Dowell v. Oklahoma City Board of Education Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Public Court Documents
September 28, 1987

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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Dowell v. Oklahoma City Board of Education Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 1987. 49fe1325-b09a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/12bc53c0-b6bd-4ee5-bdf7-13727cc68c7a/dowell-v-oklahoma-city-board-of-education-plaintiffs-proposed-findings-of-fact-and-conclusions-of-law. Accessed May 23, 2025.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA ROBERT L. DOWELL, et al., Plaintiffs, v . BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE OKLAHOMA CITY PUBLIC SCHOOLS, et al., Defendants. NO. CIV 9452 PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW_______ LEWIS BARBER, JR. Barber/Traviolia 1528 N.E. 23rd Street Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73111 (405) 424-5201 JOHN W. WALKER John W. Walker, P.A. 1723 Broadway Little Rock, Arkansas 72206 (501) 374-3758 JULIUS L. CHAMBERS JAMES M. NABRIT, III NORMAN J . CHACHKIN 99 Hudson Street New York, New York 10013 (212) 219-1900 Attorneys for Plaintiffs ROBERT L. DOWELL, et al., : Plaintiffs, : IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA NO. CIV 9452 BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE OKLAHOMA CITY PUBLIC SCHOOLS, et al. , Defendants. PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT ________ AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW_______ This case is before the Court pursuant to the remand direc tions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, 795 F .2d 1516 (10th Cir.), cert, denied. 107 S. Ct. 486 (1986). In 1972 this Court granted plaintiffs injunctive relief de signed to dismantle the dual school system in Oklahoma City, 338 F. Supp. 1256 (W.D. Okla.), aff'd. 465 F.2d 1012 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 409 U.S. 1041 (1972). On January 18, 1977 the Court entered an Order finding that the Board had carried out the injunc tion and had "slowly and painfully accomplished" the goal of estcblishing a "unitary system." The Order dissolved the Biracial Coimt ittee previously created and directed that "Jurisdiction in this case is terminated . . . " but it did not by its terms vacate or dissolve the injunctive relief granted in 1972. The immediate impetus for the current proceedings was a deci sion by the Board of Education in 1985 to adopt a new plan of pupil assignment for elementary (grades 1-4) schools, to be effective for the 1985-86 school year. Under this plan, the school cluster- ings and grade restructuring which had been utilized since the 1972-73 school year for the purpose of achieving desegregated schools were dismantled. In their place, the Board of Education adopted a "neighborhood" school assignment plan utilizing geo graphic zone lines for each elementary school facility. There is no dispute about the fact that under the "neighborhood" plan, a number of elementary schools, most located in the northeast area of Oklahoma City, were expected to and did have student enrollments that are more than 90% black. In 1985, the plaintiffs sought to intervene new class repre sentatives and to reopen this action in order to enjoin implemen tation of the new plan. This Court denied relief, holding that "once a school system has become unitary, the task of a supervising federal court is concluded." 606 F. Supp. at 1555-56. The Court of Appeals disagreed, see 795 F.2d at 1520, and remanded the matter with instructions for this Court to determine whether "changed conditions reguire modification or [whether] the facts or law no longer require the enforcement of the [1972 injunctive] order." Id. at 1523. The Court granted the Petition for Intervention and the Motion to Reopen on February 5, 1987 and a hearing was held from June 15 through June 24, 1987. Based upon consideration of all of the evidence presented by the parties, the trial briefs and post-trial submissions and arguments, the Court makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 2 Findings of Fact A. The Basis for the Court's 1972 Injunctive Order 1. The Oklahoma City Public Schools, Independent District No. 89, Oklahoma County (the "School District") historically oper ated a compulsory segregated school system, with separate schools for blacks and whites, as required by Oklahoma constitutional and statutory provisions. Dowell v. School Board of Oklahoma City Public Schools. 219 F. Supp. 427 (W.D. Okla. 1963). 2. In operating the dual system, the School District deliber ately located and constructed facilities for the education of black pupils in areas of Oklahoma City identified by governmental action and public policy as areas within which blacks would reside. id. at 433-34. 3. After the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the Board of Education of the School District took no meaningful steps to eliminate the dual system and integrate the public schools of Oklahoma C.ty. id, at 434-35. 5. After 1954 the Board of Education established "neighbor hood" boundaries for school attendance purposes, which were super imposed upon the pattern of racial residential segregation created by governmental action and public policy, and which resulted in the continued operation of segregated schools. Dowell v. Board of 3 Education of Oklahoma City. 244 F. Supp. 971, 976 (W.D. Okla. 1965), aff'd in pertinent part. 375 F.2d 158 (10th Cir.)/ cert, denied. 387 U.S. 931 (1967). 6. Adherence to these "neighborhood school" boundaries in making initial assignment of students after 1954 affected racial residential patterns within the city "by extending areas of all Negro housing, destroying in the process already integrated neigh borhoods and thereby increasing the number of segregated schools." 244 F. Supp. at 977. 7. The Board of Education also maintained the dual system by employing black faculty members or principals only at predominantly black or all-black schools. Id. at 442-45. 8. As late as the 1971-72 school year, the elementary facili ties of the School District remained largely segregated.1 Of 86 elementary schools, 69 enrolled no more than 10% of either black students or white students. Dowell v. Board of Education of Okla homa City, 338 F. Supp. 1256, 1259-60 & n.3 (W.D. Okla.), aff'd 465 F .2d 1012 (10th Cir.), cert, denied. 409 U.S. 1041 (1972). 9. Because of continuing residential segregation, adherence to the School District's "neighb->rhood school" zoning in 1972 would ^•Because the present controversy concerns only the elementary schools of the School District, the Court is focusing its histor ical findings on that grade level. 4 not have created integrated schools.2 This Court accordingly ap proved the plan drafted by Dr. John Finger, utilizing the tech- nigues of clustering, grade restructuring, and pupil transportation in order to eliminate the dual school system. Id. at 1265, 1270; Tr. 387 (Hermes). 10. The extent of the continuing residential segregation in the School District at the time this Court entered its 1972 Order was clearly depicted in the evidence presented at the recent hear ing. For example, according to the 1970 United States Census, there were 13 census tracts in Oklahoma City that were at least 75% black; 73.3% of all black residents of the City lived within these tracts. Tr. 1129-31 (Rabin). The area of concentrated black population expanded geographically between 1960 and 1980, id. at 1131 (Rabin); DX 2-4 (maps), while the white population declined within the city and increased substantially in other parts of the Oklahoma City SMSA. DX 6 (table). 2The I resident of the Board of Education testified in 1975 that at' th=t time as well, continuing residential segregation re quired the approach of the Finger Plan, utilizing pupil transpor tation, if schools were to be maintained on a desegregated basis: 'IHE COURT: Do you know of any other. way in which you can bring about desegregation except through busing? THE WITNESS: I think it's certainly going to re quire transportation of some sort, busing of some nature. PX 55 (excerpt from transcript of hearing). Similarly, Mrs. Hermes, who was President of the Board of Education in 1985, stated that in order to establish desegregated fifth-grade centers under the plan adopted in that year, it was necessary to establish non contiguous zones because of segregated residential patterns. Tr. 345. 5 B. Results under the Court's 1972 Order 11. After the plan drawn by Dr. Finger was implemented, the racial composition of the School District's elementary schools was significantly altered. The School District's expert witness, Dr. Finis Welch, testified that the Finger Plan brought about the eighth largest reduction in the "dissimilarity index" (a measure of the extent to which individual school populations in a system diverge from district-wide student racial proportions) of 125 school districts he studied. Tr. 131 (Welch). 12. The desegregative effects of the Finger Plan were main tained by the School District from 1972-73 through 1984-85 through a series of student assignment alterations implemented by the Board of Education within the overall scheme of the plan, as schools were closed due to enrollment declines or as population movements within the District caused individual school enrollments to vary by more than 10% (or, subsequently, by more than 15%) from the district-wide elementary student racial proportions. Tr. 206-08 (Welch); DX 85-86 (tables). From the 1972-73 school year through the 1984-85 school year, no elementary facility had an enrollment that was 90% or more black, or 90% or more white [non-black].3 3The enrollment statistics upon which the Finger Plan was based, and which were regularly submitted to the court, actually portrayed student enrollments in only two groups: black and non black. The second category included a small proportion of non black minority students, which has grown in size since 1972. DX 20, 58-59 (graphs), 63-66 (tables)[1985-86, 1986-87 and projected 1987-88 elementary school enrollments by racial group, showing non-black minority students]. However, the School District's ex pert witness testified and prepared exhibits demonstrating that the enrollment patterns were the same whether or not non-black 6 There were 69 such schools (out of a total of 89 elementary schools) in the 1971-72 school year, 30 such schools in the 1985- 86 school year and 26 such schools in the 1986-87 school year (out of a total of 65 elementary schools operated in 1985-86 and 64 elementary schools in 1986-87). PX 41, 52, 54 (tables). C. Inequitable Burdens on Black Students (1) Disproportionate busing of younger black students 13. While the approach of the Finger Plan resulted in effective desegregation, at the elementary grade level it did place certain burdens primarily upon black students and the black community. Under the plan, formerly black schools became fifth-year centers serving only the fifth grade and kindergarten. As a result, black elementary-grade children living in the northeast quadrant and other predominantly black areas of Oklahoma City were transported four out of five years, while white students were bused only in the fifth grade. Witnesses for both plaintiffs and defendants agreed that this was inequitable. Tr. 385 (Hermes), 432 (Fuse), 1265 (Foster), 1412-13 (Luper), 1431-32 (Porter); cf. Tr. 512 (Mrs. Hill reads statement of Urban League President Leonard Bento, from December 10, 1984 hearing).4 minority students were included in the comparisons. Ti. 191 (Welch); DX 41-48 (tables and graphs). 4Dr. Finger testified in 1971 that northeast quadrant schools were all made fifth-grade centers "as a concession to the white community." Transcript of hearing of December 19, 1971, at p. 117. The plaintiffs sponsored and endorsed the Finger Plan at that time, perhaps recognizing the difficulties of making a change from long-ingrained practices of segregation in this community. In any event, as noted in the next finding, by 1984 the demograph 7 14. In 1972 (when the plan was drawn), black students made up 23% of the total elementary school population, PX 47 (table), and black students living in the northeast quadrant attended facilities to which they did not have to be bused for a similar proportion (20%) of their elementary schooling. But in 1984-85, black chil dren were 35.8% of all elementary pupils, id., and this demographic change increased the inequitable burden upon black elementary-grade students because they still were bused for 80% of their elementary years. Tr. 220, 292-93 (Welch). 15. Between 1972 and 1985 under the Finger Plan, the Board of Education never made a student assignment change to add grades to schools in the northeast quadrant, although this was suggested by the school system's research staff; the School District's expert witness testified that in light of the demographic change, this would have been essential to maintain integration with a minimum amount of busing. Tr. 292-93 (Welch), 498-99 (Fink).5 * (2) "Stand-Alone11 Schools 16. Another source of inequity was the "stand-alone" school feature of the Finger Plan. Tr. 1278 (Foster). As approved by this Court in 1972, the Finger Plan provided: ics of the School District had changed in such a way as to make the limitation of northeast quadrant schools to a single elementary grade more inequitable than when originally proposed. 5Had more grades been placed in northeast quadrant schools, the level of parent involvement would also have increased. Tr. 858 (Brown). 8 If any school in a cluster is already desegre gated because [students] residing within its present attendance zone and enrolled in the school are more than 10% black and less than 35% black, then that school would operate as a school enrolling grades K-5. Schools which appear to meet this condition are underlined on the following listings. PX 6, p. liv. 17. According to Board of Education policy, the School District interpreted the Finger Plan's "stand-alone" feature to require the withdrawal of an elementary school from a grade-restructured cluster, and its operation as a "stand-alone" facility, whenever the student population living in the school's attendance zone was within ten (and subsequently, fifteen) percentage points above or below the district-wide racial student proportion at the elementary grade level. When a "stand-alone" school was established, no stu dents were assigned to the school from outside its zone nor were students living within its zone assigned to other facilities. DX 68-70 (internal staff memoranda on "stand-alone" schools). 