Bayside Enterprises v. National Labor Relations Board Petitions and Briefs
Public Court Documents
January 1, 1975
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The Supreme Court
of the United States
Bayside Enterprises, Inc.
versus
National Labor Relations
Board
Petition and Briefs
Law Reprints
Labor Series vol. 10, no. 10
1976/1977 Term
I« 111?
jshtprem? (Emart at % Intitb States?
O ctober T e e m , 1975
No.
BAYSIDE ENTERPRISES, INC.,
PENOBSCOT POULTRY COMPANY,
AND POULTRY PROCESSING, INC.,
PETITIONEES,
V .
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
RESPONDENT.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
A lan J oel L evenson
187 Middle Street
Portland, Maine 04111
Attorney for Petitioners
INDEX
Page
Opinions Below............................................................. 1
Jurisdiction ................................................................... 2
Question Presented........................................................ 2
Statutes Involved .......................................................... 2
Statement of the C ase ................................................... 3
The Board’s Decision and O rder.................................. 4
The Decision of the Court of A ppeals......................... 5
Reasons For Granting the W r i t .................................. 6
The Employing Entity—Single or M ultiple................ 11
The Growout Contract.................................................. 12
Agricultural or Commercial......................................... 15
Judicial or Legislative.................................................. 17
Conclusion...................................................................... 19
Appendix A—(Court of Appeals’ Opinion and Judg
ment) .............. : ..................................A-l
Appendix B—(Board and Administrative Law Judge’s
Decisions)...........................................AT
Appendix C—(the Bayside Grower Contract).............. A-23
T able oe C ita tions
Cases
Abbott Farms, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 487 F.2d 904 (5th Cir.
1973)............................................................................ 5
Bowie v. Gonzales, 117 F.2d 11, 18 (1st Cir. 1941) . . . . 13
Colchester Egg Farms, Inc., 214 N.L.R.B. No. 64 (1974)
5, 9, 11
Drummond v. Maine Employment Security Commis
sion, 157 Me. 404, 173 A.2d 353 (1961) ..................... 10
Drummonds Poultry Transportation Service v. Wheeler,
178 F. Supp. 12 (D.C.S.D. Me. 1959) .......................... 10
11 Index
Page
Eastern Sugar Associates, 99 N.L.R.B. 809 (1952) . . . . 14
Etchechoury v. Avi-Simplot, Inc., 93 Idaho 438, 462
P.2d 737 (1969) . , ................................................ 16, 19
Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. McComb, 337
U.S. 755 (1949) .................................................. 6, 8, 17
Samuel Gass, et al., 154 N.L.R.B. 728 (1965) ................ 5
Local Union No. 300. v. McCulloch, 428 F.2d 396 (5th
Cir. 1970) .................................................................. 17
Maneja v. Waialua, 349 U.S. 254 (1961) ..................... 16
Maplewood Poultry Company v. Maine Employment
Security Commission, 151 Me. 467, 121 A.2d 360
1956) ...................................................................... 10, 11
McElrath Poultry Co., Inc., 206 N.L.R.B. No. 9 4 ....... 5
McElrath Poultry Co., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 494 F.2d 519
(5th Cir. 1974) .................................................. 5, 9, 16
Mitchell v. Hunt, 263 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1959) ............ 13
Mitchell v. Huntsville Wholesale Nurseries, Inc., 267
F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1959) ........................................... 14
N.L.R.B. v. Bayside Enterprises, Inc.,__F.2d — (1st
Cir. 1975) ................................................................ 6, 9
N.L.R.B. v. Gass, 377 F.2d 438 (1st Cir. 1967)........... 5, 14
N.L.R.B. v. Kent Bros. Transportation Co., 485 F.2d
480 (9th Cir. 1972) .................................................... 6
N.L.R.B. v. Strain Poultry Farms, Inc., 405 F.2d 1025
(5th Cir. 1969) .................................................. 5, 11, 14
N.L.R.B. v. Tepper, 297 F.2d 280 (10th Cir. 1961)....... 13
N.L.R.B. v. Victor Ryckebosch, Inc., 471 F.2d 20 (9th
Cir. 1972) ................................................................ 5, 18
Norton <& McElroy Produce, Inc., 133 N.L.R.B. 104
(1961) .......................................................................... 13
George I. Petit, Inc., 89 N.L.R.B. 710 (1950) ............ 13
Stockbridge Vegetable Producers, Inc., 121 N.L.R.B.
1395 (1961) ................................................................... 13
Vives v. Serralles, 145 F.2d 552 (1st Cir. 1944) ......... 14
Index
Page
Wirtz v. Osceola Farms Company, 372 F.2d 584 (5th
Cir. 1967) ................................................................... 14
Wirtz v. Tyson’s Poultry, Inc., 355 F.2d 255 (8th Cir.
1966) .......................................................................... 5
Statutes, Regulations and Interpretative Bulletins
The Clayton Act, 15 TJ.S.C, § 17 (1914) .................... 11,
Capper-Volstead Act, 7 TJ.S.C. §§ 291-92 (1922) ... 11,
F.L.S.A., 29 TJ.S.C. § 203(f) (1964) ........................... 2,
F.L.S.A. Regulation, 29 C.F.R. 780.126 (1972) ......... 4,
Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 26 US.C. § 3306(c) (1)
and § 3306(k) (1954) .................................................
Internal Revenue Regulations, Section 61-4................
Maine Agricultural Marketing and Bargaining Act,
13 M.R.S.A. 1953 (1973) ........................................
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1935)
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 409(h)(2) (1935) . . . .
Miscellaneous
The Broiler Industry, An Economic Study of Structure,
Practices and Problems, U. S. Department of Agri
culture (1971) ........................................................... 7
40th Annual Report of the National Labor Relations
Board (1975) ............................................................. 5
Legislative History of N.L.R.A., p. 3202 ...................... 18
Note: “ Trust Busting Down on the Farm: Narrowing
the Scope of Antitrust Exemptions for Agricultural
Cooperatives,” 61 Virginia Law Review 341. (1975) 8
Vertical Coordination via Contract Farming, Economic
Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture,
Miscellaneous Publication No. 1073 (1968) ......... 11, 12
18
18
10
15
11
11
13
2
11
In the
Court of tlw luttrd #tutro
O ctober T er m , 1975
No.
BAYSIDE ENTERPRISES, INC.,
PENOBSCOT POULTRY COMPANY,
AND POULTRY PROCESSING, INC.,
PETITIONERS,
V .
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
RESPONDENT.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
Petitioners, Bayside Enterprises, Inc., Penobscot Poultry
Company and Poultry Processing, Inc., pray that a writ
of certiorari issue to review a judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit entered in
this case on December 10, 1975.
Opinions Below
The opinion of the Court of Appeals is reprinted as
Appendix A of this petition. The findings of fact, con-
cusions of law, and order of the National Labor Relations
Board are reprinted as Appendix B of this petition and
reported at 216 N.L.R.B. No. 92 (1975).
1
2
Jurisdiction
The decree of the Court of Appeals was entered on
December 10, 1975 (Appendix A, p. A-l). The juris
diction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1)
and pursuant to Rule 19-1.(b) of the Rules of this Court.
Question Presented
Whether a poultry organization vertically integrated
from hatcheries to processing plant is a “ farmer” qualify
ing its employees who drive feed trucks to its contract
farms as exempt “ agricultural laborers” within the agri
cultural exemption of the National Labor Relations Act
(29 U.S.C. §152(3)) as defined in the Fair Labor Stan
dards Act (29 U.S.C. § 203(f)).
Statutes Involved
1. The National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§152(3) “ The term ‘employee’ . . . shall not include any
individual employed as ah agricultural laborer . . . ”
2. Since 1946, the appropriation acts for the National
Labor Relations Board have regularly carried a rider
which provides that the term “ agricultural laborer” shall
be defined in accordance with Section 203(f) of the F.L.S.A.
3. The Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 203(f)
provides “ agriculture” includes farming in all its branches
and among other things includes the cultivation and tillage
of the soil, dairying, the production, cultivation, growing,
and harvesting of any agricultural or horticultural com
modities . . . the raising of livestock, bees, furbearing
animals, or poultry, and any practices . . . performed by
a farmer or on a farm as an incident to, or in conjunction
with, such farming operations, including preparation for
market, delivery to storage or to market or to carriers
for transportation to market.”
2
3
Statement of the Case
Petitioners, Bayside Enterprises, Inc. and Poultry Pro
cessing, Inc., parent and subsidiary, are an integrated
poultry organization located in four separate towns in
central coastal Maine. The operation is organized func
tionally. Bayside carries out the poultry hatching and
growing and Poultry Processing is responsible for the
milling, processing and marketing. Specifically Bayside
has a pedigree hatchery for breeding at Waldo, Maine and
a commercial hatchery at Unity, Maine to supply chicks
to its farms.
In addition to Bayside’s own six farms that produce
hatching eggs, there are 119 independent farmers that are
under contract with Bayside to raise poultry. The essence
of the contract is that Bayside provides each farmer with
chicks, feed, medicine, fuel, litter and vaccines, and makes
all management and marketing decisions. The farmer is
required to furnish the housing utilities and feed, and
look after the birds. For this service he is paid on the
basis of a guarantee for poultry house square footage
plus a bonus based on pounds of poultry he produces. The
title to the birds at all times remains in Bayside.
Besides the hundreds of thousands of broilers, roasters
and capons located on the contract farms and the chicks
and eggs in the hatcheries, Bayside owns the grain, the
medicines and other feed ingredients which are milled
together at a mill in Thorndike, Maine. This mill is owned
and operated by Poultry Processing which mixes the feed
to the specifications of the Bayside broiler department
manager based on the weather and the age or health of a
particular flock.
Bayside employs a farm crew whose duties include going
from farm to farm vaccinating, blood testing and cleaning
the chicken houses after the flock has been taken out.
In all there are some 80 employees who work for Bayside
3
4
including a geneticist, four poultry servicemen (who main
tain standards of animal husbandry and are constantly
checking for disease) and the six feed drivers that are
the subject of this case.
Bayside owns four specially constructed feed trucks,
three of which are used daily on two shifts by the six feed
drivers. Their job is to shuttle back and forth between the
feed mill and the 119 contract farms bringing feed and
medicine in accordance with the schedule made up by the
Bayside dispatcher.
Poultry Processing has about 400 employees divided
roughly into 20 in its feed mill and 380 in its Belfast,
Maine processing plant. The general offices of the two cor
porations are at a separate Belfast location. Operating
out of the processing plant with separate supervision is
a group of drivers whose job is to drive flatbed trailers
with coops onto the farms, catch the birds and transport
them back to the processing plant. After processing a
separate group of drivers at the processing plant with
I.C.C. permits, take the birds to market. The processing
plant only processes the Bayside birds. However, at the
time of this hearing one-third of the production of the
feed mill was sold to another unaffiliated farm organiza
tion for its own contract farm requirements. It, however,
employed an independent feed transportation company to
pick up at the feed mill and deliver to its growers. Bay-
side’s feed drivers bring feed to only Bayside’s farms.
The Board’s Decision and Order
The administrative law judge affirmed by the Board
held that the Bayside-Poultry Processing operation con
stituted “ a multifaceted organization whose enterprises
and purposes go far beyond traditional farming” and that
“ while Bayside’s own farms and hatcheries may constitute
branches of farming, the overall operations of Bayside
and Poultry Processing, and more specifically the feed
4
mill and feed delivery operations, may not be removed
from coverage by the Act by utilizing these aspects of
Bayside’s operations which are traditional branches of
farming to characterize Bayside’s entire operation as
farming” .
The decision then stated that the case was indistin
guishable from Samuel Gass, et al., 154 N.L.R.B, 728
enf’d 377 F.2d 438 (1st Cir. 1967) and McElrath Poultry
Co., Inc., 206 N.L.R.B. No. 94 enf. denied 494 F.2d 518
(5th Cir. 1974).
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
On the Board’s petition for enforcement the First Cir
cuit Court of Appeals was faced with a split of authority
with regard to the applicability of the farm exemption
as it applies to employees of poultry organizations. On
the one side was the Board majority and its own N.L.R.B.
v. Gass, 377 F.2d 438, 444 (1st Cir. 1967) decision holding
feed drivers not exempt. On the other side were decisions
of the Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals 1
and the minority of the Board chastizing the majority for
being unwilling to file a petition for certiorari, notwith
standing five years of adverse decisions. The minority
argued it was now time to acquiesce and declare these
employees exempt.2
Counsel for the corporations sought to have this Court
of Appeals confine its Gass, supra to the facts of that
case; namely, that the employing entity was a trucking
company and therefore a separately organized business
1 McElrath Poultry Co., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 494 F.2d 519 (5th
Cir. 1974) ; Abbott Farms, Inc. v. N.L.R.B, 487 F.2d 904 (5th
Cir. 1973) ; Wirtz v. Tyson’s Poultry, Inc., 355 F.2d 255 (8th
Cir. 1966) ; N.L.R.B. v. Victor Ryckebosch, Inc., 471 F.2d 20
(9th Cir. 1972) ; and N.L.R.B. v. Strain Poultry Farms, Inc..
405 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1969).
2 Colchester Egg Farms, 214 N.L.R.B. No. 64 (1974). See the
40th Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board
(1975), pp. 67-68.
6
not entitled to the farm exemption. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v.
Kent Bros. Transportation Co., 485 F.2d 480 (9th Cir.
1972).
However, the First Circuit Court of Appeals chose
not to accept this attempt to reconcile its holding in
Gass, supra with the decisions in the other circuits saying
it found the other cases “ both distinguishable and unper
suasive”. The court’s approach was to break down peti
tioners’ organization into its component parts — feed
mill, processing plant, chick hatcheries, breeding farms
and contract farms and then make the judgment that it was
a commercial rather than agricultural venture since the
bulk of its capital and personnel were devoted to non
farming operations. It bolstered its argument with a De
partment of Labor interpretation at 29 C.F.E. 780.126
(1972) having to do with feed dealers and processors.
As for the feed drivers, it declared them part of a separate
organization “ supportive of agricultural activity, but not
directly engaged in farming”. N.L.R.B. v. Bay side En
terprises, Inc., — F.2d__ (1st Cir. 1975).
The object of this petition is to put into issue under the
agricultural exemption of the N.L.E.B. the status of the
vertically integrated poultry organization as an employing
entity, to wit, is it a farmer under the secondary definition
of farming in Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v.
McComb, 337 IJ.S. 755, 762-63 (1949), and the status of
its feed drivers as being incidental to that farming.
Reasons for Granting the Writ
This case emerges out of one of the most dynamic in
dustries in American agriculture. In the 1920’s most
poultry was produced in small scale farm enterprises,
almost completely integrated. Poultry producers commonly
hatched eggs on the farm, used home grown feeds,
slaughtered and processed poultry. Some even hauled the
birds to market. A few retailed them.
6
7
Beginning in the 1930’s, various phases of poultry pro
duction became separate entities and profit centers. Spe
cialized firms began to emerge in primary breeding,
hatching, feed milling, processing and marketing. Most
prominent were the independent feed dealer and poultry
hauler who had various types of supply contracts with
processors.
As the scale of specialized firms increased and the in
dustry began to expand rapidly during World War II,
problems developed in coordination of firms in various
vertical stages. Vertical integration emerged as a means
of minimizing or sharing risks with price and production
variabilities.
Currently, more than 95 percent of the broilers pro
duced in the United States are grown under contract in
integrator-owned or integrator-leased facilities.
A very limited market exists for live broilers produced
by independent growers. Most live broiler trading is be
tween integrated firms or processors.
The emerging integrated structure of the broiler in
dustry brought with it the demise of small independent
farms. Narrowing profit margins first put specialized
hatcheries at a disadvantage. Independent feed dealers
and local feed mill next faced the price-costs squeeze.
Finally, in the last few years, specialized independent
processors faced the same problems.
Today the typical firm in the broiler industry is a large
vertically integrated broiler organization.3
This development has taken place against the general
background of all agriculture in which mechanization, new
production technology and sophisticated management sys
tems have proliferated — all designed to achieve greater
cost efficiency. In addition, agriculture has begun an ir-
3 The Broiler Industry: An Economic Study of Structure,
Practices and Problems, U.S. Department of Agriculture (1971).
7
8
reversible course of consolidation accompanied by an in
crease in size of the average farm.
In the broiler industry this development has seen, in
the last 20 years, production of broilers go from 1/3 billion
to more than 2% billion along with a price decline and
a quality improvement. Per capita consumption of broiler
meat has increased from 0.5 pound in 1934 to an estimated
32 pounds in 1966.
The broiler industry is centered in four general areas
of the United States; the South, Delaware, New England
and the Far West. Of these, the South is the most im
portant, producing over two-fifths of the output of the
industry.4 Nearly all broilers today are produced by con
tract growers of integrated broiler firms. Production per
farm averages more than 50,000 birds per year.4A
A typical integrated broiler producing and marketing
firm has its own hatchery, feed mill and processing plant.5
The petitioners contend that their feed drivers are en
titled to the agricultural exemption under the secondary
definition as laid down in Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation
Co. v. McComh, 337 U.S. 755, 762-63 (1949); namely, “ any
practices, whether or not themselves farming practices,
which are performed either by a farmer or on a farm
incident to or in conjunction with ‘such’ farming opera
tions ’ ’.
Both the National Labor Relations Board and the First
Circuit Court of Appeals have denied this position main
taining essentially that Bayside is : 1) not a single farmer
because of many contract growers; and 2) is not a farmer
at all or at least not predominantly a farmer because its
processing plant gives it a commercial coloration.
4 The Broiler Industry, supra, p. 5.
4A Contract growing has been accompanied by a 900 percent
increase in output since 1948. “ Trust Busting Down on the
Farm ; Narrowing the Scope of Antitrust Exemptions for Agri
cultural Cooperatives” , 61 Virginia Law Review 341, 362 (1975).
5 Ibid, p. 22.
8
9
The issue of essential importance in this case is what
are vertically integrated poultry organizations in contem
plation of the law. Since the agricultural exemption of the
National Labor Relations Act depends on the Fair Labor
Standards Act for its definition, two important labor
statutes are involved in this decision. Although the Fair
Labor Standards Act says explicitly that the raising of
poultry is an exempt agricultural activity, lias the ver
tically integrated poultry operation somehow annihilated
itself as an agricultural entity either by having contract
farms or by establishing its own processing plant!
This decision by the First Circuit places the issue
squarely in conflict. In New England henceforth, the chief
enforcement officers of both the National Labor Relations
Board and the Wage and Hour Division must rule that a
vertically integrated poultry operation is not a farmer and
that therefore, its employees are not eligible for the farm
exemption. Meanwhile in at least two of the other three
producing areas (the Far West, 9th Circuit and the South,
Fifth Circuit), the holding is that a vertically integrated
organization is a farmer. In a competitive, price conscious
industry such as this where pennies make the difference
between success and failure and poultry can be frozen and
transported across the country in a day as well as to
foreign countries, any unequal treatment can be ruinous.
It obviously cannot be explained to the layman as to
why the driver of a feed truck for an integrated poultry
organization in Georgia is exempt16 and the same man
working for a similar organization in Maine is not. It is
little consolation to the corporation that the First Circuit
finds decisions of other circuits “ unpersuasive” 7 or that
it “ declines to follow” them.8
6 McElrath Poultry Company, Inc. v. N.L.B.B., 494 F.2d 518,
per curiam opinion (5th Cir. 1974).
7 N.L.B.B. v. Bayside Enterprises, Inc., — F.2d — (1st Cir.
1975).
8 N.L.B.B. v. Samuel B. Gass, 377 F.2d 438, 444 n. 12 (1st
Cir. 1967).
9
10
This issue of contract farming and the relationship of
the farmer to the integrator does not confine itself to the
poultry industry. The egg industry, although not making
use of contract farming to the extent of the poultry in
dustry, is very heavily concerned with the answer to the
question as to whether the farmers’ contracts amount to
a total integration of the farmers into the contractor’s
business or still allow him to be considered independent.9
Within the poultry industry itself there are other, dif
ferent occupations affected by whether their employer is
a farmer or a commercial enterprise — the farm, service
men and the pickup crews, for example.10
In addition, a great many other farm commodities are
the object of contract farming and have seen a substantial
proportion of the entrepreneurship function transferred
from the farmer to the contractor. For example, there are
tomatoes, green and wax beans, peas, sweet corn and vari
ous fruits.
Although not controlled by Section 3(f) of the Fair
Labor Standards Act, there are many other statutes that
exempt “ agricultural labor” from their provisions. The
Maine Unemployment Statute is one.111 In speaking on
this same issue concerning the poultry industry, the highest
Maine court said “ We are not aware of any decision
which labels the business of raising poultry as a business
9 Colchester Egg Farms, 214 N.L.E.B., No. 64 (1974).
10 Maplewood Poultry Company v. Maine Employment Security
Commission, 151 Me. 467, 468, 121 A.2d 360 (1956) ; See also
Drummons Poultry Transportation Service v. Wheeler, 178 F. Supp.
12 (D. Me. 1959) and Drummond v. Maine Employment Security
Commission, 157 Me. 404, 173 A.2d 353 (1961).
11 Title 26 M.E.S.A. 1043 - 1.A (1959) defined argicultural labor
substantially like Section 3(f) of F.L.S.A. In 1973, the definition
was changed twice, excluding the agricultural labor exemption,
unless more than one-half of the product was produced by the
operator for which the services were performed. The additional
changes excluded the definition entirely for “ commercial” hatch
ery processing and transportation of poultry, but specifically
included services performed on a “ family-type farm” with not
over 100,000 laying birds.
10
11
enterprise.” 12 Maplewood Poultry Company v. Maine
Employment Security Commission, 151 Me. 467, 472 (1956).
The present decision by the First Circuit Court of Appeals
changes that. There are other acts as well, concerned with
defining agricultural labor.13
The Employing Entity — Single or Multiple
Although the emphasis in the First Circuit Court of
Appeals’ opinion denying the agricultural exemption to
Bayside is on the predominance of the commercial compo
nents of the business, the decision makes it very clear that
even if the corporations were not integrated to the proces
sing plant level that they would not even then be regarded
as a farmer. The Court says it is not persuaded by the
rationale of the decisions in the other circuits.
It thus firmly takes a position with the majority of the
National Labor Relations Board that the raising of the
poultry is not being done by the integrator, but by its
contract farms. The Court of Appeals in N.L.R.B. v. Strain
Poultry Farms, Inc., 405 F.2d 1025, 1033 (5th Cir. 1969),
says ” . . . the Board’s finding that the employees were
not agricultural employees can only be sustained if re
spondent’s arrangement with the independent growers is
viewed as removing it from the primary definition of
agriculture pertinent here ‘the raising of poultry’ ” . The
dissenters in Colchester Egg Farms, Inc., 214 N.L.R.B.
No. 64 (1974), say that the courts have repeatedly rejected
the Board’s attempt to compartmentalize what is essen
tially a total “ farming” activity.
12 Vertical Coordination via Contract Farming-, Economic Re
search Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Miscellaneous
Publication No. 1073, p. 91 (1968).
13 Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. 3306(c)(1), (k)
(1954); the Social Security Act 42 U.S.C. 409(h)(2) (1935).
In addition the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1970) and the
Capper-Volstead Act, 7 U.S.C. 291-92 (1970) allow Bayside to
join a farm cooperative and Section 61-4 of the Internal Revenue
Regulations allow it to file on a cash basis as a farmer
11
12
The Growout Contract
As previously mentioned, the poultry industry is now
almost entirely operating under a system of contract
farmers. Considerations of efficiency in feed delivery and
other service activity plus assembly of the final product
give certain advantages to compact growout territories.
The result is local monopolies in the market for contracts.
