Bayside Enterprises v. National Labor Relations Board Petitions and Briefs
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January 1, 1975

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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Bayside Enterprises v. National Labor Relations Board Petitions and Briefs, 1975. 86cc2600-c39a-ee11-be37-00224827e97b. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/132d8f7f-9220-4cc2-b649-a366b6335464/bayside-enterprises-v-national-labor-relations-board-petitions-and-briefs. Accessed April 18, 2025.
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The Supreme Court of the United States Bayside Enterprises, Inc. versus National Labor Relations Board Petition and Briefs Law Reprints Labor Series vol. 10, no. 10 1976/1977 Term I« 111? jshtprem? (Emart at % Intitb States? O ctober T e e m , 1975 No. BAYSIDE ENTERPRISES, INC., PENOBSCOT POULTRY COMPANY, AND POULTRY PROCESSING, INC., PETITIONEES, V . NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, RESPONDENT. PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT A lan J oel L evenson 187 Middle Street Portland, Maine 04111 Attorney for Petitioners INDEX Page Opinions Below............................................................. 1 Jurisdiction ................................................................... 2 Question Presented........................................................ 2 Statutes Involved .......................................................... 2 Statement of the C ase ................................................... 3 The Board’s Decision and O rder.................................. 4 The Decision of the Court of A ppeals......................... 5 Reasons For Granting the W r i t .................................. 6 The Employing Entity—Single or M ultiple................ 11 The Growout Contract.................................................. 12 Agricultural or Commercial......................................... 15 Judicial or Legislative.................................................. 17 Conclusion...................................................................... 19 Appendix A—(Court of Appeals’ Opinion and Judg ment) .............. : ..................................A-l Appendix B—(Board and Administrative Law Judge’s Decisions)...........................................AT Appendix C—(the Bayside Grower Contract).............. A-23 T able oe C ita tions Cases Abbott Farms, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 487 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1973)............................................................................ 5 Bowie v. Gonzales, 117 F.2d 11, 18 (1st Cir. 1941) . . . . 13 Colchester Egg Farms, Inc., 214 N.L.R.B. No. 64 (1974) 5, 9, 11 Drummond v. Maine Employment Security Commis sion, 157 Me. 404, 173 A.2d 353 (1961) ..................... 10 Drummonds Poultry Transportation Service v. Wheeler, 178 F. Supp. 12 (D.C.S.D. Me. 1959) .......................... 10 11 Index Page Eastern Sugar Associates, 99 N.L.R.B. 809 (1952) . . . . 14 Etchechoury v. Avi-Simplot, Inc., 93 Idaho 438, 462 P.2d 737 (1969) . , ................................................ 16, 19 Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. McComb, 337 U.S. 755 (1949) .................................................. 6, 8, 17 Samuel Gass, et al., 154 N.L.R.B. 728 (1965) ................ 5 Local Union No. 300. v. McCulloch, 428 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1970) .................................................................. 17 Maneja v. Waialua, 349 U.S. 254 (1961) ..................... 16 Maplewood Poultry Company v. Maine Employment Security Commission, 151 Me. 467, 121 A.2d 360 1956) ...................................................................... 10, 11 McElrath Poultry Co., Inc., 206 N.L.R.B. No. 9 4 ....... 5 McElrath Poultry Co., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 494 F.2d 519 (5th Cir. 1974) .................................................. 5, 9, 16 Mitchell v. Hunt, 263 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1959) ............ 13 Mitchell v. Huntsville Wholesale Nurseries, Inc., 267 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1959) ........................................... 14 N.L.R.B. v. Bayside Enterprises, Inc.,__F.2d — (1st Cir. 1975) ................................................................ 6, 9 N.L.R.B. v. Gass, 377 F.2d 438 (1st Cir. 1967)........... 5, 14 N.L.R.B. v. Kent Bros. Transportation Co., 485 F.2d 480 (9th Cir. 1972) .................................................... 6 N.L.R.B. v. Strain Poultry Farms, Inc., 405 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1969) .................................................. 5, 11, 14 N.L.R.B. v. Tepper, 297 F.2d 280 (10th Cir. 1961)....... 13 N.L.R.B. v. Victor Ryckebosch, Inc., 471 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1972) ................................................................ 5, 18 Norton <& McElroy Produce, Inc., 133 N.L.R.B. 104 (1961) .......................................................................... 13 George I. Petit, Inc., 89 N.L.R.B. 710 (1950) ............ 13 Stockbridge Vegetable Producers, Inc., 121 N.L.R.B. 1395 (1961) ................................................................... 13 Vives v. Serralles, 145 F.2d 552 (1st Cir. 1944) ......... 14 Index Page Wirtz v. Osceola Farms Company, 372 F.2d 584 (5th Cir. 1967) ................................................................... 14 Wirtz v. Tyson’s Poultry, Inc., 355 F.2d 255 (8th Cir. 1966) .......................................................................... 5 Statutes, Regulations and Interpretative Bulletins The Clayton Act, 15 TJ.S.C, § 17 (1914) .................... 11, Capper-Volstead Act, 7 TJ.S.C. §§ 291-92 (1922) ... 11, F.L.S.A., 29 TJ.S.C. § 203(f) (1964) ........................... 2, F.L.S.A. Regulation, 29 C.F.R. 780.126 (1972) ......... 4, Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 26 US.C. § 3306(c) (1) and § 3306(k) (1954) ................................................. Internal Revenue Regulations, Section 61-4................ Maine Agricultural Marketing and Bargaining Act, 13 M.R.S.A. 1953 (1973) ........................................ National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1935) Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 409(h)(2) (1935) . . . . Miscellaneous The Broiler Industry, An Economic Study of Structure, Practices and Problems, U. S. Department of Agri culture (1971) ........................................................... 7 40th Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board (1975) ............................................................. 5 Legislative History of N.L.R.A., p. 3202 ...................... 18 Note: “ Trust Busting Down on the Farm: Narrowing the Scope of Antitrust Exemptions for Agricultural Cooperatives,” 61 Virginia Law Review 341. (1975) 8 Vertical Coordination via Contract Farming, Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Miscellaneous Publication No. 1073 (1968) ......... 11, 12 18 18 10 15 11 11 13 2 11 In the Court of tlw luttrd #tutro O ctober T er m , 1975 No. BAYSIDE ENTERPRISES, INC., PENOBSCOT POULTRY COMPANY, AND POULTRY PROCESSING, INC., PETITIONERS, V . NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, RESPONDENT. PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT Petitioners, Bayside Enterprises, Inc., Penobscot Poultry Company and Poultry Processing, Inc., pray that a writ of certiorari issue to review a judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit entered in this case on December 10, 1975. Opinions Below The opinion of the Court of Appeals is reprinted as Appendix A of this petition. The findings of fact, con- cusions of law, and order of the National Labor Relations Board are reprinted as Appendix B of this petition and reported at 216 N.L.R.B. No. 92 (1975). 1 2 Jurisdiction The decree of the Court of Appeals was entered on December 10, 1975 (Appendix A, p. A-l). The juris diction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) and pursuant to Rule 19-1.(b) of the Rules of this Court. Question Presented Whether a poultry organization vertically integrated from hatcheries to processing plant is a “ farmer” qualify ing its employees who drive feed trucks to its contract farms as exempt “ agricultural laborers” within the agri cultural exemption of the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. §152(3)) as defined in the Fair Labor Stan dards Act (29 U.S.C. § 203(f)). Statutes Involved 1. The National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §152(3) “ The term ‘employee’ . . . shall not include any individual employed as ah agricultural laborer . . . ” 2. Since 1946, the appropriation acts for the National Labor Relations Board have regularly carried a rider which provides that the term “ agricultural laborer” shall be defined in accordance with Section 203(f) of the F.L.S.A. 3. The Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 203(f) provides “ agriculture” includes farming in all its branches and among other things includes the cultivation and tillage of the soil, dairying, the production, cultivation, growing, and harvesting of any agricultural or horticultural com modities . . . the raising of livestock, bees, furbearing animals, or poultry, and any practices . . . performed by a farmer or on a farm as an incident to, or in conjunction with, such farming operations, including preparation for market, delivery to storage or to market or to carriers for transportation to market.” 2 3 Statement of the Case Petitioners, Bayside Enterprises, Inc. and Poultry Pro cessing, Inc., parent and subsidiary, are an integrated poultry organization located in four separate towns in central coastal Maine. The operation is organized func tionally. Bayside carries out the poultry hatching and growing and Poultry Processing is responsible for the milling, processing and marketing. Specifically Bayside has a pedigree hatchery for breeding at Waldo, Maine and a commercial hatchery at Unity, Maine to supply chicks to its farms. In addition to Bayside’s own six farms that produce hatching eggs, there are 119 independent farmers that are under contract with Bayside to raise poultry. The essence of the contract is that Bayside provides each farmer with chicks, feed, medicine, fuel, litter and vaccines, and makes all management and marketing decisions. The farmer is required to furnish the housing utilities and feed, and look after the birds. For this service he is paid on the basis of a guarantee for poultry house square footage plus a bonus based on pounds of poultry he produces. The title to the birds at all times remains in Bayside. Besides the hundreds of thousands of broilers, roasters and capons located on the contract farms and the chicks and eggs in the hatcheries, Bayside owns the grain, the medicines and other feed ingredients which are milled together at a mill in Thorndike, Maine. This mill is owned and operated by Poultry Processing which mixes the feed to the specifications of the Bayside broiler department manager based on the weather and the age or health of a particular flock. Bayside employs a farm crew whose duties include going from farm to farm vaccinating, blood testing and cleaning the chicken houses after the flock has been taken out. In all there are some 80 employees who work for Bayside 3 4 including a geneticist, four poultry servicemen (who main tain standards of animal husbandry and are constantly checking for disease) and the six feed drivers that are the subject of this case. Bayside owns four specially constructed feed trucks, three of which are used daily on two shifts by the six feed drivers. Their job is to shuttle back and forth between the feed mill and the 119 contract farms bringing feed and medicine in accordance with the schedule made up by the Bayside dispatcher. Poultry Processing has about 400 employees divided roughly into 20 in its feed mill and 380 in its Belfast, Maine processing plant. The general offices of the two cor porations are at a separate Belfast location. Operating out of the processing plant with separate supervision is a group of drivers whose job is to drive flatbed trailers with coops onto the farms, catch the birds and transport them back to the processing plant. After processing a separate group of drivers at the processing plant with I.C.C. permits, take the birds to market. The processing plant only processes the Bayside birds. However, at the time of this hearing one-third of the production of the feed mill was sold to another unaffiliated farm organiza tion for its own contract farm requirements. It, however, employed an independent feed transportation company to pick up at the feed mill and deliver to its growers. Bay- side’s feed drivers bring feed to only Bayside’s farms. The Board’s Decision and Order The administrative law judge affirmed by the Board held that the Bayside-Poultry Processing operation con stituted “ a multifaceted organization whose enterprises and purposes go far beyond traditional farming” and that “ while Bayside’s own farms and hatcheries may constitute branches of farming, the overall operations of Bayside and Poultry Processing, and more specifically the feed 4 mill and feed delivery operations, may not be removed from coverage by the Act by utilizing these aspects of Bayside’s operations which are traditional branches of farming to characterize Bayside’s entire operation as farming” . The decision then stated that the case was indistin guishable from Samuel Gass, et al., 154 N.L.R.B, 728 enf’d 377 F.2d 438 (1st Cir. 1967) and McElrath Poultry Co., Inc., 206 N.L.R.B. No. 94 enf. denied 494 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1974). The Decision of the Court of Appeals On the Board’s petition for enforcement the First Cir cuit Court of Appeals was faced with a split of authority with regard to the applicability of the farm exemption as it applies to employees of poultry organizations. On the one side was the Board majority and its own N.L.R.B. v. Gass, 377 F.2d 438, 444 (1st Cir. 1967) decision holding feed drivers not exempt. On the other side were decisions of the Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals 1 and the minority of the Board chastizing the majority for being unwilling to file a petition for certiorari, notwith standing five years of adverse decisions. The minority argued it was now time to acquiesce and declare these employees exempt.2 Counsel for the corporations sought to have this Court of Appeals confine its Gass, supra to the facts of that case; namely, that the employing entity was a trucking company and therefore a separately organized business 1 McElrath Poultry Co., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 494 F.2d 519 (5th Cir. 1974) ; Abbott Farms, Inc. v. N.L.R.B, 487 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1973) ; Wirtz v. Tyson’s Poultry, Inc., 355 F.2d 255 (8th Cir. 1966) ; N.L.R.B. v. Victor Ryckebosch, Inc., 471 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1972) ; and N.L.R.B. v. Strain Poultry Farms, Inc.. 405 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1969). 2 Colchester Egg Farms, 214 N.L.R.B. No. 64 (1974). See the 40th Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board (1975), pp. 67-68. 6 not entitled to the farm exemption. