Bradley v. School Board of the City of Richmond Appellants' Brief and Appendix

    IN THE

United Slates  Court of Appeals
F or t h e  F o u r th  C ir c u it

No. 8757

M in erv a  B radley , et  al ., Appellants, 
v.

T h e  S chool  B oard of t h e  C it y  of R ic h m o n d , V ir g in ia , 
e t  a l ., Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Virginia. Richmond Division

APPELLANTS' BRIEF AND APPENDIX

S . W . T u c k e r  
H e n r y  L. M a r sh , III 

214 East Clay Street 
Eichmond 19, Virginia 

Attorneys for Appellants

P r e ss  o f  B y r o n  S . A dajvts, W a s h in g t o n . D. C.



INDEX
Page

Table of Citations..........................................................  i
Statement of the C ase .......................    1
The Question Involved .................................................  3
Statement of the Facts:

Earlier Litigation................................................... 3
The Instant Case ................................................... 4

Argument ....................................................................... 7
Conclusion ..................................................................... 12

TABLE OF CITATIONS
Ca se s :

Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) . . . .  11
Green v. School Board of the City of Roanoke, 304 F. 2d

118 (4th Cir. 1962) .................................................  11
Hill v. School Board of City of Norfolk, 282 F. 2d 473

(4th Cir. 1960) ........................................................  12
Jeffers v. Whitley, F. 2d (No. 8593, 4th Cir.,

October 12, 1962) ..............................................8,11,12
Marsh v. County School Board of Roanoke County, 305 

F. 2d 94 (4th Cir., 1962) ........................................  11

S t a t u t e s :

Code of Virginia, 1950, as amended, Section 22-232.8 .. 12



IN THE

United Stales  Court of Appeals
F or t h e  F o u r th  C ir c u it

No. 8757

M ih eev a  B radley , et  al ., Appellants, 
v.

T h e  S chool  B oard of t h e  C it y  of R ic h m o n d , V ir g in ia , 
et  al., Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Virginia, Richmond Division

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In their complaint filed September 5, 1962, and also in 

their amended complaint filed January 4, 1962, the infant 
plaintiffs, by their parents and guardians and next friends,



2

and the said parents and guardians in their own right, 
charged that the defendant school authorities maintain a 
racially segregated school system in the City of Richmond. 
The original complaint alleged that each infant plaintiff 
had made timely application to the defendants for admis­
sion to a public school in the City of Richmond hereto­
fore and now maintained for and attended predominantly, 
if not exclusively, by white persons, and further alleged 
the denial of such applications solely on account of race or 
color. Being required so to do by the District Court upon 
its consideration of motions to dismiss filed by the defend­
ants on September 22, 1961, the plaintiffs filed an amended 
complaint in which they further alleged as to each infant 
plaintiff (1) the school which each infant plaintiff sought 
to enter, (2) the date of the Pupil Placement Board’s ini­
tial denial of the requested assignment and the placement 
made by that board, (3) the reason assigned for the denial 
and (4) the date and place of hearing on the protest of the 
assignment. The Pupil Placement Board in its answer 
admitted that the plaintiffs had complied with its regula­
tions for transfer and denied the other allegations of the 
complaint. The defendant school board and superintend­
ent of schools, in their joint answTer, moved to dismiss on 
the ground that the sole responsibility for the placement of 
pupils rests with the Pupil Placement Board. All defend­
ants denied that they maintain a racially segregated school 
system and further denied that any of the infant plaintiffs 
had been discriminated against by reason of their race.

The cause came on to be heard on the merits on July 23, 
1962. The plaintiffs submitted evidence from which the 
Court found (1) that the City of Richmond is divided into 
a number of geographically defined attendance areas for 
both white and Negro schools, (2) that said areas were 
established by the school board prior to 1954 and have not 
been changed in any material way since that time, and (3) 
that several areas for white and Negro schools overlap. 
The Court’s order entered July 25, 1962, restrained the de-



3

fendants from denying the ten infant plaintiffs admission 
to the schools to which they had applied, but otherwise de­
nied the prayers for injunctive relief. In its memorandum 
opinion of the same date, the Court acknowledged that the 
school board had not presented a formal plan of desegre­
gation, but found that the defendants (through the state 
pupil placement procedure) had made “ a reasonable start 
toward a nondiscriminatory school system resulting in the 
attendance of 127 Negro students in white schools for the 
1962-63 school term.” Notice of this appeal was filed 
August 22, 1962.

THE QUESTION INVOLVED
Does the Richmond city school board’s adherence to the 

state pupil placement procedure constitute an adequate 
plan to effectuate a transition to a racially nondiscrimina­
tory school system?

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Earlier Litigation

On September 2, 1958, a suit, styled Lorna Renee War­
den, et al. v. The School Board of the City of Richmond, 
Virginia, et al. (Civil Action No. 2819), was instituted in 
the District Court praying, inter alia, that a permanent 
injunction be entered restraining the defendant School 
Board of the City of Richmond and its division superin­
tendent of schools from any and all actions that regulate 
or affect, on the basis of race or color, the admission, en­
rollment or education of the infant plaintiffs, or any other 
Negro child similarly situated, to and in any public school 
operated by the defendants.

That suit was finally decided on July 5, 1961. The Dis­
trict Court ordered that the one remaining Negro plaintiff 
be transferred from the Negro school located five miles 
from her home and admitted to the white school in her 
neighborhood. However, the Court denied class relief,



4

stating: “ There is no question as to the right of the infant 
plaintiff to be admitted to the schools of the City of Rich­
mond without discrimination on the ground of race. She 
is admitted, however, as an individual, not as a class or 
group; and it is as an individual that her rights under the 
Constitution are asserted.”

The Court refused to enter a permanent injunction and 
dismissed the case from the docket. (See Memorandum 
Opinion in Earlier Litigation, App. 40)

The Instant Case

Richmond has dual school attendance areas. The city is 
divided into areas for white schools and it is again divided 
into areas for Negro schools. In many instances the area 
for the white school and for the Negro school is the same.

The 1961-1962 Directory of the Richmond, Virginia 
Public Schools [PL Ex. No. 3] shows “ White Schools” 
in one division and “ Negro Schools” in the other. The 
schools listed as “ White Schools” are staffed entirely 
with faculties and officers who are of the Caucasian race. 
Those schools listed as “ Negro Schools” are staffed 
entirely with faculties and officers who are of the Negro 
race. [Dep., p. 13.]

The City School Board maintains five high schools, three 
for white and two for Negroes; five junior high schools for 
whites and four for Negroes; eighteen elementary schools 
for whites and twenty-two for Negroes.

As of April 30, 1962, there were 40,263 students in public 
schools, 23,177 of whom were Negro, 17,002 of whom were 
white and 84 of whom were non-whites of a race other 
than Negro but considered white for the purpose of 
assignment in the Richmond public school system (Tr., 
p. 32). Only 37 Negroes were then attending schools 
which white children attend, 30 of those being in attendance



5

at Chandler Junior High School. Three of the remaining 
seven were in attendance at John Marshall High School, 
one attended the Westhampton Junior High School and 
three attended the Richmond Cerebral Palsy Center. With 
the possible exception of the three handicapped children 
at the Cerebral Palsy Center, these children had sought 
transfers from Negro schools and all but one were able 
to satisfy the residential and academic criteria which the 
Pupil Placement Board applies in case of transfers but 
not in case of initial enrollment. The remaining child was 
admitted by court order in the earlier litigation.

Initial enrollments in the Richmond public school system 
are made pursuant to the dual attendance lines. [Dep., 
pp. 16, 17, 19.] Once enrolled, the students are routinely 
reassigned in the same school until graduation from such 
school. Upon graduation, the students are assigned in the 
following manner: “ . . . [Assignments of students based 
on promotion from an elementary school to a junior high 
school and from a junior high to high school are routinely 
made by the Pupil Placement Board. These assignments 
generally follow a pattern, aptly described as a system of 
‘feeder schools/ that existed prior to 1954. Thus a student 
from a white elementary school is routinely promoted to 
a white junior high school and in due course to a white 
high school. A Negro student is routinely promoted from 
a Negro elementary school to a Negro junior high school 
and finally a Negro high school. In order to change the 
normal course of assignment based on promotion all 
students must apply to the Pupil Placement Board.” 
Op. 4, R. 64. [Memorandum of Court, App. 34.]

As of April 30, 1962, a serious problem of overcroAvding 
existed in the Richmond public schools. The extent of this 
overcrowding in the schools maintained for normal school



6

children, as compiled from information supplied by the 
answers to interrogatories, is as follows:

Total Schools:
Senior
H igh

Ju n io r E lem entary  
H igh Schools Total

W hite 3 5 18 26
Negro 2 4 22 28

N um ber of schools in  which 
enrollm ent exceeded 
school cap ac ity :

W hite 0 0 3 3
Negro 2 3 17 22

N um ber of students by 
which above enrollm ents 
exceeded to tal capacity : 

W hite 0 0 168 168
Negro 348 468 ■939 1755

N um ber of schools in  which 
enrollm ent was less th an  
school cap ac ity :

W hite 3 5 15 23
Negro 0 1 5 6

N um ber of studen ts by 
which above enrollm ents 
were less th an  to tal 
cap ac ity :

W hite 556 804 1085 2445
Negro 0 30 564 594

The superintendent of schools testified that the school 
board had attempted to meet the problem of overcrowded 
schools by requesting the Pupil Placement Board to con­
vert white schools into Negro schools, by building new 
schools or by making additions to schools; but in no case 
had the school board requested that Negro pupils be 
assigned to schools with white pupils to relieve the over­
crowded situation. [Tr., pp. 31, 32.]

The infant plaintiffs made timely application for transfer 
to and enrollment in “ white” schools. One application 
was denied by the Pupil Placement Board because the 
student lived closer to the (Negro) Maggie Walker High



7

School than to the (white) John Marshall High School, 
both of which schools serve the same area. The other ten 
plaintiffs’ applications were denied by the Pupil Place­
ment Board for “ lack of academic qualifications.” The 
Pupil Placement Board is never concerned with “ academic 
qualifications” (in the sense in which the term is used to 
explain the denial) except when considering applications 
for transfers. [Tr., p. 94.]

The school board has not at any time taken initiative to 
desegregate the school system. The superintendent of 
schools testified that “ it has been a feeling of both the 
School Board and the Administration that any conflict that 
might exist between the state [Pupil Placement Act] and 
federal law should be decided by the Courts, not by the 
School Board and the Administration.” [Hep., p. 21.]

The Pupil Placement Board has not at any time taken 
initiative to desegregate the schools. The chairman of the 
Pupil Placement Board testified, “ Now, we do not think 
that this Board was appointed for the purpose or that 
the law required the attempt on our part to try to 
integrate every child possible. What we thought we were 
to do was to be completely fair in considering the request 
of Negroes, we will say, to go into white schools, but 
certainly not trying to put them in that didn’t want to go 
in.” [Tr., p. 54.]

