Ross v. Houston Independent School Brief for Appellees

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SCHOOL ,DISTRICT/ ET AL,

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Defendants-Appellees,

'• ‘ '/■. *■•/;•• vV ’ 'On Appeal From the'-United States District Court 
- For the Southern 'District of Texas

»■'' Houston Division 1

■ : i :t,;V' BRIEF FOR" THE APPELLEES
■ HOUSTON. INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, ET A]

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WILLIAM KEY'-WILDE 
| KELLY FRELS v, ,. ''

TIMOTHY T. COOPER -
2900 SouthJTower Pennzoil Place 
Houston, Texas 77002.'
(713) 223-2900 .
Attorneys for Appellees,
' Houston. Independent' School 
District, et al



CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS

The undersigned, counsel of record, certifies that the 
following listed persons have an interest in the outcome of 
this case. These representations are made in order that the 
Judges of this Court may evaluate possible disqualification 
or possible recusal.

1. The Plaintiff, Delores Ross, and her mother, Mrs. 
Mary Alice Benjamin;

n  2. The Plaintiff, Benva Delois Williams and her 
father, Marion Williams;

3.r —
i

The Plaintiff, Ndapanda Nyamu, and her mother, 
Mrs. Beneva Delois Williams Nyamu;

4. Weldon H. Berry, Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit, 
III, Lowell Johnston and Bill Lann Lee, attorneys 
for the Appellants;

H 5 • The National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People;

6 •
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The Houston Independent School District, whose 
General Superintendent is Billy R. Reagan and 
whose Superintendents are Ms. Patricia Shell, Mr. 
Joseph Angle and Dr. Michael Say;

7. The members of the Board of Trustees of the 
Houston Independent School District: Ray A. 
Morrison, President, Mr. Tarrant Fendley, Vice- 
President, Ms. Cathy Mincberg, Secretary, Mrs. 
Marquis Alexander, Mr. Wiley Henry, Dr. J. C. 
Jones, Mrs. Bobby Ann Peiffer, Ms. Tina Reyes, and 
Mrs. Elizabeth Spates;

8 . Bracewell & Patterson, attorneys for the Appel­
lees .

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9TTCSK
Kelly Frels

1



STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

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The Defendants, the Houston Independent School Dist­
rict, et al, believe that oral argument is necessary. This 
case involves important issues of desegregation law pre­
sented in the context of a large, mostly minority, urban 
school district beset by the problems of mobility and trans­
portation, demographic change, and special educational 
needs. This case also involves a very belated request by 
the Original Plaintiffs to change their theory of the case 
and seek to institute a metropolitan remedy.

Because the issues in this case are important and in 
many aspects, novel, the Defendants feel that oral argument 
will prove helpful to this Court.

!
10TTCSD

11



TABLE OF CONTENTS
Certificate of Interested Persons .................. i
Statement Regarding Oral Argument .................. ii
Table of Contents ..................................  iii
Index of Authorities ............. .................  v
Statement of the Issues ............................  1
Statement of the Case ..............................  2

(i) Course of proceedings and disposition in
court below ..............................  2

(ii) Statement of the Facts ....................  5
Summary of the Argument ...........................  14
Argument ........................................... 15

I. INTRODUCTION .............................  15
II. THE HISD IS A UNITARY SCHOOL DISTRICT ___ 15

A. The Remaining One Race Schools are
not Vestiges of the Formerly Dual 
System ..............................  19

B. The HISD has Taken all Practicable
Steps to Desegregate the Schools .... 23

III. THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN DENYING
THE APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
AND TO ADD ADDITIONAL PARTIES ...........  36
A. The District Court Properly Denied

the Original Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Leave to Amend Their Complaint .......  37

B. The Proposed Additional Defendants
are not Necessary Parties ..........  47

C. The Proposed Defendants Should Not
be Joined Under Rule 21 ............  49



Conclusion 50
Certificate of Service .............................  51
10TTCSA

IV



INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
A. Cherney Disposal Co. v. Chicago and Suburban 

Refuse Disposal Co., 68 F.R.D. 383 (N.D.
111. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 484 
F.2d 751 (7th Cir. 1973), cert, denied,
414 U.S. 1131, 94 S.Ct. 870 (1974)............... 39

Adams v. United States, 620 F.2d 1277 (8th
Cir. 1980), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 826.
101 S.Ct. 88 (1980)..............................  37

Axnco Engineering Co. v. Bud Radio, Inc. 38
F.R.D. 51 (N.D. Ohio 1965)...................... 48,49

Anderson Moorer, 372 F.2d 747 (5th Cir. 1967).....  49
Barr Rubber Products Co. v. Sun Rubber Co.,

425 F.2d 1114 (2nd Cir. 1970), cert, denied,
400 U.S. 878 , 91 S.Ct. 118 (1970)___777777.....  49

Beloit Corporation v. Kusters, 13 F.R. Serv.
2d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)...........................  41

Benger Laboratories. Ltd. v. R. K. Laros Co.,
24 F.R.D. 450 (E.D. Pa. 1959) .77777.777 ........  49

Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294,
75 S.Ct. 753 (1955)..........................  14,16,35

Calhoun v̂ _ Cook, 522 F.2d 717- (5th Cir. 1975).......  32,37
Calhoun v. Cook, 525 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir. 1973).......  24
Carr v. Montgomery County Board of Education,

377 F.Supp. 1123, (M.D. Ala. 1974), aff'd,
511 F.2d 1374 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.“denied,
423 U.S. 986, 96 S.Ct. 394 (5th Cir. 1975)......  32

Chromalloy American Corporation v. Alloy
Surfaces Co., Inc., 351 F.Supp. 449 (D.
Del. 1972)___ 7777...............................  45

Conklin v . Joseph C. Hofgesang Sand Company,
Inc. , 565 F. 2d 405 (6th Cir. 1977).............  42,44

County of Marin v. United States, 150 F.Supp.
619 (N.D. Cal. 1957), rev'd on other
grounds, 356 U.S. 412, 78 S.Ct. 880 (1958)......  39

v



Data Digests, Inc. v. Standard & Poor's
Corporation, 57 F.R.D. 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).......  41

Daves v. Payless Cashways, Inc., 661 F.2d
1022 (5th Cir. 1981).............................  42

Davis v . Board of School Commissioners of 
Mobile County, 402 U.S. 33, 91 S.CtT
1289 (1971)....................................... 23

Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish School
Board, 570 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1978), 
cert, denied, 439 U.S. 1114, 99 S.Ct.
1016 (1979)....................................... 17

Dunn v. Koehring Company, 546 F.2d 1193
(5th Cir. 1977)..................................  41

Dyke v. Gulf Oil Corp., 601 F.2d 557 (Emerg.
C .A . 1979)........................................ 48

Eckels v. Ross, 402 U.S. 953, 91 S.Ct.
1614 (1971)....................................... 3

Fair Housing Development Fund Corporation
v. Burke, 55 F.R.D. 414 (E.D.N.Y. 1972)...... 47,49,50

Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 83 S.Ct.
227 (1962)................................  36,38,39,46

Freeman v . Continental Gin Company, 381
F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1967)........................  39,40

Goss v. Revlon, Inc., 548 F.2d 405 (2nd Cir.
1976), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 968, 98
S.Ct. 514 (1977).................................  43

Green v. County School Board of New
Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 88 S.Ct.
1689 (1968)....................................... 16

Hall v . Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 617
' F . 2d 1108 (5th Cir. 1980)........................  39

Harkless v . Sweeney Independent School
District, 554 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir. 1977)..........  38

Hayes v . New England Millwork Distributors,
Inc. , 602 F. 2d 15 (1st Cir. 1979).................  43

vi



Horton v . Lawrence County Board of Education,
578 F . 2d 147 (5th Cir. 1978)................. 18,19,23

Johnson v . Sales Consultants, Inc., 61
F.R.D. 369 (N.D. 111. 1973)......................  45

Kuhn v . Philadelphia Electric Company, 85
'F.R.D. 86 (E.D. Pa. 1979)........................  45

La Chemise La Coste v. General Mills,
Inc., 53 F.R.D. 596 (D. Del. 1971),
aff'd 487 F. 2d 312 (3rd Cir. 1972)............... 47

Ladwig v. Travelers Insurance Company, 254
F . 2d 840 (5th Cir. 1958).........................  41

Lamar v. American Finance System of Fulton 
County, Inc., 577 F.2d 953 (5th Cir.
1978)............................................. 41

Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 7117, 94
S.Ct. 3112 (1974)................................  43

Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 97 S.
Ct. 2749 (1977)..................................  34

Pasadena City Board of Education v.
Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 96 sTct.
2697 (1976)....................................... 19

Plaquemines Parish School Board v. United
States, 415 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1969)..............  34

Pollux Marine Agencies Inc. v. Louis
Dreyfus Corporation, 455 F.Supp. 211
(S.D. N.Y. 1978).................................  38

Quality Education for all Children,
Inc. v. Board, 385 F.Supp. 803 (N.D.
111. 1974)........................................ 16

Reisner v. General Motors Corporation,
511 F.Supp. 1167 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)................. 41,45

Ross Eckels, 317 F.Supp. 512 (D.C.
Tex. 1970)....................................  2,5,24

Ross v. Eckels, 434 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir.
1970)........................................... 2,5,24

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i Ross v. Eckels, F.Supp. (S.D. Tex.. No.
10,444 , Aug. 6, 1971)..........................

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Ross v. Peterson, 5 Race Rel. L. Reo. 703
(S.D. Tex. 1960), aff’d sub nom., HISD 
v. Ross, 282 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1960) . 
stay and cert, denied, 364 U.S. 803,
81 S.Ct. 27 (1960).......................

' . j

Ross v. Rogers, 2 Race Rel. L. Reo. 1114
(S.D. Tex. 1957)..........................

n
Salwen Paper Company v. Merrill Lynch,

Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 79 F.R.D.
130 (S.D. N.Y. 1978)..........................

Sims v. Mack Truck Corporation, 488 F.Supp.
592 (E.D. Pa. 1980).......................

r Stout v. Jefferson County Board of
Education, 537 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1976).......

1 ■:{
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Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board Of
Education, 402 U.S. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1267 (1971)....

Tasby v. Estes, 572 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir.
1978).....................

passim

1 f. 17
; .ji j Tasby v. Wright, 520 F.Supp. 683 (N.D.

Tex. 1981).........................
1 i Thomson Newspapers, Inc. v. Toledo

Typographical Union, 20 F.R. Serv.
2d 78 (E.D. Mich. 1974)..................

Troxel Manufacturing Company v. Schwinn 
Bicycle Company, 489 F.2d 968 (5th 
Cir. 1973)........................

United States v. Board of Education of
Valdosta, Georgia, 576 F.2d 37 75th 
Cir. 1978), cert, denied, 439 U.S. 1007,
99 S.Ct. 622 (1978)..............................  18

United States v. Board of School
Commissioners, 506 F.Supp. 657 (N.D.
Ind. 1979) aff’d in part, 637 F.2d 1011
(7th Cir. 1980).......................  28

vixi



United States v. Texas, 447 F.2d 441 (5th
Cir. 1971) (C .A . 5281)...........................  43

Vaca Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 87 S.Ct. 903
(1967)............................................  43

Washburn v . Madison Square Garden Corp.,
340 F.Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).................  46

WISP HISD, 583 F.2d 712 (5th Cir. 1978)...........  3
Zenith Radio Corporation v. Hazeltine

Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 91 S.
Ct. 795 (1971)...................................  38

Zucker v. Sable, 426 F.Supp. 658 (S.D.N.Y.
1976).............................................  41

MISCELLANEOUS
Bell, Brown v . Board of Education and the

Interest Convergence Dilemma, 93 Harv.
L. Rev. 518 (1980)...............................  35

3A Moore's Federal Practice § 19.07-9 [2]
(1982)............................................ 48

6 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice &
Procedure §1484 (1971)........ 7 .................  38

6 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice &
Procedure: Civil §1487 (1971)...................  45

7 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice &
Procedure: Civil §1688 (1971)..7...............  49,50

10TTCSC

ix



IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
NO. 81-2323

DELORES ROSS, et al §
§

Appellants §
§

v* §
§HOUSTON INDEPENDENT §

SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al §
§Appellees §

Appeal From the United States District Court For The 
Southern District of Texas, Houston Division

BRIEF FOR APPELLEES

Statement of the Issues
1. Whether the District Court was correct in finding that 

the HISD is a unitary school district, specifically finding that 
the remaining one race schools are not vestiges of a former dual 
system and that all practicable steps have been taken to eliminate 
the vestiges of a dual system.

2. Whether the District Court correctly exercised its 
discretion in denying the Original Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to 
Amend their Complaint, filed well after the hearing on unitary 
status, wherein they sought to invoke a totally new theory of 
liability involving numerous new parties.



STATEMENT OF THE CASE
(i) Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Court Below
Initially filed in 1956, this case alleged that the Houston 

Independent School District ("HISD" or "District") unconstitution­
ally operated a segregated school district. The District Court 
entered an order declaring the dual school system to be unconsti­
tutional. Ross v. Rogers, 2 Race Rel. L. Rep. 1114 (S.D. Tex. 
1957). In 1960, the District Court ordered the implementation of 
a grade per year desegregation plan. Ross v. Peterson, 5 Race 
Rel. L. Rep. 703 (S.D. Tex. 1960), af f' d sub nom. , HISD v. Ross, 
282 F. 2d 95 (5th Cir. 1960), stay and cert, denied, 364 U.S. 803, 
81 S.Ct. 27 (1960).

Other orders_ designed to speed up the desegregaion process 
were implemented in 1965. In July 1967, the United States inter­
vened as a Plaintiff. On September 5, 1967, the District Court 
adopted a freedom of choice desegregation plan.

In 1969 the Original Plaintiffs and the United States made a 
motion for further relief, and the District Court ordered the 
implementation of an equi-distant zoning plan along with other 
requirements. Ross v. Eckels, 317 F. Supp. 512 (D.C. Tex. 1970). 
The Plaintiffs appealed, and this Court affirmed the District 
Court's decision as to the zoning of the elementary schools, but 
modified its order by pairing 24 elementary schools, rezoning 
another, and implementing a geographic capacity plan for the 
secondary schools. Ross v, Eckels, 434 F. 2d 1140 (5th Cir. 
1970) .

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The HISD immediately implemented the plan ordered by the 
Fifth Circuit except for the pairing of elementary schools. The 
HISD filed an Application for Writ of Certiorari with the United 
States Supreme Court to reverse the pairing order. At that time, 
the Supreme Court had before it the case of Swann v. Charotte- 
Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 91 S. Ct. 1267 (1971)
(hereinafter "Swann"). On April 20, 1971, Swann was decided, and 
on May 3, 1971, the HISD's Application for Writ of Certiorari was 
denied. Eckels v. Ross , 402 U.S. 953, 91 S. Ct. 1614 (1971).

While the Writ of Certiorari was pending, the District Court 
entered its Amended Decree of September 18, 1970, which, as later 
modified, is the order under which the HISD operates today. 
(Record, Docket No. 257, hereinafter "R. No."). A motion by the

to modify the pairings was denied, and the schools were fully 
paired in 1971-72.

"̂he failure of the pairings to maintain the desired integra­
tion together with unhappiness in the HISD community led the HISD 
to appoint a community task force to study alternatives to the 
Pa^r^n<?s* As a result of this task force's recommendations, the 
HISD proposed the Magnet School Plan to the District Court as an 
alternative to the pairings. The plan was unopposed by any party 
and was approved by the District Court on July 11, 1975. In the 

the District Court also depaired the 24 elementary schools. 
(R. No. 371).

The controversy over the formation of the proposed Westheimer 
Independent School District (WISD) was a protracted affair of 
eight year's duration which ended with this Court upholding the

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District Court's injunction in 1978. WISP v. HISD, 583 F.2d 712 
(5th Cir. 1978) .

The Hispanic intervenors first sought to intervene in 1971, 
and intervention was granted in 1975 . (R. No. 373). No finding
of discrimination against Hispanics by the HISD has ever been 
made. The Houston Teachers Association (HTA) was granted leave to 
appear as amicus curiae in 1977. (R. No. 634).

