Dowell v. Oklahoma City Board of Education Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Public Court Documents
September 28, 1987
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Dowell v. Oklahoma City Board of Education Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 1987. 49fe1325-b09a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/12bc53c0-b6bd-4ee5-bdf7-13727cc68c7a/dowell-v-oklahoma-city-board-of-education-plaintiffs-proposed-findings-of-fact-and-conclusions-of-law. Accessed December 04, 2025.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
ROBERT L. DOWELL, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v .
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE OKLAHOMA
CITY PUBLIC SCHOOLS, et al.,
Defendants.
NO. CIV 9452
PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW_______
LEWIS BARBER, JR.
Barber/Traviolia
1528 N.E. 23rd Street
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73111
(405) 424-5201
JOHN W. WALKER
John W. Walker, P.A.
1723 Broadway
Little Rock, Arkansas 72206
(501) 374-3758
JULIUS L. CHAMBERS
JAMES M. NABRIT, III
NORMAN J . CHACHKIN
99 Hudson Street
New York, New York 10013
(212) 219-1900
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
ROBERT L. DOWELL, et al., :
Plaintiffs, :
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
NO. CIV 9452
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE OKLAHOMA
CITY PUBLIC SCHOOLS, et al. ,
Defendants.
PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT
________ AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW_______
This case is before the Court pursuant to the remand direc
tions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit,
795 F .2d 1516 (10th Cir.), cert, denied. 107 S. Ct. 486 (1986).
In 1972 this Court granted plaintiffs injunctive relief de
signed to dismantle the dual school system in Oklahoma City, 338
F. Supp. 1256 (W.D. Okla.), aff'd. 465 F.2d 1012 (10th Cir.), cert,
denied, 409 U.S. 1041 (1972). On January 18, 1977 the Court
entered an Order finding that the Board had carried out the injunc
tion and had "slowly and painfully accomplished" the goal of
estcblishing a "unitary system." The Order dissolved the Biracial
Coimt ittee previously created and directed that "Jurisdiction in
this case is terminated . . . " but it did not by its terms vacate
or dissolve the injunctive relief granted in 1972.
The immediate impetus for the current proceedings was a deci
sion by the Board of Education in 1985 to adopt a new plan of pupil
assignment for elementary (grades 1-4) schools, to be effective
for the 1985-86 school year. Under this plan, the school cluster-
ings and grade restructuring which had been utilized since the
1972-73 school year for the purpose of achieving desegregated
schools were dismantled. In their place, the Board of Education
adopted a "neighborhood" school assignment plan utilizing geo
graphic zone lines for each elementary school facility. There is
no dispute about the fact that under the "neighborhood" plan, a
number of elementary schools, most located in the northeast area
of Oklahoma City, were expected to and did have student enrollments
that are more than 90% black.
In 1985, the plaintiffs sought to intervene new class repre
sentatives and to reopen this action in order to enjoin implemen
tation of the new plan. This Court denied relief, holding that
"once a school system has become unitary, the task of a supervising
federal court is concluded." 606 F. Supp. at 1555-56. The Court
of Appeals disagreed, see 795 F.2d at 1520, and remanded the matter
with instructions for this Court to determine whether "changed
conditions reguire modification or [whether] the facts or law no
longer require the enforcement of the [1972 injunctive] order."
Id. at 1523.
The Court granted the Petition for Intervention and the Motion
to Reopen on February 5, 1987 and a hearing was held from June 15
through June 24, 1987. Based upon consideration of all of the
evidence presented by the parties, the trial briefs and post-trial
submissions and arguments, the Court makes the following Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law:
2
Findings of Fact
A. The Basis for the Court's 1972 Injunctive Order
1. The Oklahoma City Public Schools, Independent District
No. 89, Oklahoma County (the "School District") historically oper
ated a compulsory segregated school system, with separate schools
for blacks and whites, as required by Oklahoma constitutional and
statutory provisions. Dowell v. School Board of Oklahoma City
Public Schools. 219 F. Supp. 427 (W.D. Okla. 1963).
2. In operating the dual system, the School District deliber
ately located and constructed facilities for the education of black
pupils in areas of Oklahoma City identified by governmental action
and public policy as areas within which blacks would reside. id.
at 433-34.
3. After the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the Board of Education of the
School District took no meaningful steps to eliminate the dual
system and integrate the public schools of Oklahoma C.ty. id, at
434-35.
5. After 1954 the Board of Education established "neighbor
hood" boundaries for school attendance purposes, which were super
imposed upon the pattern of racial residential segregation created
by governmental action and public policy, and which resulted in the
continued operation of segregated schools. Dowell v. Board of
3
Education of Oklahoma City. 244 F. Supp. 971, 976 (W.D. Okla.
1965), aff'd in pertinent part. 375 F.2d 158 (10th Cir.)/ cert,
denied. 387 U.S. 931 (1967).
6. Adherence to these "neighborhood school" boundaries in
making initial assignment of students after 1954 affected racial
residential patterns within the city "by extending areas of all
Negro housing, destroying in the process already integrated neigh
borhoods and thereby increasing the number of segregated schools."
244 F. Supp. at 977.
7. The Board of Education also maintained the dual system by
employing black faculty members or principals only at predominantly
black or all-black schools. Id. at 442-45.
8. As late as the 1971-72 school year, the elementary facili
ties of the School District remained largely segregated.1 Of 86
elementary schools, 69 enrolled no more than 10% of either black
students or white students. Dowell v. Board of Education of Okla
homa City, 338 F. Supp. 1256, 1259-60 & n.3 (W.D. Okla.), aff'd
465 F .2d 1012 (10th Cir.), cert, denied. 409 U.S. 1041 (1972).
9. Because of continuing residential segregation, adherence
to the School District's "neighb->rhood school" zoning in 1972 would
^•Because the present controversy concerns only the elementary
schools of the School District, the Court is focusing its histor
ical findings on that grade level.
4
not have created integrated schools.2 This Court accordingly ap
proved the plan drafted by Dr. John Finger, utilizing the tech-
nigues of clustering, grade restructuring, and pupil transportation
in order to eliminate the dual school system. Id. at 1265, 1270;
Tr. 387 (Hermes).
10. The extent of the continuing residential segregation in
the School District at the time this Court entered its 1972 Order
was clearly depicted in the evidence presented at the recent hear
ing. For example, according to the 1970 United States Census,
there were 13 census tracts in Oklahoma City that were at least
75% black; 73.3% of all black residents of the City lived within
these tracts. Tr. 1129-31 (Rabin). The area of concentrated black
population expanded geographically between 1960 and 1980, id. at
1131 (Rabin); DX 2-4 (maps), while the white population declined
within the city and increased substantially in other parts of the
Oklahoma City SMSA. DX 6 (table).
2The I resident of the Board of Education testified in 1975
that at' th=t time as well, continuing residential segregation re
quired the approach of the Finger Plan, utilizing pupil transpor
tation, if schools were to be maintained on a desegregated basis:
'IHE COURT: Do you know of any other. way in which
you can bring about desegregation except through busing?
THE WITNESS: I think it's certainly going to re
quire transportation of some sort, busing of some nature.
PX 55 (excerpt from transcript of hearing). Similarly, Mrs.
Hermes, who was President of the Board of Education in 1985, stated
that in order to establish desegregated fifth-grade centers under
the plan adopted in that year, it was necessary to establish non
contiguous zones because of segregated residential patterns. Tr.
345.
5
B. Results under the Court's 1972 Order
11. After the plan drawn by Dr. Finger was implemented, the
racial composition of the School District's elementary schools
was significantly altered. The School District's expert witness,
Dr. Finis Welch, testified that the Finger Plan brought about the
eighth largest reduction in the "dissimilarity index" (a measure
of the extent to which individual school populations in a system
diverge from district-wide student racial proportions) of 125
school districts he studied. Tr. 131 (Welch).
12. The desegregative effects of the Finger Plan were main
tained by the School District from 1972-73 through 1984-85 through
a series of student assignment alterations implemented by the Board
of Education within the overall scheme of the plan, as schools
were closed due to enrollment declines or as population movements
within the District caused individual school enrollments to vary
by more than 10% (or, subsequently, by more than 15%) from the
district-wide elementary student racial proportions. Tr. 206-08
(Welch); DX 85-86 (tables). From the 1972-73 school year through
the 1984-85 school year, no elementary facility had an enrollment
that was 90% or more black, or 90% or more white [non-black].3
3The enrollment statistics upon which the Finger Plan was
based, and which were regularly submitted to the court, actually
portrayed student enrollments in only two groups: black and non
black. The second category included a small proportion of non
black minority students, which has grown in size since 1972. DX
20, 58-59 (graphs), 63-66 (tables)[1985-86, 1986-87 and projected
1987-88 elementary school enrollments by racial group, showing
non-black minority students]. However, the School District's ex
pert witness testified and prepared exhibits demonstrating that
the enrollment patterns were the same whether or not non-black
6
There were 69 such schools (out of a total of 89 elementary
schools) in the 1971-72 school year, 30 such schools in the 1985-
86 school year and 26 such schools in the 1986-87 school year (out
of a total of 65 elementary schools operated in 1985-86 and 64
elementary schools in 1986-87). PX 41, 52, 54 (tables).
C. Inequitable Burdens on Black Students
(1) Disproportionate busing of younger black students
13. While the approach of the Finger Plan resulted in effective
desegregation, at the elementary grade level it did place certain
burdens primarily upon black students and the black community.
Under the plan, formerly black schools became fifth-year centers
serving only the fifth grade and kindergarten. As a result, black
elementary-grade children living in the northeast quadrant and
other predominantly black areas of Oklahoma City were transported
four out of five years, while white students were bused only in
the fifth grade. Witnesses for both plaintiffs and defendants
agreed that this was inequitable. Tr. 385 (Hermes), 432 (Fuse),
1265 (Foster), 1412-13 (Luper), 1431-32 (Porter); cf. Tr. 512 (Mrs.
Hill reads statement of Urban League President Leonard Bento, from
December 10, 1984 hearing).4
minority students were included in the comparisons. Ti. 191
(Welch); DX 41-48 (tables and graphs).
4Dr. Finger testified in 1971 that northeast quadrant schools
were all made fifth-grade centers "as a concession to the white
community." Transcript of hearing of December 19, 1971, at p.
117. The plaintiffs sponsored and endorsed the Finger Plan at
that time, perhaps recognizing the difficulties of making a change
from long-ingrained practices of segregation in this community.
In any event, as noted in the next finding, by 1984 the demograph
7
14. In 1972 (when the plan was drawn), black students made up
23% of the total elementary school population, PX 47 (table), and
black students living in the northeast quadrant attended facilities
to which they did not have to be bused for a similar proportion
(20%) of their elementary schooling. But in 1984-85, black chil
dren were 35.8% of all elementary pupils, id., and this demographic
change increased the inequitable burden upon black elementary-grade
students because they still were bused for 80% of their elementary
years. Tr. 220, 292-93 (Welch).
15. Between 1972 and 1985 under the Finger Plan, the Board of
Education never made a student assignment change to add grades to
schools in the northeast quadrant, although this was suggested by
the school system's research staff; the School District's expert
witness testified that in light of the demographic change, this
would have been essential to maintain integration with a minimum
amount of busing. Tr. 292-93 (Welch), 498-99 (Fink).5 *
(2) "Stand-Alone11 Schools
16. Another source of inequity was the "stand-alone" school
feature of the Finger Plan. Tr. 1278 (Foster). As approved by
this Court in 1972, the Finger Plan provided:
ics of the School District had changed in such a way as to make
the limitation of northeast quadrant schools to a single elementary
grade more inequitable than when originally proposed.
5Had more grades been placed in northeast quadrant schools,
the level of parent involvement would also have increased. Tr.
858 (Brown).
8
If any school in a cluster is already desegre
gated because [students] residing within its
present attendance zone and enrolled in the
school are more than 10% black and less than
35% black, then that school would operate as
a school enrolling grades K-5. Schools which
appear to meet this condition are underlined
on the following listings.
PX 6, p. liv.
17. According to Board of Education policy, the School District
interpreted the Finger Plan's "stand-alone" feature to require
the withdrawal of an elementary school from a grade-restructured
cluster, and its operation as a "stand-alone" facility, whenever
the student population living in the school's attendance zone was
within ten (and subsequently, fifteen) percentage points above or
below the district-wide racial student proportion at the elementary
grade level. When a "stand-alone" school was established, no stu
dents were assigned to the school from outside its zone nor were
students living within its zone assigned to other facilities. DX
68-70 (internal staff memoranda on "stand-alone" schools).