ARGUMENT
The Court Should Have Enjoined the Discriminatory Assign­

ment Procedures and R eq u ired  a P la n  for a Systematic 
Transition to a Unitary School System

The district judge found that the defendants have made 
a “ reasonable start toward a non-discriminatory school 
system resulting in the attendance of 127 Negro students 
in white schools for the 1962-63 school term” (A. 37). 
Hence the district court did not enjoin the discriminatory 
practices which had made this suit necessary, neither did 
it require the school board to submit a formal plan for



8

desegregation. The conclusion that such “ reasonable 
start” has been made was reached out of consideration of 
four factors discussed in the district court’s opinion, viz.:

“ Rigid adherence to placement of students by attend­
ance areas has been modified in four respects. First, 
the Chairman of the Pupil Placement Board testified 
that any Negro child applying for enrollment in the 
first grade of a white public school in his attendance 
area is assigned to that school. Second, the Super­
intendent of Schools testified that George Wythe 
High School and John Marshall High School had been 
constructed to accommodate all high school students 
in their respective attendance areas. Counsel stated 
in argument that six Negro students had applied for 
admission to George Wythe High School for 1962 and 
all had been accepted. Third, a Negro student presently 
attending a white school, upon promotion to a 
higher school, is routinely assigned to a white school. 
Fourth, some Negro students have been assigned to 
schools in white attendance areas.” (App. 34)

In the context of this case, these premises would not 
be sufficient to evidence a “ reasonable start toward a non- 
discriminatory school system” . Notwithstanding the four 
deviations noted by the district court, the bi-racial 
character of the basic attendance areas would have to 
depend for its validity upon “ the volition of the pupils 
and their parents” . (Jeffers v. Whitley, No. 8593, Fourth 
Circuit, October 12, 1962).

The instant action was filed on September 5, 1961, by 
eleven children whose applications for transfer to schools 
attended by white children had been denied as a result of 
the Pupil Placement Board’s discriminatory application 
of residential and academic criteria. As was recently 
observed by this Court in Jeffers v. Whitley, supra.

“ If a reasonable attempt to exercise a pupil’s indi­
vidual volition is thwarted by official coercion or 
compulsion, the organization of the schools, to that 
extent, comes into plain conflict with the constitutional



9

requirement. A voluntary system is no longer 
voluntary when it becomes compulsive. # * * There 
can be no freedom of choice if its exercise is condi­
tioned upon exhaustion of administrative remedies 
which, as administered, are unnegotiable obstacle 
courses. Freedom of choice is not accorded if the 
choice of the individual may be desregarded unless 
he can prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that, 
under some other system never adopted nor practiced 
by the Schol Board, he would have been assigned to 
the school of his choice/’

As of the close of the 1961-62 school session, only thirty- 
seven Negro children were attending schools with white 
children; and for the current (1962-63) school term, the 
number had been increased by ninety. In the City of 
Richmond, where 22 of the 28 “ Negro” schools are over­
crowded by an aggregate of 1,755 students and the com­
bined enrollments of 23 of the 26 “ white” schools are 
2,445 less than the total capacity of those schools, the 
approval of transfer applications of a mere 127 Negro 
students to “ white” schools (eight years after the Brown 
decision) does not constitute a “ reasonable start” at 
compliance with any concept of equal protection.

This action was not defended on a claim that a reasonable 
start toward school desegregation had been made and a 
suggestion that additional time, consistent with good faith 
compliance at the earliest practical date, is necessary in 
the public interest. The answer of the local school 
authorities denied that anything done or omitted by them 
had given rise to the action and, in addition, suggested 
that the plaintiffs were seeking to enjoin the enforcement 
of the Pupil Placement Act without the intervention of a 
three judge district court. The answer of the Pupil 
Placement Board admitted the plaintiffs’ compliance with 
its administrative procedures but denied and demanded 
strict proof of all of the basie charges of racial dis­
crimination. The plaintiffs served interrogatories, the 
fourth of which was: “ What obstacles, if any, are there



10

which will prevent the racially non-discriminatory assign­
ment of students to public schools in the City of Rich­
mond at the commencement of the 1962-63 school 
session?” The local authorities claimed to be unable 
to answer because all power to assign students to schools 
had been vested in the Pupil Placement Board. The 
(state) Pupil Placement Board replied, viz.: “ That to 
the extent that such question implies discrimination, 
such implication is denied and that such question lacks 
sufficient specificity to evoke an intelligent answer which 
does not involve broad conclusions or have argumentative 
deductions. Aside from that, and under Brown v. Board 
of Education, these defendants know of no reason wdiy 
students should not be assigned to public schools without 
discrimination on the ground of race, color, or creed.” 
The short of the matter is that the defendants had no con­
scious intention of making the start toward school 
desegregation for which the district court gave them 
credit.

The Pupil Placement Board disclaims any purpose or 
intention of desegregating schools (Tr. 54). The school 
board has done nothing and plans nothing to achieve a 
racially non-discriminatory school system (Tr. 41). To 
the contrary, every action voluntary taken by the school 
authorities has been to the end of continuing the bi-raeial 
character of the school system. The earlier litigation 
(Warden v. The School Board of the City of Richmond) 
was instituted on September 2, 1958. At a special meeting 
held on September 15, 1958 (approximately two weeks 
after the beginning of the school term), the School Board 
voted to request the Pupil Placement Board “ to transfer 
the pupils [then] attending the [white] Nathaniel Bacon 
School to the [white] East End Junior High School, and 
that enough pupils be transferred from George Mason 
and Chimborazo Schools [both Negro] to the Nathaniel 
Bacon Building to utilize its capacity, thus converting 
Nathaniel Bacon to [a] Negro” school (Tr. 29; PI. Ex. 17).



11

To relieve overcrowding of “ Negro” schools, the School 
Board has built new schools, has made additions to 
schools and has converted “ white” schools to “ Negro” 
schools; but in no case has it requested that Negro pupils 
be assigned to schools with white pupils (Tr. 31).

The view of the Richmond school authorities, as dis­
closed in the testimony of the Superintendent of Schools, 
is and has been “ that the state law took out of the 
hands of the school board and the Superintendent of 
Schools any decision relating to the integration of 
schools [and that] it has been a feeling of both the 
school board and the administration that any conflict 
that might exist between the state and federal law should 
be decided by the courts, not by the school board and 
the administration” (Dep., pp. 20-21). The need for 
positive direction from the court could hardly have been 
more clearly stated by a defendant. The duty of the 
court to have resolved the question confronting the local 
school authorities is the very essence of the implementing 
decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 
(1955). Here, as in Green v. School Board of the CAty 
of Roanoke, 304 F. 2d 118 (4th Cir., 1962), the defendants 
have disavowed any purpose of using their assignment 
system as a vehicle to desegregate the schools and have 
stated that there was no plan aimed at ending the present 
practices, the discriminatory character of which required 
the district court to grant relief to the infant plaintiffs 
before it. If the opinion in Green and the opinion in 
Marsh v. The County School Board of Roanoke County, 
305 F. 2d 94 (4th Cir., 1962) left any doubt that an in­
junction should have been issued so as to control future 
assignments of pupils, the detailed directives of the more 
recent Jeffers case, supra, leave no room for further 
question as to the propriety or the nature and effect of 
such injunction.

Under the status in which the district court left the 
case, the school authorities are yet “ free to ignore the



12

lights of other applicants” and thus to require the parents 
of new applicants to protest discriminatory denials of 
transfers and to risk possible social pressures resulting 
from the publication of the fact of such protests pursuant 
to Section 22-232.8 of the Code of Virginia, to require an 
infant applicant with both of his parents to attend a 
hearing on the protest which is not likely to be held earlier 
than August of 1963, and then to require the applicants 
to intervene in the pending litigation, endure dilatory 
defensive tactics, and hope to obtain relief at the hand 
of the court not too long after the beginning of the 
1963-61 school session for such relief to be meaningful. 
Such falls far short of that adequate supervision of the 
desegregation process contemplated in Hill v. The School 
Board of the City of Norfolk, 282 F. 2d 473 (4th Cir., 
1960), and in Jeffers v. Whitley, supra.

CONCLUSION
Words from the last cited case are appropriate in con­

clusion here. The duty to recognize the constitutional 
rights of pupils . . . rests primarily upon the School 
Board. There it should be placed by an appropriate order 
of the court, for the District Court has a secondary duty 
of enforcement of individual rights and of supervision of 
the steps taken by the School Board to bring itself within 
the requirements of the law.

Respectfully submitted,

S. W. T u c k e r  
H e n r y  L. M a r sh , III 

214 East Clay Street 
Richmond 19, Virginia 

Attorneys for Appellants



APPENDIX



INDEX TO APPENDIX

Page
Docket Entries .............................................................. 1
Amended Complaint ..................................................... 3
Schedule “ A ” to Complaint ........................................ 12
Interrogatories .............................................................  13
Answer of School Board to Interrogatories................  13
Answer of Pupil Placement Board to Interrogatories 19
Answer of Pupil Placement B oard ............................... 20
Answer of School Board and Division Superintendent 21
Pre-Trial Depositions Taken July 18, 1962 ................  24
Transcript of Trial Proceedings..................................  25
Memorandum of the C ourt............................................ 33
Decree ............................................................................  38
Notice of A ppeal............................................................ 39
Memorandum Opinion in Earlier Litigation................  40



APPENDIX

Docket Entries
No. 3353—Bradley v. School Board.
1961
Sept. 5—Complaint filed.
Sept. 6—Summons issued.
Sept. 11—Marshal’s return on summons executed, filed.
Sept. 22—Motion to dismiss complaint under Buie 12(b), 

filed by defts, School Board of City of Bichmond and 
H. I. Willett.

Sept. 26—Motion to dismiss filed by defts, E. J. Oglesby, 
Edward T. Justis and Alfred L. Wingo, ind. and consti­
tuting the Pupil Placement Board of Ya.

Oct. 24—Application for hearing on motions to dismiss 
filed by plfs.

Nov. 6—Order consolidating this case with C. A. 3365 
and Alex. C. A. 2476 for hearing on motion to dismiss 
etc. on 12-8-61. Copies mailed counsel.

Dec. 8—Case argued on Motions to dismiss (Lewis, J.) 
Motions denied. Plaintiffs allowed thirty (30) days to 
file amended complaint.

1962
Jan. 4—Amended complaint filed.
May 10—Interrogatories filed by plfs.
May 25—Answer to interrogatories filed by dtfs. School 

Board of City of Bichmond and H. I. Willett.
May 25—Answer of Pupil Placement Board to Interroga­

tories, filed



2

May 2o Joint and several answer to amended complaint 
filed by defendants, E. J. Oglesby, Alfred L. Wingo and 
E; T . Justis, individually and constituting the members 
of the Pupil Placement Board, etc., filed

June 21—Answer of School Board of City of Richmond 
and H. I. Willett, Div. Supt., to amended complaint, filed.

July 23 Depositions in behalf of pltfs. received
July 23 TRIAL PROCEEDINGS—Butzner, J . .- Appear­

ance by parties by counsel. Issues joined. Evidence 
fully heard and argued.