On June 9, 1978, the District Court ordered the HISD to file 
a plan for achieving unitary status. (R. No. 709). That plan was 
filed August 9 , 1978 , (R. No. 712) , and a hearing concerning the
plan was held on September 29, 1978. A hearing began on June 4,

/

1979, concerning whether the HISD had reached unitary status. At 
that trial, which lasted 17 days during June and October, 1979, 
all parties were given a full opportunity to present any evidence 
concerning the status of HISD's desegregation efforts. The 
Original Plaintiffs presented no proposed findings and no evidence 
to the District Court.

On September 28, 1979, the District Court ordered the Texas 
Education Agency (TEA) to study the challenges faced by HISD and 
other urban school districts and to develop a plan to meet these 
challenges and provide for voluntary cooperation and sharing of 
educational opportunities. (R. No. 763). As a result of this

, the TEA filed its plan for voluntary educational 
cooperation on March 31, 1980. (R. No. 780a). The Voluntary
Interdistrict Education Plan (VIEP) is currently in operation in 
Houston and Harris County.

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On May 15 , 1980 , the United States filed a Motion for Leave 
to Amend its Complaint and a Motion to add 22 surrounding school 
districts plus several other governmental entities to the case. 
(R. No. 784). The HISD and many of the parties sought to be added 
opposed the Motion. (R. No. 787). On June 9, 1980, the Original 
Plaintiffs filed virtually the same Motion as the United States 
had filed the previous month. (R. No. 792). Those Motions were 

t>Y the District Court on June 10 and 11, 1981 for the same 
reasons. (R. Nos. 804 and 807) . Both the United States and the 

Plaintiffs filed Motions to Alter or Amend the District 
s decisions, (R. Nos. 810 and 808) , and the HISD opposed 

both Motions. (R. Nos. 821 and 813).

On June 17, 1981, the District Court entered an order de­
claring the HISD to be a unitary school district and denying the 
Motions to Alter or Amend its prior decisions concerning the 
amendment of the complaint and addition of other parties. (R. 
No. 818)

(ii) Statement of Facts

The history of desegregation in the HISD from 1956 through 
1969 is contained in Ross v_̂  Eckels, supra, 317 F. Supp. at 
513-515. As stated previously, this Court modified the District 
Court's 1970 decree and ordered a comprehensive plan for the HISD.

I

In approving the equidistant zoning plan for the elementary 
schools, this Court stated that there would be 15 all or virtually 
all black elementary schools remaining in the HISD. Ross v. 
Eckels, supra, 434 F.2d at 1148. Numerous one race white

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elementary schools were approved under the Fifth Circuit's 
affirmance of the District Court's plan. 317 F. Supp. at 525-530.

The pairing of the 24 elementary schools, however, resulted 
largely in pairing Hispanic and black students and required the 
busing of those students. (Transcript of June and October, 1979, 
Hearings, pp. 1456 , 1457 , hereinafter "Tr."; R. No. 818, p. 5).
The pairings were not popular with the patrons of the HISD and 
eventually resulted in a decrease in the number and percentage of 
anglo students attending the paired schools because in most 
instances a significant number of anglo students moved from the 
attendance areas. (Tr., pp. 1456, 1457, 1976). The failure of
the pairing to maintain integration over its five-year history 
prompted the HISD's General Superintendent, Mr. Billy R. Reagan, 
to recommend to the Board of Education that a tri-ethnic community 
task force be appointed to consider an alternative to the 
pairings. As a result, on November 25, 1974, the HISD's Board of 
Education authorized the naming of the Task Force for Quality 
Integrated Education (QIE) . The Task Force for QIE was asked to 
develop a program that would: (1) stall or stop the flight of
residents from urban schools by offering quality education, (2) 
promote integration, (3) offer more educational opportunities for 
students of the District, and (4) bring about an alternative to 
the pairing of schools which was not meeting the needs of the 
District. (Tr. pp. 1737-1742; R. No. 361, p. 3).

The tri-ethnic Task Force for QIE spent many hours in study, 
research and discussion from the time of formation until its 
report was presented to the Board of Education on February 24,

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1975. The Task Force for QIE, through sub-committees, conducted 
an intense review of the District's operations, conducted com­
munity hearings and visited other school districts which were 
operating under desegregation orders which utilized the various 
techniques enumerated in Swann. Numerous consultants were made 
available to the Task Force for QIE, including representatives of 
the Community Services Department of Justice Department. (Tr. 
pp. 1737-1742; R. No. 361, p. 3; Transcript of September 29, 1978, 
Hearing, hereinafter "1978 Tr.", pp. 196-198). The other parties 
to the lawsuit were continually kept abreast of developments and 
given the opportunity to provide input. The Task Force for QIE 
recommended the development and implementation of a program of 
magnet schools.

As a result of the Task Force's report, the HISD's Board of 
Education appointed a tri-ethnic Administrative Task Team to 
develop the Magnet School Plan for presentation to the HISD Board 
and the Court. The major goals of the Magnet School Plan were to 
provide quality education, increase the percentage of students 
attending integrated schools, and decrease the number of one race 
schools. (R. No. 361). This plan was approved by the District 
Court on July 11, 1975, (R. No. 371), and Phase I was implemented 
at the beginning of the 1975-76 school year. Phases II and III of 
the Magnet School Plan were implemented in 1976-77 and in 1977-78. 
The HISD has yearly evaluated and made changes in order to make 
the Magnet School Plan more effective in meeting the expressed 
purposes of the plan.

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Since the implementation of the September 18 , 1970 Amended 
Decree, it has not been necessary for the District Court to ever 
be called upon to order the HISD to take action in meeting newly 
enunciated judicial standards applicable to desegregation. The 
development of the Magnet School Plan is one example. Several 
other examples of the HISD's commitment to providing equity of 
access to education are also illustrative. When the Supreme Court 
found Hispanics to be a separate minority which could be subject 
to discriminatory action as an identifiable ethnic group, the 
District took several actions even though there has never been a 
finding of discrimination against Hispanics as a separate ethnic 
group within the HISD. First, in order to prevent ethnic 
isolation of Hispanic students, the District amended its 
majority-to-minority transfer provisions to include Hispanics and 
provided free transportation for the transferring students. 
Secondly, the District recognized Hispanic teachers as a separate 
ethnic group for purposes of assignment, again to prevent the 
ethnic isolation of Hispanic teachers.

A most significant example of the HISD's commitment to 
achieving and maintaining a desegregated school system was its 
opposition to the proposed Westheimer Independent School District 
(WISD) . First in 1970-73 and then in 1976 to 1978 , the HISD 
shouldered the laboring oar in the opposition to this divisive and 
disruptive movement. The Original Plaintiffs did participate to 
some degree in fighting the proposed WISD in 1970-73 , but did 
virtually nothing in 1976-78. While the HISD's opposition to the 
WISD was not supported by many groups in the Houston community,

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the HISD did not capitulate in its efforts to prevent a result 
that would have fostered racial and ethnic isolation and would 
have seriously depleted the tax base of the HISD which, in turn, 
would have delimited the educational opportunities for the 
remaining students, the overwhelming majority of whom would be 
minority.

During the 1970's the HISD developed many educational and 
support programs to improve the educational opportunities for all 
students. Operation Fail Safe, a parental involvement program, 
was initiated in 1977 to help improve the achievement of students 
who were having difficulties in school. (Tr. pp. 1828-1834; HISD 
Exhibit Nos. 86-88, Hearing of June and October, 1979, hereinafter 
"Ex. No."; See R. No. 755 for Exhibit List of HISD for 1979 
Hearing) . The Basic Skills Program was instituted to help all 
students improve their academic performance. These programs and 
others reversed an eight year downward trend of test scores at the 
elementary level and resulted in achievement of national norm 
scores for grades one through six in 1978. (HISD Ex. 103).

In 1977, to assure minority participation in the District's 
governance, the HISD converted from at large membership on the 
school board to single member districts. (Tr., pp. 1710-1714).

Additional financial and educational resources were utilized 
at various schools with high concentrations of students from low 
socio-economic backgrounds and/or low achieving students. The 
District embarked on an intensive nation-wide search for qualified 
teachers for critical subjects such as math, science, bilingual 
education, and special education. In 1978, the HISD also

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instituted the Second Mile Plan, an incentive pay plan designed to 
reduce teacher turnover and stabilize faculties. All of these 
activities were accompanied by the implementation of the magnet 
schools, Majority-to-Minority (M to M) transfers, faculty 
desegregation, the facilities improvement program, desegregration 
of extracurricular activities, expansion of transportation 
provided to students, and other aspects of the 1970 Court Order.

In 1979 , the HISD operated a total of 226 schools —  170 
elementary, 34 junior high or middle schools and 22 senior high 
schools. (R. No. 747 , p. 14). The student enrollment for the 
1978-1979 school year, was 201,960 students, of whom 45% were 
black, 24.2% Hispanic and 30.8% anglo or other. (R. No. 747,
P* 14) . This compares to a student ethnic percentage in 
1969-1970, the year before the comprehensive Court Order, of 33.5% 
black, 13.4% Hispanic and 53.1% anglo or other. (HISD Ex. No. 6, 
Hearing of September 29, 1978, hereinafter "1978 Ex. No."), The 
present enrollment for 1981-82 is 44.3% black, 29.7% Hispanic, and 
26% anglo or other, (with 2.6% of anglo being Asian-Americans). 
(See Appendix "A", the current enrollment figures). In 1979, the 
projected ethnic enrollment for 1985-86 was 48.8% black, 31.4% 
Hispanic and 19.8% anglo or other. (R. No. 747, p. 14). Because 
of a dramatic influx of Hispanic families into the Houston area, 
those projections have now been revised to reflect a projected 
enrollment in 1985-86 of approximately 38% black, 42% Hispanic, 
and 20% anglo or other.

The number of one race schools has decreased greatly since 
the implementation of the Court Order in 1970. (Ex. Nos. 57, 58,

-10-



60 , 63 , 64 , 65 , 66). On a bi-racial basis, there were 162 one 
race schools in 1970-71 and 122 such schools in 1978-79. On a 
tri-ethnic basis there were 133 one race schools in 1970-71 and 
101 such schools in 1978—79. (Ex. No. 64) . This substantial 
decrease in one race schools, which results in over one half of 
the schools being integrated, has taken place in spite of the fact 
that in 1978-79 under 30% of the students in the District were 
anglo.

During this same period, the students availing themselves of 
the tri-ethnic transfer (M to M) has steadily increased from 2,388 
in 1970-1971 to 12,759 in 1978-79. (Ex. No. 96).

By 1979, the Magnet School Plan was expanded to 48 campuses: 
31 elementary, 7 junior high schools and 10 high schools. In 
1978-79, a total of 7,557 students transferred to the magnet 
schools, and of these 3,411 are black, 1,544 Hispanic and 2,602 
white. (Ex. No. 68) . The total number of students attending 
schools with magnet programs, excluding the cluster centers, was 
42,093. The cluster centers also provided part-time programs for 
another 27,300 students with 7,200 participating in the Outdoor 
Learning Centers, 17,700 taking part in the Anderson, Briargrove, 
Port Houston and Sinclair centers, and 2,400 attending the People 
Place Center. The total number of students impacted by the magnet 
school programs in 1979 in the HISD was 69,393. (Ex. No. 68).

The maps submitted by the HISD at the 1979 hearings, showing 
the elementary school zones for 1969-70, 1970-71, 1975-76 and 
1978-79, dramatically reflect the growth in the minority popula­
tion attending the HISD schools. (Ex. Nos. 35-50). These maps

-11-



also show the extensive natural integration of neighborhoods being 
experienced in Houston, together with the effects of the Dis­
trict's efforts to further integrate the schools through the 
tri—ethnic transfers and the Magnet School Plan. These graphic 
depictions are augmented by the study of Dr. Barton Smith of the 
University of Houston, whose study was based on census tracts and 
zip code zones. (Ex. No. 70).

These various maps and other evidence demonstrate that 
noncontiguous pairings would have to be employed to achieve a 
greater degree of desegregation without disturbing the naturally 
integrated schools or those integrated through the tri-ethnic or 
magnet school transfers. A review of the maps and existing 
transportation routes reveals that the time and distance of travel 
from one noncontiguous zone to another in congested Houston 
traffic would be extensive and beyond any conceivably reasonable 
requirements. (Ex. Nos. 35-50; 1978 Ex. Nos. 21-26A).

When considering the various desegregation plans submitted in 
1969 and 1970, the District Court made projections of student 
enrollment for each school within the HISD. The student 
attendance at most of the schools the first year of the plan, 
1970-71, was within the projections. Some one race black schools, 
however, did not attain the 10% white enrollment projected. The 
overwhelming reason for this was that the white students either 
moved, attended private school, or simply did not attend school. 
(Tr., pp. 1456 , 1457) .

The HISD resisted political and other challenges designed to 
change the Court approved zone lines and enacted and enforced a

-12-



strict policy requiring the students to attend their designated 
schools. See, Ross v^ Eckels (S.D. Tex., No. 10,444, August 6, 
1971) . The District Court found that the HISD did all that was 
practical in the circumstances to enforce the requirements of the 
Court Order relating to student attendance. (R. No. 818, p. 27).

While the 1970 projections of this Court and the District 
Court were not met in some schools, this is more than offset by 
the overwhelming number of schools which have become integrated 
which this Court did not project would be integrated. (Ex. 
Nos. 62 and 66). Many of these schools have become integrated by 
the changing housing patterns of Houston. (Tr., pp. 571-790). 
Numerous others have, however, become integrated because of the 
HISD's encouragement of tri-ethnic transfers and because of the 
magnet schools. There were only five one race white elementary 
schools in the District in 1978-79. (Ex. No. 64). At the present 
time there are only 2 such schools, and one of them, Briargrove, 
serves as a Cluster Center under the desegregation plan. (See 
Appendix "A"). In fact, the approved transfers for the 1982-83 
school year will result in a single one race white school 
(Ashford, located on the far western edge of the HISD) and rela­
tively few schools with over 35% or 50% white students. (See 
Appendix "B").

A number of formerly all white schools have become one race 
black schools. Each of these schools changed racial composition 
by virtue of housing patterns or other factors over which the HISD 
had no control. None of these schools became one race due to 
discriminatory acts by the HISD. (Tr., pp. 571-790).

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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The HISD has done all that is practicable to desegregate the 

schools. Its faithful implementation of the zoning plans and 
M-to-M transfers, approved by this Court, along with its initia­
tion of the Magnet School Plan, has significantly decreased the 
racial isolation in the HISD. The number of one race schools has 
been decreased greatly in spite of declining anglo enrollment.

The District Court correctly held that the remaining one race 
schools in the HISD are not vestiges of a former dual school 
system. The District Court also correctly held that even if the 
one race schools were vestiges, the implementation of the 
techniques mentioned in Swann is not practicable in the HISD 
because of a variety of factors.

The HISD's implementation of various educational programs 
assures equal access to educational opportunities as is the 
mandate of Erown.

The Original Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend their
Complaint and to Add Additional Parties comes too late. The
Original Plaintiffs waited to file their Motion, at the very 
least, more than three years after they were apprised that 
interdistrict transfers of black students occurred in Harris 
County. They waited over seven months after the the 1979 hearing 
concerning HISD's desegregation status to file their Motion. 
Indeed, they only sprang to life when it became apparent that HISD 
was a unitary school district. The belated attempt to avoid such 
a ruling, along with prejudice to the HISD, were sufficient 
reasons for the District Court to deny their Motions.

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ARGUMENT
I.

INTRODUCTION
twenty—six years, this desegregation case comes to this 

Court for a decision concerning whether the HISD has done all that 
is practicable to purge itself of the vestiges of its former dual 
school system. After considering the many actions voluntarily 
undertaken by the HISD to eradicate the vestiges of the dual 
system and provide equity of access to education, the many 
demographic changes in the HISD, and the attendant practical 
problems of implementing a desegregation plan in such a location, 
the District Court determined that the HISD is a unitary school 
district and has done all that is practicable to eliminate the 
vestiges of its former dual system.