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Kent Bros. Transportation Co., 485 F.2d 480 (9th Cir. 1972). However, the First Circuit Court of Appeals chose not to accept this attempt to reconcile its holding in Gass, supra with the decisions in the other circuits saying it found the other cases “ both distinguishable and unper suasive”. The court’s approach was to break down peti tioners’ organization into its component parts — feed mill, processing plant, chick hatcheries, breeding farms and contract farms and then make the judgment that it was a commercial rather than agricultural venture since the bulk of its capital and personnel were devoted to non farming operations. It bolstered its argument with a De partment of Labor interpretation at 29 C.F.E. 780.126 (1972) having to do with feed dealers and processors. As for the feed drivers, it declared them part of a separate organization “ supportive of agricultural activity, but not directly engaged in farming”. N.L.R.B. v. Bay side En terprises, Inc., — F.2d__ (1st Cir. 1975). The object of this petition is to put into issue under the agricultural exemption of the N.L.E.B. the status of the vertically integrated poultry organization as an employing entity, to wit, is it a farmer under the secondary definition of farming in Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. McComb, 337 IJ.S. 755, 762-63 (1949), and the status of its feed drivers as being incidental to that farming. Reasons for Granting the Writ This case emerges out of one of the most dynamic in dustries in American agriculture. In the 1920’s most poultry was produced in small scale farm enterprises, almost completely integrated. Poultry producers commonly hatched eggs on the farm, used home grown feeds, slaughtered and processed poultry. Some even hauled the birds to market. A few retailed them. 6 7 Beginning in the 1930’s, various phases of poultry pro duction became separate entities and profit centers. Spe cialized firms began to emerge in primary breeding, hatching, feed milling, processing and marketing. Most prominent were the independent feed dealer and poultry hauler who had various types of supply contracts with processors. As the scale of specialized firms increased and the in dustry began to expand rapidly during World War II, problems developed in coordination of firms in various vertical stages. Vertical integration emerged as a means of minimizing or sharing risks with price and production variabilities. Currently, more than 95 percent of the broilers pro duced in the United States are grown under contract in integrator-owned or integrator-leased facilities. A very limited market exists for live broilers produced by independent growers. Most live broiler trading is be tween integrated firms or processors. The emerging integrated structure of the broiler in dustry brought with it the demise of small independent farms. Narrowing profit margins first put specialized hatcheries at a disadvantage. Independent feed dealers and local feed mill next faced the price-costs squeeze. Finally, in the last few years, specialized independent processors faced the same problems. Today the typical firm in the broiler industry is a large vertically integrated broiler organization.3 This development has taken place against the general background of all agriculture in which mechanization, new production technology and sophisticated management sys tems have proliferated — all designed to achieve greater cost efficiency. In addition, agriculture has begun an ir- 3 The Broiler Industry: An Economic Study of Structure, Practices and Problems, U.S. Department of Agriculture (1971). 7 8 reversible course of consolidation accompanied by an in crease in size of the average farm. In the broiler industry this development has seen, in the last 20 years, production of broilers go from 1/3 billion to more than 2% billion along with a price decline and a quality improvement. Per capita consumption of broiler meat has increased from 0.5 pound in 1934 to an estimated 32 pounds in 1966. The broiler industry is centered in four general areas of the United States; the South, Delaware, New England and the Far West. Of these, the South is the most im portant, producing over two-fifths of the output of the industry.4 Nearly all broilers today are produced by con tract growers of integrated broiler firms. Production per farm averages more than 50,000 birds per year.4A A typical integrated broiler producing and marketing firm has its own hatchery, feed mill and processing plant.5 The petitioners contend that their feed drivers are en titled to the agricultural exemption under the secondary definition as laid down in Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. McComh, 337 U.S. 755, 762-63 (1949); namely, “ any practices, whether or not themselves farming practices, which are performed either by a farmer or on a farm incident to or in conjunction with ‘such’ farming opera tions ’ ’. Both the National Labor Relations Board and the First Circuit Court of Appeals have denied this position main taining essentially that Bayside is : 1) not a single farmer because of many contract growers; and 2) is not a farmer at all or at least not predominantly a farmer because its processing plant gives it a commercial coloration. 4 The Broiler Industry, supra, p. 5. 4A Contract growing has been accompanied by a 900 percent increase in output since 1948. “ Trust Busting Down on the Farm ; Narrowing the Scope of Antitrust Exemptions for Agri cultural Cooperatives” , 61 Virginia Law Review 341, 362 (1975). 5 Ibid, p. 22. 8 9 The issue of essential importance in this case is what are vertically integrated poultry organizations in contem plation of the law. Since the agricultural exemption of the National Labor Relations Act depends on the Fair Labor Standards Act for its definition, two important labor statutes are involved in this decision. Although the Fair Labor Standards Act says explicitly that the raising of poultry is an exempt agricultural activity, lias the ver tically integrated poultry operation somehow annihilated itself as an agricultural entity either by having contract farms or by establishing its own processing plant! This decision by the First Circuit places the issue squarely in conflict. In New England henceforth, the chief enforcement officers of both the National Labor Relations Board and the Wage and Hour Division must rule that a vertically integrated poultry operation is not a farmer and that therefore, its employees are not eligible for the farm exemption. Meanwhile in at least two of the other three producing areas (the Far West, 9th Circuit and the South, Fifth Circuit), the holding is that a vertically integrated organization is a farmer. In a competitive, price conscious industry such as this where pennies make the difference between success and failure and poultry can be frozen and transported across the country in a day as well as to foreign countries, any unequal treatment can be ruinous. It obviously cannot be explained to the layman as to why the driver of a feed truck for an integrated poultry organization in Georgia is exempt16 and the same man working for a similar organization in Maine is not. It is little consolation to the corporation that the First Circuit finds decisions of other circuits “ unpersuasive” 7 or that it “ declines to follow” them.8 6 McElrath Poultry Company, Inc. v. N.L.B.B., 494 F.2d 518, per curiam opinion (5th Cir. 1974). 7 N.L.B.B. v. Bayside Enterprises, Inc., — F.2d — (1st Cir. 1975). 8 N.L.B.B. v. Samuel B. Gass, 377 F.2d 438, 444 n. 12 (1st Cir. 1967). 9 10 This issue of contract farming and the relationship of the farmer to the integrator does not confine itself to the poultry industry. The egg industry, although not making use of contract farming to the extent of the poultry in dustry, is very heavily concerned with the answer to the question as to whether the farmers’ contracts amount to a total integration of the farmers into the contractor’s business or still allow him to be considered independent.9 Within the poultry industry itself there are other, dif ferent occupations affected by whether their employer is a farmer or a commercial enterprise — the farm, service men and the pickup crews, for example.10 In addition, a great many other farm commodities are the object of contract farming and have seen a substantial proportion of the entrepreneurship function transferred from the farmer to the contractor. For example, there are tomatoes, green and wax beans, peas, sweet corn and vari ous fruits. Although not controlled by Section 3(f) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, there are many other statutes that exempt “ agricultural labor” from their provisions. The Maine Unemployment Statute is one.111 In speaking on this same issue concerning the poultry industry, the highest Maine court said “ We are not aware of any decision which labels the business of raising poultry as a business 9 Colchester Egg Farms, 214 N.L.E.B., No. 64 (1974). 10 Maplewood Poultry Company v. Maine Employment Security Commission, 151 Me. 467, 468, 121 A.2d 360 (1956) ; See also Drummons Poultry Transportation Service v. Wheeler, 178 F. Supp. 12 (D. Me. 1959) and Drummond v. Maine Employment Security Commission, 157 Me. 404, 173 A.2d 353 (1961). 11 Title 26 M.E.S.A. 1043 - 1.A (1959) defined argicultural labor substantially like Section 3(f) of F.L.S.A. In 1973, the definition was changed twice, excluding the agricultural labor exemption, unless more than one-half of the product was produced by the operator for which the services were performed. The additional changes excluded the definition entirely for “ commercial” hatch ery processing and transportation of poultry, but specifically included services performed on a “ family-type farm” with not over 100,000 laying birds. 10 11 enterprise.” 12 Maplewood Poultry Company v. Maine Employment Security Commission, 151 Me. 467, 472 (1956). The present decision by the First Circuit Court of Appeals changes that. There are other acts as well, concerned with defining agricultural labor.13 The Employing Entity — Single or Multiple Although the emphasis in the First Circuit Court of Appeals’ opinion denying the agricultural exemption to Bayside is on the predominance of the commercial compo nents of the business, the decision makes it very clear that even if the corporations were not integrated to the proces sing plant level that they would not even then be regarded as a farmer. The Court says it is not persuaded by the rationale of the decisions in the other circuits. It thus firmly takes a position with the majority of the National Labor Relations Board that the raising of the poultry is not being done by the integrator, but by its contract farms. The Court of Appeals in N.L.R.B. v. Strain Poultry Farms, Inc., 405 F.2d 1025, 1033 (5th Cir. 1969), says ” . . . the Board’s finding that the employees were not agricultural employees can only be sustained if re spondent’s arrangement with the independent growers is viewed as removing it from the primary definition of agriculture pertinent here ‘the raising of poultry’ ” . The dissenters in Colchester Egg Farms, Inc., 214 N.L.R.B. No. 64 (1974), say that the courts have repeatedly rejected the Board’s attempt to compartmentalize what is essen tially a total “ farming” activity. 12 Vertical Coordination via Contract Farming-, Economic Re search Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Miscellaneous Publication No. 1073, p. 91 (1968). 13 Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. 3306(c)(1), (k) (1954); the Social Security Act 42 U.S.C. 409(h)(2) (1935). In addition the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1970) and the Capper-Volstead Act, 7 U.S.C. 291-92 (1970) allow Bayside to join a farm cooperative and Section 61-4 of the Internal Revenue Regulations allow it to file on a cash basis as a farmer 11 12 The Growout Contract As previously mentioned, the poultry industry is now almost entirely operating under a system of contract farmers. Considerations of efficiency in feed delivery and other service activity plus assembly of the final product give certain advantages to compact growout territories. The result is local monopolies in the market for contracts. One study published by the Department of Agriculture seeks to set up a classification system for these farmer- contractor contracts.14 The system is designed to classify contracts according to the degree to which various elements of entrepreneurship are shifted by contractual agreement from the farmer to the contractor. One view of integration holds that integration increases as elements of entrepre neurship are shifted from the farmer to the contractor, chiefly through assumption of management control and decision-making. Implicit in this view is a corollary assump tion that increased integration results in increased assump tion of risk and uncertainty by the contractor and increased certainty of price and market for the farmer. Judged by these standards the poultry industry, in general, and Bayside, in particular, are the most highly integrated of industries and companies. Dividing decision making into input decisions (acquiring the animals), pro duction decisions and marketing decisions, in all categories, Bayside’s control is almost total. (See Appendix C.) The Bayside-Poultry Processing Management decides what type of poultry to grow and when and where to grow it. It owns the flocks and bears the risk of loss at all phases. It sets production standards, makes the sole decisions as to animal husbandry, including medical care of the poultry. It restricts the farmer from handling any other poultry. It makes all marketing and pricing 114 Vertical Coordination in Contract Farming, infra, p. 74. 12 13 decisions, including the timing of the processing of each flock.15 The feed drivers are controlled by the age and health of each particular flock along with the weather that affects their eating habits. The First Circuit Court of Appeals uses its own decision in Bowie v. Gonzales, 117 F.2d 11, 18 (1st Cir. 1941), for the proposition that the contract farms on which the poultry are grown are each separate independent oper ations and that they are the farmers and not the contractor or integrator. Although the approach is like other past Board'16 and Court17 decisions, the application to the 15 The contract farmers complain that their situation is created in part because economy demands high density growout areas, not allowing any alternative contractor to bid for growers, except in fringe areas. There is also lack of information about compar able contracts allowing market forces to operate in optimum fashion. They also say that even an independent farmer with the capital is forced into a contractual arrangement because of the impossibility of getting chicks and because the_ system doesn’t allow for a live market for independent production. The State of Maine has attempted to help these farmers by passing the Maine Agricultural Marketing and Bargaining Act of 1973, 13 M. R.S. 1953, to help “ the bargaining position of individual farmers” . George I. Petit, Inc., (1950) 89 N.L.R.B. 710, 711, n. 4. (poultry processing employees whose employer purchased all poultry and eggs are not exempt) ; Stockbridge Vegetable Pro ducers, Inc., (1961), 121 N.L.R.B. 1395 (truckdrivers and box stitchers of a grower shipper who packs crops grown by another held not exempt) ; Norton & McElroy Produce, Inc., (1961), 133 N. L.R.B. 104 (truckdrivers and stitchers in the fields are not agricultural laborers if employed by a firm shipping and market ing produce bought from farmers). 17 N.L.R.B. v. Topper, 297 F.2d 280 (10th Cir. 1961) (a dairy employee who worked processing milk products, some of which came from other farms not exempt) ; Mitchell v. Hunt, 263 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1959) (employees of auction barn selling livestock belonging to other farmers than the farmer operator not exempt). Mitchell v. Huntsville Wholesale Nurseries, Inc., 267 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1969) (warehouse owners who make advances to growers against marketable plants produced for it was not exempt as Huntsville did not grow the nursery stock. It bought it from independent growers.) 13 14 vertically integrated poultry operation is misconceived. The important factor in determining whether or not the farmer has been truly and totally integrated into the con tractor’s business is the substance of their relationship. The Fifth Circuit in the fact of its own decision in Mitchell v. Huntsville Wholesale Nurseries, Inc., 267 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1959), to bolster the denial of the exemption looked at poultry industry contract farming, and said: “ The fact that Strain hired the independent growers to raise its birds and contract loaders to catch the birds for loading onto its trucks, would not seem to destroy its claim to having raised the poultry. . . . The trucking operation was a part of an integrated poultry raising operation and although unlike poultry farms of the past, it is today a typical broiler raising operation . . . . As in all the other cases cited by the Board on this point, the distinction between those situations and the present one is that these birds belonged to the re spondent and although the raising of them was shared with independent growers, Strain’s activities were more nearly that of one engaged in the ‘raising of . . . poultry’ than that of a purchaser jobber; Hunts ville clearly did not grow the nursery stock in ques tion; it bought it from independent growers.” N.L.R.B. v. Strain Poultry Farms, Inc., 405 F.2d 1025, 1032-33 (5th Cir. 1969)18 18 Since Strain was decided after N.L.R.B. v. Gass, 377 F.2d 438 (1st Cir. 1967), the Fifth Circuit considered it and found it to be distinguishable because there the drivers were not employed by the farmers nor were they under their control. Of course Bayside does employ and control the driver; however, the First Circuit chose not to accept the Fifth Circuit’s distinction. 