One study published by the Department of Agriculture
seeks to set up a classification system for these farmer-
contractor contracts.14 The system is designed to classify
contracts according to the degree to which various elements
of entrepreneurship are shifted by contractual agreement
from the farmer to the contractor. One view of integration
holds that integration increases as elements of entrepre
neurship are shifted from the farmer to the contractor,
chiefly through assumption of management control and
decision-making. Implicit in this view is a corollary assump
tion that increased integration results in increased assump
tion of risk and uncertainty by the contractor and increased
certainty of price and market for the farmer.
Judged by these standards the poultry industry, in
general, and Bayside, in particular, are the most highly
integrated of industries and companies. Dividing decision
making into input decisions (acquiring the animals), pro
duction decisions and marketing decisions, in all categories,
Bayside’s control is almost total. (See Appendix C.)
The Bayside-Poultry Processing Management decides
what type of poultry to grow and when and where to
grow it. It owns the flocks and bears the risk of loss
at all phases. It sets production standards, makes the
sole decisions as to animal husbandry, including medical
care of the poultry. It restricts the farmer from handling
any other poultry. It makes all marketing and pricing
114 Vertical Coordination in Contract Farming, infra, p. 74.
12
13
decisions, including the timing of the processing of each
flock.15 The feed drivers are controlled by the age and
health of each particular flock along with the weather
that affects their eating habits.
The First Circuit Court of Appeals uses its own decision
in Bowie v. Gonzales, 117 F.2d 11, 18 (1st Cir. 1941),
for the proposition that the contract farms on which the
poultry are grown are each separate independent oper
ations and that they are the farmers and not the contractor
or integrator. Although the approach is like other past
Board'16 and Court17 decisions, the application to the
15 The contract farmers complain that their situation is created
in part because economy demands high density growout areas,
not allowing any alternative contractor to bid for growers, except
in fringe areas. There is also lack of information about compar
able contracts allowing market forces to operate in optimum
fashion. They also say that even an independent farmer with
the capital is forced into a contractual arrangement because of
the impossibility of getting chicks and because the_ system doesn’t
allow for a live market for independent production. The State
of Maine has attempted to help these farmers by passing the
Maine Agricultural Marketing and Bargaining Act of 1973, 13
M. R.S. 1953, to help “ the bargaining position of individual
farmers” .
George I. Petit, Inc., (1950) 89 N.L.R.B. 710, 711, n. 4.
(poultry processing employees whose employer purchased all
poultry and eggs are not exempt) ; Stockbridge Vegetable Pro
ducers, Inc., (1961), 121 N.L.R.B. 1395 (truckdrivers and box
stitchers of a grower shipper who packs crops grown by another
held not exempt) ; Norton & McElroy Produce, Inc., (1961), 133
N. L.R.B. 104 (truckdrivers and stitchers in the fields are not
agricultural laborers if employed by a firm shipping and market
ing produce bought from farmers).
17 N.L.R.B. v. Topper, 297 F.2d 280 (10th Cir. 1961) (a dairy
employee who worked processing milk products, some of which
came from other farms not exempt) ; Mitchell v. Hunt, 263 F.2d
913 (5th Cir. 1959) (employees of auction barn selling livestock
belonging to other farmers than the farmer operator not exempt).
Mitchell v. Huntsville Wholesale Nurseries, Inc., 267 F.2d 286
(5th Cir. 1969) (warehouse owners who make advances to
growers against marketable plants produced for it was not exempt
as Huntsville did not grow the nursery stock. It bought it from
independent growers.)
13
14
vertically integrated poultry operation is misconceived.
The important factor in determining whether or not the
farmer has been truly and totally integrated into the con
tractor’s business is the substance of their relationship.
The Fifth Circuit in the fact of its own decision in
Mitchell v. Huntsville Wholesale Nurseries, Inc., 267 F.2d
286 (5th Cir. 1959), to bolster the denial of the exemption
looked at poultry industry contract farming, and said:
“ The fact that Strain hired the independent growers
to raise its birds and contract loaders to catch the
birds for loading onto its trucks, would not seem to
destroy its claim to having raised the poultry. . . . The
trucking operation was a part of an integrated poultry
raising operation and although unlike poultry farms
of the past, it is today a typical broiler raising
operation . . . .
As in all the other cases cited by the Board on this
point, the distinction between those situations and the
present one is that these birds belonged to the re
spondent and although the raising of them was shared
with independent growers, Strain’s activities were
more nearly that of one engaged in the ‘raising of
. . . poultry’ than that of a purchaser jobber; Hunts
ville clearly did not grow the nursery stock in ques
tion; it bought it from independent growers.”
N.L.R.B. v. Strain Poultry Farms, Inc., 405 F.2d
1025, 1032-33 (5th Cir. 1969)18
18 Since Strain was decided after N.L.R.B. v. Gass, 377 F.2d
438 (1st Cir. 1967), the Fifth Circuit considered it and found
it to be distinguishable because there the drivers were not
employed by the farmers nor were they under their control.
Of course Bayside does employ and control the driver; however,
the First Circuit chose not to accept the Fifth Circuit’s distinction.
14
15
Agricultural or Commercial
With this case the Board established and the First Cir
cuit Court of Appeals sustained what was essentially a
new rationale to achieve the same result—the denial of
the agricultural exemption to an integrated poultry firm.
The court decision recast its Gass rationale19 post hoc
so that the feed drivers were employed by an integrated
poultry processing company. The interpretative bulletin
29 C.F.R. 780, 126 (1972)20 having to do with feed dealers
and processors was used to bolster the argument. And
finally the poultry firm was dismembered into its component
parts and pronounced “ not predominantly agriculture”.
The answer to all of this is obvious. Gass was an inde
pendent trucking company and never entitled to the farm
exemption under the F.L.S.A. Bayside is neither a feed
dealer nor a processor, so that the interpretative bulletin
does not apply. It, along with its subsidiary, Poultry
Processing, Inc., make up a vertically integrated poultry
organization whose aim is to prosper raising and selling
poultry. As such if it—a typical broiler operation of today—
is not considered a poultry raiser, then there aren’t any.
Bayside-Poultry Processing is not a mercantile enterprise.
Common sense tells us it is a farming operation; however,
rather than being farmer-based, the modern integrated
farm corporation is management based. It has arisen
for many reasons, one of the important ones being because
of the necessity for closer coordination between the pro
duction and marketing phase than price could supply.2'1
19 377 F.2d 438, 444.
20 The decision states this was promulgated in 1974. Actually
the date was June 17, 1972, before McElrath, Abbott Farms,
and Victor Byckebosch ignored it.
21 In addition, individuals are incorporating their operations
to take advantage of the tax laws, increased bargaining power,
insulation from risk and continuity of management.
15
16
However, the primary purpose of the petitioners’ poultry
business is to produce, hatch, raise and sell poultry. The
various components of the corporation constitute a single
integrated farming venture producing and processing its
own poultry. Etchechoury v. Avi-Simplot, Inc., 43 Idaho
438, 462 P.2d 737, 741.
It is important to understand that the real significance
of this case and the reason it must be overruled is because
drawn to its logical conclusion, it disqualifies every off-
farm employee working for a vertically integrated oper
ation from qualifying under the secondary definition of
agriculture. This is because the first requisite is that the
employee works for a farmer, and if the integrator is not
regarded as such, you do not get to the next question as to
whether or not his job is incidental to or in conjunction
with farming. Just as petitioners do not claim all of its
employees automatically exempt, so too the First Circuit
Court of Appeals should not allow them to be regarded as
automatically covered.
The six feed drivers involved here are controlled by the
broiler department dispatcher. They are separate from the
processing plant operation. Their job is completely involved
in maintaining the growth cycle and health of the birds on
each individual farm. They along with the farm servicemen
and the pick-up crews are necessary and essential for the
raising, feeding, caring for, and management of the poultry
growing operation.22
22 Mcrneja v. Waialua (1961) 349 U.S. 254 (railroad em
ployees) ; McElrath Poultry Co. v. N.L.R.B., 494 F.2d 418 (5th
Cir. 1974) ; Vives v. Serralles, 145 F.2d 552 (1st Cir. 1944);
Witrz v. Osceola Farms Compamy, 372 F.2d 584 (5th Cir. 1967) ;
Eastern Sugar Associates (1952) 99 N.L.R.B. 809.
16
17
Judicial or Legislative
This Court in Farmers Reservoir and Irrigation Co. v.
McComb, 337 U.S. 755, 760 (1949), spoke in general terms
about the definition of agriculture:
“ Whether a particular type of activity is agricultural
depends, in large measure, upon the way in which that
activity is organized in a particular society. The de
termination cannot be made in the abstract. In less
advanced societies the agricultural function included
many types of activity which, in others, are not agri
cultural. The fashioning of tools, the provision of
fertilizer, the processing of the product, to mention
only a few examples, are functions which, in some
societies, are performed on the farm by farmers as
part of their normal agricultrural routine. Economic
progress, however, is characterized by a progressive
division of labor and separation of function, (empha
sis supplied)
What has happened in the poultry industry is that it has
come full circle since the 1920’s from the single farmer
performing all functions to the corporate organization
performing all functions. In this case economic progress
has resulted in a combination rather than a division in the
form of the vertically integrated farm organization.
The question has arisen of how to treat these organiza
tions in contemplation of the law because certainly they
have many of the characteristics of a commercial enterprise
rather than an agricultural one.23
Petitioners contend that it is the wrong approach by
judicial fiat to transfer a whole industry from the agricul-
23 However, the agricultural exemption of the N.L.R.A. is not
measured by the magnitude of the farmer’s planting nor the
prolificacy of his harvest. Local Union No. 300 v. McCulloch, 428
F.2d 396, 399 (5th Cir. 1970).
17
18
tural to the commercial column. This is particularly true
where the statute involved makes particular reference to the
raising of poultry which is the exact business of these firms.
N.L.R.B. v. Victor Ryckebosch, Inc., 471 F.2d 20, 21 (9th
Cir. 1972) says:
“ The social and economic problems related to large-
scale corporate farming are more appropriately re
solved by debate and committee study in Congress
than by adversary proceedings in Court. If Congress
is troubled by the reasoning in Strain, it is free to
translate its intent into clearer legislation. The N.L.
R.B. has not demonstrated that we need create a con
flict between the Circuits on this point.”
The farmer has been the subject of special legislation
for many decades the origins and rationale for which
sometimes having no discernible foundation except
politics.24
The legislature of this country has just recently taken
a second look at the farm laws and are in the process of
changing them. Maine is an example with a new bargaining
act for farmers and modifications of the definition of
agricultural employee in the Unemployment Compensation
Law. The federal Congress, although in the past affixing
the prohibition in the N.L.R.A. against agriculture in an
appropriations act, has also begun to modify long standing
agricultural laws.
24 Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C., § 17 (1970), originally passed in
1914; Capper-Volstead Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-92 (1970), originally
passed in 1922; “ The committee discussed this matter carefully
in executive session and decided not to include agricultural work
ers. We hope that the agricultural worker will be taken care o f...
I am in favor of giving agricultural workers every protection,
but just now I believe in biting off one mouthful at a time.
If we can get this bill through and get it working properly, there
will be an opportunity later, and I hope soon to take care of the
agriculutral worker” . N.L.R.A.’s sponsor, Representative Con
nery, from Legislative History of N.L.R.A., p. 3202.
18
19
In April of 1974 by amendment to the Fair Labor Stan
dards Act, it dealt with the exemption from overtime of
businesses which would include many vertically integrated
farm operations. It amended Section 13 by adding a 13(g)
of the Act restricting the exemption from applying to all
commonly controlled establishments whose annual gross
volume in sales exceeds ten million dollars.
The point is that if there is a feeling that the large
farm organization should be covered by the N.L.R.A.,
exactly how and which ones should be the prerogative of
Congress rather than the courts. This is especially true
in this area because the origins are so political. See
Etchechoury v. Avi-Simplot, Inc., 93 Idaho 438, 462 F.2d 737.
Conclusion
Although Belfast, Maine, may not be regarded as the
center of the farm belt, the truth is that it is the center of
the Maine poultry industry which makes up a significant
segment of the state’s economic activity. Maine is the
largest poultry state in New England.
Bayside-Poultry Processing is a typical vertically in
tegrated poultry operation. The issue raised herein as to
whether or not it and others like it are farmers is im
portant to the industry and most particularly now in light
of this court of appeals’ decision, to New England.
Wherefore the petitioners pray that this petition for a
writ of certiorari be granted and that ultimately the com
plaint against them be dismissed for want of jurisdic
tion.
Respectfully submitted,
A lan J oel L evenson
187 Middle Street
Portland, Maine 04111
Attorney for Petitioners
19
APPENDIX
Appendix A—(Court of Appeals' Opinion and Judg
ment)
Appendix B—(Board and Administrative Law Judge’s
Decisions)
20
APPENDIX C
BAYSIDE ENTERPRISE, INC.
153 High Street
Belfast, Maine
Contract
B ayside E n ter prises , I n c ., and ------------------------------------------
E x c lu siv ely ; B roiler , R oaster and Capon C ontract.
This contract made this -------- day of — ---------- ------- ,
19-----, between Bayside Enterprises, Inc. of Belfast, here
after referred to as “ Bayside” and-------------------------- ,
referred to hereafter as the “ Grower” . Bayside will de
liver baby chicks to the Grower’s farm a t ------------------ ,
Maine to be grown out as either Broilers, Roasters, or
Capons. The number of baby chicks to be placed on the
farm and the Growing Program to be followed will be
determined by Bayside. The Grower will give his best
care and management to the growing of chicks placed on
the farm in. accordance with Bayside’s Feeding and Man
agement Programs. This contract shall remain in effect,
with the following provisions, for successive flocks as may
be placed by mutual agreement.
B ayside A grees :
Section A:
1. ) To furnish all chicks, feed, fuel, litter, medica
ments, and vaccines.
2. ) To provide supervision in the care and manage
ment of the flock.
3. ) To be the sole judge in determining when a
facility shall be sprayed or washed and is ade
quately prepared for the placement of another
flock.
21
4. ) To pay for spray, power wash, and disinfectants
used as such which then become apart of the
Grower’s total cost of production, except the
cost of powerwash before and/or following a
flock of Capons, A Grower with proper equip
ment may wash or spray his own facility, (or
pay to hire this service), for which no charge
will be assessed against the flock concerned.
5. ) To furnish the Grower with copies of all charge
slips for feed, fuel medicaments, litter, wash
and spray, poultry weight tickets, and bonus cal
culation sheets.
Section B — To Guarantee the Broiler Grower:
1. ) A payment of $0.01 per square foot for the clean
out period within 10 days after a subsequent
Bayside flock is placed.
2. ) A payment of $0,007 per square foot per week
to be paid bi-weekly during the growing period.
3. ) A “ Balance of Guarantee Payment” , within 10
days after the flock is marketed, to equal $0.01225
per square foot per week. (This total includes
1 & 2 Above.)
4. ) A “ Bonus Payment” based upon an equal in
crement spread from the lowest cost flock maxi
mum of $0.01775 per square foot per week to a
minimum of $0.01225 per square foot per week
to the highest cost flock settling within a given
settlement period. (This total includes 1, 2, & 3
above.)
5. ) An additional ‘‘Electric Power Payment” , within
10 days after the flock is marked, equal to $0.0005
per square foot per week. This payment to be
for Windowless facilities with fan capacities
and equipment in accordance with Bayside spe
cifications.
22
Section C — To Guarantee Roaster Growers:
1. ) A payment of $0.01 per square foot for the
cleanout period within 10 days after a subse
quent Bayside flock is placed.
2. ) A payment of $0,007 per square foot per week
to be paid bi-weekly during the growing period.
3. ) A “ Balance of Guarantee Payment”, within 10
days after the flock is marketed, equal to $0.0125
per square foot per week. (This total includes
1 & 2 above.)
4. ) A “ Bonus Payment” based on an equal incre
ment spread from the lowest cost flock maximum
of $0.0185 per square foot per week to a minimum
of $0.0125 per square foot per week to the highest
cost flock settling within a given settlement
period. (This total includes 1, 2, & 3 above.)
5. ) An additional “ Electric Power Payment”, within
10 days after the flock is marketed, equal to
$0.0005 per square foot per week. This payment
to be for Windowless facilities with fan capacities
and equipment in accordance with Bayside spe
cifications.
Section I) — To Guarantee the Capon Grower:
1. ) A payment of $0.01 per square foot for the
cleanout period within 10 days after a subse
quent Bayside flock is placed.
2. ) A payment of $0.01 per square foot per week
to be paid bi-weekly during the growing period.
3. ) A “ Balance of Guarantee Payment” , within 10
days after the flock is marketed, to equal $0.0135
per square foot per week. (This total includes
2 above.)
4. ) An additional “ Electric Power Payment” , within
10 days after the flock is marketed, equal to
$0.0005 per squire foot per week. This payment
23
to be for Capon Growers with Windowless facil
ities in accordance with Bayside specifications.
T h e Geow ee A g r e e s :
Section E:
1. ) To furnish adequate housing, equipment, water,
labor, feed, and oil storage facilities as necessary
for an efficient operation, as in accordance with
Bayside specifications. (See specification sheet
attached.)
2. ) To maintain an effective rodent and wild bird
control program.
3. ) To provide State approved disposal facilities for
dead birds.
4. ) To have no poultry other than Bayside’s on the
farm during the period of this contract.
5. ) To use only those materials supplied by Bayside
for the purpose of feeding and maintenance of
birds under this contract.
6. ) To provide suitable facilities for water medica
tion.
7. ) TO BE PRESENT DURING THE LOADING
OUT OF POULTRY.
8. ) To keep an accurate flock inventory, on sheets
provided by Bayside, and to have these sheets
available to the “ Load Out Foreman” when
poultry is loaded.
9. ) To maintain suitable roadways for feed, fuel and
chick deliveries and for the efficient load out of
flocks. To pay all wrecker service as required by
live haul, chick, feed, or fuel delivery trucks as
attributed to unsuitable roadways on Grower’s
farm.
10.) To follow instructions of the Bayside Supervisor
in the care and management of Broiler, Roaster
24
or Capon flocks. To allow such personnel to enter
any facility pertinent to this contract at reason
able times.
11. ) That Bayside will remain the owner of all poul
try, feed, and other materials, and may without
process of law, enter on the premises of the
Grower to remove or to assume the active care
and management of the flock—if Bayside believes
that said flock is not receiving proper care and
attention. Cost of labor or other expenses thus
incurred will be deducted from the contract pay
ment.
12. ) To pay a charge of $10.00 per ton for the removal
of any feed left on the farm, in “ excess” of a
calculated 1 day supply at the time a flock is
removed. A one day supply will be considered
200 lbs. per 1,000 Broilers and 300 lbs. per 1,000
Roasters and Capons. Feed left on the farm due
to schedule changes shall not be considered
“ EXCESS”.
13. ) That a prorated payment will be made based
upon respective guarantees—in lieu of Sections
B, C, & D—the payment will be prorated on the
basis of average mortality within a settlement,
original flock density, and actual percentage sal
vaged when excessive bird losses resulted from:
a. ) An act of God (including, but not limited
to, fire, winds, snow, or flooding).
b. ) OR, over 4% in excess of the average die
as a result of lack of oxygen and/or heat
exhaustion.
14. ) That minimum payment will be set at $0.0075
per square foot per week in cases described under
Item 13 above.
25
S ettle m e n t C ost A nalysis :
Section F:
Charges for monthly cost calueulations will be as follows:
1.) Broilers—-Chix $0.15
Feed $100/Ton
Fuel $0.20/Gal.
Medicaments Per Type
Litter $8.00/Cord
Wash and Spray Invoice Charge
2.) Roasters--Chix $0.15
Feed $100/Ton
Fuel $0.20/Gal.
Medicaments Per Type
Litter $8.00/Cord
Wash and Spray Invoice Charge
Age to Weight Adjustment factor--$0.00010 per .01 lb.
above and below average ROASTER MALE weight.
(See attached example.)
B ayside and t h e Geow eb M utually A geee :
Section G:
1. ) That the Grower accept full and exclusive lia
bility for the payment of any and all taxes aris
ing as a result of the performance of this contract
including, but not limited to, any and all taxes
for Workmen’s Compensation Insurance, or Old
Age Benefits or Annuities now or hereafter im
posed by any persons engaged in the performance
of this Agreement on behalf of the Grower, but
excluding local taxes on birds.
2. ) That the Grower, his agents and employees shall
not be considered to be employees of Bayside for
any purpose whatsoever.
3. ) That this contract supercedes and replaces all
previous Broiler, Roaster and Capon contracts.
26
4. ) That this contract may be cancelled for sustained
inferior performance, or violation of the terms
of this contract by either party.
5. ) That notice of contract termination will be given
for a subsequent flock five weeks prior to removal
of the preceding flock by either party.
In W it n e ss W h eb eo e , the parties hereto have executed
these presents th is_________day o f___________ , 19__
BAYSIDE ENTERPRISES, INC.
By :
Gboweb :
Witness
27
No. 75-1267
ttje Supreme (Eourt of ttie United States
October Term, 1975
Bayside Enterprises, Inc., et al., petitioners
v.
National Labor Relations Board
ON PETITION FOR A W RIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STA TES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIRST CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT
Robert H. Bork,
Solicitor General,
Department o f Justice,
Washington, D.C. 20530.
John S. Irving,
General Counsel,
J ohn E. Higgins, J r.,
Deputy General Counsel,
Norton J. Come,
Deputy Associate General Counsel,
Robert A. Giannasi,
Assistant General Counsel,
National Labor Relations Board,
Washington. D.C. 20570.
29
INDEX
Page
Opinions below ............................ ....................... ............. 1
Jurisdiction ........................................................................ 1
Question presented ..................... 1
Statutes involved ...... 2
Statement ..................................... 2
Argument ............................................... 5
Conclusion ......................................................................... 10
CITATIONS
Cases:
Abbott Farms, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Board, 487 F.2d 904 .....................................8
Bowie v. Gonzalez, 117 F,2d 11 ................................. 6
Boy Is v. Wirtz, 352 F.2d 63 ........................................6
Colchester Egg Farms, Inc., 214 NLRB No. 64 .... 9
Elm Spring Farm v. United States, 127 F.2d 920 .. 7
Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. McComb,
337 U.S. 755 ............................................................6
McElrath Poultry Co., Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Board, 494 F.2d 518 ...............................8
Mitchell v. Hunt, 263 F.2d 913 ................................6
Mitchell v. Huntsville Wholesale Nurseries,
Inc., 267 F.2d 286 ......................................... 7
National Labor Relations Board v. Gass,
377 F.2d 438 ....................... 6
31
Page
National Labor Relations Board v. Olaa Sugar
Company, 242 F.2d 714 ................................... . 6
National Labor Relations Board v. Strain Poultry
Farms, Inc., 405 F.2d 1025 ............................... 7-8
National Labor Relations Board v. Victor
Ryckebosch, Inc., 471 F.2d 20 ............................ 8
Skidmore v. Swift & Co. 323 U.S. 134 .................. 7
Wirtz v. Jackson & Perkins Co., 312 F.2d 48 ........7
Wirtz v. Tyson’s Poultry, Inc., 355 F.2d 255 .... . 8, 9
Statutes:
Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended (52 Stat.
1060, 29 U.S.C. 201, et seq.) ................... ............ 2
Section 3(f), 29 U.S.C. 203(f) ................... 5-6
National Labor Relations Act, as amended (61
Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. 151, et seq.) .........................2
Section 2(3), 29 U.S.C. 152(3) ..................... 5
Section 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1) .............5
Section 8(a)(5), 29 U.SC. 158(a)(5) .............. 5
60 Stat. 698 .........................................................5
87 Stat. 763 ................................................................5
Miscellaneous:
Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Ap
pellate System, Structure and Internal Proce
dures: Recommendations for Change (1975) ..... 9
32 n
% Supreme Court of tt|r plntierl States
October Term, 1975
No. 75-1267
Bayside Enterprises, Inc., et al., petitioners
v.