18. While the explicit language of the Finger Plan referred only to K-5 "stc id-alone" schools, the Board of Education consid ered establishing "stand-alone" schools serving grades K-4, as well as K-5; at least three such schools [Western Village, Har rison, and Edgemere] were actually created. Tr. 217-18 (Welch), 490, 492-93 (Fink); DX 68-70, 72-75, 78 (internal staff memoranda); DX 76, p. M—14 (Minutes of Board of Education meeting, July 2, 1984) . 9 19. From as early as the 1982-83 school year, the school system's staff regularly prepared memoranda identifying school attendance zones which qualified for "stand-alone" status. These memoranda would normally be put in final form and provided to mem bers of the Board of Education. Tr. 470-71 (Fink). 20. Conversion to "stand-alone" status was not automatic when ever the attendance zone population would have qualified a school, however. Instead, the Board of Education had to make an affirma tive decision to alter a school's status, taking into account fac tors other than the population change. Tr. 489, 493, 496-97 (Fink), 528 (Hill). 21. For example, in the 1982-83 school year, only three of ten eligible schools were operated as "stand-alone" facilities. DX 68 (internal staff memoranda). 22. The only new "stand-alone" school created after initial implementation of the Finger Plan was Bodine in 1984-85. PX 24- 25 (enrollments); Tr. 475 (Fink), 1324 (Foster). 23. The pattern of demographic change in Oklahoma City was such that, after 1980, the creation of additional "stand-alone" schools under the Finger Plan would have increased the busing dis tances for black students in grades 1-4 living in the northeast quadrant at the same time as that demographic change made the con tinued operation of single-grade schools in the northeast area more inequitable. Tr. 219 (Welch). 10 24. In addition, the creation of additional K-5 "stand-alone" schools under the Finger Plan would have threatened the continued operation of fifth-year centers in the northeast quadrant by re ducing their enrollments. Id. (Welch); Tr. 527-28 (Hill). 25. The Board of Education was aware as early as 1982 of the problems which could be created in the northeast quadrant by the "stand-alone" feature. Tr. 474-75 (Fink). 26. A petition circulated and signed in 1985 by some 400 black patrons of the School District living in the northeast quadrant stated that the signers' "endorsement is based upon the fact that the [neighborhood] plan will reduce the inequitable busing burden [under the Finger Plan] on all children, especially black children, in the northeast quadrant, and maintain elementary schools in the northeast quadrant." Tr. 642 (White). 27. Dr. Muse, a leading proponent of the plan substituted in 1985 for the Finger Plan, believed that the conclusion was "ines capable" that if the Finger Plan remained in effect, all schools located in the northeast quadrant would have been closed. Tr. 445. 28. Senator Melvin Porter testified that the understanding of the black community in 1985 was that schools in the northeast quad rant would be closed unless the new plan proposed by the Board of Education to replace the Finger Plan were accepted. Tr. 1433. 11 29. In fact, schools were not always closed when their enroll ments dropped. According to Dr. Steller, the current Superinten dent of Schools, during the 1970's the School District closed fewer schools than warranted by the overall decline in pupil enrollment because school closings are always unpopular with patrons of the District. Tr. 729. 30. In the 1972-73 school year, there were eleven "stand alone" schools within the School District. Tr. 289 (Welch); PX 8 (tables), 13 (1972-73 enrollments). This number decreased over the years: to nine in 1974-75, eight in 1978-79, and two in 1980- 81. PX 15, 19, 21 (enrollments). 31. In each instance, the Board of Education made the decision whether to discontinue a stand-alone school. Sometimes this was done because the student enrollment drawn from the school's atten dance zone no longer fell within the racial guidelines. For exam ple, enrollment at the North Highland Elementary School was 50% black (grades 1-5) in 1972-73 and 66.9% black (grades 1-5) in 1973- 74, the last year it operated as a "stand-alone" K-5 facility. PX 13-15 (enrollments). North Highland was thereafter clustered with a group of northwestern Oklahoma City el ementary schools and served as a fifth-year center. PX 8 (tables). 32. However, discontinuance of a "stand-alone" school did not mean necessarily that it would become part of a cluster under the Finger Plan: In the 1977-78 school year, total enrollment in grades 1-5 in the School District was 30.2% black while enrollment 12 at Ross Elementary School (grades 1-5) was 4.7% black, or more than fifteen percentage points below the district-wide proportion. PX 18 (enrollments). The following year, students in grades 1-4 residing within a small portion of the Dewey Elementary School attendance zone (who had previously been assigned to Quail Creek Elementary) were shifted to Ross; the 1978-79 enrollment at Ross (grades 1-5) was 20.0% black. PX 8 (tables), PX 19 (enrollments). No fifth-grade students in the Ross area were assigned to Dewey; Ross continued to serve as a "neighborhood" school for the students (mostly white) in grades K-5 living within its attendance zone. PX 8 (tables). 33. Nor did the Board of Education alter a school's "stand alone" status automatically whenever its enrollment fell outside the guidelines. For example, the enrollments at Columbus and River side ("stand-alone" K-5 schools from 1972-73 until the 1980-81 school year) were more than 15 percentage points below the districtwide enrollment in grades 1-5 from the 1977-78 school year through the 1979-80 year. PX 18-20 (enrollments).6 Not until 6The trial exhibits indicate the following: % Black, crrades 1-5 1976-77 1977-78 1978-79 1979-80 Columbus 10.6 9.7 11.4 10.4 Riverside 15.6 14.5 15.1 7.3 Districtwide 29.1 30.2 31.5 32.7 [less 15%] 14.1 15.2 16.5 17.7 13 1980- 81 did the Board change the status of these "stand-alone" facilities. PX 8 (tables). 34. In most instances, according to the School District's ex pert witness, "stand-alone" schools were discontinued as part of assignment changes made by the Board of Education in other parts of the School District. Tr. 290-91 (Welch). 35. For example, effective with the 1980-81 school year, Mark Twain, Shidler, and Stand Watie were discontinued as "stand-alone" facilities in conjunction with numerous other assignment shifts. PX 20, 21 (enrollments). During the previous (1979-80) school year, 32.7% of all students in grades 1-5 in the School District were black. PX 20 (enrollments). Mark Twain (29.0%), Shidler (34.4%) and Stand Watie (24.2%) all met the +/-15% guideline. Id.? Tr. 522-26 (Hill). 36. K-5 "stand-alone" schools were also discontinued for rea sons having nothing to do with racial proportions. For instance, E:\gemere was eliminated as a K-5 "stand-alone" school when it be- c. me overcrowded in the 1978-79 school year and was made a K-4 tand-alone" school (sending its fifth-grade pupils to Polk) until 1981- 82, when its attendance zone was subdivided between Edgemere and Kaiser. DX 76, p. M-16 (Minutes of Board of Education Meeting, July 2, 1984); PX 8 (tables) 37. Thus, if the Finger Plan required the operation of K-5 "stand-alone" schools whenever the guideline was satisfied, the 14 Board of Education did not comply with the Plan when it discon tinued the operation of these facilities as K-5 "stand-alone" schools, when it allowed schools to retain their "stand-alone" status even though their enrollments fell outside the guideline, and when it failed to establish "stand-alone" schools as attendance zones underwent demographic change which brought them within the guideline. 38. After discontinuance as "stand-alone" schools, Mark Twain, along with Columbus and Riverside, became part of a cluster with the Longfellow fifth-year center. Longfellow had previously served as a fifth-grade center for a group of northwestern Oklahoma City schools. PX 8 (tables). The 1980-81 reassignment, prompted by the closing rather than the opening of "stand-alone" schools, sub stantially increased the busing distance for black students in grades 1-4 living within the Longfellow zone. Tr. 287-89 (Welch). 39. The current President of the Board of Education testified that the Board did not eliminate the "stand-alone" feature of the Finger Plan, despite the potential inequity of adhering to it, because the community had been promised — when the Finger Plan was ordered into effect in 1972 — that if residential neighborhoods became integrated, neighborhood "stand-alone" schools would be cre ated. Tr. 528 (Hill). 40. However, the evidence summarized above reflects that the School District did not follow, nor consistently apply, any speci fic policy with respect to the creation, maintenance or discon 15 tinuance of "stand-alone" schools after 1972. Between at least 1980 and 1985, for instance, the Board of Education did not fulfill the "promise" of the Finger Plan to residentially integrated neigh borhoods . 41. Decisions whether to create or discontinue "stand-alone" facilities, and how to distribute the burdens of concomitant pupil reassignments among black and white students, were made by the Board of Education on an individual basis, and the Board exercised wide discretion in every instance. Therefore, any determinations by the Board of Education to create or eliminate "stand-alone" schools, to fail to add grades to schools in the northeast quad rant, to reassign pupils in such a way as to increase busing dis tances for black children in the northeast quadrant, or in such a way as to reduce enrollments in northeast quadrant facilities and endanger their continued operation, were all conscious and deliber ate choices made by the Board of Education, and no particular deci sion may properly be regarded as required by the Finger Plan. D. The Decision to Alter the Student Assignment Plan 42. This Court's 1975 Order required that The Defendant School Board shall not alter or deviate from the [Finger Plan] . . . without the prior approval and permission of the court. If the Defendant is uncertain concerning the meaning of the plan, it should apply to the court for interpretation and clarification. 16 Dowell v. Board of Education of Oklahoma Citv. 338 F. Supp. at 1273. This Court has never vacated its injunctive order.7 43. In 1975, the Board of Education filed a motion requesting dismissal of this lawsuit on the ground that the School District had complied with the 1972 injunctive decree. A hearing was held on this motion on November 18, 1975. 44. At that hearing, the individual who was then President of the Board of Education testified that the Board did not seek dis missal of the case in order to return to segregated schools. Rather, the district wished to eliminate what was perceived as a limitation upon its ability to provide dynamic educational leader ship: [THE COURT:] The Court would like to ask you, if the Court should terminate its jurisdiction, will this mean that the Board will terminate its busing program for desegregation? THE WITNESS: No, sir. * * * THE WITNESS: Well, I would say that of course we want to operate — we feel like that we can handle our prob ems and our responsibili ties without court • urisdiction. 70n several occasions following the entry of this Order, the Board of Education requested the Court's approval for alterations in feeder patterns or school closings. After the matter was brought to the Court's attention by the Bi-Racial Committee, the Board was also ordered to reassign principals in order to mitigate the racial identifiability of the two high schools enrolling the highest proportions of black students. Dowell v. Board of Educa tion of Oklahoma Citv. No. CIV-9452 (W.D. Okla. June 3, 1974), aff7d , No. 74-1415 (10th Cir. Jan. 28, 1975), cert, denied. 423 U.S. 824 (1975). 17 We believe very sincerely that we are operating a unitary school system. I really believe that the court order, the presence of the court order stifles in a way the creativity within the school system and I will cite one case. When we were, as a Board, debating the innova tive high school, the Superintendent at that time used as a reason for us not to set up such a program, was a concern that the Court would reopen the entire Dowell case, hold a hearing and reopen the whole thing, and the fear was that the Court might order some brand new plan on the District. I think that this is inhibiting to people with in the District, as far as administrative people maybe, our staff, that feel like there is no reason to try to have different things sometimes because of the little fear that maybe the Court is not going to approve it or that it would in some way cause a shakeup within the present plan. Transcript of hearing at pp. 69-71.8 45. At the time the hearing was held, plaintiffs' motion for an award of attorneys' fees was still pending. After that motion was disposed of, 71 F.R.D. 49 (W.D. Okla. 1976), and an appeal from this Court's award was withdrawn as part of a settlement on that issue, this Court on January 18, 1977 entered an "Order Terminating Case" which recited that the Finger Plan worked and that substantial compliance with the constitutional requirements has been achieved. The. School Board, under the over sight of the Court, has operated the Plan prop erly, and the Court does not foresee that the termination of its jurisdiction will result in the dismantlement of the Plan or any affir mative action by the defendant to undermine the unitary system so slowly and painfully 8Pp. 69-70 of this transcript are included in PX 55. 18 accomplished over the 16 years during which the cause has been pending before the Court. . . . The Court believes that the present mem bers and their successors on the Board will now and in the future continue to follow the constitutional desegregation requirements. 