14 15 Agricultural or Commercial With this case the Board established and the First Cir cuit Court of Appeals sustained what was essentially a new rationale to achieve the same result—the denial of the agricultural exemption to an integrated poultry firm. The court decision recast its Gass rationale19 post hoc so that the feed drivers were employed by an integrated poultry processing company. The interpretative bulletin 29 C.F.R. 780, 126 (1972)20 having to do with feed dealers and processors was used to bolster the argument. And finally the poultry firm was dismembered into its component parts and pronounced “ not predominantly agriculture”. The answer to all of this is obvious. Gass was an inde pendent trucking company and never entitled to the farm exemption under the F.L.S.A. Bayside is neither a feed dealer nor a processor, so that the interpretative bulletin does not apply. It, along with its subsidiary, Poultry Processing, Inc., make up a vertically integrated poultry organization whose aim is to prosper raising and selling poultry. As such if it—a typical broiler operation of today— is not considered a poultry raiser, then there aren’t any. Bayside-Poultry Processing is not a mercantile enterprise. Common sense tells us it is a farming operation; however, rather than being farmer-based, the modern integrated farm corporation is management based. It has arisen for many reasons, one of the important ones being because of the necessity for closer coordination between the pro duction and marketing phase than price could supply.2'1 19 377 F.2d 438, 444. 20 The decision states this was promulgated in 1974. Actually the date was June 17, 1972, before McElrath, Abbott Farms, and Victor Byckebosch ignored it. 21 In addition, individuals are incorporating their operations to take advantage of the tax laws, increased bargaining power, insulation from risk and continuity of management. 15 16 However, the primary purpose of the petitioners’ poultry business is to produce, hatch, raise and sell poultry. The various components of the corporation constitute a single integrated farming venture producing and processing its own poultry. Etchechoury v. Avi-Simplot, Inc., 43 Idaho 438, 462 P.2d 737, 741. It is important to understand that the real significance of this case and the reason it must be overruled is because drawn to its logical conclusion, it disqualifies every off- farm employee working for a vertically integrated oper ation from qualifying under the secondary definition of agriculture. This is because the first requisite is that the employee works for a farmer, and if the integrator is not regarded as such, you do not get to the next question as to whether or not his job is incidental to or in conjunction with farming. Just as petitioners do not claim all of its employees automatically exempt, so too the First Circuit Court of Appeals should not allow them to be regarded as automatically covered. The six feed drivers involved here are controlled by the broiler department dispatcher. They are separate from the processing plant operation. Their job is completely involved in maintaining the growth cycle and health of the birds on each individual farm. They along with the farm servicemen and the pick-up crews are necessary and essential for the raising, feeding, caring for, and management of the poultry growing operation.22 22 Mcrneja v. Waialua (1961) 349 U.S. 254 (railroad em ployees) ; McElrath Poultry Co. v. N.L.R.B., 494 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1974) ; Vives v. Serralles, 145 F.2d 552 (1st Cir. 1944); Witrz v. Osceola Farms Compamy, 372 F.2d 584 (5th Cir. 1967) ; Eastern Sugar Associates (1952) 99 N.L.R.B. 809. 16 17 Judicial or Legislative This Court in Farmers Reservoir and Irrigation Co. v. McComb, 337 U.S. 755, 760 (1949), spoke in general terms about the definition of agriculture: “ Whether a particular type of activity is agricultural depends, in large measure, upon the way in which that activity is organized in a particular society. The de termination cannot be made in the abstract. In less advanced societies the agricultural function included many types of activity which, in others, are not agri cultural. The fashioning of tools, the provision of fertilizer, the processing of the product, to mention only a few examples, are functions which, in some societies, are performed on the farm by farmers as part of their normal agricultrural routine. Economic progress, however, is characterized by a progressive division of labor and separation of function, (empha sis supplied) What has happened in the poultry industry is that it has come full circle since the 1920’s from the single farmer performing all functions to the corporate organization performing all functions. In this case economic progress has resulted in a combination rather than a division in the form of the vertically integrated farm organization. The question has arisen of how to treat these organiza tions in contemplation of the law because certainly they have many of the characteristics of a commercial enterprise rather than an agricultural one.23 Petitioners contend that it is the wrong approach by judicial fiat to transfer a whole industry from the agricul- 23 However, the agricultural exemption of the N.L.R.A. is not measured by the magnitude of the farmer’s planting nor the prolificacy of his harvest. Local Union No. 300 v. McCulloch, 428 F.2d 396, 399 (5th Cir. 1970). 17 18 tural to the commercial column. This is particularly true where the statute involved makes particular reference to the raising of poultry which is the exact business of these firms. N.L.R.B. v. Victor Ryckebosch, Inc., 471 F.2d 20, 21 (9th Cir. 1972) says: “ The social and economic problems related to large- scale corporate farming are more appropriately re solved by debate and committee study in Congress than by adversary proceedings in Court. If Congress is troubled by the reasoning in Strain, it is free to translate its intent into clearer legislation. The N.L. R.B. has not demonstrated that we need create a con flict between the Circuits on this point.” The farmer has been the subject of special legislation for many decades the origins and rationale for which sometimes having no discernible foundation except politics.24 The legislature of this country has just recently taken a second look at the farm laws and are in the process of changing them. Maine is an example with a new bargaining act for farmers and modifications of the definition of agricultural employee in the Unemployment Compensation Law. The federal Congress, although in the past affixing the prohibition in the N.L.R.A. against agriculture in an appropriations act, has also begun to modify long standing agricultural laws. 24 Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C., § 17 (1970), originally passed in 1914; Capper-Volstead Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-92 (1970), originally passed in 1922; “ The committee discussed this matter carefully in executive session and decided not to include agricultural work ers. We hope that the agricultural worker will be taken care o f... I am in favor of giving agricultural workers every protection, but just now I believe in biting off one mouthful at a time. If we can get this bill through and get it working properly, there will be an opportunity later, and I hope soon to take care of the agriculutral worker” . N.L.R.A.’s sponsor, Representative Con nery, from Legislative History of N.L.R.A., p. 3202. 18 19 In April of 1974 by amendment to the Fair Labor Stan dards Act, it dealt with the exemption from overtime of businesses which would include many vertically integrated farm operations. It amended Section 13 by adding a 13(g) of the Act restricting the exemption from applying to all commonly controlled establishments whose annual gross volume in sales exceeds ten million dollars. The point is that if there is a feeling that the large farm organization should be covered by the N.L.R.A., exactly how and which ones should be the prerogative of Congress rather than the courts. This is especially true in this area because the origins are so political. See Etchechoury v. Avi-Simplot, Inc., 93 Idaho 438, 462 F.2d 737. Conclusion Although Belfast, Maine, may not be regarded as the center of the farm belt, the truth is that it is the center of the Maine poultry industry which makes up a significant segment of the state’s economic activity. Maine is the largest poultry state in New England. Bayside-Poultry Processing is a typical vertically in tegrated poultry operation. The issue raised herein as to whether or not it and others like it are farmers is im portant to the industry and most particularly now in light of this court of appeals’ decision, to New England. Wherefore the petitioners pray that this petition for a writ of certiorari be granted and that ultimately the com plaint against them be dismissed for want of jurisdic tion. Respectfully submitted, A lan J oel L evenson 187 Middle Street Portland, Maine 04111 Attorney for Petitioners 19 APPENDIX Appendix A—(Court of Appeals' Opinion and Judg ment) Appendix B—(Board and Administrative Law Judge’s Decisions) 20 APPENDIX C BAYSIDE ENTERPRISE, INC. 153 High Street Belfast, Maine Contract B ayside E n ter prises , I n c ., and ------------------------------------------ E x c lu siv ely ; B roiler , R oaster and Capon C ontract. This contract made this -------- day of — ---------- ------- , 19-----, between Bayside Enterprises, Inc. of Belfast, here after referred to as “ Bayside” and-------------------------- , referred to hereafter as the “ Grower” . Bayside will de liver baby chicks to the Grower’s farm a t ------------------ , Maine to be grown out as either Broilers, Roasters, or Capons. The number of baby chicks to be placed on the farm and the Growing Program to be followed will be determined by Bayside. The Grower will give his best care and management to the growing of chicks placed on the farm in. accordance with Bayside’s Feeding and Man agement Programs. This contract shall remain in effect, with the following provisions, for successive flocks as may be placed by mutual agreement. B ayside A grees : Section A: 1. ) To furnish all chicks, feed, fuel, litter, medica ments, and vaccines. 2. ) To provide supervision in the care and manage ment of the flock. 3. ) To be the sole judge in determining when a facility shall be sprayed or washed and is ade quately prepared for the placement of another flock. 21 4. ) To pay for spray, power wash, and disinfectants used as such which then become apart of the Grower’s total cost of production, except the cost of powerwash before and/or following a flock of Capons, A Grower with proper equip ment may wash or spray his own facility, (or pay to hire this service), for which no charge will be assessed against the flock concerned. 5. ) To furnish the Grower with copies of all charge slips for feed, fuel medicaments, litter, wash and spray, poultry weight tickets, and bonus cal culation sheets. Section B — To Guarantee the Broiler Grower: 1. ) A payment of $0.01 per square foot for the clean out period within 10 days after a subsequent Bayside flock is placed. 2. ) A payment of $0,007 per square foot per week to be paid bi-weekly during the growing period. 3. ) A “ Balance of Guarantee Payment” , within 10 days after the flock is marketed, to equal $0.01225 per square foot per week. (This total includes 1 & 2 Above.) 4. ) A “ Bonus Payment” based upon an equal in crement spread from the lowest cost flock maxi mum of $0.01775 per square foot per week to a minimum of $0.01225 per square foot per week to the highest cost flock settling within a given settlement period. (This total includes 1, 2, & 3 above.) 5. ) An additional ‘‘Electric Power Payment” , within 10 days after the flock is marked, equal to $0.0005 per square foot per week. This payment to be for Windowless facilities with fan capacities and equipment in accordance with Bayside spe cifications. 22 Section C — To Guarantee Roaster Growers: 1. ) A payment of $0.01 per square foot for the cleanout period within 10 days after a subse quent Bayside flock is placed. 2. ) A payment of $0,007 per square foot per week to be paid bi-weekly during the growing period. 3. ) A “ Balance of Guarantee Payment”, within 10 days after the flock is marketed, equal to $0.0125 per square foot per week. (This total includes 1 & 2 above.) 4. ) A “ Bonus Payment” based on an equal incre ment spread from the lowest cost flock maximum of $0.0185 per square foot per week to a minimum of $0.0125 per square foot per week to the highest cost flock settling within a given settlement period. (This total includes 1, 2, & 3 above.) 5. ) An additional “ Electric Power Payment”, within 10 days after the flock is marketed, equal to $0.0005 per square foot per week. This payment to be for Windowless facilities with fan capacities and equipment in accordance with Bayside spe cifications. Section I) — To Guarantee the Capon Grower: 1. ) A payment of $0.01 per square foot for the cleanout period within 10 days after a subse quent Bayside flock is placed. 2. ) A payment of $0.01 per square foot per week to be paid bi-weekly during the growing period. 3. ) A “ Balance of Guarantee Payment” , within 10 days after the flock is marketed, to equal $0.0135 per square foot per week. (This total includes 2 above.) 4. ) An additional “ Electric Power Payment” , within 10 days after the flock is marketed, equal to $0.0005 per squire foot per week. This payment 23 to be for Capon Growers with Windowless facil ities in accordance with Bayside specifications. T h e Geow ee A g r e e s : Section E: 1. ) To furnish adequate housing, equipment, water, labor, feed, and oil storage facilities as necessary for an efficient operation, as in accordance with Bayside specifications. (See specification sheet attached.) 2. ) To maintain an effective rodent and wild bird control program. 3. ) To provide State approved disposal facilities for dead birds. 4. ) To have no poultry other than Bayside’s on the farm during the period of this contract. 5. ) To use only those materials supplied by Bayside for the purpose of feeding and maintenance of birds under this contract. 6. ) To provide suitable facilities for water medica tion. 7. ) TO BE PRESENT DURING THE LOADING OUT OF POULTRY. 8. ) To keep an accurate flock inventory, on sheets provided by Bayside, and to have these sheets available to the “ Load Out Foreman” when poultry is loaded. 9. ) To maintain suitable roadways for feed, fuel and chick deliveries and for the efficient load out of flocks. To pay all wrecker service as required by live haul, chick, feed, or fuel delivery trucks as attributed to unsuitable roadways on Grower’s farm. 10.) To follow instructions of the Bayside Supervisor in the care and management of Broiler, Roaster 24 or Capon flocks. To allow such personnel to enter any facility pertinent to this contract at reason able times. 11. ) That Bayside will remain the owner of all poul try, feed, and other materials, and may without process of law, enter on the premises of the Grower to remove or to assume the active care and management of the flock—if Bayside believes that said flock is not receiving proper care and attention. Cost of labor or other expenses thus incurred will be deducted from the contract pay ment. 12. ) To pay a charge of $10.00 per ton for the removal of any feed left on the farm, in “ excess” of a calculated 1 day supply at the time a flock is removed. A one day supply will be considered 200 lbs. per 1,000 Broilers and 300 lbs. per 1,000 Roasters and Capons. Feed left on the farm due to schedule changes shall not be considered “ EXCESS”. 13. ) That a prorated payment will be made based upon respective guarantees—in lieu of Sections B, C, & D—the payment will be prorated on the basis of average mortality within a settlement, original flock density, and actual percentage sal vaged when excessive bird losses resulted from: a. ) An act of God (including, but not limited to, fire, winds, snow, or flooding). b. ) OR, over 4% in excess of the average die as a result of lack of oxygen and/or heat exhaustion. 14. ) That minimum payment will be set at $0.0075 per square foot per week in cases described under Item 13 above. 