II.
THE HISD IS A UNITARY SCHOOL DISTRICT

The Original Plaintiffs challenge only the student assignment 
portion of the District Court's Memorandum and Order of June 17, 
1981. No challenge is made of the District Court's findings 
concerning faculty assignment, transportation, extra curricula 
activities or facilities. Those issues will not, therefore, be 
addressed in this Brief. Suffice it to say that the District 
Court's findings are correct and supported by ample evidence.

The crux of the Original Plaintiffs' argument is that more 
racial mixing of students must be undertaken by the HISD. In 
Section I of their Brief, the Original Plaintiffs recite many

-15-



standards concerning student assignment which have been discussed 
in various contexts. The Original Plaintiffs conclude that the 
HISD is not unitary because it has not attempted to utilize all 
the student assignment techniques mentioned in Swann. (Brief for 
Appellants, p. 25, hereinafter "Brief").

The Original Plaintiffs' contention that utilization of 
pairing, rezoning, clustering, and/or cross-town busing is re­
quired is erroneous. Swann does not say that utilization of the 
techniques discussed is required; it merely says their utilization 
is permissible. To infer such an inflexible requirement is 
directly contrary to the long line of cases which hold that local 
conditions must be analyzed and considered in fashioning an ap­
propriate remedy because no two desegregation .cases are alike. 
Green v • County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 88 
S.Ct. 1689 (1968); Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 75 
S.Ct. 753 (1955) hereinafter "Brown II"); Quality Education for 
a11 Children, Inc, v. Board, 385 F.Supp. 803 (N.D.I11. 1974). As 
the Supreme Court has stated:

There is no universal answer to complex problems of 
desegregation; there is obviously no one plan that will 
do the job in every case. The matter must be addressed 
in light of the circumstances present and the options 
available in each instance. Green v. County School 
Board of New Kent County, supra, 391 U.S. at 439“! 88 
S.Ct. at 1695. ’

Accord, Swann, supra.

The Original Plaintiffs also cite Tasby v. Estes, 572 F.2d 
1010 (5th Cir. 1978) for the proposition that the techniques of 
Swann must be considered prior to a declaration of unitary status 
and that time and distance studies must be undertaken. First,

-15-



this Court had already remanded Tasby specifically for considera­
tion of the Swann techniques. Second, the general approach taken 
by this Court is that practicable alternatives must be examined if 
a substantial number of one race schools remain. No specific 
alternatives are mandated. Davis v . East Baton Rouge Parish 
SchoQl Board, 570 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1978), cert, denied, 439 
U.S. 1114, 99 S.Ct. 1016 (1979).

Notwithstanding the Original Plaintiffs' arguments, in the 
case sub judice there has been utilization of some of the Swann 
techniques and a great deal of consideration given to possible 
utilization of other Swann techniques by both the HISD and the 
District Court. As will be more fully discussed later, the tech­
niques of rezoning, pairing and clustering have been utilized in 
the HISD; and these and other techniques such as non-contiguous 
pairing and further mandatory transfers have been considered by 
the HISD and the District Court on several occasions. The 
uncontroverted and extensive evidence submitted to the District 
Court in 1979 supports its finding that further expansion of such 
techniques are not practicable in the HISD. Never in the past 
decade have the Original Plaintiffs asked for any modifications in 
the present desegregation plan, and never have they made any 
proposals for improvement or modification of the plan. In fact, 
at the hearing held in 1979, the Original Plaintiffs presented not 
one shred of evidence that the HISD was not unitary or that 
utilization of other student assignment methods was practicable. 
In contrast, the HISD made a lengthy presentation and submitted 
overwhelming evidence that unitary status had been achieved.

-17-



The several cases cited by the Original Plaintiffs regarding 
utilization of various tools such as pairing (Brief, p. 24) are in 
no way relevant to this case because those cases all involve 
school districts that are much smaller than the HISD, have dif­
ferent demographics and mobility rates than the HISD, and involve 
vastly different circumstances and problems.

In constructing a unitary school system, it is not required 
that there be a racial balance in all of the schools. Swann v. 
Charlotte Mecklenburg Board of Education, supra, 402 U.S. at 24, 
91 S.Ct. at 1280; Horton v . Lawrence County Board of Education, 
578 F .2d 147 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Board of Education 
of Valdosta, Georgia, 576 F.2d 37 (5th Cir. 1978), cert, denied, 
439 U.S. 1007, 99 S.Ct. 622 (1977).

The United States Supreme Court has recognized that difficult 
problems may exist in "metropolitan areas with dense and shifting 
population, numerous schools, congested and complex traffic 
patterns." Swann, supra, 402 U.S. at 14, 91 S.Ct. at 1275 . The 
Court has also observed that in "metropolitan areas minority 
groups are often found concentrated in one part of the city", and 
"certain schools may remain all or largely of one one race until 
new schools can be provided or neighborhood patterns change." 
Swann, supra, 402 U.S. at 25, 91 S.Ct at 1280, 1281.

Where the presence of one race schools is due to factors such 
as changing housing patterns, the school district is not respon­
sible for integration or desegregation of those schools. Horton 
Xjl Lawrence County Board of Education, supra. Even in former dual 
systems, one race schools may remain if the district explains that

-18-



r~!

their composition is not the result of action by the school 
district or if nothing practicable can be done to integrate them. 
Swann, supra, 402 U.S. at 26, 91 S.Ct. at 1281. A school district 
also cannot be required to rearrange its attendance boundaries 
each year to ensure a particular racial balance in the schools. 
Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 , 96
S.Ct. 2697 (1976); Horton v.

LJ supra.

1 A. The Remaining One Race
1 j Formerly Dual System

The Original Plaintiffs begin their argument with conclusory 
allegations regarding the number of black students in HISD attend­
ing 90% minority schools and the number of one race black schools 
in the HISD. (Brief, p. 26). The Original Plaintiffs then claim 
that the HISD argued that white flight was the cause of the 
"continuing existence of previous patterns of racial segregation" 
in the HISD. (Brief, p. 26). From these premises, the Original 
Plaintiffs argue that the HISD has not done all it can reasonably 
do to reduce the number of one race schools.

First, the Original Plaintiffs reference no portion of the 
Record to support their allegation that the HISD made such a white 
flight argument. There is no such reference because no such 
argument was made by the HISD. In fact, Mr. Billy Reagan, General 
Superintendent, testified at length that the present composition 
of the HISD was due in large part, not to white flight, but to 
differences in birth rates. (1978 Tr. , pp. 37 , 207-215). While 
the Original Plaintiffs might like the Record to reflect that HISD

-19-



case.made such a white flight argument, that is simply not the 
The District Court, likewise, did not "adopt" this view.

Second, the Original Plaintiffs' arguments regarding the 
numbers of minority students in one race schools is neither 
relevant nor helpful in discussing the issues. In citing con- 
clusory figures to bolster their total lack of evidence before the 
District Court, the Original Plaintiffs ignore the hundreds of 
pages of testimony and many exhibits which explain the composition 
of HISD's schools and why some of them remain one race.

The District Court specifically found that the "one race 
schools remaining in the HISD are not vestiges of the dual sys­
tem." (R. No. 818, p. 30) . This finding is supported by the 
Record. The testimony of Mr. John Eaton, Assistant Superintendent 
for Administrative Services, traced in great detail the historical 
evolution of Houston housing patterns, in several cases beginning 
in the 1830's. (Tr., pp. 488-505). His testimony delineated a
long history of certain heavy concentrations of black and Mexican- 
American residents within HISD and the City of Houston. A review 
of that testimony, given in conjunction with Exhibit 34, substan­
tiates that the former black schools (under the dual system) which 
have remained predominantly black are located in virtually all 
black areas which have become much larger and that the schools 
which have changed from predominantly white to predominantly black 
are located in areas of the HISD which have had a change in 
housing patterns.

The HISD also presented this evidence in the form of maps 
(Ex. 35-50) and school profiles (Ex. Nos. 54 a-d, 55 and 56)

-20-



prepared by Mr. Lon Wheeler, Executive Director of Pupil Transfer. 
The maps depict the changes in housing and attendance patterns 
which have occurred in the HISD since 1968-69 (Tr., pp. 520-550). 
The school profiles furnish a detailed history of attendance at 
each school by ethnicity, indicate whether the court projections 
of 1970 were met and why, and explain the reasons each school is 
one race or integrated. (Tr. , pp. 571-790; Ex. Nos. 54 a-d, 55, 
and 56).

All of the 21 schools cited by the Original Plaintiffs as 
being all black schools since 1960 are explained by the evidence 
presented by the HISD. Fourteen of those schools, Dunbar, Easter, 
Fairchild, Grimes, Highland Heights, Rhodes, Sanderson, Wesley, 
Key, Ryan, E. 0. Smith, Kashmere, Worthing and Yates, were rezoned 
or paired in 1970 and were projected to be desegregated on a 
bi-racial basis. 317 F.Supp. at 528 , 529; 434 F.2d at 1148. 
Eight of the schools, Blackshear, Clinton Park, Douglass, 
Langston, Reynolds, Sunnyside, and Whidby, were projected by this 
Court to remain virtually all black. 434 F.2d at 1148.

testimony of Messrs. Eaton and Wheeler establishes that 
all of the 21 schools questioned by the Original Plaintiffs are 
now located in all black areas of the City. (Tr. , pp. 571-790; 
Ex. Nos. 54a, 54b, 54c, 54d). The present racial makeup of these 
schools, then, is not the result of -the former dual system, but is 
due to the concentration of the black population in certain areas 
of the HISD. The testimony of Messrs. Eaton and Wheeler explains 
that many of the remaining one race black schools were at one time 
integrated or projected to be integrated, but all are now one race

-21-



because of housing patterns. (Tr. , pp. 571-790; Ex. Nos. 54 a-d, 
55, and 56).

The District Court specifically found that HISD did every­
thing practical to insure that students attended their assigned 
schools. (R. No. 818, p. 27). The pairings simply did not work 
because the anglo students (and many Hispanics) went to private 
schools, moved to other districts, or simply did not go to school. 
(Tr., pp. 1456, 1457, 1976; R. No. 818, p. 25).

Dr. Barton Smith, a professor of economics at the University 
of Houston, also testified concerning his study of the changes in 
the geographic distribution of the black and Hispanic population 
within the HISD. (Tr., pp. 1135-1397). His study (HISD Ex. No. 
70) and testimony corroborates Messrs. Eaton and Wheeler's tes­
timony. Among Dr. Smith's conclusions were the following:

Clearly most areas within the Houston Independent School 
District are now at least partially integrated due to 
significant improvements in minority access to housing 
throughout the district . . .

. . . areas of Black and Hispanic concentration appear
to cross with a major north-south Black corridor and and 
east-west Hispanic corridor that intersects approxi­
mately at the CBD [central business district] . This 
means that many schools are apt to have significantly 
less than 90% Blacks or Hispanics, but over 90% minori­
ties (both Black and Hispanic) . . . traditional minori­
ty areas appear to be becoming more concentrated and 
consolidated. The latter phenomenon means that simply 
because of the demographic changes that are occurring 
more minority dominated (one race) schools may emerge 
■ while at the same time all White/ Non-Hispanic schools 
are gradually disappearing completely. (Ex. No. 70, pp.
25-27). ^

Mr. Eaton also testified that there was no factor that contained
any racial or ethnic group in any area of the HISD. (Tr., p. 497).

-22-



of this evidence was in no way contradicted or questioned 
by any party. The Original Plaintiffs introduced no evidence at 
the 1979 Hearing. In fact, the Original Plaintiffs did not even 
attempt to challenge these facts in their Brief to this Court. 
Instead, they attempt to obfuscate the issues by misstating the 
HISD position.

Since the remaining one race schools are not vestiges of the 
former dual system, there is no legal requirement for further 
actions with respect to those schools. Swann, supra; Horton v. 
Lawrence County Board of Education, supra.
B. The HISD Has Taken All Practicable Steps to Deseareaate the

Schools -------------2-------

Even if the District Court had found that some of the re­
maining one race schools in the HISD were vestiges of the former 
dual system, it also found that further actions to eliminate some 
or all of the one race schools would not be practicable. The 
Original Plaintiffs' complaint, however, is that all the 
techniques mentioned in Swann have not been utilized in HISD and 
that the reasons for not utilizing them are inadequate. The
Original Plaintiffs' factual assumptions and assertions, however, 
as well as their legal analysis, are simply incorrect.

First, there is no requirement in Swann that all of the 
techniques discussed in the case be utilized in any particular 
case. Practicable and realistic steps must be taken. Davis v. 
Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County, 402 U.S. 33, 91 
S.Ct. 1289 (1971). As this Court stated in upholding the deter­
mination that Atlanta had become a unitary school district:

-23-



It would blink reality and authority, however, to hold 
the Atlanta School System to be nonunitary because 
further racial integration is theoretically possible and 
we expressly decline to do so.

Calhoun v̂ _ Cook, 525 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir. 1973) .

Second, as was previously stated, the utilization of the
various techniques discussed in Swann, and now proposed by the

Plaintiffs, has, in fact, occurred and has been
considered on several other occasions. The first occasion was
during the development of the 1970 Court Order. The initial plan
proposed by the Original Plaintiffs was one which would have
attempted to place a set ratio of white students in each of the
schools and would have required massive cross-town busing. This
plan was rejected by the District Court. Ross v. Eckels, 317 F.
Supp. 512 (S.D. Tex. 1970). (See pp. 515 and 516 for the District
Court's discussion of the practical problems of this approach.)
This Court also rejected the Original Plaintiffs' proposal and
ordered the pairing of 24 elementary schools. This Court
implicitly determined that these pairings, along with a geographic
capacity plan at the secondary level, which still left 15
virtually all black elementary schools and many one-race white
schools, were the only practicable additions to the District
Court's implementation of an equi-distant zoning plan. Ross v.
Eckels, 434 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir. 1970) (See pp. 1147-48).

Due in large part to the rapid changes in residential 
patterns which occurred after this Court's 1970 decision, the 
P^itings of the 24 elementary schools in 1971 resulted largely in 
the pairing of minority students. (Tr., pp. 1456, 1456, 1976).

-24-



The pairings did not significantly reduce the amount of racial 
isolation in the HISD. Accordingly, in 1975, the HISD established 
a task force of community and school people to examine possible 
alternatives to the pairings and to examine other means of 
increasing integration. This task force spent many hours studying 
various possibilities. The task force was given a review of the 
various techniques of desegregation - specifically including 
Pa-f r-f / both contiguous and non—contiguous, and clustering — by 
Mr. Kelly Frels, one of the HISD's attorneys. (Tr., p. 1741; HTA, 
Exhibit 12) . Other cities were visited and many other plans 
studied. (R. No. 361). Mr. Billy Reagan, who instituted the task 
force in late 1974, related that:

. . . after the task force started functioning in 
November that sometime in mid-December Mr. Frels did 
present the task force a detailed briefing on alter­
natives and the way the alternatives would have to 
function. And those alternatives included additional 
pairing, additional zoning, and the different types of 
remedies that were available that could be submitted to 
the ̂ Court as an alternative . . . the task force did 
deliberate on a number of issues, and their recom­
mendations reflect that they deliberated on a number of 
alternatives. And I do know that they did visit, I 
guess, eight or ten other school systems in the country, 
Atlanta, Memphis, I believe, San Francisco, Chicago, 
Cleveland, and the school systems - large metropolitan 
school systems or metropolitan areas that had either 
undergone or were attempting to undergo some sort of 
desegregation plan. (Tr., p. 1741).

After all of these actions were taken, it was determined that 
the magnet school concept had the promise of being the most 
successful and beneficial. A hearing was held before the District 
Court in 1975 concerning this proposal, but, for whatever reason, 
the Original Plaintiffs and their counsel, Mr. Weldon Berry, did 
not attend that hearing. (Another attorney attended for a short

-25-



time and informed the Court that the Original Plaintiffs did not 
oppose the plan). After the hearing, the District Court approved 
the depairing of the 24 schools and the implementation of the 
Magnet School Plan. (R. No. 371).