July 25—Memorandum of the Court filed.
July 25 Decree ent. as follows: denying motions to dis­

miss; enjoining and restraining defts. from denying 
Carolyn Bradley, Michael Bradley, Daria A. Cameron, 
Rosalind Dobson, Bruce W. Johnson, John Edward John­
son, Jr., Phyllis Antoinette Johnson, Robert S. Meyers 
and William Dunbar Quarles, Jr. admission to Chandler 
Junior High School and from denying Morgan N. Jack- 
son admission to John Marshall High School; denying 
prayer of plfs. for further injunctive relief at this time; 
retaining cause on docket, with leave of any party, or of 
persons constituting a class with the plaintiffs, to peti­
tion for appropriate relief, all ent. and filed.

Aug. 22 Joint notice of appeal filed by Minerva Bradley,
I. A. Jackson, Jr., Rosa Lee Quarles, John Edw. Johnson 
Elihu C. Myers and and Eliz. S. Myers.

Aug. 23—Appeal Bond in sum of $250., executed, filed by 
plf.

Sept. 19—Appeal Record (one vol.) and exhibits delivered 
to Clerk, USCA (Plfs. $3.10)



3

[Filed January 4, 1962]
Amended Complaint

I

1. (a) Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under Title 
28, United States Code, Section 1331. This action arises 
under Article 1, Section 8, and the Fourteenth Amendment 
of the Constitution of the United States, Section 1, and 
under the Act of Congress, Revised Statutes, Section 1977, 
derived from the Act of May 31, 1870, Chapter 114, Section 
16, 16 Stat. 144 (Title 42, United States Code, Section 
1981), as hereafter more fully appears. The matter in 
controversy, exclusive of interest and cost, exceeds the 
sum of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00).

(b) Jurisdiction is further invoked under Title 28, 
United States Code, Section 1343. This action is author­
ized by the Act of Congress, revised Statutes, Section 1979, 
derived from the Act of April 20, 1871, Chapter 22, Section 
1, 17 Stat. 13 (Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983), 
to be commenced by any citizen of the United States or 
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to redress the 
deprivation under color of state law, statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom or usage of rights, privileges and im­
munities secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States and by the Act of Con­
gress, Revised Statutes, Section 1977, derived from the 
Act of May 31, 1870, Chapter 114, Section 16, 16 Stat. 144 
(Title 42, United States Code, Section 1981), providing for 
the equal rights of citizens and of all persons within the 
jurisdiction of the United States as hereafter more fully 
appears.

II
2. Infant plaintiffs are Negroes, are citizens of the 

United States and of the Commonwealth of Virginia, and 
are residents of and domiciled in the political subdivision 
of Virginia for which the defendant school board main-



4

tains and operates public schools. Said infants are within 
the age limits of eligibility to attend, and possess all quali­
fications and satisfy all requirements for admission to, said 
public schools.

3. Adult plaintiffs are Negroes, are citizens of the 
United States and of the Commonwealth of Virginia, and 
are residents of and domiciled in said political subdivision. 
They are parents or guardians or persons standing in loco 
parentis of one or more of the infant plaintiffs.

4. Plaintiffs bring this action in their own behalf and, 
there being common questions of law and fact affecting the 
rights of all other Negro children attending public schools 
in the Commonwealth of Virginia and, particularly, in said 
political subdivision, and the parents and guardians of 
such children, similarly situated and affected with refer­
ence to the matters here involved, who are so numerous 
as to make it impracticable to bring all before the court, 
and a common relief being sought, as will hereinafter more 
fully appear, the plaintiffs also bring this action, pursuant 
to Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, as a 
class action on behalf of all other Negro children attending 
public schools in the Commonwealth of Virginia and, 
particularly, in said political subdivision, and the parents 
and guardians of such children, similarly situated and 
affected with reference to the matters here involved.

I l l
5. The Commonwealth of Virginia has declared public 

education a state function. The Constitution of Virginia, 
Article IX, Section 129, provides:

“ Free schools to be maintained. The General As­
sembly shall establish and maintain an efficient sys­
tem of public free schools throughout the State.”

Pursuant to this mandate, the General Assembly of Vir­
ginia has established a system of public free schools in



5

the Commonwealth of Virginia according to a plan set out 
in Title 22, Chapters 1 to 15, inclusive, of the Code of Vir­
ginia, 1950. The establishment, maintenance and admin­
istration of the public school system of Virginia is vested 
in a State Board of Education, a Superintendent of Public 
Instruction, Division Superintendents of Schools, and 
County, City and Town School Boards (Constitution of 
Virginia, Article IX, Sections 130-133; Code of Virginia, 
1950, Title 22, Chapter 1, Section 22-2).

IV
6. The defendant school board, the corporate name of 

which is stated in the caption, exists pursuant to the Con­
stitution and laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia as an 
administrative department of the Commonwealth, dis­
charging governmental functions, and is declared by law to 
be a body corporate. Said school board is empowered and 
required to establish, maintain, control and supervise an 
efficient system of public free schools in said political sub­
division, to provide suitable and proper school buildings, 
furniture and equipment, and to maintain, manage and 
control the same, to determine the studies to be pursued 
and the methods of teaching, to make local regulations for 
the conduct of the schools and for the proper discipline of 
the students, to employ teachers, to provide for the trans­
portation of pupils, to enforce the school laws, and to per­
form numerous other duties, activities and functions es­
sential to the establishment, maintenance and operation 
of the public free schools in said political subdivision. 
(Constitution of Virginia, Article IX, Section 133; Code 
of Virginia, 1950, as amended, Title 22.)

7. The defendant division superintendent of schools, 
whose name as such officer is stated in the caption, holds 
office pursuant to the Constitution and laws of the Common­
wealth of Virginia as an administrative officer of the public 
free school system of Virginia. (Constitution of Virginia, 
Article IX, Section 133; Code of Virginia, 1950, as amended,



6

Title 22.) He is under the authority, supervision and con­
trol of, and acts pursuant to the orders, policies, practices, 
customs and usages of the defendant school hoard. He is 
made a defendant herein in his official capacity.

8. A Virginia statute, first enacted as Chapter 70 of the 
Acts of the 1956 Extra Session of the General Assembly, 
viz, Article 1.1 of Chapter 12 of Title 22 (Sections 22-231.1 
through 22-232.17) of the Code of Virginia, 1950, as 
amended, confers or purports to confer upon the Pupil 
Placement Board all powers of enrollment or placement 
of pupils in the public schools in Virginia and to charge 
said Pupil Placement Board to perform numerous duties, 
activities and functions pertaining to the enrollment or 
placement of pupils in, and the determination of school 
attendance district for, such public schools, except in those 
counties, cities or towns which elect to be bound by the 
provisions of Article 1.2 of Chapter 12 of Title 22 (Sec­
tions 22-232.18 through 22-232.31) of the Code of Virginia, 
1950, as amended. (Section 22-232.30 of the Code of Vir­
ginia, 1950, as amended.) The names of the individual 
members of the Pupil Placement Board are stated in the 
caption.

V
9. Notwithstanding the holding and admonitions in 

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, and 349 U.S. 
294, the pre-existing pattern of racial segregation in the 
public schools maintained and operated by the defendant 
school hoard continues unaffected except in the few in­
stances, if any there are, in which individual Negroes have 
sought and obtained admission to schools other than those 
attended exclusively by Negroes. The defendants have 
not devoted efforts toward initiating nonsegregation and 
bringing about the elimination of racial discrimination in 
the public school system, neither have they made a reason­
able start to effectuate a transition to a racially non-dis- 
criminatory school system, as under paramount law it is



7

their duty to do. Deliberately and purposefully, and 
solely because of race, the defendants continue to require 
all or virtually all Negro public school children to attend 
school where none but Negroes are enrolled and to require 
all white public school children to attend school where no 
Negroes, or at best few Negroes, are enrolled.

10. As matters of routine, every white child entering 
school for the first time is initially assigned to and placed 
in a school which predominantly, if not exclusively, is at­
tended by white children; or if otherwise assigned, then, 
upon request of the parents or guardians, such child is 
transferred to a school which, being attended exclusively 
or predominantly by white children, is considered as a 
school for white children. Upon graduation from ele­
mentary school, every white child is routinely assigned to 
a high school or junior high school which is predominantly, 
if not exclusively, attended by white children. Similarly, 
and with few if any exceptions, Negro children entering 
school for the first time are initially assigned to a school 
which none but Negroes attend upon their graduation from 
elementary school they are routinely assigned to a high 
school or to a junior high school which none but Negroes 
attend.

11. To avoid the racially discriminatory result of the 
practice described in the paragraph next preceding, the 
Negro child, or his parent or guardian for him, is required 
to make application for transfer from the school which 
none but Negroes attend to a school specifically named. 
In acting upon such application for transfer from the all- 
Negro school, the defendants take into consideration cer­
tain criteria which defendants do not consider when making 
initial enrollments or placements in any school other than 
the initial placement or enrollment of a Negro child in a 
school which wdiite children attend. If such criteria are 
not met, the application for transfer is denied. For ex­
ample, if the home of the applicant is closer to the school 
to which he has been assigned than to the school to which



8

transfer is sought, the application is denied notwithstand­
ing the fact that the latter school is attended by white 
children similarly situated with respect to residence. For 
further example, if intelligence, achievement or other 
standardized test scores or other academic records of the 
applicant do not compare favorably with the best or the 
better of similar scores or records of children attending 
or assigned to the school which the applicant seeks to at­
tend, the application is denied notwithstanding the fact 
that many white children attending said school have lower 
scores or lower academic records than the applicant has.

VI
12. Timely application was made to the defendants for 

the admission of each infant plaintiff to a public school in 
said political subdivision heretofore and now attended ex­
clusively or predominantly by white persons. The refusal 
of such application was made known to the parent, guard­
ian, of each infant plaintiff by letter from the Pupil Place­
ment Board indicating the placement of the child in a cer­
tain school, which school is one attended exclusively by 
Negroes. In the case of each infant plaintiff, a written 
protest of such placement was made to the Pupil Place­
ment Board within the time prescribed by statute; Avhere- 
upon the Pupil Placement Board scheduled a hearing upon 
said protest. In the case of each infant plaintiff, but only 
to the extent that such details can now be stated with cer­
tainty, the attached “ Schedule ‘A’ ” sets out: (1) the name 
of the infant plaintiff, (2) the school assignment to which 
is sought, (3) the date of the letter from the Pupil Place­
ment Board and the name of the all-Negro school in which 
the infant plaintiff was placed, (4) the reason assigned for 
denial of the application, and (5) the date and place of the 
hearing on the protest of the placement. Notwithstanding 
the said protest and hearing thereon, the Pupil Placement 
Board confirmed its placement previously made in the case 
of each of the infant plaintiffs.