25 S ettle m e n t C ost A nalysis : Section F: Charges for monthly cost calueulations will be as follows: 1.) Broilers—-Chix $0.15 Feed $100/Ton Fuel $0.20/Gal. Medicaments Per Type Litter $8.00/Cord Wash and Spray Invoice Charge 2.) Roasters--Chix $0.15 Feed $100/Ton Fuel $0.20/Gal. Medicaments Per Type Litter $8.00/Cord Wash and Spray Invoice Charge Age to Weight Adjustment factor--$0.00010 per .01 lb. above and below average ROASTER MALE weight. (See attached example.) B ayside and t h e Geow eb M utually A geee : Section G: 1. ) That the Grower accept full and exclusive lia bility for the payment of any and all taxes aris ing as a result of the performance of this contract including, but not limited to, any and all taxes for Workmen’s Compensation Insurance, or Old Age Benefits or Annuities now or hereafter im posed by any persons engaged in the performance of this Agreement on behalf of the Grower, but excluding local taxes on birds. 2. ) That the Grower, his agents and employees shall not be considered to be employees of Bayside for any purpose whatsoever. 3. ) That this contract supercedes and replaces all previous Broiler, Roaster and Capon contracts. 26 4. ) That this contract may be cancelled for sustained inferior performance, or violation of the terms of this contract by either party. 5. ) That notice of contract termination will be given for a subsequent flock five weeks prior to removal of the preceding flock by either party. In W it n e ss W h eb eo e , the parties hereto have executed these presents th is_________day o f___________ , 19__ BAYSIDE ENTERPRISES, INC. By : Gboweb : Witness 27 No. 75-1267 ttje Supreme (Eourt of ttie United States October Term, 1975 Bayside Enterprises, Inc., et al., petitioners v. National Labor Relations Board ON PETITION FOR A W RIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STA TES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT Robert H. Bork, Solicitor General, Department o f Justice, Washington, D.C. 20530. John S. Irving, General Counsel, J ohn E. Higgins, J r., Deputy General Counsel, Norton J. Come, Deputy Associate General Counsel, Robert A. Giannasi, Assistant General Counsel, National Labor Relations Board, Washington. D.C. 20570. 29 INDEX Page Opinions below ............................ ....................... ............. 1 Jurisdiction ........................................................................ 1 Question presented ..................... 1 Statutes involved ...... 2 Statement ..................................... 2 Argument ............................................... 5 Conclusion ......................................................................... 10 CITATIONS Cases: Abbott Farms, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 487 F.2d 904 .....................................8 Bowie v. Gonzalez, 117 F,2d 11 ................................. 6 Boy Is v. Wirtz, 352 F.2d 63 ........................................6 Colchester Egg Farms, Inc., 214 NLRB No. 64 .... 9 Elm Spring Farm v. United States, 127 F.2d 920 .. 7 Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. McComb, 337 U.S. 755 ............................................................6 McElrath Poultry Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 494 F.2d 518 ...............................8 Mitchell v. Hunt, 263 F.2d 913 ................................6 Mitchell v. Huntsville Wholesale Nurseries, Inc., 267 F.2d 286 ......................................... 7 National Labor Relations Board v. Gass, 377 F.2d 438 ....................... 6 31 Page National Labor Relations Board v. Olaa Sugar Company, 242 F.2d 714 ................................... . 6 National Labor Relations Board v. Strain Poultry Farms, Inc., 405 F.2d 1025 ............................... 7-8 National Labor Relations Board v. Victor Ryckebosch, Inc., 471 F.2d 20 ............................ 8 Skidmore v. Swift & Co. 323 U.S. 134 .................. 7 Wirtz v. Jackson & Perkins Co., 312 F.2d 48 ........7 Wirtz v. Tyson’s Poultry, Inc., 355 F.2d 255 .... . 8, 9 Statutes: Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended (52 Stat. 1060, 29 U.S.C. 201, et seq.) ................... ............ 2 Section 3(f), 29 U.S.C. 203(f) ................... 5-6 National Labor Relations Act, as amended (61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. 151, et seq.) .........................2 Section 2(3), 29 U.S.C. 152(3) ..................... 5 Section 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1) .............5 Section 8(a)(5), 29 U.SC. 158(a)(5) .............. 5 60 Stat. 698 .........................................................5 87 Stat. 763 ................................................................5 Miscellaneous: Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Ap pellate System, Structure and Internal Proce dures: Recommendations for Change (1975) ..... 9 32 n % Supreme Court of tt|r plntierl States October Term, 1975 No. 75-1267 Bayside Enterprises, Inc., et al., petitioners v. National Labor Relations Board ON PETITION FOR A W RIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED S T A TES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT OPINIONS BELOW The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. Al- A5) is reported at 527 F. 2d 436. The Board’s decision and order (Pet. App. A7-A22) are reported at 216 NLRB No. 92. JURISDICTION The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on December 10, 1975 (Pet. App. A6). The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on March 8, 1976. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1). QUESTION PRESENTED Whether truck drivers, who transport feed from their employer’s mill to independent farms under contract with the employer to raise poultry hatched in his hatchery facilities, are employees, rather than agricultural laborers, and thus covered under the National Labor Relations Act. ( 1) 33 2 STATUTES INVOLVED The relevant portions of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. 151, et seq.), and of the Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended (52 Stat. 1060, 29 U.S.C. 201, et seq.), are set forth at page 2 of the petition. STATEMENT 1. Petitioner Bayside Enterprises, Inc., operates chick hatcheries and breeding farms in Belfast, Maine (Pet. App. A10; Tr. 34-37, 129-130).1 Bayside has contracts with 119 independent growers or farmers in the area around Belfast for the care and feeding of the chickens from the age of one day until they are ready for processing for market (Pet. App. All ; Tr. 30-31). Petitioner Poultry Processing, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of Bayside, operates a mill at Thorndike, Maine, which supplies feed to the independent farms as well as to another poultry firm (Pet. App. A11-A12; Tr. 80-81, 84-85). Most of the poultry raised by the contract farms for Bayside is sold to Poultry Processing and processed for market at a plant owned by Poultry Processing (Pet. App. A12; Tr. 54-55, 190-191).2 Although Bayside and Poultry Processing have separate employees, they have common officers and directors, a single corporate office, and a single controller '“Tr.” references are to the transcript of testimony before the Board, a copy of which has been lodged with the Clerk of this Court. Employees at this plant (which operates under the name of Penobscott Poultry Company), including crews who transport the live poultry from the contract farms to the plant, are jointly represented by Truck Drivers, Warehousemen, and Helpers of America Local 340, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, and Amalgamated Meat Cutters Local 385 (Tr. 54-55, 191). 34 3 (Pet. App. A 13; Tr. 79, 88, 147-148, 152-153). They have common management and common control over labor relations (Pet. App. A13; Tr. 9-13, 40, 139-140). Bayside furnishes feed, medicine and other supplies to the independent farmers and occasionally sends em ployees to the farms to observe the care given to the chickens and to determine if medical attention is needed (Pet. App. Al l ; Tr. 40-41). The contract between Bay- side and the farmers (“growers”) provides that “the Grower, his agents and employees shall not be considered to be employees of Bayside for any purpose whatsoever” (Pet. App. A28). The farmers provide the land, the facilities, and the labor for raising the poultry (Pet. App. All ; Tr. 78). A farmer’s compensation for raising the poultry is ordinarily determined by the weight of the flock at maturity less the cost of the feed and materials supplied (Pet. App. A15, A23-A28; Tr. 101-105, 110-111, 125). Title to the chickens remains in Bayside until after they leave the farms for processing (Pet. App. Al l - A12; Tr. 40). Bayside employs 6 truck drivers to deliver feed from the mill at Thorndike to the independent contract growers who are situated, on the average, from 12 to 15 miles from the mill (Pet. App. A13; Tr. 53, 182). The drivers are supervised by a mill supervisor and dispatcher who makes up delivery schedules (Pet. App. A13-A14; Tr. 112, 135, 164-165, 174-179, 213-225). The feed trucks are loaded and weighed at the mill, sometimes by the drivers and sometimes by the dis patcher (Pet. App. A 14; Tr. 69, 177, 181-183, 199-200). In either case, the drivers are given slips telling them how much feed of a particular type to deliver to a given farm (Pet. App. A14; Tr. 176-177). The drivers then drive to the contract farms where they unload the feed into bins designated by the farmers (Pet. App. A14; Tr. 67, 35 4 200). The drivers’ responsibilities include putting the proper amounts of feed into the designated bins, trying to keep rain out of the bins when unloading in bad weather, spraying their boots and trucks with disinfectant to avoid spreading poultry diseases, and driving their trucks carefully so as to avoid disturbing the chickens by loud noises and bright reflections from headlights (Pet. App. A14-A15; Tr. 67-68, 74). The drivers have no direct contact with the poultry (Pet. App. A15; Tr. 112). Less than half of the drivers’ time is spent at the farms; the remainder is spent at the feed mill and in driving (Pet. App. A14-A15; Tr. 166-167). The drivers deliver feed to three or four farms a day (Pet. App. A 15; Tr. 64), spending from half an hour to an hour at each farm (Tr. 201). They drive approximately 100 to 120 rpiles each day (Tr. 224).3 In October 1973, the Union4 requested recognition as the representative of Bayside’s drivers who deliver feed from the Thorndike mill to the contract farms (Pet. App. All). Bayside recognized the Union and began contract negotiations (Pet. App. All ; Tr. 11). However, after several sessions, Bayside broke off bargaining negotia tions on the ground that the drivers were agricultural employees and hence not covered by the Act (Pet. App. All ; Tr. 13, 16). 2. Upon charges filed by the Union, the Board found that Bayside and Poultry Processing constituted a single ’In addition to making deliveries to the contract farms, the drivers have also on occasion delivered feed from another feed mill to breeder farms owned by Bayside, and have transported feed ingredients from Rockland, Maine, and Gloucester, Massachusetts, to the feed mill at Thorndike (Pet. App. A15-A16; Tr. 112-114). 4Local 340 of the Teamsters, one of the representatives of the pro cessing plant employees (n. 2, supra). 36 5 employer (“Bayside”) for purposes of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The Board further found that, while Bayside’s own breeding farms and hatcheries may consti tute branches of farming, the feed mill and feed delivery operations were not farming, and that the feed truck driv ers’ duties were incidental to the operation of the feed mill and not to Bayside’s farming operations. (Pet. App. A 18- A19.) Accordingly, the Board concluded that the drivers were not “agricultural laborers” but rather “employees” within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the NLRA, that they constituted an appropriate unit for bargaining, and that Bayside thus violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the NLRA when it refused to bargain with the Union for that unit (A20). The Board entered a bargaining order (Pet. App. A21-A22, A7-A8). 3. The court of appeals enforced the Board’s order (Pet. App. A1-A5). The court upheld the Board’s finding that Bayside and Poultry Processing were a single employer, “a multi-faceted organization whose enterprises and pur poses go beyond the bounds of farming” (Pet. App. A4). The court also held that Bayside was not a farmer “for that portion of its business which supports the raising of poultry on contract farms” and that thus the feed mill drivers were not employed “incidental to or in conjunc tion with” Bayside’s own farming operations (Pet. App. A5). Consequently, they were not exempt from the NLRA as agricultural laborers {ibid.). ARGUMENT 1. Section 2(3) of the NLRA excludes from the defini tion of employee “any individual employed as an agricul tural laborer.” Since 1946, riders to the Board’s appropria tion acts (e.g., 60 Stat. 698; 87 Stat. 763) have regularly provided that the term “agricultural laborer” shall be defined in accordance with Section 3(f) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 203(f), which reads: 37 6 “Agriculture” includes farming in all its branches and * * * includes * * * the raising of * * * poultry, and any practices * * * performed by a farmer or on a farm as an incident to or in conjunction with such farming operations * * * . This Court has held that the FLSA definition has two distinct parts. The first relates to actual farming operations, and the second “includes any practices whether or not themselves farming practices, which are performed either by a farmer or on a farm, incidentlv to or in conjunction with ‘such’ farming operations.” Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. McComb, 337 U.S. 755, 763. The activi ties included in the second portion of the definition, how ever, must actually be performed on a farm, and be inci dental to the farming operations of that farm. Id. at 766, n. 15; Bowie v. Gonzalez, 117 F.2d 11, 18 (C.A. 1); Mitchell v. Hunt, 263 F.2d 913 (C.A. 5). See also National Labor Relations Board v. Olaa Sugar Company, 242 F.2d 714, 718 (C.A. 9); cf. Boyls v. Wirtz, 352 F.2d 63 (C.A. 5). The court of appeals correctly applied these principles in rejecting petitioners’ contention that the feed mill driv ers came within the second part of the definition because they were performing services incidental to Bayside’s farming operations.5 As the court stated (Pet. App. A4- A5): The bulk of the capital and personnel of Bayside is devoted to the feed mill and the processing plant operations which are concededly not farming. The company does operate chick hatcheries and breeding farms which do constitute farming under the appli cable statutes. 29 C.F.R. §780.125(b) (1974). In the remaining segment of the business, the raising of 38 5The court followed its earlier decision in National Labor Relations Board v. Gass, 377 F.2d 438 (C.A. 1). 7 chickens to maturity, the actual farming activity is done by the contract farmers. According to current Department of Labor regulations, retention of title to the poultry pending maturity on contract farms does not entitle a business to be classified as a farmer. 29 C.F.R. §780.126 (1974).4 Nor does Bayside’s delivery of feed, however crucial to the development of poultry on the contract farms it may be, justify classifying Bayside as a farmer. Rather, the Bayside feed delivery system is part of a separate organization, supportive of agricultural activity, but not directly engaged in farming. See 29 C.F.R. §780.126 (1974) * * * . 4“Feed dealers and processors sometimes enter into contractual arrangements with farmers under which the latter agree to raise to marketable size baby chicks supplied by the former who also undertake to furnish all the required feed and possibly additional items. Typically, the feed dealer or processor retains title to the chickens until they are sold. Under such an arrangement . . . [t]he activities of the feed dealer or processor . . . are not ‘raising of poultry’ and employees engaged in them cannot be considered agricultural employees on that ground . . . ." The court properly relied on the Department of Labor regulations; since the regulations were promulgated by the agency in charge of enforcing the FLSA, they are entitled to great weight. Skidmore v. Swift <& Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-140. Moreover, the regulations are con sistent with analogous case law involving similar con tractual arrangements for growing or processing an employer’s product. See Mitchell v. Huntsville Wholesale Nurseries, Inc., 267 F. 2d 286 (C.A. 5); Wirtzv. Jackson & Perkins Co., 312 F. 2d 48, 51 (C.A. 2); Elm Spring Farm v. United States, 127 F. 2d 920 (C.A. 1). 