National Labor Relations Board
ON PETITION FOR A W RIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED S T A TES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FIRST CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. Al-
A5) is reported at 527 F. 2d 436. The Board’s decision
and order (Pet. App. A7-A22) are reported at 216 NLRB
No. 92.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on
December 10, 1975 (Pet. App. A6). The petition for a writ
of certiorari was filed on March 8, 1976. The jurisdiction
of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether truck drivers, who transport feed from their
employer’s mill to independent farms under contract with
the employer to raise poultry hatched in his hatchery
facilities, are employees, rather than agricultural laborers,
and thus covered under the National Labor Relations Act.
( 1) 33
2
STATUTES INVOLVED
The relevant portions of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended (61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. 151, et seq.),
and of the Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended (52
Stat. 1060, 29 U.S.C. 201, et seq.), are set forth at page
2 of the petition.
STATEMENT
1. Petitioner Bayside Enterprises, Inc., operates chick
hatcheries and breeding farms in Belfast, Maine (Pet.
App. A10; Tr. 34-37, 129-130).1 Bayside has contracts with
119 independent growers or farmers in the area around
Belfast for the care and feeding of the chickens from the
age of one day until they are ready for processing for
market (Pet. App. All ; Tr. 30-31). Petitioner Poultry
Processing, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of Bayside,
operates a mill at Thorndike, Maine, which supplies feed
to the independent farms as well as to another poultry
firm (Pet. App. A11-A12; Tr. 80-81, 84-85). Most of the
poultry raised by the contract farms for Bayside is sold
to Poultry Processing and processed for market at a plant
owned by Poultry Processing (Pet. App. A12; Tr. 54-55,
190-191).2 Although Bayside and Poultry Processing
have separate employees, they have common officers and
directors, a single corporate office, and a single controller
'“Tr.” references are to the transcript of testimony before the
Board, a copy of which has been lodged with the Clerk of this Court.
Employees at this plant (which operates under the name of
Penobscott Poultry Company), including crews who transport the
live poultry from the contract farms to the plant, are jointly
represented by Truck Drivers, Warehousemen, and Helpers of
America Local 340, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, and
Amalgamated Meat Cutters Local 385 (Tr. 54-55, 191).
34
3
(Pet. App. A 13; Tr. 79, 88, 147-148, 152-153). They have
common management and common control over labor
relations (Pet. App. A13; Tr. 9-13, 40, 139-140).
Bayside furnishes feed, medicine and other supplies to
the independent farmers and occasionally sends em
ployees to the farms to observe the care given to the
chickens and to determine if medical attention is needed
(Pet. App. Al l ; Tr. 40-41). The contract between Bay-
side and the farmers (“growers”) provides that “the
Grower, his agents and employees shall not be considered
to be employees of Bayside for any purpose whatsoever”
(Pet. App. A28). The farmers provide the land, the
facilities, and the labor for raising the poultry (Pet. App.
All ; Tr. 78). A farmer’s compensation for raising the
poultry is ordinarily determined by the weight of the
flock at maturity less the cost of the feed and materials
supplied (Pet. App. A15, A23-A28; Tr. 101-105, 110-111,
125). Title to the chickens remains in Bayside until
after they leave the farms for processing (Pet. App. Al l -
A12; Tr. 40).
Bayside employs 6 truck drivers to deliver feed from
the mill at Thorndike to the independent contract
growers who are situated, on the average, from 12 to
15 miles from the mill (Pet. App. A13; Tr. 53, 182). The
drivers are supervised by a mill supervisor and dispatcher
who makes up delivery schedules (Pet. App. A13-A14;
Tr. 112, 135, 164-165, 174-179, 213-225).
The feed trucks are loaded and weighed at the mill,
sometimes by the drivers and sometimes by the dis
patcher (Pet. App. A 14; Tr. 69, 177, 181-183, 199-200).
In either case, the drivers are given slips telling them how
much feed of a particular type to deliver to a given farm
(Pet. App. A14; Tr. 176-177). The drivers then drive
to the contract farms where they unload the feed into
bins designated by the farmers (Pet. App. A14; Tr. 67,
35
4
200). The drivers’ responsibilities include putting the
proper amounts of feed into the designated bins, trying to
keep rain out of the bins when unloading in bad weather,
spraying their boots and trucks with disinfectant to avoid
spreading poultry diseases, and driving their trucks
carefully so as to avoid disturbing the chickens by loud
noises and bright reflections from headlights (Pet. App.
A14-A15; Tr. 67-68, 74).
The drivers have no direct contact with the poultry (Pet.
App. A15; Tr. 112). Less than half of the drivers’ time is
spent at the farms; the remainder is spent at the feed mill
and in driving (Pet. App. A14-A15; Tr. 166-167). The
drivers deliver feed to three or four farms a day (Pet. App.
A 15; Tr. 64), spending from half an hour to an hour at
each farm (Tr. 201). They drive approximately 100 to 120
rpiles each day (Tr. 224).3
In October 1973, the Union4 requested recognition as
the representative of Bayside’s drivers who deliver feed
from the Thorndike mill to the contract farms (Pet. App.
All). Bayside recognized the Union and began contract
negotiations (Pet. App. All ; Tr. 11). However, after
several sessions, Bayside broke off bargaining negotia
tions on the ground that the drivers were agricultural
employees and hence not covered by the Act (Pet. App.
All ; Tr. 13, 16).
2. Upon charges filed by the Union, the Board found
that Bayside and Poultry Processing constituted a single
’In addition to making deliveries to the contract farms, the drivers
have also on occasion delivered feed from another feed mill to breeder
farms owned by Bayside, and have transported feed ingredients from
Rockland, Maine, and Gloucester, Massachusetts, to the feed mill at
Thorndike (Pet. App. A15-A16; Tr. 112-114).
4Local 340 of the Teamsters, one of the representatives of the pro
cessing plant employees (n. 2, supra).
36
5
employer (“Bayside”) for purposes of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA). The Board further found that, while
Bayside’s own breeding farms and hatcheries may consti
tute branches of farming, the feed mill and feed delivery
operations were not farming, and that the feed truck driv
ers’ duties were incidental to the operation of the feed mill
and not to Bayside’s farming operations. (Pet. App. A 18-
A19.) Accordingly, the Board concluded that the drivers
were not “agricultural laborers” but rather “employees”
within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the NLRA, that they
constituted an appropriate unit for bargaining, and that
Bayside thus violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the NLRA
when it refused to bargain with the Union for that unit
(A20). The Board entered a bargaining order (Pet. App.
A21-A22, A7-A8).
3. The court of appeals enforced the Board’s order (Pet.
App. A1-A5). The court upheld the Board’s finding that
Bayside and Poultry Processing were a single employer,
“a multi-faceted organization whose enterprises and pur
poses go beyond the bounds of farming” (Pet. App. A4).
The court also held that Bayside was not a farmer “for
that portion of its business which supports the raising of
poultry on contract farms” and that thus the feed mill
drivers were not employed “incidental to or in conjunc
tion with” Bayside’s own farming operations (Pet. App.
A5). Consequently, they were not exempt from the NLRA
as agricultural laborers {ibid.).
ARGUMENT
1. Section 2(3) of the NLRA excludes from the defini
tion of employee “any individual employed as an agricul
tural laborer.” Since 1946, riders to the Board’s appropria
tion acts (e.g., 60 Stat. 698; 87 Stat. 763) have regularly
provided that the term “agricultural laborer” shall be
defined in accordance with Section 3(f) of the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 203(f), which reads:
37
6
“Agriculture” includes farming in all its branches
and * * * includes * * * the raising of * * * poultry,
and any practices * * * performed by a farmer or on
a farm as an incident to or in conjunction with such
farming operations * * * .
This Court has held that the FLSA definition has two
distinct parts. The first relates to actual farming operations,
and the second “includes any practices whether or not
themselves farming practices, which are performed either
by a farmer or on a farm, incidentlv to or in conjunction
with ‘such’ farming operations.” Farmers Reservoir &
Irrigation Co. v. McComb, 337 U.S. 755, 763. The activi
ties included in the second portion of the definition, how
ever, must actually be performed on a farm, and be inci
dental to the farming operations of that farm. Id. at 766,
n. 15; Bowie v. Gonzalez, 117 F.2d 11, 18 (C.A. 1);
Mitchell v. Hunt, 263 F.2d 913 (C.A. 5). See also National
Labor Relations Board v. Olaa Sugar Company, 242 F.2d
714, 718 (C.A. 9); cf. Boyls v. Wirtz, 352 F.2d 63 (C.A. 5).
The court of appeals correctly applied these principles
in rejecting petitioners’ contention that the feed mill driv
ers came within the second part of the definition because
they were performing services incidental to Bayside’s
farming operations.5 As the court stated (Pet. App. A4-
A5):
The bulk of the capital and personnel of Bayside
is devoted to the feed mill and the processing plant
operations which are concededly not farming. The
company does operate chick hatcheries and breeding
farms which do constitute farming under the appli
cable statutes. 29 C.F.R. §780.125(b) (1974). In the
remaining segment of the business, the raising of
38
5The court followed its earlier decision in National Labor Relations
Board v. Gass, 377 F.2d 438 (C.A. 1).
7
chickens to maturity, the actual farming activity is
done by the contract farmers. According to current
Department of Labor regulations, retention of title to
the poultry pending maturity on contract farms does
not entitle a business to be classified as a farmer. 29
C.F.R. §780.126 (1974).4 Nor does Bayside’s delivery
of feed, however crucial to the development of poultry
on the contract farms it may be, justify classifying
Bayside as a farmer. Rather, the Bayside feed delivery
system is part of a separate organization, supportive
of agricultural activity, but not directly engaged in
farming. See 29 C.F.R. §780.126 (1974) * * * .
4“Feed dealers and processors sometimes enter into contractual arrangements with farmers under which the latter
agree to raise to marketable size baby chicks supplied by the former who also undertake to furnish all the required feed
and possibly additional items. Typically, the feed dealer or processor retains title to the chickens until they are sold.
Under such an arrangement . . . [t]he activities of the feed dealer or processor . . . are not ‘raising of poultry’ and
employees engaged in them cannot be considered agricultural employees on that ground . . . ."
The court properly relied on the Department of Labor
regulations; since the regulations were promulgated
by the agency in charge of enforcing the FLSA, they are
entitled to great weight. Skidmore v. Swift <& Co., 323
U.S. 134, 139-140. Moreover, the regulations are con
sistent with analogous case law involving similar con
tractual arrangements for growing or processing an
employer’s product. See Mitchell v. Huntsville Wholesale
Nurseries, Inc., 267 F. 2d 286 (C.A. 5); Wirtzv. Jackson &
Perkins Co., 312 F. 2d 48, 51 (C.A. 2); Elm Spring Farm
v. United States, 127 F. 2d 920 (C.A. 1).
2. While we believe it is correct, the decision of the
court below is in conflict with decisions of other courts
of appeals. Thus, in National Labor Relations Board v.
39
8
Strain Poultry Farms, Inc., 405 F. 2d 1025, the Fifth Circuit
held that, in a poultry raising operation similar to that here,
the agricultural exemption applied to the employer’s
(Strain’s) truck drivers, who hauled chickens to market
from farmers under contract with Strain to grow them to
maturity. In the court’s view (id. at 1032), “[t]he fact
that Strain hired the independent growers to raise
its birds and contract loaders to catch the birds for loading
onto its trucks would not seem to destroy its claim to hav
ing raised the poultry.” The Ninth Circuit, following Strain,
reached the same conclusion in a substantially identical
situation. National Labor Relations Board v. Victor
Ryckebosch, Inc., 471 F. 2d 20. Moreover, in Abbott
Farms, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 487 F. 2d
904, and McElrath Poultry Co., Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Board, 494 F. 2d 518, the Fifth Circuit extended
Strain to exempt from the NLRA feed mill employees and
employees who transport feed to and from the employ
er’s mill. See also Wirtz v. Tyson’s Poultry, Inc., 355 F. 2d
255 (C.A. 8).
The court below purported to distinguish Strain and
Abbott on the ground that the employers there were
primarily engaged in traditional agriculture and, unlike
petitioners, owned no processing plant to slaughter
and dress the poultry (Pet. App. A5). We submit, however,
that the underlying rationale for the court’s decision is
directly at odds with that of Strain and Abbott, as well
as of the other contrary decisions which the court did not
specifically attempt to distinguish.6 The analysis of the
court below rests on the premise that Bayside’s farming
6The court below did indicate that it found the contrary decisions
unpersuasive (Pet. App. A3).
40
9
operations are limited to its hatcheries, which are sep
arate from its feed mill operations, and that the inde
pendent farmers who are under contract to raise Bay-
side’s poultry to maturity are engaged in their own
farming. Thus services furnished by Bayside’s feed mill
drivers are incidental to its feed mill operations, rather
than to any farming operations. The other courts have
rejected this basic premise.
3. The question presented is a recurring one in the
administration of the NLRA. Thus, in Colchester Egg
Farms, Inc., 214 NLRB No. 64, the Board reaffirmed its
position in the instant case, and has filed an application
for enforcement in the Second Circuit (No. 76-4052).7
As petitioners note (Pet. 9), there are serious practical
objections to having a conflict in the circuits on this
issue.8 Moreover, resolution of the issue would have a
direct impact on cases arising under the FLSA (see Wirtz
v. Tysons Poultry, supra), as well as on those arising under
other statutes which refer to agricultural laborers or
employees (see Pet. 11, n. 13).
7The Board has requested the Second Circuit to hold the proceeding
in abeyance until this Court rules on the instant petition.
sFor example, petitioners’ earlier attempt to have the instant
case reviewed in the Fifth Circuit (see 514 F. 2d 475 (C.A. 1), 515
F. 2d 503 (C.A. 5) ) demonstrates that the conflict among the circuits
furnishes a strong inducement for forum shopping.
The Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate
System has identified the question presented here as one that
has too long escaped authoritative resolution. Structure and Internal
Procedures: Recommendations for Change (1975), A152-A153.
41
10
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ
of certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted.
Robert H. Bork,
Solicitor General.
J ohn S. Irving,
General Counsel,
J ohn E. Higgins, jr .,
Deputy General Counsel,
Norton J. Come,
Deputy Associate General Counsel,
Robert A. Giannasi,
Assistant General Counsel,
National Labor Relations Board.
April 1976.
42
Intfjoe
Bnpxmt fflmttrt o f % It u & i S t a t e
Octobeb Teem, 1975
No. 75-1267
BAYSIDE ENTERPRISES, INC.,
PENOBSCOT POULTRY COMPANY,
and POULTRY PROCESSINGS, INC.
v.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS
Alast J. Levenson, Esq.
Attorney for Petitioners
187 Middle Street
Portland, Maine 04111
43
INDEX
Page
Opinions Below .............................................................
Jurisdiction ...................................................................
Statutes Involved .........................................................
Questions Presented ....................................................
Statement ......................................................................
Argument ......................................................................
Tlie Company’s Six Feed Drivers Are “ Agricul
tural Laborers” and Therefore Exempt Under Sec
tion 2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act...........
I. Introduction and Summary ..............................
II. Bayside as a F a rm er........................................
A. Bayside as less than a farmer—the growout
contract .......................................................
B. Bayside as more than a farmer—the pro
cessing plant ..............................................
C. Bayside as a poultry raiser—the employing
entity ...........................................................
III. The Feed Drivers as Being Incidental to and in
Conjunction With Farming ..............................
Conclusion ....................................................................
1
2
2
2
4
5
5
7
7
10
14
19
21
T able op C itations
Cases
Abbott Farms, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board,
487 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1973) .................................. 12, 20
Birmingham v. Bucher’s Breeding Farm, 152 F.2d 837
(8th Cir. 1945) ......................................................... 20
Bowie v. Gonzalez, 177 F.2d 11 (1st Cir. 1941) ............ 11
Colchester Egg Farms, Inc., 214 NLRB No. 64 (1974) 19
DiGiorgio Fruit Corp., 80 NLRB 853 (1948) ............ 13
Elm Spring Farm v. United States, 127 F.2d 920 (1st
Cir. 1942) .................................................................. 8
45
ii Index
Page
Etchechoury v. Avi-Simplot, Inc., 93 Idaho 438, 462
I’.2d 737, 741 (1969) ............................................. 13, 18
Farmers Reservoir $ Irrigation Co. v. McComb, 337
U.S. 755 (1949) ................................................ 5, 14, 20
Fors Farms, Inc. v. Washington State Employment
Security Dept., 75 Wash. 2d 383, 450 P.2d 973
(1969) .................................................................. 11, 20
George I. Petit, Inc., 89 NLRB 710 (1950) .................. 18
Hersey Estates, 112 NLRB 1300 (1955) ................... 13
Johnston v. Cotton Producers Association, 244 F.2d
553 (5th Cir. 1957) ................................................ 9, 18
Local Union No. 300 v. McCulloch, 428 F.2d 396 (5th
Cir. 1970) .................................................................. 18
Manejav. Waialua, 349 U.S. 254 (1954) .................. 12, 18
Maplewood Poultry Company v. Maine Employment
Security Commission, 151 Me. 467 A.2d 360 (1956) 13, 20
McElrath Poultry Co., Inc.v. National Labor Relations
Board, 494 F.2d 519 (5th Cir. 1974) ..................... 13, 20
Mitchell v. Huntsville Wholesale Nurseries, Inc., 267
F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1959) ........................................... 8
NLRB v. Bayside Enterprises, Inc., 527 F.2d 436 (1st
Cir. 1975) .................................................................. 15
NLRB v. Gass, 377 F.2d 438, 444 (1st Cir. 1967) . . . . 11, 15
NLRB v. John W. Campbell, Inc., 159 F.2d 184 (5th
Cir. 1947) .................................................................. 12
NLRB v. Kelly Brothers Nurseries, Inc., 341 F.2d 433,
435 fn. 2 ...................................................................... 18
NLRB v. Kent Bros. Transportation Co., 458 F.2d 480
(9th Cir. 1972) ................ 14
NRLB v. Olaa Sugar Company, 242 F.2d 714 (9th Cir.
1957) ......................................................................... 19
NLRB v. Strain Poultry Farms, Inc., 405 F.2d 1025,
1033, 1032-35 (5th Cir. 1969) ........................... 8, 9, 18
NLRB v. Victor Rychebosch, Inc., 471 F.2d 20 (9th Cir.
1972) ......................................................................... 19
46
Index iii
Page
North Whittier Heights Citrus Assn., 10 NLRB 1269
(1939) ........................................................................ 16
Vives v. Serralles, 145 F.2d 552 (1st Cir. 1944) ......... 14
Waldo Rohnert Co. v. NLRB, 322 F.2d 46 (9th Cir.
1963) .......................................................................... 8
Wirtz v. Jackson <& Perkins Co., 312 F.2d 48 (2nd Cir.
1963) ......................................................................... 8
Wirtz v. Osceola Farms Co., 372 F.2d 584 (5th Cir.
1967) .......................................................................... 20
Wirtz v. Tyson’s Poultry, Inc., 355 F.2d (8th Cir. 1966) 10
Statutes
Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended (52 Stat. 1060,
29 TT.S.C. 201, et seq.) .............................................. 2
Section 3(f) .................................................... 3, 19
Section 13(a)(6) .............................................. 18
Section 13(g) ................................................... 18
National Labor Relations Act, as amended (61 Stat.
136, 73 Stat. 519, 29 U.S.C. 151, et seq.) .................. 2
Section 2(3) ...................................................... 2, 5
60 Stat. 698 .................................................................. 2
87 Stat. 763 .................................................................. 2
Miscellaneous
Broiler Industry: An Economic Study of Structure,
Practices and Problems, U.S. Department of Agri
culture (1971) .............................................- ........ 17, 18
54 Cal. L. Rev. 1939, 1955 ............................................. 18
25 Labor Law Journal 241 ......................................... 19
Legislative History of NLRA, p. 3202 ....................... 18
Vertical Coordination via Contract Farming, Economic
Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture,
Miscellaneous Publication No. 1073, p. 74, et seq.
(1968) 10
47
lit %
Supreme (Hmtrt of tfr? States
O ctober T er m , 1975
No. 75-1267
BAYSIDE ENTERPRISES, INC.,
PENOBSCOT POULTRY COMPANY,
and POULTRY PROCESSING, INC.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS
Opinions Below
The opinion of the Court of Appeals (Pet. app. A. 1-5)
is reported at 527 F.2d 436. The Board’s Decision and
Order (Pet. app. A. 7-22) are reported at 216 NLRB No. 91.
49
2
Jurisdiction
The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on
December 10, 1975 (Pet. app. A. 6). The Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari was filed March 8, 1976 and was granted
on May 19, 1976. The jurisdiction of this court rests on
28 U.S.C. 1254 (1).
Statutes Involved
The relevant provisions of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended (61 Stat. 136, 73 Stat. 519, 29 U.S.C. 151,
et seq.) are as follows:
Sec. 2 * * *
# * #
(3) The term “ employee” shall include any em
ployee, and shall not be limited to the employees of
a particular employer, unless the act explicitly states
otherwise, and shall include any individual whose work
has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with
any current labor dispute or because of any unfair
labor practice, and who has not obtained any other
regular and substantially equivalent employment, but
shall not include any individual employed as an agri
cultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any
family or person at his home, or any individual em
ployed by his parents or spouse, or any individual
having the status of independent contractor, or any
individual employed as a supervisor, or any individual
employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor
Act, as amended from time to time, or by any other
person who is not an employer as herein defined.
* * #
50
3
Since 1946, riders to the Board’s appropriation acts
(e.g., 60 Stat. 698; 87 Stat. 763) have regularly provided
that the term “ agricultural laborer” shall be defined in
accordance with Section 3(f) of the Fair Labor Standards
Act (F.L.S.A.) 29 U.S.C. 203(f).
# # #
The relevant provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act,
as amended (52 Stat. 1060, 29 U.S.C. 201, et seq.) 29 U.S.C.
203(f):
3(f) “ Agriculture” includes farming in all its
branches and among other things includes the cultiva
tion and tillage of the soil, dairying, the production,
cultivation, growing, and harvesting of any agricul
tural or horticultural commodities (including com
modities defined as agricultural commodities in Sec
tion 15(g) of the Agricultural Marketing Act, as
amended), the raising of livestock, bees, fur-bearing
animals, or poultry, and any practices (including any
forestry or lumbering operations) performed by a
farmer or on a farm as an incident to or in conjunction
with such farming operations, including preparation
for market, delivery to storage or to market or to
carriers for transportation to market.
Question Presented
Whether the Court of Appeals correctly determined that
the Board’s decision that employees of a poultry organiz
ation vertically integrated from hatcheries to processing
plant, who transport feed from the company’s feed mill to
its contract farms are covered “ employees” rather than
exempt “ agricultural laborers” under the National Labor
Relations Act as defined in the Fair Labor Standards Act.
51
4
Statement
Bayside Enterprises, Ine. and Poultry Processing, Inc.
are parent and subsidiary corporations engaged in poultry
hatching, breeding, raising, processing, and marketing in
central coastal Maine. Like many other poultry organiza
tions these days, the companies, which have been found to
be one joint enterprise, are made up of several elements.
There is a breeder hatchery at Waldo with six primary
breeder farms connected to it (A. 11), a commercial hatch
ery at Unity with eleven farms connected to it (A. 11),
and a feed mill at Thorndike that produces 80-85 percent of
the feed required by the Bayside contract farmers (A. 24-
25). At the time of the hearing, one-third of the production
of this mill was sold to an unconnected company1
(A. 26). Also located at Thorndike with a separate office
for its dispatcher (A. 49) is the feed move operation whose
drivers are the subject of this case. They deliver all of
the Bayside medicine and feed produced at the mill to the
Bayside contract farmers (A. 42). The other one-third of the
production of the feed mill that is sold to an unconnected
company, is transported to their contract farms by an inde
pendent trucker (A. 6). There is also a processing plant
at Belfast (A. 17-18) that processes all of the Bayside
Poultry (A. 35), and a general business office at Belfast
where the General Manager, Comptroller, Breeder Depart
ment Manager, Broiler Department Manager, and the ac
counting office is located (A. 8, 60). Over two-thirds of
the 119 contract farms are located within a 12 to 15 mile
radius of the feed mill (A. 17).