18. While the explicit language of the Finger Plan referred
only to K-5 "stc id-alone" schools, the Board of Education consid
ered establishing "stand-alone" schools serving grades K-4, as
well as K-5; at least three such schools [Western Village, Har
rison, and Edgemere] were actually created. Tr. 217-18 (Welch),
490, 492-93 (Fink); DX 68-70, 72-75, 78 (internal staff memoranda);
DX 76, p. M—14 (Minutes of Board of Education meeting, July 2,
1984) .
9
19. From as early as the 1982-83 school year, the school
system's staff regularly prepared memoranda identifying school
attendance zones which qualified for "stand-alone" status. These
memoranda would normally be put in final form and provided to mem
bers of the Board of Education. Tr. 470-71 (Fink).
20. Conversion to "stand-alone" status was not automatic when
ever the attendance zone population would have qualified a school,
however. Instead, the Board of Education had to make an affirma
tive decision to alter a school's status, taking into account fac
tors other than the population change. Tr. 489, 493, 496-97
(Fink), 528 (Hill).
21. For example, in the 1982-83 school year, only three of
ten eligible schools were operated as "stand-alone" facilities.
DX 68 (internal staff memoranda).
22. The only new "stand-alone" school created after initial
implementation of the Finger Plan was Bodine in 1984-85. PX 24-
25 (enrollments); Tr. 475 (Fink), 1324 (Foster).
23. The pattern of demographic change in Oklahoma City was
such that, after 1980, the creation of additional "stand-alone"
schools under the Finger Plan would have increased the busing dis
tances for black students in grades 1-4 living in the northeast
quadrant at the same time as that demographic change made the con
tinued operation of single-grade schools in the northeast area
more inequitable. Tr. 219 (Welch).
10
24. In addition, the creation of additional K-5 "stand-alone"
schools under the Finger Plan would have threatened the continued
operation of fifth-year centers in the northeast quadrant by re
ducing their enrollments. Id. (Welch); Tr. 527-28 (Hill).
25. The Board of Education was aware as early as 1982 of the
problems which could be created in the northeast quadrant by the
"stand-alone" feature. Tr. 474-75 (Fink).
26. A petition circulated and signed in 1985 by some 400 black
patrons of the School District living in the northeast quadrant
stated that the signers' "endorsement is based upon the fact that
the [neighborhood] plan will reduce the inequitable busing burden
[under the Finger Plan] on all children, especially black children,
in the northeast quadrant, and maintain elementary schools in the
northeast quadrant." Tr. 642 (White).
27. Dr. Muse, a leading proponent of the plan substituted in
1985 for the Finger Plan, believed that the conclusion was "ines
capable" that if the Finger Plan remained in effect, all schools
located in the northeast quadrant would have been closed. Tr.
445.
28. Senator Melvin Porter testified that the understanding of
the black community in 1985 was that schools in the northeast quad
rant would be closed unless the new plan proposed by the Board of
Education to replace the Finger Plan were accepted. Tr. 1433.
11
29. In fact, schools were not always closed when their enroll
ments dropped. According to Dr. Steller, the current Superinten
dent of Schools, during the 1970's the School District closed fewer
schools than warranted by the overall decline in pupil enrollment
because school closings are always unpopular with patrons of the
District. Tr. 729.
30. In the 1972-73 school year, there were eleven "stand
alone" schools within the School District. Tr. 289 (Welch); PX 8
(tables), 13 (1972-73 enrollments). This number decreased over
the years: to nine in 1974-75, eight in 1978-79, and two in 1980-
81. PX 15, 19, 21 (enrollments).
31. In each instance, the Board of Education made the decision
whether to discontinue a stand-alone school. Sometimes this was
done because the student enrollment drawn from the school's atten
dance zone no longer fell within the racial guidelines. For exam
ple, enrollment at the North Highland Elementary School was 50%
black (grades 1-5) in 1972-73 and 66.9% black (grades 1-5) in 1973-
74, the last year it operated as a "stand-alone" K-5 facility.
PX 13-15 (enrollments). North Highland was thereafter clustered
with a group of northwestern Oklahoma City el ementary schools and
served as a fifth-year center. PX 8 (tables).
32. However, discontinuance of a "stand-alone" school did not
mean necessarily that it would become part of a cluster under the
Finger Plan: In the 1977-78 school year, total enrollment in
grades 1-5 in the School District was 30.2% black while enrollment
12
at Ross Elementary School (grades 1-5) was 4.7% black, or more
than fifteen percentage points below the district-wide proportion.
PX 18 (enrollments). The following year, students in grades 1-4
residing within a small portion of the Dewey Elementary School
attendance zone (who had previously been assigned to Quail Creek
Elementary) were shifted to Ross; the 1978-79 enrollment at Ross
(grades 1-5) was 20.0% black. PX 8 (tables), PX 19 (enrollments).
No fifth-grade students in the Ross area were assigned to Dewey;
Ross continued to serve as a "neighborhood" school for the students
(mostly white) in grades K-5 living within its attendance zone.
PX 8 (tables).
33. Nor did the Board of Education alter a school's "stand
alone" status automatically whenever its enrollment fell outside
the guidelines. For example, the enrollments at Columbus and River
side ("stand-alone" K-5 schools from 1972-73 until the 1980-81
school year) were more than 15 percentage points below the
districtwide enrollment in grades 1-5 from the 1977-78 school year
through the 1979-80 year. PX 18-20 (enrollments).6 Not until
6The trial exhibits indicate the following:
% Black, crrades 1-5
1976-77 1977-78 1978-79 1979-80
Columbus 10.6 9.7 11.4 10.4
Riverside 15.6 14.5 15.1 7.3
Districtwide 29.1 30.2 31.5 32.7
[less 15%] 14.1 15.2 16.5 17.7
13
1980- 81 did the Board change the status of these "stand-alone"
facilities. PX 8 (tables).
34. In most instances, according to the School District's ex
pert witness, "stand-alone" schools were discontinued as part of
assignment changes made by the Board of Education in other parts
of the School District. Tr. 290-91 (Welch).
35. For example, effective with the 1980-81 school year, Mark
Twain, Shidler, and Stand Watie were discontinued as "stand-alone"
facilities in conjunction with numerous other assignment shifts.
PX 20, 21 (enrollments). During the previous (1979-80) school
year, 32.7% of all students in grades 1-5 in the School District
were black. PX 20 (enrollments). Mark Twain (29.0%), Shidler
(34.4%) and Stand Watie (24.2%) all met the +/-15% guideline.
Id.? Tr. 522-26 (Hill).
36. K-5 "stand-alone" schools were also discontinued for rea
sons having nothing to do with racial proportions. For instance,
E:\gemere was eliminated as a K-5 "stand-alone" school when it be-
c. me overcrowded in the 1978-79 school year and was made a K-4
tand-alone" school (sending its fifth-grade pupils to Polk) until
1981- 82, when its attendance zone was subdivided between Edgemere
and Kaiser. DX 76, p. M-16 (Minutes of Board of Education Meeting,
July 2, 1984); PX 8 (tables)
37. Thus, if the Finger Plan required the operation of K-5
"stand-alone" schools whenever the guideline was satisfied, the
14
Board of Education did not comply with the Plan when it discon
tinued the operation of these facilities as K-5 "stand-alone"
schools, when it allowed schools to retain their "stand-alone"
status even though their enrollments fell outside the guideline,
and when it failed to establish "stand-alone" schools as attendance
zones underwent demographic change which brought them within the
guideline.
38. After discontinuance as "stand-alone" schools, Mark Twain,
along with Columbus and Riverside, became part of a cluster with
the Longfellow fifth-year center. Longfellow had previously served
as a fifth-grade center for a group of northwestern Oklahoma City
schools. PX 8 (tables). The 1980-81 reassignment, prompted by
the closing rather than the opening of "stand-alone" schools, sub
stantially increased the busing distance for black students in
grades 1-4 living within the Longfellow zone. Tr. 287-89 (Welch).
39. The current President of the Board of Education testified
that the Board did not eliminate the "stand-alone" feature of the
Finger Plan, despite the potential inequity of adhering to it,
because the community had been promised — when the Finger Plan was
ordered into effect in 1972 — that if residential neighborhoods
became integrated, neighborhood "stand-alone" schools would be cre
ated. Tr. 528 (Hill).
40. However, the evidence summarized above reflects that the
School District did not follow, nor consistently apply, any speci
fic policy with respect to the creation, maintenance or discon
15
tinuance of "stand-alone" schools after 1972. Between at least
1980 and 1985, for instance, the Board of Education did not fulfill
the "promise" of the Finger Plan to residentially integrated neigh
borhoods .
41. Decisions whether to create or discontinue "stand-alone"
facilities, and how to distribute the burdens of concomitant pupil
reassignments among black and white students, were made by the
Board of Education on an individual basis, and the Board exercised
wide discretion in every instance. Therefore, any determinations
by the Board of Education to create or eliminate "stand-alone"
schools, to fail to add grades to schools in the northeast quad
rant, to reassign pupils in such a way as to increase busing dis
tances for black children in the northeast quadrant, or in such a
way as to reduce enrollments in northeast quadrant facilities and
endanger their continued operation, were all conscious and deliber
ate choices made by the Board of Education, and no particular deci
sion may properly be regarded as required by the Finger Plan.
D. The Decision to Alter the Student Assignment Plan
42. This Court's 1975 Order required that
The Defendant School Board shall not alter or
deviate from the [Finger Plan] . . . without
the prior approval and permission of the court.
If the Defendant is uncertain concerning the
meaning of the plan, it should apply to the
court for interpretation and clarification.
16
Dowell v. Board of Education of Oklahoma Citv. 338 F. Supp. at
1273. This Court has never vacated its injunctive order.7
43. In 1975, the Board of Education filed a motion requesting
dismissal of this lawsuit on the ground that the School District
had complied with the 1972 injunctive decree. A hearing was held
on this motion on November 18, 1975.
44. At that hearing, the individual who was then President of
the Board of Education testified that the Board did not seek dis
missal of the case in order to return to segregated schools.
Rather, the district wished to eliminate what was perceived as a
limitation upon its ability to provide dynamic educational leader
ship:
[THE COURT:] The Court would like to ask you,
if the Court should terminate its jurisdiction,
will this mean that the Board will terminate
its busing program for desegregation?
THE WITNESS: No, sir.
* * *
THE WITNESS: Well, I would say that of course
we want to operate — we feel like that we
can handle our prob ems and our responsibili
ties without court • urisdiction.
70n several occasions following the entry of this Order, the
Board of Education requested the Court's approval for alterations
in feeder patterns or school closings. After the matter was
brought to the Court's attention by the Bi-Racial Committee, the
Board was also ordered to reassign principals in order to mitigate
the racial identifiability of the two high schools enrolling the
highest proportions of black students. Dowell v. Board of Educa
tion of Oklahoma Citv. No. CIV-9452 (W.D. Okla. June 3, 1974),
aff7d , No. 74-1415 (10th Cir. Jan. 28, 1975), cert, denied. 423
U.S. 824 (1975).
17
We believe very sincerely that we are operating
a unitary school system. I really believe
that the court order, the presence of the court
order stifles in a way the creativity within
the school system and I will cite one case.
When we were, as a Board, debating the innova
tive high school, the Superintendent at that
time used as a reason for us not to set up
such a program, was a concern that the Court
would reopen the entire Dowell case, hold a
hearing and reopen the whole thing, and the
fear was that the Court might order some brand
new plan on the District.
I think that this is inhibiting to people with
in the District, as far as administrative
people maybe, our staff, that feel like there
is no reason to try to have different things
sometimes because of the little fear that maybe
the Court is not going to approve it or that
it would in some way cause a shakeup within
the present plan.
Transcript of hearing at pp. 69-71.8
45. At the time the hearing was held, plaintiffs' motion for
an award of attorneys' fees was still pending. After that motion
was disposed of, 71 F.R.D. 49 (W.D. Okla. 1976), and an appeal from
this Court's award was withdrawn as part of a settlement on that
issue, this Court on January 18, 1977 entered an "Order Terminating
Case" which recited that the Finger Plan
worked and that substantial compliance with
the constitutional requirements has been
achieved. The. School Board, under the over
sight of the Court, has operated the Plan prop
erly, and the Court does not foresee that the
termination of its jurisdiction will result
in the dismantlement of the Plan or any affir
mative action by the defendant to undermine
the unitary system so slowly and painfully
8Pp. 69-70 of this transcript are included in PX 55.