The use of the techniques mentioned in Swann was again 
considered by the District Court in its Order of July 17, 1981.
The Original Plaintiffs presented no evidence whatsoever to rebut 
the HISD's presentation and offered no proposed plan or any 
further practicable steps which could be undertaken. The District 

correctly analyzed the possible use of the Swann techniques 
and, because of their impracticability, rejected them.

While the Original Plaintiffs highlight the fact that 70% of 
the black students attend 90% minority schools, they themselves 
show that the number of 90% black schools has decreased since 
1969-70 from 66 to 55 and the percentage of black students attend­
ing 90% black schools has decreased from 70% to 56%. (Brief, 
pp. 19, 20). This progress has occurred in spite of the fact that 
the percentages of black and Hispanic students attending the HISD 
has increased dramatically since 1969-70. In 1969-70, the anglo 
percentage was approximately 53% (1978 Ex. No. 6) , and for the
1981-82 school year, the percentage of anglo or other students in 
the HISD is .only 26 percent. (See Appendix "A").

The Original Plaintiffs contend that the District Court did 
not make specific findings regarding the practicability of other 
desegregation techniques (Brief, p. 26). Apparently they did not 
read pages 20 through 32 of the District Court's June 17, 1981
Order, wherein the Court explains in great detail why further

-26-



court intervention would be impracticable. Those findings are 
supported by the voluminous amounts of uncontroverted evidence
submitted by the HISD.

%
In its findings, the District Court first stated that the 

demographic makeup of the HISD has changed substantially since the 
implementation of the 1970 Court Order and that the number of one 
race schools has been reduced considerably since that time. The 
Court went on to cite testimony from various witnesses regarding 
the problems associated with the suggestions of pairing or other 
similar possibilities. For example, Mr. Billy R. Reagan testified 
in the 1979 hearing that pairing of schools had previously been 
tried and had failed. (Tr., pp. 1773-74). "Knowing what I know", 
Mr. Reagan said, " [to advise the Court to] to create a pairing 
situation, I would consider myself to be guilty of malpractice in 
education... I think that folly would prove totally disastrous.
I think you would have the same results that you had in our first 
experiment with pairing." (Tr., pp. 1772-1774). Mr. Joseph

/ Superintendent for Area Administration, also so testified. 
(Tr., pp. 1456, 1457).

The housing pattern maps (Ex. Nos. 35-50) show and the 
District Court found that, because of the natural integration 
which has occurred in many areas of the HISD (R. No. 818, p. 24), 
the schools which would need to be paired are those on the extreme 
western and eastern ends of the HISD (i.e. , some of the schools 
depicted on the time and distance studies). Otherwise, naturally 
integrated schools would be disturbed. The need for and 
desirability of not disturbing desegregated schools has been

-27-



recognized by the courts. United States v. Board of School 
Commissioners, 506 F.Supp. 657 (N.D. Ind. 1979) aff'd in part, 637 
F• 2d 1011 (7th Circ. 1980); Tasby v. Wright, 520 F.Supp. 683 , 705 
(N.D. Tex. 1981). The United States' witness, Dr. Gary Orfield, 
testified that already desegregated schools should generally not 
be disturbed. (Tr. , p. 2245) . He even went on to assert his 
belief that "pairing adjacent schools is a very misguided policy." 
(Tr., p. 2256) .

The Original Plaintiffs also contend that no time and dis­
tance studies were undertaken. As with many of their arguments, 
this is erroneous. At the September 29, 1978, hearing, several 
specific examples of the time and distance of representative runs 
throughout the HISD were analyzed and explained. (1978 Ex. 
Nos. 21-26A; 1978 Tr. , pp. 86-99). These representative studies 
show, as the District Court found, that the travel time between 
those areas in the central and east ends of the HISD and the west 
end of the HISD is considerable.

Mr. Reagan also testified that "due to the fantastic increase 
in congestion in the city, that we are extending our time about 15 
to 17 minutes per [bus] route per year." (1978 Tr. , p. 99). He 
went on to state that "transportation is the number one concern of 
the parent in terms of the time and the distance" and that "our 
number one complaint about our magnet program, and also our M to 
M... is transportation." (1978 Tr., p. 91). Since this testimony 
and these exhibits are damaging to their case, the Original 
Plaintiffs have valiantly tried to ignore them. They cannot,

-28-



however, be ignored, and they support the District Court's 
findings.

Citing the testimony of Dr. Gary Orfield, a witness for the 
United States, the Original Plaintiffs allege that there was 
"ample credible evidence" that other desegregation tools could 
work. (Brief, pp. 28, 29). Dr. Orfield, however, based his bald 
assertion that "more could be accomplished" in HISD on an 
admittedly incomplete and cursory review of pupil enrollment 
statistics. He admitted that he had not fully studied the HISD's 
case and was in no position to propose a plan for the HISD (Tr. , 
p. 2300, 2360, 2377). He admitted that his comparison of several 
other districts utilizing magnet schools with the HISD was not
relevant to the HISD's situation. (Tr., p. 2380). He admitted
that it was impossible to desegregate all of the HISD schools to a 
level he would consider adequate. (Tr., p. 2310, 2320). He 
admitted that he did not know the pupil assignment requirements of 
the HISD and stated that "You [HISD] may have a freedom of choice 
plan for all I know." (Tr., p. 2372). Dr. Orfield admitted that 
the comparative study he utilized to claim that HISD's 
desegregation efforts were not successful was not a comprehensive 
study and included many school districts with dramatically 
different demographics and problems than the HISD. (Tr., 
pp. 2376-2382). In short, Dr. Orfield's testimony was, in the
words of one of the court appointed counsel for the children in 
the HISD, like that of "the man that was passing the funeral. He 
didn't know the deceased, but decided to stop and say a few words 
anyway." (Tr., p. 2257).

-29-



Dr. Orfield's testimony gave no support for the development 
of any mandatory pairing or other such plan. It was based on an 
incomplete review of numbers and reflects an academician's theo­
retical hope and desire for greater racial mixing of students. A 
review of his testimony makes it eminently clear that Dr. Orfield 
has a personal desire to mix students, whether or not it is 
legally necessary or practicable and with no regard for the 
educational consequences. Problems of implementation and the 
possibility of resegregation apparently do not concern him. In 
summary, his testimony does not support the Original Plaintiffs' 
argument that more can be done. Even if Dr. Orfield's ideas 
concerning his optimum desegregation levels - 50% white and 50% 
minority - were attempted, the impact on the HISD would be 
negligible, if not harmful. (Ex. No. 114).

The Original Plaintiffs seek to bolster the paucity of 
evidence supporting their position by referring to a "study" done 
by Mark Smylie of Vanderbilt University (Brief, p. 29) . The 
Original Plaintiffs did not see fit to produce this person as a 
witness at trial and subject him to cross examination, and this 
belated attempt to introduce evidence should be ignored. Even a 
cursory review of the "study", however, shows it to be an invalid 
exercise. The study asserts that the implementation year of the 
KISD's desegregation plan (1970) was 1980. Given such a funda­
mental error in the premise of the "study", any "conclusions" made 
by the study are incorrect and irrelevant.

The Original Plaintiffs also argue that concern over white 
flight is not a valid reason for not pursuing their desired, but

-30-



unspecified, mandatory plan of mixing of students. Once again,
the Original Plaintiffs do not correctly state either the law or
the HISD's position. This Court has, of course, held that while
concern over white flight cannot be used to avoid desegregation,
consideration of ways to minimize white boycotts and of the
problem of resegregation are valid factors to consider when trying
to analyze various acceptable alternatives. Stout v . Jefferson
County Board of Education, 537 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1976).

In the case sub judice the District Court specifically found
that the use of other techniques, such as non-contiguous pairing,
would be counterproductive to desegregation efforts. (R. No. 818,
pp. 23-27). The HISD presented significant evidence concerning
this very real problem. (Tr., p. 977, 1457,. 1716, 1771-1779,
1976 , 1977 , 2852-2854; Ex. No. 70) . Instead of analyzing the
HISD s case correctly or making any evidentiary presentation, the
Original Plaintiffs sat mute at the 1979 hearings and now seek to
make a case by citing a plethora of platitudes which have no
bearing on the HISD's situation.

The Atlanta case is very similar to this one. In Atlanta a
plan was approved by this Court and the school system declared
unitary in spite of the fact that many of the techniques of Swann
had not been used. This Court stated:

Appellants^ urge that existing precedent will not allow 
us to affirm this adjudication of unitary status to a 
school district which has never utilized noncontinuous 
pairing, has never bussed white children into pre­
dominant black schools and in which over 60% of its 
schools are all— or substantially all— black. These
contentions appear to be supported by substantial 
precedent. However, for today and in Atlanta, the 
unique features of this district distinguish every prior

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school case pronouncement. . . . The district court also 
found that Atlanta's remaining one-race schools are the 
product of its preponderant majority of black pupils 
rather than a vestige of past segregation. These 
findings are not clearly erroneous. The aim of the 
Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection on 
which this litigation is based is to assure that state 
supported educational opportunity is afforded without 
regard to race; it is not to achieve racial integration 
in public schools. (Citations omitted.) Conditions in 
most school districts have frequently caused courts to 
treat these aims as identical. In Atlanta, where white 
students now comprise a small minority and black citi­
zens can control school policy, administration and 
staffing, they no longer are. See Swann v. Charlotte- 
Mecklenburq Board of Education (Part V) , 402 uTs-: T “at 
122, 91 S.Ct. 1267 at 1279, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 at 570 
(1971). Calhoun v. Cook, 522 F.2d 717,719 (5th Cir. 1975). ~ ----

In approving a desegregation plan which allowed many one 
race schools to remain, an Alabama district court found that 
the one race schools were located "deep in black residential 
areas." Carr v. Montgomery County Board of Education, 377 
F.Supp. 1123 , 1132 (M.D. Ala. 1974), aff'd, 511 F.2d 1374 
(5th Cir. 1975), cert, denied, 423 U.S. 986 , 96 S.Ct. 394 
(1975). Since the schools continued to exist without any 
discriminatory actions by the school district, the plan was 
approved. The court found that the one race schools could 
not be practically and workably desegregated. The court 
emphasized that the system as a_ whole is to be examined to 
determine whether it is unitary - "individual schools are not 
looked to for that purpose." 377 F.Supp. at 1138. The Carr 
court went on to find that the six indicia of a unitary 
school district - faculty, staff, transportation, extracur­
ricular activities, facilities, and student body — were met.

-32-



It is, then, not surprising that in their Brief the 
Orig'inal Plaintiffs completely ignored the issue of 
educational opportunities in the HISD. Since access to equal 
educational opportunities was at the heart of Brown I, the 
HISD feels the issue is of major importance. The Original 
Plaintiffs apparently do not. The Original Plaintiffs' 
counsel, Mr. Weldon Berry, clearly enunciated their lack of 
concern about the quality of education several times during 
the 1979 hearing. At one point, Mr. Berry alluded to the 
fact that if the HISD had somehow "properly" mixed students, 
the District Court would not have to listen to "the avalanche 
of statistical data regarding the quality of your educational 
program." (Tr., p. 2099). In response to this observation, 
Judge Robert O'Conor stated: "This Court is interested in 
the quality of education." (Tr., p. 2099).

Ift its Order, the District Court found that the academic 
achievement of- HISD students had greatly improved "due to the 
importance the District attaches to providing equal access to 
quality education." (R. No. 818, p. 30) . The evidence 
presented by the HISD proves this point. Mr. Reagan 
testified at length concerning the implementation of the 
Basic Skills Program (1978 Tr. , p. 65; Tr., p. 1802), the 
formation of Operation Fail Safe (Tr., pp. 1828-1834; HISD 
Ex. Nos. 86-88), the monitoring programs to measure student 
achievement (1978 Tr. , pp. 51-56; Tr. , pp. 1900-1910; HISD 
Ex. Nos. 99-101) , expenditures per pupil at various schools 
(Tr., pp. 1785-87; Childrens' Ex. Nos. 1 and 2), diagnostic

-33-



reading programs (Tr. , p. 1807), efforts to increase student 
attendance (Tr., pp. 1808-1820; HISD Ex. No. 83 and 84), the 
Schools Facility Improvement Program, a $300 million dollar 
effort (1978 Tr. , pp. 99-158; Tr., pp. 1720-1730), evaluation 
of faculty members, (Tr., pp. 1870-1880; Ex. Nos. 92 and 93), 
achievement score improvements (Ex. 103), the development of 
fundamental schools (Tr., pp. 1940-1942), and socioeconomic 
factors affecting achievement (Tr., p. 1914).

Mr. Larry Marshall, Deputy Superintendent for 
Alternative Education, testified at length concerning various 
educational components which have been developed for all 
student and specifically for minority students. (Tr., p. 
1498-1605). Ms. Faye Bryant, Assistant Superintendent for 
Magnet Schools, testified about their development and their 
educational components. (Tr., pp. 942-1134). Mr. Angle 
testified about the implementation of the Second Mile Plan 
designed to stabilize faculties at schools with high turnover 
rates, and about the factors which have led to the HISD's 
reaching unitary status. (Tr., pp. 1398-1497).

While the Original Plaintiffs evince no interest in the 
educational quality of the HISD's programs, it has been held 
that remedial educational programs may be ordered by the 
courts as part of a desegregation plan in order to ' help 
remedy the past vestiges of segregation and to provide equal 
educational opportunities. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 
267, 97 S.Ct. 2749 (1977); Plaquemines Parish School Board v. 
United States, 415 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1969). In the case sub

-34-



judice, the District Court has not had to order the HISD to
develop these various programs. The HISD has undertaken them 
voluntarily in an effort to assure equal educational 
opportunities for all students.

A recent law review article by a prominent black law 
professor, Derrick Bell, is instructive of the need to 
consider the quality of education. Professor Bell notes that 
the usual remedies in major school cases have not guaranteed 
black children a better education than in pre-Brown days. He 
goes on to observe:

This approach to the implementation of Brown, however, 
has become increasingly ineffective; indeed, it has in 
some cases been educationally destructive. A preferable 
method is to focus on obtaining real educational effec­
tiveness which may entail the improvement of presently 
desegregated schools. . . .
. . . But successful magnet schools may provide a lesson 
that effective schools for blacks must be a primary goal 
rather than a secondary result of integration. . . .
If the decision [Brown] . . .  is to remain viable, those 
who rely on it must exhibit the dynamic awareness of all 
the legal and political considerations that influenced 
those who wrote it.

Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest - Conver­
gence Dilemma, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 518, 530-533 (1980).

The development of a quality integrated educational 
program has been achieved in the HISD, a large, urban school 
district, in spite of the fact that the demographics have 
changed dramatically, in spite of the high mobility rate of 
students, in spite of those who would dissect the district 
along racial lines, and in spite of all the outside forces 
which mitigate against such an achievement. The

-35-



accomplishments of the HISD have been made without prodding 
by the courts because of a real commitment to providing a 
quality education available to all students and to doing all 
that is practicable to provide an integrated environment. 
Silent for almost ten years, the Original Plaintiffs, armed 
with no evidence, ask this Court to cavalierly ignore the 
facts of the case, the work of the HISD, and the
practicalities of the situation in order to make a futile and 
counterproductive attempt at the forced mixing of students.
The Constitution does not require such futile and damaging 
efforts and neither should this Court.

III.
THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN DENYING THE APPELLANTS' 
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND AND TO ADD ADDITIONAL PARTIES

The Original Plaintiffs have several complaints regarding the 
District Court's denial of their Motion for Leave to Amend their 
Complaint to add additional parties. As with their analysis of
the unitary status issue, the Original Plaintiffs once again
incorrectly analyze the law and seek to divert attention from 
their own lack of diligence.

The Original Plaintiffs initially make several general
statements regarding their belated motion. The Original 
Plaintiffs' reference to the language of Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 
178, 83 S.Ct. 227 (1962), on page 34 of their Brief, is misleading 

inappropriate. The Original Plaintiffs' attempt to convince 
this Court that their failure to timely seek leave to file an

-36-



Amended Complaint is a mere "technicality" or "misstep" is pure 
sophistry designed to bolster an untenable position.