9

13. But for the deliberate purpose of the defendants to 
avoid performance of their duty as hereinabove mentioned 
in paragraph 9 hereof, plaintiffs would have had no need 
to apply for attendance at certain schools. But for the 
fact that the defendants intended to maintain the racially 
segregated pattern of public schools through the routine 
practices described in paragraph 10 hereof, the applications 
made on behalf of the infant plaintiffs would have been 
granted. Solely by reason of the practices, customs, 
usages and calculated result thereof as mentioned and 
complained of in paragraph 11 hereof, the placement of 
each infant plaintiff in an all-Negro school was confirmed, 
even after protest. Unless and until the defendants, as a 
result of injunction or otherwise, will cease and desist from 
the practice and usage mentioned in paragraph 11, appli­
cations and protests will be vain and futile when made on 
behalf of any Negro child situated as the infant plaintiffs 
are with regard to residence or with regard to intelligence, 
achievement or other standardized test scores or other 
academic records.

V I I

14. The refusal of the defendants to grant the requested 
assignments, viewed in the light of the refusal of the de­
fendants to bring about the elimination of racial discrimina­
tion in the public school system and to make a reasonable 
start to effectuate a transition to a racially non-discrimina- 
tory system, constitutes a deprivation of the liberty of the 
infant plaintiffs as well as all other Negro public school 
children within said political subdivision and a denial of 
their right to the equal protection of the laws secured by 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States, and a denial of rights secured by Title 42, 
United States Code, Section 1981.

15. Plaintiffs and those similarly situated and affected 
are suffering irreparable injury and are threatened with 
irreparable injury in the future by reason of the policy,



10

practice, custom and usage and the actions of the defend­
ants herein complained of. They have no plain, adequate 
or complete remedy to redress the wrongs and illegal acts 
herein complained of other than this complaint for an in­
junction. Any other remedy to which plaintiffs and those 
similarly situated could be remitted would be attended by 
such uncertainties and delays as would deny substantial 
relief, would involve a multiplicity of suits, and would 
cause  ̂ further irreparable injury and occasion damage, 
vexation and inconvenience.

VIII
wherefore, plaintiffs respectfully pray:
(A) That this Court enter an interlocutory and a perma­

nent injunction restraining and enjoining defendants, and 
each of them, their successors in office, and their agents and 
employees, forthwith, from denying infant plaintiffs, or 
either of them, solely on account of race or color, the right 
to be enrolled in, to attend and to be educated in, the public 
schools to which they, respectively, have sought admission;

(B) That this Court enter a permanent injunction re­
straining and enjoining defendants, and each of them, their 
successors in office, and their agents and employees from 
any and all action that regulates or affects, on the basis of 
race or color, the initial assignment, the placement, the 
transfer, the admission, the enrollment or the education of 
any child to and in any public school;

(C) That, specifically the defendants and each of them, 
their successors in office, and their agents and employees 
be permanently enjoined and restrained from denying the 
application of any Negro child for assignment in or trans­
fer to any public school attended by white children when 
such denial is based solely upon requirements or criteria 
which do not operate to exclude white children from said 
school;



11

(D) That the defendants be required to submit to the 
Court a plan to achieve a system of determining initial as­
signments, placements or enrollments of children to and 
in the public schools on a non-racial basis and be required 
to make periodical reports to the Court of their progress 
in effectuating a transition to a racially non-discriminatory 
school system; and that during the period of such transi­
tion the Court retain jurisdiction of this case;

(E) That defendants pay to plaintiffs the costs of this 
action and attorney’s fees in such amount as to the Court 
may appear reasonable and proper; and

(F) That plaintiffs have such other and further relief 
as is just.



SCHEDULE “ A ” TO COMPLAINT THE SCHOOL BOARD OF THE CITY OF 
RICHMOND, VA., ET AL, DEFENDANTS

1 2  3
Date o f Letter From 
Pupil Placement 
Board and Placement

In fa n t P laintiff Desired Assignment Made Thereby

4 5

Season Assigned For Date and Place Of 
Denial Hearing on Protest

Carolyn Bradley Chandler Jr. High July 17, 1961
Benjamin Graves

Lack of academic qualifi- August 18, 1961 
cations Richmond, Virginia

Michael Bradley Chandler Jr. High July 18, 1961
Benjamin Graves

Lack of academic qualifi­
cations

Rosalind Dobson Chandler Jr. High July 18, 1961
Benjamin Graves

Lack of academic qualifi- August 18, 1961 
cations Richmond, Virginia

Morgan N. Jackson John Marshall High July 18, 1961
Maggie Walker High

Distance from school August 18, 1961
Richmond, Virginia

Bruce W. Johnson Chandler Jr. High July 18, 1961
Benjamin Graves

Lack of academic qualifi- August 18, 1961 
cations Richmond, Virginia

John Edward Johnson, Chandler Jr. High July 18, 1961 
^r- Benjamin Graves

Lack of academic qualifi- August 18, 1961 
cations Richmond, Virginia

Phyllis Antoinette Chandler Jr. High July 18, 1961 
Johnson Benjamin Graves

Lack of academic qualifi- August 18, 1961 
cations Richmond, Virginia

Robert S. Meyers Chandler Jr. High July, 1961
Benjamin Graves

Lack of academic qualifi- August 18, 1961 
cations Richmond, Virginia

Daria A. Cameron Chandler Jr. High July 18, 1961
Benjamin Graves

Lack of academic qualifi- August 18, 1961 
cations Richmond, Virginia

William Dunbar Quarles, Chandler Jr. High July, 1961
^r* Benjamin Graves

Lack of academic qualifi- August 18, 1961 
cations Richmond, Virginia

Lemuel Wimbish, Jr. Chandler Jr. High July 18, 1961 
Benjamin Graves

Lack of academic qualifi- August 18, 1961 
cations Richmond, Virginia



13

Interrogatories
[Filed May 10, 1962]

To the above named defendants:
You are hereby notified to answer under oath the inter­

rogatories numbered 1 to 4, inclusive, as shown below, 
within fifteen (15) days of the time service is made upon 
you, in accordance with Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.

1. Give the name of each public school in the City of 
Richmond, the pupil capacity of each school, the number of 
white pupils presently attending each school, the number 
of non-white pupils presently attending each school, the 
number of white teachers employed in each school and the 
number of non-white teachers employed in each school.

2. Give the name of each Negro child who attends a 
school which white children attend, the school attended by 
such child and the grade to which each such child is pres­
ently assigned.

3. What, if anything, has been done by the defendants 
and by each of them, in the way of initiating nonsegregation 
and bringing about the elimination of racial discrimination 
in the public school system of the City of Richmond?

4. What obstacles, if any, are there which will prevent 
the racially non-discriminatory assignment of students to 
public schools in the City of Richmond at the commencement 
of the 1962-63 school session?

[Filed May 25, 1962]
Answer of School Board to Interrogatories

Now comes the defendant, The School Board of the City 
of Richmond, Virginia, by H. I. Willett, Division Superin­
tendent of Schools of the City of Richmond, Virginia, its 
agent, and the defendant, H. I. Willett, Division Superin­
tendent of Schools of the City of Richmond, Virginia, who



14

having’ been duly sworn in response to the interrogatories 
served upon the said defendants in the above case make the 
following answers and responses:

A n sw e r  to I nterrogatory  N o. 1

The name of each public school in the City of Richmond, 
the pupil capacity of each school, the number of white 
pupils attending each school, and the number of non-white 
pupils presently attending each school is as follows:

Name of School
Armstrong
Bainbridge Junior
Binford Junior
Blackwell Junior
Chandler Junior
East End Junior
Benjamin Graves
Albert H. Hill
Thomas Jefferson
John Marshall
Park Junior
Randolph Junior
Maggie Walker
Booker T. Washington, Jr.
Westhampton Junior
George Wythe
Amelia Street
Grace Arents
Nathaniel Bacon
Baker
Bellemeade
Bellevue

Pupil
apacity

Number of pupils 
attending as of 
April 30,1962 

Non­
m i te  White

1575 — 1722
725 584 3
850 499 6
475 ------- 445
875 604 30
875 — 959
900 — 1025
875 817 4

1650 1439 5
1600 1320 3
100 96 —

450 — 709
900 — 1101
380 — 125
250 223 1

1600 1527 —

600 — 663
300 259 —

750 — 781
1380 — 1390
630 567 1
810 — 816



15

Name of School
Blackwell 
Andrew Boler 
Buchanan 
George W. Carver 
John B. Cary- 
Cerebral Palsy Center 
Chimborazo 
Community Training Center 
Kate Cooke
Cooperative Training Center
Webster Davis
Fairfield Court
Fairmount
William Fox
Franklin
Robert Fulton
Ginter Park
Patrick Henry
Highland Park
Stonewall Jackson
Robert E. Lee
Madison
George Mason
Maury
Maymont
Mary Munford
Navy Hill
Albert Norrell
Oak Grove
Randolph
Mary Scott
Sidney

Number of pupils

Pupil
apacity

attending as of 
April 30,1962 

Non-
White White

720 — 842
780 — 904
630 — 573

1170 — 955
420 368 4
72 58 3

510 — 555
80 — 68
40 — 14
80 54 —

600 — 669
840 — 805

1110 — 1190
690 634 15
600 — 655
540 416 —

750 741 3
720 777 —

900 701 4
300 220 2
780 660 7
510 291 6

1290 — 1234
600 430 2
600 — 659
840 749 2
450 — 515
660 — 825
780 756 8
540 — 362
270 — 234
80 — 37



16

Name of School
Pupil

Capacity

Number of pupils 
attending as of 
April 30,1962 

Non-
White White

J. E. B. Stuart 600 453 3
Summer Hill 480 575 6
West End 600 — 633
Westhampton 600 514 3
Westover Hills 660 670 ____

Whitcomb Court 840 ____ 823
Woodville 840 — 852

A n sw e r  to I nterrogatory  N o . 2

The name of each negro child who attends a school which 
white children attend, the school attended by each such 
child and the grade to which each such child is presently 
assigned is as follows:

CHANDLER JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL
Grade 7

Bickers, Bonita 
Boykins, Guy Andre 
Cameron, James Landon 
Coles, Madeline Kay 
Cooper, Katherine E.
Crumm, Jacqueline R.
Goins, Theresa Faye 
Green, Etna Armstead 
Hill, Oliver White 
Johnson, Barbara Ann 
Johnson, Beverly Ann 
Marrow, Patricia Ann 
Mead, Robert Henry 
Mitchell, Herbert L.
Monroe, Shari E.



17

Motley, Milwood A.
Robertson, Craig N.
Ross, Berthel B.
Scott, Barbara Jean 
Starkes, Raymond H.
Sutton, Joyce Rene 
Thorpe, Wayne Cornel 
White, Eva Lou 
White, James 0.
Williams, Alva C.
Williams, WilliAnn

G-rade 8
Cheatham, Jane 
Gray, Francine 
Smith, Sylvia 
Thorpe, Jerrell

JOHN MARSHALL HIGH SCHOOL
Grade 9

Mead, Gloria 
Swann, Carol 
Williams, Brenda

RICHMOND CEREBRAL PALSY CENTER SCHOOL
Ungraded

Bell, Joyce 
Roberts, Vanessa 
Story, Jacob

WESTHAMPTON JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL 
Grade 8

Cooper, Daisy Jane



18

A n sw e r  to I nterrogatory  No. 3
Neither of the said defendants assign any child, white, 

negro or of any other race to any school. Section 22-232.1 
of the Code of Virginia divests the said defendants of all 
authority to determine the school to which any child shall 
be admitted, and vests such authority in the defendants 
constituting the Pupil Placement Board of the Common­
wealth of Virginia. The said defendants have not since 
the adoption of section 22-232.1 nor do they now institute 
any request for a change in the assignment of any child for 
the reason that they have been divested of all authority to 
determine the school to which any child shall be admitted 
by section 22-232.1. The said defendants have not insti­
tuted a policy of asking the Pupil Placement Board to mix 
the races in the schools for the reason that they have been 
divested of all authority to determine the school to which 
any child shall be admitted by section 22-232.1.