46. As previously noted, at least as early as 1982 the staff of the School District brought to the attention of the Board of Education the fact that a number of attendance areas within the system appeared to qualify for "stand-alone" status and also the consequences for the northeast quadrant fifth-year centers of crea ting additional "stand-alone" centers. 47. In 1984, the Board of Education decided to establish Bodine as a K-5 "stand-alone" school. DX 76 (Minutes of July 2, 1984 meeting). 48. When the Board of Education decided to make Bodine a K-5 "stand-alone" school, Dr. Clyde Muse, a black member, expressed concern about the additional reassignment burden on black students froir the northeast quadrant who were attending the school and the potential for reducing enrollment in, and ultimately causing the closing of, schools in the northeast quadrant. Id. at M-17, M- 18. 49. The Board of Education at its next meeting established a study committee to consider 1) neighborhood racial makeup; 2) potential busing reduction; 3) possible boundary changes;- 4) possible grade realignments. \ 19 At the same time, the Board voted not to reassign black students in grades 1-4 who had previously attended Bodine Elementary School while it was clustered with Creston Hills fifth-grade center, at least until the study committee reported its recommendations. DX 77, p. M—13 (Minutes of Board of Education meeting of July 16, 1984) . 50. The study committee of three Board of Education members (Dr. Muse, Mrs. Hill and Mrs. Hermes) met throughout the summer and early fall at the administration offices of the school system. It was provided with detailed information by the school system's research staff on the racial composition of neighborhoods in Okla homa City. Tr. 306-07 (Biscoe). 51. Although the committee decided "that the K-5 stand-alone arrangement could not continue to be a part of the plan," Tr. 427 (Muse), it did not ask the research staff for a simulation of modi fications to the Finger Plan which would establish equitable (two- way) busing of black and white pupils in grades 1-4 because the members had made a determination not to bus students at these grade levels, Tr. 385 (Hermes).9 52. The committee was "trying to go back to neighborhood schools [the method of pupil assignment utilized prior to this 9Mrs. Hermes, who in 1985 was the President of the Board of Education, testified at the 1987 hearings that the original approach of the Finger Plan, busing only black children in grades 1-4, was inequitable, but that busing white and black children in those grades would not have made the plan equitable. Tr. 385-86. 20 Court's 1972 order], for the entire district, trying to treat each neighborhood the same." Tr. 505, 521 (Hill). 53. On November 19, 1984 the committee reported its recommen dations to the Board of Education, calling for "K-4 neighborhood schools throughout the district." DX 79, p. M-2 (Minutes of Board of Education meeting, November 19, 1984). The plan also included provision for majority-to-minority student transfers, occasional "student interaction" between pupils at the virtually all-black schools and pupils at schools of opposite racial composition, and for an "Equity Committee" to assure equal distribution of resources to all schools in the District. PX 9 (plan). 54. Although the committee's report did not include a set of projected enrollments under the plan/ the committee and the Board of Education were aware that the elimination of the Finger Plan's clustering approach would result 'in reestablishing elementary schools that had heavily black or non-black student enrollments: in presenting the committee's report, Mrs. Hill indicated that the group had decided against recommending K-5 or K-6 ! neighborhood schools" throughout the district in part because "the Board feels that the fifth grade is the latest point in a student's education where integration needs to occur . . . ." Id. at p. M-3. 55. On December 3, 1984 the Board of Education adopted modifi cations to the plan recommended by the committee, which did not alter the basic scheme of dismantling the Finger Plan's clustering approach and substituting geographically zoned "neighborhood" 21 schools serving grades 1-4. DX 80 (Minutes of Board of Education meeting, December 3, 1984). 56. The elementary school zones under the plan adopted in 1985 are the same as those used in 1971 and earlier, except for modifi cations necessitated over the years as individual facilities were closed. Tr. 346 (Hermes). This is apparent from a comparison of the 1985-87 zone boundaries (PX 7) and the 1963-64 elementary school zone boundaries (PX 3, 4). 57. The school attendance zones whose outer edges, taken to gether, formed the boundary of the "northeast quadrant" in the 1971-72 school year, prior to the entry of the order requiring implementation of the Finger Plan, were (proceeding clockwise): Longfellow, Edison, Creston Hills, Garden Oaks, Edwards, Dunbar, Woodson, Page, Lincoln, and Dewey. (Each of these schools was more than 90% black). PX 5 (1968-72 attendance areas), PX 41 (table). 58. The edges of the attend?nee zones of the following virtu ally all-black elementary schoof s (more than 90% black in student enrollment in 1985-87) today define, as the northeast quadrant, the same area as in 1972: Longfellow, Creston Hills, Garden Oaks, Edwards, Lincoln, and Dewey. The area contained within these bounds is identical to the area described in the preceding finding. PX 7 (map), PX 41 (table). 22 59. The Board of Education conducted several public meetings on the new pupil assignment recommendations. About one-third of the patrons attending the meetings opposed the new plan. Tr. 511 (Hill) . 60. Parents and citizens of Oklahoma City told the Board of Education that they objected to the plan because it would result in re-segregating the district's elementary schools. PX 56 (Min utes of Board of Education meeting, December 10, 1984). 61. The President of the Oklahoma City Urban League, Leonard Benton, said that the original Finger Plan "was unfair in that black children had to be bused grades 1-4 and white did not" and that "if we are not going to have two-way busing, then students should be allowed to stay in their own neighborhoods." Id. at p. M-5; Tr. 512 (Hill). 62. On December 17, 1984 the Board of Education adopted the plan for implementation commencing with the 1985-86 school year. DX 95 (Minutes of Board of Education meeting). 63. On April 25, 1985, this Court denied plaintiffs' request to reopen ".he case and for injunctive relief preventing the Board of Education from implementing the new plan. Dowell v. Board of Education. 606 F. Supp. 1548 (W.D. Okla.. 1985). 23 E . Results Under the 1985 Plan (1) Pupil enrollment 64. Implementation of the "neighborhood" plan in the 1985-86 school year created racially identifiable schools which are over 90% black and white. Tr. 419 (Hermes). 65. In the 1985-86 school year there were 30 such elementary schools, and in the 1986-87 school year there were 26 such schools. PX 41 (table). 66. This included eleven schools with enrollments in excess of 90% black students: School % Black Enrollment 1985-86 1986-87 Creston Hills 98.8 99.4 Dewey 97.1 97.9 Edwards 99.3 100.0 Garden Oaks 98.8 98.0 King 99.5 99.5 Lincoln 97.5 99.1 Longfellow 99.3 98.9 North Highland 96.3 97.6 Parker 97.3 97.0 Polk 97.7 99.5 Truman 99.3 99.7 Id. 67. All of these schools except Parker and North Highland are located in the northeast quadrant, and all except North Highland were virtually all-black schools in the 1971-72 school year, just prior to the entry of this Court's order to implement the Finger Plan. Id. 24 68. Although the Board of Education determined to close seven elementary schools for budgetary reasons at the end of the 1986- 87 school year, the pattern of virtually one-race schools will not be substantially altered. Of the schools with more than 90% black student enrollments, Lincoln and Truman will be closed and Dunbar will be reopened. PX 28, DX 62 (projections). 69. In the 1985-86 school year, 44.7% of all black students in grades 1-4 attended schools with enrollments greater than 90% black10; in the 1986-87 school year, 42.7% of all black students in these grades were assigned to schools more than 90% black.11 PX 26, 27 (enrollments).12 70. Implementation of the 1985 plan resulted in a substantial rise in the dissimilarity index, especially among elementary schools, from the level to which it had fallen after the Finger Plan was put into effect. Tr. 186-87 (Welch); DX 44, 45 (tables and graphs) 71. Defendants' expert witness prepared an exhibit (DX 38) comparing the current school racial composition dissimilarity index 10If North Highland is excluded from these calculations 'since it was not a virtually all-black school in 1971-72), 40.1% cf all black students in grades 1-4 attended historically all-black ele mentary schools which once again had enrollments above 90% black. ^Excluding North Highland (see preceding footnote), 36.9% of all black students in grades 1-4 were attending historically black elementary schools with enrollments greater than 90% black. 12Dr. Foster calculated, based on the October 31, 1986 enroll ment print-out, that 46% of black students in grades 1-4 were at tending schools more than 90% black. Tr. 1298. 25 in the Oklahoma City School District to the respective indices for other school districts in comparably sized SMSAs. The Court accepts Dr. Welch's calculations but does not find the chart to be of much assistance in this matter, since Dr. Welch was not aware whether or not the districts with which Oklahoma City was compared are carrying out a conscious desegregation effort, either on a voluntary basis or because of a prior finding of constitutional violation. Furthermore, he had not compared the results achieved in those districts which were carrying out plans to those antici pated when the plans were drawn up or implemented. Tr. 2 67-69 (Welch). 72. Dr. Welch also prepared an exhibit (DX 39) comparing the dissimilarity index of the School District to a group of school systems which were identified as "unitary" districts in a press release issued by the U.S. Department of Justice. The value of this exhibit also is very minimal. Dr. Welch did not know what the Justice Department's criteria were for classification as a "unitary" district. Moreover, both tae exhibit and the Depart ment's listing, on which it was based, .nclude school systems later found by a United States Court of Appea.s not to have reached "uni tary status." Tr. 271, 279-80, 283 (Welch); DX 39 (table); Georgia State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia. 775 F.2d 1403, 1413-14 (11th Cir. 1985). 73. Several months before the hearing in this case, Dr. Welch testified in another federal desegregation suit that he "doubt[ed] 26 seriously" that a school system with ten virtually all-black ele mentary schools would be a "unitary system." Tr. 272-78 (Welch). The exhibit which Dr. Welch prepared, however, includes not only Oklahoma City but also Norfolk, Virginia, which has that number of virtually all-black schools. Tr. 271; DX 39 (table). 74. Dr. Gordon Foster, plaintiffs' desegregation expert, tes tified that in his opinion, the 1985 plan created a segregated school system despite the continued operation of integrated schools serving the fifth and higher grades. Tr. 1265. 75. Dr. John Finger, the author of the plan implemented in 1972 pursuant to this Court's direction, stated that the 1985 plan "has not maintained desegregated schools" in Oklahoma City. Tr. 1186. (2) Faculty assignments 76. After the 1985-86 "neighborhood" school pupil assignment plan was implemented, the pattern of faculty assignments within the School District also began to change. Between the 1984-85 school year and the 1987-88 school year, "the blacker schools in enrollment became much blacker in percentage black faculty, while in the schools v; th the least black enrollment, the faculty becomes less black." Tr. 1270 (Foster), 551 (Moore). 77. The pattern is clearly revealed in plaintiffs' exhibits 48, 50, 52 and 54. By 1986-87, the proportions of individual school faculties that were black, at northeast quadrant K-4 schools 27 with enrollments over 90% black, were substantially higher than they had been under the Finger Plan: School % Black Facultv 1972-73 1984-85 1985-86 1986- Creston Hills 28 48 57 43 Dewey 21 15 48 42 Dunbar 25 29 36 Edwards 15 48 65 70 Garden Oaks 39 48 40 50 Lincoln 21 55 49 64 Longfellow 20 16 31 38 North Highland 19 34 39 38 Parker 22 29 44 46 Polk 19 32 43 46 Truman 32 42 33 44 PX 48 (table). 78. Plaintiffs' exhibits 50, 52 and 54 each give the percentage of the elementary schools' faculties which were black, and the per centage of the schools' student bodies which were black, for the 1984-85, 1985-86 and 1986-87 school years, respectively — ranked in order of proportion of faculty which was black. Immediately after adoption of the 1985 and increasing in the 1986-87 school year, there was an obvious pattern. In 1986-87, of the ten ele mentary schools with the highest proportions of black faculty, nine had student enrollments more than 90% black. The other two schools more than with more than 90%-black student bodies were ranked 14th and 17th, respectively (of a total of 64 elementary schools), in percentage of black faculty members. PX 50, 52, 54 (tables). 79. These patterns developed despite the Board of Education's official policy calling for racially non-identifiable faculties, 28 and despite memoranda sent periodically to building administrators from the school system's Affirmative Action Officer, reminding them of the policy. DX 88, pp. 29-30 (1985 Affirmative Action Plan), DX 191 (February, 1987 memoranda to school principals from Linda Johnson). 80. The School District's Executive Director of Personnel Ser vices testified that teacher transfers under the plan adopted by the Board of Education in 1985 were responsible for the pattern of racially identifiable faculties. Tr. 551 (Moore). 