The Original Plaintiffs' assertion, in footnote 7, that 
Calhoun v\ Cook, supra, 522 F.2d 717 (5th Cir. 1975), stands for 
the proposition that it would be error to declare the HISD unitary 
if an interdistrict case was pending, is incorrect. In Calhoun, 
this Court made no such finding, but merely stated that final 
dismissal of the case would be postponed until the metropolitan 
case was resolved. In the case sub judice, the District Court has 
decreed that it would retain jurisdiction of the case for at least 
three years.

The Original Plaintiffs next allege that the District Court's 
denial is "unprecedented" and that no court has refused to hear a 
request for an interdistrict plan. Such a seemingly profound 
observation is merely hollow rhetoric, is, in fact, ‘incorrect, 
adds nothing helpful to the analysis of this issue, and is ap­
parently being utilized in an attempt to avoid the fact that the 
Original Plaintiffs simply did not act with required diligence. 
See, Adams v̂ _ United States, 620 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. 
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 101 S.Ct. 88 (1980).

A - The District Court Properly Denied the Original Plaintiffs'
Motion for Leave to Amend Their Complaint
On June 10, 1980, the Original Plaintiffs sought leave of the 

District Court to amend their Complaint, pursuant to Rule 15, 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to allege inter-district segre­
gation of school children in metropolitan Houston. The Original 
Plaintiffs first complain that their Motion was denied "without a

-37-



hearing or even time for movants to respond to procedural objec­
tions." There is, however, no requirement that there be a hearing 
for this type of Motion. In fact, the Local Rules of the Southern 
District of Texas specifically provide that a hearing will be held 
only if one is requested by a party or the court. (See 
Appendix "C"). No such request was made by the Original Plain­
tiffs. There is also no provision requiring that the movants be 
allowed a response to any opposition, but the Original Plaintiffs 
got such a chance through their later Motion to Alter or Amend the 
District Court's decision. (R. No. 808).

The grant or denial of leave to amend is committed to the 
discretion of the trial court. Zenith Radio Corporation v. 
Hazeltine Research, Inc. , 401 U.S.321, 91 S.Ct. 795 (1971); Foman 
v. Davis, supra. On appeal, therefore, review of the lower 
court's decision concerns whether the trial court abused that 
discretion. Harkless v . Sweeny Independent School District, 554 
F.2d 1353 (5th Cir. 1977).

In support of their request for leave to amend, the Original 
Plaintiffs did no more than recite the statement in Rule 15 (a) 
that leave to amend "shall freely be given when justice so re­
quires." It must, however, be remembered that the proviso:

... necessarily implies justice to both parties. Thus, 
the Court must "examine the effect and timing of the 
proposed amendments ... to determine whether they would 
prejudice the rights of ... the other part[y] to the 
suit." 6 C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice & 
Procedure §1484, at 420 (1971). Pollux Marine Agencies 
Inc. v. Louis Dreyfus Corporation, 455 F.Supp. 211. 215 
(S.D. N.Y. 1978).

-38-



Accord, Hall v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 617 F.2d 1108 (5th 
Cir. 1980).

The prejudice to the other party which will lead to a denial 
of a motion to amend includes: when new and extensive discovery 
will be needed, when the amendment would cause undue delay in the 
final disposition of the case, when new parties and new causes of 
action are added, or when the party seeking amendment has known 
about the issues it seeks to raise, but has unduly delayed in 
amending its pleadings. A^ Cherney Disposal Co. v. Chicago and 
Suburban Refuse Disposal Co. , 68 F.R.D. 383 (N.D. 111. 1975) ,
rev'd 9 R  other grounds, 484 F.2d 751 (7th Cir. 1973), cert, 
denied, 414 U.S. 1131, 94 S.Ct. 820 (1974); County of Marin v̂ _
United States, 150 F.Supp. 619 (N.D. Cal. 1957), rev'd on other
grounds, 356 U.S. 412, 78 S.Ct. 880 (1958); See, Foman v^ Davis,
supra.

This Court considered a defendant's request for leave to 
amend which was filed after summary judgment was entered against 

in Freeman v. Continental Gin Company, 381 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 
1967). In discussing Rule 15(a), this Court stated:

As this court has observed before, this "is not a 
mechanical absolute and the circumstances and terms upon 
which such leave is to be 'freely given' is committed to 
the informed, careful judgment and discretion of the 
Trial Judge . . . [citation omitted] . . . Where the
trial court has had a reason for refusing to allow 
amendment, this court has left its action undisturbed, 
[citations omitted] 381 F.2d at 468. (emphasis added)
The Original Plaintiffs argue that the District Court's

findings of undue delay and prejudice to the HISD are unsupported
and that the decision is an abuse of discretion. (Brief, p. 36).

-39-



The Original Plaintiffs also argue that the District Court did not 
adequately allow them to explain their delay, that it allegedly 
did not consider their "uncontradicted" affidavit, and that their 
affidavit evidence was ignored. (Brief, p. 37) . The contention 
that the affidavit by Mr. Weldon Berry, Attorney for the 
Plaintiffs, was • uncontroverted is a patent falsity. The HISD's 
Opposition to the Original Plaintiffs' Motion to Alter or Amend 
incorporates by reference its Opposition to the United States' 
Motion to Alter or Amend which contains an affidavit by Mr. Kelly 
F.rels substantiating that Mr. Frels discussed the issue of the 
transfer of black students from the Spring Branch Independent 
School District to other school districts with Mr. Berry on June 
8, 1977, a full three years before the Original Plaintiffs' Motion 
was filed. (R. No. 812, Affidavit by Kelly Frels). The Original 
Plaintiffs contention that it was May 13, 1980, before they knew 
of the existence of alleged interdistrict violations, therefore, 
cannot stand.

The appellants also blame the HISD's refusal to turn over the 
results of its interdistrict investigation for any delay. The 
Original Plaintiffs did not even ask for the results and chose not 
to file a motion to produce. Furthermore, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure contain no rule which requires that a party
prepare a potential adversary's case. The same information
reviewed by the KISD was available to the Original Plaintiffs;
they simply chose not to go look at the records.

The Freeman court, in discussing the various reasons which 
justify the denial of leave to amend, stated:

-40-



It is clear that lack of diligence is reason for 
refusing to permit amendment . . .

The motion to amend in this case was made more than 
three years after the events in question had occurred.
It was made fourteen months after the filing of 
Freeman's original answer . . . and more than eight 
months after the court had granted summary judgment. . .

A busy district court need not allow itself to be 
imposed upon by the presentation of theories seriative. 
Liberality in amendment is important to assure a party a 
fair opportunity to present his claims and defenses, but 
"equal attention should be given to the proposition that 
there must be an end finally to a particular litiga­
tion." [citation omitted] 381 F.2d at 469.
In Ladwig v . Travelers Insurance Company, 254 F.2d 840 (5th 

d r . 1958), this Court upheld the denial of leave to amend after 
trial and said:

• • • it is sufficient to say that in denying plain­
tiff's request, presented nearly four years after the 
claimed accident occurred and after the trial on an 
entirely different theory had been fully completed, the 
court used, he did not abuse, his discretion in refusing 
plaintiff's request for . . .  an opportunity to later 
retry the case on entirely new pleadings. 254 F.2d at 842.

Leave to amend is routinely denied where there has been 
unjustified and undue delay. Lamar v. American Finance System of 
-Fulton County, Inc. , 577 F.2d 953 (5th Cir. 1978); Dunn v^
Koehring Company, 546 F.2d 1193 (5th Cir. 1977); Reisner v^ 
General Motors Corporation, 511 F.Supp. 1167 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Sims 
v. Mack Truck Corporation, 488 F.Supp. 592 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Zucker 
v. Sable, 426 F.Supp. 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Data Digests, Inc, v^ 
Standard ^ Poor's Corporation, 57 F.R.D. 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1972);
Beloit Corporation v. Kusters, 13 F.R. Serv.2d 174 (S.D.N.Y.
1969) .

-41-



In Daves v. Payless Cashways, m e . , 661 F.2d 1022, 1025 (5th
Cir. 1981), this Court upheld the denial of leave to amend filed
on the eve of trial and stated:

At some point in the course of litigation, an 
unjustified delay preceding a motion to amend goes 
beyond excusable neglect, even when there is no evidence 
of bad faith or delatory motive. Liberality in pleading 
does not bestow on a litigant the privilege of 
neglecting her case for a long period of time.
(citations omitted).

Likewise, in Conklin v . Joseph C. Hofgesang Sand Company, 
_Inc_;_, 565 F .2d 405, 407 (6th Cir. 1977) , the court, in denying 
leave to amend an answer to allege a statutory exemption after 
trial, observed:

The ̂ chronology of the case shows clearly the undue 
dilitoriness of the defendant, and, as the trial judge 
noted in his memorandum opinion, it was clear that 
defendant's attorney had failed to investigate the 
matter or do any legal research thereon until after the 
hearing.

The delay in the case sub .judice is unjustified and undue. 
At least by June 8, 1977, the Original Plaintiffs' attorney was 
apprised of transfers of black students in Spring Branch. (R. 
Nos. 812, 813). In 1978, the District Court ordered a submission 
by the Department of Justice concerning legal authorities relating 
to interdistrict relief. (R. No. 709). Mr. Robert Hall, attorney 
for the HTA, made a presentation to the District Court in 
April 27 , 1978 , in which he argued that there was need for a
metropolitan plan of desegregation. (R. No. 710). As early as 
1969, deposition testimony referred to county or interdistrict 
transfers of students. (R. No. 224, pp. 86, 87; R. No. 288, pp. 
44 , 45). With all of this information available to them, the

-42-



Original Plaintiffs cannot reasonably claim that they did not know 
of any of the facts which formed the basis for their Motion.

Since 1971, the case of United States v. Texas, 447 F.2d 441 
(5th Cir. 1971) (C.A. 5281), has governed the entire State of
Texas, except for school districts under separate orders, and it 
specifically governs the interdistrict transfer of students. In 
1974, the case of Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 94 S.Ct. 3112 
(1974), set the legal standard for interdistrict desegregation and 
created a great deal of interest in the issue across the nation. 
The basis for the Original Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint includes 
allegations regarding statutes and county resolutions enacted in 
the early 1950's allegedly encasing the HISD. All of the 
foregoing are in the nature of legal standards and/or actions of 
which the Original Plaintiffs should have been aware. It is 
consistently held that lack of knowledge of the law is not an 
excuse for delay in filing a motion to amend pleadings. Hayes v. 
New England Millwork Distributors, Inc. , 602 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 
1979); Goss Revlon, Inc., 548 F.2d 405 (2nd Cir. 1976), cert. 
denied, 434 U.S. 968, 98 S.Ct. 514 (1977).

The Original Plaintiffs' claim that because a "widespread 
pattern" of interdistrict violations must be shown they were not 
in a "position" to seek interdistrict relief until May 13, 1980, 
is fatuous. It is akin to arguing that one was incapable of 
filing a case before the running of the statute of limitations 
because all of the evidence had not yet been gathered. That is 
precisely the purpose of the discovery process. The fact of the

-43-



matter is that in the case sub judice the Original Plaintiffs have 
done nothing for a long period of time.

With all the experience in desegregation litigation possessed 
by the Original Plaintiffs' counsel and the NAACP, it is implausi­
ble that they were unaware of the alleged transfer of black 
students from certain school districts to others. Even if they 
were unaware, there is no justifiable excuse for such lack of 
knowledge. Some degree of diligence is required. Conklin v. 
Joseph Hofqesamq Sound Company, Inc., supra. The Original 
Plaintiffs took no action of their own in the early 1970's or even 
in 1977 or 1978 to pursue any investigation of possible inter- 
district violations. They did not even file any proposed findings 
in the 1979 hearings. In short, they sat on their rights. It was 
only when the Original Plaintiffs saw the obvious - that the HISD 
was unitary - that they sprang into action.

The Original Plaintiffs also argue that they cannot "under­
stand" any prejudice to the HISD. The preparation and trial of an 
entire new and massive case which, by the Original Plaintiffs' own 
request, would delay a finding of unitary status for possibly many 
years, would seem to be adequate prejudice. The District Court 
held that it was. (R. No. 804, p. 10).

This type of prejudice is recognized by the courts as being a 
valid basis for denying a motion to amend. As one court stated in 
denying such a motion:

The case has been pending for more than two and one-half 
years, and . . . [the Defendant] already has had to 
defend against one theory at both the district court and 
the appellate court levels. The District Court would 
have been justified in concluding that to put . . . [the

-44-



Defendant] through the time and expense of continued 
litigation on a new theory, with the possibility of 
additional discovery, would be manifestly unfair and 
unduly prejudicial. Troxel Manufacturing Company v. 
Schwinn Bicycle Company, 489 F.2d 968 , 971 (6th CiFT 
1973), cert, denied, 416 U.S. 939, 94 S.Ct. 1942 (1974).

Accord, Kuhn v . Philadelphia Electric Company, 85 F.R.D. 86 (E.D.
Pa. 1979); Johnson v. Sales Consultants, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 369 (N.D. 
111. 1973); Chromalloy American Corporation v. Alloy Surfaces Co., 
-*-nc • • 351 F.Supp. 449 (D. Del. 1972); 6 Wright & Miller, Federal
Practice & Procedure: Civil §1487 (1971) .

Prejudice will also inure to the clients of the educational 
systems in and around Houston,: the students. Institution of the
massive piece of litigation sought by the Original Plaintiffs will 
only result in trauma, discord, ill will, and disruption of 
educational programs. -The Voluntary Interdistrict Education 
Program (VIEP), established in response to the District Court's 
order, will be emaciated before it has had a realistic chance to 
develop and improve. Years of hard work at attempting to stabil­
ize the HISD and emphasize education and basic skills will be 
rendered meaningless as the HISD is thrown again into the 
emotional turmoil which such litigation naturally brings. The 
ultimate losers will be children, whose education together with 
the efforts of the HISD to insure the equality of that education 

ke relegated to a position of virtual unimportance.
Courts have also held that leave to amend may be denied if 

the moving party makes its motion in bad faith or with a dilatory 
motive. Reisner v. General Motors Corporation, supra. In the
case sub judice, at the eleventh hour, when the District Court

-45-



indicated that it would rule on the unitary status of the HISD, 
the Original Plaintiffs stepped forward to reassert their interest 
in this litigation. Given their ten years of inactivity, it is 
obvious that the Original Plaintiffs' frantic filing of motions 
was to avoid a ruling on the HISD's unitary status. The Original 
Plaintiffs are attempting to obfuscate the issue of whether the 
HISD has become desegregated.

There is yet another reason the District Court was correct in 
denying the Original Plaintiff's Motion. Where a motion to amend 
is futile and clearly cannot result in a valid cause of action, it 
is proper to deny the motion. Foman v. Davis, supra; Salwen Paper 
Company v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &_ Smith, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 
130 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Washburn v. Madison Square Garden Corp., 340 
F.Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).

The Plaintiffs' own pleadings acknowledge that the most 
recent alleged cross-district transfer occurred during the 1964-65 
school year, over seventeen years ago. On its very face, the 
proposed amendments would be time barred by either the statute of 
limitations or by laches. The violations alleged are those of a 
tortious nature, and actions such as these, brought under 28 
U.S.C. §1983 are governed by the Texas two year statute of limita­
tions, Article 5526, V.A.T.S. Even if that statute were not 
applicable, the action would be barred by laches. Since the 
amendment, therefore, would be futile, it was properly denied.

The Original Plaintiffs sought the initiation of massive 
litigation involving a totally new theory requiring an extra­
ordinary amount of discovery and preparation by over thirty

-46-



parties. All this was requested, seven months after the hearings 
concerning HISD's unitary status and at a time when a voluntary
inter-district plan was being implemented. One can hardly
conceive of a more paradigmatic case for the denial of leave to 
amend.

B. The Proposed Additional Defendants are not Necessary Parties
The issue currently before this Court is the status of

desegregation within the HISD; specifically, whether the HISD has
achieved unitary status. (R. No. 818, p. 7; See R. No. 1, the
Original Complaint). In September of 1978 and in June and October
of 1979, every party had the opportunity to present any evidence
concerning their views as to HISD's unitary status.