A n sw e r  to I nterrogatory  N o. 4

Neither of the said defendants are able to answer this 
interrogatory because they have been divested of all au­
thority to determine the school to which any child shall be 
admitted by section 22-232.1 of the Code of Virginia.

T h e  S chool  B oard of t h e  C ty  of R ic h m o n d , 
V ir g in ia

By H. I .  W il l e t t

Division Superintendent of Schools of 
the City of Richmond, Virginia, its agent

H. I .  W il l e t t

Division Superintendent of Schools of the
Schools of the City of Richmond, Virginia



19

[Filed May 25, 1962]
Answer of Pupil Placement Board to Interrogatories

Now comes the members of the Pupil Placement Board, 
by counsel, and submit the following answer to the inter­
rogatories filed by the plaintiffs, namely:

1. As to the first interrogatory, these defendants are not 
as adequately, nor, indeed sufficiently, informed to an­
swer these questions in detail and submit that this infor­
mation comes more accurately and properly from the local 
school division.

2. As to the second interrogatory, these defendants have 
publicly stated and adopted the policy that there shall be 
no enforced discrimination in the placement of pupils in 
the public schools of Virginia based on race, color, or creed, 
and that each case shall be treated and determined on its 
own individual merits.

3. As to the third interrogatory, these defendants say 
that to the extent that such question implies discrimination, 
such implication is denied and that such question lacks suffi­
cient specificity to evoke an intelligent answer which does 
not involve broad conclusions or have argumentative de­
ductions. Aside from that, and under Brown v. Board of 
Education, these defendants know of no reason why stu­
dents should not be assigned to public schools without dis­
crimination on the ground of race, color, or creed.

P u p il  P la c e m e n t  B oard 
By A. B. S cott 

A. B. Scott



20

[Filed May 25, 1962]
Answer of ihe Pupil Placement Board

For their joint and several answer to the amended com­
plaint in this action in so far as advised material and 
proper that they should answer, the defendants E. J. 
Oglesby, Alfred L. Wingo and E. T. Justis say:

1. That the infant and adult plaintiffs are Negroes, are 
citizens of the United States and of the Commonwealth of 
Virginia and are residents of and domiciled in the City of 
Richmond in such State, the existence of the City School 
Board of the said City, that H. I. Willett is the Division 
Superintendent of Schools of the said City, and that these 
defendants constitute the Pupil Placement Board of the 
Commonwealth of Virginia, is all admitted.

2. That the infant plaintiff, Jackson, was placed in Mag­
gie Walker High School and all other infant plaintiffs in 
Benjamin Graves, such placements were duly protested, and 
after the hearings and other proceedings pursuant to the 
Pupil Placement Act, the transfer and admission of the 
said Jackson to John Marshall High and of all other infant 
plaintiffs to Chandler Junior High was denied, is also 
admitted.

3. All of the other allegations of the complaint are denied, 
or strict proof thereof is called for, or constitute a recital 
of laws and legal conclusions as to which no answer is 
required.



21

[Filed June 21, 1962]
Answer of the School Board of the City of Richmond and H. I. 

Willeit, Division Superiniendenf of Schools of the City of 
Richmond

For their joint and several answers in this case the 
defendants, The School Board of the City of Richmond and 
H. I. Willett, Division Superintendent of Schools of the 
City of Richmond, answer and say:

1. These defendants do not deny the jurisdiction stated 
in paragraph 1 of the amended bill of complaint, but they 
deny that any action of theirs, or either of them, has de­
prived the plaintiffs, or any of them, under color of state 
law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any 
right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution 
of the United States or any amendment thereto, or any act 
of Congress, as alleged in paragraph 1 of the amended bill 
of complaint.

2. These defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 
2, 3 and 4 of the amended bill of complaint.

3. These defendants admit the allegations of paragraph
5 of the amended bill of complaint.

4. These defendants admit the allegations of paragraph
6 of the amended bill of complaint, except that they say that 
while The School Board of the City of Richmond is em­
powered to provide school buildings, title to such property 
in the City of Richmond is vested in the City of Richmond 
as provided for by § 22-94 of the Code of Virginia, and only 
such school buildings are provided, maintained and oper­
ated in the City of Richmond as are authorized by the City 
Council to be provided, maintained and operated, and at 
such places as are designated and within the limitations 
of funds provided by the Council for the purpose in the 
exercise of its discretion; and except that the performance 
of the other function alleged in paragraph 6 are subject to 
appropriation of funds for such purposes by the City Coun­
cil in the exercise of its discretion.



22

5. These defendants admit the allegations of paragraph
7 of the amended bill of complaint, except that they say that 
the defendant, H. I. Willett, as Division Superintendent of 
Schools is under the authority, supervision and control, and 
acts pursuant to, the orders, policies, practices, customs 
and usages of the defendant, The School Board of the City 
of Richmond, only to the extent that there is no conflict with 
the provisions of §§ 22-36 and 22-97 and with §§ 22-232.1 
through 22-232.17 of the Code of Virginia, as amended by 
chapter 500 of the Acts of Assembly of 1958, known as the 
Pupil Placement Act, or with any other statute of the 
Commonwealth of Virginia.

6. These defendants admit the allegations of paragraph
8 of the amended bill of complaint, except that they say: 
(a) that § 22-232.1 of the Code of Virginia, whieh is a part 
of the Pupil Placement Act, has divested these defendants 
of all power and authority “ now or at any future time” to 
determine the school to which the plaintiffs and any other 
child shall be admitted; (2) that article 1.2 of Chapter 12 
of Title 22 (§§ 22-232.18 through 22-232.31) of the Code of 
Virginia is not applicable or operative in the City of Rich­
mond because the defendant, The School Board of the City 
of Richmond, has not recommended to the Council or gov­
erning body of the City of Richmond that the provisions of 
article 1.2 of chapter 12 of Title 22 of the Code of Virginia 
be made applicable or operative in the City of Richmond, 
nor has the Council or governing body taken any action 
with respect thereto; (c) that it is within the uncontrolled 
discretion of the defendant, The School Board of the City 
of Richmond, and the Council or governing body of the 
City of Richmond whether the provisions of article 1.2 of 
chapter 12 of Title 22 of the Code of Virginia shall be 
applicable or operative in the City of Richmond; and (d) 
that these defendants are wholly without power to admit 
the plaintiffs and any other child to a public school in the 
City of Richmond, except in the sense that they may per-



23

form purely ministerial acts when clearly authorized by 
law so to do.

7. These defendants deny all of the allegations of para­
graphs 9 through 15 of the amended bill of complaint; and 
say: (a) that these defendants have been divested of all 
power and authority “now or at any future time” to deter­
mine the school to which the plaintiffs and any other child 
shall be admitted; (b) that these defendants are wholly 
without power to admit the plaintiffs and any other child 
to a public school in the City of Richmond, except in the 
sense that they may perform purely ministerial acts when 
clearly authorized by law so to do; and (c) that these de­
fendants have done no act that has deprived the plaintiffs, 
or any of them, or any other child under color of state law, 
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, 
privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the 
United States or any amendment, thereto, or any act of 
Congress.

F u r t h e r  A n sw er

Further answering, these defendants jointly and sever­
ally say the purpose of the bill of complaint is to obtain 
the entry of an order which will enjoin and restrain the 
enforcement, operation and execution of the Pupil Place­
ment Act, by restraining the action of officers of the State 
of Virginia in the enforcement and execution of the statute, 
and of an order or orders made by an administrative board 
or commission acting under such statute, upon the ground 
of the unconstitutionality of the statute. Under the pro­
visions of Title 28 U.S.C.A., section 2281, such an injunc­
tion cannot be granted by any district court or judge there­
of unless the application therefor is heard and determined 
by a district court of three judges under Title 28, U.S.C.A., 
section 2284.
* * # # # # # * # #



24

Pre-Trial Depositions Taken July 18, 1962 
4 H. I. Willett,

a witness called by counsel for the plaintiffs, of legal 
age, first being duly sworn, testified as follows:

Direct Examination
By Mr. Marsh:

Q. Would you state your name, address and occupation, 
please? A. I am H. I. Willet, Superintendent of Public 
Schools of Richmond, and the address of this office is 312 
N. 9th Street.

Q. How long have you been superintendent of the public 
schools, sir? A. I became superintendent in January of 
1946.

13 Q. Doesn’t generally this Directory contain the 
members of the School Board, administrative offi­

cers, high schools and the other schools maintained by the 
City of Richmond ? A. That is correct.

Q. And these schools are listed under the heading of 
first white schools, and then all the white schools are listed; 
and then Negro schools, and then all of the Negro schools 
are listed? A. That is correct.

Q. And the schools which are designated as white schools 
are attended predominantly if not completely by white 
pupils ? A. Attended primarily by white pupils.

Q. And the faculties are entirely filled by persons of the 
white race, is that correct? A. That is correct.

Q. And conversely are those designated as Negro stu­
dents attended solely by Negro students, these schools? 
A. So far as we know.

Q. And their faculties are composed solely of members 
of the Negro race? A. That is correct.

14 Q. Prior to the time when the Pupil Placement 
Board began to assume responsibility for the assign­

ments of pupils, wasn’t the Richmond Public School Sys-



25

tem set up on a completely segregated basis? A. That is 
correct.

Q. I believe you said it was sometime in 1956, approxi­
mately, we don’t want the exact date, that the Pupil Place­
ment Act came into effect? A. You mean-----

Q. It is not important for this question. The question 
is, after the Pupil Placement Board began to assume some 
responsibility, did the various school zones undergo any 
substantial change? A. No, so far as I know the Pupil 
Placement Board has not set up zones per se in the assign­
ment of pupils.

The assignments have been made on the basis of appli­
cations that were made to the Pupil Placement Board.
* * # # * # # # * *
16 Q. I hand you a booklet entitled “ School Dis­

tricts” . Would you tell me what that booklet con­
tains. A. This booklet contains a description of attendance 
areas of the various schools, public schools, in the city of 
Richmond, and for the most part this includes boundary 
lines that had been set up by the School Board before the 
authority for the placement of pupils had been taken from 
the School Board and the Superintendent and placed in the 
hands of the Pupil Placement Board.

There is this exception, this book has been brought up 
to date. For example, the first book in it is the Amelia 
School District, which school was built since the Pupil 
Placement Board took over that authority.