81. On April 22, 1987, well after this matter had been sched uled for trial and after the question of faculty assignments had become an issue between the parties,13 the Board of Education adop 13 [On February 25, 1987, plaintiffs submitted Answers to Interrogatories propounded by the Board of Education. In response to an inquiry (No. 8) about facts supporting a contention that the School District is not "unitary," plaintiffs said, in part: The Board of Education has also assigned fac ulty in a manner which reinforces the racial identity of these schools. Although the 1986- 87 FTE elementary school faculty is 28% Black, the average proportion of Black faculty members assigned to these ten schools is 49%. Only one other elementary school in the system has a higher proportion of Black faculty than this: Telstar, with a current 65%-Black faculty and a 59.7%-Black student body. Only one of the ten schools has a faculty which is less than 4 0% Black (Longfellow, 38% Black) , but in addi tion to Telstar, only two other elementary schools in the system have faculties more than 40% Black: Willow Brook, with a 42%-Black faculty and a 51.5%-Black student enrollment; and Hawthorne, with a 41%-Black faculty and a 19.2%-Black student body. Plaintiffs' Answers to Defendants' Interrogatories, at p. 13.] 29 ted a new policy limiting transfers among schools by teachers. Under this new policy, no transfer reguest would be approved unless it contributed to maintenance of the system's goal of non-identi- fiable faculties at all schools. DX 193 (staff memorandum to Superintendent), 194 (Minutes of Board of Education meeting of April 22, 1987). 82. Plaintiffs' expert witness testified that the new policy, if implemented, would be adequate to deal with the problem of fac ulty assignments which had occurred after the 1985 plan was adop ted. Tr. 1276 (Foster). (3) Maioritv-to-minoritv transfers 83. Under the 1985 plan, majority-to-minority transfers are available to students, but these transfers have not resulted in desegregating the schools in the northeast quadrant. Tr. 609 (Mason). 84. In the 1985-86 school year, 332 students transferred under the majority-to-minority provision; in the 1986-87 school year this number dropped to 181 children. Neai ly all the transfers were made by black students. Tr. 349 (Hermes), 1235 (Taylor); DX 108 (tables). 85. Except for an initial letter to parents at the time the 1985 pupil reassignment plan was adopted, the Board of Education has not sought to promote the use of majority-to-minority trans fers. Tr. 327 (Biscoe). 30 86. The Chair of the Equity Committee established under the 1985 plan testified that he understood that the purpose of the provision was to permit parents to send their children wherever they wished, and that he and his wife used it "for convenience." Tr. 837 (Bender) . (4) Academic achievement 87. Extensive evidence was introduced at the hearing about the academic performance of Oklahoma City pupils, both black and white, on standardized achievement tests before and after imple mentation of the 1985 pupil reassignment plan. DX 161-64, 172, 179-85 (tables and graphs). 88. Defendants contend that adoption of "neighborhood" schools stimulated a variety of other changes, such as increased parental participation, which have improved performance. The Court finds it is not possible to evaluate these claims at the present time, for a number of reasons. 89. About the same time as the 1985 pupil assignment plan was implemented, the School District began to carry out an Effective Schools program of instruction involving specific staff training and pedagogical approaches. DX 131, 151-54. It is not possible to isolate the impact of the pupil assignment change separately from the impact of these improved instructional procedures. For example, defendants' expert witness testified that gains result ing from increased parental involvement and the Effective Schools 31 program might have masked losses, if any, resulting from the rees tablishment of virtually all-black schools. Tr. 947-48 (Walberg). 90. A recent national study of standardized test score infor mation reaches a similar conclusion: Although a large number of diverse factors have been suggested as causes of the recent trends [in scores on achievement tests], many analysts are confident that one or a few fac tors can account for much of the change shown by test scores over the past two decades. Moreover, many analysts believe that factors of a single type are responsible for these changes. The majority of them looks among educational factors for an explanation, while a smaller and less influential group expects the answer to be found in noneducational fac tors such as demographic trends and changes in students' use of alcohol and other drugs. The available evidence, however, paints a much more complicated picture. The trends most likely resulted from the combined effects of numerous factors, both educational and non educational. . . . * * * Trends in average test scores have become a common criterion for gauging the effectiveness of educational programs. The link between trends in test scores and educational policies, however, is far less straightforward than many people assume. Even when test data are suffi cient to provide reliable information about students' achievement, they can lead to erro neous inferences about the effectiveness of educational programs. Congressional Budget Office, Educational Achievement: Explanations and Implications of Recent Trends xi-xii, xv (August, 1987).14 14[This study was released after the hearing in this matter. A copy of the report is being furnished to the Court and to counsel for defendants along with these proposed Findings of Fact and Con clusions of Law.] 32 91. Plaintiffs' expert witness testified that while the post- 1985 plan data were limited and not conclusive, they indicated cause for concern about the possible negative impact of the assign ment changes. Tr. 999-1003 (Crain). 92. Dr. Finger concurred that it was too early to draw con clusions about program effectiveness on the basis of only a year or two of test scores. Tr. 1191 (Finger). 93. The parties also disagreed about the impact of desegrega tion on pupil achievement. Dr. Robert Crain, plaintiffs' expert witness, has concluded on the basis of his research studies that segregation in schools inhibits the academic performance of minor ity children, and that the positive effects of integration on aca demic achievement are greatest at the early grade levels. Tr. 971-73, 976-77. Defendants' witnesses, Dr. Herbert Walberg and Dr. William Sampson, disagree with Dr. Crain's interpretation of the available research evidence. Tr. 913-15 (Walberg), 1458-59 (Sampson). 94. The Court need not resolve this disagreement among the experts. Defendants' witnesses, both lay and expert, stated that the Effective Schools program could be carried out in the School District in conjunction with a desegregation plan for grades 1-4 and did not depend upon the "neighborhood school" assignment method adopted by the Board of Education in 1985. Tr. 693 (Hughes), 901 (Lane), 944 (Walberg). 33 95. Dr. Crain described numerous benefits other than those relating to academic performance on standardized tests, which are associated with attending integrated schools. Tr. 986-93. 96. The same effects of desegregation were referred to by Mrs. Luper and Senator Porter, each of whom had the experience of send ing children to public schools in Oklahoma City which were first segregated and then were desegregated. Tr. 1398-1400, 1405 (Luper); 1425-30 (Porter). (5) Parental participation 97. Defendants also contend that there was a drastic drop in PTA and parental participation after implementation of the Finger Plan in 1972, and that there has been a marked increase in the last two years in parental participation in school and PTA activ ities which is attributable to the 1985 adoption of a "neighbor hood school" plan at the elementary grade levels, and which "is one of many reasons for returning to racially-identifiable schools in Oklahoma City." Tr. 599, 618 (Mason). The evidence introduced at the hearing fails to support this argument. 98. The Board member who was President in 1985, when the pupil assignment plan was adopted, testified that the .ncrease in PTA participation after that time was attributable to the efforts of Mrs. Billie Oldham. Tr. 362 (Hermes).15 15In addition, Mrs. Hermes testified that she could not recall any efforts by the Board of Education or school staff prior to 1985 to increase PTA participation among parents — efforts which are now being made as part of the system's Effective Schools pro- 34 99. Mrs. Oldham also testified at the hearings. She served the previous two school years as district-wide PTA Council Presi dent and helped organize active PTA chapters at individual schools throughout the School District; for several years prior to that time, there had been no functioning PTA Council. Tr. 865-67 (Old ham) . 100. Another witness who has long been active in school system affairs also identified the disbanding of the PTA Council as a major factor in the post-1981 decline in PTA activity shown on defendants' exhibits 138-40. Tr. 778 (Leveridge). 101. Defendants' claims are also inconsistent with the decline in PTA participation even at elementary schools in white neighbor hoods of Oklahoma City which served as "neighborhood schools" for students in grades K-4 under the Finger Plan. Tr. 602 (Mason), 858--59 (Brown), 867 (Oldham). One of the School District's admini strators attributed this decline to an overall negative image of the school system held by patrons irrespective of their color. Tr. 610 (Mason). 102. In addition, witnesses agreed that other factors such as economic declines, the rise in single-parent families, and the increased participation of women in the work force, could have gram. Tr. 364. Mrs. Luper testified that increased PTA involve ment depends on the efforts made by the school system, not on the method of student assignment. Tr. 1413-14. 35 been responsible, at least in part, for the reduction in PTA activ ity in the 1970's and 1980's. Tr. 600-01 (Mason), 780 (Leveridge). (5) White Flight 103. The Board of Education also asserts that the Finger Plan caused massive "white flight" from the School District which would be repeated if mandatory two-way busing of children in grades 1-4 were implemented, resulting in resegregation of the system. Pre- Trial Order, Defendants' Contentions, p. 7; Tr. 440 (Muse). 104. Exhibits and testimony introduced at the hearing indicate that the white student population of the School District has been steadily declining since at least 1970. DX 15-20 (tables and graphs); Tr. 143-53 (Welch). 105. Defendants' expert witness testified that even in the ab sence of the Finger Plan, the number of white students in the School District would have declined — that "between 1968 and 1984, I think I say in the commission report, the number of white stu dents nationally dropped by about 20 percent." Tr, 257 (Welch). 106. The same witness confirmed that he had stated in an inter view that "the trend towards suburbanization is a more important factor than desegregation in the growing racial isolation in cen tral city schools." Tr. 258-59 (Welch). 107. The proportion of the School District's total enrollment which was black grew from 22.9% to 39.3% between 1970 and 1986, while the proportion of the District's enrollment in grades K-5 36 which was black underwent a smaller change from 23.4% to 36.6% in the same period of time. Tr. 262 (Welch); PX 47. 108. Although the defendants' expert witness attributed this difference to the substantial withdrawal of white students from the School District prior to the fifth grade, the first year during which white children were bused for desegregation under the Finger Plan, in 1985 the Board of Education decided to retain busing in grades 5-12. Tr. 151 (Welch); PX 9 (plan). 109. Factors other than the desegregation of the Oklahoma City Public Schools stimulated the relocation of the School District's white population after 1970. Tr. 1435-36 (Porter).16 Although the defendants' expert witness, when directly questioned on the sub ject, stated that implementation of a desegregation plan under which children in grades 1-4 were bused would cause white flight, _16Determining the extent to which white families would have remained_ in the School District had the Constitution permitted the continued maintenance of segregated schools in 1972 is fraught with risk of error. In Riddick v. School Board of Norfolk. 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir.), cert, denied. 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986), the court approved the board's plan for "neighborhood” elementary schools which reestablished some ten virtually all-black schools, in part based upon the board's contention that the earlier mandatory deseg regation plan (using busing) had caused "white flight" which would be ended and reversed by the return to geographic zoning. A recently completed study based on the same survey methodology used by Dr. David Armor to justify the "neighborhood school" plan in that case indicates that school integration may not have been an important factor in relocation decisions — and that ending busing had not caused an influx of white families back into the Norfolk public_schools. Institute for the Study of Minority Issues, Some Preliminary Results of a Survey on the Issue of Busina for Racial Integration in Norfolk, Virginia (July, 1987). [A copy of this study, completed after the hearing in this matter, is being fur nished to the court and counsel along with these proposed find ings and conclusions.] 37 he had not identified school desegregation as a major factor influ encing the patterns of residential segregation in cities. Tr. 84 (Clark). 110. Plaintiffs' expert witnesses would not recommend limiting desegregation efforts because of white pupil loss unless an entire school system was heavily black. Tr. 1100 (Crain), 1346-47 (Fos ter) . F. Residential Patterns in Oklahoma City 111. As noted above, the Court has previously found in this case that areas of Oklahoma City were earmarked for residence by blacks through racially discriminatory official policies and ac tions of private entities and governmental officials, and that these segregated patterns were exacerbated by the actions of school authorities in maintaining a virtually completely segregated school system until entry of the 1972 Order. Also as noted above, the segregated residential patterns which existed in Oklahoma City in 1972 made the School District's "neighborhood school" assignment plan inadequate to meet its constitutional responsibilities to dismantle the dual system it had long maintained. 