The Original Plaintiffs seek to join the additional parties
under Rule 19(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This is not
possible, however, since Rule 19 can only be utilized to bring in
parties necessary to a complete and just adjudication of the'
issues presently before the Court. As the court stated in La
Chemise La Coste v. General Mills, Inc. , 53 F.R.D. 596 , (D. Del.
1971), aff'd, 487 F.2d 312 (3rd Cir. 1972):

It amounts to a misapplication of Rule 19 (a) to add 
parties who are neither necessary or indispensable and 
who are not essential for just adjudication in order to 
be able to assert against them claims that are foreign 
and unrelated to the claims asserted in the pleadings 
and on a separate cause of action entirely . . .  In 
applying these standards for joinder under Rule~T9(a), 
the Court must base its decision on the pleadings as 
they stood at the time of joinder. (emphasis added).
These additional parties need not be added since the existing

parties are adequate to a resolution of whether the HISD is a
unitary school district. In Fair Housing Development Fund

-47-



.1

Corporation v. Burke, 55 F.R.D. 414 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), the plain­
tiffs challenged a town's zoning ordinances and requested the 
addition of twelve incorporated villages, located within the town, 
who were alleged to control their own land use. In denying the 
proposed addition of the parties pursuant to Rule 19, the court 
stated that the primary consideration regarding joinder is to 
determine if any judgment will be adequate in the absence of the 
parties sought to be joinded. The court went on to find that the 
proposed parties did not have any powers outside their boundaries 
and that there would be nothing incomplete about the relief to be 
given between the then present parties to the suit. See also, 
Dyke Gulf Oil Corp. , 601 F.2d 557 (Emer. Ct. App. 1979); 3A
Moore's Federal Practice 519.07-9 [2] (1982).

The Original Plaintiffs admit that the proposed additional 
parties are not necessary to the issue of intradistrict desegre­
gation in HISD (Brief, p. 43; See, R. No. 812, p. 3) . What they 

actuality, seeking is a change in the theory of their 
case. Since the Motion to Amend under Rule 15 comes too late, the 
use of Rule 19 is unnecessary and not appropriate. See, Amco 
Engineering Co. v. Bud Radio, Inc. , 38 F.R.D. 51 (N.D. Ohio 1965).

The Original Plaintiffs' use of the Richmond, Virginia case 
(Brief, p. 44) is inapposite here. First, it is respectfully 
submitted that the analytical approach taken by the court in that 
case is incorrect. The case sub judice was brought by the 
Plaintiffs, and they sought relief against only the HISD. To that 
end, any change in the theory of the case and the remedy requested 
must be governed by Rule 15. Second, the motion to add parties in

-48-



the Richmond case came much earlier in that litigation than did 
the motion in this case. For all of the reasons previously 
stated, the motion to amend the complaint and for joinder of other 
parties was correctly denied by the District Court. Amco 
Engineering Co. v. Bid Radio, Inc., supra.

As stated, the issues which were before the District Court 
were the issues pled by the Plaintiffs themselves and involved the 
desegregation of the HISD, not the alleged segregative acts across 
district lines in metropolitan Houston. The additional parties 
the Original Plaintiffs seek to join were not necessary to the 
resolution of the Plaintiffs' own issues.
C. The Proposed Defendants Should Not be Joined Under Rule 21.

The Original Plaintiffs also argue that Rule 21 is appropri­
ate. for bringing in the proposed parties. Even when Rule 21 is 
considered alone, the decision whether to join new parties is 
committed to the sound discretion of the court. Anderson v. 
Moorer, 372 F.2d 747 (5th Cir. 1967); Fair Housing Development 
Fund Cor£. v_̂  Burke, supra; 7 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice 
and Procedure: Civil §1688 (1971). The same reasons supporting 
denial of leave to amend are applicable to the request to add 
parties under Rule 21.

The courts have, as with motions to amend, denied motions 
under Rule 21 when they come too late. Barr Rubber Products Co. 
v. Sun Rubber Co., 425 F.2d 1114 (2nd Cir. 1970); cert, denied, 
400 U.S. 878 , 91 S.Ct. 118 (1970). Thompson Newspapers, Inc. v. 
Toledo Typographical Union, 20 F.R. Serv. 2d. 78 (E.D. Mich. 
1974); Benqer Laboratories, Ltd, v. R. K. Laros Co., 24 F.R.D. 450

-49-



(E.D. Pa. 1959); 7 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Pro­
cedure: Civil §1688 (1971) .

The Court in Fair Housing Development Fund Corporation v. 
Burke, supra, denied a motion to add parties to that case pursuant 
to Rule 21. The court found that the motion, made after "an 
enormous amount of pretrial discovery" had been completed would 
"introduce many complicated issues into an already complicated 
case." 55 F.R.D. at 420. The court noted that prejudice and 
delay would result from such a joinder and that the parties sought 
to be joined were not necessary to afford full and complete 
relief.

Since 1970 , the HISD has, in undisputed good faith, sought 
after and has achieved unitary status. If this Court were to 
permit the addition of these parties at this critical juncture, a 
decision on unitary status might be delayed, and the HISD would be 
prejudiced. In this case, the HISD has reached unitary status, 

the District Court exercised its sound discretion in denying 
the Original Plaintiffs' request to add parties.

CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, the orders of the District 

Court should be, in all things, affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,
Bracewell & Patterson

William Key Wilde 
Kelly Frels 
Timothy T. Cooper
Attorneys for the Defendants - Appellees9TTCSL

-50-



XICIN3ddY



HOUSTON INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT 
PUPIL .ACCOUNTING DEPARTMENT 

October 2, 1981
TEXAS EDUCATION .AGENCY FALL SURVEY 1981-82

1981 TOTALS .AM.INDIAN .ASLAN or 3LACK, not of HISP.ANIC WHITE, not of TOTALS
______________ or .ALASKAN PAC.ISL. Hispanic Prig.____________Hispanic. Prig._______

1980 ELEMENTARY 64 . 1 2387 2 . 2 47072 43.6 34781 52.2 23671 21.9 10797
1981 ELEMENTARY 54 . 1 271S 2 . 6 45317 43.0 36545 34.7 20710 19.6 10534!

1930 SECONDARY S9 . 1 1704 2 . 0 39504 46.4 18966 22.5 24822 29.2 3505.
1981 SECONDARY 101 • . 1 2362 2.7 40061 46.0 20736 23.9 233 14 27.3 8712-

1980 SPECIAL SERV. 4 .4 526 31.9 170 16.3 313 50.9 ioi:
1981 SPECIAL SE5V . i .3 26 2 . 1 456 36.9 227 13.5 524 42.4 123*

1980 GRAND TOTAL 123 . 1 409 S 2 . 1 37102 44.9 53917 27.3 48306 25.1 194041
1981 GRAND TOTAL 159 . 1 5103 2 . 6 85334 44.3 57533 29.7 45043 23.3 19370;

John 0. Taylor, Director 
Pupil Accounting 3



I i
lJ

~L

HOUSTON INOl'I’I-NWiNT SCHOOL DISTRICT 
PUPIL ACCOUNTING DEPARTMENT 

October 2, 1981

TEXAS EDUCATION .AGENCY FALL SURVEY 1981-32

ELEMENTARY AM. INDIAN ASIAN or 3LACX,not of HISPANIC WHITE, not of TOTALS
or ALASKAN PAC.ISL. Hispanic Orig. Hispanic Orig.

ALCOTT 1040 97.9 17 1 . 6 3 . 5 1062
ALLEN 446 93.7 14 3.0 6 1.3 466
.ALMEDA 40 11.4 127 36.1 185 32.5 332
ANDERSON 1 . 1 40 4.9 335 43.7 100 12.3 315 39.0 311
ASHFORD 43 4.3 13 2 . 0 36 4.0 804 39.2 901
.ASKEW 2 < 2 58 5.4 176 16.3 126 1 1 . 6 719 66.3 1031
ATHERTON 37S 95.7 17 4.3 392
BARRICK 10 1 . 2 233 33.3 543 63.0 836
BASTLAN 880 98.0 IS 1.7 3 .3 S98
BELL 94 12.7 168 22.3 49 6 . 6 427 57.9 738
3ENBROOK 5 1 . 0 13 3.4 131 24.3 374 70.3 32S
3ERRY 1 . 1 336 30.4 629 37.0 133 12.3 1104
3LAC<SHEAR 333 1 0 0 . 0 853
BONHAM 36 6 . 8 149 13.0 72 3.7 331 6 6.5 823
BONNER 17 2.5 69 1 0 . 1 363 53.7 229 33.7 630
BOWIE 829 93. S 55 6 . 2 3 . 5 337
B RAEBURN 53 16.2 37 2S. 6 60 17.6 133 40.6 340
BRI.ARGRQVE 1 .3 12 3.1 10 2 . 6 7 7 S.7 340 88.3 383
BRISCOE 1 . 1 790 97.4 20 2.5 311
BROCK 127 44.1 160 53.6 1 .3 233
3RCCKLINE 2 22 2.3 117 1 2 . 0 649 66.3 132 13.7 972
3RCWNING 2 . 3 1 7 389 91.3 32 7.3 424
BRUCE 105 17.4 307 SO.3 132 50.1 10 1.7 604
BURBANK 12 1 . 1 2 SO 22.3 491 44.2 357 32.2 1 1 1 0

3URNET 1166 98.2 77 1.3 1137
3URRUS 1 . 1 623 35.6 67 9.2 37 5.1 730
CAGE 2 .4 476 92.4 37 7.2 312
CARNEGIE 468 1 0 0 . 0 468
CHATHAM 331 96.7 15 2.9 i .4 349
CLINTON PARK 133 96.3 1 .3 3 2.7 139
CODWELL 733 95.7 4 .3 29 3.8 763
CONCORD 476 97.0 7 1.4 3 1 . 6 491
CONDIT 3 .3 22 3.5 24 6 . 0 46 1 1 . 6 3C3 76.1 393
m n n'.k A /f 113 13.2 336 64.0 199 22.3 370
CORNELIUS 1 . 1 5 y 273 55.6 33.2 219 23.4 '72
CRANFORD 3"4 33.3 49 10.9 2S 3.6 443
CRCCXETT 12 3.7 307 93.3 3 2.5 32'
CUNNINGHAM 30 6 .* 33.6 1 7 " 29.9 7 7 7 29.3 "4 7
DECHAUMES 1 . 2 3 . 5 2 . 3 202 31.5 435 6 " .  7 544
OECAV.ALA 1 . 1 355 99.9 336
XDSCN ~  3 10.3 s o : 68.9 32 1 1 .3 69 3 . 22 '23~23

•4



HISD - PUPIL ACCOUNTING - TEA FALL PURVEY 1981 Page 2
AM.INDIAN ASLAN or SLACK, not of HISPANIC WHITE, not of TOTALS
or .ALASKAN PAC. ISL. Hispanic Orig. Hispanic Orig.

DOGAN 443
DOUGLASS 1 . 1 838
DCW 5 2.7
DURHAM 6 1.4 134
DURKEE 2 .2 43 4.6 179
EASTER 433
EIGHTH AVE. 1 .4 79
ELIOT 22
ELROD 39 6.3 198
EMERSON 22 3.8 34
FAIRCHILD 896
FIELD SS 3.2 1 1

FOERSTER 1 . 1 34 4.3 401
FONDREN 2 .7 4 1.4 S3
FOSTER 732
FRANKLIN 3
FRCST 1106
GARDEN OAKS S 1.4 37
GARDEN VILLAS 4 . 6 3 .4 313
GOLFCREST 44 6 . 0 72
GORDON 1 . 6 3 3.1 12

GREGG 3 . 6 367
GREGORY/LINC. 222 27.6 413
GRIMES 733
GRISSCM 2S 2 . 1 649
HARPER 34
HARRIS, J.R. 2 7 1 1 2

HARRIS, R.P. 1 .1 34 4.2 277
KARTSFIELD 396
HARVARD 3 .S 33
HELMS 4 .9 46
HENDERSON, J R . 1 1 1.4 41
HENDERSON rN.Q. 444
HEROD 1 .3 23 9.2 48
HIGHLAND HTS. 321
HOBBY 8 1.0 707
HCHL 5 .9 338
HOLDEN 126
HORN 1 1
HOUSTON GARDENS 1 _ 2 334
ISAACS 479
JANCWSKI 7 .3 23
JEFFERSON 2 .3 6
JONES, ANSON 113 20.7 114
JONES, J.WILL 411

32.2 93 17.2 3 .6 S39
98.2 10 1.2 4 . 5 853

213 96.4 2 .9 223
43.3 89 20.9 146 34.4 42S
19.0 236 27.2 461 49.0 941
33.6 79 14.0 74. .4 564
34.3 137 59.6 13 5.7 230
2.0 1092 96.0 23 2.0 1137
31.3 70 11.3 314 30.6 621
22.1 122 32.1 152 40.0 380
98.3 ' .3 4 .4 907
1.6 473 70.5 132 19.7 671
30.7 80 10.1 275 34.3 791
19.3 148 49.3 33 23.6 297
93.0 9 1.1 7 .9 763
.3 1092 98.3 16 1.4 1111

99.0 5 .3 6 _ 5 1117
10.3 98 23.5 204 59.3 344
44.3 134 23.9 20 S 2S.3 711
9.9 476 63.2 138 13.9 730
7.6 4S 28.7 91 53.0 137
73.4 97 19.9 20 4.1 . 437
52.0 1S7 19. S 7 .9 304
98.9 ? .3 6 .8 763
34.6 414 34.9 100 3.4 1133
33.0 123 37.9 9 4.1 221
3.6 1136 37.0 53 4.2 1303
34.1 266 32.7 233 23.9 313
95.6 24 3.9 3 . 5 623
5.6 463 73.5 91 13.4 590
10.1 322 70.9 82 18.1 454
5.1 646 79.9 110 13.6 308
97.3 10 2.2 4 54
13.9 43 14.2 183 60.4 303
93.1 16 4.6 3 2.3 34S
83.6 94 11.3 17 2.1 326
69.7 125 22.4 39 *.0 337
40.6 140 45.2 44 14.2 310
4. S 43 17.4 193 73.1 247
96.0 16 2.6 7 i.2 60S
63.1 222 31.6 2 .3 713

3.4 621 73.1 171 2 0.* 32*
. a 562 36.6 -a 1 2 . 2 649

20. 0 333 33.3 6 1 . 0 3*1
73.0 123 “tn - 24 4.3 565

5



KISS - PUPIL ACCOUNTING - TEA ".ALL SURVEY 1981
ELEMENTARY AM.INDIAN .ASIAN or 

or .ALASKAN PAC. ISL. 3LACK, riot 
Hisoanic Orof HISPANIC 

U - __
WHITE, not of 
Hisoanic Oricr TOTALS

KASBERE 343 97.1 1 1 2 . 0 3 .9 564KELSO 983 95.3 44 4.3 4 .4 1031KENNEDY 665 9S.4 21 3.0 1 1 1 . 6 697KOLTER 9 3.4 69 2S.7 32 11.9 133 59.0 253LAMAR 46 6 . 1 690 92.0 14 1.9 750LANGSTON 239 93.5 19 6 . 2 1 .3 309LANTRIP 3 .3 22 2 . 0 976 90.9 73 6.3 1074LAW 3S6 96.0 10 1.7 13 2.3 579LEE 234 9 4.4 14 3.6 243LBVIS 29 4.3 164 25.3 180 27.7 276 42.5 649LOCKHART 2 .3 734 98.3 3 1.0 3 .4 747LONGFELLOW IS 4.3 143 37.3 54 14.3 163 43.1 373LOOSCAV 3 . 6 S 1.0 470 96.0 12 2.4 490LOVE 39 10.3 252 66.7 37 23.0 373 'LOVETT 10 4.1 103 44.6 3 3.5 116 48.0 242MACARTHUR 302 72.2 102 24.4 14 3.4 413MACGREGOR 1 . 2 453 38.0 32 6.2 29 5.6 31SMCDADE 904 90.6 92 9.2 > 2 QQ Q,
MCNAMARA 2 .3 76 12.1 130 20.7 i27 20.2 294 46.7 629MADING 2 . 2 2 .2 963 93.2 9 .9 3 .5 981MEMORLAL 31 3.4 299 31.3 38 10.3 363MILAM 127 26.9 308 65.3 37 7.3 472MITCHELL 13 2.2 233 23.9 234 28.3 336 40.6 327MONTGOMERY 1 . 1 10 1 . 2 566 63.3 200 24.1 32 6.3 329NEFF 31 13.3 76 1 2 . 6 98 16.3 346 57.6 601NORTHLINE 4 . 6 77 12.4 256 41.1 236 45.9 623OAK FOREST 7 1 . 2 179 31.1 125 21.3 264 45.9OATES 51 13.3 252 66.0 79 20.7 382OSBORNE 655 94.7 26 3.7 1 1 1 . 6 692PARK PLACE 30 4.0 120 16.1 390 52.2 207 27.7 747P.ARKER 13 1.3 244 53.5 112 15.5 360 49.4 729PATTERSON 3 .7 21 3.0 152 31.4 265 62.9 421PECK 2S 3.3 331 76.3 48 11.1 27 6.3 451PETERSEN 3 .4 490 70.3 159 22.3 45 6.3 697PILGRIM 49 10.9 57 1 2 . 6 244 54.1 101 22.4 451PINEY POINT 26 7.7 148 44.1 90 26.3 72 21.4
PLEASANTS 565 96.1 15 3.9 530PLEASANTVT LLE 1 .2 4 .3 371 77.1 62 12.9 43 9.0 4S1PCE 9 1.4 249 33.7 123 19.1 263 40.3 644PORT HOUSTON 31 7.3 1 1 2.7 339 32.3 31 ".5 4i?RJGH 92 10.2 31 3.4 748 83.0 31 3.4 ■90 2RED 14 3.3 1 01 23.9 27 6.4 231 66.4REYNOLDS 560 iOO.O
RHOADS 543 99.2 2 i 2 .4RIVER r0AKS 1 -2 30 3.9 149 26.4 163. 23.9 201 33.5ROBERTS 10 2 ." 179 43.3 44 1 2 . 0 134 56.5 56"

lo



m ay - .“U^iL ACUAJMlNU - TEA FALL SURVEY I9S1

■
EL3ENTARY AM. INDIAN 

or .ALASKAN
ASIAN or 
PAC. ISL.