Beside the feed drivers that deliver the feed and medi
cines in specialized trucks, the enterprise has other truck
drivers that transport eggs to breeder farms and chicks
to the contract farms (A. 18). Attached to the processing
1 The Company’s feed mill now is used exclusively for its own
production needs.
52
5
plant under separate supervision are truck drivers that
catch, coop, and deliver the birds from the contract farms
to the processing plant (A. 50-51). There are farm super
visors who check the health of the poultry on a regular
basis at the farms (A. 13, 45), and there is a full time farm
crew that take blood tests, debeak and vaccinate the poultry,
and clean the poultry houses after each flock is taken out
(A. 19). The company also employs a full time geneticist
to constantly improve the strain (A. 10). The ownership
of both feed and poultry is at all times in Bayside.
The enterprise has organized itself so that the 400 em
ployees of the processing plant and the feed mill are paid
by Poultry Processing, Inc. The other 80 working at and
for the hatcheries, breeding and contract farm, are paid
by Bayside Enterprises Inc.2
Argument
T h e C om pa n y ’s S ix F eed D rivers A be “ A gricultural
L aborers” and T h ebepoee E xem pt U nder S ection 2(3)
op t h e N ational L abor R elations A ct.
I . I ntroduction and S um m ary
The combination of Section 2(3) of the NLRA exempting
“ agricultural laborers” with the annual appropriation
rider for the NLRB defining those words under Section
203(f) of the Fair Labor Standards Act have produced
this controversy over the eligibility of the appellants to
fall within that definition.1 Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation
2 The Petitioners can accept the factual findings of the Adminis
trative Law Judge (Pet. app. A. 9-16). In the appendix there is
a more complete annotated rendition of the facts (A. 66-77).
1 “ ‘ Agriculture ’ includes farming in all its branches and . . .
includes . . . the raising of . . . poultry and any practices . . . per
formed by a farmer or on a farm as incident to or in conjunction
with such farming operations . . . ”
53
6
Co. v. McComb, 337 U.S. 755, 762-63 (1949) has pointed out
that the FLSA section has two distinct parts — (1), actual
farming operations and (2), “ any practices, whether or
not themselves farming practices, which are performed
either by a farmer or on a farm, incidentally to or in
conjunction with ‘such’ farming operations.” Id. at 763.
Since the work of the feed drivers in loading, transport
ing, and delivering feed to their employer’s contract farms
is not actual farming, Bayside contends that their work
falls within the secondary branch of farming. To so qualify,
their employer must be a farmer and their own work must
be incidental to such farming.
The conflict within the National Labor Relations Board
and between the circuits centers upon the first of those
requirements, namely, is a poultry organization such as this
a “ farmer.” The question of the work being incidental
to farming in this particular case has much less significance
because if the company is a farmer it follows that the work
of the drivers is incidental to that farming.
The rejection of the classification “ farmer” for Bayside
and companies like it by the NLRB and the First Circuit
has two distinct generic roots. The first emphasizes the
contract farmers, maintaining that it is they and not the
company who are raising the poultry. The second argu
ment stresses the processing plant, urging that it gives
the whole company a commercial coloration that pre
dominates over any farming aspect.
The company maintains that both the contract farmers
and the processing plant are but parts of a whole, inte
grated operation that has as its essence the raising and
marketing of its own poultry and as such it is a “ farmer.”
54
7
II. B ayside as a F abmeb
A. Bayside as Less Than a Farmer — The Growout
Contract
The principal argument against Bayside being a farmer
centers upon the growout contract with its farmers. This
is the arrangement whereby the birds from its hatcheries
and breeding farms are placed upon farms belonging to
others until they grow to maturity (a typical contract and
a duplicate of Exhibit 1 can be found at Page A. 23 of
Pet. App.)
From the contract farmer’s point of view, he agrees to
keep and maintain suitable facilities for the flocks, including
adequate housing, water, feed, oil storage, and dead bird
disposal facilities, according to Bayside’s specifications. He
also agrees to follow Bayside’s directions in the care and
management of each flock, to use only Bayside materials
for feeding and maintenance, and to have no other poultry
on his farm during the contract period (Pet. App. A. 26-27).
Bayside furnishes the chicks, feed, fuel, litter, medica
ments, and vaccines, makes the decision when and what
kind of poultry are placed on each farm, what they are fed
(A. 15), what medicines, vaccines, and blood tests are
administered, and when to remove each flock from the
farmer’s premises (A. 45). Bayside maintains a farm
crew that watches over these farms and cleans out the
poultry houses after each flock is removed (A. 20).
In return for his services and the use of his facilities,
the farmer is guaranteed payment on the basis of the
square footage in his poultry house plus a bonus based
on the pounds of poultry he has produced in relationship
to his production costs with the rest of the growers (A. 30).
This contract arrangement between the farmer and the
company is the focal point in the clash between the argu-
55
8
merits over whether the farmer is an integral part of the
poultry company or whether he is an independent entre
preneur.
In the brief for the Respondent, on the petition for
certiorari in this case, there are cited three cases as
examples of analogous contract arrangements with the
Bayside growout contract (p. 7). They are Mitchell v.
Huntsville Wholesale Nurseries, Inc., 267 F.2d 286 (5th Cir.
1959) rose growers; Wirte v. Jackson & Perkins Co., 312
F.2d 48, 51 (2nd Cir. 1963) nursery stock; and Elm Spring
Farm v. United States, 127 F.2d 920 (1st Cir. 1942) milk
handler. Petitioners have also found another case favor
able to the Respondent, Waldo Rohnert Co. v. NLRB, 322
F.2d 46 (9th Cir. 1963) seed growers.
However, Petitioners feel that these cases not only do
not support Respondent, but make clearer the distinction
of a vertically integrated poultry grower.
In Mitchell v. Huntsville, supra, although Huntsville sup
plied the growers with the plants, it only paid them “ based
on an agreed amount for each merchantable plant pro
duced” 267 F.2d 289 for 2.2
In Jackson <fc Perkins, supra, although the growers pro
vided the land, labor and equipment, they agreed to indem
nify the company for any claims arising out of the farming
operations. The growers also bore any loss due to crop
failures save for the cost of the original understock, and
the developed stock was sold by them to the defendant at
a price calculated per saleable plant. 312 F.2d 48, 51.
The Elm Spring Farm case, supra, was a promotion by
a company to a group of dairy farmers to claim the milk
received from the farmers was its own and thereby escape
2 The same Fifth Circuit in NLRB v. Strain Poidtry Farms, Inc.,
405 F.2d 1025, 1033 (5th Cir. 1969) distinguished Huntsville
saying the stock was purchased and that the growers were not
employees or agents of the company.
56
9
making payments to an equalization pool. The court prop
erly disregarded what it called an ‘ ‘ elaborate camouflage ’ ’
since at any time the cooperative could make the farmer
take back title to a cow or the farmer himself could demand
a retransfer of all the cows on 90 days notice. The risk
of loss in the production of milk remained upon the indi
vidual farmer. 127 F.2d 920, 926.
In the Rohnert Co. case, supra, the growers also did not
receive compensation under the seed contract for any crop
seed which was not as to quality and grade acceptable to
Rohnert “ as acceptable merchantable seed” and the grower
had to pay Rohnert for any planting seed supplied by it
if the planting seed failed to produce a crop or produced
undergrade crop seed. 322 F.2d 46, 47.
The common thread in these cases was the fact that the
farm product had to be marketable, saleable, or acceptable to
the company and thus the risk of loss fell on the farmer.3
The First Circuit looks upon the Bayside-farmer ar
rangement and labels it in “ support” of the raising of
poultry, 527 F.2d 436, 438. It thus rejects the argument
in NLRB v. Strain Poultry Farms, Inc., 405 F.2d 1025
(5th Cir. 1969) that companies such as Strain, Bayside, and
other vertically integrated poultry organizations are en
gaged in farming in its primary sense.
What Strain points out is that it is the poultry company
that continually retains the ownership of the birds and
assumes the risk of loss throughout the entire process.
It also assumes the risk of market fluctuations which affect
the price of the birds. This is unlike the previous contractor-
3 Even in Johnston v. Cotton Producers Association, 244 F.2d
553, 554 (5th Cir. 1957), the ease quoted in the Department of
Labor interpretation 29 C.F.R. 780.126 (1972) relied upon by the
First Circuit, the Exchange sold the baby chicks to the farmer-
customer, but retained title as security for the purchase price
and for advances for feed, supplies or equipment.
57
10
farmer examples in which it is the farmer that accepted
this risk.
In Wirts v. Tyson’s Poultry, Inc., 355 F.2d 255 (8th Cir.
1966) the situation is very much like Bayside with a corpo
ration and two subsidiaries that together make up a single
integrated egg producer. There the court said at Page 258:
“ . . . the appellees (Tyson) are farmers and the ones
who initiate the farming operations here involved.
Without appellees the independent growers arguably
would never have undertaken the initial and continu
ing cost of acquiring the birds and producing the eggs.
The contract growers merely aid the appellees, who
the District Court found to be the ones qualified to
claim the agricultural exemption . . . ”
The point is that it is not the poultry company that is
supporting the farmers, but it is the farmers who are
aiding the company in raising the poultry.
Whether you define the relationship as an agency, sub
contractor, or in substance as a lease by the company of
the farm, equipment, and labor (A. 12), the elements of
entrepreneurship have been shifted by contractual agree
ment from the farmer to the contractor-company. Vertical
Coordination via Contract Farming, Economic Research
Service U.S. Department of Agriculture, Miscellaneous
Publication No. 1073, p. 74 et seq. (1968). It is this shifting
that makes the farmer an integral part of the company.
The income of the farmer is not affected by the market price
at the time the poultry leaves his farm and he is guaranteed
at least a minimum preset price, no matter what the market.
B. Bayside As More Than A Farmer — The Proces
sing Plant
The Court of Appeals decision in this case although using
the independent contract farms argument also makes a
58
11
different argument grounded in the company’s ownership
of a processing plant for its poultry. The decision states
that the Court’s previous decision in NLRB v. Gass, 377
F.2d 438, 444 (1st Cir. 1967) was predicated on the
fact that the truckdrivers there were employed by
an integrated poultry processing company. The deci
sion characterizes Bayside as a multifaceted or
ganization whose enterprises and purposes go be
yond the bounds of farming. It points to the feed mill
and processing plant where it says the bulk of the capital
and personnel are, and notes that these are “ coneededly”
not farming. Finally, it denies the farm exemption dis
tinguishing other contrary opinions because those compa
nies were engaged in “ traditional” agriculture with no
processing plant. The court finishes by saying Bayside’s
operations are not “ predominantly” agriculture.
Although there are certain elements in this commercial
argument that find their root in the independent contract
farmers argument (i.e. if the farmers were indeed inde
pendent then the processing plant would actually be a com
mercial enterprise since it was processing the products
of different farms and different farmers, Bowie v. Gonzalez,
177 F.2d 11, 18 (1st Cir. 1941) ) the major point is like that
articulated by the Supreme Court of Washington in Fors
Farms, Inc. v. Washington State Employment Security
Dept., 75 Wash. 2d 383, 450 P.2d 973 (1969). There the court
said that a corporation engaged in processing chickens and
manufacturing chicken feed was not an exempt employer
because basically its operation was a commercial proces
sing company seeking a stable supply of chickens, rather
than a farming operation seeking a way of marketing
products.4
4 The Fors Farms case was a particularly difficult one as it
involved processing plant employees who had previously been
covered by the unemployment law and now that their plant had
been merged with a farmer, he argued that they should be exempt.
59
12
This theory that in a poultry company the entire organ
ization is incidental to the processing plant rather than
the reverse is not in keeping with a view of the company
as a single enterprise concerned with all aspects of grow
ing, raising, and selling its own product.5
In NLRB v. John W. Campbell, Inc., 159 F.2d 184 (5th
Cir. 1947) the court said at Page 187
“ no farmer, dependent upon that which he produces to
sustain his operations, could long exist if he could not
market that which he produces . . . the wheat farmer
must thresh his wheat; the cane grower must cut his
cane and make its juice into syrup; the cotton grower
must gin and hale his cotton; the citrus grower must
pick and pack his oranges; and the tomato grower
must do likewise. So long as these undertakings are
in preparation and packing by him for market of that
which he has grown on his farm, the labor necessary
thereto is agricultural labor.” ’
The court went on to say that if you bought, packed or
marketed the products of another, that was commercial;
while if you packed products from your own farm, that was
agricultural, and that the growing, harvesting, packing,
and selling of your own product was all part of a single
enterprise (agriculture) 159 F.2d 184, 187.
5 In Abbott Farms, Inc. v. NLRB, 487 F.2d 904, 905 (5th Cir.
1973) the court in referring to the trucking operation from the
feed mill of Abbott said in referring to Strain, “ There, as here,
the question was whether the poultry raiser was conducting a
trucking operation (feed mill) on the side or whether the operation
(mill) was part of a poultry raising venture; — Bayside in this
case would similarly contend that not only its trucking, but its
processing plant was part of a whole poultry-raising enterprise.
This does not necessarily mean that the work of every employee
automatically is classified as “ agricultural labor” only that Bay-
side is a “ farmer” under the F.L.S.A. Maneja v. Waialua,
349 U.S. 254 (1954).
60
13
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court has spoken directly
on this issue in construing its unemployment statute. In
Maplewood Poultry Company v. Maine Employment Secur
ity Commission, 151 Me. 467, 472, 121 A.2d 360 (1956) the
court said “ we are not aware of any decision which labels
the business of raising poultry as a business enterprise.”
In Etchechoury v. Avi-Simplot, Inc., 93 Idaho 438, 462
P.2d 737 (1969) the highest court of that state exempted
employees of the company processing plant from the em
ployment law as agricultural laborers where the employer
owned breeder and poultry farms and processed only his
own poultry.6
In the McElrath Poultry Co. case, 206 NLRB No. 94 enf.
denies McElrath Poultry Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 494 F.2d 519
(5th Cir. 1974) the company was a subsidiary of a parent
company with a processing plant. There the drivers in
the feed move operation were ruled exempt as agricultural
laborers despite the processing plant.
Petitioners question whether in a typical vertically inte
grated operation that produces all the poultry it processes
or to put it another way, processes all it produces, it is
possible to characterize the entire operation by the pre
dominant motivation (i.e. to assure a stable market for
poultry; to seek a way to market the product).7
If it is, it would seem the more important aspect would
be to sell a saleable product; and in the absence of a live
market for poultry, the birds must be processed (A. 18).
See DiGiorgio Fruit Corp., 80 NLRB 853, 855-857 (1948).
6 The court said, ‘ ‘ The test as to what constitutes agricultural
labor turns not on the size of the farming operation involved but
rather on whether the processor is in reality a farmer-producer,
and whether the processing is incidental to such farming.” 462
P.2d 737, 741.
7 There are, however, obvious cases, Hersey Estates, 112 NLRB
1300 (1955) (a chocolate maker who provided recreational facili
ties)
61
14
C. Bayside As A Poultry Raiser — The Employing
Entity
Of extreme importance in all of this discussion and of
absolute necessity before the question of “ raising poultry”
can be resolved, is what is the employment entity we are
discussing. Farmers Reservoir, 337 U.S. at Page 760 says
that whether a particular type of activity is agricultural,
. . is not determined by the necessity of the activity
to agriculture nor by the physical similarity of the
activity to that done by farmers in other situations.
The question is whether the activity in the particular
case is carried on as part of the agricultural function
or is separately organized as an independent produc
tive activity.”
That case itself demonstrated this principle by example
when the Court ruled the separately organized water com
pany there involved to be a non-farmer.8 In NLRB v. Kent
Bros. Transportation Co., 458 F.2d 480 (9th Cir. 1972) an
independently organized trucking company that transported
the produce of others was similarly held covered by the
NLRA.
Thus, in each case, the answer to the question of which
entity is the person employed and paid by is sometimes
determinative of his status, Vines v. Serralles, 145 F.2d
552, 555 (1st Cir. 1944).
In the poultry industry, whether because of the newness
of the vertically integrated form of business, the use of
8 The court at Page 766 went on to clarify, “ . . . it is equally
clear that it does constitute a practice performed as ‘an incident
to or in conjunction with’ farming. If the act exempted all such
practices, the company would be exempt. But the exemption is
limited. Such practices are exempt only if they are performed
by a farmer or on a farm. ’ ’
62
15
multiple corporations, or the fact that the nature of the
business requires several quite different elements, there has
always been some confusion about just what was the em
ploying entity. In the Gass case before the NLRB, the
trial examiner wrote that Gass was “ either an integral part
of this integrated commercial enterprise (Lipman) which
has engaged in commerce or else it was an independent
trucking concern hauling for a commercial enterprise which,
in turn, was engaged in commerce”, 154 NLRB 728, 746.
The Board said the same feed drivers were employed by
joint employers, 154 NLRB 728, 732-733. When the case
reached the Court of Appeals, the court said, “ It is signifi
cant that these drivers are not employed or paid by the
farms nor are they under the control of the farmers”,
NLRB v. Gass, 377 F.2d 438, 444 (1st Cir. 1967).
When the First Circuit decided this case it found Bay-
side “ a multi-faceted organization” and agreed with the
administrative law judge “ that Bayside and its component
parts constitute a single employer with common ownership
management and control of labor relations.” Further it
stated that Gass was part of an integrated poultry
processing company, NLRB v. Bayside Enterprises, Inc.,
527 F.2d 436 (1st Cir. 1975).
The court went on to say, however, that although Bay-
side could not be classified as a farmer for that portion
of its business which supports raising of poultry on contract
farms, it was a farmer in relationship to its chick hatch
eries and breeder farms. 527 F.2d 438-439.
The court has, therefore, formulated a rule whereby the
vertically integrated company as a whole would not be
regarded as engaged in primary agriculture, but parts of
it would, i.e., the hatcheries and breeder farms.9 In support
9 From the company’s point of view the employing entity has
also not been free from doubt. The case was tried before the
Administrative Law Judge on the theory that only the feed drivers’
employer, Bayside Enterprises, Inc., was the farmer and that the
subsidiary Poultry Processing, Inc. was not.
63
16
of the denial of the whole company's status as a farmer,
the court cited the Department of Labor interpretation
29 C.F.R. 780.126 (1972) that begins “ Feed dealers and
processors sometimes enter into contractual arrangements
with farmers . .
Although Bayside - Poultry Processing as a single enter
prise owns a feed mill and a processing plant, it, as an
organization, cannot be classified as either, nor does the
statutory exemption depend on the concept of ownership.
The FLSA makes specific reference to the raising of poul
try. It is by this standard Bayside seeks to be judged.
North Whittier Heights Citrus Assn., 10 NLRB 1269 (1939).
Is it raising poultry!
Bayside begins its poultry program with the hiring of
a full-time geneticist (A. 10) who selects the basic breeders
and the traits desired in the birds to be grown. There is
a breeding hatchery with four or five breeding farms which
breed and select strains or lines of birds (A. 10) and there
is a commercial hatchery with eleven breeding farms
attached to it whose function is to take in eggs and hatch
chicks (A. 11). When the chicks are one day old, they are
placed on the contract farms (A. 23) and stay there for
about nine weeks. Whether on one farm or the other, Bay-
side’s farm crew debeak, vaccinate, and blood test the flocks
(A. 19, 20). The company decides which farmers raise which
birds (A. 43) and initiates a feed program. This requires
designing the composition of the feed and seeing that it is
changed at least four times during the growing cycle (A. 13-
14). In addition, the company has four field supervisors
to check each farm on a routine basis (A. 13). A preventive
program is maintained for poultry disease, but should it
break out, the company treats the poultry using both feed
and water (A. 64). It delivers the feed to the farms and
picks it up when no longer needed (A. 22). It delivers the
chicks to the farms and catches, coops and delivers the
64
17
fully grown birds to the processing plant (A. 51). The
size of the operation is substantial as at any one time there
are 3% million birds (A. 20), all of which are subsequently
processed by the processing plant (A. 35).
It is important to understand that there is a central man
agement of this whole operation from egg to processing that
is coordinating and making the strategic economic decisions.
This emanates from a separate main office in Belfast with
a general manager (A. 77) and a common controller (A. 76).
Also located there is the broiler department manager, Avho
coordinates the scheduling of both feed and chicks to the
farms. In addition he is in charge of the continued health
of the flocks (A. 68). This puts him in contact on a daily
basis with farm managers, farm servicemen, the dispatcher
at the feed mill, the pick up crews, and the farmers them
selves (A. 62, 64).
Besides the pick up crew that comes from the processing
plant to the farms, there is a driver who delivers animal
by-products from the processing plant to the feed mill for
inclusion in the feed (A. 74). The feed formula is watched
very carefully, not just because of the type and age of the
poultry, but because of the weather and because of price
changes and availability of ingredients (A. 14).
The advantage of owning all elements of a poultry organ
ization, besides the coordination advantage, is the oppor
tunity to control as many variables as possible. Bayside
does not grow its own grains nor does it retail its chickens,
but in all other respects, its ownership or control allows it
more flexibility than otherwise. It is no longer necessary
to make a profit on the passing from one stage to another.
This has allowed greater cost efficiency with a consequent
price decline and a consumption increase. The Broiler
Industry: An Economic Study of Structure, Practices and
Problems, U.S. Department of Agriculture (1971).
65
18
There is no doubt that in the past there have been
different forms used in the poultry industry that arguably
were not agriculture. Certainly an independent feed dealer10
or an independent food processor11 were not in agriculture.
However, where the company is hatching, breeding, par
ticipating actively in the growing and then processing its
own product, it should be considered a farmer, NLRB v.
Strain Poultry Farms, Inc., 405 F.2d 1025, 1032-35 (5th Cir.
1969); Etchechoury v. Avi-Simplot, Inc.. 43 Idaho 438,
462 P.2d 737, 741.
There is nothing in the history of the NLRA,12 nor the
history of the passage of the 1946 rider13 that would deny
this exemption. When this Court regarded the fact that
Waialua was using a railroad to transport its sugar cane
from the field to the mill, it said, “ There is no reason to
construe the FLSA so as to discourage modernization . . ,”14
The poultry industry has merely borrowed the vertically
integrated structure from industry, or to put it another
way, has reverted back to the small, self-contained family
farm it was in the 1920’s on a much larger scale. The Broiler
Industry, supra.15
Nor is there any compelling social reason for placing
the vertically integrated poultry company in the commerce
column. Through Section 13(a)(6), the agricultural exemp
tion has been narrowed and most recently in 13(g) the
10 Johnston v. Cotton Producers Association, 244 F.2d 553 (5th
Cir. 1957).
11 George I. Petit, Inc., 89 NLRB 710 (1950).
12 Legislative History of NLRA, p. 3202 and 54 Cal. L. Rev. 1939,
1955, fn. 72.
13 NLRB v. Kelly Brothers Nurseries, Inc., 341 F.2d 433, 435,
fn. 2.
14 Maneja v. Waialua, 349 U.S. 254, 261.
15 The agricultural exemption of the N.L.R.A. is not measured
by the magnitude of the farmer’s planting nor the prolifigacy of
his harvest. Local Union No. 300 v. McCulloch, 428 F.2d 396, 399
(5th Cir. 1970).
66
19
exemptions have been restricted even more, excluding any
employee who works for a controlled establishment with
a gross volume of sales exceeding $10,000,000. Congress,
by modifying 3(f) in the same manner, could include most
vertical integrators in the NLEA. It, however, has not
shown the inclination to do so. NLRB v. Victor Ryckebosch,
Inc., 471 F.2d 20, 21 (9th Cir. 1972). Indeed there is a
good argument that like the construction industry, because
of the complex character of the problem, special treatment
is indicated. 25 Labor Law Journal 241.