18
accomplished over the 16 years during which
the cause has been pending before the Court.
. . . The Court believes that the present mem
bers and their successors on the Board will
now and in the future continue to follow the
constitutional desegregation requirements.
46. As previously noted, at least as early as 1982 the staff
of the School District brought to the attention of the Board of
Education the fact that a number of attendance areas within the
system appeared to qualify for "stand-alone" status and also the
consequences for the northeast quadrant fifth-year centers of crea
ting additional "stand-alone" centers.
47. In 1984, the Board of Education decided to establish Bodine
as a K-5 "stand-alone" school. DX 76 (Minutes of July 2, 1984
meeting).
48. When the Board of Education decided to make Bodine a K-5
"stand-alone" school, Dr. Clyde Muse, a black member, expressed
concern about the additional reassignment burden on black students
froir the northeast quadrant who were attending the school and the
potential for reducing enrollment in, and ultimately causing the
closing of, schools in the northeast quadrant. Id. at M-17, M-
18.
49. The Board of Education at its next meeting established a
study committee to consider
1) neighborhood racial makeup;
2) potential busing reduction;
3) possible boundary changes;-
4) possible grade realignments.
\ 19
At the same time, the Board voted not to reassign black students
in grades 1-4 who had previously attended Bodine Elementary School
while it was clustered with Creston Hills fifth-grade center, at
least until the study committee reported its recommendations. DX
77, p. M—13 (Minutes of Board of Education meeting of July 16,
1984) .
50. The study committee of three Board of Education members
(Dr. Muse, Mrs. Hill and Mrs. Hermes) met throughout the summer
and early fall at the administration offices of the school system.
It was provided with detailed information by the school system's
research staff on the racial composition of neighborhoods in Okla
homa City. Tr. 306-07 (Biscoe).
51. Although the committee decided "that the K-5 stand-alone
arrangement could not continue to be a part of the plan," Tr. 427
(Muse), it did not ask the research staff for a simulation of modi
fications to the Finger Plan which would establish equitable (two-
way) busing of black and white pupils in grades 1-4 because the
members had made a determination not to bus students at these grade
levels, Tr. 385 (Hermes).9
52. The committee was "trying to go back to neighborhood
schools [the method of pupil assignment utilized prior to this
9Mrs. Hermes, who in 1985 was the President of the Board of
Education, testified at the 1987 hearings that the original
approach of the Finger Plan, busing only black children in grades
1-4, was inequitable, but that busing white and black children in
those grades would not have made the plan equitable. Tr. 385-86.
20
Court's 1972 order], for the entire district, trying to treat each
neighborhood the same." Tr. 505, 521 (Hill).
53. On November 19, 1984 the committee reported its recommen
dations to the Board of Education, calling for "K-4 neighborhood
schools throughout the district." DX 79, p. M-2 (Minutes of Board
of Education meeting, November 19, 1984). The plan also included
provision for majority-to-minority student transfers, occasional
"student interaction" between pupils at the virtually all-black
schools and pupils at schools of opposite racial composition, and
for an "Equity Committee" to assure equal distribution of resources
to all schools in the District. PX 9 (plan).
54. Although the committee's report did not include a set of
projected enrollments under the plan/ the committee and the Board
of Education were aware that the elimination of the Finger Plan's
clustering approach would result 'in reestablishing elementary
schools that had heavily black or non-black student enrollments:
in presenting the committee's report, Mrs. Hill indicated that
the group had decided against recommending K-5 or K-6 ! neighborhood
schools" throughout the district in part because "the Board feels
that the fifth grade is the latest point in a student's education
where integration needs to occur . . . ." Id. at p. M-3.
55. On December 3, 1984 the Board of Education adopted modifi
cations to the plan recommended by the committee, which did not
alter the basic scheme of dismantling the Finger Plan's clustering
approach and substituting geographically zoned "neighborhood"
21
schools serving grades 1-4. DX 80 (Minutes of Board of Education
meeting, December 3, 1984).
56. The elementary school zones under the plan adopted in 1985
are the same as those used in 1971 and earlier, except for modifi
cations necessitated over the years as individual facilities were
closed. Tr. 346 (Hermes). This is apparent from a comparison of
the 1985-87 zone boundaries (PX 7) and the 1963-64 elementary
school zone boundaries (PX 3, 4).
57. The school attendance zones whose outer edges, taken to
gether, formed the boundary of the "northeast quadrant" in the
1971-72 school year, prior to the entry of the order requiring
implementation of the Finger Plan, were (proceeding clockwise):
Longfellow, Edison, Creston Hills, Garden Oaks, Edwards, Dunbar,
Woodson, Page, Lincoln, and Dewey. (Each of these schools was
more than 90% black). PX 5 (1968-72 attendance areas), PX 41
(table).
58. The edges of the attend?nee zones of the following virtu
ally all-black elementary schoof s (more than 90% black in student
enrollment in 1985-87) today define, as the northeast quadrant,
the same area as in 1972: Longfellow, Creston Hills, Garden Oaks,
Edwards, Lincoln, and Dewey. The area contained within these
bounds is identical to the area described in the preceding finding.
PX 7 (map), PX 41 (table).
22
59. The Board of Education conducted several public meetings
on the new pupil assignment recommendations. About one-third of
the patrons attending the meetings opposed the new plan. Tr. 511
(Hill) .
60. Parents and citizens of Oklahoma City told the Board of
Education that they objected to the plan because it would result
in re-segregating the district's elementary schools. PX 56 (Min
utes of Board of Education meeting, December 10, 1984).
61. The President of the Oklahoma City Urban League, Leonard
Benton, said that the original Finger Plan "was unfair in that
black children had to be bused grades 1-4 and white did not" and
that "if we are not going to have two-way busing, then students
should be allowed to stay in their own neighborhoods." Id. at p.
M-5; Tr. 512 (Hill).
62. On December 17, 1984 the Board of Education adopted the
plan for implementation commencing with the 1985-86 school year.
DX 95 (Minutes of Board of Education meeting).
63. On April 25, 1985, this Court denied plaintiffs' request
to reopen ".he case and for injunctive relief preventing the Board
of Education from implementing the new plan. Dowell v. Board of
Education. 606 F. Supp. 1548 (W.D. Okla.. 1985).
23
E . Results Under the 1985 Plan
(1) Pupil enrollment
64. Implementation of the "neighborhood" plan in the 1985-86
school year created racially identifiable schools which are over
90% black and white. Tr. 419 (Hermes).
65. In the 1985-86 school year there were 30 such elementary
schools, and in the 1986-87 school year there were 26 such schools.
PX 41 (table).
66. This included eleven schools with enrollments in excess
of 90% black students:
School % Black Enrollment
1985-86 1986-87
Creston Hills 98.8 99.4
Dewey 97.1 97.9
Edwards 99.3 100.0
Garden Oaks 98.8 98.0
King 99.5 99.5
Lincoln 97.5 99.1
Longfellow 99.3 98.9
North Highland 96.3 97.6
Parker 97.3 97.0
Polk 97.7 99.5
Truman 99.3 99.7
Id.
67. All of these schools except Parker and North Highland are
located in the northeast quadrant, and all except North Highland
were virtually all-black schools in the 1971-72 school year, just
prior to the entry of this Court's order to implement the Finger
Plan. Id.
24
68. Although the Board of Education determined to close seven
elementary schools for budgetary reasons at the end of the 1986-
87 school year, the pattern of virtually one-race schools will
not be substantially altered. Of the schools with more than 90%
black student enrollments, Lincoln and Truman will be closed and
Dunbar will be reopened. PX 28, DX 62 (projections).
69. In the 1985-86 school year, 44.7% of all black students
in grades 1-4 attended schools with enrollments greater than 90%
black10; in the 1986-87 school year, 42.7% of all black students
in these grades were assigned to schools more than 90% black.11
PX 26, 27 (enrollments).12
70. Implementation of the 1985 plan resulted in a substantial
rise in the dissimilarity index, especially among elementary
schools, from the level to which it had fallen after the Finger
Plan was put into effect. Tr. 186-87 (Welch); DX 44, 45 (tables
and graphs)
71. Defendants' expert witness prepared an exhibit (DX 38)
comparing the current school racial composition dissimilarity index
10If North Highland is excluded from these calculations 'since
it was not a virtually all-black school in 1971-72), 40.1% cf all
black students in grades 1-4 attended historically all-black ele
mentary schools which once again had enrollments above 90% black.
^Excluding North Highland (see preceding footnote), 36.9% of
all black students in grades 1-4 were attending historically black
elementary schools with enrollments greater than 90% black.
12Dr. Foster calculated, based on the October 31, 1986 enroll
ment print-out, that 46% of black students in grades 1-4 were at
tending schools more than 90% black. Tr. 1298.
25
in the Oklahoma City School District to the respective indices
for other school districts in comparably sized SMSAs. The Court
accepts Dr. Welch's calculations but does not find the chart to
be of much assistance in this matter, since Dr. Welch was not aware
whether or not the districts with which Oklahoma City was compared
are carrying out a conscious desegregation effort, either on a
voluntary basis or because of a prior finding of constitutional
violation. Furthermore, he had not compared the results achieved
in those districts which were carrying out plans to those antici
pated when the plans were drawn up or implemented. Tr. 2 67-69
(Welch).
72. Dr. Welch also prepared an exhibit (DX 39) comparing the
dissimilarity index of the School District to a group of school
systems which were identified as "unitary" districts in a press
release issued by the U.S. Department of Justice. The value of
this exhibit also is very minimal. Dr. Welch did not know what
the Justice Department's criteria were for classification as a
"unitary" district. Moreover, both tae exhibit and the Depart
ment's listing, on which it was based, .nclude school systems later
found by a United States Court of Appea.s not to have reached "uni
tary status." Tr. 271, 279-80, 283 (Welch); DX 39 (table); Georgia
State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia. 775 F.2d 1403,
1413-14 (11th Cir. 1985).
73. Several months before the hearing in this case, Dr. Welch
testified in another federal desegregation suit that he "doubt[ed]
26
seriously" that a school system with ten virtually all-black ele
mentary schools would be a "unitary system." Tr. 272-78 (Welch).
The exhibit which Dr. Welch prepared, however, includes not only
Oklahoma City but also Norfolk, Virginia, which has that number of
virtually all-black schools. Tr. 271; DX 39 (table).
74. Dr. Gordon Foster, plaintiffs' desegregation expert, tes
tified that in his opinion, the 1985 plan created a segregated
school system despite the continued operation of integrated schools
serving the fifth and higher grades. Tr. 1265.
75. Dr. John Finger, the author of the plan implemented in
1972 pursuant to this Court's direction, stated that the 1985 plan
"has not maintained desegregated schools" in Oklahoma City. Tr.
1186.
(2) Faculty assignments
76. After the 1985-86 "neighborhood" school pupil assignment
plan was implemented, the pattern of faculty assignments within
the School District also began to change. Between the 1984-85
school year and the 1987-88 school year, "the blacker schools in
enrollment became much blacker in percentage black faculty, while
in the schools v; th the least black enrollment, the faculty becomes
less black." Tr. 1270 (Foster), 551 (Moore).
77. The pattern is clearly revealed in plaintiffs' exhibits
48, 50, 52 and 54. By 1986-87, the proportions of individual
school faculties that were black, at northeast quadrant K-4 schools
27
with enrollments over 90% black, were substantially higher than
they had been under the Finger Plan:
School % Black Facultv
1972-73 1984-85 1985-86 1986-
Creston Hills 28 48 57 43
Dewey 21 15 48 42
Dunbar 25 29 36
Edwards 15 48 65 70
Garden Oaks 39 48 40 50
Lincoln 21 55 49 64
Longfellow 20 16 31 38
North Highland 19 34 39 38
Parker 22 29 44 46
Polk 19 32 43 46
Truman 32 42 33 44
PX 48 (table).
78. Plaintiffs' exhibits 50, 52 and 54 each give the percentage
of the elementary schools' faculties which were black, and the per
centage of the schools' student bodies which were black, for the
1984-85, 1985-86 and 1986-87 school years, respectively — ranked
in order of proportion of faculty which was black. Immediately
after adoption of the 1985 and increasing in the 1986-87 school
year, there was an obvious pattern. In 1986-87, of the ten ele
mentary schools with the highest proportions of black faculty,
nine had student enrollments more than 90% black. The other two
schools more than with more than 90%-black student bodies were
ranked 14th and 17th, respectively (of a total of 64 elementary
schools), in percentage of black faculty members. PX 50, 52, 54
(tables).