112. Defendants' expert witness testified that areas oice estab lished as minority residential zones by discrimination are unlikely to change in racial composition until their minority residents depart because whites are so strongly disinclined to move into such areas. For this reason, except for results achieved by such devices as majority-to-minority transfers, racially identifiable 38 schools serving such areas also will not change. Tr. 106-07 (Clark). 113. Current residential patterns in Oklahoma City bear out this opinion. The northeast quadrant was the location of the ori ginal black residential concentration within Oklahoma City and remains heavily disproportionately black today. Tr. 66, 93-94 (Clark), 1129-31 (Rabin). 114. This area included most of the virtually all-black elemen tary schools in 1971-72 and includes most of the virtually all black elementary schools today. Tr. 93-94 (Clark), 1135 (Rabin); PX 5 (1968-72 attendance areas), PX 7 (map), PX 41 (table). 115. One of defendants' expert witnesses attempted to project what the racial composition of attendance areas within the School District would be in 1995 — portraying significant increases in integration throughout the system. DX 11, 14, 40, 89 (tables, maps and graphs). 116. The Court find that these projections are not sufficiently reliable to serve as a basis for decisionmaking in this case. The projections suggest, for exairj le, that white families with school-age children will relocate into the northeast quadrant by 1995, a claim which directly contradicts the testimony of another expert witness called by the Board -of Education. Tr. 252-53 (Welch), 106-07 (Clark). 39 117. There has been no significant movement of white residents into the area of the city into which blacks were originally con centrated; rather, that area has expanded in population and geo graphic size. Tr. 45, 93-94 (Clark), 388-89 (Hermes), 1127-31 (Rabin); DX 1-4, 5A (maps and overlay), 12-13 (maps); PX 58, 60, 62 (maps). 118. The projections may best be characterized, in the words of the witness, as "fuzzy numbers" or "guesstimates" produced by a complicated series of calculations, at each stage of which the witness employed a different methodology to produce a series of estimates which would, the witness hoped, withstand cross-examina tion. Tr. 229-48 (Welch). 119. The methodology was not verified by applying it to earlier data so as to project enrollments in 1986-87 and then checking these projections against the actual enrollment figures. Tr. 249- 50 (Welch). 120. Indeed, the basic approach (regression estimates) tends, according to :he witness, to fail to predict the extremes; as a result, it wovld tend to underestimate the extent to which virtu ally all-blacic schools would continue in 1995. Tr. 254-55 (Welch). 121. Contrary to the circumstances existing in 1972, at least a small number of blacks now resides in most of the attendance zones within the School District, including formerly all-white 40 areas of the city. Tr. 53-54, 60-61 (Clark); DX 1-4, 5A (maps and overlay), 12-13 (maps); PX 58, 60, 62 (maps). 122. Among the factors responsible for the relocation of black residents within and outside the northeast quadrant are public redevelopment programs and highway construction, both of which have eliminated residential units previously occupied by black persons in Oklahoma City. Tr. 68 (Clark), 1154, 1158, 1162 (Rabin). 123. The availability of public housing outside the northeast quadrant was also a factor which enabled black families to relocate from that area. Tr. 60, 77 (Clark). 124. Defendants' expert witness, Dr. Clark, testified that in his opinion, past discriminatory practices are not a significant factor affecting the racial composition of neighborhoods in Okla homa City today. Tr. 89, 100. Based upon this thesis, the Board of Education contends that although readoption in 1985 of the pre- 1972 elementary school attendance zones results in virtually all black student enrollments in northeast quadrant elementary schools which were all-black or virtually all-black prior to 1972, this is either a coincidence or the result of the exercise of a now- available unfettered choice of residential locations by Oklahoma City's citizenry, including blacks. Pre-Trial Order, Defendants' Contentions, p. 5. 41 125. The Court finds neither Dr. Clark's testimony nor the posi tion of the Board of Education to be credible. 126. Dr. Clark's opinions are not based upon a historical study of Oklahoma City. Instead, he characterized them as "a fairly standard explanation for the development of black concentrations in the central cities of North American metropolitan areas." Tr. 95-96. Most of Dr. Clark's professional work, however, has focused on the post-World War II era. Tr. 50 (Clark). 127. Although Dr. Clark admits that there was discrimination against black people in the past, he believes that its impact was limited and ceased to have much effect quite a long time ago. Thus, for example, he suggested that the reasons why blacks lived in a densely settled, concentrated area of the northeast quadrant in 1950 were (a) the availability of jobs in the downtown area, (b) preferences of blacks to live near other blacks and the infor mation network among blacks available to those seeking to relocate, (c) the availability of cheaper housing in the area, "having been vacated by other families who had moved out," and (d) ordinances which in the 1930's had "attempted to concentrate black househoclcs in certain parts of the city." Tr. 45-46 (emphasis added). 128. This explanation utterly fails to attach adequate weight to the longstanding and pervasive discriminatory practices of pri vate entities and governmental bodies which this Court has identi fied in its earlier opinions. Thus, in assessing the continuing impact of earlier discrimination upon the current residential pat 42 terns within Oklahoma City, Dr. Clark starts from a position which underestimates the importance of discrimination as a cause of the segregated residential patterns that were evident more than thirty- five years ago. 129. Dr. Clark minimizes the impact of restrictive covenants on the maintenance of white areas in Oklahoma City. However, he was not aware whether Oklahoma courts had enforced covenants by cancelling deeds executed in favor of black purchasers by willing sellers. Tr. 96, 98. 130. In fact, trial court decrees cancelling deeds or leases freely executed in favor of blacks, when the instruments violated restrictive covenants, were affirmed on at least three occasions by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in the 1940's. Hemslev v. Houah. 157 P.2d 182 (Okla. 1945); Hemslev v. Sage. 154 P.2d 577 577 (Okla. 1944) Lyons v. Wallen. 133 P.2d 555 (Okla. 1941). 131. The importance of covenant enforcenent as a matter of the State's public policy was also reflected in the enactment of a statute explicitly providing that restr:. ztive covenants should survive foreclosure and sale for non-paymer.t of taxes. Okla. Stat. Ann. § 456; see Dowell v. School Board of Oklahoma City Public Schools, 219 F. Supp. at 433 (W.D. Okla. 1963) . 132. Dr. Clark suggested that the Supreme Court's decision in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) and the Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision in Correll v. Easlev. 237 P.2d 1017 (Okla. 1951) 43 were "very important in changing the patterns — of allowing the patterns to change" in Oklahoma City. Tr. 89. However, while Dr. Clark understood that the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Correll followed Shelley and refused to cancel a deed to black purchasers, he was unaware that the Court nevertheless sustained an award of damages against the white seller, 237 P.2d at 1021,17 and he had not considered whether such damages awards tended to make property owners reluctant to sell in violation of restrictive covenants. Tr. 99-100. 133. Another indication of Dr. Clark's failure to appreciate the strength and persistence of past discrimination was apparent with respect to the role of the Federal Housing Administration. Dr. Clark estimates that the assets of white families were as much as ten times as high as the assets of black families after World War II, when FHA financing was a factor in suburban expansion, and he agrees that because down payments for FHA-financed housing were lower than those required for conventional financing, the availability of FHA loans could make the difference in ability to move to the suburbs for a family with limited assets. Tr. 86, 107- 09. But, while Dr. :lark was aware of language in the FHA under writing manual up t: 1949 which, he said, "did not encourage the movement into -- well, black households into white neighborhoods," he was unaware of what FHA's practices were after 1949. Tr. 110. 17The Supreme Court of the United States prohibited such dam age awards by state courts in Barrows v, Jackson. 346 U.S. 249 (1953). 44 134. It is instructive to compare Dr. Clark's limited knowledge of FHA's discriminatory practices — which in part undergirds his opinion about the continuing effect of past discrimination — with the findings of another court: By deliberate policy the Federal Housing Admin istration encouraged the institution and perpetuation of segregated housing. This was the avowed FHA policy from its beginning until well after the end of World War II. Only in 19 4 7 did the FHA remove the caveats in its underwriters' manual advising appraisers about the dangers of "inharmonious racial groups." Somewhat disingenuously, the phrase "inhar monious user groups: was substituted. No pol icy change was intended, nor did one occur at that time. (K-26) * * * [T]he federal discriminatory policies spread as well to private builders and lend ers. Such a tendency was bolstered by the echange of personnel between the FHA and the private lending industry. The current FHA Commissioner formerly was president of the National Association of Home Builders. (K-28) Policies fixed during the initial years of the FHA spread and have endured to have a sub stantial effect on the current housing market practices. Bradley v. School Board of Richmond. 338 F. Supp. 67, 217 (E.D. Va.), rev'd on other grounds. 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972), aff'd by equally divided court. 412 U.S. 92 (1973). 135. Dr. Clark also testified that his opinion on the lack of any persisting impact of prior discrimination was based, in part, upon blacks' responses to questions on two surveys which he con ducted in the course of school desegregation cases involving Kansas City, Missouri and Little Rock, Arkansas. Tr. 101-02. 45 136. The surveys, asked respondents whether they had been dis criminated against when seeking housing. While Dr. Clark admitted that minority homeseekers could be subjected to discriminatory treatment without their knowledge (for example, a family might be shown housing only in minority neighborhoods or might not receive information about other available properties — but might purchase a property which they were shown and so withdraw from the market without every becoming aware of the discriminatory treatment), he could not recall the wording of the survey questions and thus could not state unequivocally that they would have been likely to result in respondents identifying subtle, as well as overt, instances of discrimination. Tr. 102-03. 136. The validity of drawing the conclusion, based upon these survey responses, that racial discrimination is no longer a force in the housing market, is thrown into question by the lack of any comparative data indicating how minority homeseekers would have responded to similar surveys in earlier time periods when discrim ination was pervasive. Tr. 112 (Clark). 138. In sum, Dr. Clark's testimony revealed that he is generally unfamiliar with the manifestations and extent of racial discrimi nation in the American housing market. His imperfect understanding of the mechanisms of bias inevitably skews, and renders less cred ible, his assessment of the extent to which past discriminatory practices continue to exert a strong impact upon racial residential patterns today, in Oklahoma City or elsewhere in the United States. 46 139. Other witnesses, who are active in seeking to combat hous ing bias in the Oklahoma City area, testified that discriminatory practices continue today, although they are more subtle and less overt — and that minority homeseekers are often not aware that they have been discriminated against. Tr. 314-15 (Biscoe), 1168, 1170, 1177-78 (Silovsky). 140. The Executive Director of the Metropolitan Fair Housing Council of Greater Oklahoma City (which conducts "tests" and as sists individuals who feel that they may have been the victims of discrimination) , who has been in her position for the past eight years and is familiar with housing bias in Oklahoma City, disagreed with Dr. Clark's opinion that racial discrimination is no longer a factor in determining where people live in Oklahoma City. She testified that "steering continues to determine where people live, where people buy homes." Tr. 1166, 1171-72 (Silovsky). The Court believes that her testimony is entitled to much greater weight than Dr. Clark's opinions for the reasons discussed above. 141. The Court also credits her opinion that tie current racial composition of the northeast quadrant is directl y related to the pervasive discriminatory practices of the past upon which this Court remarked in its earlier decisions. Tr. 1172-73 (Silovsky). 142. Dr. Clark also identifies "preferences" -- attitudes, rather than behavior (which he characterizes as "discrimination") — as an important determinant of current, racially largely separ 47 ate, residential distribution in urban areas. He includes "preju dice" within the category of "preferences." Tr. 84, 113. 