To hold this company nonagricultural, is not merely what
the minority in Colchester Egg Farms, Inc., 214 NLRB
No. 64 (1974) says is to compartmentalize what is essen
tially a total farming activity, but is, in effect, to “ process”
Bayside as Bayside processes its broilers — chopping off
its head by disregarding the importance of its management
to the whole organization and then dismembering it into
parts.
What is needed is an approach viewing the vertical inte
grator as engaged in primary agriculture and then an
inquiry as to whether a specific employee’s work is “ inci
dental to or in conjunction with” that agriculture.
III. T he F eed D bivebs as B ein g I ncidental to and in
C o n ju n c t io n W it h F a em in g .
The employer has centered its feed move operation in
the middle of its contract farms. With four trucks and six
drivers. Bayside delivered feed to the farms itself even
when it did not have a feed mill (R. 89, 222). The drivers
only deliver Bayside feed. There is a separate office at the
mill for the dispatcher where the drivers report because it is
the most central point (A. 17). NLRB v. Olaa Sugar Com
pany, 242 F.2d 714,718 (9th Cir. 1957). The testimony is that
the purpose in having your own feed move operation rather
67
20
than subcontracting is to maintain control over contami
nation (A. 42). This is so because the duties of the drivers
are not just positive ones such as loading, transporting,
and unloading, but are also negative ones, such as prevent
ing the transmission of disease, the contamination of the
feed, and scaring of the flocks (A. 42).
In Farmers Reservoir, this court said that the delivery
of water was a practice performed as an incident to or in
conjunction with farming, 337 U.S. 755, 766. So, too, is
the delivery of feed to poultry.16 The evidence is that
each farm must receive a delivery at least once a week
(A. 20). See Wirts v. Oscealo Farms Co., 372 F.2d 584
(5th Cir. 1967).
Other courts have held that the feed drivers as well as
even the feed mill employees themselves are engaged in
raising poultry, Abbott Farms, Inc. v. NLRB, 487 F.2d 904
(5th Cir. 1973), McElrath Poultry Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 494
F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1974). They are like the field men in
Fors Farms, Inc. v. Washington State Employment Secur
ity Dept., 450 P.2d 973, 976 and the servicemen, pick up
crews, and grain crews (feed truck drivers) in Maplewood
Poultry Co. v. Maine Employment Security Commission,
151 Me. 467, 121 A.2d 360 (1956). Basically, each class of
employee is offering a service to the grower concerned with
the raising of poultry. See also Birmingham v. Rucker’s
Breeding Farm, 152 F.2d 837, 840 (8th Cir. 1945). The
feed driver is intimately involved in the growth and pro
tection of the birds whose feed and medicine he delivers.
16 The Court of Appeals adheres to its disjunctive approach to
Bayside, “ . . . the Bayside feed delivery system is part of a separate
organization, supportive of agricultural activity, but not directly
engaged in farming.” 527 F.2d 436, 438. This ignores the testi
mony of the dispatcher concerning the integration of the feed
delivery with the hatchery, the broiler department manager, and
the farmers (A. 45, 46). Even the birds themselves have more
control over feed delivery than the dispatcher (A. 14, 21).
68
21
Conclusion
The judgment of the Court of Appeals should be reversed
and the case remanded with instructions to enter a decree
denying enforcement of the Board’s order and dismissing
the case for want of jurisdiction.
Respectfully submitted,
A lan J. L even son , Esq.
Attorney for Petitioners
Bayside Enterprises, Inc.,
Penobscot Poultry Company, and
Poultry Processing, Inc.
July 15, 1976
69
N o. 75-1267
g# to J&tgrme djuitrt »f to ®tM $iate
October Term, 1976
B ayside E nterprises, I nc., et al., petitioners
v.
N ational L abor R elations B oard
ON W R IT O F C E R T IO R A R I TO T E E U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F
A P P E A L S F O R T E E F I R S T C IR C U IT
BRIEF FOR THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ROBERT H, BORK,
S o lic i to r G en era l,
D e p a r tm e n t o f Ju s t i c e ,
W ash in g ton , D.G. 20530.
JOHN S. IRVING,
G en er a l C ounsel,
JOHN E. HIGGINS, Jr.,
D ep u ty G en er a l C ou n sel,
CARL L. TAYLOR,
A s s o c ia t e G en era l C ou n sel,
NORTON J. COME,
D ep u ty A ss o c ia te G en era l C ou nsel,
ELINOR HADLEY STILLMAN,
A tto rn ey ,
N a t io n a l L a b o r R e la t io n s B o a rd ,
W ash in g ton , D .C. 20570.
71
I N D E X
Page
Opinions below------------------------------------------------------- 1
J urisdiction----------------------------------------------------------- 1
Statutes involved--------------------------------- ------------------- 2
Question presented--------------------------------------------------- 3
Statement ------------------------------------------------------------- 3
A. The Board’s findings of fact--------------------------- 3
B. The Board’s decision-------------------------------------- 9
C. The decision of the court of appeals------------------- 10
Summary of argument--------------------------------------------- 10
Argument:
Truck drivers who transport feed from their em
ployer’s mill to independent farms which under con
tract with the employer raise poultry hatched in his
hatchery facilities are employees, rather than agri
cultural laborers, and thus are covered under the
National Labor Relations Act--------------------------- 14
A, Introduction------------------------------------ :----------- 14
B. The drivers’ duties do not constitute practices per
formed by a farmer as an incident to or in con
junction with his farming operations--------------- 16
1. The independent growers, not the Company,
raise the poultry on the contract farms------ 17
a. The division of risk between the grower
and the Company indicates that the
grower, not the Company, is the fanning
u n i t______________________________ 20
b. The other factors in the relationship be
tween the growers and the Company
indicate the growers are independent
farm ers----------------------------------------- 25
2. The Company’s feed delivery operation is
not a subordinate part of its farming opera
tions ______________________________ _— 30
(i)
73
I I
Argument—Continued Page
C. The drivers do not perform work on a farm as an
incident to or in conjunction with farming oper
ations within the meaning of the FLSA agri
cultural exemption-------------------------------------- 35
1. The delivery of supplies is not work “on a
farm” within the agricultural exemption— 36
2. The driver’s work is not substantially per
formed “on a farm”____________________ 42
Conclusion________________________________________ 44
C IT A T IO N S
Cases:
Abbott Farms, I no. v. National Labor Relations Board,
487 F. 2d 904________________________________ 20
Aquaculture Research Cory., 215 NLRB No. 1, 87
LRRM 1496_________________________________
Bowie v. Gonzales, 117 F. 2d 11___________________, 16
Boyls v. Wirtz, 352 F. 2d 63______________________ 38
Calaf v. Gonzalez, 127 F. 2d 934__________________ 34
Clinton Foods, Inc., 108 NLRB 8 5 ________________ 42, 43
Elm Spring Farm v. United States, 127 F. 2d 920-__ 21, 23
Etchechoury v. Avi-Simplot, Inc., 93 Idaho 438, 462
P. 2d 737____________________________________ 15
Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. McComb, 337
U.S. 755__________________________ 11,15,16, 36, 40, 41
Fors Farms, Inc. v. Washington State Employment
Security Dept., 75 Wash. 2d. 383,450 P. 2d 973_______ 19
Ileamsberger v. Gillespie, 435 F.2d 926_____________ 43
Hodgson v. Wittenburg, 464 F.2d 1219____________ 43
IloltvUle Alfalfa Mills v. Wyatt, 230 F.2d 398___ 33, 38-39
Johnston v. Cotton Producers Assn., 244 F.d 553_____ 40
Light's Tree Co., 194 NLRB 229_________________ 44
McComb v. Super-A Fertilizer Works, Inc., 165 F. 2d
824 _______ v_________________________________ 40
McElra-th Poultry Co., Inc., 206 NLRB 354 enforce
ment denied, 494 F.2d. 518______________________ 19, 20
Maneja v. Waialua Agricultural Co., Ltd., 349 U.S.
254 ------------------------------------------------- 12,17, 30, 32,33
Maplewood Poultry Co. v. Maine Employment Security
Common, 151 Me. 467,121 A. 2d 360_________________ 15
74
Ill
Cases—Continued ?a«c
Mitchell v. Budd, 350 U.S. 473___________________ 33
Mitchell v. Ilertzke, 234 F. 2d 183______________ 26
Mitchell v. Hunt, 263 F. 2d 913__________________ 16,43
Mitchell v. Huntsville Wholesale Nurseries, Inc., 267
F. 2d 286__________________________________21,25, 26
National Labor Relations Board v. Deaton, Inc., 502
F. 2d 1221, certiorari denied, 422 U.S. 1047_______ 27
National Labor Relations Board v. Kelly Brothers
Nurseries, Inc., 341, F. 2d 433__________________ 14, 43
National Labor Relations Board v. Olaa Sugar Go.,
242 F. 2d 714 on remanded, 118 NLRB 1442___ 16, 35, 42, 43
National Labor Relations Board v. Ryckebosch, Inc.,
471 F. 2d. 20_________________________________ 19, 20>
National Labor Relations Board v. Strain Poultry
Farms, Inc., 405 F. 2d 1025__________________ 19, 20, 21
National Labor Relations Board v. United Insurance
Co., 390 U.S., 254______________________________ 2T
Parks v. Federal Crop Insurance Corp., 146 F. 2d 833— 21, 26
Rutherford Food Cmy, v. McConib, 331 U.S. 722___ 27,28
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134_____________ 19
Tipton y . Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 398 F.Supp.
743 _______ _____________________________ ____ 39
Tobin v. Blue Channel Corp., 198 F. 2d 245________43
United States v. American Trucking Assn., 310 U.S.
534 _________________________________________ 18
Victor Ryckebosch, Inc., 189 NLRB 40_____________ 20
Vines v. Serralles, 145 F. 2d 552__________________ 34
Wabash Radio Corp. v. Walling, 162 F. 2d 391_____ 43
Waldo Rohnert Co. v. National Labor Relations Board,
322 F. 2d 46______________________________ 16, 20, 26
Wirtz v. Jackson & Perkins Co., 312 F. 2d 48_______ 21
Wirtz v. Lyon Flying Service, 16 W II Cases 414_____ 42
Wirtz v. Osceola Farms Co., 372 F. 2d 584_________ 39
Wirtz v. Ti Ti Peat Humus Co., 373 F. 2d 209, certiorari
denied, 389 U.S. 834----------------------------------------- 4 0 .
Wirtz v. Tyson’s Poultry, Inc., 355 F. 2d 255_____ 19, 20, 21
Wirtz x. Von'Carstedt, 362 F. 2d.-67________________ 43,
75
IV
Statutes and regulations: Page
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Section 3 (f), 52
Stat. 1060, as amended, 29 U.S.C. 203(f)-----------passim
Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Section
203(a), 80 Stat, 833, 29 U.S.C. 213(a)___________26,28
National Labor Relations Act, as amended (61 Stat,
136,73 Stat. 519,29 U.S.C. 151 et seq.) :
Section 2(3)------------------------------------------------ 2,14
Section 8 (a )(1 )------------------------------------------ 10
Section 8(a)(5)------------------------------------------ 10
Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, 53 Stat, 1360,
1377 ____________________________1___________ 14
90 Stat, 23_________________________________ 2
42 U.S.C. 410(f)____________________________ 14
29 C.F.R,:
Section 780.11______________________________ 43
Section 780.126--------------------------------------------- 12,18
Section 780.134_____________________________ 42
Section 780.136______________________________ 37
Section 780.137______________________________ 16
Miscellaneous:
81 Cong. Rec. 7653, 7659 (1937)__________________ 37
81 Cong. Rec. 7888 (1937)______________________ 36,37
92 Cong. Rec. 6689-6692 (1946)__________________ 14
92 Cong. Rec. 9514 (1946)________________________ 14
112 Cong. Rec. 20819-20820 (1966)________________ 27
26 Fed. Reg. 10386______________________________ 17
S. Rep. No. 1487, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966)________ 27
B. W. Marion and H. B. Arthur, Dynamic Factors in
Vertical Commodity Systems: A Case Study of the
Broiler System (Ohio Agricultural Research and
Development Center, 1973)____________________ 23
F. D. Reed, The Maine Poultry Industry: Its Impact,
Growth and G ompetitive Position (Univ. of Maine,
Cooperative Extension Service, Circular 394, Rev.
July 1970)-------------------------------------------------- 33
U.S.D.A., Packers and Stockyards Administration,
The Broiler Industry: An Economic Study of Struc
ture, Practices and Problems (1967)_____________ 22
76
Hit flit djjrart 4 i t In M States
October Term, 1976
No. 75-1267
B ayside E nterprises, I nc,, et al., petitioners
v.
N ational L abor R elations B oard
ON W R IT O F C E R T IO R A R I TO T H E U N IT E D S T A T E S
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S F O R T H E F I R S T C IR C U IT
BRIEF FOR THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App.
A1-A5) is reported at 527 P. 2d 436.1 The Board’s
decision and order (Pet. App. A7-A22) are reported
at 216 NLRB 502.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered
on December 10, 1975 (Pet. App. A6). The petition
for a writ of certiorari was filed on March 8, 1976,
and granted on May 19, 1976. The jurisdiction of this
Court rests on 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).
1 “Pet. App.” refers to the appendix to the petition and “A.”
to the separate appendix printed pursuant to Rule 36. “Tr." refers
to the original transcript of the Board hearing.
(1)
77
2
STATUTES IITVOLVED
1. Section 2(3) of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended (61 Stat. 136, 73 Stat. 519, 29 U.S.C.
151, et seq.), provides in pertinent part that “ The
term ‘ employee’ * * * shall not include any indi
vidual employed as an agricultural laborer * * *.”
2. Since 1946, the appropriation acts for the
National Labor Relations Board have regularly car
ried a rider linking the definition of the term
“ agricultural employee” to the definition of “agri
culture” in Section 3(f) of the Fair Labor Standards
Act, 52 Stat. 1060, as amended, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 203(f).
The latest such rider (90 Stat. 23) provides in rele
vant part as follows:
P rovided , That no part of this appropriation
shall be available to organize or assist in orga
nizing agricultural laborers or used in connec
tion with investigations, hearings, directives, or
orders concerning bargaining units composed
of agricultural laborers as referred to in sec
tion 2(3) of the Act of July 5, 1935 (29 IT.S.C.
152), and as amended by the Labor-Manage
ment Relations Act, 1947, as amended, and
as defined in section 3(f) of the Act of June
25, 1938 (29 U.S.C. 203) * * *.
3. Section 3(f) of the Act of June 25, 1938 (29
U.S.C. 203; the Fair Labor Standards Act) provides
in pertinent part, as follows:
“Agriculture” includes farming in all its
branches and among other things includes the
cultivation and tillage of the soil, dairying, the
production, cultivation, growing, and harvest-
78
3
ing of any agricultural or horticultural com
modities * * * the raising of livestock, bees,
fur-bearing animals, or poultry, and any prac
tices * * * performed by a farmer or on a
farm as an incident to or in conjunction with
such farming operations, including preparation
for market, delivery to storage or to market or
to carriers for transportation to market.
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether truck drivers, who transport feed from
their employer’s mill to independent farms that are
under contract with the employer to raise poultry
hatched in his hatchery facilities, are employees,
rather than agricultural laborers, and thus covered
under the National Labor Relations Act.
STATEMENT
A. THE BOARD’S FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Petitioner Bayside Enterprises, Inc. operates
chicken hatcheries and breeding farms near Belfast,
Maine, the site of its corporate offices (Pet. App.
A-10 to A—11; A. 8-10, 18). As detailed below, Bay-
side has contracts with 119 independent farmers
(hereinafter “the growers”) in the area around Bel
fast for the care and breeding of the chickens from
the age of one day until they are ready for processing
for market. Petitioner Poultry Processing, Inc., a
wholly-owned subsidiary of Bayside, operates a mill
at Thorndike, Maine, which supplies feed to the
growers as well as to another poultry firm ( in fra ,
79
4
pp. 6-7).2 The truck drivers whose status is at issue
here haul feed from the mill to the growers. Poultry
Processing also owns a processing plant at Belfast,
which handles the poultry raised by the growers
(Pet. App. A - l l to A-13; A. 8-9).
Employees on the processing plant payroll trans
port live poultry from the farms to the plant, slaugh
ter and dress the poultry, and ship it out to buyers
(Pet. App. A-12; A. 8-9).3 These employees, including
the crews who collect the grown birds from the grow
ers and transport them to the processing plant, are
members of a bargaining unit jointly represented by
the Amalgamated Meat Cutters Local 385 and the
Truck Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers Union,
Local 340.4 The latter organization (the Union) also
represents the feed truck drivers (Pet. App. A-10 to
A -ll; A. 17, 51).
2 The court of appeals affirmed the Board's finding that Bayside
and Poultry Processing constitute a single employer, and peti
tioners are not challenging that finding in this Court (Br. f> n. 2;
cf. 15 n. 9). The term “Company,” as used herein, refers to both
Bayside and Poultry Processing.
Petitioner Penobscot Poultry Company is a defunct subsidiary
of Bayside, providing a trade name for products sold by Poultry
Processing (Pet. App. A-12; A. 39).
3 The plant employees, together with those on the Poultry Proc
essing payroll who work at the feed mill, total over 400 (A. 17).
The feed track drivers are carried on Bayside’s payroll (Pet. Br.
5).
4 In the printing of the appendix, the agreement of petitioners’
counsel to a stipulation on this matter was inadvertently omitted.
The omitted sentence, which would appear as the last line on A. 51,
is “MB. LEVENSON: Yes.”
80
The 119 independent growers who contract with
Bayside take chickens from its hatchery and raise
them for a specified time, at the end of which they
are marketable as broilers, capons, or roasters (Pet.
App. A - ll , A-23 to A-29, A. 8-11).5 Bayside retains
title to the poultry throughout this operation; title
passes to its processing subsidiary when the chickens
are cooped for delivery to the processing plant (Pet.
App. A-27 A. 9-10). The grower furnishes housing
for the flock, water, storage areas for supplies, and
the equipment and labor required to raise the chickens
to maturity (Pet. App. A -ll , A-26).
In addition to supplying the chicks, Bayside pro
vides poultry feed, fuel, and medications, and it makes
available the services of four of its employees who
periodically check on the health of the flocks and vac
cinate the poultry against diseases when this appears
necessary (Pet. App. A - l l ; A. 13, 19-20). These em
ployees are under the supervision of Bayside’s broiler
department manager, who also determines the compo
sition of the feed supplied to the growers (Pet. App.
A-13, A-14; A. 13-14, 40).
Although the contracts between Bayside and the
growers guarantee the growers fixed payments per
square foot of space occupied by the flocks at given
intervals, a grower’s total compensation includes a
“ bonus” determined by the weight of the poultry he
5 The contract expressly provides “[t]hat the Grower, his agents
and employees shall not be considered to be employees of Bayside
for any purpose whatsoever” (Pet. App. A-28).
81
6
raises to maturity and his production costs in rela
tion to the corresponding figures for the other growers
(Pet. App. A-15, A-24 to A-25 to A-28; A. 30, 34).
Payments are normally calculated separately for each
successive flock placed on a farm, although the terms
of each contract remain in effect “for successive flocks
as may be placed by mutual agreement” (Pet. App.
A-23 to A -27; A. 30).
In addition to contracting with the growers for
the raising of poultry, Bayside owns and operates,
using its own employees, six breeder farms on which
new poultry strains are bred and two hatcheries—
the “commercial” hatchery from which chicks are
supplied to the growers and a “pedigree” hatchery
connected with the breeder farms (Pet. App. A - l l ;
A. 8-11).6 The feed for flocks on Bayside’s own
breeder farms and on a few of the contract farms
which raise capons and roasters rather than broilers
is supplied by the feed mill of Knox-Lincoln Parm
er Co-op (KLF) (Pet, App. A-12, n, 2; A. 24-25,
34, 69). The deliveries of feed from this source are
generally made by drivers employed by KLF (Pet.
App. A-15 to A—16; A. 25, 49).
Most of the growers, however, are supplied with
feed from the Company’s mill at Thorndike. At the
time of the Board hearing, approximately two-thirds
of the mill’s output went to the contract growers,
6 Ihe Bayside employees who work on the breeder farms and in
the hatcheries are among the approximately 80 persons petitioners
identify as employees of Bayside (A. 17, 60-62).
82
7
and the remaining one-third was sold to the Fort
Halifax Packing Co., an unrelated poultry company
which, like Bayside, contracts with independent
growers for the raising of poultry to be processed in
its processing plant, but which does not have its own
feed mill (Pet. App. A-12; A. 5-7, 25-26).7
The feed supplied to the contract growers by the
Company’s mill is delivered to the farms by truck
drivers working in two shifts; at the time of the
Board hearing there were six such drivers (Pet. App.
A-13; A. 44-45). Feeding schedules for the various
flocks are made up by the Company’s broiler depart
ment manager and copies are sent to the dispatcher
at the mill, who is responsible for preparing delivery
schedules for the farms (Pet. App. A-15; A. 45-46,
59). The dispatcher supervises the feed drivers, and
reports to the assistant feed mill manager (Pet.
App. A-13; A. 47-48).
The drivers begin their regular duties by loading
their trucks with feed at the mill and then weighing
the loaded trucks; the drivers are given slips telling
them how much of a particular type of feed to deliver
to the farm or farms they are scheduled to visit that
day (Pet. App. A-14; A. 22, 46, 48, 53). The drivers
then drive to the contract farms, where they dis-
7 Feed deliveries to farms under contract with Fort Halifax are
made by an independent hauler, who is paid by Fort Halifax for
this service (Pet. App. A-12; A. 6-7). On some occasions, in the
event of equipment failure, Bayside has that hauler deliver feed
from its mill to some of its contract growers (Pet. App. A-16;
A. 35).
83
8
charge the feed into bins.8 I f a grower is not present
to indicate which bins he wants filled, he may leave
a note for the driver (Pet. App. A-14; A. 22, 54).
The drivers’ responsibilities include putting the pro
per amounts of feed into the bins, keeping raim out
of the bins when unloading in bad weather, spraying
their boots and trucks with disinfectant to avoid
spreading poultry diseases, and driving their trucks
carefully to avoid disturbing the chickens with loud
noises and bright reflections from headlights (Pet.
App. A-14 to A-15). The drivers wash their trucks
after they return to the mill (Pet. App. A-15).
The drivers have no direct contact with the poultry
(Pet. App. A-15; A. 32). Less than half their time is
spent at the farms, since a small portion is spent at
the mill and the remainder is equally divided between
driving on the road and unloading at the farms (Pet.
App. A-15; A. 43-44). The contract farms are approx
imately 12 to 15 miles from the mill, and the drivers
deliver to three or four of these farms on each work
day (Pet. App. A-15; A. 17, 21). The drivers spend
between half an hour and an hour on each farm, and
they drive approximately 120 miles each day (A. 54,
58).
In addition to making deliveries to the contract
farms, the drivers have also on occasion delivered
feed from the KLF feed mill to the six breeder farms
owned by Bayside, and have transported feed ingredi
ents from Rockland, Maine, and Gloucester, Massa-
8 The discharge is accomplished by power equipment, and takes
two and one half to three minutes per ton (A. 16-17).
84
9
ehusetts, to. the Company’s feed mill (Pet. App. A.15
to A-16; A. 25, 32-33, 54-56).
2. In October 1973, the Union requested recogni
tion as the representative of the drivers. Bernard
Lewis, the president of Bayside and Poultry Process
ing, recognized the Union on behalf of Bayside and
began contract negotiations. However, after several
negotiating sessions, the Company broke off bargain
ing. Lewis informed a Union representative that the
Company believed it was not obligated to bargain fur
ther because the drivers were agricultural employees
and hence were not covered by the National Labor
Relations Act (Pet. App. A-10 to A - l l) .