79. These patterns developed despite the Board of Education's
official policy calling for racially non-identifiable faculties,
28
and despite memoranda sent periodically to building administrators
from the school system's Affirmative Action Officer, reminding
them of the policy. DX 88, pp. 29-30 (1985 Affirmative Action
Plan), DX 191 (February, 1987 memoranda to school principals from
Linda Johnson).
80. The School District's Executive Director of Personnel Ser
vices testified that teacher transfers under the plan adopted by
the Board of Education in 1985 were responsible for the pattern
of racially identifiable faculties. Tr. 551 (Moore).
81. On April 22, 1987, well after this matter had been sched
uled for trial and after the question of faculty assignments had
become an issue between the parties,13 the Board of Education adop
13 [On February 25, 1987, plaintiffs submitted Answers to
Interrogatories propounded by the Board of Education. In response
to an inquiry (No. 8) about facts supporting a contention that
the School District is not "unitary," plaintiffs said, in part:
The Board of Education has also assigned fac
ulty in a manner which reinforces the racial
identity of these schools. Although the 1986-
87 FTE elementary school faculty is 28% Black,
the average proportion of Black faculty members
assigned to these ten schools is 49%. Only
one other elementary school in the system has
a higher proportion of Black faculty than this:
Telstar, with a current 65%-Black faculty and
a 59.7%-Black student body. Only one of the
ten schools has a faculty which is less than
4 0% Black (Longfellow, 38% Black) , but in addi
tion to Telstar, only two other elementary
schools in the system have faculties more than
40% Black: Willow Brook, with a 42%-Black
faculty and a 51.5%-Black student enrollment;
and Hawthorne, with a 41%-Black faculty and a
19.2%-Black student body.
Plaintiffs' Answers to Defendants' Interrogatories, at p. 13.]
29
ted a new policy limiting transfers among schools by teachers.
Under this new policy, no transfer reguest would be approved unless
it contributed to maintenance of the system's goal of non-identi-
fiable faculties at all schools. DX 193 (staff memorandum to
Superintendent), 194 (Minutes of Board of Education meeting of
April 22, 1987).
82. Plaintiffs' expert witness testified that the new policy,
if implemented, would be adequate to deal with the problem of fac
ulty assignments which had occurred after the 1985 plan was adop
ted. Tr. 1276 (Foster).
(3) Maioritv-to-minoritv transfers
83. Under the 1985 plan, majority-to-minority transfers are
available to students, but these transfers have not resulted in
desegregating the schools in the northeast quadrant. Tr. 609
(Mason).
84. In the 1985-86 school year, 332 students transferred under
the majority-to-minority provision; in the 1986-87 school year
this number dropped to 181 children. Neai ly all the transfers
were made by black students. Tr. 349 (Hermes), 1235 (Taylor); DX
108 (tables).
85. Except for an initial letter to parents at the time the
1985 pupil reassignment plan was adopted, the Board of Education
has not sought to promote the use of majority-to-minority trans
fers. Tr. 327 (Biscoe).
30
86. The Chair of the Equity Committee established under the
1985 plan testified that he understood that the purpose of the
provision was to permit parents to send their children wherever
they wished, and that he and his wife used it "for convenience."
Tr. 837 (Bender) .
(4) Academic achievement
87. Extensive evidence was introduced at the hearing about
the academic performance of Oklahoma City pupils, both black and
white, on standardized achievement tests before and after imple
mentation of the 1985 pupil reassignment plan. DX 161-64, 172,
179-85 (tables and graphs).
88. Defendants contend that adoption of "neighborhood" schools
stimulated a variety of other changes, such as increased parental
participation, which have improved performance. The Court finds
it is not possible to evaluate these claims at the present time,
for a number of reasons.
89. About the same time as the 1985 pupil assignment plan was
implemented, the School District began to carry out an Effective
Schools program of instruction involving specific staff training
and pedagogical approaches. DX 131, 151-54. It is not possible
to isolate the impact of the pupil assignment change separately
from the impact of these improved instructional procedures. For
example, defendants' expert witness testified that gains result
ing from increased parental involvement and the Effective Schools
31
program might have masked losses, if any, resulting from the rees
tablishment of virtually all-black schools. Tr. 947-48 (Walberg).
90. A recent national study of standardized test score infor
mation reaches a similar conclusion:
Although a large number of diverse factors
have been suggested as causes of the recent
trends [in scores on achievement tests], many
analysts are confident that one or a few fac
tors can account for much of the change shown
by test scores over the past two decades.
Moreover, many analysts believe that factors
of a single type are responsible for these
changes. The majority of them looks among
educational factors for an explanation, while
a smaller and less influential group expects
the answer to be found in noneducational fac
tors such as demographic trends and changes
in students' use of alcohol and other drugs.
The available evidence, however, paints a much
more complicated picture. The trends most
likely resulted from the combined effects of
numerous factors, both educational and non
educational. . . .
* * *
Trends in average test scores have become a
common criterion for gauging the effectiveness
of educational programs. The link between
trends in test scores and educational policies,
however, is far less straightforward than many
people assume. Even when test data are suffi
cient to provide reliable information about
students' achievement, they can lead to erro
neous inferences about the effectiveness of
educational programs.
Congressional Budget Office, Educational Achievement: Explanations
and Implications of Recent Trends xi-xii, xv (August, 1987).14
14[This study was released after the hearing in this matter.
A copy of the report is being furnished to the Court and to counsel
for defendants along with these proposed Findings of Fact and Con
clusions of Law.]
32
91. Plaintiffs' expert witness testified that while the post-
1985 plan data were limited and not conclusive, they indicated
cause for concern about the possible negative impact of the assign
ment changes. Tr. 999-1003 (Crain).
92. Dr. Finger concurred that it was too early to draw con
clusions about program effectiveness on the basis of only a year
or two of test scores. Tr. 1191 (Finger).
93. The parties also disagreed about the impact of desegrega
tion on pupil achievement. Dr. Robert Crain, plaintiffs' expert
witness, has concluded on the basis of his research studies that
segregation in schools inhibits the academic performance of minor
ity children, and that the positive effects of integration on aca
demic achievement are greatest at the early grade levels. Tr.
971-73, 976-77. Defendants' witnesses, Dr. Herbert Walberg and
Dr. William Sampson, disagree with Dr. Crain's interpretation of
the available research evidence. Tr. 913-15 (Walberg), 1458-59
(Sampson).
94. The Court need not resolve this disagreement among the
experts. Defendants' witnesses, both lay and expert, stated that
the Effective Schools program could be carried out in the School
District in conjunction with a desegregation plan for grades 1-4
and did not depend upon the "neighborhood school" assignment method
adopted by the Board of Education in 1985. Tr. 693 (Hughes), 901
(Lane), 944 (Walberg).
33
95. Dr. Crain described numerous benefits other than those
relating to academic performance on standardized tests, which are
associated with attending integrated schools. Tr. 986-93.
96. The same effects of desegregation were referred to by Mrs.
Luper and Senator Porter, each of whom had the experience of send
ing children to public schools in Oklahoma City which were first
segregated and then were desegregated. Tr. 1398-1400, 1405
(Luper); 1425-30 (Porter).
(5) Parental participation
97. Defendants also contend that there was a drastic drop in
PTA and parental participation after implementation of the Finger
Plan in 1972, and that there has been a marked increase in the
last two years in parental participation in school and PTA activ
ities which is attributable to the 1985 adoption of a "neighbor
hood school" plan at the elementary grade levels, and which "is
one of many reasons for returning to racially-identifiable schools
in Oklahoma City." Tr. 599, 618 (Mason). The evidence introduced
at the hearing fails to support this argument.
98. The Board member who was President in 1985, when the pupil
assignment plan was adopted, testified that the .ncrease in PTA
participation after that time was attributable to the efforts of
Mrs. Billie Oldham. Tr. 362 (Hermes).15
15In addition, Mrs. Hermes testified that she could not recall
any efforts by the Board of Education or school staff prior to
1985 to increase PTA participation among parents — efforts which
are now being made as part of the system's Effective Schools pro-
34
99. Mrs. Oldham also testified at the hearings. She served
the previous two school years as district-wide PTA Council Presi
dent and helped organize active PTA chapters at individual schools
throughout the School District; for several years prior to that
time, there had been no functioning PTA Council. Tr. 865-67 (Old
ham) .
100. Another witness who has long been active in school system
affairs also identified the disbanding of the PTA Council as a
major factor in the post-1981 decline in PTA activity shown on
defendants' exhibits 138-40. Tr. 778 (Leveridge).
101. Defendants' claims are also inconsistent with the decline
in PTA participation even at elementary schools in white neighbor
hoods of Oklahoma City which served as "neighborhood schools" for
students in grades K-4 under the Finger Plan. Tr. 602 (Mason),
858--59 (Brown), 867 (Oldham). One of the School District's admini
strators attributed this decline to an overall negative image of
the school system held by patrons irrespective of their color.
Tr. 610 (Mason).
102. In addition, witnesses agreed that other factors such as
economic declines, the rise in single-parent families, and the
increased participation of women in the work force, could have
gram. Tr. 364. Mrs. Luper testified that increased PTA involve
ment depends on the efforts made by the school system, not on the
method of student assignment. Tr. 1413-14.
35
been responsible, at least in part, for the reduction in PTA activ
ity in the 1970's and 1980's. Tr. 600-01 (Mason), 780 (Leveridge).
(5) White Flight
103. The Board of Education also asserts that the Finger Plan
caused massive "white flight" from the School District which would
be repeated if mandatory two-way busing of children in grades 1-4
were implemented, resulting in resegregation of the system. Pre-
Trial Order, Defendants' Contentions, p. 7; Tr. 440 (Muse).
104. Exhibits and testimony introduced at the hearing indicate
that the white student population of the School District has been
steadily declining since at least 1970. DX 15-20 (tables and
graphs); Tr. 143-53 (Welch).
105. Defendants' expert witness testified that even in the ab
sence of the Finger Plan, the number of white students in the
School District would have declined — that "between 1968 and 1984,
I think I say in the commission report, the number of white stu
dents nationally dropped by about 20 percent." Tr, 257 (Welch).
106. The same witness confirmed that he had stated in an inter
view that "the trend towards suburbanization is a more important
factor than desegregation in the growing racial isolation in cen
tral city schools." Tr. 258-59 (Welch).
107. The proportion of the School District's total enrollment
which was black grew from 22.9% to 39.3% between 1970 and 1986,
while the proportion of the District's enrollment in grades K-5
36
which was black underwent a smaller change from 23.4% to 36.6% in
the same period of time. Tr. 262 (Welch); PX 47.
108. Although the defendants' expert witness attributed this
difference to the substantial withdrawal of white students from
the School District prior to the fifth grade, the first year during
which white children were bused for desegregation under the Finger
Plan, in 1985 the Board of Education decided to retain busing in
grades 5-12. Tr. 151 (Welch); PX 9 (plan).
109. Factors other than the desegregation of the Oklahoma City
Public Schools stimulated the relocation of the School District's
white population after 1970. Tr. 1435-36 (Porter).16 Although the
defendants' expert witness, when directly questioned on the sub
ject, stated that implementation of a desegregation plan under
which children in grades 1-4 were bused would cause white flight,
_16Determining the extent to which white families would have
remained_ in the School District had the Constitution permitted
the continued maintenance of segregated schools in 1972 is fraught
with risk of error. In Riddick v. School Board of Norfolk. 784
F.2d 521 (4th Cir.), cert, denied. 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986), the court
approved the board's plan for "neighborhood” elementary schools
which reestablished some ten virtually all-black schools, in part
based upon the board's contention that the earlier mandatory deseg
regation plan (using busing) had caused "white flight" which would
be ended and reversed by the return to geographic zoning. A
recently completed study based on the same survey methodology used
by Dr. David Armor to justify the "neighborhood school" plan in
that case indicates that school integration may not have been an
important factor in relocation decisions — and that ending busing
had not caused an influx of white families back into the Norfolk
public_schools. Institute for the Study of Minority Issues, Some
Preliminary Results of a Survey on the Issue of Busina for Racial
Integration in Norfolk, Virginia (July, 1987). [A copy of this
study, completed after the hearing in this matter, is being fur
nished to the court and counsel along with these proposed find
ings and conclusions.]