Now, in describing the people that would normally attend 
that school, in order to play our role, we have outlined some 
district lines here, which were not approved by the Pupil 
Placement Board as district lines, but were approved in 

terms of pupils attending that school.
17 In other words, that we had to get permission 

from the Pupil Placement Board in terms of by
name and address, I believe, of all the pupils who attended 
that school.



They are pupils who live within the area here. So in 
effect the School Board does not now have the authority 
of setting district lines.

The Pupil Placement Board has not set up such lines 
itself, but so that we can communicate with these parents 
we have to set up lines which are approved by the Pupil 
Placement Board not as lines, but in terms of the pupils 
that would attend the school.

Q. But these are the-----  A. These are so far as I know
the most recent and up to date district lines of the individ­
ual schools in defining the attendance areas from which 
the pupils come who attend these individual schools.

Q. They are current? A. Yes, they are. You recall I 
said earlier that in effect the rules and regulations of the 
Pupil Placement Board seem to me, at least, to more or 
less freeze pupils where they were.

So the basis of these lines wTere the boundary lines set 
up by the School Board and Superintendents when they 
had that authority, but these are the best record that we 

have now of the current attendance lines in terms 
18 of how it is now operated.

By Mr. Drinard:
Q. Meaning the lines originally based prior to 1956? A. 

That is correct.
* * # * # # # # * #  

Cross Examination
By Mr. Drinard:

Q. Mr. Willett, in discussing school boundaries, we are 
largely controlled by the location of the pupil with respect 
to the schools, is that correct? A. That is correct.

Q. Does race enter into that picture at all? Let me put 
it this way: If race enters into the picture it is by reason 
of the location of the pupil with respect to the school rather 
than by arbitrary separation? A. Well, of course I think 
we will go back to what I said earlier, Mr. Drinard: Of



27

course, prior to the decision of the Supreme Court 
19 and the Pupil Placement Board taking over of course 

we were operating segregated schools which meant 
that at that time there were dual lines.

The placement of pupils in schools was based on geog­
raphy, distance, availability of space and transportation.

Of course, there were dual lines at that time. Any change 
from that now of course is the question for the Pupil Place­
ment Board.

Any parent that wishes to go to another school may make 
application to the Pupil Placement Board for such change 
of their child, a number have been made and a number 
have been granted.

Q. What you are saying is, the race situation is out of 
the picture so far as you and the School Board are con­
cerned? A. Yes.

Q. With respect to these strict boundary lines? A. Yes. 
That now rests with the Pupil Placement Board.

Q. Mr. Willet, has the Superintendent of Schools, or the 
School Board or School Administration at anytime taken 
initiative promoting desegregation in the use or admin­
istrative changes in the public school system? A. Mr. 
Drinard, the Pupil Placement Act placed the authority for 
pupil placement in the Pupil Placement Board, and stated 

that the School Board and Superintendent were 
20 divested of all authority for the placement of such 

pupils.
This Act of the General Assembly had more or less the 

effect of freezing pupils in the school that they were then 
attending.

With the organization of the Pupil Placement Board that 
body then set up rules and regulations in accordance with 
the authority by reason given them by the Act, and the 
School Board and the Administration have attempted to 
work under these rules and regulations.

It is clear from the intent of the law and the Rules and 
Regulations of the Pupil Placement Board that that body



28

would pass on all assignment problems with careful con­
sideration to any cases that would not fall within the 
normal course.

I  use here for clarity the same illustration that I used 
earlier, the case of Negro pupils, those that went in normal 
course after the Courts injunction registration forms were 
used. That took care of the groups that we are talking 
about.

But at all times, so far as I know, any parent who wanted 
his child to go to a different school without regard to race 
was required to sign a Pupil Placement Board form, which 
form went to the Pupil Placement Board and was con­
sidered by that Board.

This meant then that the state law took out of 
21 the hands of the School Board and the Superin­

tendent of schools any decision relating to the inte­
gration of schools.

Consequently, it has been a feeling of both the School 
Board and the Administration that any conflict that might 
exist between the state and federal law should be decided 
by the Courts, not by the School Board and the Administra­
tion.

I might add from my own observation, that the Pupil 
Placement Board has been acting on applications including 
those involving integration, and from this observation I 
would say that they have been placing pupils in a manner 
that was designated to increase the degree of integration 
within this state.

Q. And within the city? A. And within the city, yes. 
# # # # # # # # # #  

Transcript of Trial Proceedings 
25 H. I. Willett

was called as a witness on behalf of the plaintiffs 
and, being first duly sworn, was examined and testified as 

follows:
* 41. M, JJ. Jfc -Sfcw ' S ' T P W W W W T P ' f f



29

26 Direct Examination
By Mr. Marsh:

# # # * # * * * # #
29 Q. I show you Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 17. Would 

you read that letter, beginning here, to the Court,
please? A. “ It was moved, seconded, unanimously ap­
proved that the School Board and Superintendent request 
the State Pupil Placement Board to transfer the pupils 
now attending the Nathaniel Bacon School to the East End 
Junior High School and transfer enough pupils from 
George Mason to Nathaniel Bacon building to utilize its 
capacity.

“ It was pointed out that this proposal had been
30 informally presented to the Pupil Placement Board 

and that that Board was generally in accord with
the transfer. However, the formal request would have to 
be accompanied by the names and addresses of the pupils 
affected and the reasons as to why the request for transfers 
was being made.

“ It was emphasized by both the Board and the Superin­
tendent that this was purely an administrative move to 
relieve overcrowded conditions in the George Mason High 
School and the East End Junior High School and to afford 
a more effective operation of schools and that it was in no 
way related or prompted by current litigation on the part 
of the Negro parents wishing to enroll their children in 
White schools.”
# # # * # # # # # #

31 Q. No, I am getting at something else. In each 
such case in the past the request was made to trans­

fer a formerly White school, as in the case of East End, 
to a Negro school to relieve the overcrowded situations. Is 
that not the way the School Board has been meeting this 
problem? A. Well, the School Board has made no request, 
as you word it, to the Pupil Placement Board for transfers



30

involving the question of transfer of Negro pupils to White 
schools, or White pupils to Negro schools.

Q. My question was in meeting the problem of over­
crowding, the only requests that have been made by the 
School Board have been requests to convert a formerly 
White school into a Negro school and shift the pupils 
around? A. No, not necessarily, because in some cases 
there have been new schools.

Q. Bight. A. Some cases, additions to schools. It has 
not involved just conversion of schools.

32 Q. But in no case has the School Board requested 
that Negro pupils living in an area be assigned to 

schools with White pupils to relieve the overcrowded sit­
uation? A. That’s correct.

40 Q. My question, sir, is are you aware of any pro­
gram by which the assignment of pupils will be made

on the basis of academic criteria, as is indicated on these 
forms, or any academic standards? A. Are you referring 
to the actions of the School Board, or action of the Pupil 
Placement Board?

Q. Action of the School Board? You say you don’t 
know about the Pupil Placement Board? A. I set forth in 
my deposition, Mr. Marsh, that the School Board has taken 
no initiative to place White pupils in Negro schools or 
Negro pupils in White schools, because we believed that 
that was the authority of the Pupil Placement Board up 
to this point.

Now, in line with that, then, I indicated in the deposi­
tion that we had no plan that has been set forth to go

41 beyond that fact. Now, whether or not—what plan 
the Pupil Placement Board might have for the use

of academic standards is a matter that they would have 
to answer.

Q. I am sorry, I  don’t believe you understood my ques­
tion. My question was, are you aware, or does the School



31

Board of-the City of Richmond have any plans to admit 
pupils to any school on the basis of academic tests! 
# # # # * # # # : * #

A. When we had the authority for placing pupils, we did 
use tests to place pupils in certain schools involving special 
education. They were not used in the normal school.

Q. Now, my question is, are there any such plans now, or 
are you aware of any such plans at the present time? A. 
Of the School Board, or of the Pupil Placement Board?

Q. Of the School Board. A. No.
Q. You are not? A. Because, as I  indicated to you ear­

lier, that we have taken no initiative in that field, because 
we feel it to be the responsibility of the Pupil Placement
Board.
# # # * * #

42 Dr. E. J. Oglesby
was called as a witness on behalf of the plaintiffs 

and, being first duly sworn, was examined and testified 
as follows:

Direct Examination
By Mr. Tucker:

Dr. Oglesby, I  believe you are the chairman of the Pupil 
Placement Board of Virginia? A. That is correct.

Q. How long have you been chairman? A. About twm 
years.
# * # # # # # # # #

54 Q. Well, what do you do where you have overlap­
ping school zones and school areas? A. You have 

got that, of course, in Richmond.
Q. Yes. A. Normally, I would say fully 99 per cent of 

the Negro parents who are entering a child in First Grade 
prefer to have that child in the Negro school. Judging by 
the small number of applications we get, that must be true.



32

Now, wTe do not think that this Board was appointed for 
the purpose or that the law required the attempt on our 
part to try to integrate every child possible. What we 
thought we were to do was to be completely fair in consid­
ering the requests of Negroes, we will say, to go into White 
schools, but certainly not trying to put those in that didn’t 
want to go in.

Now, when a Negro parent asks for admission of his 
child in the First Grade of a White school, very clearly he 
is asking for desegregation or for integration, or whatever 
you want to call it, and he gets it. And it is true that in 
general there will be two schools that that child could attend 

in his area, one White and one Negro, and we assume 
55 that the Negro wants to go to the Negro school unless 

he says otherwise, but if he says otherwise, he gets 
the other school.

Q. All right. Now, the tests that we have been referring 
to come into play here when a Negro child who has advanced 
somewhere along in school, possibly finished the First 
Grade or any subsequent grade, seeks to attend the White 
school which serves his area of residence? A. Or if he 
would ask to attend a Negro school that didn’t serve his 
area, or if a White did the same thing, we apply exactly 
the same educational tests, same records to the Whites 
when they ask for transfer as we do Negroes, get the same 
information, we apply the same criteria, the same decision.

Q. But that same criteria would not be applied in the 
case of a White child, let us say one just coming into the 
city who is advanced in school desiring to attend the same 
school, assuming that he lives within the area of that same 
school? A. No, I guess it wouldn’t.

Q. You would just routinely assign the White child to 
the White school? A. If that’s his attendance area and he 
asked for that school, exactly the same applied to the 
Negro. If he comes in, he asks for a school, he gets it.



33

[July 25, 1962]
Memorandum of the Court

Eleven Negro students, their parents and guardians in­
stituted this action to require the defendants to transfer the 
students from Negro public schools to white public schools. 
The plaintiffs also pray, on behalf of all persons similarly 
situated, that the defendants be enjoined from operating 
racially segregated schools and that the defendants be 
required to submit to the Court a plan of desegregation.

The Pupil Placement Board answered, admitting that the 
plaintiffs had complied with its regulations for transfer 
and denying the other allegations of the complaint. The 
City School Board and the Superintendent of Schools an­
swered and moved to dismiss on the ground that sole 
responsibility for the placement of pupils rested with the 
Pupil Placement Board pursuant to the Pupil Placement 
Act of Virginia, Sections 22-232.1 through 232.17 of the 
Code of Virginia, as amended.