B. THE BOARD’S DECISION
The Board, adopting the decision of its Adminis
trative Law Judge, found that Bayside and Poultry
Processing were a single employer for purposes of
the Act, and that, taken together, they “ constitute a
multifaceted organization whose enterprises and pur
poses go far beyond the bounds of traditional farm
ing” (Pet. App. A-18). The Board further found
that the operation of the Company’s feed mill was not
farming within the meaning of the definition in Sec
tion 3(f) of the FLSA, and that the work of the feed
truck drivers was incident to the operation of that
mill (Pet. App. A-18 to A-19).
The Board found that the feed truck drivers are
not “agricultural laborers,” that they constitute an
appropriate unit for purposes of collective bargain-
85
10
ing, and that the Company violated Section 8(a) (5)
and (1) of the Act by refusing to bargain with the
Union which was the representative of the drivers.
I t issued an appropriate remedial order. (Pet. App.
A-7 to A-8, A-20 to A-22.)
C. THE DECISION OE THE COURT OP APPEALS
The court of appeals enforced the Board’s order. It
found that “ the bulk of the capital and personnel of
the Company is devoted to the feed mill and process
ing plant operations, which are coneededly not farm
ing” (Pet. App. A-4). Although the Company “does
operate chick hatcheries and breeding farms which
do constitute farming,” in respect to “the raising of
chickens to maturity, the actual farming activity is
done by the contract farmers” (ib id .). The feed truck
drivers are not agricultural laborers, the court held,
because they are not employed in work incidental to
the Company’s own farming operations, but rather
perform duties which are part of a “ feed delivery
system” which functions as “a separate organization”
(Pet. App. A-4 to A-5).
SUMMARY O F ARGUMENT
I
The National Labor Relations Act does not apply to
“ any individual employed as an agricultural laborer,”
as defined in Section 3(f) of the Pair Labor Stand
ards Act, which defines “ agriculture” to include
“farming in all its branches and any practices * * *
performed by a farmer or on a farm as an incident
86
11
to, or in conjunction with, such farming operations,
including preparation for market.” The work per
formed by the feed truck drivers whose status is at
issue here does not come within either the “primary”
branch of this exemption, covering actual farming
operations, such as the cultivation of crops or the
raising of poultry, or the “secondary” branch, com
prising “ any practices” performed either “by a
farmer or on a farm, incidently to or in conjunction
with ‘such’ farming operations.” See F arm ers R eser
vo ir & Irrig a tio n Co. v. M cComb, 337 U.S. 755, 762-
763.
II
1. It is well settled that, in order to constitute “prac
tices * * * performed by a farmer * * * as an inci
dent to, or in conjunction with such farming opera
tions,” the work in question must relate to the
farming operations of the employer claiming the ex
emption, as distinguished from the farming opera
tions of other farmers. The Company’s farming oper
ations are limited to its hatcheries and breeder farms
and do not include the operations on the 119 contract
farms where the independent growers raise the Com
pany’s poultry.
The Company’s contrary contention relies on deci
sions by the Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits hold
ing that, in similar contract farming relationships,
the farming operations of the growers are the opera
tions of the contracting company which owns the
poultry. But these decisions are inconsistent with
87
12
an interpretive ruling by the Department of Labor
(29 C.F.R. 780.126) and with court decisions dealing
with contract farming arrangements for the produc
tion of other agricultural and horticultural commod
ities. Furthermore, the cases on which the Company
relies oversimplify or misconceive important elements
of the contract farming relationship, such as the divi
sion of risk of loss and the existence of supervisory
services. In the present case, the relationship between
the Company and its growers indicates that the
growers are independent contractors rather than
agents or employees of the Company and that the
Company is not the “farmer” raising the poultry.
This conclusion is also consistent with the legislative
history of a 1966 amendment of the FLSA relating to
the agricultural exemption, which indicates that Con
gress considers the growers, and not the integrated
poultry producers with which they contract, to be the
farm unit.
2. Since the Company’s farming is limited to its
hatcheries and breeder farms, the feed delivery op
eration is not “part of the [Company’s] agricultural
venture” (see M aneja v. W aia lua A gricu ltu ra l Co.,
L td ., 349 U.S. 254, 264-265), and the drivers are not
performing practices incident to the Company’s farm
ing operations. Less than twenty percent of the Com
pany’s workforce is involved in its actual farming-
operations : the Company’s business, in the aggregate,
is not farming. The record shows that the drivers
in question have relatively little contact with the
88
13
small farming segment of the enterprise, and that
they are supervised by individuals at the Company’s
feed mill, which supplies feed to farms other than
those which the Company owns and operates.
I l l
The drivers are not within the other half of the
secondary branch of the agricultural exemption, since
they do not perform work “on a farm as an incident
to, or in conjunction with such farming operations”.
The legislative history of that portion of the defini
tion of agriculture in Section 3 (f) of the Fair Labor
Standards Act reveals that Congress wished to ex
empt work, such as the threshing of wheat, which is
performed substantially, if not entirely, on a farm
by an employee of a company performing a special
ized agricultural function and which is carried out
as part of actual farming operations, even though not
performed by the farmer or his employees. The de
livery of supplies such as poultry feed to a farmer is
essentially the final phase of a separately organized
manufacturing operation.
Moreover, the most significant portion of the driv
ers’ work takes place off the farm, and thus is not
done “on a farm”. Since the National Labor Relations
Act covers workers whose work is substantially non-
agricultural, even though they perform some agri
cultural work, the drivers’ on-farm work is not in
any event sufficient to bring them within the agricul
tural exemption.
89
14
ARGUMENT
TRUCK DRIVERS WHO TRANSPORT FEED FROM THEIR EM
PLOYER^ MTTL TO INDEPENDENT FARMS W HICH UNDER
CONTRACT WITH THE EMPLOYER RAISE POULTRY
HATCHED IN HIS HATCHERY FACILITIES ARE EMPLOYEES,
RATHER THAN AGRICULTURAL LABORERS, AND THUS ARE
COVERED UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
A . IN T R O D U C T IO N
Section 2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act
provides that the term “employee” shall exclude “any
individual employed as an agricultural laborer.” Since
1946, the appropriation acts for the Board have car
ried a rider which provides that the term “agricul
tural laborer” shall be defined in accordance with
Section 3(f) of the Fair Labor Standards Act,
(“FLSA”).9 Section .3(f) of the. FLSA defines the
term agriculture in pertinent part as follows:
9 As one court has observed, “The 1946 rider was the product of
heated debate and of sharp conflict between the two-houses, which
unfortunately sheds relatively little light on its interpretation.”
National Labor Relations Board v. Killy Brothers Nurseries, Inc.,
341 F. 2d 433, 435 n. 2 (C.A. 2). However, it is noteworthy that
the version offered by Congressman Elliott, which the House first
adopted, would have defined, “agricultural labor” as it was defined
in the Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, 53 Slat. 1377.
92 Cong. Rec. 668-9-6692 (1946). (A modified version of that pro-
vision is now codified in 42 U.S.C. 410(f).) As Senator Me-
Carran later reported, however, the House and the Senate “were
in complete disagreement * * * on what is known as the Elliott
rider,” and the conference committee finally agreed to substitute a
provision referring to the definition of agriculture in Section 3(f)
of the FLSA. 92 Cong. Rec. 9514 (1946). Senator Ball, a member
of the conference committee, characterized the definition of “agri
cultural laborer” in the Social Security Act as “very broad” and
90
15
“Agriculture” includes farming in all its
branches and among other things includes the
cultivation and tillage of the soil * * the
raising of livestock, bees, fur-bearing animals
or poultry, and any practices * * * performed
by a farmer or on a farm as an incident to or
in conjunction with such farming operations,
including preparation for market, delivery to
storage or to market or to carriers for trans
portation to market.
As this Court noted in Farm ers R eservo ir & Irriga tion
Co. v. M eComb, 337 U.S. 755, 762-763, this definition
has “two distinct branches.” The “ primary” branch—
“farming in all its branches”—includes actual farm
ing operations such as the raising of produce from
the soil or the raising of poultry; and the “secondary”
branch includes “any practices, whether or not them
selves farming practices, which are performed either
by a farmer or on a farm, incidently to or in con
junction with ‘such’ farming operations” (ib id .).
Petitioners properly concede (Br. 6) that the feed
truck drivers do not perform work that would bring
them within the “primary” branch of the agricultural
exemption, i.e., that delivering truckloads of poultiy
the FLSA section as “a much narrower definition” to which coun
sel for the National Labor Relations Board had no real objection
because only “a few minor changes in [the Board s] present pro
cedure and definition” would be called for. Ibid.
The language of the state statutes construed in two cases relied
upon by the Company (Br. 13) is virtually identical to language
of the “broad” definition incorporated in the Elliott rider which
the Senate rejected. See Etchechowy v. Avi-Simplot, Inc., 93
Idaho 438, 462 P. 2d 737, 739; Maplewood Poultry Co. v. Maine
Employment Security Common, 151 Me. 467, 121 A. 2d 360, o61-
363.
91
16
feed from a mill is not equivalent to raising poultry.
Accordingly, petitioners must satisfy the “secondary”
branch of the definition by showing that those drivers
perform work by a farmer or on a farm, and also
that the work is an incident to or in conjunction with
the farming operations involved. As we show below,
neither of these tests is met.
B. T H E DRIVERS’ D U T IE S DO N O T C O N S T IT U T E PRA CTICES PER FO R M E D B Y
A F A R M E R AS A N IN C ID E N T TO OR I N C O N JU N C T IO N W IT H H IS
F A R M IN G O PERA TIO N S
From the earliest days of the FL'SA the Wage and
Hour Division of the Department of Labor, which is
responsible for administering the statute, and the
courts have construed the phrase “practices * * * per
formed by a farmer * * * as an incident to, or in con
junction with, such farming operations” to refer to
practices related to the farming operations of the
farmer claiming the exemption, as distinct from the
farming operations of other farmers. W aldo R ohnert
Co. v. N ational Labor Relations B oard, 322 F. 2d 46,
48-49 (C.A. 9); M itchell v. H u n t, 263 F. 2d 913, 916-
917 (C.A. 5), quoting from Department of Labor In
terpretive Bulletin No. 14, para. 10(f) (August 1939),
1940 WHM 185; N ational Labor R ela tions B oard v.
Olaa S u gar Co., 242 F. 2d 714, 718 (C.A. 9) ; B ow ie v.
Gonzales, 117 F. 2d 11, 18 (C.A. 1), cited with ap
proval in F arm ers R eservo ir & Irr ig a tio n Co. v.
McCornb, supra, 337 TT.S. at 766-767 n. 15; Depart
ment of Labor Interpretive Bulletin, 29 C.F.R.
780.137.
Indeed, the Company (Br. 11-12) concedes this
point. Thus, the thrust of its argument (Br. 6, 7-10)
92
17
is that the raising of poultry on the contract farms is
part of its own operations and that the duties of the
truck drivers are performed as an incident to or in
conjunction with this poultry raising. Stated other
wise, it is the Company’s contention that the poultry
feed delivery operation is a subordinate part of the
Company’s agriculture venture—that venture being
defined to include the raising of poultry by the grow
ers on the contract farms.
We submit that the Board and the court of appeals
properly found, to the contrary, that the Company’s
farming operations were limited to its own breeder
farms and hatcheries, and that the duties of the truck
drivers were practices incident to the operation of the
Company’s feed mill rather than to its farming op
erations. Cf. M aneja v. W aialua A gricu ltu ra l Co.,
L td ., 349 U.S. 254, 263, 265.
1. The independent growers, not the Company, raise the poultry
on the contract farms
The Company contracts with growers to raise its
chickens in the growers’ facilities located on the grow
ers’ farms. This operation is connected at one end to
the Company’s hatcheries and feed mill and at the
other end to the Company’s processing plant where
the poultry is slaughtered and dressed for sale. In
1961, the Wage and Hour Division of the Depart
ment of Labor issued an interpretive bulletin con
cerning the status of such arrangements under Section
3(f) of the FLSA (26 Fed. Reg. 10386), and the
interpretation is still adhered to by that agency in
93
18
substantially the same form. The interpretation pres
ently states (29 C.F.R, 780.126) :
§ 780.126 Contract arrangements for raising poultry.
Feed dealers and processors sometimes enter
into contractual arrangements with farmers
under which the latter agree to raise to market
able size baby chicks supplied by the former
who also undertake to furnish all the required
feed and possibly additional items. Typically,
the feed dealer or processor retains title to the
chickens until they are sold. Under such an
arrangement, the activities of the farmers and
their employees in raising the poultry are
clearly within section 3(f). The activities of
the feed dealer or processor, on the other hand,
are not “raising of poultry” and employees en
gaged in them cannot be considered agricul
tural employees on that ground. Employees of
the feed dealer or processor who performs work
on a farm as an incident to or in conjunction
with the raising of poultry on the farm are em
ployed in “secondary” agriculture (see §§ 780.-
137 et seq., [explaining that work must be per
formed in connection with the farmer-employ
er’s own farming to qualify as “secondary”
agriculture by a farmer] and Johnston v. Cot
ton Producers A ssn., 244 F. 2d 53).10
An interpretation such as this—made by the agency
responsible for administering the statute in ques
tion—is “ entitled to great weight.” U nited S ta tes v.
A m erican T rucking A ssn., 310 U.S. 534, 549. As this
10 In Section C, infra, we show that the truck drivers are not
employed in “secondary” agriculture by virtue of the fact that
part of their work is performed on the growers’ farms.
94
19
Court has observed, interpretations of the FLSA by
the Department of Labor, “ while not controlling upon
the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute
a body of experience and informed judgment to which
courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.”
S kid m o re v. S w i f t <& Co., 323 TT.S. 134, 140. Both the
court of appeals ( Pet. App. A-4 n. 4), and the Board
thus properly relied on this interpretation.11
However, the administering agency’s conclusion that
contractors like the Company are not themselves en
gaged in the raising of poultry has been rejected by
the Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits in decisions
relied upon by the Company (Br. 8-10, 19). N ational
Labor Relations B oard v. R yckebosch, Inc., 471 F. 2d
20 (C.A. 9); N ational Labor R ela tions B oard v. S tra in
P o u ltry F arm s, Inc., 405 F. 2d 1025 (C.A. 5) ; W ir tz
v. T yson’s P o u ltry , Inc ., 355 F. 2d 255 (C.A. 8).12 As
11 The Board’s decision does not cite the interpretation, but it
relies on an earlier Board decision, McElrath Poultry Go., Inc.,
206 NLRB 354, enforcement denied, 494 F. 2d 518 (C.A. 5), in
which the interpretation is cited (206 NLRB at 355 n. 4).
12 Tyson's, the earliest of these decisions, is not flatly incon
sistent with the Labor Department’s interpretation, since the con
tracting arrangement there was somewhat different from the one
described in the interpretation: the contractor placed laying hens
with growers for the production of eggs, which were then handled,
cooled, graded, candled, and packed by the contractor’s employees
(who were found to be agricultural laborers). Moreover, as one
state court has pointed out, only 27 percent of the eggs handled by
the contractors’ employees were produced by the growers; the re
maining 73 percent came from the contractor’s own farms. Fors
Farms, Ino. v. Washington State Employment Security Dept., 75
Wash. 2d 383, 450 P. 2d 973, 977. However, Strain, supra, which
95
20
we show below, the Company’s contention, based on
these authorities, that it is engaged in the raising of
poultry by virtue of its arrangements with the con
tract growers is inconsistent with court decisions
dealing with contract farming arrangements for the
production of other agricultural and horticultural
commodities, and it misconceives the contract farming
relationship.
a. The division of risk between the grower and the Company
indicates that the grower, not the Company, is the farming unit
The Company (Br. 8-10), tracking the rationale of
T yson’s, supra, 355 F. 2d at 260, and S tra in , supra,
405 F. 2d at 1033, stresses that it retains title to the
chickens from the day they are hatched to the time
they are sold as processed broilers. The Company does
not—nor can it properly—-contend that continuing
ownership of the poultry itself suffices to make the
Company a farmer, for the courts have generally
rejected this proposition.13
involved a contractor-feed dealer like those described in the inter
pretation, relied and elaborated upon the Tyson’s rationale; and
Ryckebosch, supra, in which the poultry contractor owned not
only a feed mill, but also a processing plant and a few farms of
its own (see Victor Ryckebosch, Inc., 189 NLRB 40, 41-42), relied
on Strain without substantial discussion. The Fifth Circuit subse
quently relied on Strain in Abbott Farms, Inc. v. National Laboi■>
Relations Board, 487 F. 2d 904, and on Abbott Farms in McElrath
Poultry Go., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 494 F. 2d
518. Neither decision turns on the extent of integration of the
poultry contractor involved, although the court in Abbott noted
that the contractor there owned no processing plant.
13 Waldo Rohnert Go. v. National Labor Relations Board, supra,
322 F. 2d at 47 (seed mill company not a farmer by virtue of its
contracts with farmers to grow vegetable seed crops using com-
96
21
The Company instead asserts (Br. 9), again re
flecting the analysis in T yso n ’s, supra, 355 F. 2d at
259-61 and S tra in , supra, 405 F. 2d at 1031, 1033, that,
under its contracts with the growers, ownership of the
poultry carries with it the entire risk of loss in the
farming operations, whereas in the cases in which the
contracting company was held not to be a farmer,
“the farm product had to be marketable, saleable, or
acceptable to the company and thus the risk of loss
fell on the farmer.” In addition, the Company argues
(Br. 9-10), citing S tra in , that, in a contract rela
tionship like the one it maintains with its growers,
the contractor, and not the growers, “assumes the risk
of market fluctuations which affect the price of the
birds.” Both of these arguments represent a consid
erable over-simplification of the economic realities.
The grower bears a substantial share of the risk
of loss. He is able to enter into contracts with the
pany-supplied seed, even though the company retained legal title
to the growing crops and seed); Wirts v. Jackson & Perkhis Go.,
312 F. 2d 48 (C.A. 2) (contractor not a farmer although it pro
vided understock to growers raising plants for the contractor’s
nursery business); Mitchell v. Huntsville 'Wholesale Nurseries,
Inc., 267 F. 2d 286, 289 n. 2 (C.A. 5) (contractor not a farmer by
virtue of its agreements with growers which provided “crop to be
property of Huntsville at all times”). See also Parks v. Federal
Crop Insurance Corp., 416 F. 2d 833 (C.A. 7) (farmers wTho grew
corn from hybrid seed corn furnished by contractor that re
tained legal title to portion of crops were the actual producers of
all the corn under a provision of the Federal Crop Insurance Act,
7 U.S.C. 1508(c)); Elm Spring Farm v. United States, 127 F.
2d 920 (C.A. 1) (milk handling corporation that held title to
dairy cows tended by farmers not a milk producer within the
meaning of orders issued under the Agricultural Marketing
Agreement Act of 1937,50 Stat. 246).
97
22
Company only after making a sizeable investment in
land, poultry housing facilities, and related equip
ment.14 Moreover, in carrying out his obligations
under the contract, the grower incurs expenses not
reimbursed by the Company under the contract. Thus,
the grower pays the wages of any hired hands, the
interest on any mortgage payments on the farm, any
taxes other than local taxes on birds, and all main
tenance and repair costs of his facilities and equip
ment (Pet. App. A-28).
While a grower is guaranteed a certain minimum
payment based on square footage of his facilities
supplied for housing the flock, he has no assurance
that this fee will exceed his costs in any given con
tract period, much less that he will recover his origi
nal investment in land and farm facilities. More
over, if for any reason the grower loses his farm, he
is out of business, whereas the Company can simply
switch to another contract grower or contract with the
new owner of the farm for the raising of poultry. As
14 The growers’ combined investment probably exceeds that of
the Company. A 1967 report issued by the U.S. Department of
Agriculture stated that studies of broiler production in New Eng
land showed that for an annual output of 19.76 million birds, the
investment of the growers would be approximately 6.4 million
dollars, v'hile the investment of the integrator (i.e., the poultry
contractor) in its hatchery, feed mill and processing operation
would be about 2.3 million dollars. Because of “the large invest
ment required,” the report noted, “most integrators have not in
vested greatly in growout operations.” U.S.D.A., Packers and
Stockyards Administration, The Broiler Industry: An Economic
Study of Structure, Practices and Problems (1967), p. 13 and Ap
pendix 3. See also the description of grower investment in Ar
kansas, id. at 14, n. 13.
98
23
the First Circuit noted in E lm S p rin g F arm v.
U nited S ta te s , supra, 127 F. 2d at 927:
[The company] might have become a producer
by acquiring a farm and milk cows and going
into the business of operating a dairy farm
with the attendant risks of loss. “It chose to
employ the scheme in question here. It con
sidered it advantageous to avoid the risks of
production and now must bear the burdens of
a determination that other entities than itself
are the producers.” G ray v. Pow ell, 1941, 314
U.S. 402, 414, 62 S. Ct, 326, 86 L. Ed —.
The growers in the present case have significant
risks of loss related to market shifts and to factors
influencing the number and size of the chickens at
maturity. Since the contracts between growers and the
Company remain in effect only for such successive
flocks “as may be placed by mutual agreement” (Pet.
App. A-23), the Company is free to negotiate new
terms, including the amount of the fixed fee, before
placing a new flock. Thus, the rates negotiated will
normally reflect market shifts in poultry prices;
while the effects on the growers of market shifts may
be delayed, they are not eliminated. See B. W. Marion
and H. B. Arthur, D ynam ic Factors in V ertical Com
m odity System s: A Case S tu d y o f the B ro iler S ystem ,
(Ohio Agricultural Research and Development Center,
1973), p. 44.
Although there is no specific contract condition re
quiring that the full-grown chickens be acceptable to
the Company, that omission does not mean that the
Company bears the full risk of loss from factors af-
99
24
fecting the survival and weight of the chickens. A
grower’s compensation includes, in addition to the
square footage guarantee, a bonus payment based in
part on the weight of the poultry raised to maturity;
the compensation can be calculated only after a given
flock has been weighed and taken to the processing-
plant. Thus, the grower is necessarily affected by any
thing which reduces the weight or number of chickens
still alive at the end of the grow-out period.15
In short, although some risks have been shifted
from the grower to the Company under the contract
governing their relationship, the grower still is sub
ject to the turns of fortune which have always af
fected those who invest their capital in farmland
and their labor in farming. Accordingly, the grower,
and not the Company, remains the farmer for pur
poses of the agricultural exemption.
15 The contract does guarantee the grower a prorated payment
in the event of certain calamities (Pet. App. A-27):
“* * * the payment will be prorated on the basis of average
mortality within a settlement, original flock density, and actual
percentage salvaged when excessive bird losses resulted from:
“a) An act of God (including, but not limited to, fire,
winds, snow, or flooding).
“b) OR, over 4% in excess of the average die as a result of
lack of oxygen and/or heat exhaustion.”
While the grower thus receives at least some payment in these
circumstances, it is obviously less than he would receive had all
the chickens lived to maturity. In other words, the loss in such
circumstances is shared by grower and contractor. This provision
does not cover mortality resulting from poultry diseases; the Com
pany’s general manager explained (A. 30-31) that, although the
Company volunteered to absorb losses resulting from an epidemic
of laryngotraeheitis occuring shortly before the Board hearing,
it was not obligated to do so under the contract.
100
25
b. The other factors in the relationship between the growers and
the Company indicate the growers are independent farmers
Even if this Court were to conclude, contrary to the
foregoing, that the risk of loss in the poultry-raising
venture had been shifted to the Company, it would
not necessarily follow that the Company was raising
the poultry on the contract farms. Another important
factor to be considered is the nature of the relation
ship between the growers and the Company—whether
the growers are the agents or employees of the Com
pany rather than independent contractors. M itchell v.
H untsv ille W holesale N urseries, Inc ., supra, 267 P.
2d at 291.