37
he had not identified school desegregation as a major factor influ
encing the patterns of residential segregation in cities. Tr. 84
(Clark).
110. Plaintiffs' expert witnesses would not recommend limiting
desegregation efforts because of white pupil loss unless an entire
school system was heavily black. Tr. 1100 (Crain), 1346-47 (Fos
ter) .
F. Residential Patterns in Oklahoma City
111. As noted above, the Court has previously found in this
case that areas of Oklahoma City were earmarked for residence by
blacks through racially discriminatory official policies and ac
tions of private entities and governmental officials, and that
these segregated patterns were exacerbated by the actions of school
authorities in maintaining a virtually completely segregated school
system until entry of the 1972 Order. Also as noted above, the
segregated residential patterns which existed in Oklahoma City in
1972 made the School District's "neighborhood school" assignment
plan inadequate to meet its constitutional responsibilities to
dismantle the dual system it had long maintained.
112. Defendants' expert witness testified that areas oice estab
lished as minority residential zones by discrimination are unlikely
to change in racial composition until their minority residents
depart because whites are so strongly disinclined to move into
such areas. For this reason, except for results achieved by such
devices as majority-to-minority transfers, racially identifiable
38
schools serving such areas also will not change. Tr. 106-07
(Clark).
113. Current residential patterns in Oklahoma City bear out
this opinion. The northeast quadrant was the location of the ori
ginal black residential concentration within Oklahoma City and
remains heavily disproportionately black today. Tr. 66, 93-94
(Clark), 1129-31 (Rabin).
114. This area included most of the virtually all-black elemen
tary schools in 1971-72 and includes most of the virtually all
black elementary schools today. Tr. 93-94 (Clark), 1135 (Rabin);
PX 5 (1968-72 attendance areas), PX 7 (map), PX 41 (table).
115. One of defendants' expert witnesses attempted to project
what the racial composition of attendance areas within the School
District would be in 1995 — portraying significant increases in
integration throughout the system. DX 11, 14, 40, 89 (tables, maps
and graphs).
116. The Court find that these projections are not sufficiently
reliable to serve as a basis for decisionmaking in this case.
The projections suggest, for exairj le, that white families with
school-age children will relocate into the northeast quadrant by
1995, a claim which directly contradicts the testimony of another
expert witness called by the Board -of Education. Tr. 252-53
(Welch), 106-07 (Clark).
39
117. There has been no significant movement of white residents
into the area of the city into which blacks were originally con
centrated; rather, that area has expanded in population and geo
graphic size. Tr. 45, 93-94 (Clark), 388-89 (Hermes), 1127-31
(Rabin); DX 1-4, 5A (maps and overlay), 12-13 (maps); PX 58, 60,
62 (maps).
118. The projections may best be characterized, in the words
of the witness, as "fuzzy numbers" or "guesstimates" produced by
a complicated series of calculations, at each stage of which the
witness employed a different methodology to produce a series of
estimates which would, the witness hoped, withstand cross-examina
tion. Tr. 229-48 (Welch).
119. The methodology was not verified by applying it to earlier
data so as to project enrollments in 1986-87 and then checking
these projections against the actual enrollment figures. Tr. 249-
50 (Welch).
120. Indeed, the basic approach (regression estimates) tends,
according to :he witness, to fail to predict the extremes; as a
result, it wovld tend to underestimate the extent to which virtu
ally all-blacic schools would continue in 1995. Tr. 254-55 (Welch).
121. Contrary to the circumstances existing in 1972, at least
a small number of blacks now resides in most of the attendance
zones within the School District, including formerly all-white
40
areas of the city. Tr. 53-54, 60-61 (Clark); DX 1-4, 5A (maps
and overlay), 12-13 (maps); PX 58, 60, 62 (maps).
122. Among the factors responsible for the relocation of black
residents within and outside the northeast quadrant are public
redevelopment programs and highway construction, both of which
have eliminated residential units previously occupied by black
persons in Oklahoma City. Tr. 68 (Clark), 1154, 1158, 1162
(Rabin).
123. The availability of public housing outside the northeast
quadrant was also a factor which enabled black families to relocate
from that area. Tr. 60, 77 (Clark).
124. Defendants' expert witness, Dr. Clark, testified that in
his opinion, past discriminatory practices are not a significant
factor affecting the racial composition of neighborhoods in Okla
homa City today. Tr. 89, 100. Based upon this thesis, the Board
of Education contends that although readoption in 1985 of the pre-
1972 elementary school attendance zones results in virtually all
black student enrollments in northeast quadrant elementary schools
which were all-black or virtually all-black prior to 1972, this
is either a coincidence or the result of the exercise of a now-
available unfettered choice of residential locations by Oklahoma
City's citizenry, including blacks. Pre-Trial Order, Defendants'
Contentions, p. 5.
41
125. The Court finds neither Dr. Clark's testimony nor the posi
tion of the Board of Education to be credible.
126. Dr. Clark's opinions are not based upon a historical study
of Oklahoma City. Instead, he characterized them as "a fairly
standard explanation for the development of black concentrations
in the central cities of North American metropolitan areas." Tr.
95-96. Most of Dr. Clark's professional work, however, has focused
on the post-World War II era. Tr. 50 (Clark).
127. Although Dr. Clark admits that there was discrimination
against black people in the past, he believes that its impact was
limited and ceased to have much effect quite a long time ago.
Thus, for example, he suggested that the reasons why blacks lived
in a densely settled, concentrated area of the northeast quadrant
in 1950 were (a) the availability of jobs in the downtown area,
(b) preferences of blacks to live near other blacks and the infor
mation network among blacks available to those seeking to relocate,
(c) the availability of cheaper housing in the area, "having been
vacated by other families who had moved out," and (d) ordinances
which in the 1930's had "attempted to concentrate black househoclcs
in certain parts of the city." Tr. 45-46 (emphasis added).
128. This explanation utterly fails to attach adequate weight
to the longstanding and pervasive discriminatory practices of pri
vate entities and governmental bodies which this Court has identi
fied in its earlier opinions. Thus, in assessing the continuing
impact of earlier discrimination upon the current residential pat
42
terns within Oklahoma City, Dr. Clark starts from a position which
underestimates the importance of discrimination as a cause of the
segregated residential patterns that were evident more than thirty-
five years ago.
129. Dr. Clark minimizes the impact of restrictive covenants
on the maintenance of white areas in Oklahoma City. However, he
was not aware whether Oklahoma courts had enforced covenants by
cancelling deeds executed in favor of black purchasers by willing
sellers. Tr. 96, 98.
130. In fact, trial court decrees cancelling deeds or leases
freely executed in favor of blacks, when the instruments violated
restrictive covenants, were affirmed on at least three occasions
by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in the 1940's. Hemslev v. Houah.
157 P.2d 182 (Okla. 1945); Hemslev v. Sage. 154 P.2d 577 577 (Okla.
1944) Lyons v. Wallen. 133 P.2d 555 (Okla. 1941).
131. The importance of covenant enforcenent as a matter of the
State's public policy was also reflected in the enactment of a
statute explicitly providing that restr:. ztive covenants should
survive foreclosure and sale for non-paymer.t of taxes. Okla. Stat.
Ann. § 456; see Dowell v. School Board of Oklahoma City Public
Schools, 219 F. Supp. at 433 (W.D. Okla. 1963) .
132. Dr. Clark suggested that the Supreme Court's decision in
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) and the Oklahoma Supreme
Court's decision in Correll v. Easlev. 237 P.2d 1017 (Okla. 1951)
43
were "very important in changing the patterns — of allowing the
patterns to change" in Oklahoma City. Tr. 89. However, while
Dr. Clark understood that the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Correll
followed Shelley and refused to cancel a deed to black purchasers,
he was unaware that the Court nevertheless sustained an award of
damages against the white seller, 237 P.2d at 1021,17 and he had
not considered whether such damages awards tended to make property
owners reluctant to sell in violation of restrictive covenants.
Tr. 99-100.
133. Another indication of Dr. Clark's failure to appreciate
the strength and persistence of past discrimination was apparent
with respect to the role of the Federal Housing Administration.
Dr. Clark estimates that the assets of white families were as much
as ten times as high as the assets of black families after World
War II, when FHA financing was a factor in suburban expansion,
and he agrees that because down payments for FHA-financed housing
were lower than those required for conventional financing, the
availability of FHA loans could make the difference in ability to
move to the suburbs for a family with limited assets. Tr. 86, 107-
09. But, while Dr. :lark was aware of language in the FHA under
writing manual up t: 1949 which, he said, "did not encourage the
movement into -- well, black households into white neighborhoods,"
he was unaware of what FHA's practices were after 1949. Tr. 110.
17The Supreme Court of the United States prohibited such dam
age awards by state courts in Barrows v, Jackson. 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
44
134. It is instructive to compare Dr. Clark's limited knowledge
of FHA's discriminatory practices — which in part undergirds his
opinion about the continuing effect of past discrimination — with
the findings of another court:
By deliberate policy the Federal Housing Admin
istration encouraged the institution and
perpetuation of segregated housing. This was
the avowed FHA policy from its beginning until
well after the end of World War II. Only in
19 4 7 did the FHA remove the caveats in its
underwriters' manual advising appraisers about
the dangers of "inharmonious racial groups."
Somewhat disingenuously, the phrase "inhar
monious user groups: was substituted. No pol
icy change was intended, nor did one occur at
that time. (K-26)
* * *
[T]he federal discriminatory policies
spread as well to private builders and lend
ers. Such a tendency was bolstered by the
echange of personnel between the FHA and the
private lending industry. The current FHA
Commissioner formerly was president of the
National Association of Home Builders. (K-28)
Policies fixed during the initial years of
the FHA spread and have endured to have a sub
stantial effect on the current housing market
practices.
Bradley v. School Board of Richmond. 338 F. Supp. 67, 217 (E.D.
Va.), rev'd on other grounds. 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972), aff'd
by equally divided court. 412 U.S. 92 (1973).
135. Dr. Clark also testified that his opinion on the lack of
any persisting impact of prior discrimination was based, in part,
upon blacks' responses to questions on two surveys which he con
ducted in the course of school desegregation cases involving Kansas
City, Missouri and Little Rock, Arkansas. Tr. 101-02.
45
136. The surveys, asked respondents whether they had been dis
criminated against when seeking housing. While Dr. Clark admitted
that minority homeseekers could be subjected to discriminatory
treatment without their knowledge (for example, a family might be
shown housing only in minority neighborhoods or might not receive
information about other available properties — but might purchase
a property which they were shown and so withdraw from the market
without every becoming aware of the discriminatory treatment), he
could not recall the wording of the survey questions and thus could
not state unequivocally that they would have been likely to result
in respondents identifying subtle, as well as overt, instances of
discrimination. Tr. 102-03.
136. The validity of drawing the conclusion, based upon these
survey responses, that racial discrimination is no longer a force
in the housing market, is thrown into question by the lack of any
comparative data indicating how minority homeseekers would have
responded to similar surveys in earlier time periods when discrim
ination was pervasive. Tr. 112 (Clark).
138. In sum, Dr. Clark's testimony revealed that he is generally
unfamiliar with the manifestations and extent of racial discrimi
nation in the American housing market. His imperfect understanding
of the mechanisms of bias inevitably skews, and renders less cred
ible, his assessment of the extent to which past discriminatory
practices continue to exert a strong impact upon racial residential
patterns today, in Oklahoma City or elsewhere in the United States.
46
139. Other witnesses, who are active in seeking to combat hous
ing bias in the Oklahoma City area, testified that discriminatory
practices continue today, although they are more subtle and less
overt — and that minority homeseekers are often not aware that
they have been discriminated against. Tr. 314-15 (Biscoe), 1168,
1170, 1177-78 (Silovsky).
140. The Executive Director of the Metropolitan Fair Housing
Council of Greater Oklahoma City (which conducts "tests" and as
sists individuals who feel that they may have been the victims of
discrimination) , who has been in her position for the past eight
years and is familiar with housing bias in Oklahoma City, disagreed
with Dr. Clark's opinion that racial discrimination is no longer
a factor in determining where people live in Oklahoma City. She
testified that "steering continues to determine where people live,
where people buy homes." Tr. 1166, 1171-72 (Silovsky). The Court
believes that her testimony is entitled to much greater weight
than Dr. Clark's opinions for the reasons discussed above.