3LACX, not of 
Hisoanic Oriz

HISPANIC 'WHITE,
Hisoan

not of 
lc Oris.

TOTALS

ROGERS, WILL 23 5.7 2S7 41.2 186 29.3 1S3 25.3 624
RCCSEVELT 0 170 23.6 463 64.2 38 1 2 . 2 721ROSS 1 . 2 300 72.9 123 13.7 36 3.2 683. * RUCXER . 4 . 7 2S7 42.7 341 36.6 602RUSK 14 3.3 2 .3 407 9S.3 4 .9 427RYAN 322 39.9 213 39.7 2 .4 537

r .J SANDERSON 58 3.7 367 8S.S 88 3.7 1 . i 1014
SCARBOROUGH 5 . 6 30 3.3 41S 52.3 336 42.3 736

" '1 SCOTT 547 32.7 1 1 1 16.8 3 . 5 661
; SCROGGINS :  .3 3 .4 60 3.4 397 33.1 36 7.3 713

SHEARN 37 3.1 238 32.0 112 24.4 71 15.5 438
SHERMAN 2 . 2 36 9.7 791 39.2 3 .9 887
SINCLAIR 3 2.3 34 29.9 139 67.3 231SMITH 10 1.7 253 42.3 1 1 1 13.5 2.12 36.9 6Q1SCUTH4AYD 31 1.7 104 5.3 1S36 84.7 142 7.8 1313STE'/ENS 1 . 1 9 1.4 73 11.9 120 18.3 449 63.3 657
STEVENSON 4 .9 2 .4 403 39.3 40 3.9 451

— SUNNY SIDE S82 99.0 1 . 2 5 .3 383SUTTON 141 13.7 170 16.6 243 23.7 472 46.0 1026THOMPSON 67S 93.3 17 2.4 13 1.3 70STIJERINA 2 • im 947 97.3 19 2 . 0 963TRAVIS 7 1.3 3 .5 433 33.1 79 15.0 527TURNER 765 98.9 1 . 1 3 1 . 0 774TWAIN 17 7.0 45 13.8 90 57.3 33 36.7 240
WAINWRIGHT 2 .3 15 3.5 95 22.3 112 26.4 201 47.3 423

. - WALNUT 3EMD S .3 43 4.6 134 14.2 91 9.7 670 71.0 943WESLEY 636 94.9 29 4.3 c .3 670’.VEST UNIV. 5 .5 43 7.8 21 3.7 304 33.0 S73WHARTON 1 .3 5 1.3 ' S3 13.5 293 73.3 17 4.6 374WHIEBY 461 99.3 1 462
~ ' ’ WHITE 177 27.3 49 7.6 82 12.3 333 S2 . 1

; WHITTIER 4 .3 55 10.3 191 36.6 272 52.1 522’WILSON 23 9.9 61 2 1.S 34 29.7 1 1 0 33.9 233
1 WINDSOR VILL. 2 .3 35 4.9 393 55.4 118 16.6 162 22.3 710
.1 TOTAL elem. 54 . 1 27IS 2.6 43317 43.0 36S4S 34.7 20710 19.6 103341

7



i1 ■ pupil accounting - tea fall survey issi
SECONDARY AM. INDLAN .ASLAN or 

or .ALASKAN FAC. ISL. BLACK, not of HISPANIC 
Hisoanic Orie. WHITE, not of 

Hisnanic O r  i n .
TOTALS

AT7UCKS JR. 1 2 1 2 98.3 11 .9 4 .3 1 2 2'
AUSTIN SR. 1 . 1 46 2 . 6 257 14.6 1339 79.0 65 5.7 1738
BELLLARE SR. 1 5 7 6 . 6 230 11.3 200 8.4 1736 73.2 2373
3LAGC MIDDLE 1 . 1 13 1 . 0 507 37.9 330 24.6 488 36.4 1339
BURBANK JR. 1 . 1 6 . 5 367 31.2 347 46.S 236 21.7 1177
CARTER C.E.C. S* 119 89.5 14 10.5 133
CLIFTON MIDDLE 2 . 1 16 1 . 2 419 31.0 3C6 22.6 610 43.1 1353
CCM-IUNITY SR. 39 S3.4 17 23.3 17 23.3 /5
C.L.C. MIDDLE 1 .3 60 47.2 24 13.9 42 33.1 127
C.L.C. SR. 131 42.5 52 14.7 132 42.3 355
C.O.T.C. 143 61.7 47 19.5 43 13.7 240
CULLEN MIDDLE I . 1 1234 96.2 41 3.0 9 .7 1335
DAVIS SR. 1 . 1 71 4.9 316 36.0 321 57.2 26 1 . 8 1435
DEADY JR. 7 .3 6S 3.2 163 3.0 1230 62.2 342 26.3 2039
COWLING MIDDLE 25 1.3 1267 65.3 461 24.0 171 3.9 1924
EDISON JR. 3 . 2 4 .5 1356 97.3 30 2 . 2 1393
EL3!ING JR. 29 2.7 303 "3.7 199 13.2 33 5. .1 1090
FCMDRE-f MIDDLE 1 . 1 27 2.5 330 31.3 49 4.6 647 61.4 10S4
SONY IDLE JR. 1 . 1 20 2 . 2 290 31.9 234 25.3 363 40.0 902
FURR SR. 1 . 1 10 1 . 0 372 33.3 327 33.6 253 27.0 973
GULF COAST TR. 1 1 . 1 23 32.6 29 33.7 23 52.6 36
HAMILTON MIDDLE IS 1.3 18 1 . 6 393 34.0 437 37.3 25.5 1133
'HARPER L.S.C. 64 31.0 6 7.6 Q 11.4 7*9
HARRIS CO. YOUTH 38 3T.3 23 22.5 41 40.2 102
HART-LAN JR. 10 1036 7 5.6 204 14.9 120 3.3 i370
HEALTH PROF. SR. 2 .3 23 3.0 423 36.0 137 20.7 152 2 0. 0 739
HENRY JR. 3 .3 91 3.7 453 .45.7 495 47.3 1047
HOGG MIDDLE 19 1.3 135 13.2 1031 75.0 147 10.3 1402
HOLLA'D MIDDLE 2 .2 46 5.9 4S7 39.1 414 33.4 231 21.4 1170
HOUSTON SR. 23 1.2 14 . 7 526 26.4 637 32.0 791 39.7 1991
JACKSON JR. 1 . 1 30 3.5 120 3.4 1156 30.6 106 7.4 1433
JOHNSTON MIDDLE 2 .2 32 2.9 407 37.0 91 3.3 568 51.6 1100
JONES SR. ii .7 14S3 93.0 40 2.6 53 3.7 1562
JORDAN SR. 7 # 7 721 70.8 241 23.6 SO 4.9 1019
KASrMEPE SR. 1891 99.3 7 .4 ? 19C0
KEY JR. 993 96.1 40 3.S i . 1 1C3S
LAMAR SR. 70 3. S 326 41.0 293 14.5 326 41.0 9013
LANIER MIDDLE 2 . 1 63 4.2 679 44.9 336 22.5 430 23.5 1510
LAN ENFORCEMENT SR.l -3 155 37. 6 140 39.0 33 23.1 559
LEH SR. 2 . 1 215 3.0 236 10.3 21S 3.2 1933 '2.9 265,
LINCOLN MIDDLE 33 19.3 215 49.3 123 23.-6 11 ? A 430
LONG MIDDLE 4 .4 133 :11.3 192 17.0 210 IS.’ 337 32.1 1125
MADISON SR. 3 .2 1 1 . 5 1490 70.2 324 13.5 294 15.3 2124
MARSHALL MIDDLE 26 2. 0 223 17.6 1013 '3.2 2 9 "> ■> 1299
'•CRSiNCLDS MIDDLE i .i 2 ? 319 23.4 900 71.3 52 2 .5 1234

Special Education

8



HISD - PUPIL ACCOUNTING - tea FALL SURVEY 1931 Page 6

SECONDARY .AM. INDIAN 
or ALASKAN

.ASLAN or 
P.AC. ISL.

BLACK, not ot 
Hisoanic Oris.

HISPANIC WHITE, not of 
Hisoanic Orij».

TOTALS

MILBY SR. 2 .1 94 5.6 466 17.9 1230 49.1 764 29.3 2606
NIGHT 107 62.9 42 24.7 21 12.4 170
TON-GOING ED. 116 90.6 12 9.4 123
PERF. ARTS SR. S .3 153 26.6 57 9.6 375 63.0 595
PERSHING MIDDLE 2 .1 S3 3.9 496 36.3 130 11.1 648 43.1 1349
REAGAN SR. 138 3.0 445 25.7 322 47.6 324 13.7 1729
REVERE MIDDLE 1 . I 101 5.2 198 10.1 169 3.6 1433 76.0 1952
RYAN JR. 1273 99.5 6 .5 1279
SCARBOROUGH SR. 2 .1 34 4.1 213 15.9 232 17.3 338 62.6 1339
SHARPSTCWN MID. T . 5 1S2 10.3 252 17.0 153 10.3 911 61.7 1477
SHARPSTOWN SR. 4 # 2 208 3.9 221 9.5 134 7.3 1717 73.6 2334
SMITH MIDDLE 740 93.6 51 6.4 791
STERLING SR. 6 .4 1393 90.9 57 3.7 76 5.0 1532
TERRELL MIDDLE 23 2.3 750 92.5 29 3.6 9 1.1 311
THOMAS JR. 1326 96.1 26 1.9 27 2.0 1379
WALTRIP SR. 17 .8 627 30.3 364 17.6 1059 51.3 2067
'WASHINGTON SR. 21 1.2 1339 38.6 31 4.6 98 5.5 1759
'■WELCH MIDDLE 6 .4 72 4.5 535 33.1 130 11.1 322 50.9 1615
WESTBUF.Y SR. 38 3.4 576 22.5 213 3.3 1700 66.0 257“
WHEATLEY SR. 1 .1 1136 75.5 559 23.9 7 . 5 1504
WILLIAMS MIDDLE 591 96.2 14 2.3 9 1.5 614
WOODSON MIDDLE 1034 9S.3 26 2.4 25 2.3 1085
WORTHING SR. 1645 99. S 9 .5 1634
YATES SR. A*♦ .i 2412 97.8 22 .9 29 1.2 2467

TOTAL SECONDARY 101 .1 2362 2.7 40061 46.0 20736 23.9 23314 27.3 37124

*Special Education



HISD - PUPIL ACCOUNTING - TEA FALL SURAT. 1231 Page 7
i” 'ICE5 AM. INDIAN' .ASTAN or 3LACX or HflPA'l'C iVHITE. net at 'TOI\LSor ALASKAN PAC. ISL. Hisoanic Oriz. Hisoanic Oriz.

3AYCU PLACE 6 23.1 1 3.3 19 73.1 26
- X CNTR. RETARDED I .9 48 44.S 52 29.6 27 25.0 108

CH. MENTAL HL7H. 10 S3.3 1 S.9 6 35.5 17
CRITTENTCN 42 91.2 2 4.4 2 4.4 46
DAVIS 41 30.4 3 IS.7 2 3.9 51
EASTER SEALS 2 33.3 2 33.3 ? 33.3 6

GRADY INFANT 13 31.7 12 29.3 16 39.0 41
HARRIS CO.DET. 3 61. S 3 23.1 2 IS.4 13
HCMEBOUND I 1 . 0 30 29.4 26 25. S 45 44.1 102

HOPE CENTER ?tm 2 2 . 2 2 2 2 . 2 5 55.6 9
HOSPITAL 3 2.3 21 16.3 3 0 23.3 75 58.1 129
KCU.SCH.DEAF ? 23.6 5 71.4 7

INFANT PROG. RDS 5 62.S 3 37.5 3
INGRANDO 1 1 0 . 0 9 90.0 10

1 ■
1 MH4RA DAY HCSP. 4 44.4 1 1 1 . 2 4 44.4 9

PYRAMID HOUSE 1 1 0 0. 0 1
RESIDENTIAL PLACE 1 6.7 2 13.3 12 30.0 IS
RCCERS/GRADY HEC? 1 1.4 30 41.1 20 27.4 30.1 73

J , RaSKS/ORADY RDS 2 1.4 S3 57.2 33 26.2 ?7 13.2 145
ROGERS, r H . F15.MID .1 .4 :o 7.3 61 23.3 19 7.4 155 60.6 236

■ RONALD .MCDONALD 3 73.0 1 2S. 0 4
1 : THOMAS CARE CNTR. 28 2 1 . 1 13 13.5 37 65.4 133
. VILLA MARIE 17 60.7 S 17.9 . 6 21.4 23

SPEC. SERV. TOT.AL 4 .3 26 2 . 1 -56 36.9 227 13.3 524 42.4 1237

10



XIQN3ddV



L.J
PROJECTED ENROLLMENT IN SCHOOLS FOR 1932-33 WERE MUTE ENROLLMENT IS OVER 50%

ri Schoo1 1 Slack 1 | Hsr. % Asian i White 1 1 Total
i :i ASHFORD 19 2.0 40 4.4 45 4.9 813 S3.7 1194' -J Trs. 31-82 0 0 0 0 o* Trs. 82-33 0 0 0 1 0 0
1 ; ”  ASKEW ISO 16.5 131 12.0 60 S. 6 71S 65.9 1089 10SO
'' i Trs. S1-S2 

* Trs. 32-33
23
22

25
9

29
25

S2
56

rr*2 ”  BELL 189 24.9 S3 7.7 98 12.9 413 54.5 758 737Trs. 31-82 130 IS* Trs. S2-33 SI 10 91
BONHAM 150 18.0 78 9.3 60 7.2 547 65.3 335 1002i ! Trs. 31-32 6 1 0 o* Trs. 32-83 0
BRAEBURN 96 28.1 63 13.4 58 17.0 123 36.5 34 2 426