143. Nevertheless, Dr. Clark does not see a connection between the widespread official discriminatory policies of the past and today's "preferences" or "prejudices" which may, for example, take the form of strong aversion on the part of whites to moving into established minority neighborhoods. Tr. 111.18 This also obvi 1SDr. Clark discounted the nexus by pointing to homogeneous residential patterns among ethnic groups in Los Angeles: Q. Now, Doctor Clark, if I can return to the subject of preferences, and particularly the white disinclination to move into areas of minority residential concentration. In your view, are those preferences related to prior official discriminatory policies of governmental agencies, both to their tangible and symbolic value? A. I would say that there is probably some effect of the past, but how much, in my opin ion, — Let me restate that. But the amount, in my opii ion, is probably small, because we see other ethnic groups, and in my own city is a good example. Of these other ethnic groups, like tie Vietnamese, the Koreans, the Japanese, having quite high levels of preference for people of their own race. The Hispanics also. Tr. 111. Although there are no actual data before the Court, it is apparent that most of the groups to which Dr. Clark referred include large numbers of recent immigrants or even illegal aliens, who would not be expected to disperse residentially until later generations. See generally K. & A. Taeuber, Nearoes in Cities 16-17, 68 (1965). 48 ously affected his evaluation of the continuing impact of prior discrimination on current housing patterns in Oklahoma City. 144. The other significant explanatory factor mentioned by Dr. Clark was economic status. Although he recognized that there are still very substantial economic differentials between black and white families, Dr. Clark stated that any determination of the relationship between prior discrimination against blacks and their current economic status is beyond his area of expertise. Tr. 84, 107, 114. Here, too, Dr. Clark's failure to weigh the contribution of past discrimination to the creation of racial differences which, he acknowledges, are responsible for the very substantial degree of racial residential separation which exists today, drains his analysis of its probative value. 145. The Court credits the conclusions of plaintiffs' expert witness, Dr. Taylor, who has studied the ways in which institu tional practices may perpetuate the effects of past discriminatory policies and actions, that "Oklahoma City has a history of racial segregation;;, ] exclusion and discrimination, and that history worked to shape the institutional patterns that are evident in Oklahoma City today." Tr. 1222. 146. While Dr. Clark and Dr. Taylor "agree that economic re sources and preferences are important influences on residential decisions," Dr. Taylor correctly characterizes Dr. Clark's inter pretation as holding that these factors are "incidental individual matters, and I think this view suffers from taking — from having 49 a limited perspective on the impact of discrimination over time." Tr. 1228-29. 147. It is Dr. Taylor's opinion, which the Court accepts, that economic resources and preferences are proximate causes of residential segregation, but they are also effects of past officially- produced residential segregation. In that sense, they're intervening links. They help to explain why the black residential area, once it was created through official segrega tion, continues to exist even in the absence of continuing official action. Tr. 1229.19 19As Dr. Taylor explained: Q. Well, what about Doctor Clark's suggestion that these circumstances — the movement demon strates that residents of Oklahoma City can now live wherever they want, and those who remain in the northeast quadrant are there by preference and not because of any impact of discrimination? A. Uh-huh. I don't share Doctor Clark's view on that. I think there are continuing barriers to the residential mobility of black residents. Certainly economic factors present a barrier to the residential mobility of black residents. The median family income of black Americans continues to be substantially below the median family income for white Americans. And when we look at assets, the economic disparities between whites and blacks are compounded. An important point about this is that economic scarcity is not just an incidental extraneous accident that befalls black individuals. The economic scarcity disproportionately afflicts black Americans, largely because of institu tionally-created and often officially-created segregation in schools and housing. So one barrier to black mobility is economic disadvantage that derives, in part, from a history of segregated schools and housing. 50 148. Dr. Taylor is in accord with Dr. Clark's view that most whites will not move into established minority residential areas but unlike Dr. Clark, sees this phenomenon as directly linked to past discrimination and segregation. Tr. 1231-34. 149. Dr. Taylor's conclusions are consonant with the Supreme Court's recognition in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 20 (1971) that when public agencies, includ ing school boards, choose to implement discriminatory policies, "[o]ver the long run, the consequences of the choices will be far- Another barrier to exodus from the black com munity is something that's been referred to in the literature as the perpetuation of segre gation phenomenon. Black individuals who have experienced segregated schooling tend to have fewer contacts with whites, they tend to feel poorly received in white settings, to be appre hensive about discrimination, to perceive more discrimination than black individuals who were educated in desegregated schools. . . . * * * * . . . I think this perception is another resi due then of experience in a segregated setting, and it, in fact, is an important barrier to the residential mobility of people whose exper ience has been -- black people whose experience has been in segregated settings. * * * . . . [T]he sense that one will not be welcome in a white setting is certainly going to affect the preferences of black individuals about whether to attempt to move into that white setting. Tr. 1226-28. 51 reaching," as well as with numerous other judicial decisions in discrimination cases. 150. Based upon a consideration of all of the testimony on this subject, the Court finds that the racial composition of the north east quadrant today is, at the very least in significant part, the product of past discriminatory practices, just as it was in 1972. As Dr. Taylor summarized the situation: [I]n 19 65, the Court noted that thes segregated schools and residential area were a product of official discrimination. I believe that the segregation in the residential area has continued to show that impact of official dis crimination. It's continued to show that impact, in part, because of the barriers to black residential mobility out of the area, — I talked about that — in part because of white avoidance that itself was shaped by that institutional history. During the — during the Finger Plan, in fact, the impact of that earlier official discrimi nation on the schools was interrupted, but now that the link between housing and schools has been resumed, in my view the impact of the earlier official discrimination is now reflected in the schools, as well. Tr. 1236. G. Plaintiffs' Suggested Plans 151. Plaintiffs' expert witness, Dr. Gordon Foster, prepared two alternative elementary school desegre3ation plans for the School District "to be more eguitable [than the Finger Plan] in terms of the burden of busing; to desegregate all of the eleven predominantly black schools, the ones that were 90 percent, if that was feasible; and to eliminate the stand-alone schools, in 52 terms of the concept of stand-alone schools, as much as possible, that feature of the Finger Plan that seemed to have difficulty." Tr. 1278. 152. Both of the plans use the same clustering and grade restructuring techniques as the Finger Plan, but each would reas sign both black and white pupils in grades 1-4. PX 55 (plans). 153. Neither plan drawn by Dr. Foster would affect elementary schools in the discontiguous Arcadia and Spencer areas of the School District. Id. 154. Plan B would affect all other elementary schools, while Plan A would eliminate all 90%-or-more black elementary schools (except Parker, in the Spencer area20) without involving six pre dominantly non-black elementary schools along the southern and southwestern edges of the School District's main geographic area. PX 55 (plans). Plan B would require more extensive pupil transpor tation than Plan A. Tr. 1304, 1317 (Foster). 155. Since plaintiffs' counsel announced at the hearing that they would be satisfied with implementation of Plan A, even though it is not as comprehensive as Plan B, the Court's findings are in the main limited to that proposal. Tr. 1316. 20Dr. Foster estimated that Parker would enroll approximately 6% of all black students enrolled in grades 1-4 in the School Dis trict. Tr. 1298. 53 156. Dr. Foster testified that other school systems are cur rently utilizing the techniques and actual grade structure proposed in Plan A for purposes of desegregation. Tr. 1305 157. Dr. Foster's proposal does not include a specification of the geographic areas to be reassigned among clustered schools where a grade or grades would be divided among more than one facility; rather, as was true of the Finger Plan when it was submitted in 1972, the school system's staff would be responsible for preparing detailed pupil assignments to meet the projected results in each school. Tr. 1305-06 (Foster); PX 6, pp. liv ("Some method of as signment will be necessary for the black pupils. The method of assignment might be alphabetical, or by lottery, but probably a geographic assignment will be most feasible"), lxxxv (Finger Plan). The plan would also require adjustments by the staff to accommodate special curricular needs, such as bilingual programs. Tr. 1359 (Foster). 158. Dr. Foster proposed a combination of "shuttle" transpor tation between clustered schools and neighborhood pick-ups for children who live beyond walking distance from the nearest school in the cluster to which they are assigned. Tr. 1301. 159. By counting all students reassigned from their present schools under Plan A, Dr. Foster estimated that a total of 3,978 pupils would need to be bused, making no reduction for the students who could walk to their new assignments or who are already trans ported to their "neighborhood" schools because of distance or haz 54 ard. Tr. 1304 (Foster). (The Superintendent testified that the School District in 1986-87 operated approximately 275-280 bus routes — including special education routes — at an operating cost of between $7 and $9 million; he did not know how many stu dents were transported because of the distance they lived from an assigned school and how many were transported for desegregation purposes.) Tr. 751-54 (Steller). 160. Dr. Foster drove between the schools clustered in his plan for the purpose of estimating the time and distance necessary for pupil transportation, using a private car and moving no faster than the 30-mile-per-hour speed limit on city streets except for one segment of travel on Interstate 35, which he travelled at 50 miles per hour. Tr. 1302 (Foster). 161. Dr. Foster concluded that the transportation required under Plan A was feasible, with the longest times between clustered fa cilities approximating 30 minutes. Tr. 1303-05, 1391. 162. The longest distance between paired or clustered schools, according to Dr. Foster, was ten miles between Edwards and Cool- idge. Tr. 1304. Under the Finger Plan, between 1978 and 1984 students were transported from Coolidge to Dewey, a distance the same or greater than that between Coolidge and Edwards. Tr. 1525- 27 (Steller). 163. Dr. Foster estimated that an additional 85 buses, including an allowance for spares, would be required to implement Plan A, 55 at an initial cost of $3.5 million and. an annual operating expense of $1.06 million. Tr. 1311-13. 164. The Superintendent of Schools attacked Plan A. In the apt characterization of another court, in another case, he "raise[d] every carping, contumacious objection conceivable" to the proposal. Acree v. Drummond. 336 F. Supp. 1275 (S.D. Ga.), aff'd. 458 F .2d 486 (5th Cir.), cert, denied. 409 U.S. 1006 (1972). 165. For example, the Superintendent disagreed with Dr. Foster's time and mileage estimates between schools. His testimony was based on mileage charts used for employee reimbursements by the School District but he was unaware of how they were prepared. Tr. 747 (Steller). The defendants did not offer testimony of any employee in the system's Transportation Department. 166. Although Dr. Foster calculated his estimate that 85 addi tional buses would be required to implement Plan A based on buses making single runs only, without any staggered openings, the Super intendent sought to support the School District's claim that at least 125 buses would be necessary based on the . ssumption that buses would be making multiple runs. Tr. 1310-11,.1389 (Foster), 758-59, 1525 (Steller). 167. The Superintendent was not aware of the busing times and distances under the Finger Plan while in-effect in Oklahoma City between 1972 and 1984, nor whether elementary school opening times 56 were staggered under the Finger Plan to permit more efficient use of buses. Tr. 705, 1530 (Steller). 168. The Superintendent admitted: [0]n that 85 versus 125, frankly it doesn't make all that much difference. You know, we could — once we knew exactly which students we were talking about and exactly all the other things, the number of 125 could be reduced some. Five, ten, fifteen buses, I don't know for sure until we knew exactly what students we were talking about. Tr. 1529 (Steller). 169. Dr. Steller also criticized Plan A because it did not take into account the existing placement of special programs such as bilingual education and mighr disrupt them. Tr. 1476, 1482-83, 1493-95. He admitted that relocating the programs could "reduce some of that negative impact that I talked about." Tr. 1531. 170. When the School District substantially changed the method of elementary pupil assignment in 1985, it had to alter the loca tion of special education ani other such programs, with many of the same impacts that the Superintendent suggested would accompany implementation of Plan A. Ti. 1519-20 (Steller). 