141. The Court also credits her opinion that tie current racial
composition of the northeast quadrant is directl y related to the
pervasive discriminatory practices of the past upon which this
Court remarked in its earlier decisions. Tr. 1172-73 (Silovsky).
142. Dr. Clark also identifies "preferences" -- attitudes,
rather than behavior (which he characterizes as "discrimination")
— as an important determinant of current, racially largely separ
47
ate, residential distribution in urban areas. He includes "preju
dice" within the category of "preferences." Tr. 84, 113.
143. Nevertheless, Dr. Clark does not see a connection between
the widespread official discriminatory policies of the past and
today's "preferences" or "prejudices" which may, for example, take
the form of strong aversion on the part of whites to moving into
established minority neighborhoods. Tr. 111.18 This also obvi
1SDr. Clark discounted the nexus by pointing to homogeneous
residential patterns among ethnic groups in Los Angeles:
Q. Now, Doctor Clark, if I can return to the
subject of preferences, and particularly the
white disinclination to move into areas of
minority residential concentration.
In your view, are those preferences related
to prior official discriminatory policies of
governmental agencies, both to their tangible
and symbolic value?
A. I would say that there is probably some
effect of the past, but how much, in my opin
ion, —
Let me restate that.
But the amount, in my opii ion, is probably
small, because we see other ethnic groups,
and in my own city is a good example. Of these
other ethnic groups, like tie Vietnamese, the
Koreans, the Japanese, having quite high levels
of preference for people of their own race.
The Hispanics also.
Tr. 111. Although there are no actual data before the Court, it
is apparent that most of the groups to which Dr. Clark referred
include large numbers of recent immigrants or even illegal aliens,
who would not be expected to disperse residentially until later
generations. See generally K. & A. Taeuber, Nearoes in Cities
16-17, 68 (1965).
48
ously affected his evaluation of the continuing impact of prior
discrimination on current housing patterns in Oklahoma City.
144. The other significant explanatory factor mentioned by Dr.
Clark was economic status. Although he recognized that there are
still very substantial economic differentials between black and
white families, Dr. Clark stated that any determination of the
relationship between prior discrimination against blacks and their
current economic status is beyond his area of expertise. Tr. 84,
107, 114. Here, too, Dr. Clark's failure to weigh the contribution
of past discrimination to the creation of racial differences which,
he acknowledges, are responsible for the very substantial degree
of racial residential separation which exists today, drains his
analysis of its probative value.
145. The Court credits the conclusions of plaintiffs' expert
witness, Dr. Taylor, who has studied the ways in which institu
tional practices may perpetuate the effects of past discriminatory
policies and actions, that "Oklahoma City has a history of racial
segregation;;, ] exclusion and discrimination, and that history
worked to shape the institutional patterns that are evident in
Oklahoma City today." Tr. 1222.
146. While Dr. Clark and Dr. Taylor "agree that economic re
sources and preferences are important influences on residential
decisions," Dr. Taylor correctly characterizes Dr. Clark's inter
pretation as holding that these factors are "incidental individual
matters, and I think this view suffers from taking — from having
49
a limited perspective on the impact of discrimination over time."
Tr. 1228-29.
147. It is Dr. Taylor's opinion, which the Court accepts,
that economic resources and preferences are
proximate causes of residential segregation,
but they are also effects of past officially-
produced residential segregation. In that
sense, they're intervening links. They help
to explain why the black residential area,
once it was created through official segrega
tion, continues to exist even in the absence
of continuing official action.
Tr. 1229.19
19As Dr. Taylor explained:
Q. Well, what about Doctor Clark's suggestion
that these circumstances — the movement demon
strates that residents of Oklahoma City can
now live wherever they want, and those who
remain in the northeast quadrant are there by
preference and not because of any impact of
discrimination?
A. Uh-huh. I don't share Doctor Clark's view
on that. I think there are continuing barriers
to the residential mobility of black residents.
Certainly economic factors present a barrier
to the residential mobility of black residents.
The median family income of black Americans
continues to be substantially below the median
family income for white Americans. And when
we look at assets, the economic disparities
between whites and blacks are compounded.
An important point about this is that economic
scarcity is not just an incidental extraneous
accident that befalls black individuals. The
economic scarcity disproportionately afflicts
black Americans, largely because of institu
tionally-created and often officially-created
segregation in schools and housing.
So one barrier to black mobility is economic
disadvantage that derives, in part, from a
history of segregated schools and housing.
50
148. Dr. Taylor is in accord with Dr. Clark's view that most
whites will not move into established minority residential areas
but unlike Dr. Clark, sees this phenomenon as directly linked to
past discrimination and segregation. Tr. 1231-34.
149. Dr. Taylor's conclusions are consonant with the Supreme
Court's recognition in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education, 402 U.S. 1, 20 (1971) that when public agencies, includ
ing school boards, choose to implement discriminatory policies,
"[o]ver the long run, the consequences of the choices will be far-
Another barrier to exodus from the black com
munity is something that's been referred to
in the literature as the perpetuation of segre
gation phenomenon. Black individuals who have
experienced segregated schooling tend to have
fewer contacts with whites, they tend to feel
poorly received in white settings, to be appre
hensive about discrimination, to perceive more
discrimination than black individuals who were
educated in desegregated schools. . . .
* * * *
. . . I think this perception is another resi
due then of experience in a segregated setting,
and it, in fact, is an important barrier to
the residential mobility of people whose exper
ience has been -- black people whose experience
has been in segregated settings.
* * *
. . . [T]he sense that one will not be welcome
in a white setting is certainly going to affect
the preferences of black individuals about
whether to attempt to move into that white
setting.
Tr. 1226-28.
51
reaching," as well as with numerous other judicial decisions in
discrimination cases.
150. Based upon a consideration of all of the testimony on this
subject, the Court finds that the racial composition of the north
east quadrant today is, at the very least in significant part,
the product of past discriminatory practices, just as it was in
1972. As Dr. Taylor summarized the situation:
[I]n 19 65, the Court noted that thes segregated
schools and residential area were a product
of official discrimination. I believe that
the segregation in the residential area has
continued to show that impact of official dis
crimination. It's continued to show that
impact, in part, because of the barriers to
black residential mobility out of the area,
— I talked about that — in part because of
white avoidance that itself was shaped by that
institutional history.
During the — during the Finger Plan, in fact,
the impact of that earlier official discrimi
nation on the schools was interrupted, but
now that the link between housing and schools
has been resumed, in my view the impact of
the earlier official discrimination is now
reflected in the schools, as well.
Tr. 1236.
G. Plaintiffs' Suggested Plans
151. Plaintiffs' expert witness, Dr. Gordon Foster, prepared
two alternative elementary school desegre3ation plans for the
School District "to be more eguitable [than the Finger Plan] in
terms of the burden of busing; to desegregate all of the eleven
predominantly black schools, the ones that were 90 percent, if
that was feasible; and to eliminate the stand-alone schools, in
52
terms of the concept of stand-alone schools, as much as possible,
that feature of the Finger Plan that seemed to have difficulty."
Tr. 1278.
152. Both of the plans use the same clustering and grade
restructuring techniques as the Finger Plan, but each would reas
sign both black and white pupils in grades 1-4. PX 55 (plans).
153. Neither plan drawn by Dr. Foster would affect elementary
schools in the discontiguous Arcadia and Spencer areas of the
School District. Id.
154. Plan B would affect all other elementary schools, while
Plan A would eliminate all 90%-or-more black elementary schools
(except Parker, in the Spencer area20) without involving six pre
dominantly non-black elementary schools along the southern and
southwestern edges of the School District's main geographic area.
PX 55 (plans). Plan B would require more extensive pupil transpor
tation than Plan A. Tr. 1304, 1317 (Foster).
155. Since plaintiffs' counsel announced at the hearing that
they would be satisfied with implementation of Plan A, even though
it is not as comprehensive as Plan B, the Court's findings are in
the main limited to that proposal. Tr. 1316.
20Dr. Foster estimated that Parker would enroll approximately
6% of all black students enrolled in grades 1-4 in the School Dis
trict. Tr. 1298.
53
156. Dr. Foster testified that other school systems are cur
rently utilizing the techniques and actual grade structure proposed
in Plan A for purposes of desegregation. Tr. 1305
157. Dr. Foster's proposal does not include a specification of
the geographic areas to be reassigned among clustered schools where
a grade or grades would be divided among more than one facility;
rather, as was true of the Finger Plan when it was submitted in
1972, the school system's staff would be responsible for preparing
detailed pupil assignments to meet the projected results in each
school. Tr. 1305-06 (Foster); PX 6, pp. liv ("Some method of as
signment will be necessary for the black pupils. The method of
assignment might be alphabetical, or by lottery, but probably a
geographic assignment will be most feasible"), lxxxv (Finger Plan).
The plan would also require adjustments by the staff to accommodate
special curricular needs, such as bilingual programs. Tr. 1359
(Foster).
158. Dr. Foster proposed a combination of "shuttle" transpor
tation between clustered schools and neighborhood pick-ups for
children who live beyond walking distance from the nearest school
in the cluster to which they are assigned. Tr. 1301.
159. By counting all students reassigned from their present
schools under Plan A, Dr. Foster estimated that a total of 3,978
pupils would need to be bused, making no reduction for the students
who could walk to their new assignments or who are already trans
ported to their "neighborhood" schools because of distance or haz
54
ard. Tr. 1304 (Foster). (The Superintendent testified that the
School District in 1986-87 operated approximately 275-280 bus
routes — including special education routes — at an operating
cost of between $7 and $9 million; he did not know how many stu
dents were transported because of the distance they lived from an
assigned school and how many were transported for desegregation
purposes.) Tr. 751-54 (Steller).
160. Dr. Foster drove between the schools clustered in his plan
for the purpose of estimating the time and distance necessary for
pupil transportation, using a private car and moving no faster
than the 30-mile-per-hour speed limit on city streets except for
one segment of travel on Interstate 35, which he travelled at 50
miles per hour. Tr. 1302 (Foster).
161. Dr. Foster concluded that the transportation required under
Plan A was feasible, with the longest times between clustered fa
cilities approximating 30 minutes. Tr. 1303-05, 1391.
162. The longest distance between paired or clustered schools,
according to Dr. Foster, was ten miles between Edwards and Cool-
idge. Tr. 1304. Under the Finger Plan, between 1978 and 1984
students were transported from Coolidge to Dewey, a distance the
same or greater than that between Coolidge and Edwards. Tr. 1525-
27 (Steller).
163. Dr. Foster estimated that an additional 85 buses, including
an allowance for spares, would be required to implement Plan A,
55
at an initial cost of $3.5 million and. an annual operating expense
of $1.06 million. Tr. 1311-13.
164. The Superintendent of Schools attacked Plan A. In the
apt characterization of another court, in another case, he
"raise[d] every carping, contumacious objection conceivable" to
the proposal. Acree v. Drummond. 336 F. Supp. 1275 (S.D. Ga.),
aff'd. 458 F .2d 486 (5th Cir.), cert, denied. 409 U.S. 1006 (1972).
165. For example, the Superintendent disagreed with Dr. Foster's
time and mileage estimates between schools. His testimony was
based on mileage charts used for employee reimbursements by the
School District but he was unaware of how they were prepared.
Tr. 747 (Steller). The defendants did not offer testimony of any
employee in the system's Transportation Department.
166. Although Dr. Foster calculated his estimate that 85 addi
tional buses would be required to implement Plan A based on buses
making single runs only, without any staggered openings, the Super
intendent sought to support the School District's claim that at
least 125 buses would be necessary based on the . ssumption that
buses would be making multiple runs. Tr. 1310-11,.1389 (Foster),
758-59, 1525 (Steller).
167. The Superintendent was not aware of the busing times and
distances under the Finger Plan while in-effect in Oklahoma City
between 1972 and 1984, nor whether elementary school opening times
56
were staggered under the Finger Plan to permit more efficient use
of buses. Tr. 705, 1530 (Steller).
168. The Superintendent admitted:
[0]n that 85 versus 125, frankly it doesn't
make all that much difference. You know, we
could — once we knew exactly which students
we were talking about and exactly all the other
things, the number of 125 could be reduced
some. Five, ten, fifteen buses, I don't know
for sure until we knew exactly what students
we were talking about.
Tr. 1529 (Steller).