; • » Trs. 81-82
* Trs. 82-83 0
BRIARGROVE 13 3.2 30 7.4 15 3.7 34 7 85.7 405 400
Trs. 81-82 5 3 8 *! . * Trs. 32-33 1 i
CONDIT 2S 6.2 50 12.5 25 6.2 — 301 75.1 401 504

' 1 Trs. 31-S2 10 LQ
|

* Trs. 32-33 S 5
ELROD 209 33.1 77 12.2 45 7.1 301 47.6 632 780
Trs. 81 -‘82 3 3( • 

1 ! * Trs. 32-33 3 3
iJ GORDON 13 s.s 45 23.1 ( 10 6.5 37 56.9 155 2S2

Trs. 81-32 Q
I - -i * Trs. 82-33 o

HEROD 45 IS. 1 47 13.3 30 10.0 176 59.1 293 540
Trs. 31-82 7 7

* Trs. S2-S3 3 3
i HORN 13 5.1 45 17.8 13 ' 5.2 182 71.9 253 540

Trs. 31-82 o* Trs. 82-83 0
f '! KOLTER 70 25.9 33 13.0 10 3.7 155 57.4 270 354
. . Trs. 81-82 29 i 30* Trs. 32-33 20 2 22

- \ LOVETT ns 42.6 10 3.7 12 4.4 133 49.3 270 372
Trs. 31-82 91 2 93

* Trs. 82-S3 59 i 60
McNAMARA 142 22.3 138 21.6 79 12.4 279 45.7 63S 633
Trs. 81-82 3 3

* Trs. 82-83 0
NEFF 30 13.1 107 17.5 30 13.2 34 3 56.2 610 613

\ Trs. 81-82 4 4
* Trs. S2-S3 1 1 | i
’’PARKER 230 33.7 113 15.9 15 | 2.0 360 | 4S.4 '43 762

i "• Trs. 31-32 190 37 ! i S' !
* Trs. 32-83 1 39 1* 5 ' j 55 1 i 36
RED 115 23.8

54
7.6 13 o • 4 i 2S2 | 65.2 | 446 492

Trs. 31-32 ' 65 1 i L 1 ! ! 6 b
* Trs. 32-33! 33 : - ! 1 | 1

* T r a n s f e r ?  as  5-13-32 
”  Magnet School s

P'.ipil T r a n s f e r  
" a y  19 , 1952

Department



PROJECTED ENROLLMENT IN' SCHOOLS FOR 1932-83 WHERE WHITE ENROLLMENT IS OVER 30%

* T r a n s f e r *  15 "-IS--22 
Magnet Sca00Is

P*sp i I T r a n > f c r  r*c p a r t “C"



PROJECTED ENROLLMENT IN SCHOOLS FOR 19S2-83 WERE WHITE ENROLLMENT IS OVER 35%H
f. '

C - U - 1 D 1 *» % 1 H**"~ X , \ z i z r . *.o. i *. - 9. Total Caoacitv
ALMEDA 47 12.7 133 36.4 189 50.9 571 390
Trs. 81-32 1 1

n * Trs. S2-S3 1 1
(■ i ANDERSON 370 43.3 118 13.8 46 S .4 321 57. S 8S5 7S7

Trs. 81-82 5 4 9
* Trs. 82-83 3 2 S

t .! BARRICK 12 1.4 * 293 34.9 533 63.7 840 822
Trs. 81-82 0

* Trs. 82-83 0
. BENBROOK 24 4.5 140 26.2 7 1.3 364 68.0 535 570

Trs. S1-S2 0 0
* Trs. 82-33 5 3

n BONNER 74 10.9 3S2 56.0 20 2.9 206 30.2 6S2 672
i ' j Trs. 81-82 3 3

* Trs'. 82-33 5 3

r CUNNINGHAM 2S6 34.0 230 30.5 55 7.3 213 28.2 754 730
Trs. 31-32 0 0

* Trs. 82-33 1 1
-p DECHAUMES 3 . 5 205 32.5 5 .3 417 66.2 630 ' 714

Trs. 81-82 0
* Trs. 32-83 0
DURHAM ’ 137 43.3 94 21.8 8 1.8 143 33.1 432 624

i ! Trs. S1-S2 125 11 156
; * Trs. 32-83 S4 2 36

DURKEE 182 19.1 260 27.2 45 4.7 468 49.0 935 1062
■ Trs. 81-82 29 67 96

* Trs. 82-83 6 14 20
EMERSON 86 22.0 129 33.0 25 6.4 151 58.6 391 516

• Trs. 81-82 2 2l : * Trs. 82-83 2 2
. FOERSTER 420 50.3 86 10.3 37 4.4 292 3S.0 833 900

Trs. 31-82 1 1
* Trs. 82-83 0
GARDEN OAKS 38 11.2 101 29.7 7 2.1 194 S7.0 340 420
. Trs. 81-82 11 5 16
* Trs. 82-83 4 3 7
LEWIS 173 26.6 195 50.0 33 5.4 247 38.0 650 684
Trs. 81-32 21 4 ' 25

* Trs. 82-83 16 5 21
. ■** LONGFELLOW 147 38.3 69 1S.0 20 5.2 148 3S.5 384 362

Trs. 31-S2 126 . 36 19 181
* Trs. 82-83 S3 26 109
MITCHELL 245 29.1 250 29.8 21 2.5 324 38.6 S40 840
Trs. S1-S2 7 14 21

* Trs. 32-83 5 11 14
NORTHLINE S9 13 • " 279 42.9 .9 276 42.S 630 61S
Trs. 31-82 u -> 16

* Trs. S2-S3 9 9
i

"OAK FOREST 132 31.4 I2S 22.1 9 1.3 261 45.0 5S0 362
f Trs. S1-82 I'S 33 43 276

* Trs. 32-83 S3 23. ■ 106

** Magnet Schools 
Pupil Transfer Department s - : o - s :



PROJECTED ENROLLMENT IN SCHOOLS FOR 1932-33 WHERE WHITE ENROLLMENT IS OVER 33

C " Schos I BlacV * Hsn. Asian * White * Total Canac i r.v

(J PATTERSON 24 5.6 141 32.3 5 1.1 260 60.5 430 426
Trs. SI-32 0

— A * Trs. 32-S5 1 ' 1
i'l **POE 255 38.0 126 13.9 n 1.7 275 41.4 665 675

Trs. 51-S2 241 81 8 330
n * Trs. S2-S3 123 38 10 171

‘♦RIVER OAKS 142 24.9 M1' 165 28.9 55 9.6 208 36.6 570 S73!: 1UJ Trs. 31-32 172 101 122 395
* Trs. S2-S3 10S 77 2 130 314

♦♦ROBERTS 160 41.6 48 12.5 12 3.1 165 42.8 3S5 400
!:J Trs. S1-S2 172 hi 9 12 203

* Trs. 82-83 95 ' 8 3 53 159

n RUCKER 6 1.0 262 42.5 348 56.5 616 630
! . J Trs. 31-S2 0

* Trs. 82-33 0

n SCARBOROUGH 32 3.9 435 53.0 346 42.2 320 S04
i . 
L J Trs. S1-S2 3 8

* Trs. 32-33 3 3

■; ~! SINCLAIR 12 4.1 96 32.5 187 63.4 29S 337
1 Trs. 31-S2 4 29 35

* Trs. 32-33 2 16 18
K. SMITH 261 42.8 115 13.8 12 2.0 222 36.4 610 736•--}: i1 j J
Trs. 31-32 1 2 3

'  Trs. S2-S3 0
STEVENS S2 12.2 128 19.1 11 1.6 4S0 67.1 671 726

■ Trs. 81-32 3 2 10
♦ Trs. S2-S3 S 1 9

TWAIN 43 19.2 97 33.S 20 3.0 35 34.0 250 330
Trs. 81-S2 19 5 22

* Trs. 82-83 12 i 13
♦♦KAINWRIGHT 99 22.6 121 27.7 17 3.9 200 45.8 437 412

• Trs. 81-82 66 44 32 142
* Trs. 82-83 6 6 12 •

- J WHITTIER 39 10.S 21S 38.2 6 1.1 283 50.2 365 540

f-j Trs. 81-82 0
♦ Trs. S2-S3 0
♦♦WILSON 63 21.3 91 28.4 28 8.7 133 41.6 320 273

Trs. 81-S2 SS 16 \ 29 103
♦ Trs. S2-S3 52 27 44 123

Trs. S1-S2 
♦ Trs. S2-S3

MIDDLE AND JU <I0R HIG 1 SCHO0I S

BLACK 581 41.3 322 22.9 3 .6 495 33.2 1406 1912
Trs. S1-S2 323 211 356 •

* Trs. S2-S3 530 137 467
\ i *-CLIFTON 439 31.7 320 23.1 20 1.5 60S 43.7 1334 1530

Trs. S1-S2 2-3 203 40 316
♦ Trs. S2-S3 223 149 — -7 454

i FONTILLS 515 31 .0 263 26.4 - - 2.2 410 40.4 1013 1368
■ _i Trs. S1-S2 S 61 69

* Trs. S2-S3 6 20 26

* Transfers as 5-1S-32 
■' Magnet Schools 
Pupil Transfer Department 5-20-32



PROJECTED ENROLLMENT IN SCHOOLS FOR 19S2-S3 WHERE WHITE ENROLLMENT IS OVER 35?i

School 1 Black 'j Hsp. h Asian i 'a White i TuLal Curj«ic i L y

HENRY
Trs. S1-S2 
Trs. S2-S3

107
9
3

9.2 495 42.S s .4 S51 47.6 1158
9
3

1630

SAM HOUSTON
Trs. 81-82 
Trs. 82-83

684
75
41

24.5 795
40
13

28.5 27 1.0 12S4 46.0 2790
115
54

2S59

LAMAR
Trs. 81-82 
Trs. 82-33

718
846
583

35.7 334
S3
32

19.1 78

1

3.9 S31

9

41.3 2011
929
675

2497

SCARBOROUGH
Trs. SI-32 
Trs. 82-33

215
36
15

16.2 230
86
37

17.3 60 4.3 825 62.0 1350
122
52

1974

WALTRIP
Trs. 81-32 
Trs. 82-83

630
434
272

50.4 532
201
169

18.4 20 1.0 1043 50.2 2075
635
441

2823

Trs. S1-S2 
Trs. S2-S3

•

Trs. 81-82 
Trs. S2-S3

1

Trs. 31-S2 
Trs. S2-83

Trs. S1-S2 
Trs. 82-83

Trs. 81-82 
Trs. 82-83

Trs. 81-S2 
Trs. S2-S3

Trs. 81-S2 
Trs. S2-S3

Trs. 81-82 
Trs. S2-83

Trs. 31-82 
Trs. S2-S3

-

Trs. S1-S2 
Trs. S2-S3

m

Trs. 31-S2 
Trs. 32-83

|
1 1

i •
I 1

Trs. 21-82 
Trs. 32-33

i

______ 1 i

1 :

T r a n s f e r s  a s  S - I S - S 2  
Magnet Schoo l s



I ••)
! J

n
L .. i

a
a
u
* i
i i

APPENDIX "C"

f '
Li

! ■ iIJ

(_j

i 'i_



default for a period of 60 days without the plaintiff s having moved for default judgment, the action may be summari­
ly dismissed with prejudice.

D. Appeals: Record and Transcript on Appeal. Within
10 days after filing of notice of appeal, counsel for appel­
lant shall complete the Transcript Information Sheet, send 
the original to the Court of Appeals, a copy to the District 
Clerk and, if a transcript is required, a copy to the court 
reporter. Counsel will prepay the estimated fee to the 
court reporter, if required to do so pursuant to Section 7o3 
of Title 28 U.S.C.A. (Rule 10(b), Rules of Appellate Pro­
cedure); or will within such 10 day period make application^ 
to the Court to proceed in forma pauperis (Rule 24, Rules o- 
Appellate Procedure). Counsel for the appellant, within 10 
days following notice of appeal, shall designate to the 
Clerk that portion of the record desired for the appeal an 
send copies of all filings to other parties.

Filing and docketing fees should be paid before the 
record on appeal is forwarded to the Court of Appeals.

A motion for extension of time for filing the record on 
aoDeal or the transcript will not be entertained by this 
Court but may be filed with the Court of Appeals.

RULE 15. MOTIONS IN CIVIL CASES.
A. Generally. Every opposed motion presented for 

filing shall state with particularity the relie^ or order 
sought and shall contain an averment that movant has con­
ferred in person or by telephone with opposing counsel, 
including the dates on which such conferences occurred, an 
that counsel are unable to reach an agreement upon the dis 
position of the matters raised by the motion. A ^ P ^ a t e  
proposed order granting the relief soughtshall accompan, 
the motion. Memorandum of legal authorities may also be 
filed with the motion when deemed appropriate by counsel. 
ExceDted from the requirement of prior conference with P 
posTng- counsel are the following motions: Rule 12(b) , (c) ,
(e) and (f) Fed.R.Civ.P. motions as well as motions fo.
summary judgment.

B. Written Submission. Whe 
required by the individual Judge, 
fix a submission date which will 
ten (10) working days and not mor 
days following the date of filing 
submitted to the Judge on "Submis 
sidered on that day or thereafter 
mit without the necessity of a pe 
sel.

R written submission is 
every opposed motion wi. 

be a Monday not less than 
e than thirty (30) calenda: 

Such motion will be 
sion Day" and will be con- 
as circumstances may per- 
rsonal appearance by coun-

- 13-



(1) Responses. Responses to such motions, unless 
otherwise ordered by the Judge, will be filed with the 
Clerk no later than the "Submission Day." Failure of 
counsel timely to respond may result in the granting of 
the motion.

(2) Any requests for oral presentation of a mo­
tion must accompany the motion to be filed and will be 
considered after the submission date. Unless notified 
by the Clerk, counsel will presume that no oral hearing 
is permitted.
C. Oral Submission. When oral presentation is re­

quired by an individual Judge, the motion will be filed in 
accordance with these Rules, and counsel will be notified by 
the Clerk of a date for oral presentation without the re­
quirement of a "Submission Day."

D. Unopposed Motions. If any motion is unopposed by 
all counsel of record, counsel may simply so state conspic­
uously on the face of the motion. In such event, the motion 
will be submitted forthwith by the Clerk to the Judge for 
approval, and will be granted routinely, unless the Judge is 
of the view that the granting of such motion is not in the 
interest of justice.

E. Motions to Consolidate. A motion seeking the
consolidation of two or more cases shall: (1) contain in the
caption the case numbers and styles of the cases sought to 
be consolidated; (2) be filed in the case of the earliest 
number. In addition, counsel will furnish copies sufficient 
for filing in the respective cases. The motion to consoli­
date will be considered by the Judge with the lowest num­
bered case and must comply with paragraphs A through E of 
this Rule.

F. Hearing Procedure. Notwithstanding any other 
provision in this Rule, any Judge of this Court may, at any 
time or place, entertain and decide any motion, shorten or 
extend the period for its submission, or permit or require 
the submission of additional argument, authorities, or sup­
porting material. If the Judge, on deciding the motion, 
determines that the motion or the opposition thereto is 
completely wanting of support in fact or law, or that the 
motion or opposition thereto is characterized by fraud or 
chicanery, the Judge may award to the prevailing party its 
costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees, or make such 
order as justice may require.
RULE 16. PHOTOGRAPHING, BROADCASTING AND TELECASTING IN 
COURTROOMS.

All forms, means and manner of taking photographs, or 
of broadcasting or televising on or from the floor of any

- 14 -



CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that two true and 
correct copies of the foregoing Brief for Appellees have 
been sent to the following counsel of record by placing a 
copy of same in the United States Mail, Certified, Return 
Receipt Requested, on this the _ - day of May, 1982, and 
addressed as follows:

Lowell Johnston 
10 Columbus Circle 
Suite 2030
New York, N.Y. 10019
Mr. Weldon H. Berry 
Attorney at Law 
711 Main Street 
Houston, Texas 77002

Kelly Frels
10TTCSB