171. Dr. Steller said that shuttle busing between schools would create supervision problems, that Plan A would decrease after- school activities and burden PTA participation, and involve costs for shifting library books and furniture,21 and that it would re- ^ T h e same sorts of changes had to be made when the 1985 pupil assignment plan was effectuated. Tr. 573-75 (Mason) , 788 (Scobey) . 57 suit in 632 fewer children in the School District being eligible for Chapter 1 programs.22 Tr. 1480, 1483-84, 1487-88, 1490, 1496. 22Chapter 1 of the Education Improvement and Consolidation Act of 1981, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 3801-08 (Supp. 1987), provides federal financial assistance to school districts to support compensatory or remedial programs in schools with high concentrations of stu dents from low-income families. A district must rank its schools according to the proportion of students from low-income families to select eligible attendance areas or schools, although within each such eligible school or area, all pupils who are performing below grade level may receive services. Id. at § 3805; 34 C.F.R. § 200.51 (1986). Dr. Steller maintained that because Plan A would change school populations there would be a net reduction in the number of children who would be "eligible" to participate in Chapter 1 programs — that is, the number of children performing below grade level who would be attending schools that qualified for the federal program because they had "high (above the district-wide average) concentrations" of students from low-income families. Although Dr. Steller initially maintained that the school system staff had made this determination by re-ranking all of the district's school attendance areas based on reassignments which would take place under.Plan A, Tr. 1513, he subsequently admitted that the staff had not formulated exact assignments under Plan A, which would be the only way to arrive at an accurate ranking, see 20 U.S.C.A. § 3805(b)(1) (Supp. 1987); 34 C.F.R. § 200.50(a) (1986): To the — to the extent that we have data avail- able, not knowing which students for sure, but taking approximate figure of each student -- of the grade levels that would be moved and the number of students that would be moved, we can estimate pretty close to how — what it will turn out, and there will be fewer stu dents that will be eligible to be served. (emphasis added). In any event, the federal statutory scheme provides consider able flexibility to the School District. For example, any atten dance area or school with 25% low-income children may be served. 2 0 U.S.C.A. § 3805(d) (1) , (d) (3) ; 3 4 C.F.R. § 2 00.50(b) (1) , (b) (2) . A school which participated in the program in either of the two preceding fiscal years may be served. 20 U.S.C.A. § 3805(d)(4); 34 C.F.R. § 200.-50 (b)(4). The Court finds that until detailed assignments under Plan A are made and alternatives provided by 58 - He admitted that a dual school system desegregating for the first time would have all of its programs affected in the same way, Tr. 1508. 172. Dr. Steller estimated the total cost of implementing Plan A at $7.4 million in the first year, with recurring annual opera ting costs of $1.6 million. Tr. 1500. These figures do not take into account limited state reimbursement for school busing costs, Tr. 759 (Steller), or cost reductions resulting from modifications to the Plan which the school system's staff could make. 173. Ultimately, Dr. Steller's testimony was that Plan A could be implemented despite all of these asserted difficulties — es pecially if it were modified and adapted by the staff of the School District, as Dr. Foster suggested (Tr. 1359) — ■ just as the Finger Plan was successfully implemented for thirteen years, although there would be costs involved. Tr. 1508-09, 1527. 174. The Court finds on the basis of all of the evidence that Dr. Foster's Plan A is workable in this School District and demon strates that the elementary schools of Oklahoma City can be deseg regated through a pupil assignment mechanism which involves equit able transportation of black and white pupils without the problems created or potentially existing under the Finger Plan.* 23 federal law are explored, it is not possible to determine whether the number of children served by Chapter 1 programs would be reduced. 23Dr. Foster described the purpose of plans drawn for plain tiffs in school desegregation suits as follows: 59 H. Summary 175. The basis for this Court's 1972 injunctive Order was the inadequacy of "neighborhood school" zoning at the elementary grade level to dismantle the historic dual school system, in part because of racial residential segregation created by official policy and exacerbated by school segregation practices. 176. During the school years 1972-73 through 1984-85, while the Board of Education implemented the Finger Plan pursuant to the 1972 Order, neighborhood racial residential patterns ceased to dictate school assignments and the public schools of the School District were desegregated. 177. From its inception, the Finger Plan required that younger black students bear a disproportionate share of the burden of bus ing. This inequity became greater as the percentage of black en rollment in the School District increased. You need to understand that, as a witness for plaintiff, plans that are prepared by their experts generally aren't adopted, because, in court cases, school boards have the final say, usually, in how plans — the final version of plans, which I think is certainly the way it ought to be, because they know more about their district than anybody else. But, primarily, the kind of planning I typi cally would do for plaintiffs would — would be to illustrate that a certain type of plan is operational and functional, and then usually what happens is defendants will make changes in that to suit their own situation, and even tually those plans are quite often ordered by the courts with those modifications. Tr. 1261-62. 60 178. When the Finger Plan was initially implemented, it estab lished eleven "stand-alone" schools serving grades K-5 for atten dance areas whose elementary student population was within fifteen percentage points above or below the district-wide average at this grade level. Over the years, the number of "stand-alone" K-5 schools was reduced to two; subsequently, in the 1980's, as many as ten or eleven attendance areas would have qualified for "stand alone" status based on a +/- 15% standard. The Board of Education did not act consistently to establish "stand-alone" K-5 schools or to discontinue them based on such a standard, however. It took a variety of different actions over the years to deal with the creation or discontinuance of K-5 "stand-alone" facilities and the reassignment of students accompanying such decisions. Thus, there was no uniform "stand-alone" policy Incorporated in the Fin ger Plan as that Plan was implemented by the Board of Education. 179. While the establishment of additional "stand-alone" facil ities in the mid-1980's would have increased busing distances for black children in the northeast qualrant who were already bearing a disproportionate share of the tr msportation burden, the prior history of School District actions under the Finger Plan is illus trative of the range of options avcilable to deal with the problem of inequity. For this reason, the belief of Dr. Muse and others in the black community in 1985, that continuation of the Finger Plan would necessarily have led to the closing of school buildings in the northeast quadrant, was not correct. 61 180. The committee which recommended the 1985 plan and the Board of Education were fully aware that returning to "neighborhood" attendance areas based on the elementary zones which had existed in the School District prior to 1972 would result in the creation of numerous schools with student enrollments in excess of 90% black. 181. Under the 1985 plan, nine of eleven such virtually all black schools were located in the northeast quadrant, the area of the city originally designated through official action as intended for black residents and black schools. Each of these schools was operated as a virtually all-black school in the 1971-72 school year prior to the entry of this Court's 1972 injunctive decree. 182. Once virtually all-black elementary schools were reestab lished in the School District, a pattern of faculty transfers lead ing to high concentrations of black faculty at schools with high concentrations of black students developed. The Board of Education did not take effective action to insure racially non-identifiable faculties until late in the current round of this litigation, shortly before the scheduled hearing in this matter. 183. The School District's Effective Schools Program can be implemented in conjunction with a desegregation plan for elementary schools. 184. Although participation in PTA's declined in the School District in the 1970's and early 1980's, this was associated with - 62 - the lack of district-wide efforts, either on the part of the Board of Education or through a district-wide PTA Council, to stimulate and support individual PTA chapters in schools. The rise in PTA participation after 1985 is related to the reconstitution of the PTA Council and parental outreach associated with the Effective Schools Program. 185. Although there has been some movement of blacks into for merly white areas of Oklahoma City, the northeast quadrant has continued to be occupied heavily by blacks and whites have not relocated into that sector of the city. The economic and attitud- inal factors which may be contributing to this lack of change in the northeast quadrant are intimately tied to the long history of prior discrimination and segregation in Oklahoma City. The racial composition of the northeast quadrant remains the product, in sig nificant measure, of that prior discrimination and segregation. 186. Plan A, drawn by Dr. Foster, utilizes the same techniques as were successfully carried out within the School District under the Finger Plan for many years to achieve desegregation of the elementary schools with equitable sharing of burdens, and it does not call for busing times or distances which are longer than those under the Finger Plan. 187. While there would be many dislocations associated with implementation of Plan A in this School District, the Court be lieves that the school staff could appropriately modify the plan, while retaining its essential elements of effective desegregation 63 and equitable distribution of busing burdens, to minimize those problems. 64 Conclusions of Law 1 . The question to be resolved by this Court is "whether the original [1972] mandatory order [requiring the implementation of the Finger Plan] will be enforced or whether and to what extent it should be modified." Dowell v. Board of Education of Oklahoma City. 795 F .2d 1516, 1523. 2. The Board of Education seeks either dissolution of the order, or its modification to permit continued implementation of the 1985 "neighborhood school" plan for,elementary schools. The plaintiffs seek modification of the order to require that desegre gation of the elementary schools be maintained but through an assignment plan which distributes the burdens of transporation equitably among black and white students of all ages. Pre-Trial Order. 3. The School District bears the burden of proving changed circumstances justifying dissolution of the Order or modifying it "to accommodate neighborhood elementary schools." Dowell, 795 F .2d at 1523. 4. The School District must show that "the law or the under lying facts have so changed that the dancers prevented by the in junction 'have become attenuated to a shadow,' [Securities and Exchange Commission v.l Jan-dal foil & Gas, Inc.1. 443 F.2d [304,] at 305, and the changed circumstances have produced '"hardship so extreme and unexpected" as to make the decree oppressive.' [EEOC v.] Safeway [Stores, Inc.1, 611 F.2d [795,] at 800 (quoting [United 65 States v.1 Swift & Co. IV 286 U.S. 106 (1932)]). See also United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 391 U.S. [244,] at 251-52, 88 S. Ct. at 1500-01." Id. at 1521-22. 5. The fact that this Court found that the School District was "unitary" in 1977 is not, in and of itself, a justification for dissolving the 1972 Order or modifying it in the manner sought by the Board of Education. Dowell. 795 F.2d at 1520-21 & n.3, 1523 . 6. Nor does the fact that the School District continued to implement the Finger Plan after 1977, and indeed made attendance changes which continued desegregated elementary schools until the 1985-86 school year, provide a legal justification for dissolving or modifying the Order. SEC v. Jan-dal, Inc.. 433 F.2d 304 (10th Cir. 1970). 7. Nor would the fact, if proved, that the 1985 plan was not adopted with discriminatory intent justify dissolving the order or modifying it in the manner sought by the Board of Education. Dowell. 795 F.2d at L523. 8. The purpose of the 1972 order was "not only to achieve, but also to maintain, a unitary school system. Keves v. School District No. 1, Denver. Colo.. 609 F. Supp. 1491, 1515 (D. Colo. 1985)." Dowell. 795 F.2d at 1520, also citing Lee v. Macon County Board of Education. 584 F.2d 78, 81 (5th Cir. 1978) and Graves v. 66 Walton County Board of Education, 686 F.2d 1135 (11th Cir. 1982), aff'cr in part. 91 F.R.D. 457 (M.D. Ga. 1981). 9. If the Board of Education's 1985 pupil assignment 'modifi cations caused a material change in the conditions which the Court found, in 1977, to justify its declaration that the School District had achieved "unitary status," then the Board of Education has a continuing obligation under the Fourteenth Amendment to restore the public schools to a "unitary" condition, and this Court must reassert active jurisdiction and enter the necessary remedial decrees to assure that it does so. Columbus Board of Education v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 459 (1979); Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia. 407 U.S. 451, 460 (1972) ; Dowell, 338 F. Supp. at 1258 n.l. Compare Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education. 