2. While we believe it is correct, the decision of the court below is in conflict with decisions of other courts of appeals. Thus, in National Labor Relations Board v. 39 8 Strain Poultry Farms, Inc., 405 F. 2d 1025, the Fifth Circuit held that, in a poultry raising operation similar to that here, the agricultural exemption applied to the employer’s (Strain’s) truck drivers, who hauled chickens to market from farmers under contract with Strain to grow them to maturity. In the court’s view (id. at 1032), “[t]he fact that Strain hired the independent growers to raise its birds and contract loaders to catch the birds for loading onto its trucks would not seem to destroy its claim to hav ing raised the poultry.” The Ninth Circuit, following Strain, reached the same conclusion in a substantially identical situation. National Labor Relations Board v. Victor Ryckebosch, Inc., 471 F. 2d 20. Moreover, in Abbott Farms, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 487 F. 2d 904, and McElrath Poultry Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 494 F. 2d 518, the Fifth Circuit extended Strain to exempt from the NLRA feed mill employees and employees who transport feed to and from the employ er’s mill. See also Wirtz v. Tyson’s Poultry, Inc., 355 F. 2d 255 (C.A. 8). The court below purported to distinguish Strain and Abbott on the ground that the employers there were primarily engaged in traditional agriculture and, unlike petitioners, owned no processing plant to slaughter and dress the poultry (Pet. App. A5). We submit, however, that the underlying rationale for the court’s decision is directly at odds with that of Strain and Abbott, as well as of the other contrary decisions which the court did not specifically attempt to distinguish.6 The analysis of the court below rests on the premise that Bayside’s farming 6The court below did indicate that it found the contrary decisions unpersuasive (Pet. App. A3). 40 9 operations are limited to its hatcheries, which are sep arate from its feed mill operations, and that the inde pendent farmers who are under contract to raise Bay- side’s poultry to maturity are engaged in their own farming. Thus services furnished by Bayside’s feed mill drivers are incidental to its feed mill operations, rather than to any farming operations. The other courts have rejected this basic premise. 3. The question presented is a recurring one in the administration of the NLRA. Thus, in Colchester Egg Farms, Inc., 214 NLRB No. 64, the Board reaffirmed its position in the instant case, and has filed an application for enforcement in the Second Circuit (No. 76-4052).7 As petitioners note (Pet. 9), there are serious practical objections to having a conflict in the circuits on this issue.8 Moreover, resolution of the issue would have a direct impact on cases arising under the FLSA (see Wirtz v. Tysons Poultry, supra), as well as on those arising under other statutes which refer to agricultural laborers or employees (see Pet. 11, n. 13). 7The Board has requested the Second Circuit to hold the proceeding in abeyance until this Court rules on the instant petition. sFor example, petitioners’ earlier attempt to have the instant case reviewed in the Fifth Circuit (see 514 F. 2d 475 (C.A. 1), 515 F. 2d 503 (C.A. 5) ) demonstrates that the conflict among the circuits furnishes a strong inducement for forum shopping. The Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System has identified the question presented here as one that has too long escaped authoritative resolution. Structure and Internal Procedures: Recommendations for Change (1975), A152-A153. 41 10 CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted. Respectfully submitted. Robert H. Bork, Solicitor General. J ohn S. Irving, General Counsel, J ohn E. Higgins, jr ., Deputy General Counsel, Norton J. Come, Deputy Associate General Counsel, Robert A. Giannasi, Assistant General Counsel, National Labor Relations Board. April 1976. 42 Intfjoe Bnpxmt fflmttrt o f % It u & i S t a t e Octobeb Teem, 1975 No. 75-1267 BAYSIDE ENTERPRISES, INC., PENOBSCOT POULTRY COMPANY, and POULTRY PROCESSINGS, INC. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS Alast J. Levenson, Esq. Attorney for Petitioners 187 Middle Street Portland, Maine 04111 43 INDEX Page Opinions Below ............................................................. Jurisdiction ................................................................... Statutes Involved ......................................................... Questions Presented .................................................... Statement ...................................................................... Argument ...................................................................... Tlie Company’s Six Feed Drivers Are “ Agricul tural Laborers” and Therefore Exempt Under Sec tion 2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act........... I. Introduction and Summary .............................. II. Bayside as a F a rm er........................................ A. Bayside as less than a farmer—the growout contract ....................................................... B. Bayside as more than a farmer—the pro cessing plant .............................................. C. Bayside as a poultry raiser—the employing entity ........................................................... III. The Feed Drivers as Being Incidental to and in Conjunction With Farming .............................. Conclusion .................................................................... 1 2 2 2 4 5 5 7 7 10 14 19 21 T able op C itations Cases Abbott Farms, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 487 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1973) .................................. 12, 20 Birmingham v. Bucher’s Breeding Farm, 152 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1945) ......................................................... 20 Bowie v. Gonzalez, 177 F.2d 11 (1st Cir. 1941) ............ 11 Colchester Egg Farms, Inc., 214 NLRB No. 64 (1974) 19 DiGiorgio Fruit Corp., 80 NLRB 853 (1948) ............ 13 Elm Spring Farm v. United States, 127 F.2d 920 (1st Cir. 1942) .................................................................. 8 45 ii Index Page Etchechoury v. Avi-Simplot, Inc., 93 Idaho 438, 462 I’.2d 737, 741 (1969) ............................................. 13, 18 Farmers Reservoir $ Irrigation Co. v. McComb, 337 U.S. 755 (1949) ................................................ 5, 14, 20 Fors Farms, Inc. v. Washington State Employment Security Dept., 75 Wash. 2d 383, 450 P.2d 973 (1969) .................................................................. 11, 20 George I. Petit, Inc., 89 NLRB 710 (1950) .................. 18 Hersey Estates, 112 NLRB 1300 (1955) ................... 13 Johnston v. Cotton Producers Association, 244 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1957) ................................................ 9, 18 Local Union No. 300 v. McCulloch, 428 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1970) .................................................................. 18 Manejav. Waialua, 349 U.S. 254 (1954) .................. 12, 18 Maplewood Poultry Company v. Maine Employment Security Commission, 151 Me. 467 A.2d 360 (1956) 13, 20 McElrath Poultry Co., Inc.v. National Labor Relations Board, 494 F.2d 519 (5th Cir. 1974) ..................... 13, 20 Mitchell v. Huntsville Wholesale Nurseries, Inc., 267 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1959) ........................................... 8 NLRB v. Bayside Enterprises, Inc., 527 F.2d 436 (1st Cir. 1975) .................................................................. 15 NLRB v. Gass, 377 F.2d 438, 444 (1st Cir. 1967) . . . . 11, 15 NLRB v. John W. Campbell, Inc., 159 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1947) .................................................................. 12 NLRB v. Kelly Brothers Nurseries, Inc., 341 F.2d 433, 435 fn. 2 ...................................................................... 18 NLRB v. Kent Bros. Transportation Co., 458 F.2d 480 (9th Cir. 1972) ................ 14 NRLB v. Olaa Sugar Company, 242 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1957) ......................................................................... 19 NLRB v. Strain Poultry Farms, Inc., 405 F.2d 1025, 1033, 1032-35 (5th Cir. 1969) ........................... 8, 9, 18 NLRB v. Victor Rychebosch, Inc., 471 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1972) ......................................................................... 19 46 Index iii Page North Whittier Heights Citrus Assn., 10 NLRB 1269 (1939) ........................................................................ 16 Vives v. Serralles, 145 F.2d 552 (1st Cir. 1944) ......... 14 Waldo Rohnert Co. v. NLRB, 322 F.2d 46 (9th Cir. 1963) .......................................................................... 8 Wirtz v. Jackson <& Perkins Co., 312 F.2d 48 (2nd Cir. 1963) ......................................................................... 8 Wirtz v. Osceola Farms Co., 372 F.2d 584 (5th Cir. 1967) .......................................................................... 20 Wirtz v. Tyson’s Poultry, Inc., 355 F.2d (8th Cir. 1966) 10 Statutes Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended (52 Stat. 1060, 29 TT.S.C. 201, et seq.) .............................................. 2 Section 3(f) .................................................... 3, 19 Section 13(a)(6) .............................................. 18 Section 13(g) ................................................... 18 National Labor Relations Act, as amended (61 Stat. 136, 73 Stat. 519, 29 U.S.C. 151, et seq.) .................. 2 Section 2(3) ...................................................... 2, 5 60 Stat. 698 .................................................................. 2 87 Stat. 763 .................................................................. 2 Miscellaneous Broiler Industry: An Economic Study of Structure, Practices and Problems, U.S. Department of Agri culture (1971) .............................................- ........ 17, 18 54 Cal. L. Rev. 1939, 1955 ............................................. 18 25 Labor Law Journal 241 ......................................... 19 Legislative History of NLRA, p. 3202 ....................... 18 Vertical Coordination via Contract Farming, Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Miscellaneous Publication No. 1073, p. 74, et seq. (1968) 10 47 lit % Supreme (Hmtrt of tfr? States O ctober T er m , 1975 No. 75-1267 BAYSIDE ENTERPRISES, INC., PENOBSCOT POULTRY COMPANY, and POULTRY PROCESSING, INC. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS Opinions Below The opinion of the Court of Appeals (Pet. app. A. 1-5) is reported at 527 F.2d 436. The Board’s Decision and Order (Pet. app. A. 7-22) are reported at 216 NLRB No. 91. 49 2 Jurisdiction The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on December 10, 1975 (Pet. app. A. 6). The Petition for a Writ of Certiorari was filed March 8, 1976 and was granted on May 19, 1976. The jurisdiction of this court rests on 28 U.S.C. 1254 (1). Statutes Involved The relevant provisions of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (61 Stat. 136, 73 Stat. 519, 29 U.S.C. 151, et seq.) are as follows: Sec. 2 * * * # * # (3) The term “ employee” shall include any em ployee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless the act explicitly states otherwise, and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment, but shall not include any individual employed as an agri cultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person at his home, or any individual em ployed by his parents or spouse, or any individual having the status of independent contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor, or any individual employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act, as amended from time to time, or by any other person who is not an employer as herein defined. * * # 50 3 Since 1946, riders to the Board’s appropriation acts (e.g., 60 Stat. 698; 87 Stat. 763) have regularly provided that the term “ agricultural laborer” shall be defined in accordance with Section 3(f) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (F.L.S.A.) 29 U.S.C. 203(f). # # # The relevant provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended (52 Stat. 1060, 29 U.S.C. 201, et seq.) 29 U.S.C. 203(f): 3(f) “ Agriculture” includes farming in all its branches and among other things includes the cultiva tion and tillage of the soil, dairying, the production, cultivation, growing, and harvesting of any agricul tural or horticultural commodities (including com modities defined as agricultural commodities in Sec tion 15(g) of the Agricultural Marketing Act, as amended), the raising of livestock, bees, fur-bearing animals, or poultry, and any practices (including any forestry or lumbering operations) performed by a farmer or on a farm as an incident to or in conjunction with such farming operations, including preparation for market, delivery to storage or to market or to carriers for transportation to market. Question Presented Whether the Court of Appeals correctly determined that the Board’s decision that employees of a poultry organiz ation vertically integrated from hatcheries to processing plant, who transport feed from the company’s feed mill to its contract farms are covered “ employees” rather than exempt “ agricultural laborers” under the National Labor Relations Act as defined in the Fair Labor Standards Act. 51 4 Statement Bayside Enterprises, Ine. and Poultry Processing, Inc. are parent and subsidiary corporations engaged in poultry hatching, breeding, raising, processing, and marketing in central coastal Maine. Like many other poultry organiza tions these days, the companies, which have been found to be one joint enterprise, are made up of several elements. There is a breeder hatchery at Waldo with six primary breeder farms connected to it (A. 11), a commercial hatch ery at Unity with eleven farms connected to it (A. 11), and a feed mill at Thorndike that produces 80-85 percent of the feed required by the Bayside contract farmers (A. 24- 25). At the time of the hearing, one-third of the production of this mill was sold to an unconnected company1 (A. 26). Also located at Thorndike with a separate office for its dispatcher (A. 49) is the feed move operation whose drivers are the subject of this case. They deliver all of the Bayside medicine and feed produced at the mill to the Bayside contract farmers (A. 42). The other one-third of the production of the feed mill that is sold to an unconnected company, is transported to their contract farms by an inde pendent trucker (A. 6). There is also a processing plant at Belfast (A. 17-18) that processes all of the Bayside Poultry (A. 35), and a general business office at Belfast where the General Manager, Comptroller, Breeder Depart ment Manager, Broiler Department Manager, and the ac counting office is located (A. 8, 60). Over two-thirds of the 119 contract farms are located within a 12 to 15 mile radius of the feed mill (A. 17). Beside the feed drivers that deliver the feed and medi cines in specialized trucks, the enterprise has other truck drivers that transport eggs to breeder farms and chicks to the contract farms (A. 18). Attached to the processing 1 The Company’s feed mill now is used exclusively for its own production needs. 52 5 plant under separate supervision are truck drivers that catch, coop, and deliver the birds from the contract farms to the processing plant (A. 50-51). There are farm super visors who check the health of the poultry on a regular basis at the farms (A. 13, 45), and there is a full time farm crew that take blood tests, debeak and vaccinate the poultry, and clean the poultry houses after each flock is taken out (A. 19). The company also employs a full time geneticist to constantly improve the strain (A. 10). The ownership of both feed and poultry is at all times in Bayside. The enterprise has organized itself so that the 400 em ployees of the processing plant and the feed mill are paid by Poultry Processing, Inc. The other 80 working at and for the hatcheries, breeding and contract farm, are paid by Bayside Enterprises Inc.2 Argument T h e C om pa n y ’s S ix F eed D rivers A be “ A gricultural L aborers” and T h ebepoee E xem pt U nder S ection 2(3) op t h e N ational L abor R elations A ct. I . I ntroduction and S um m ary The combination of Section 2(3) of the NLRA exempting “ agricultural laborers” with the annual appropriation rider for the NLRB defining those words under Section 203(f) of the Fair Labor Standards Act have produced this controversy over the eligibility of the appellants to fall within that definition.1 Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation 2 The Petitioners can accept the factual findings of the Adminis trative Law Judge (Pet. app. A. 9-16). In the appendix there is a more complete annotated rendition of the facts (A. 66-77). 