The Company (Br. 10) does not appear to be claim
ing that the growers and their hired hands are its
employees;16 it contends only that “[w]hether you
define the relationship as an agency, subcontractor, or
in substance as a lease by the company of the farm,
equipment, and labor (A. 12), the elements of entre
preneurship have been shifted by contractual agree
ment from the farmer to the contractor company”.
Although the Company provides some supervision
of the growers,17 the record shows that it is not the
16 Indeed, the agreements explicitly state that they are not (Pet.
App. A-28).
17 The contract provides that the grower will “follow instruc
tions of the Bayside Supervisor in the care and management of
Broiler, Roaster or Capon flocks” and will permit the Company’s
personnel to enter “any facility pertinent to this contract at
reasonable times” (Pet..App. A-26 to A-27). The Company also
determines the composition of the feed supplied to the farms and
the. scheduling of deliveries and provides certain disease-preven
tion and other services.
1 0 1
26
kind of supervision generally associated with an em
ployer-employee relationship. Thus, the Company’s
general manager testified (A. 13) that the four field
supervisors, or poultry servicemen, “called periodi
cally on these farms on a routine basis or on a basis
as the grower feels that he has a problem and needs
their attention” (emphasis added). This suggests that
some of the growers may encourage regular visits
while others are content to call in the servicemen
only in emergencies, such as conditions indicating the
possible presence of disease. The existence of such
supervision and auxiliary services has generally been
held inadequate to show that the contractor is in
fact engaged in farming.”
The legislative history of Section 203(a)(6) of the
Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, 80 Stat.
833, 29 U.S.C. 213(a)(6) establishes that Congress,
viewed growers for integrated poultry producers such
as petitioners as independent contractors, and thus
that the growers, not the integrated producers, are the
18 Waldo Rohnert Go. v. National Labor Relations Board, supra,.
322 F. 2d at 4f (contractor “given right to and does supervise the
planting, inspects the growing crops * * * (removing undesirable
plants) and decides when to irrigate * * *, when to weed, spray
and finally when to harvest”) ; Mitchell v. Huntsville Wholesale
Nurseries, Inc., supra, 267 F. 2d at 289 n. 2 (the crops were “under
[the contractor’s] supervision as to the best methods of planting,
production, digging, grading, packing, and shipping”) ; Mitchell
v. Hertzke, 234 F. 2d 183, 190 (C.A. 10) (contractor determined
“time and conditions of the planting [of bean crops], the condi
tions under which the beans w'ere to be raised,” and the time for
harvesting). See also Parks v. Federal Crop Insurance Gorp.,.
supra, 416 F. 2d at 835 (contractor agreed to furnish to corn grow
ers “a man to supervise the planting of the seed”).
102
27
farmers for purposes of that Section. It strongly sug
gests the same conclusion under the related Section
3(f), 29 U.S.C. 203(f), involved here.
Section 203(a) exempts “any employee employed in
agriculture” from the minimum wage provisions of
the FLSA under certain conditions. In explaining the
effect of this exemption on farmers who contract with
integrated poultry producers, Senator Yarborough,
the floor manager of the bill, confirmed his question
er’s belief in the continued applicability of “the tra
ditional tests that have heretofore been applied under
the Act in determining whether an independent con
tractor or an employee relationship exists” between
the grower and the company, under which the
grower—and not the company—was the agricultural
employer affected by the exemption. Senator Yar
borough specifically identified the tests involved as
those contained in the committee report. (112 Cong.
Ree. 20819-20820 (1966).)
That report, S. Rep. No. 1487, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1966), relies on R u th er fo rd Food Corp. v. McCornb,
331 U.S. 722, noting that “the total situation controls”
in determining whether individuals are employees or
independent contractors (S. Rep. No. 1487, supra, at
11).19 The report (ib id .) lists the following factors,
19 This is consistent with the Board’s test for determining in
dependent contractor status. See National Labor Relations Board
v. United Insurance Co., 390 U.S. 254, 258; National Labor Rela
tions Board v. Deaton, Inc., 502 F. 2d 1221, 1223-1224 (C.A. 5),
certiorari denied, 422 U.S. 1047.
103
28
derived from R u th er fo rd (331 U.S. at 730), to be
considered:
(1) The extent to which the services rendered
are an integi*al part of the principal’s business;
(2) The permanency of the relationship;
(3) The opportunities for profit or loss;
(4) The initiative, judgment, or foresight ex
ercised by the one who performs the services;
(4) The amount of investments; and
(6) The degree of control which the principal
has in the situation.
The fact that the legislative history of Section 203(a)
identifies these factors as the “traditional tests” for
distinguishing between employees of farmers and in
dependent contractors is strong evidence that they
were also intended to apply in making the same dis
tinction under Section 3(f) of the same statute.
The first factor is, in a broad sense, a statement of
the ultimate issue; but in the context of R u th er fo rd ,
where the individuals found to be employees were meat
boners who “did a specialty job on the production
line” in the employer’s slaughtering plant (331 U.S.
at 730) it could be viewed as a factor weighing against
employee status for the growers and their helpers. Al
though the raising of the poultry is essential to the
Company’s business and the supplies and services fur
nished by the Company are necessary to the growers,
the growers’ work is scarcely an integral part of the
Company’s operation comparable to a single operation
on an assembly line.
With respect to “ the permanency of the relation
ship,” the contracts are in effect only for a particular
104
29
grow-out period of seven to nine weeks and may be
extended only “by mutual agreement.” As shown (pp.
21-24, supra ), the growers do have “opportunities for
profit or loss” ; and insofar as their total compensa
tion depends on their bonus payments, which are in
turn dependent on how many pounds of poultry they
have produed by the end of the grow-out period, it is
incumbent upon them to exercise “ initiative, judg
ment, or foresight.” Indeed, the Company’s General
Manager testified (A. 31) that the contract ŵ as de
signed so that “in a normal operating situation with
normal mortalities, [a grower’s] income would be in
fluenced by his capabilities.”
As already discussed, the growers have considerable
amounts invested in the poultry raising, since they
must furnish the farms, facilities, and labor.20 Finally,
although the contract enables the Company to exer
cise some supervision of operations, it is not the kind
of close daily supervision over details of work which
would be typical of an employer-employee relation
ship (see pp. 25-26 supra ), and there is no evidence to
suggest the Company has a voice in hiring or firing a
grower’s farmhands. Thus, the degree of control main
tained by the principal is not such as to deprive the
growers of independent contractor status.
In the light of all of the circumstances, the growers
are independent contractors, as the legislative history
referred to above indicates Congress understood to be
20 In contrast, in Rutherford, supra, 331 U.S. at 725, the meat
boner’s investment was limited to the cost of a hook on which to
hang the meat, a knife, a knife sharpener, and a leather apron.
105
30
the case for typical contract growers in the broiler
industry.
£. The Company's feed delivery operation is not a subordinate
part of its fanning operations
Although the Company is not engaged in the raising
of poultry on the contract farms, it does, as the Board
found, engage in some farming operations coming
within the primary branch of Section 3(f) of the
FLSA.21 However, under the tests of M aneja v. W ai-
alua A gricu ltura l Co., L td ., supra, 349 U.S. at 264-265,
the feed delivery operation is not “part of [the Com-
21 In discussing the Company’s character as a vertically inte
grated poultry enterprise (Br. 10-19), the Company misconceives
the Board's position and the reasoning of the court of appeals.
Although the Board (Pet. App. A-18) found that “Bayside and
Poultry Processing constitute a multifaceted organization whose
enterprises and jourposes go far beyond the bounds of traditional
farming,” it was not concerned, as the Company asserts (Br. 13),
with the Company’s “motivation,” nor was it seeking, as the Com
pany suggests (Br. 18-19), to place the entire organization “in
the commerce column” or hold it to be entirely “non-agricultural.”
Kather the Board found, and the court agreed, that the Company
consists of a number of different operations, some of which are
agricultural and some of which are not—in other words, the orga
nization as a whole was not placed in any “column” (Pet. App.
A-4, A-18). The Board further found, and the court agreed, that
the feed mill and feed delivery operations were not among the
Company’s farming operations and that they were not incident
to any of the operations which were. In reaching that conclusion,
it was appropriate, contrary to the Company’s assertion (Br. 19),
to look at each of the Company’s components in order to determine
the size of the nonfarming operations relative to that of the farm
ing operations and to determine the relationship between the work
of the employees in question and the farming operations. Maneja
v. Waialua Agricultural Co., supra, 349 U.S. at 264-265.
106
31
pany’s] agricultural venture” and the Board prop
erly found that feed truck drivers do not perform
duties incident to that venture.
In W aialua, this Court held that, in determining
whether a particular operation is incident to or in
conjunction with farming, it is necessary to consider
all of the facts, including the seven criteria develop
ed by the Wage-Hour Administrator (349 IT.S. at
264-265):
(a) The size of the ordinary farming opera-
tions. * * *
(b) The type of product resulting from the
operation in question. * * *
(c) The investment in the processing opera
tion as opposed to the ordinary farming activi
ties. * * *
(d) The time spent in processing and in
ordinary farming. * * *
(e) The extent to which ordinary farmwork
ers do processing. * * *
(f) The degree of separation by the em
ployer between the various operations. * * *
(g) The degree of industrialization.
These criteria indicate that the operation of the
feed mill is not incidental to the Company’s farming
operations, and that the feed delivery is incidental
to the feed mill, and not the farming operations.
The ordinary farming operations of the Company
are only a small part of its total enterprise. The Com
pany owns and operates approximately six breeder
farms and two hatcheries, a commercial hatchery and
107
32
a pedigree hatchery.22 There are no more than 80
employees of these breeder farms and hatcheries,
whereas the feed mill and processing plant employ
more than 400 persons (A. 17, 60-62).23 Since less
than twenty per cent of the Company’s workforce is
engaged in actual farming operations, the Board
(Pet. App. A-17) properly rejected the Company’s
claim that its operations, in the aggregate, constituted
farming.
Nor do the other factors specified in W aialua,
supra, indicate that the processing of the feed is in
cidental to the company’s agricultural operations. The
feed mill operation is separate from the ordinary
farming operations; the mill itself is leased from
the company that built it (A. 26-27), and is evidently
operated by employees who have no ordinary agricul-
22 The six breeder farms are connected to the pedigree hatchery.
The record indicates (A. 11) that there are eleven farms associated
with the commercial hatchery, but the Company apparently does
not own them. The Company did not specifically except to the
Administrative Law Judge’s finding that it owned and operated
“two hatcheries and six primary breeding farms,” and it asserted
in its fact statement filed with the Board (A. 67) that “Bayside
itself owns approximately seven farms ([Tr.] 130, 30) all of which
at the present time are being used for the parent-grandparent
operation ([Tr.] 133-34).” In its brief to the court of appeals
(p. 2), the Company mentioned only the hatcheries, the 110 con
tract farms, and “six or seven company-owned farms (used for
breeding).”
The Company’s Exhibit 5, a list of employees carried on the
payroll of Bayside, the parent corporation (A. 60-62), has 80
names, but they include those of the Company’s General Manager
and the feed truck drivers and their dispatcher who, as shown
below, have very little to do with the Company’s own farms.
108
33
tural duties (A. 18, 45).84 Its function is to transform
purchased ingredients—some of them, such as drugs
and soybean meal, already in a manufactured state—
into a manufactured agricultural product in a variety
of forms (A. 14-15, 70). The mill produces about
120,000 tons of feed a year, and sells about a third
of that to an unrelated company (A. 26). The produc
tion of feed is thus a typical industrial operation.
M aneja v. W aiahta A gricu ltu ra l Co., L td ., supra, 349
U.S. at 264-265; M itchell v. B udd , 350 U.S. 473;
481-482; H oltv ille A l f a l f a M ills v. W y a tt , 230 P. 2d
398, 403 (C.A. 9).
The feed delivery is the final step in the feed pro
duction process, and is thus incidental to the feed mill
operation, not to the Company’s farming operations.
The feed mill drivers have very little contact with the
Company’s hatcheries and breeder farms. Most of the
24 Poultry farmers apparently ordinarily have not operated their
own feed mills. A publication describing the Maine poultry in
dustry during the 1960’s notes that, before 1963, “three-fourths of
the manufactured feed was shipped in from out-of-state plants.”
F. D. Reed, The Maine Poultry Industry: Its Impact, Growth
and Competitive Position (Univ. of Maine, Cooperative Extension
Service, Circular 394, Rev. July 1970), p. 9. Because of a change
in rail rates in 1964 and because of “certain developments in mill
ing technology,” it became more advantageous to use feed mills
within the state, so that, as of December 31, 1969, approximately
“85 to 90 percent of the feed” consumed by Maine poultry was
manufactured in the state (id., Foreword and pp. 9-10). At this
same time there were “13 commercial feed mills manufacturing
poultry feeds” and only “a half-dozen small farm mills manu
facturing feed for home use” (id. at 10), while there were then
737 broiler farms in the state (id. at 11; see also Tr. 75-76).
109
34
feed deliveries to the breeder farms are made by
drivers working for the KLF feed mill rather than by
the Company’s drivers (A. 25). There is no exchange
of duties between the feed truck drivers and the
Company’s farm employees. Instead, the drivers’
duties in addition to loading their trucks and deliver
ing feed to the contract farms are related solely to
the feed mill operation; as shown (pp. 8-9, supra ),
the drivers sometimes transport feed ingredients to
the mill from places as distant as Gloucester,
Massachusetts.
The drivers report to the mill for work and return
there when deliveries are completed to wash down
their trucks. See V ives v. Serralles, 145 F. 2d 552,
555 (C.A. 1); Calaf v. Gonzales, 127 F. 2d 934, 937
(C.A. 1). They are supervised by a dispatcher at the
mill, and, although the dispatcher consults with the
Company’s broiler department manager—whose re
sponsibilities include the supervision of the growers
(A. 40-41)—regarding feed composition and schedul
ing, the dispatcher’s “day-to-day” supervisor is, as he
testified (A. 47), Merle Weymouth, the assistant
manager of the feed mill, who is in charge of mixing
the feed (A. 45, 47). Moreover, the undisputed
testimony of a former Company feed truck driver
shows that Weymouth hired and fired the drivers (A.
52-53, 58-59).25
In sum, the Company’s farming operations consti
tute only a small proportion of its total enterprise,
25 Although the drivers and the dispatcher were carried on the
payroll of Bayside, the parent corporation (A. 60-62), Weymouth
was identified as an employee of the subsidiary, Poultry Proc
essing, which operated the mill (A. 32).
110
35
and the feed truck drivers do not perform work “inci
dent to or in conjunction with” those operations, hut
instead work in conjunction with the independent feed
production operation. The delivery of feed to the con
tract farms is not part of the Company’s “agricultural
venture.”
C. T H E DRIVERS DO N O T PER FO R M W O R K O N A F A R M AS A N IN C ID E N T
TO OR I N C O N JU N C T IO N W IT H F A R M IN G O PE R A T IO N S W IT H IN T H E
M E A N IN G O F T H E FLSA A G R IC U LT U R A L E X E M P T IO N
Neither petitioners nor the cases upon which they
rely have suggested that the truck drivers’ work might
be within the secondary branch of the definition of
agriculture in Section 3(f) on the theory that it in
volves “ practices * * * on a farm as an incident to,,
or in conjunction with, such farming operations.”
Although the drivers’ work requires them to spend
some time daily on the growers’ farms, that fact does
not suffice to bring them within this part of the defini
tion. This is so because first, the work the drivers per
form on the farm is not of the type contemplated by
this part of the definition, and second, in any event,,
the drivers are not “on the farm” for most of their
working hours.26
26 At least one court in addition to the court below has evidently
concluded that the requirement that the agricultural work must
be incidental to the employer's farming operations {supra, p. 16)
applies to work claimed to be exempt because performed “on a
farm” as well as to that performed “by a farmer.” See National
Labor Relations Board v. Olaa Sugar Company, 242 F. 2d 714T
718 (C.A. #9) ; Pet. App. A-3.
I l l
36
1. The delivery of supplies is not work “on a farm” within the
agricultural exemption
As this Court observed in F arm ers R eservo ir dc
Irriga tion Co. v. M cComb, supra, 337 U.S. at 767,
the secondary branch of the definition of agriculture
in Section 3(f) as originally proposed would have
included only “practices * * * performed by a farmer
as an incident to, or in conjunction with, such farm
ing operations * * On an amendment offered by
Senator McGill, the phrase “or on a farm” was in
serted immediately following “by a farmer.” 81 Cong.
Rec. 7888 (1937). The concern prompting the amend
ment, as this Court noted (337 U.S. at 767), was that
the definition of agriculture would otherwise not cover
“the threshing of wheat or other functions necessary
to the farmer if those functions were not performed
by the farmer and his hands, but by separate com
panies organised fo r and devoted solely to tha t par
ticular job” (emphasis supplied).27
27 The following colloquy, quoted by the Court, 337 U.S. at 7G7
n. 16, took place between Senators Tydings and Borah (Senator
Borah was a member of the Senate Committee on Education and
Labor which reported out S. 2475, eventually enacted into law as
the FLSA) :
“Mr. T ydings. * * * In the case I visualize * * * the farmer is
not performing the service. The man to whom I refer makes a
business of doing nothing but threshing. He owns his own ma
chine, and hauls it from farm to farm, and enters into contracts
with farmers to thresh their crops; the point being that while he
is dealing with an agricultural commodity, he is not necessarily a
farmer, and he is not doing work ordinarily done by a farmer.
“Mr. B oraii. lie is doing the exact work which the farmer did
before he took it up.
“Mr. T ydings. That is true, but I do not think the bill is drawn
112
37
Thus, the practices performed “on a farm” to which
the exemption was intended to refer are activities,
such as threshing, performed substantially, if not en
tirely, on a farm by employees of a company provid
ing specialized agricultural services, and carried out
as part of a traditional farming activity, such as har
vesting. Accordingly, the Wage and Hour Division of
the Department of Labor has issued the following
interpretation of “employment in practices on farm”
(29 C.F.R. 780.136) :
§ 780.136 Employment in practices o:n a farm.
Employees engaged in building terraces or
threshing wheat and other grain, employees en
gaged in the erection of silos and granaries,
employees engaged in digging wells or building
dams for farm ponds, employees engaged in
inspecting and culling flocks of poultry, and
pilots and flagmen engaged in the aerial dust
ing and spraying of crops are examples of the
types of employees of independent contractors
who may be considered employed in practices
performed “on a farm”. Whether such em
ployees are engaged in “ agriculture” depends,
of course, on whether the practices are per
formed as an incident to or in conjunction with
the farming operations on the particular farm,
as discussed in §§ 780.141-780.147; that is,
whether they are carried on as a part of the
agricultural function or as a separately orga-
in sufficient detail to bring the man to whom I refer under its pro
visions of exemption.” (81 Cong. Rec. 7653 (1937).)
See also the comments of Senator Bone, id. at 7659, and the
colloquy between Senators McGill, George and Black, id. at 7888.
113
38
nized productive activity (§§780.104-780.144).
Even though an employee may work on several
farms during a workweek, he is regarded as em
ployed “ on a farm” for the entire workweek
if his work on each farm pertains solely to
farming operations on that farm. The fact that
a minor and incidental part of the work of such
an employee occurs off the farm will not affect
this conclusion. Thus, an employee may spend
a small amount of time within the workweek
in transporting necessary equipment for work
to be done on farms. Field employees of a can-
ner or processor of farm products who work
on farms during the planting and growing sea
son where they supervise the planting opera
tions and consult with the grower on problems
of cultivation are employed in practices per
formed “on a farm” so long as such work is
done entirely on farms save for an incidental
amount of reporting to their employer’s plant.
Other employees of the above employers em
ployed away from the farm would not come
within Section 3(f) . For example, airport em
ployees such as mechanics, loaders, and officer
workers employed by a crop dusting firm would
not be agriculture employees [citations
omitted].
The decisions on the status of activities allegedly
•exempt by reason of being “practices performed on a
farm” as an incident to farming operations have been
consistent with this interpretation. See, e.g., B oyls v.
W irtz , 352 F. 2d 63 (C.A. 5) (pilot and flagman en
gaged in aerial crop dusting within the exemption,
but not their off-farm support personnel) ; H oltv ille
114
39
Al f a l f a M ills v. W y a tt , supra, 230 F. 2d at 402-
403 (remanded on theory that transportation of
chopped alfalfa from field to mill by drivers who did
not handle product at mill but returned immediately
to field with empty trucks would be exempt as on-the-
farm activity only if factual findings showed that
transportation was actually a continuous part of
harvesting) ; T ip to n v. Associated M ilk Producers,
Inc., 398 F. Supp. 743 (N.D. Tex.) (employees who
installed and repaired milk cooling equipment on
farms are within the exemption where off-farm work
was only occasional, minor, and incidental). But see
W ir t2 v. Osceola F arm s Co., 372 F. 2d 584, 589 (C.A.
5) (exemption applied to drivers employed by sugar
mill to transport farm laborers to farm of inde
pendent growers and to bring meals to the laborers
during harvesting).
By contrast to the types of activities exempt under
the principles set forth above, the delivery of sup
plies such as poultry feed to a farmer is essentially
the final phase of the operation by which supplies are
produced and distributed, rather than an incident
of the poultry-feeding process.28 This distinction is
28 The situation might be different if, for example, the drivers
had significant responsibilities for the care of the chickens or even
for assuring the proper operation of the feeding equipment. In
stead, although they take certain precautions on the farms to avoid
spreading disease or spoiling the feed, they have no direct contact
with the poultry and are no more involved in actual farm activities
than truck drivers who took care to avoid causing fires when
delivering crude oil to oil refineries would be involved in oil
refining.
115
40
reflected in the language of Section 3(f) . In defining
the practices included in the secondary branch of
agriculture, Congress specifically identified “delivery
to storage or to market or to carriers for transpor
tation to market.” Such deliveries of farm products
are the final phase of the agricultural venture. On
the other hand, the delivery of supplies to the farm
is the final phase of their production. And the
off-farm production of such supplies is a separately
organized nonagricultural function, even when the
supplies are essential to farming.29 Their distribution
to farms is hardly akin to wheat threshing, even if a
portion of the activity takes place on the farm.
Thus, in Johnston v. C otton P roducers A ssn ., 244
F. 2d 553 (C.A. 5), in which the employee in ques
tion worked for an organization which, like the Com
pany, placed its chicks on contract growers’ farms to
be raised into broilers, the court held (id . at 555)
that the empolyee’s work in supervising the growing
of the chicks and catching and cooping them for
market was, to the extent done on the farms, within
the agricultural exemption of the FLSA. However,
the same employee’s work in “hauling a load of fer
tilizer from the car in which it wTas shipped from
outside the state to a farmer customer” was “in con
nection with and incidental to a retail sale” (ib id .) and
28 See, e.ff., Wirtz v. Ti Ti Peat Ilumus Go., 373 F. 2d 209, 213
(C.A. 4), certiorari denied, 389 U.S. 834 (production of peat moss
used as a soil conditioner and fertilizer) ; McConnb v. Super-A
Fertilizer Works, Inc., 165 F. 2d 824, 828 (C.A, 1) (production
of fertilizer), cited with approval in Farmers Reservoir & Irriga
tion Co. v. McCornb, supra, 337 U.S. at 761.
116
41
thus within the retail establishment exemption, not
the agricultural exemption, of the FLSA. In the pres
ent ease, there is no formal retail sale of poultry feed
because the feed cost is simply figured into the form
ula by which the grower’s total compensation is cal
culated; nevertheless, the Board’s finding (Pet. App.
A-19) that the delivery of the feed was incident to
the feed milling operation is analogous to the finding
in Johnston that the delivery was incident to the sale.