The defendants interpreted the bill of complaint as at­
tacking the constitutionality of the Pupil Placement Act 
and moved to dismiss on the ground that its constitution­
ality should first be determined by the Supreme Court of 
Appeals of Virginia, or the case should be heard by a dis­
trict court of three judges.

The evidence disclosed that the City of Richmond is 
divided into a number of geographically defined attendance 
areas for both white and Negro schools. These areas were 
established by the School Board prior to 1954 and have not 
been changed in a material way since that time. Several 
areas for white and Negro schools overlap. The Pupil 
Placement Board enrolls and transfers all students. Neither 
the Richmond School Board nor the Superintendent makes 
recommendations to the Pupil Placement Board.

During the 1961-1962 school term, thirty-seven Negro 
students were assigned to white schools. For the 1962-1963 
school term, ninety additional students have been assigned.



34

At the start of the 1962-1963 school term all of the white 
high schools will have Negro students in attendance. Negro 
students will also attend several of the white junior high 
schools and elementary schools.

Eigid adherence to placement of students by attendance 
areas has been modified in four respects. First, the Chair­
man of the Pupil Placement Board testified that any Negro 
child applying for enrollment in the first grade of a white 
public school in his attendance area is assigned to that 
school. Second, the Superintendent of Schools testified that 
George Wythe High School and John Marshall High School 
had been constructed to accommodate all high school stu­
dents in their respective attendance areas. Counsel stated 
in argument that six Negro students had applied for admis­
sion to George Wythe High School for 1962 and all had 
been accepted. Third, a Negro student presently attending 
a white school, upon promotion to a higher school, is rou­
tinely assigned to a white school. Fourth, some Negro stu­
dents have been assigned to schools in white attendance 
areas.

Usually, however, assignments of students based on pro­
motion from an elementary school to a junior high school 
and from junior high to high school are routinely made by 
the Pupil Placement Board. These assignments generally 
follow a pattern, aptly described as a system of “ feeder 
schools,” that existed prior to 1954. Thus, a student from 
a white elementary school is routinely promoted to a white 
junior high school and in due course to a white high school. 
A Negro student is routinely promoted from a Negro ele­
mentary school to a Negro junior high school and finally a 
Negro high school. In order to change the normal course 
of assignment based on promotion all students must apply 
to the Pupil Placement Board. The majority of the plain­
tiffs in the present case are such applicants.

The Chairman of the Pupil Placement Board testified 
that 98 per cent of the applications were of a routine nature 
and were handled by the staff of the Board. The remain-



35

ing 2 per cent, divided about equally between white and 
Negro applicants, requested transfers from one school to 
another outside of the regular routine. These percentages 
applied to the entire state, but there was no evidence that 
they varied materially for the City of Richmond.

First to be determined are the defendants’ motions to 
dismiss on the ground that the case involves the consti­
tutionality of the Pupil Placement Act. The plaintiffs 
have made no challenge of the constitutionality of the Act, 
and the motions are denied.

The second issue is the joinder of the School Board and 
Superintendent of Schools. The State Pupil Placement 
Board has authority over the placement of pupils, and the 
local officials refrain from making recommendations to the 
Board, but approximately 98 per cent of the placements 
are made routinely as a result of the regulations of the 
School Board pertaining to attendance areas. The evidence 
shows that the State Pupil Placement Board has no inclina­
tion to vary these attendance areas, although undoubtedly 
it has authority to do so. In view of this situation, the 
School Board and the Superintendent of Schools are proper 
parties.

The next issue concerns the plaintiffs’ applications. The 
Court wras advised that Lemuel Wimbish, Jr. has been 
assigned to Chandler Junior High School to which he had 
made application. His case is moot.

The following students who have completed elementary 
school seek admission to Chandler Junior High School: 
Carolyn Bradley, Rosalind Dobson, John Edward Johnson, 
Jr., and William Dunbar Quarles, Jr.

The State Pupil Placement Board, after comparing test 
scores of these students with test scores of other students, 
denied the applications on the ground of lack of academic 
qualifications. The plaintiffs do not challenge the tests or 
the method of comparison used by the State Pupil Place­
ment Board. The plaintiffs emphasize, however, that stu­
dents from white elementary schools in the same attend-



36

ance area are placed routinely in Chandler Junior High 
School, and their scores are not scrutinized by the State 
Pupil Placement Board. On the other hand, the plaintiffs, 
because they sought transfer based on promotion from a 
Negro elementary school, are screened by the State Pupil 
Placement Board. This is a valid criticism of the procedure 
inherent in the system of “ feeder schools.”

Proper scholastic tests may be used to determine the 
placement of students. But when the tests are applied only 
to Negroes seeking admission to particular schools and not 
to white students routinely assigned to the same schools, 
the use of the tests can not he sustained. Jones v. School 
Board of Alexandria, 278 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1960).

Plaintiff, Morgan N. Jackson, who was promoted from 
Graves Junior High School, seeks admission to John Mar­
shall High School. His application was denied because he 
lives thirteen blocks from the John Marshall High School 
and five blocks from a Negro high school. The plaintiffs 
point out that he lives in the attendance area of John Mar­
shall High School, and had he been a white student he 
would have been routinely assigned to John Marshall High 
School without determination of whether his residence was 
closer to that high school or any other high school. Resi­
dence may he a proper basis for assignment of pupils, hut 
it is an invalid criteria when linked to a system of “feeder 
schools.” Dodson v. School Board of the City of Char­
lottesville, 289 F.2d 439 (4th Cir. 1961).

The third group of plaintiffs, namely, Michael Bradley, 
Daria A. Cameron, Bruce W. Johnson, Phyllis Antoinette 
Johnson and Robert S. Meyers, seek to transfer from 
Graves Junior High School to Chandler Junior High 
School. They were denied transfer because of lack of aca­
demic qualifications. The evidence showed that the same 
standards for determining transfer from one junior high 
school to another junior high school were applied by the 
Board indiscriminately to both white and colored students. 
Were this the only factor in this phase of the case, the issue



37

would involve only judicial review of the decision of an 
administrative board. However, the situation of these 
plaintiffs must be considered in the context of the system 
of “ feeder schools,” which routinely placed them in the 
Graves Junior High School while white students routinely 
were placed in Chandler Junior High School. The applica­
tion of scholarship qualifications under these circumstances 
is discriminatory. Green v. School Board of the City of 
Roanoke, — F.2d — (4th Cir., May 22, 1962).

The foregoing facts and conclusions of law require the 
admission of the plaintiffs to the schools for which they 
made application.

The plaintiffs prayed that the defendants be enjoined 
from continuing discrimination in the city schools and that 
the School Board be required to submit a desegregation 
plan. The Court has weighed all of the factors presented 
by the evidence in this case and finds that the defendants 
have taken measures to eliminate racially discriminatory 
enrollments in the first grade. Apparently they are elimi­
nating discriminatory enrollments in George Wythe High 
School and they are routinely assigning Negro students in 
white junior high schools to white high schools.

While the School Board has not presented a formal plan 
of desegregation, the Court finds that the defendants have 
made a reasonable start toward a non-discriminatory school 
system resulting in the attendance of 127 Negro students 
in white schools for the 1962-1963 school term. In view of 
the steps that have been taken in this direction, the Court 
concludes that the defendants should be allowed discretion 
to fashion within a reasonable time the changes necessary 
to eliminate the remaining objectionable features of the 
system of “ feeder schools.”

In Brown v. Board of Education, 349 H.S. 294, 300 (1955), 
the Supreme Court stated “Traditionally, equity has been 
characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its rem­
edies and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling public 
and private needs.” The Court is of the opinion that the



38

relief decreed in this case is sufficient at this time in view 
of the evidence presented. The refusal of broad injunctive 
relief now is not to be construed as approval to continue the 
“feeder school system” as it is now operated. See Hill v. 
School Board of the City of Norfolk, Virginia, 282 F.2d 
473 (4th Cir. 1960); Dodson v. School Board of the City of 
Charlottesville, 289 F.2d 439 (4th Cir. 1961).

This case will be retained on the docket for such further 
relief as may be appropriate.

/ s /  J o h n  D. B u t z n e r , J r . 
United States District Judge

Eichmond, Virginia 
July 25, 1962

Decree
This cause came on to be heard upon the bill of complaint, 

the amended complaint, the several motions to dismiss and 
answers tiled by the Pupil Placement Board of the Com­
monwealth of Virginia and the School Board of the City of 
Eichmond and the Division Superintendent of Schools, the 
depositions of witnesses duly taken and filed, the testimony 
of witnesses heard ore tenus and exhibits; and was argued 
by counsel.

Upon consideration whereof, for reasons appearing in 
the Memorandum of the Court this day made a part of the 
record, the Court doth A d ju d g e , Order  and D ecree  as fol­
lows :

1. The motions to dismiss are denied.
2. The defendants, and each of them, are enjoined and 

restrained from denying Carolyn Bradley, Michael Bradley, 
Daria A. Cameron, Eosalind Dobson, Bruce W. Johnson, 
John Edward Johnson, Jr., Phyllis Antoinette Johnson, 
Bobert S. Meyers and William Dunbar Quarles, Jr., admis­
sion to Chandler Junior High School, and from denying



39

Morgan. N. Jackson admission to John Marshall High 
School.

3. The prayer of the plaintiffs for further injunctive 
relief is denied at this time.

4. This cause is retained on the docket, with leave of any 
party, or of persons constituting a class with the plaintiffs, 
to petition for appropriate relief.

/ s /  J ohn  D. B utzner, J r. 
United States District Judge

Richmond, Virginia 
July 25, 1962

[Filed August 22,1962]
Notice of Appeal

Notice is hereby given that Minerva Bradley, I. A. Jack- 
son, Jr., Rosa Lee Quarles, John Edward Johnson, Elihu 
C. Myers and Elizabeth S. Myers hereby appeal to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
from so much of the order of this Court entered on July 25, 
1962, in the above-captioned action as denies the prayers 
of the amended complaint designated as (B), (C), (D) 
and (E).



40

Memorandum Opinion in Earlier Litigation
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINA 

RICHMOND DIVISION
Civil Action No. 2819 

L orna  R e n e e  W arden , an infant, et al 
v.

T h e  S chool  B oard of t h e  C it y  of R ic h m o n d , 
V ir g in ia , e t  a l

[July 5, 1961]
During the month of July, 1958, several Negro children, 

through their attorney, filed applications with the School 
Board of the City of Richmond, for transfers to schools 
as indicated, commencing with the school session 1958-59, 
or, in the alternative, to such other school to which their 
assignment might properly be determined on the basis of 
objective considerations without regard to their race or 
color. These applications were promptly forwarded to the 
State Pupil Placement Board.

Under date of September 2, 1958, the Pupil Placement 
Board assigned the said children to certain schools that 
were then being attended by other Negro children. The 
children’s attorney was advised accordingly by letter dated 
September 3, 1958.