169. Dr. Steller also criticized Plan A because it did not take
into account the existing placement of special programs such as
bilingual education and mighr disrupt them. Tr. 1476, 1482-83,
1493-95. He admitted that relocating the programs could "reduce
some of that negative impact that I talked about." Tr. 1531.
170. When the School District substantially changed the method
of elementary pupil assignment in 1985, it had to alter the loca
tion of special education ani other such programs, with many of
the same impacts that the Superintendent suggested would accompany
implementation of Plan A. Ti. 1519-20 (Steller).
171. Dr. Steller said that shuttle busing between schools would
create supervision problems, that Plan A would decrease after-
school activities and burden PTA participation, and involve costs
for shifting library books and furniture,21 and that it would re-
^ T h e same sorts of changes had to be made when the 1985 pupil
assignment plan was effectuated. Tr. 573-75 (Mason) , 788 (Scobey) .
57
suit in 632 fewer children in the School District being eligible
for Chapter 1 programs.22 Tr. 1480, 1483-84, 1487-88, 1490, 1496.
22Chapter 1 of the Education Improvement and Consolidation
Act of 1981, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 3801-08 (Supp. 1987), provides federal
financial assistance to school districts to support compensatory
or remedial programs in schools with high concentrations of stu
dents from low-income families. A district must rank its schools
according to the proportion of students from low-income families
to select eligible attendance areas or schools, although within
each such eligible school or area, all pupils who are performing
below grade level may receive services. Id. at § 3805; 34 C.F.R.
§ 200.51 (1986).
Dr. Steller maintained that because Plan A would change
school populations there would be a net reduction in the number
of children who would be "eligible" to participate in Chapter 1
programs — that is, the number of children performing below grade
level who would be attending schools that qualified for the federal
program because they had "high (above the district-wide average)
concentrations" of students from low-income families.
Although Dr. Steller initially maintained that the school
system staff had made this determination by re-ranking all of the
district's school attendance areas based on reassignments which
would take place under.Plan A, Tr. 1513, he subsequently admitted
that the staff had not formulated exact assignments under Plan A,
which would be the only way to arrive at an accurate ranking,
see 20 U.S.C.A. § 3805(b)(1) (Supp. 1987); 34 C.F.R. § 200.50(a)
(1986):
To the — to the extent that we have data avail-
able, not knowing which students for sure,
but taking approximate figure of each student
-- of the grade levels that would be moved and
the number of students that would be moved,
we can estimate pretty close to how — what
it will turn out, and there will be fewer stu
dents that will be eligible to be served.
(emphasis added).
In any event, the federal statutory scheme provides consider
able flexibility to the School District. For example, any atten
dance area or school with 25% low-income children may be served.
2 0 U.S.C.A. § 3805(d) (1) , (d) (3) ; 3 4 C.F.R. § 2 00.50(b) (1) , (b) (2) .
A school which participated in the program in either of the two
preceding fiscal years may be served. 20 U.S.C.A. § 3805(d)(4);
34 C.F.R. § 200.-50 (b)(4). The Court finds that until detailed
assignments under Plan A are made and alternatives provided by
58 -
He admitted that a dual school system desegregating for the first
time would have all of its programs affected in the same way,
Tr. 1508.
172. Dr. Steller estimated the total cost of implementing Plan
A at $7.4 million in the first year, with recurring annual opera
ting costs of $1.6 million. Tr. 1500. These figures do not take
into account limited state reimbursement for school busing costs,
Tr. 759 (Steller), or cost reductions resulting from modifications
to the Plan which the school system's staff could make.
173. Ultimately, Dr. Steller's testimony was that Plan A could
be implemented despite all of these asserted difficulties — es
pecially if it were modified and adapted by the staff of the School
District, as Dr. Foster suggested (Tr. 1359) — ■ just as the Finger
Plan was successfully implemented for thirteen years, although
there would be costs involved. Tr. 1508-09, 1527.
174. The Court finds on the basis of all of the evidence that
Dr. Foster's Plan A is workable in this School District and demon
strates that the elementary schools of Oklahoma City can be deseg
regated through a pupil assignment mechanism which involves equit
able transportation of black and white pupils without the problems
created or potentially existing under the Finger Plan.* 23
federal law are explored, it is not possible to determine whether
the number of children served by Chapter 1 programs would be reduced.
23Dr. Foster described the purpose of plans drawn for plain
tiffs in school desegregation suits as follows:
59
H. Summary
175. The basis for this Court's 1972 injunctive Order was the
inadequacy of "neighborhood school" zoning at the elementary grade
level to dismantle the historic dual school system, in part because
of racial residential segregation created by official policy and
exacerbated by school segregation practices.
176. During the school years 1972-73 through 1984-85, while
the Board of Education implemented the Finger Plan pursuant to
the 1972 Order, neighborhood racial residential patterns ceased
to dictate school assignments and the public schools of the School
District were desegregated.
177. From its inception, the Finger Plan required that younger
black students bear a disproportionate share of the burden of bus
ing. This inequity became greater as the percentage of black en
rollment in the School District increased.
You need to understand that, as a witness for
plaintiff, plans that are prepared by their
experts generally aren't adopted, because, in
court cases, school boards have the final say,
usually, in how plans — the final version of
plans, which I think is certainly the way it
ought to be, because they know more about their
district than anybody else.
But, primarily, the kind of planning I typi
cally would do for plaintiffs would — would
be to illustrate that a certain type of plan
is operational and functional, and then usually
what happens is defendants will make changes
in that to suit their own situation, and even
tually those plans are quite often ordered by
the courts with those modifications.
Tr. 1261-62.
60
178. When the Finger Plan was initially implemented, it estab
lished eleven "stand-alone" schools serving grades K-5 for atten
dance areas whose elementary student population was within fifteen
percentage points above or below the district-wide average at this
grade level. Over the years, the number of "stand-alone" K-5
schools was reduced to two; subsequently, in the 1980's, as many
as ten or eleven attendance areas would have qualified for "stand
alone" status based on a +/- 15% standard. The Board of Education
did not act consistently to establish "stand-alone" K-5 schools
or to discontinue them based on such a standard, however. It took
a variety of different actions over the years to deal with the
creation or discontinuance of K-5 "stand-alone" facilities and
the reassignment of students accompanying such decisions. Thus,
there was no uniform "stand-alone" policy Incorporated in the Fin
ger Plan as that Plan was implemented by the Board of Education.
179. While the establishment of additional "stand-alone" facil
ities in the mid-1980's would have increased busing distances for
black children in the northeast qualrant who were already bearing
a disproportionate share of the tr msportation burden, the prior
history of School District actions under the Finger Plan is illus
trative of the range of options avcilable to deal with the problem
of inequity. For this reason, the belief of Dr. Muse and others
in the black community in 1985, that continuation of the Finger
Plan would necessarily have led to the closing of school buildings
in the northeast quadrant, was not correct.
61
180. The committee which recommended the 1985 plan and the Board
of Education were fully aware that returning to "neighborhood"
attendance areas based on the elementary zones which had existed
in the School District prior to 1972 would result in the creation
of numerous schools with student enrollments in excess of 90%
black.
181. Under the 1985 plan, nine of eleven such virtually all
black schools were located in the northeast quadrant, the area of
the city originally designated through official action as intended
for black residents and black schools. Each of these schools was
operated as a virtually all-black school in the 1971-72 school
year prior to the entry of this Court's 1972 injunctive decree.
182. Once virtually all-black elementary schools were reestab
lished in the School District, a pattern of faculty transfers lead
ing to high concentrations of black faculty at schools with high
concentrations of black students developed. The Board of Education
did not take effective action to insure racially non-identifiable
faculties until late in the current round of this litigation,
shortly before the scheduled hearing in this matter.
183. The School District's Effective Schools Program can be
implemented in conjunction with a desegregation plan for elementary
schools.
184. Although participation in PTA's declined in the School
District in the 1970's and early 1980's, this was associated with
- 62 -
the lack of district-wide efforts, either on the part of the Board
of Education or through a district-wide PTA Council, to stimulate
and support individual PTA chapters in schools. The rise in PTA
participation after 1985 is related to the reconstitution of the
PTA Council and parental outreach associated with the Effective
Schools Program.
185. Although there has been some movement of blacks into for
merly white areas of Oklahoma City, the northeast quadrant has
continued to be occupied heavily by blacks and whites have not
relocated into that sector of the city. The economic and attitud-
inal factors which may be contributing to this lack of change in
the northeast quadrant are intimately tied to the long history of
prior discrimination and segregation in Oklahoma City. The racial
composition of the northeast quadrant remains the product, in sig
nificant measure, of that prior discrimination and segregation.
186. Plan A, drawn by Dr. Foster, utilizes the same techniques
as were successfully carried out within the School District under
the Finger Plan for many years to achieve desegregation of the
elementary schools with equitable sharing of burdens, and it does
not call for busing times or distances which are longer than those
under the Finger Plan.
187. While there would be many dislocations associated with
implementation of Plan A in this School District, the Court be
lieves that the school staff could appropriately modify the plan,
while retaining its essential elements of effective desegregation
63
and equitable distribution of busing burdens, to minimize those
problems.
64
Conclusions of Law
1 . The question to be resolved by this Court is "whether the
original [1972] mandatory order [requiring the implementation of
the Finger Plan] will be enforced or whether and to what extent
it should be modified." Dowell v. Board of Education of Oklahoma
City. 795 F .2d 1516, 1523.
2. The Board of Education seeks either dissolution of the
order, or its modification to permit continued implementation of
the 1985 "neighborhood school" plan for,elementary schools. The
plaintiffs seek modification of the order to require that desegre
gation of the elementary schools be maintained but through an
assignment plan which distributes the burdens of transporation
equitably among black and white students of all ages. Pre-Trial
Order.
3. The School District bears the burden of proving changed
circumstances justifying dissolution of the Order or modifying it
"to accommodate neighborhood elementary schools." Dowell, 795
F .2d at 1523.
4. The School District must show that "the law or the under
lying facts have so changed that the dancers prevented by the in
junction 'have become attenuated to a shadow,' [Securities and
Exchange Commission v.l Jan-dal foil & Gas, Inc.1. 443 F.2d [304,]
at 305, and the changed circumstances have produced '"hardship so
extreme and unexpected" as to make the decree oppressive.' [EEOC
v.] Safeway [Stores, Inc.1, 611 F.2d [795,] at 800 (quoting [United
65
States v.1 Swift & Co. IV 286 U.S. 106 (1932)]). See also United
States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 391 U.S. [244,] at 251-52,
88 S. Ct. at 1500-01." Id. at 1521-22.
5. The fact that this Court found that the School District
was "unitary" in 1977 is not, in and of itself, a justification
for dissolving the 1972 Order or modifying it in the manner sought
by the Board of Education. Dowell. 795 F.2d at 1520-21 & n.3,
1523 .
6. Nor does the fact that the School District continued to
implement the Finger Plan after 1977, and indeed made attendance
changes which continued desegregated elementary schools until the
1985-86 school year, provide a legal justification for dissolving
or modifying the Order. SEC v. Jan-dal, Inc.. 433 F.2d 304 (10th
Cir. 1970).
7. Nor would the fact, if proved, that the 1985 plan was not
adopted with discriminatory intent justify dissolving the order
or modifying it in the manner sought by the Board of Education.
Dowell. 795 F.2d at L523.
8. The purpose of the 1972 order was "not only to achieve,
but also to maintain, a unitary school system. Keves v. School
District No. 1, Denver. Colo.. 609 F. Supp. 1491, 1515 (D. Colo.
1985)." Dowell. 795 F.2d at 1520, also citing Lee v. Macon County
Board of Education. 584 F.2d 78, 81 (5th Cir. 1978) and Graves v.
66
Walton County Board of Education, 686 F.2d 1135 (11th Cir. 1982),
aff'cr in part. 91 F.R.D. 457 (M.D. Ga. 1981).
9. If the Board of Education's 1985 pupil assignment 'modifi
cations caused a material change in the conditions which the Court
found, in 1977, to justify its declaration that the School District
had achieved "unitary status," then the Board of Education has a
continuing obligation under the Fourteenth Amendment to restore
the public schools to a "unitary" condition, and this Court must
reassert active jurisdiction and enter the necessary remedial
decrees to assure that it does so. Columbus Board of Education
v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 459 (1979); Wright v. Council of the City
of Emporia. 407 U.S. 451, 460 (1972) ; Dowell, 338 F. Supp. at 1258
n.l. Compare Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education.