Nor is F arm ers R eservo ir &, Irrig a tio n Co. v. Mc-
Comb, supra, authority for the view that a simple
supply function, like the feed mill drivers’, is within
the agricultural exemption. There this Court indicated
(337 U.S. at 766) that the work of employees of a
company that collects, stores and distributes irrigation
water would be exempt as “a practice performed as an
incident to or in conjunction with farming” if per
formed by a farmer or on a farm. This is because
irrigation of the farm itself, as opposed to simply
delivering water to floodgates at the edges of the farm,
would result in the actual watering of crops.80 The
exemption of the irrigation workers would not follow
because, like the truck drivers here, they simply de
livered supplies to the farm. The fact that the truck
drivers, unlike the irrigation workers, must enter the
3<> The Court emphasized this distinction in concluding that the.
irrigation workers were not farmers: “the responsibility of the
company’s employees ceases when they so release the water. The
water is supplied to the farmer at the head gates and he takes it
over there and uses it, in his own laterals as he sees fit, to irrigate
his crops” (id. at 763).
117
42
farm in order to make their deliveries, does not suffice
to bring the basic delivery function within the exemp
tion.
2. The drivers work is not substantially 'performed “on a farm”
Even if the truck drivers’ deliveries to the growers
are considered to be incidental to the growers’ farm
ing operations, the drivers are not working “on the
farm” in any substantial sense. Their on-farm work
is instead simply incidental to their main job, both
in terms of importance and of the time consumed.
They are drivers, not feed bin loaders—their primary
function is to transport the feed to the growers, and
that function cannot be performed on a farm. See
29 C.F.R. 780.134.31 Moreover, they are physically
on a farm for only one-half to one hour at a time,
or a total of one and a half to four hours out of the
usual nine-hour work day (A. 21, 54, 57-58). Thus,
most of their work time is not spent on a farm, and
is not within the agricultural exemption.
Originally, the Board declined to assert jurisdiction
over employees who regularly spend part of their
time in agricultural work. See C linton Foods, Inc.,
108 NLRB 85; N ational Labor R ela tions B oard v.
Olaa Sugar Com pany, supra, 242 F. 2d at 71,9-721.
31 In contrast, in Wirtz v. Lyon Flying Service, 16 WH Cases
414 (W.D. La.), the agricultural exemption applied to employees
of a crop dusting company who drove with fertilizers and insecti
cides from the company office to farms where they spent the day
loading the crop dusting planes, returning to the office at the end
of the day to wa-sh their trucks. In that case, the employees were
loaders, not drivers; their on-farm work was more significant than
their transportation responsibilities.
118
43
The Board has, however, formally abandoned the
C linton Foods doctrine, and now follows the rule
that the National Labor Relations Act covers em
ployees who regularly perform non-agricultural work,
in addition to some agricultural work. I I . A . R id er &
Sons, 117 NLRB 517; Olaa Sugar Com pany, 118
NLRB 1442, 1443 (on remand from N ational Labor
R ela tions B oard v. Olaa Sugar, su p ra ).32 This rule
was disapproved in N ational Labor R elations B oard v.
K e lly B ro thers N urseries, Inc., 341 F. 2d 433 (C.A. 2)
when applied to bring within the coverage of the Act
employees spending more than eighty-five percent of
their time in agricultural work. But the court empha
sized the soundness of a rule which would cover
employees whose work was substantially non-agricul
tural.
In K elly B ro thers, the objection was simply that
the “small proportions (of non-agricultural work)
are inadequate to tip the scales in favor of bringing
these men, who would be regarded as farmers on any
realistic view, within the National Labor Relations
32 It is settled that the exemptions to the Fair Labor Standards
Act, including the agricultural exemption, are not applicable if
the workweek includes any nonexempt work at all. Thus, Mitchell
v. Hunt, 263 F. 2d 913 (C.A. 5) held that the FSLA applied to
all work of empoyees who worked in admittedly exempt farming
operations every day of the wreek, but worked at the farmer’s auc
tion barn on Saturday, where he sold livestock of other farmers as
well as his own. Accord, Hodgson v. Wittenburg, 464 F. 2d 1219,
1220-21 (C.A. 5); HearnsVerger v. Gillespie, 435 F. 2d 926, 930
(C.A. 8); Wirtz v. Von Carstedt, 362 F. 2d 67, 69-70 (C.A, 9);
Tobin v. Blw Channel Corp., 198 F. 2d 245, 248 (C.A. 4) ; 1Vabash
Radio Corp. v. Walling, 162 F. 2d 391, 394 (C.A. 6) ; 29 C.F.E.
780.11.
119
44
Act'-’ {id. at 439) A Here the converse situation exists:
the small proportions of their agricultural work are
inadequate to bring the feed truck drivers, who would
not be regarded as farmers on any realistic view,
within the agricultural exemption to the Act.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the court of appeals should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted.
R obert H . B okk,
Solic itor General.
J ohn S. I rving,
General Counsel,
J ohn E. H iggins, Jr.,
D epu ty General Counsel,
Carl L. T aylor,
Associate General Counsel,
N orton J . Come,
D ep u ty Associate General Counsel,
E linor H adley Stillman,
A tto rney .
N ational Labor R elations Board.
September 1976.
33 Recent Board decisions involving the mixed work rule are
essentially consistent with this reasoning. See, e.g., Aquaculture
Research Coi'p., 215 NLRB No. 1, 87 LRRM 1496 (jurisdiction
asserted where agricultural and nonagricultural work intermixed
and nonagricultural work was substantial); Light's Tree Go., 194
NLRB 229 (jurisdiction not asserted where ninety per cent of total
worktime was spent in agricultural work).
120
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM , 1976
No. 75-1267
BAYSIDE ENTERPRISES, INC., et al„
Petitioners,
v.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE
AND BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF GEORGIA
POULTRY FEDERATION, INC.
Of Counsel
ALSTON, M ILLER & GAINES
MICHAEL A. DOYLE
FREDERICK H. VON UNWERTH
1200 Citizens and Southern National
Bank Building
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
Counsel for Georgia Poultry
Federation, Inc.
November, 1976
121
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM , 1976
No. 75-1267
BAYSIDE ENTERPRISES, INC., et ai„
Petitioners,
v.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE
OF GEORGIA POULTRY FEDERATION, INC.
Georgia Poultry Federation, Inc. hereby respectfully moves
for leave to file the attached brief amicus curiae in this case.
The consent of the attorney for the Petitioner has been obtained.
Counsel has been advised that the Solicitor General, as attorney
for the Respondent, will not oppose the filing of the brief if filed
sufficiently prior to oral argument.
123
11
The interest of the Georgia Poultry Federation in this case
arises from the fact that it is an association whose membership
includes all integrated poultry producers in the State of Geor
gia, each of whom will be substantially affected by the ruling
in this case. Like the Petitioners herein, these members of the
Georgia Poultry Federation are companies engaged in the pro
duction of poultry who use contract growers during the growout
phase of production, but who generally own the poultry through
out all stages of production, supply the initiative for and major
investment in the production, and make all the important de
cisions with respect to both production and marketing of the
agricultural product. These integrated producers thus perform
the critical functions and face the traditional risks which are
inherent in the role of the farmer producing an agricultural
product.
The qualification of integrated poultry producers as agri
cultural producers entitled to the special consideration afforded
by Congress to such producers under a supportive national agri
culture policy implemented by a comprehensive statutory
scheme, including the labor exemption at issue here, is a matter
of paramount importance to all poultry producers. It is likely
that the decision in this case will control the application of
agricultural exemptions to integrated poultry producers in a
variety of contexts, including federal and state taxation and anti
trust laws in addition to the Fair Labor Standards Act and the
National Labor Relations Act.
The character of integrated poultry production operations as
“agriculture” and “farming” has been recognized and affirmed
repeatedly by the Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits. This case
offers the Court an opportunity to make the practical reasoning
of those circuits binding and conclusive in all areas where
poultry is produced in the United States.
The Petitioners have relied upon a distinction between a “pri
mary” and “secondary” meaning of agriculture drawn by the
124
iii
Court below from this Court’s decision in Farmers Reservoir
& Irrigation Co. v. McComb, 337 U.S. 755 (1949), and have
limited their argument before this Court to a contention that
Bayside and its employees fall only within the “secondary
branch of farming”. (Pet. Br. at 6). It is believed that Bayside
and other integrated poultry producers fall within the “primary”
meaning of agriculture as this Court intended the definition to
be read, and the attached brief which amicus curiae is request
ing permission to file develops this argument for the Court’s con
sideration. The “primary” definition argument offered by ami
cus curiae, which is not otherwise developed in briefs before
the Court, would be dispositive of this case if accepted.
Respectfully submitted,
MICHAEL A. DOYLE
FREDERICK H. VON UNWERTH
1200 Citizens and Southern
National Bank Building
35 Broad Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
Counsel for Georgia Poultry-
Federation, Inc.
125
V
INDEX
Page
Interest of the Amicus Curiae........................................ 1
Argument ....................................................................... 3
A. Poultry “farming” today is carried on almost ex
clusively by integrated producers who own the birds,
initiate and direct production, and bear the risks of
production and marketing .............. 3
B. Integrated broiler producers such as Bayside are
engaged in “agriculture” in its primary meaning—
“The raising of poultry” ..................................... 5
Conclusion .................................................................... 11
CITATIONS
Cases
Abbott Farms, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 487
1 .2d 904 .................................................................. 6, 9
Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. McComb, 337 U.S.
775 ............................................................................ 5
Garth, 56 T.C. 6 1 0 ........................................................ 9
Maple Leaf Farms, Inc., 64 T.C. 438 ............................. 9
McElrath Poultry Co., Inc., 206 NLRB 354 enforcement
denied, 494 F.2d 518 ................................................. 6, 9
National Labor Relations Board v. Ryckebosch, Inc., 471
F.2d 20 ............................... ................................. .6, 8, 9
127
VI
National Labor Relations Board v. Strain Poultry Farms,
Inc., 405 F.2d 1025 .....................................6, 7, 8, 9, 10
Nix v. Farmers’ Mutual Exchange of Calhoun, Inc., 218
F.2d 642 .................................................................... 6
United States v. Chemell, 243 F,2d 944 ......................... 6, 9
Wirtz v. Tyson’s Poultry, Inc., 355 F.2d 255 ................. 6
Statutes and Regulations
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Section 3(f), 52 Stat.
1060, as amended, 29 U.S.C. 203 (f) ......................... 3, 5, 7
National Labor Relations Act, Section 2(3), as amended
(61 Stat. 136, 73 Stat. 519, 29 U.S.C. 152(3))............. 7
128
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM , 1976
No. 75-1267
BAYSIDE ENTERPRISES, INC., et al„
Petitioners,
v.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit
BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF
GEORGIA POULTRY FEDERATION, INC.
INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE
The Georgia Poultry Federation includes in its membership
all integrated producers of broilers, eggs and turkeys in Georgia.
Georgia is the poultry capital of the world, leading all states in
total income from poultry and poultry products.
129
2
The integrated poultry producers who are members of the
Georgia Poultry Federation have a vital interest in the decision
of this case for two reasons: (a) it will directly affect the right
of all of them to claim the specific exemption at issue here, and
(b) the decision in this case is likely to control indirectly the
application of agricultural exemptions to integrated poultry
producers in a variety of contexts, including federal and state
taxation and antitrust, in addition to imposing upon them the
broad requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the
National Labor Relations Act.
130
3
ARGUMENT
A. Poultry “Farming” Today Is Carried on Almost Exclu
sively by Integrated Producers Who Own the Birds, Initiate
and Direct Production, and Bear the Risks of Production and
Marketing.
The question of overriding general importance presented by
this case is whether or not integrated poultry production as it is
carried on today is “farming” or “agriculture”. The techniques
and organization of the poultry system are unique in agricultural
production, and their uniqueness poses certain analytical prob
lems in statutory application. Nevertheless, there can be no
doubt that the result is an agricultural product, and the inte
grated poultry producer faces the same agricultural risks and
problems which gave rise to the congressional concern for farm
ers underlying the creation of a comprehensive statutory scheme
of protection for agricultural producers.
“Agriculture”, in the terms of Fair Labor Standards Act Sec
tion 3(f), 29 U.S.C. 203(f), includes “farming in all its branches,”
including “the raising of . . . poultry.” If what integrated
poultry producers do is “farming”, then they are exempt from
a variety of requirements imposed generally upon employers un
der the Fair Labor Standards Act and the National Labor Rela
tions Act.
Poultry “farming” today involves several stages and opera
tions. For broiler chickens such as Bayside produces, it includes
(a) the placement, raising and breeding of breeder flocks to pro
duce eggs for hatching as broiler chicks, (b) the hatching of these
eggs and the placement of the chicks for growout to maturity,
(c) the growing of the broiler chicks to the age of maturity, (d)
the catching, cooping and hauling of the grown-out birds to
processing facilities, and (e) the operation of facilities to process
and prepare the broilers for market.
131
— 4 —
In the present day broiler system, all or most of these opera
tions are carried on by integrated producers through various
kinds of employees and, during the growout stage, contract
growers. The integrated producer provides the initiative for
production in the first instance, directs the production operations
in all phases, supplies inputs accounting for more than 90% of
the production costs, makes all important production and market
ing decisions, and bears the risk of being unable to market the
agricultural product at a price adequate to cover the production
and marketing costs.
During the growout phase, where contract growers are em
ployed to house and care for the birds until they reach maturity,
ownership of the birds remains in the integrators. In addition
to owning the birds, the integrated producers choose the breed
or type of broiler to be produced and make all decisions with
respect to the number and timing of chick placements; supply
the feed and make all decisions with regard to diet and type of
feed; supply the medicines, vaccines and other health supplies
for the birds; supply all veterinary services during the growout
period; transport the chickens and feed to the growers, and
transport the grown-out chickens from the growers to the
processing plants; provide the equipment and some or all of the
labor for catching, cooping and loading the live birds; and make
all decisions with regard to the age and size at which the birds
shall be marketed. Fieldmen or supervisors employed by the
integrators provide supervision of the growout operation to assure
that the grower is properly feeding, watering and otherwise
caring for the producer’s birds.
Having initiated, paid for and directed the production of
broilers, the integrated producer must then market his product in
a typical agricultural market. There is no live market for broilers
today, and broilers are marketed in fresh, ready-to-cook form by
the integrated producers. The product is highly perishable, and
once production is committed, the integrator must either sell his
132
5
product or destroy it. Pricing is characterized by volatility and
instability, a characteristic which is harmful to producers and
consumers alike, and the product is distributed through middle
men intervening between the integrator and the consumer. In
tegrated broiler producers are scattered and largely uninformed
with respect to inventories and demand, and the market is con
sequently highly susceptible to over-production. The demand
for broilers is seasonal and cyclical, the market price fluctuates
weekly and sometimes hourly, and the market is dominated by
concentrated buyers. It is apparent from all of this that integrated
broiler producers occupy the traditional role of “farmers” in
producing and marketing an agricultural product.
B. Integrated Broiler Producers Such as Bayside Are En
gaged in “Agriculture” in Its Primary Meaning—“The Raising
of . . , Poultry.”
The decision of the First Circuit Court of Appeals below was
based on a misreading of this Court’s decision in Farmers Reser
voir & Irrigation Co. v. McComb, 337 U.S. 755 (1949). In
Farmers Irrigation Co., this Court indeed observed that the sec
tion 3(f) definition of “agriculture” has two branches. “Farm
ing in all its branches” was said to be the “primary meaning”,
and “practices performed either by a farmer or on a farm” fell
within the “broader meaning” of agriculture. Id. at 762, 763.
The Farmers Irrigation Company was organized solely to supply
irrigation water to farmers, and it produced no product of its own
at all, unless irrigation water is considered a product. Thus
this Court observed that the Company for whose employees the
exemption was claimed “owns no farms and raises no crops .
Id. at 763. As the Court further noted: “The ditch company,
then, is not engaged in cultivating or tilling the soil or in grow
ing any agricultural commodity”. Id. at 764. It is obvious there
fore that the employer in Farmers Irrigation Co. was not
“farming” in any branch, and the Court relied on the character
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of the employer’s activity to determine that its employees were
not employed in agriculture under the “primary meaning” of
the word.
Just the opposite is true with the Petitioner here and with all
integrated poultry producers. Bayside is engaged in “growing
an agricultural commodity”—fresh dressed broilers—as its
principal and overriding function. All of its activities, from
breeder farm to processing and marketing, are a part of its main
business activity of producing and marketing broilers. The
entire investment and effort of the integrated broiler producer
are devoted principally to “agriculture” in one of its important
branches—“the raising of . . . poultry”. To hold otherwise is
to ignore the purpose of the integrated operation entirely.
This practical reasoning underlies the view held by the Fifth,1
Eighth2 and Ninth3 Circuits, which is directly contrary to the
holding of the First Circuit in this case. In the Tyson’s Poultry
case, the Eighth Circuit held that employees who worked in an
egg assembly plant operated by an integrated egg producing firm
were “employed in agriculture” and thus exempt from the Fair
Labor Standards Act. The appellees in Tyson's Poultry, Inc.
(whose assembly plant employees were the workers involved),
Poultry Growers, Inc., an affiliated corporation which produced
eggs through contract growers similar to Bayside's broiler grow
ers, a parent corporation which owned all the stock of the first
1 McElrath Poultry Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board,
494 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1974); Abbott Farms, Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Board, 487 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1973); National Labor
Relations Board v. Strain Poultry Farms, Inc., 405 F.2d 1025 (5th
Cir. 1969); United States v. Chemell, 243 F.2d 944 (5th Cir. 1957);
Nix v. Farmers’ Mutual Exchange of Calhoun, Inc., 218 F.2d 642
(5th Cir. 1955).
2 Wirtz v. Tyson’s Poultry, Inc., 355 F.2d 255 (8th Cir. 1966).
3 National Labor Relations Board v. Victor Ryckebosch, Inc.,
471 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1972).
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two, and an individual who was president of all three corpora
tions. The Eighth Circuit held as follows:
“We are here concerned with a single and completely
integrated farming operation carried on and headed up by
appellees through their affiliated corporation, Poultry Grow
ers, Inc. As found by the District Court, the appellees are
farmers and are the ones who initiated the farming opera
tions here involved. Without appellees the independent
growers arguably would never have undertaken the initial
and continuing cost of acquiring the birds and producing
the eggs. The contract growers merely aid the appellees,
who the District Court found to be the ones qualified to
claim the agricultural exemption under the Act as to their
employees engaged in the ‘handling, cooling, grading, can
dling and packing’ of eggs.” 355 F.2d at 258.
The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Strain Poultry Farms, Inc. is
directly in point, and directly contrary to the decision of the
Court of Appeals in this case. Strain was an integrated broiler
producer, and the National Labor Relations Board found Strain
guilty of unfair labor practices under the National Labor Rela
tions Act. The NLRB petitioned for an enforcement order, and
the Fifth Circuit denied enforcement on the ground that the
employees involved—truck drivers employed by Strain to haul
live chickens to processing plants—were “agricultural em
ployees” within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. 152(3) (NLRA Sec
tion 2(3)) and 29 U.S.C. 203(0 (FLSA Section 3(f)). In
Strain, as in this case, the integrated producer employed inde
pendent contract growers during the growout phase of broiler
production.
The Board in Strain argued that the broilers were “the results
of someone else’s farming efforts—the independent growers,”
contending that the fact that Strain used independent growers
destroyed its claim to having raised the birds. 405 F.2d at
135
1030. After carefully analyzing the applicable law and the form
and function of Strain's integrated operation, the Court con
cluded as follows:
“In summary, the Board’s finding that the employees
were not agricultural employees can only be sustained if re
spondent’s arrangement with the independent growers is
viewed as removing it from the primary definition of agri
culture pertinent here, ‘the raising of poultry’. Since we have
concluded that this is not the case, there was no warrant in
the record or a reasonable basis in law for the Board’s con
clusion that the employees were not ‘agricultural laborers
within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the NLRA.’” Id.
at 1033.
As was the case with the delivery truck drivers in Strain, the
activities of the feedtruck drivers in this case are not only inci
dental but are absolutely essential to the integrated poultry
raising operation here. These drivers deliver the feed rations—
specified and mixed by Bayside—to Bayside’s broiler chickens
housed in the contract growers’ facilities. They are delivering
Bayside’s feed to Bayside’s birds during the growout process.
Delivering the feed to the birds is clearly an essential part of the
integrated poultry-raising operation. This was the conclusion of
the Fifth Circuit in Strain'.
“Furthermore, the trucking activities were part of Strain’s
poultry-raising venture. They were performed incident to
or in conjunction with Strain’s poultry-raising operations
and Strain was not a poultry raiser conducting a trucking
operation on the side. The trucking operation was a part
of an integrated poultry-raising operation and, although
unlike poultry farms of the past, it is today a typical broiler
raising operation.” Id. at 1032.
The reasoning of Strain was adopted, on “substantially iden
tical” facts, by the Ninth Circuit in NLRB v. Victor Rycke-
9 —
bosch, Inc., 471 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1972). In Ryckebosch, the
integrator also owned and operated a processing plant. See
Victor Ryckebosch, Inc., 189 NLRB 40, 41-42. The Strain
reasoning has been reaffirmed twice more by the Fifth Circuit
in recent years. Abbott Farms. Inc., and McElrath Poultry Co.,
supra, p. 5, n. 1.
The same recognition of the realities of modern broiler pro
duction and its “farming” character underlies a number of deci
sions allowing integrated poultry producers to take advantage
of various provisions of the Internal Revenue Code available
only to “farmers”. See United States v. Chemell, 243 F.2d 944
(5th Cir. 1957); Maple Leaf Farms, Inc., 64 T.C. 438 (1975);
Garth, 56 T.C. 610 (1971).
Respondent has made a point of arguing that contract growers
bear some risks of loss in connection with the poultry raising
operations at issue here. The Brief cites studies which indicate
that growers make a sizable investment in land, poultry housing
facilities, and related equipment. (Respondent’s Br. 22, n. 14).
What the Respondent fails to mention is that the integrated
broiler producers supply the birds themselves and inputs which
together account for more than 90% of the cost per pound of
producing broilers on an operating basis, including feed which
accounts for more than half the total cost of producing broilers.
Moreover, the growers are guaranteed a return for their labor
and facilities, while the integrated producer must find a buyer
for the agricultural product in the open market if he is to re
cover for his efforts and investment.
It is true that growers bear some risks during the growout
phase ot broiler production. Nevertheless, there is nothing in
the law to suggest that a farmer must bear 100% of the risk
of producing and marketing his product in order to engage in
“agriculture” or “farming”. With the variety of crop mortgage
financing available to farmers today, shared risk is more the
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rule than the exception in modem farming. Moreover, the Fifth
Circuit in Strain was not at all bothered by the fact that the
poultry raising was “shared” with independent growers:
“As in all the other cases cited by the Board on this
point, the distinction between those situations and the
present one is that these birds belonged to the respondent
and, although the raising of them was shared with inde
pendent growers, Strain’s activities were more nearly that
of one engaged in the ‘raising of . . . poultry’ than that
of a purchaser, jobber, etc.” 405 F.2d at 1033.
There is no reason to conclude that contract growers, just be
cause they may share some of the functions and some of the
risks of poultry raising, are the only persons engaged in “agri
culture”.
138
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CONCLUSION
Integrated poultry operations are organized and operated for
one purpose: the production and marketing of broilers. As
the Strain court observed of the integrated broiler producing
operations before it, “although unlike poultry farms of the past,
it is today a typical broiler raising operation”. Integrated broiler
production is within the “primary” definition of agriculture,
and Bayside’s feed truck drivers, who deliver the rations mixed
and supplied by Bayside to the location where Bayside’s broiler
chickens are housed, are clearly essential to Bayside’s integrated
poultry raising operation. For this reason, the drivers are “agri
cultural laborers” within the meaning of the exemption, and the
judgment of the Court of Appeals should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
MICHAEL A. DOYLE
FREDERICK H. VON UNWERTH
1200 Citizens and Southern
National Bank Building
35 Broad Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
Counsel for Georgia Poultry Federation, Inc.
November, 1976
139
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