base its findings of a prima facie case 

of Title VII violations solely or even primarily on statistical 

summaries of work force composition. Rather, it relied on 
specific, vivid examples of racially motivated employment 
procedures and disparate treatment of numerous black workers. 

See Main Br. at 7-8, 11-13, 15-21.

Insofar as the district court did emphasize statistics, 

Teamsters supports its analysis. The Supreme Court reiterated 

the great weight attached to careful statistical analyses in 

Title VII cases, see 45 U.S.L.W. at 4510. Teamsters notes that 

statistical evidence of an employer's nondiscriminatory hiring

14



after the effective date of Title VII might tend to rebut a 

prima facie case based mainly on overall work force statistics. 

See 45 U.S.L.W. at 4510. But the court's observations was only 
that such proof might exonerate an employer, unlike the one in 
that case, who "had done virtually no new hiring since the 

effective date of Title VII," 45 U.S.L.W. at 4510. That 

observation did not save the employer there because its "later 
changes in its hiring and promotion policies could be little 

comfort to the victims of the earlier post-Act discrimination, 

and could not erase its previous illegal conduct or its obliga­
tion to afford relief to those who suffered because of it," id. 

The same reasoning applies here. Avco enjoyed a large increase 

in employment totals after 1964, with concommitant copening up 

of large numbers of entry level and higher level positions.
See A. 1383. Yet, the statistics as of years after 1964 still 

reflects a nearly total exclusion of black employees from the 
better and higher paying jobs. See Main Br. at 13-15, and see

p. ____ , supra. Moreover, the record contains numerous examples
of how appellant purposefully discriminated against individual 
black employees long after 1965, see Main Br. at 17-19. The 

district court correctly found that a whole panoply discrimi- 
minatory practices remained in effect after 1965, many until 

trial in 1971. The victims of those discriminatory practices 
are entitled to a finding of entitlement and a grant of relief.

The court suggested in Hazelwood only "the possibility 

that this prima facie statistical proof in the records might 

at the trial court level be rebutted by statistics dealing with

15



Hazelwood's hiring after it became subject to Title VII, 45 

U.S.L.W. at 4885. That suggestion at most would give Avco "an 

opportunity to show 'that the claimed discriminatory pattern 
is a product of pre-act hiring rather than unlawful post-act 
discrimination,'" id. Avco had that opportunity, and failed.
The district court emphatically concluded that the observed 
statistical disparities were the product of post-Act discri­

minatory practices, see main Br. at 16, A. 1385-87, 1410-11.

Avco also stresses the holding in Hazelwood that where 
special qualifications are required for certain positions, 
general population statistics may not be an appropriate statis­

tical measure of the employers hiring patterns, see 45 U.S.L.W. 

at 4884, n. 13. Avco's reliance on that comment is misplaced.
The great bulk of Avco's jobs are not similar to the profes­
sional teaching positions involved in Hazelwood. Rather, they 

more closely resemble the truck driver positions at stake in 

Teamsters, as to which the court reiterated in Hazelwood that 
general population figures are "highly probative", since "the 

job skill their involved . . .  is one that many persons possess 
or can fairly readily acquire," 45 U.S.L.W. at 4884, n. 13.

Avco's assertions that, because of these two holdings, 
the district court statistical findings were "irrelevant"
(Br. 2) and "without probative value" (Br. 3, see also Br. 7), 
are greatly exaggerated. While as Avco notes (Br. 7) in some 

later post Acts (and, of course, post law suit) years its overall 

employment percentages reflected a substantial number of black

16



employees, that single fact masks significant statistical 
evidence of continuing exclusion of black workers. As of 

the time of this appeal, Avco1s total work force once again 
had only one-half as many blacks as the local work force, see 

main Br. at 38, n. 59. Even more significantly, the temporary 

employment of large numbers of blacks in the assembler-bench 
and jig occupation (see Main Br. at 21) did not affect Avco's 

continuing refusal to employe blacks in higher paid, more skilled 

and more secure jobs, such as those in the mechanical department's 

higher ranked production jobs, and salaried positions, see Main 
Br. at 14. Even at the time of this appeal, most of Avco1s jobs 
remained segregated, with blacks holding maily lower rated 

positions. See Main Br. at 38, n. 59, report of Avco dated 
11/25/75 attached to main brief.

The district court correctly relied on the statistical 

evidence to confirm what it otherwise found: that after as 
well as before 1965, Avco continued to suppress the aspirations 
of its black employees for advancement to the better jobs.

CONCLUSION

The recent Supreme Court decision in no way changes the 

result which this Court should reach in the instant case. The 

judgment below should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

17



*7JACK GREENBERG 
O. PETER SHERWO 
ERIC SCHNAPPER

10 Columbus Circle
New York, New York 10019

MORRIS J. BALLER 
145 Ninth Street 
San Francisco, Calif. 94103

AVON N. WILLIAMS, JR.
1414 Parkway Towers
404 James Robertson Parkway
Nashville, Tennessee 37219

RUSSELL C. B. ENNIX, JR. 
Morris Memorial Building 
330 Charlotte Avenue 
Nashville, Tennessee 37201

Attorneys for Appellees

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that on this _3 sJL day of August, 1977,
I served a copy of the foregoing Appellees' Response to Second 
Supplemental Briefs of Appellants upon the following counsel of 

record by depositing same in the United States mail, postage prepaid

Don A Banta, Esq. 
Naphin, Banta & Cox 
105 West Adams Street 
Chicago, Illinois 60603

William Waller, Esq.
Waller, Lansden, Dortch & Davis 
American Trust Building 
Nashville, Tennessee 37201

Carrol D. Kilgore, Esq.
216 Third Avenue, North 
Nashville, Tennessee 37201

James Scanlan, Esq.
Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission
2401 E Street, N.W.

Attorney for Appelll^s

18



1