402 U.S. at 31-32 ("Neither school authorities nor district courts are constitutionally required to make year-by-year adjustments of the racial composition of student bodies [to offset demographic shifts unaccompanied by official action] once the affirmative duty to desegregate has been accomplished and racial discrimination through official action is eliminated from the system"); Dowell. 795 F.2d at 1522. 10. The injunction entered by this Court in 1972 was designed to eliminate the dual system in this School District and to inte grate the formerly all-black and all-white schools, including the black schools in the northeast quadrant. While the injunction was being effectuated, it accomplished this purpose. However, 67 under the assignment plan adopted by the Board of Education in 1985, the northeast quadrant schools which had been virtually all black in 1971-72 again became virtually all-black in student enrollment. The evidence reveals that the attendance zones adopted in 1985 were, except as modified to account for closed facilities, the same as the zones used under the dual system prior to the 1972 Order, and that both before 1972 and after 1985 school zone lines traced the same boundary around all-black northeast quadrant schools. In addition, after 1985 black faculty members were in creasingly concentrated in these schools, tending to recreate another element of the prior dual system of schools. It is evi dent that the 1985 plan does not accomplish the maintenance of the unitary system which this Court found to exist in 1977. See Vaughns v. Board of Education of Prince George's County. 574 F. Supp. 1280 (D. Md. 1983), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds. 758 F.2d 983 (4th Cir. 1985). 11. The injunction to implement the Finger Plan was necessary to establish and maintain a unitary school system in Oklahoma City because the Court was presented with a "'loaded game board,'" Swann. 402 U.S. 1, 28 (1971), in the form of geographic "neighbor hood school" zones drawn around facilities intentionally construc ted or operated as black schools in the northeast quadrant of Okla homa City, an area whose racial composition was a direct product of official discriminatory policies and actions. Dowell v. School Board of Oklahoma City Public Schools, 219 F. Supp. 427, 433-34 (W.D. Okla. 1963); Dowell v. Board of Education of Oklahoma City, 68 244 F . Supp. 971, 976-77 (W.D. Okla. 1965) , aff'd in pertinent part, 375 F .2d 158 (10th Cir.), cert, denied. 387 U.S. 931 (1967); Dowell v. Board of Education of Oklahoma City. 338 F. Supp. 1256, 1265, 1270 (W.D. Okla.), aff'd, 465 F.2d 1012 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 409 U.S. 1041 (1972); see, e.g., United States v. Lawrence Countv School District, 799 F.2d 1031, 1044 (5th Cir. 1986). 12. Because, as the Court has found, the racial composition of the northeast quadrant is still the product of the prior dis criminatory conduct of public officials in Oklahoma, including the predecessors in office of the defendant members of the Board of Education, the conditions necessitating entry of the 1972 in junction have not changed, and the dangers which the injunction was intended to prevent — the existence of virtually all-black schools originally created by deliberate state action — • are cer tainly not "attenuated to a shadow." 13. Judged by its effectiveness in eliminating the prior dual system, the 1985 plan does not meet constitutional standards. The Board of Education has not overcome the pr ̂ sumption against one-race schools, Swann. 402 U.S. at 26; the majDrity-to-minority transfer provision has proved ineffective tc eliminate such schools, Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968) ; and the student interaction plan, which provides only limited, part-time opportunities for desegregation, is no substi tute, Keves v. School District No. 1, Denver. 521 F.2d 465, 477- 69 79 (10th Cir. 1975), cert, denied, 423 U.S. 1066 (1976); see cases cited in Dowell, 338 F. Supp. at 1272. 14. The Board of Education has not demonstrated a material change in conditions which would justify the relief it seeks. 15. While the racial composition of the School District's enrollment is different now from what it was in 1972, with black students making up an increasing proportion of total enrollment, that fact is without legal significance. The Supreme Court has rejected arguments that desegregation plans must assign pupils so as to establish schools of any particular racial composition. E.q. , Swann. 402 U.S. at 24 n.8 (insistence on assigning white students only to schools at least 60% white was "arbitrary" limi tation on remedy). 16. The Court also has consistently required the elimination of dual school systems in districts of widely varying racial compo sition, including districts with substantially higher proportions of black pupils than Oklahoma City. E.q., Brown v. Board of Edu cation. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ; 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Clarendon County, South Carolina, 90% black; see Argument: The Oral Argument Before the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 1952- 55 54, 411 (1969); Raney v. Board of Education. 391 U.S. 443, 445 (1968)(Gould, Arkansas schools 60% black); Milliken v. Bradley. 418 U.S. 717, 753 (1974)(Detroit, Michigan school system 71.5% black at time remedy implemented, see Milliken v. Bradley. 433 U.S. 267, 271 n.3 (1977)). See Morgan v. Kerrigan. 530 F.2d 401, - 70 421-22 (1st Cir.)/ cert, denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976)(right to desegregation remedy under Fourteenth Amendment not dependent upon degree to which white students found in school system). 17. The Board of Education has also sought to link the demo graphic change to "white flight" from the School District, in reac tion to the mandatory desegregation required by this Court's 1972 Order. The proof does not clearly establish the extent to which reactions to the desegregation plan, as contrasted to other fac tors, were responsible for the population changes. On the other hand, Dr. Foster's Plan A demonstrates that meaningful desegrega tion of the public schools is still feasible in Oklahoma City. In any event, the law is clear that "white flight" may not justify a retreat from public school desegregation required by the Four teenth Amendment. United States v. Scotland Neck City Board of Education. 407 U.S. 484 (1972); Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972); Monroe v. Board of Commissioners of Jack;.on. 391 U.S. 450 (1968); United States & Pittman v. Hatties burg Municipal Separate School District, 808 F.2d 385, 391 (5th Cir. 1987), citing Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board. 721 l‘.2d 1425, 2438 (5th Cir. 1983); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 530 F.2d at ^22; cf. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).24 24Defendants' reliance upon cases involving desegregation measures voluntarily undertaken by school boards which had not been adjudicated to have committed constitutional violations is unavailing. In each of those decisions, the courts were careful to distinguish their rulings from cases in which a school district was required by the Fourteenth Amendment to implement a desegrega tion plan. See Parent Association of Andrew Jackson High School v. Ambach. 598 F.2d 705, 719-20 (2d Cir. 1979) (contrasting what 71 18. The Board also attempted to establish that the 1985 student assignment change was necessary to deal with reduced parental in volvement in the schools. However, the testimony indicates that the decline — particularly in PTA participation — was associated with factors other than the student assignment plan in place, and that the recent resurgence of PTAs and other parental and citizen participation in school affairs is also traceable to other causes. 19. Finally, the defendants have consistently maintained that the 1985 change in student assignments was necessary to avoid per petuating or increasing inequitable transportation burdens on black students residing in the northeast quadrant. As the Court's de tailed factual findings reflect, there was inequity in the dis tribution of the burdens of desegregation under the Finger Plan and that inequity grew more severe over time. The findings also indicate that choices made by the Board of Education in connection with the possible creation of additional "stand-alone" schools in the 1980's could have exacerbated the inequity — although the Board chose, over the years, to deal with individual situations in a variety of different ways (some less burdensome than others). It is well established that the burdens of desegregation plans "the Constitution commands" of a formerly segregated system with "the limited circumstances of purely voluntary action," id. at 720); Higgins v. Board of Education of Grand Rapids. 508 F.2d 779, 793-94 (6th Cir. 1974)(suggesting that the "authority of school officials to formulate plans for achieving an improved racial bal ance should not be as restrictive in the case of a school system which has not been found to have engaged in purposeful segregation as for a system which has practiced de jure segregation," id. at 793) . 72 should not be disproportionately borne by minority students. Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, 521 F.2d at 479; Arvizu v. Waco Independent School District, 495 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Board of Education of Waterbury. 605 F.2d 573 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Missouri. 388 F. Supp. 1058, 1061-62 (E.D. Mo.), modified on other grounds, 515 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir.), cert, denied. 423 U.S. 951 (1975); McPherson v. School District No. 186. 426 F. Supp. 173, 187 (S.D. 111. 1976). The issue here, however, is whether it is necessary substantially to re-segregate the School District in order to avoid the inequity. Both the manner in which "stand-alone" schools under the Finger Plan were managed and Plan A devised by Dr. Foster indicate that it is not. 20. The Court thus concludes that, under the standards set forth in the Tenth Circuit's opinion and remand in this matter, the Board of Education has failed to justify dissolution of the 1972 injunctive decree or its modification to accommodate the Board's 1985 "neighborhood school" plan. 21. Plaintiffs also seek modification of the decree. — but in a manner more consistent with its basic purpose than waa requested by the Board of Education. The authority of the Couit to grant relief fully vindicating the underlying rights at issue in this litigation, especially when sought by the party in whose favor the original decree was entered, is broad, and does not depend upon the rigorous showing necessary when a defendant seeks to escape from the requirement of continued compliance with the decree. 73 United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corporation, 391 U. S . 244, 248-49, 251-52 (1968); see United States v. Lawrence County School District, 799 F.2d 1031, 1042-46 (5th Cir. 1986); Sizzler Family Steak Houses v. Western Sizzlin Steak Houses, Inc., 793 F.2d 1529, 1539 (11th Cir. 1986); Booker v. Special School District No. 1. 585 F.2d 347, 352 (8th Cir. 1978), cert, denied. 443 U.S. 915 (1979); Kina-Seelev Thermos Company v. Aladdin Industries, Inc., 418 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1969); Evans v. Buchanan, 512 F. Supp. 839, 849 (D. Del. 1981). 22. Contrary to the assertions of the Board of Education, plaintiffs do not seek additional or different relief than was awarded in the original decree. See Dowell, 795 F.2d at 1522. Rather, plaintiffs seek merely to carry out the purposes of the 1972 Order by having the School District adopt a plan of pupil assignment which is adequate to protect their constitutional rights and which does not allocate the burdens of transportation and reas signment in an inequitable fashion. 23. The evidence indicates ;hat such a plan can be devised for Oklahoma City. While there \ ill be costs associated with the plan, the Court is confident that the staff of the School District can make improvements upon Dr. Foster's Plan A which will minimize disruption and any interference with the school system's ongoing effort to improve the educational program, and which will also reduce costs as much as possible. Since the Court has found that there must be continued adherence to the 1972 decree, except as 74 expressly modified for the purpose of making the desegregation process more equitable, the fact that reinstituting a desegregative assignment process for grades 1-4 in the School District will in volve additional costs "is not a valid argument against the con stitutional mandate to desegregate." Dowell, 338 F. Supp. at 1272 and cases cited. If ultimately necessary, the Court has authority to insure that the constitutional mandate can be effectuated. See, e.q.. Liddell v. State of Missouri. 731 F.2d 1294, 1322-23 (8th Cir. 1984) . Accordingly, the Court will afford the Board of Education an opportunity to submit for approval a plan which achieves these goals, and if no acceptable plan is forthcoming, will order imple mentation of Plan A drawn by Dr. Foster for the 1988-89 and suc ceeding school years. An appropriate order to this effect will be entered. United States District Judge 75 Respectfully submitted LEWIS BARBER, JR. Barber/Traviolia 1528 N.E. 23rd Street Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73111 (405) 424-5201 JOHN W. WALKER John W. Walker, P.A. 1723 Broadway Little Rock, Arkansas 72206 (501) 374-3758 JULIUS L. CHAMBERS JAMES M. NABRIT, III NORMAN J . CHACHKIN 99 Hudson Street New York, New York 10013 (212) 219-1900 Attorneys for Plaintiffs 76 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on this 28th day of September, 1987, I served a copy of the foregoing Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law upon counsel for the defendants herein, by delivering the same to an agent of Federal Express, for delivery on September 29, 1987 (charges prepaid) to: Ronald L. Day, Esq. Fenton, Fenton, Smith, Reneau & Moon Suite 800, One Leadership Square 200 North Robinson Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73102 77