Under date of September 2, 1958, this suit was instituted 
against the School Board of the City of Richmond and H. I. 
Willett, its Division Superintendent, praying that the 
Court enter an interlocutory and permanent injunction, 
enjoining the defendants, their successors in office, and 
their agents and employees from denying the infant plain­
tiffs solely on account of race or color the right to be en­
rolled in and to attend the public schools of the City of 
Richmond, to which they respectively had sought admis­
sion for under the 1958-59 school session.



41

Upon consideration of the facts shown by the evidence 
and upon argument of counsel, Judge Sterling Hutcheson 
under date of September 11, 1958, denied the motion for an 
interlocutory injunction; whereupon the defendants filed 
their responsive pleadings, including a motion to dismiss.

Judge Hutcheson under date of May 20, 1959, denied the 
motion to dismiss and entered an order of June 2, 1959, 
granting plaintiffs leave to amend their bill of complaint 
requesting relief against the state Pupil Placement Board 
and its individual members.

Pursuant thereto, three of the original plaintiffs filed an 
amended and supplemental complaint, naming the School 
Board of the City of Richmond, H. I. Willett, its Division 
Superintendent, and Andrew A. Farley, Beverley H. Ran­
dolph, Jr., and Hugh V. White, individually and constitut­
ing the Pupil Placement Board of the Commonwealth of 
Virginia, as parties defendant; praying among other things, 
that the Court enter a judgment declaring that the enforce­
ment, operation or execution of certain sections of the Code 
of Virginia, commonly known as the Pupil Placement Act, 
violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clause of 
Section 1, of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States; and that the Procedure Sections of 
the Pupil Placement Act need not be pursued as a condition 
precedent to judicial relief from the imposition of the seg­
regation requirements based on race or color; and that a 
permanent injunction be entered restraining the defendant 
School Board of the City of Richmond and its Division 
Superintendent from any and all actions that regulate or 
affect, on the basis of race or color, the admission, enroll­
ment or education of the infant plaintiffs, or any other 
Negro child similarly situated, to and in any public school 
operated by the defendants.

Responsive pleadings were promptly filed by all of the 
defendants. However, no further action was taken or re­
quested by any of the parties to this suit until the court, on



42

its own motion, set the matter for a hearing on the merits, 
to-wit, March 30, 1961.

The defendant School Board and its Division Superin­
tendent, in their answers, generally denied the allegations 
of the complaint and asserted that all rights of assignment 
and enrollment in the public schools of the City of Rich­
mond were vested in the Pupil Placement Board. The 
present members of the Pupil Placement Board having been 
substituted as parties defendant on the day of the hearing 
on the merits, filed no formal answer. The former mem­
bers of the School Board, in their answer, stated that under 
the rules of the then Pupil Placement Board, no pupil should 
be transferred from one school to another in the absence 
of a favorable recommendation by local school officials with­
out regard to race, color or creed, and that none of the 
plaintiffs in this case had filed any protest with the Pupil 
Placement Board nor indicated aggrievance by any action 
taken by it.

Upon the date of the said hearing two of the plaintiffs, 
namely, Lorna Renee Warden and her father, and Wanda 
Irene Dabney and her father, moved for leave to withdraw 
as parties plaintiff, which motions were granted; the re­
maining plaintiff is Daisy Jane Cooper, an infant, by Eliza­
beth Cooper, her mother and next friend.

The evidence, including the exhibits introduced in the 
proceedings heard by Judge Hutcheson, disclosed that 
Daisy Jane Cooper was nine years of age in 1958; that she 
last attended Grade 4-L in the George Washington Carver 
Elementary School; that she sought transfer to Grade 4-H, 
Westhampton School; that her application was denied by 
the Pupil Placement Board, with the following notation 
thereon: “ This pupil has been in attendance at Carver since 
February 1954” ; that plaintiff continued her attendance in 
the Carver School from that date to the present time; that 
no protest or appeal was taken by her parents or her 
attorney.



43

The evidence further discloses that the plaintiff is a 
Negro child residing at 5401 Marion Street, in the City of 
Richmond; that her home is approximately four and a half 
blocks from the Westhampton School and approximately 
five miles from the Carver School; that she resides in the 
Westhampton School District; that she is taken, along with 
other Negro children residing in her community, to the 
Carver School by school bus; that the Westhampton School 
is attended by children of the white race and the Carver 
School by children of the Negro race; that the Division 
Superintendent, in response to the following question: 
“ Had this Cooper child been a white child living at the 
same address, what school would that child have been 
attending?” , answered, “I presume she would have at­
tended the Westhampton School.”

The School Board of the City of Richmond does not as­
sign any child, white or Negro, to any school. That duty is 
vested in the State Pupil Placement Board. The School 
Board of the City of Richmond did not institute any request 
for a change in the assignment of any child except in the 
case where the School Board requested of the State Pupil 
Placement Board that all students in one school be trans­
ferred to another school for the purpose of utilization of 
existing school buildings due to a shift in the population.

The geographical districts for the Richmond schools are 
substantially the same as they were prior to 1957. Any 
changes that have been made were the responsibility of the 
Pupil Placement Board. Generally, students living in a 
geographical school district, attend the schools in that dis­
trict. The infant plaintiff resides in the Westhampton 
School district. Normally, both white and colored students 
graduating from elementary schools in their geographical 
districts automatically attend the junior and senior high 
schools set up for graduates of those elementary schools 
except in cases where individual students, both white and 
colored, request to be transferred to another junior or 
senior high school.



44

The School Board of the City of Bichmond has not insti­
tuted a policy of asking the Pupil Placement Board to mix 
the races in the schools. As of today all students graduat­
ing from one school to another, regardless of race or color, 
are required to make application for enrollment in the 
junior or senior high schools of their choice through the 
Pupil Placement Board. They attend the school thus as­
signed. When a student, white or Negro, makes a request 
for transfer to another school, the local School Board sends 
to the Pupil Placement Board only such information as is 
submitted by the applicant. They also furnish the Pupil 
Placement Board, when requested, any information they 
have in their records pertaining to that student. Both 
white and colored students entering school for the first 
time, pre-register at the school of their own choice. The 
assignment of the child to a specific school is made by the 
Pupil Placement Board.

It is clear from the record in this case that the infant 
plaintiff, Daisy Jane Cooper, would have been assigned to 
the Westhampton School except for the fact she is a Negro 
child. Counsel for the present members of the Pupil Place­
ment Board frankly stated during argument that there was 
no reason to believe the present Board would not act favor­
ably in her case if she would only file a current application 
for transfer.

Discrimination on account of race, in the case of the 
Cooper child, was therefore obvious, and since the final 
result would have been the same, if a protest had been filed 
with the former members of the Pupil Placement Board, in 
view of their expressed segregation policy, as found by this 
Court in Beckett v. School Board of the City of Norfolk, 
185 Fed. Supp. 459 (Norfolk Division of the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia), it is 
not necessary that the infant plaintiff exhaust all of the 
administrative procedures. To have required such, would 
have been to have required a futile act.



45

Therefore, in the case of Daisy Jane Cooper, the Court 
concludes the then Pupil Placement Board’s policy and 
practices were unconstitutional and herewith orders the 
admission of the said child to the appropriate grade in the 
Westhampton School, effective with the beginning of the 
opening of the 1961 Fall Term, without requiring her to 
proceed further before the Pupil Placement Board.

The original plaintiffs, all of whom have voluntarily 
withdrawn from this case except the Cooper child and her 
mother, pray that this Court enter a declaratory judgment 
construing certain sections of the Code of Virginia, com­
monly known as the Pupil Placement Act. As these sections 
of the Virginia Code are not facially unconstitutional, this 
Court deems it improper to pass upon the validity of these 
statutes under the doctrine of federal abstention. See Har­
rison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167. Construction and/or the 
constitutionality of the Pupil Placement Act should first be 
determined by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
The plaintiffs, or other persons similarly situated, should 
so file if they are thusly advised.

The planitiffs further pray this Court enter judgment, 
declaring the administrative procedures provided for in 
Title 22, Sections 232.8 to 232.14, inclusive, of the Code of 
Virginia are inadequate to secure and protect the rights 
of the infant plaintiffs, to nonsegregated education and 
need not be pursued as a condition precedent to judicial 
relief. Without passing on the constitutionality of these 
sections of the Virginia Code, the Court is of the opinion 
the administrative procedures set forth therein are not 
unreasonable and must be complied with except in unusual 
cases. They apply to all, regardless of race, color or creed.

The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has con­
sistently required Negro pupils desirous of being reassigned 
to schools without regard to race, to pursue established 
administrative procedures before seeking intervention of 
a federal court. Farley v. Turner, 281 Fed. 2d 131. The 
appeals to the state courts which these statutes provide, are



46

judicial, not administrative remedies and after administra­
tive remedies before the Pupil Placement Board have been 
exhausted, judicial remedies for denial of constitutional 
rights may be pursued at once in the federal courts without 
pursuing state court remedies.

There is no question as to the right of the infant plaintiff 
to be admitted to the schools of the City of Richmond with­
out discrimination of the ground of race. She is admitted, 
however, as an individual, not as a class or group; and it is 
as an individual that her rights under the Constitution are 
asserted. (Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816.) It is 
the Pupil Placement Board of Virginia which must pass in 
the first instance on her right to be admitted to any par­
ticular school. Somebody must enroll the pupils in the 
schools. They can not enroll themselves; and we can think 
of no one better qualified to undertake the task than the 
officials having that responsibility. It is to be presumed 
that these officials will obey the laws, observe the standards 
prescribed by the legislature, and avoid the discrimination 
on account of race, which the Constitution forbids. Not 
until they have been applied to and have failed to give 
relief should the federal courts be asked to interfere in the 
school administration. (With minor changes in order to 
comply with the factual situation in this case, the above 
was quoted from Chief Judge Parker’s opinion in Carson 
v. Warlick, 238 Fed. 2d 724.)

It is unnecessary to pass upon the actions of the former 
members of the Pupil Placement Board except to the extent 
their actions affected the constitutional rights of the infant 
plaintiff, Daisy Jane Cooper. (This has heretofore been 
done). They are no longer administering and enforcing 
the provisions of the Pupil Placement Statutes of Virginia.

The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, in Defebio 
v. County School Board of Fairfax County, Virginia, 100 
S.E. 2d 760, has heretofore held that the enrollment or 
placement of pupils in the public schools of Virginia, is 
vested in the State Pupil Placement Board; further, there



47

is no evidence indicating that the School Board of the City 
of Richmond or its Division Superintendent are, in fact, 
performing these duties; therefore there is no legal justi­
fication for the entry of a permanent injunction, and the 
motion so requested is herewith denied.

Counsel for the plaintiffs should prepare an appropriate 
order in accordance with this opinion, ordering the enroll­
ment of Daisy Jane Cooper in the appropriate grade in the 
Westhampton School in the City of Richmond, beginning 
with the 1961 Fall Term; submit the same to counsel for 
defendants for approval as to form and upon the entry 
thereof this case will stand dismissed. Costs will be as­
sessed against the State Pupil Placement Board.

s /  O rest R. L e w is

United States District Judge
Richmond, Virginia 
July 5, 1961