1 “ ‘ Agriculture ’ includes farming in all its branches and . . . includes . . . the raising of . . . poultry and any practices . . . per formed by a farmer or on a farm as incident to or in conjunction with such farming operations . . . ” 53 6 Co. v. McComb, 337 U.S. 755, 762-63 (1949) has pointed out that the FLSA section has two distinct parts — (1), actual farming operations and (2), “ any practices, whether or not themselves farming practices, which are performed either by a farmer or on a farm, incidentally to or in conjunction with ‘such’ farming operations.” Id. at 763. Since the work of the feed drivers in loading, transport ing, and delivering feed to their employer’s contract farms is not actual farming, Bayside contends that their work falls within the secondary branch of farming. To so qualify, their employer must be a farmer and their own work must be incidental to such farming. The conflict within the National Labor Relations Board and between the circuits centers upon the first of those requirements, namely, is a poultry organization such as this a “ farmer.” The question of the work being incidental to farming in this particular case has much less significance because if the company is a farmer it follows that the work of the drivers is incidental to that farming. The rejection of the classification “ farmer” for Bayside and companies like it by the NLRB and the First Circuit has two distinct generic roots. The first emphasizes the contract farmers, maintaining that it is they and not the company who are raising the poultry. The second argu ment stresses the processing plant, urging that it gives the whole company a commercial coloration that pre dominates over any farming aspect. The company maintains that both the contract farmers and the processing plant are but parts of a whole, inte grated operation that has as its essence the raising and marketing of its own poultry and as such it is a “ farmer.” 54 7 II. B ayside as a F abmeb A. Bayside as Less Than a Farmer — The Growout Contract The principal argument against Bayside being a farmer centers upon the growout contract with its farmers. This is the arrangement whereby the birds from its hatcheries and breeding farms are placed upon farms belonging to others until they grow to maturity (a typical contract and a duplicate of Exhibit 1 can be found at Page A. 23 of Pet. App.) From the contract farmer’s point of view, he agrees to keep and maintain suitable facilities for the flocks, including adequate housing, water, feed, oil storage, and dead bird disposal facilities, according to Bayside’s specifications. He also agrees to follow Bayside’s directions in the care and management of each flock, to use only Bayside materials for feeding and maintenance, and to have no other poultry on his farm during the contract period (Pet. App. A. 26-27). Bayside furnishes the chicks, feed, fuel, litter, medica ments, and vaccines, makes the decision when and what kind of poultry are placed on each farm, what they are fed (A. 15), what medicines, vaccines, and blood tests are administered, and when to remove each flock from the farmer’s premises (A. 45). Bayside maintains a farm crew that watches over these farms and cleans out the poultry houses after each flock is removed (A. 20). In return for his services and the use of his facilities, the farmer is guaranteed payment on the basis of the square footage in his poultry house plus a bonus based on the pounds of poultry he has produced in relationship to his production costs with the rest of the growers (A. 30). This contract arrangement between the farmer and the company is the focal point in the clash between the argu- 55 8 merits over whether the farmer is an integral part of the poultry company or whether he is an independent entre preneur. In the brief for the Respondent, on the petition for certiorari in this case, there are cited three cases as examples of analogous contract arrangements with the Bayside growout contract (p. 7). They are Mitchell v. Huntsville Wholesale Nurseries, Inc., 267 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1959) rose growers; Wirte v. Jackson & Perkins Co., 312 F.2d 48, 51 (2nd Cir. 1963) nursery stock; and Elm Spring Farm v. United States, 127 F.2d 920 (1st Cir. 1942) milk handler. Petitioners have also found another case favor able to the Respondent, Waldo Rohnert Co. v. NLRB, 322 F.2d 46 (9th Cir. 1963) seed growers. However, Petitioners feel that these cases not only do not support Respondent, but make clearer the distinction of a vertically integrated poultry grower. In Mitchell v. Huntsville, supra, although Huntsville sup plied the growers with the plants, it only paid them “ based on an agreed amount for each merchantable plant pro duced” 267 F.2d 289 for 2.2 In Jackson <fc Perkins, supra, although the growers pro vided the land, labor and equipment, they agreed to indem nify the company for any claims arising out of the farming operations. The growers also bore any loss due to crop failures save for the cost of the original understock, and the developed stock was sold by them to the defendant at a price calculated per saleable plant. 312 F.2d 48, 51. The Elm Spring Farm case, supra, was a promotion by a company to a group of dairy farmers to claim the milk received from the farmers was its own and thereby escape 2 The same Fifth Circuit in NLRB v. Strain Poidtry Farms, Inc., 405 F.2d 1025, 1033 (5th Cir. 1969) distinguished Huntsville saying the stock was purchased and that the growers were not employees or agents of the company. 56 9 making payments to an equalization pool. The court prop erly disregarded what it called an ‘ ‘ elaborate camouflage ’ ’ since at any time the cooperative could make the farmer take back title to a cow or the farmer himself could demand a retransfer of all the cows on 90 days notice. The risk of loss in the production of milk remained upon the indi vidual farmer. 127 F.2d 920, 926. In the Rohnert Co. case, supra, the growers also did not receive compensation under the seed contract for any crop seed which was not as to quality and grade acceptable to Rohnert “ as acceptable merchantable seed” and the grower had to pay Rohnert for any planting seed supplied by it if the planting seed failed to produce a crop or produced undergrade crop seed. 322 F.2d 46, 47. The common thread in these cases was the fact that the farm product had to be marketable, saleable, or acceptable to the company and thus the risk of loss fell on the farmer.3 The First Circuit looks upon the Bayside-farmer ar rangement and labels it in “ support” of the raising of poultry, 527 F.2d 436, 438. It thus rejects the argument in NLRB v. Strain Poultry Farms, Inc., 405 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1969) that companies such as Strain, Bayside, and other vertically integrated poultry organizations are en gaged in farming in its primary sense. What Strain points out is that it is the poultry company that continually retains the ownership of the birds and assumes the risk of loss throughout the entire process. It also assumes the risk of market fluctuations which affect the price of the birds. This is unlike the previous contractor- 3 Even in Johnston v. Cotton Producers Association, 244 F.2d 553, 554 (5th Cir. 1957), the ease quoted in the Department of Labor interpretation 29 C.F.R. 780.126 (1972) relied upon by the First Circuit, the Exchange sold the baby chicks to the farmer- customer, but retained title as security for the purchase price and for advances for feed, supplies or equipment. 57 10 farmer examples in which it is the farmer that accepted this risk. In Wirts v. Tyson’s Poultry, Inc., 355 F.2d 255 (8th Cir. 1966) the situation is very much like Bayside with a corpo ration and two subsidiaries that together make up a single integrated egg producer. There the court said at Page 258: “ . . . the appellees (Tyson) are farmers and the ones who initiate the farming operations here involved. Without appellees the independent growers arguably would never have undertaken the initial and continu ing cost of acquiring the birds and producing the eggs. The contract growers merely aid the appellees, who the District Court found to be the ones qualified to claim the agricultural exemption . . . ” The point is that it is not the poultry company that is supporting the farmers, but it is the farmers who are aiding the company in raising the poultry. Whether you define the relationship as an agency, sub contractor, or in substance as a lease by the company of the farm, equipment, and labor (A. 12), the elements of entrepreneurship have been shifted by contractual agree ment from the farmer to the contractor-company. Vertical Coordination via Contract Farming, Economic Research Service U.S. Department of Agriculture, Miscellaneous Publication No. 1073, p. 74 et seq. (1968). It is this shifting that makes the farmer an integral part of the company. The income of the farmer is not affected by the market price at the time the poultry leaves his farm and he is guaranteed at least a minimum preset price, no matter what the market. B. Bayside As More Than A Farmer — The Proces sing Plant The Court of Appeals decision in this case although using the independent contract farms argument also makes a 58 11 different argument grounded in the company’s ownership of a processing plant for its poultry. The decision states that the Court’s previous decision in NLRB v. Gass, 377 F.2d 438, 444 (1st Cir. 1967) was predicated on the fact that the truckdrivers there were employed by an integrated poultry processing company. The deci sion characterizes Bayside as a multifaceted or ganization whose enterprises and purposes go be yond the bounds of farming. It points to the feed mill and processing plant where it says the bulk of the capital and personnel are, and notes that these are “ coneededly” not farming. Finally, it denies the farm exemption dis tinguishing other contrary opinions because those compa nies were engaged in “ traditional” agriculture with no processing plant. The court finishes by saying Bayside’s operations are not “ predominantly” agriculture. Although there are certain elements in this commercial argument that find their root in the independent contract farmers argument (i.e. if the farmers were indeed inde pendent then the processing plant would actually be a com mercial enterprise since it was processing the products of different farms and different farmers, Bowie v. Gonzalez, 177 F.2d 11, 18 (1st Cir. 1941) ) the major point is like that articulated by the Supreme Court of Washington in Fors Farms, Inc. v. Washington State Employment Security Dept., 75 Wash. 2d 383, 450 P.2d 973 (1969). There the court said that a corporation engaged in processing chickens and manufacturing chicken feed was not an exempt employer because basically its operation was a commercial proces sing company seeking a stable supply of chickens, rather than a farming operation seeking a way of marketing products.4 4 The Fors Farms case was a particularly difficult one as it involved processing plant employees who had previously been covered by the unemployment law and now that their plant had been merged with a farmer, he argued that they should be exempt. 59 12 This theory that in a poultry company the entire organ ization is incidental to the processing plant rather than the reverse is not in keeping with a view of the company as a single enterprise concerned with all aspects of grow ing, raising, and selling its own product.5 In NLRB v. John W. Campbell, Inc., 159 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1947) the court said at Page 187 “ no farmer, dependent upon that which he produces to sustain his operations, could long exist if he could not market that which he produces . . . the wheat farmer must thresh his wheat; the cane grower must cut his cane and make its juice into syrup; the cotton grower must gin and hale his cotton; the citrus grower must pick and pack his oranges; and the tomato grower must do likewise. So long as these undertakings are in preparation and packing by him for market of that which he has grown on his farm, the labor necessary thereto is agricultural labor.” ’ The court went on to say that if you bought, packed or marketed the products of another, that was commercial; while if you packed products from your own farm, that was agricultural, and that the growing, harvesting, packing, and selling of your own product was all part of a single enterprise (agriculture) 159 F.2d 184, 187. 5 In Abbott Farms, Inc. v. NLRB, 487 F.2d 904, 905 (5th Cir. 1973) the court in referring to the trucking operation from the feed mill of Abbott said in referring to Strain, “ There, as here, the question was whether the poultry raiser was conducting a trucking operation (feed mill) on the side or whether the operation (mill) was part of a poultry raising venture; — Bayside in this case would similarly contend that not only its trucking, but its processing plant was part of a whole poultry-raising enterprise. This does not necessarily mean that the work of every employee automatically is classified as “ agricultural labor” only that Bay- side is a “ farmer” under the F.L.S.A. Maneja v. Waialua, 349 U.S. 254 (1954). 60 13 The Maine Supreme Judicial Court has spoken directly on this issue in construing its unemployment statute. In Maplewood Poultry Company v. Maine Employment Secur ity Commission, 151 Me. 467, 472, 121 A.2d 360 (1956) the court said “ we are not aware of any decision which labels the business of raising poultry as a business enterprise.” In Etchechoury v. Avi-Simplot, Inc., 93 Idaho 438, 462 P.2d 737 (1969) the highest court of that state exempted employees of the company processing plant from the em ployment law as agricultural laborers where the employer owned breeder and poultry farms and processed only his own poultry.6 In the McElrath Poultry Co. case, 206 NLRB No. 94 enf. denies McElrath Poultry Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 494 F.2d 519 (5th Cir. 1974) the company was a subsidiary of a parent company with a processing plant. There the drivers in the feed move operation were ruled exempt as agricultural laborers despite the processing plant. Petitioners question whether in a typical vertically inte grated operation that produces all the poultry it processes or to put it another way, processes all it produces, it is possible to characterize the entire operation by the pre dominant motivation (i.e. to assure a stable market for poultry; to seek a way to market the product).7 If it is, it would seem the more important aspect would be to sell a saleable product; and in the absence of a live market for poultry, the birds must be processed (A. 18). See DiGiorgio Fruit Corp., 80 NLRB 853, 855-857 (1948). 6 The court said, ‘ ‘ The test as to what constitutes agricultural labor turns not on the size of the farming operation involved but rather on whether the processor is in reality a farmer-producer, and whether the processing is incidental to such farming.” 462 P.2d 737, 741. 