402 U.S. at 31-32 ("Neither school authorities nor district courts
are constitutionally required to make year-by-year adjustments of
the racial composition of student bodies [to offset demographic
shifts unaccompanied by official action] once the affirmative duty
to desegregate has been accomplished and racial discrimination
through official action is eliminated from the system"); Dowell.
795 F.2d at 1522.
10. The injunction entered by this Court in 1972 was designed
to eliminate the dual system in this School District and to inte
grate the formerly all-black and all-white schools, including the
black schools in the northeast quadrant. While the injunction
was being effectuated, it accomplished this purpose. However,
67
under the assignment plan adopted by the Board of Education in
1985, the northeast quadrant schools which had been virtually all
black in 1971-72 again became virtually all-black in student
enrollment. The evidence reveals that the attendance zones adopted
in 1985 were, except as modified to account for closed facilities,
the same as the zones used under the dual system prior to the 1972
Order, and that both before 1972 and after 1985 school zone lines
traced the same boundary around all-black northeast quadrant
schools. In addition, after 1985 black faculty members were in
creasingly concentrated in these schools, tending to recreate
another element of the prior dual system of schools. It is evi
dent that the 1985 plan does not accomplish the maintenance of
the unitary system which this Court found to exist in 1977. See
Vaughns v. Board of Education of Prince George's County. 574 F.
Supp. 1280 (D. Md. 1983), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other
grounds. 758 F.2d 983 (4th Cir. 1985).
11. The injunction to implement the Finger Plan was necessary
to establish and maintain a unitary school system in Oklahoma City
because the Court was presented with a "'loaded game board,'"
Swann. 402 U.S. 1, 28 (1971), in the form of geographic "neighbor
hood school" zones drawn around facilities intentionally construc
ted or operated as black schools in the northeast quadrant of Okla
homa City, an area whose racial composition was a direct product
of official discriminatory policies and actions. Dowell v. School
Board of Oklahoma City Public Schools, 219 F. Supp. 427, 433-34
(W.D. Okla. 1963); Dowell v. Board of Education of Oklahoma City,
68
244 F . Supp. 971, 976-77 (W.D. Okla. 1965) , aff'd in pertinent
part, 375 F .2d 158 (10th Cir.), cert, denied. 387 U.S. 931 (1967);
Dowell v. Board of Education of Oklahoma City. 338 F. Supp. 1256,
1265, 1270 (W.D. Okla.), aff'd, 465 F.2d 1012 (10th Cir.), cert,
denied, 409 U.S. 1041 (1972); see, e.g., United States v. Lawrence
Countv School District, 799 F.2d 1031, 1044 (5th Cir. 1986).
12. Because, as the Court has found, the racial composition
of the northeast quadrant is still the product of the prior dis
criminatory conduct of public officials in Oklahoma, including
the predecessors in office of the defendant members of the Board
of Education, the conditions necessitating entry of the 1972 in
junction have not changed, and the dangers which the injunction
was intended to prevent — the existence of virtually all-black
schools originally created by deliberate state action — • are cer
tainly not "attenuated to a shadow."
13. Judged by its effectiveness in eliminating the prior dual
system, the 1985 plan does not meet constitutional standards.
The Board of Education has not overcome the pr ̂ sumption against
one-race schools, Swann. 402 U.S. at 26; the majDrity-to-minority
transfer provision has proved ineffective tc eliminate such
schools, Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S.
430 (1968) ; and the student interaction plan, which provides only
limited, part-time opportunities for desegregation, is no substi
tute, Keves v. School District No. 1, Denver. 521 F.2d 465, 477-
69
79 (10th Cir. 1975), cert, denied, 423 U.S. 1066 (1976); see cases
cited in Dowell, 338 F. Supp. at 1272.
14. The Board of Education has not demonstrated a material
change in conditions which would justify the relief it seeks.
15. While the racial composition of the School District's
enrollment is different now from what it was in 1972, with black
students making up an increasing proportion of total enrollment,
that fact is without legal significance. The Supreme Court has
rejected arguments that desegregation plans must assign pupils so
as to establish schools of any particular racial composition.
E.q. , Swann. 402 U.S. at 24 n.8 (insistence on assigning white
students only to schools at least 60% white was "arbitrary" limi
tation on remedy).
16. The Court also has consistently required the elimination
of dual school systems in districts of widely varying racial compo
sition, including districts with substantially higher proportions
of black pupils than Oklahoma City. E.q., Brown v. Board of Edu
cation. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ; 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Clarendon County,
South Carolina, 90% black; see Argument: The Oral Argument Before
the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 1952-
55 54, 411 (1969); Raney v. Board of Education. 391 U.S. 443, 445
(1968)(Gould, Arkansas schools 60% black); Milliken v. Bradley.
418 U.S. 717, 753 (1974)(Detroit, Michigan school system 71.5%
black at time remedy implemented, see Milliken v. Bradley. 433
U.S. 267, 271 n.3 (1977)). See Morgan v. Kerrigan. 530 F.2d 401,
- 70
421-22 (1st Cir.)/ cert, denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976)(right to
desegregation remedy under Fourteenth Amendment not dependent upon
degree to which white students found in school system).
17. The Board of Education has also sought to link the demo
graphic change to "white flight" from the School District, in reac
tion to the mandatory desegregation required by this Court's 1972
Order. The proof does not clearly establish the extent to which
reactions to the desegregation plan, as contrasted to other fac
tors, were responsible for the population changes. On the other
hand, Dr. Foster's Plan A demonstrates that meaningful desegrega
tion of the public schools is still feasible in Oklahoma City.
In any event, the law is clear that "white flight" may not justify
a retreat from public school desegregation required by the Four
teenth Amendment. United States v. Scotland Neck City Board of
Education. 407 U.S. 484 (1972); Wright v. Council of the City of
Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972); Monroe v. Board of Commissioners of
Jack;.on. 391 U.S. 450 (1968); United States & Pittman v. Hatties
burg Municipal Separate School District, 808 F.2d 385, 391 (5th
Cir. 1987), citing Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board.
721 l‘.2d 1425, 2438 (5th Cir. 1983); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 530 F.2d
at ^22; cf. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).24
24Defendants' reliance upon cases involving desegregation
measures voluntarily undertaken by school boards which had not
been adjudicated to have committed constitutional violations is
unavailing. In each of those decisions, the courts were careful
to distinguish their rulings from cases in which a school district
was required by the Fourteenth Amendment to implement a desegrega
tion plan. See Parent Association of Andrew Jackson High School
v. Ambach. 598 F.2d 705, 719-20 (2d Cir. 1979) (contrasting what
71
18. The Board also attempted to establish that the 1985 student
assignment change was necessary to deal with reduced parental in
volvement in the schools. However, the testimony indicates that
the decline — particularly in PTA participation — was associated
with factors other than the student assignment plan in place, and
that the recent resurgence of PTAs and other parental and citizen
participation in school affairs is also traceable to other causes.
19. Finally, the defendants have consistently maintained that
the 1985 change in student assignments was necessary to avoid per
petuating or increasing inequitable transportation burdens on black
students residing in the northeast quadrant. As the Court's de
tailed factual findings reflect, there was inequity in the dis
tribution of the burdens of desegregation under the Finger Plan
and that inequity grew more severe over time. The findings also
indicate that choices made by the Board of Education in connection
with the possible creation of additional "stand-alone" schools in
the 1980's could have exacerbated the inequity — although the
Board chose, over the years, to deal with individual situations
in a variety of different ways (some less burdensome than others).
It is well established that the burdens of desegregation plans
"the Constitution commands" of a formerly segregated system with
"the limited circumstances of purely voluntary action," id. at
720); Higgins v. Board of Education of Grand Rapids. 508 F.2d 779,
793-94 (6th Cir. 1974)(suggesting that the "authority of school
officials to formulate plans for achieving an improved racial bal
ance should not be as restrictive in the case of a school system
which has not been found to have engaged in purposeful segregation
as for a system which has practiced de jure segregation," id. at
793) .
72
should not be disproportionately borne by minority students. Keyes
v. School District No. 1, Denver, 521 F.2d at 479; Arvizu v. Waco
Independent School District, 495 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Board of Education of Waterbury. 605 F.2d 573 (2d Cir.
1979); United States v. Missouri. 388 F. Supp. 1058, 1061-62 (E.D.
Mo.), modified on other grounds, 515 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir.), cert,
denied. 423 U.S. 951 (1975); McPherson v. School District No. 186.
426 F. Supp. 173, 187 (S.D. 111. 1976). The issue here, however,
is whether it is necessary substantially to re-segregate the School
District in order to avoid the inequity. Both the manner in which
"stand-alone" schools under the Finger Plan were managed and Plan
A devised by Dr. Foster indicate that it is not.
20. The Court thus concludes that, under the standards set
forth in the Tenth Circuit's opinion and remand in this matter,
the Board of Education has failed to justify dissolution of the
1972 injunctive decree or its modification to accommodate the
Board's 1985 "neighborhood school" plan.
21. Plaintiffs also seek modification of the decree. — but in
a manner more consistent with its basic purpose than waa requested
by the Board of Education. The authority of the Couit to grant
relief fully vindicating the underlying rights at issue in this
litigation, especially when sought by the party in whose favor the
original decree was entered, is broad, and does not depend upon
the rigorous showing necessary when a defendant seeks to escape
from the requirement of continued compliance with the decree.
73
United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corporation, 391 U. S . 244,
248-49, 251-52 (1968); see United States v. Lawrence County School
District, 799 F.2d 1031, 1042-46 (5th Cir. 1986); Sizzler Family
Steak Houses v. Western Sizzlin Steak Houses, Inc., 793 F.2d 1529,
1539 (11th Cir. 1986); Booker v. Special School District No. 1. 585
F.2d 347, 352 (8th Cir. 1978), cert, denied. 443 U.S. 915 (1979);
Kina-Seelev Thermos Company v. Aladdin Industries, Inc., 418 F.2d
31, 35 (2d Cir. 1969); Evans v. Buchanan, 512 F. Supp. 839, 849
(D. Del. 1981).
22. Contrary to the assertions of the Board of Education,
plaintiffs do not seek additional or different relief than was
awarded in the original decree. See Dowell, 795 F.2d at 1522.
Rather, plaintiffs seek merely to carry out the purposes of the
1972 Order by having the School District adopt a plan of pupil
assignment which is adequate to protect their constitutional rights
and which does not allocate the burdens of transportation and reas
signment in an inequitable fashion.
23. The evidence indicates ;hat such a plan can be devised
for Oklahoma City. While there \ ill be costs associated with the
plan, the Court is confident that the staff of the School District
can make improvements upon Dr. Foster's Plan A which will minimize
disruption and any interference with the school system's ongoing
effort to improve the educational program, and which will also
reduce costs as much as possible. Since the Court has found that
there must be continued adherence to the 1972 decree, except as
74
expressly modified for the purpose of making the desegregation
process more equitable, the fact that reinstituting a desegregative
assignment process for grades 1-4 in the School District will in
volve additional costs "is not a valid argument against the con
stitutional mandate to desegregate." Dowell, 338 F. Supp. at 1272
and cases cited. If ultimately necessary, the Court has authority
to insure that the constitutional mandate can be effectuated.
See, e.q.. Liddell v. State of Missouri. 731 F.2d 1294, 1322-23
(8th Cir. 1984) .
Accordingly, the Court will afford the Board of Education an
opportunity to submit for approval a plan which achieves these
goals, and if no acceptable plan is forthcoming, will order imple
mentation of Plan A drawn by Dr. Foster for the 1988-89 and suc
ceeding school years. An appropriate order to this effect will
be entered.
United States District Judge
75
Respectfully submitted
LEWIS BARBER, JR.
Barber/Traviolia
1528 N.E. 23rd Street
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73111
(405) 424-5201
JOHN W. WALKER
John W. Walker, P.A.
1723 Broadway
Little Rock, Arkansas 72206
(501) 374-3758
JULIUS L. CHAMBERS
JAMES M. NABRIT, III
NORMAN J . CHACHKIN
99 Hudson Street
New York, New York 10013
(212) 219-1900
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
76
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 28th day of September, 1987, I
served a copy of the foregoing Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law upon counsel for the defendants herein,
by delivering the same to an agent of Federal Express, for delivery
on September 29, 1987 (charges prepaid) to:
Ronald L. Day, Esq.
Fenton, Fenton, Smith, Reneau & Moon
Suite 800, One Leadership Square
200 North Robinson
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73102
77