7 There are, however, obvious cases, Hersey Estates, 112 NLRB 1300 (1955) (a chocolate maker who provided recreational facili ties) 61 14 C. Bayside As A Poultry Raiser — The Employing Entity Of extreme importance in all of this discussion and of absolute necessity before the question of “ raising poultry” can be resolved, is what is the employment entity we are discussing. Farmers Reservoir, 337 U.S. at Page 760 says that whether a particular type of activity is agricultural, . . is not determined by the necessity of the activity to agriculture nor by the physical similarity of the activity to that done by farmers in other situations. The question is whether the activity in the particular case is carried on as part of the agricultural function or is separately organized as an independent produc tive activity.” That case itself demonstrated this principle by example when the Court ruled the separately organized water com pany there involved to be a non-farmer.8 In NLRB v. Kent Bros. Transportation Co., 458 F.2d 480 (9th Cir. 1972) an independently organized trucking company that transported the produce of others was similarly held covered by the NLRA. Thus, in each case, the answer to the question of which entity is the person employed and paid by is sometimes determinative of his status, Vines v. Serralles, 145 F.2d 552, 555 (1st Cir. 1944). In the poultry industry, whether because of the newness of the vertically integrated form of business, the use of 8 The court at Page 766 went on to clarify, “ . . . it is equally clear that it does constitute a practice performed as ‘an incident to or in conjunction with’ farming. If the act exempted all such practices, the company would be exempt. But the exemption is limited. Such practices are exempt only if they are performed by a farmer or on a farm. ’ ’ 62 15 multiple corporations, or the fact that the nature of the business requires several quite different elements, there has always been some confusion about just what was the em ploying entity. In the Gass case before the NLRB, the trial examiner wrote that Gass was “ either an integral part of this integrated commercial enterprise (Lipman) which has engaged in commerce or else it was an independent trucking concern hauling for a commercial enterprise which, in turn, was engaged in commerce”, 154 NLRB 728, 746. The Board said the same feed drivers were employed by joint employers, 154 NLRB 728, 732-733. When the case reached the Court of Appeals, the court said, “ It is signifi cant that these drivers are not employed or paid by the farms nor are they under the control of the farmers”, NLRB v. Gass, 377 F.2d 438, 444 (1st Cir. 1967). When the First Circuit decided this case it found Bay- side “ a multi-faceted organization” and agreed with the administrative law judge “ that Bayside and its component parts constitute a single employer with common ownership management and control of labor relations.” Further it stated that Gass was part of an integrated poultry processing company, NLRB v. Bayside Enterprises, Inc., 527 F.2d 436 (1st Cir. 1975). The court went on to say, however, that although Bay- side could not be classified as a farmer for that portion of its business which supports raising of poultry on contract farms, it was a farmer in relationship to its chick hatch eries and breeder farms. 527 F.2d 438-439. The court has, therefore, formulated a rule whereby the vertically integrated company as a whole would not be regarded as engaged in primary agriculture, but parts of it would, i.e., the hatcheries and breeder farms.9 In support 9 From the company’s point of view the employing entity has also not been free from doubt. The case was tried before the Administrative Law Judge on the theory that only the feed drivers’ employer, Bayside Enterprises, Inc., was the farmer and that the subsidiary Poultry Processing, Inc. was not. 63 16 of the denial of the whole company's status as a farmer, the court cited the Department of Labor interpretation 29 C.F.R. 780.126 (1972) that begins “ Feed dealers and processors sometimes enter into contractual arrangements with farmers . . Although Bayside - Poultry Processing as a single enter prise owns a feed mill and a processing plant, it, as an organization, cannot be classified as either, nor does the statutory exemption depend on the concept of ownership. The FLSA makes specific reference to the raising of poul try. It is by this standard Bayside seeks to be judged. North Whittier Heights Citrus Assn., 10 NLRB 1269 (1939). Is it raising poultry! Bayside begins its poultry program with the hiring of a full-time geneticist (A. 10) who selects the basic breeders and the traits desired in the birds to be grown. There is a breeding hatchery with four or five breeding farms which breed and select strains or lines of birds (A. 10) and there is a commercial hatchery with eleven breeding farms attached to it whose function is to take in eggs and hatch chicks (A. 11). When the chicks are one day old, they are placed on the contract farms (A. 23) and stay there for about nine weeks. Whether on one farm or the other, Bay- side’s farm crew debeak, vaccinate, and blood test the flocks (A. 19, 20). The company decides which farmers raise which birds (A. 43) and initiates a feed program. This requires designing the composition of the feed and seeing that it is changed at least four times during the growing cycle (A. 13- 14). In addition, the company has four field supervisors to check each farm on a routine basis (A. 13). A preventive program is maintained for poultry disease, but should it break out, the company treats the poultry using both feed and water (A. 64). It delivers the feed to the farms and picks it up when no longer needed (A. 22). It delivers the chicks to the farms and catches, coops and delivers the 64 17 fully grown birds to the processing plant (A. 51). The size of the operation is substantial as at any one time there are 3% million birds (A. 20), all of which are subsequently processed by the processing plant (A. 35). It is important to understand that there is a central man agement of this whole operation from egg to processing that is coordinating and making the strategic economic decisions. This emanates from a separate main office in Belfast with a general manager (A. 77) and a common controller (A. 76). Also located there is the broiler department manager, Avho coordinates the scheduling of both feed and chicks to the farms. In addition he is in charge of the continued health of the flocks (A. 68). This puts him in contact on a daily basis with farm managers, farm servicemen, the dispatcher at the feed mill, the pick up crews, and the farmers them selves (A. 62, 64). Besides the pick up crew that comes from the processing plant to the farms, there is a driver who delivers animal by-products from the processing plant to the feed mill for inclusion in the feed (A. 74). The feed formula is watched very carefully, not just because of the type and age of the poultry, but because of the weather and because of price changes and availability of ingredients (A. 14). The advantage of owning all elements of a poultry organ ization, besides the coordination advantage, is the oppor tunity to control as many variables as possible. Bayside does not grow its own grains nor does it retail its chickens, but in all other respects, its ownership or control allows it more flexibility than otherwise. It is no longer necessary to make a profit on the passing from one stage to another. This has allowed greater cost efficiency with a consequent price decline and a consumption increase. The Broiler Industry: An Economic Study of Structure, Practices and Problems, U.S. Department of Agriculture (1971). 65 18 There is no doubt that in the past there have been different forms used in the poultry industry that arguably were not agriculture. Certainly an independent feed dealer10 or an independent food processor11 were not in agriculture. However, where the company is hatching, breeding, par ticipating actively in the growing and then processing its own product, it should be considered a farmer, NLRB v. Strain Poultry Farms, Inc., 405 F.2d 1025, 1032-35 (5th Cir. 1969); Etchechoury v. Avi-Simplot, Inc.. 43 Idaho 438, 462 P.2d 737, 741. There is nothing in the history of the NLRA,12 nor the history of the passage of the 1946 rider13 that would deny this exemption. When this Court regarded the fact that Waialua was using a railroad to transport its sugar cane from the field to the mill, it said, “ There is no reason to construe the FLSA so as to discourage modernization . . ,”14 The poultry industry has merely borrowed the vertically integrated structure from industry, or to put it another way, has reverted back to the small, self-contained family farm it was in the 1920’s on a much larger scale. The Broiler Industry, supra.15 Nor is there any compelling social reason for placing the vertically integrated poultry company in the commerce column. Through Section 13(a)(6), the agricultural exemp tion has been narrowed and most recently in 13(g) the 10 Johnston v. Cotton Producers Association, 244 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1957). 11 George I. Petit, Inc., 89 NLRB 710 (1950). 12 Legislative History of NLRA, p. 3202 and 54 Cal. L. Rev. 1939, 1955, fn. 72. 13 NLRB v. Kelly Brothers Nurseries, Inc., 341 F.2d 433, 435, fn. 2. 14 Maneja v. Waialua, 349 U.S. 254, 261. 15 The agricultural exemption of the N.L.R.A. is not measured by the magnitude of the farmer’s planting nor the prolifigacy of his harvest. Local Union No. 300 v. McCulloch, 428 F.2d 396, 399 (5th Cir. 1970). 66 19 exemptions have been restricted even more, excluding any employee who works for a controlled establishment with a gross volume of sales exceeding $10,000,000. Congress, by modifying 3(f) in the same manner, could include most vertical integrators in the NLEA. It, however, has not shown the inclination to do so. NLRB v. Victor Ryckebosch, Inc., 471 F.2d 20, 21 (9th Cir. 1972). Indeed there is a good argument that like the construction industry, because of the complex character of the problem, special treatment is indicated. 25 Labor Law Journal 241. To hold this company nonagricultural, is not merely what the minority in Colchester Egg Farms, Inc., 214 NLRB No. 64 (1974) says is to compartmentalize what is essen tially a total farming activity, but is, in effect, to “ process” Bayside as Bayside processes its broilers — chopping off its head by disregarding the importance of its management to the whole organization and then dismembering it into parts. What is needed is an approach viewing the vertical inte grator as engaged in primary agriculture and then an inquiry as to whether a specific employee’s work is “ inci dental to or in conjunction with” that agriculture. III. T he F eed D bivebs as B ein g I ncidental to and in C o n ju n c t io n W it h F a em in g . The employer has centered its feed move operation in the middle of its contract farms. With four trucks and six drivers. Bayside delivered feed to the farms itself even when it did not have a feed mill (R. 89, 222). The drivers only deliver Bayside feed. There is a separate office at the mill for the dispatcher where the drivers report because it is the most central point (A. 17). NLRB v. Olaa Sugar Com pany, 242 F.2d 714,718 (9th Cir. 1957). The testimony is that the purpose in having your own feed move operation rather 67 20 than subcontracting is to maintain control over contami nation (A. 42). This is so because the duties of the drivers are not just positive ones such as loading, transporting, and unloading, but are also negative ones, such as prevent ing the transmission of disease, the contamination of the feed, and scaring of the flocks (A. 42). In Farmers Reservoir, this court said that the delivery of water was a practice performed as an incident to or in conjunction with farming, 337 U.S. 755, 766. So, too, is the delivery of feed to poultry.16 The evidence is that each farm must receive a delivery at least once a week (A. 20). See Wirts v. Oscealo Farms Co., 372 F.2d 584 (5th Cir. 1967). Other courts have held that the feed drivers as well as even the feed mill employees themselves are engaged in raising poultry, Abbott Farms, Inc. v. NLRB, 487 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1973), McElrath Poultry Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 494 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1974). They are like the field men in Fors Farms, Inc. v. Washington State Employment Secur ity Dept., 450 P.2d 973, 976 and the servicemen, pick up crews, and grain crews (feed truck drivers) in Maplewood Poultry Co. v. Maine Employment Security Commission, 151 Me. 467, 121 A.2d 360 (1956). Basically, each class of employee is offering a service to the grower concerned with the raising of poultry. See also Birmingham v. Rucker’s Breeding Farm, 152 F.2d 837, 840 (8th Cir. 1945). The feed driver is intimately involved in the growth and pro tection of the birds whose feed and medicine he delivers. 16 The Court of Appeals adheres to its disjunctive approach to Bayside, “ . . . the Bayside feed delivery system is part of a separate organization, supportive of agricultural activity, but not directly engaged in farming.” 527 F.2d 436, 438. This ignores the testi mony of the dispatcher concerning the integration of the feed delivery with the hatchery, the broiler department manager, and the farmers (A. 45, 46). Even the birds themselves have more control over feed delivery than the dispatcher (A. 14, 21). 68 21 Conclusion The judgment of the Court of Appeals should be reversed and the case remanded with instructions to enter a decree denying enforcement of the Board’s order and dismissing the case for want of jurisdiction. Respectfully submitted, A lan J. L even son , Esq. Attorney for Petitioners Bayside Enterprises, Inc., Penobscot Poultry Company, and Poultry Processing, Inc. July 15, 1976 69 N o. 75-1267 g# to J&tgrme djuitrt »f to ®tM $iate October Term, 1976 B ayside E nterprises, I nc., et al., petitioners v. N ational L abor R elations B oard ON W R IT O F C E R T IO R A R I TO T E E U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S F O R T E E F I R S T C IR C U IT BRIEF FOR THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ROBERT H, BORK, S o lic i to r G en era l, D e p a r tm e n t o f Ju s t i c e , W ash in g ton , D.G. 20530. JOHN S. IRVING, G en er a l C ounsel, JOHN E. HIGGINS, Jr., D ep u ty G en er a l C ou n sel, CARL L. TAYLOR, A s s o c ia t e G en era l C ou n sel, NORTON J. COME, D ep u ty A ss o c ia te G en era l C ou nsel, ELINOR HADLEY STILLMAN, A tto rn ey , N a t io n a l L a b o r R e la t io n s B o a rd , W ash in g ton , D .C. 20570. 71 I N D E X Page Opinions below------------------------------------------------------- 1 J urisdiction----------------------------------------------------------- 1 Statutes involved--------------------------------- ------------------- 2 Question presented--------------------------------------------------- 3 Statement ------------------------------------------------------------- 3 A. The Board’s findings of fact--------------------------- 3 B. The Board’s decision-------------------------------------- 9 C. The decision of the court of appeals------------------- 10 Summary of argument--------------------------------------------- 10 Argument: Truck drivers who transport feed from their em ployer’s mill to independent farms which under con tract with the employer raise poultry hatched in his hatchery facilities are employees, rather than agri cultural laborers, and thus are covered under the National Labor Relations Act--------------------------- 14 A, Introduction------------------------------------ :----------- 14 B. The drivers’ duties do not constitute practices per formed by a farmer as an incident to or in con junction with his farming operations--------------- 16 1. The independent growers, not the Company, raise the poultry on the contract farms------ 17 a. The division of risk between the grower and the Company indicates that the grower, not the Company, is the fanning u n i t______________________________ 20 b. The other factors in the relationship be tween the growers and the Company indicate the growers are independent farm ers----------------------------------------- 25 2. The Company’s feed delivery operation is not a subordinate part of its farming opera tions ______________________________ _— 30 (i) 73 I I Argument—Continued Page C. The drivers do not perform work on a farm as an incident to or in conjunction with farming oper ations within the meaning of the FLSA agri cultural exemption-------------------------------------- 35 1. The delivery of supplies is not work “on a farm” within the agricultural exemption— 36 2. The driver’s work is not substantially per formed “on a farm”____________________ 42 Conclusion________________________________________ 44 C IT A T IO N S Cases: Abbott Farms, I no. v. National Labor Relations Board, 487 F. 2d 904________________________________ 20 Aquaculture Research Cory., 215 NLRB No. 1, 87 LRRM 1496_________________________________ Bowie v. Gonzales, 117 F. 2d 11___________________, 16 Boyls v. Wirtz, 352 F. 2d 63______________________ 38 Calaf v. Gonzalez, 127 F. 2d 934__________________ 34 Clinton Foods, Inc., 108 NLRB 8 5 ________________ 42, 43 Elm Spring Farm v. United States, 127 F. 2d 920-__ 21, 23 Etchechoury v. Avi-Simplot, Inc., 93 Idaho 438, 462 P. 2d 737____________________________________ 15 Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. McComb, 337 U.S. 755__________________________ 11,15,16, 36, 40, 41 Fors Farms, Inc. v. Washington State Employment Security Dept., 75 Wash. 2d. 383,450 P. 2d 973_______ 19 Ileamsberger v. Gillespie, 435 F.2d 926_____________ 43 Hodgson v. Wittenburg, 464 F.2d 1219____________ 43 IloltvUle Alfalfa Mills v. Wyatt, 230 F.2d 398___ 33, 38-39 Johnston v. Cotton Producers Assn., 244 F.d 553_____ 40 Light's Tree Co., 194 NLRB 229_________________ 44 McComb v. Super-A Fertilizer Works, Inc., 165 F. 2d 824 _______ v_________________________________ 40 McElra-th Poultry Co., Inc., 206 NLRB 354 enforce ment denied, 494 F.2d. 518______________________ 19, 20 Maneja v. Waialua Agricultural Co., Ltd., 349 U.S. 254 ------------------------------------------------- 12,17, 30, 32,33 Maplewood Poultry Co. v. Maine Employment Security Common, 151 Me. 467,121 A. 2d 360_________________ 15 74 Ill Cases—Continued ?a«c Mitchell v. Budd, 350 U.S. 473___________________ 33 Mitchell v. Ilertzke, 234 F. 2d 183______________ 26 Mitchell v. Hunt, 263 F. 2d 913__________________ 16,43 Mitchell v. Huntsville Wholesale Nurseries, Inc., 267 F. 2d 286__________________________________21,25, 26 National Labor Relations Board v. Deaton, Inc., 502 F. 2d 1221, certiorari denied, 422 U.S. 1047_______ 27 National Labor Relations Board v. Kelly Brothers Nurseries, Inc., 341, F. 2d 433__________________ 14, 43 National Labor Relations Board v. Olaa Sugar Go., 242 F. 2d 714 on remanded, 118 NLRB 1442___ 16, 35, 42, 43 National Labor Relations Board v. Ryckebosch, Inc., 471 F. 2d. 20_________________________________ 19, 20> National Labor Relations Board v. Strain Poultry Farms, Inc., 405 F. 2d 1025__________________ 19, 20, 21 National Labor Relations Board v. United Insurance Co., 390 U.S., 254______________________________ 2T Parks v. Federal Crop Insurance Corp., 146 F. 2d 833— 21, 26 Rutherford Food Cmy, v. McConib, 331 U.S. 722___ 27,28 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134_____________ 19 Tipton y . Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 398 F.Supp. 743 _______ _____________________________ ____ 39 Tobin v. Blue Channel Corp., 198 F. 2d 245________43 United States v. American Trucking Assn., 310 U.S. 534 _________________________________________ 18 Victor Ryckebosch, Inc., 189 NLRB 40_____________ 20 Vines v. Serralles, 145 F. 2d 552__________________ 34 Wabash Radio Corp. v. Walling, 162 F. 2d 391_____ 43 Waldo Rohnert Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 322 F. 2d 46______________________________ 16, 20, 26 Wirtz v. Jackson & Perkins Co., 312 F. 2d 48_______ 21 Wirtz v. Lyon Flying Service, 16 W II Cases 414_____ 42 Wirtz v. Osceola Farms Co., 372 F. 2d 584_________ 39 Wirtz v. Ti Ti Peat Humus Co., 373 F. 2d 209, certiorari denied, 389 U.S. 834----------------------------------------- 4 0 . Wirtz v. Tyson’s Poultry, Inc., 355 F. 2d 255_____ 19, 20, 21 Wirtz x. Von'Carstedt, 362 F. 2d.-67________________ 43, 75 IV Statutes and regulations: Page Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Section 3 (f), 52 Stat. 1060, as amended, 29 U.S.C. 203(f)-----------passim Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Section 203(a), 80 Stat, 833, 29 U.S.C. 213(a)___________26,28 National Labor Relations Act, as amended (61 Stat, 136,73 Stat. 519,29 U.S.C. 151 et seq.) : Section 2(3)------------------------------------------------ 2,14 Section 8 (a )(1 )------------------------------------------ 10 Section 8(a)(5)------------------------------------------ 10 Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, 53 Stat, 1360, 1377 ____________________________1___________ 14 90 Stat, 23_________________________________ 2 42 U.S.C. 410(f)____________________________ 14 29 C.F.R,: Section 780.11______________________________ 43 Section 780.126--------------------------------------------- 12,18 Section 780.134_____________________________ 42 Section 780.136______________________________ 37 Section 780.137______________________________ 16 Miscellaneous: 81 Cong. Rec. 7653, 7659 (1937)__________________ 37 81 Cong. Rec. 7888 (1937)______________________ 36,37 92 Cong. Rec. 6689-6692 (1946)__________________ 14 92 Cong. Rec. 9514 (1946)________________________ 14 112 Cong. Rec. 20819-20820 (1966)________________ 27 26 Fed. Reg. 10386______________________________ 17 S. Rep. No. 1487, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966)________ 27 B. W. Marion and H. B. Arthur, Dynamic Factors in Vertical Commodity Systems: A Case Study of the Broiler System (Ohio Agricultural Research and Development Center, 1973)____________________ 23 F. D. Reed, The Maine Poultry Industry: Its Impact, Growth and G ompetitive Position (Univ. of Maine, Cooperative Extension Service, Circular 394, Rev. July 1970)-------------------------------------------------- 33 U.S.D.A., Packers and Stockyards Administration, The Broiler Industry: An Economic Study of Struc ture, Practices and Problems (1967)_____________ 22 76 Hit flit djjrart 4 i t In M States October Term, 1976 No. 75-1267 B ayside E nterprises, I nc,, et al., petitioners v. N ational L abor R elations B oard ON W R IT O F C E R T IO R A R I TO T H E U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S F O R T H E F I R S T C IR C U IT BRIEF FOR THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD OPINIONS BELOW The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. A1-A5) is reported at 527 P. 2d 436.1 The Board’s decision and order (Pet. App. A7-A22) are reported at 216 NLRB 502. JURISDICTION The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on December 10, 1975 (Pet. App. A6). The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on March 8, 1976, and granted on May 19, 1976. The jurisdiction of this Court rests on 28 U.S.C. 1254(1). 1 “Pet. App.” refers to the appendix to the petition and “A.” to the separate appendix printed pursuant to Rule 36. “Tr." refers to the original transcript of the Board hearing. (1) 77 2 STATUTES IITVOLVED 1. Section 2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (61 Stat. 136, 73 Stat. 519, 29 U.S.C. 151, et seq.), provides in pertinent part that “ The term ‘ employee’ * * * shall not include any indi vidual employed as an agricultural laborer * * *.” 2. Since 1946, the appropriation acts for the National Labor Relations Board have regularly car ried a rider linking the definition of the term “ agricultural employee” to the definition of “agri culture” in Section 3(f) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 52 Stat. 1060, as amended, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 203(f). The latest such rider (90 Stat. 23) provides in rele vant part as follows: P rovided , That no part of this appropriation shall be available to organize or assist in orga nizing agricultural laborers or used in connec tion with investigations, hearings, directives, or orders concerning bargaining units composed of agricultural laborers as referred to in sec tion 2(3) of the Act of July 5, 1935 (29 IT.S.C. 152), and as amended by the Labor-Manage ment Relations Act, 1947, as amended, and as defined in section 3(f) of the Act of June 25, 1938 (29 U.S.C. 203) * * *. 3. Section 3(f) of the Act of June 25, 1938 (29 U.S.C. 203; the Fair Labor Standards Act) provides in pertinent part, as follows: “Agriculture” includes farming in all its branches and among other things includes the cultivation and tillage of the soil, dairying, the production, cultivation, growing, and harvest- 78 3 ing of any agricultural or horticultural com modities * * * the raising of livestock, bees, fur-bearing animals, or poultry, and any prac tices * * * performed by a farmer or on a farm as an incident to or in conjunction with such farming operations, including preparation for market, delivery to storage or to market or to carriers for transportation to market. QUESTION PRESENTED Whether truck drivers, who transport feed from their employer’s mill to independent farms that are under contract with the employer to raise poultry hatched in his hatchery facilities, are employees, rather than agricultural laborers, and thus covered under the National Labor Relations Act. STATEMENT A. THE BOARD’S FINDINGS OF FACT 1. Petitioner Bayside Enterprises, Inc. operates chicken hatcheries and breeding farms near Belfast, Maine, the site of its corporate offices (Pet. App. A-10 to A—11; A. 8-10, 18). As detailed below, Bay- side has contracts with 119 independent farmers (hereinafter “the growers”) in the area around Bel fast for the care and breeding of the chickens from the age of one day until they are ready for processing for market. Petitioner Poultry Processing, Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of Bayside, operates a mill at Thorndike, Maine, which supplies feed to the growers as well as to another poultry firm ( in fra , 79 4 pp. 6-7).2 The truck drivers whose status is at issue here haul feed from the mill to the growers. Poultry Processing also owns a processing plant at Belfast, which handles the poultry raised by the growers (Pet. App. A - l l to A-13; A. 8-9). Employees on the processing plant payroll trans port live poultry from the farms to the plant, slaugh ter and dress the poultry, and ship it out to buyers (Pet. App. A-12; A. 8-9).3 These employees, including the crews who collect the grown birds from the grow ers and transport them to the processing plant, are members of a bargaining unit jointly represented by the Amalgamated Meat Cutters Local 385 and the Truck Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers Union, Local 340.4 The latter organization (the Union) also represents the feed truck drivers (Pet. App. A-10 to A -ll; A. 17, 51). 2 The court of appeals affirmed the Board's finding that Bayside and Poultry Processing constitute a single employer, and peti tioners are not challenging that finding in this Court (Br. f> n. 2; cf. 15 n. 9). The term “Company,” as used herein, refers to both Bayside and Poultry Processing. Petitioner Penobscot Poultry Company is a defunct subsidiary of Bayside, providing a trade name for products sold by Poultry Processing (Pet. App. A-12; A. 39). 3 The plant employees, together with those on the Poultry Proc essing payroll who work at the feed mill, total over 400 (A. 17). The feed track drivers are carried on Bayside’s payroll (Pet. Br. 5). 4 In the printing of the appendix, the agreement of petitioners’ counsel to a stipulation on this matter was inadvertently omitted. The omitted sentence, which would appear as the last line on A. 51, is “MB. LEVENSON: Yes.” 80 The 119 independent growers who contract with Bayside take chickens from its hatchery and raise them for a specified time, at the end of which they are marketable as broilers, capons, or roasters (Pet. App. A - ll , A-23 to A-29, A. 8-11).5 Bayside retains title to the poultry throughout this operation; title passes to its processing subsidiary when the chickens are cooped for delivery to the processing plant (Pet. App. A-27 A. 9-10). The grower furnishes housing for the flock, water, storage areas for supplies, and the equipment and labor required to raise the chickens to maturity (Pet. App. A -ll , A-26). In addition to supplying the chicks, Bayside pro vides poultry feed, fuel, and medications, and it makes available the services of four of its employees who periodically check on the health of the flocks and vac cinate the poultry against diseases when this appears necessary (Pet. App. A - l l ; A. 13, 19-20). These em ployees are under the supervision of Bayside’s broiler department manager, who also determines the compo sition of the feed supplied to the growers (Pet. App. A-13, A-14; A. 13-14, 40). Although the contracts between Bayside and the growers guarantee the growers fixed payments per square foot of space occupied by the flocks at given intervals, a grower’s total compensation includes a “ bonus” determined by the weight of the poultry he 5 The contract expressly provides “[t]hat the Grower, his agents and employees shall not be considered to be employees of Bayside for any purpose whatsoever” (Pet. App. A-28). 81 6 raises to maturity and his production costs in rela tion to the corresponding figures for the other growers (Pet. App. A-15, A-24 to A-25 to A-28; A. 30, 34). Payments are normally calculated separately for each successive flock placed on a farm, although the terms of each contract remain in effect “for successive flocks as may be placed by mutual agreement” (Pet. App. A-23 to A -27; A. 30). In addition to contracting with the growers for the raising of poultry, Bayside owns and operates, using its own employees, six breeder farms on which new poultry strains are bred and two hatcheries— the “commercial” hatchery from which chicks are supplied to the growers and a “pedigree” hatchery connected with the breeder farms (Pet. App. A - l l ; A. 8-11).6 The feed for flocks on Bayside’s own breeder farms and on a few of the contract farms which raise capons and roasters rather than broilers is supplied by the feed mill of Knox-Lincoln Parm er Co-op (KLF) (Pet, App. A-12, n, 2; A. 24-25, 34, 69). The deliveries of feed from this source are generally made by drivers employed by KLF (Pet. App. A-15 to A—16; A. 25, 49). Most of the growers, however, are supplied with feed from the Company’s mill at Thorndike. At the time of the Board hearing, approximately two-thirds of the mill’s output went to the contract growers, 6 Ihe Bayside employees who work on the breeder farms and in the hatcheries are among the approximately 80 persons petitioners identify as employees of Bayside (A. 17, 60-62). 82 7 and the remaining one-third was sold to the Fort Halifax Packing Co., an unrelated poultry company which, like Bayside, contracts with independent growers for the raising of poultry to be processed in its processing plant, but which does not have its own feed mill (Pet. App. A-12; A. 5-7, 25-26).7 The feed supplied to the contract growers by the Company’s mill is delivered to the farms by truck drivers working in two shifts; at the time of the Board hearing there were six such drivers (Pet. App. A-13; A. 44-45). Feeding schedules for the various flocks are made up by the Company’s broiler depart ment manager and copies are sent to the dispatcher at the mill, who is responsible for preparing delivery schedules for the farms (Pet. App. A-15; A. 45-46, 59). The dispatcher supervises the feed drivers, and reports to the assistant feed mill manager (Pet. App. A-13; A. 47-48). The drivers begin their regular duties by loading their trucks with feed at the mill and then weighing the loaded trucks; the drivers are given slips telling them how much of a particular type of feed to deliver to the farm or farms they are scheduled to visit that day (Pet. App. A-14; A. 22, 46, 48, 53). The drivers then drive to the contract farms, where they dis- 7 Feed deliveries to farms under contract with Fort Halifax are made by an independent hauler, who is paid by Fort Halifax for this service (Pet. App. A-12; A. 6-7). On some occasions, in the event of equipment failure, Bayside has that hauler deliver feed from its mill to some of its contract growers (Pet. App. A-16; A. 35). 83 8 charge the feed into bins.8 I f a grower is not present to indicate which bins he wants filled, he may leave a note for the driver (Pet. App. A-14; A. 22, 54). The drivers’ responsibilities include putting the pro per amounts of feed into the bins, keeping raim out of the bins when unloading in bad weather, spraying their boots and trucks with disinfectant to avoid spreading poultry diseases, and driving their trucks carefully to avoid disturbing the chickens with loud noises and bright reflections from headlights (Pet. App. A-14 to A-15). The drivers wash their trucks after they return to the mill (Pet. App. A-15). The drivers have no direct contact with the poultry (Pet. App. A-15; A. 32). Less than half their time is spent at the farms, since a small portion is spent at the mill and the remainder is equally divided between driving on the road and unloading at the farms (Pet. App. A-15; A. 43-44). The contract farms are approx imately 12 to 15 miles from the mill, and the drivers deliver to three or four of these farms on each work day (Pet. App. A-15; A. 17, 21). The drivers spend between half an hour and an hour on each farm, and they drive approximately 120 miles each day (A. 54, 58). In addition to making deliveries to the contract farms, the drivers have also on occasion delivered feed from the KLF feed mill to the six breeder farms owned by Bayside, and have transported feed ingredi ents from Rockland, Maine, and Gloucester, Massa- 8 The discharge is accomplished by power equipment, and takes two and one half to three minutes per ton (A. 16-17). 84 9 ehusetts, to. the Company’s feed mill (Pet. App. A.15 to A-16; A. 25, 32-33, 54-56). 2. In October 1973, the Union requested recogni tion as the representative of the drivers. Bernard Lewis, the president of Bayside and Poultry Process ing, recognized the Union on behalf of Bayside and began contract negotiations. However, after several negotiating sessions, the Company broke off bargain ing. Lewis informed a Union representative that the Company believed it was not obligated to bargain fur ther because the drivers were agricultural employees and hence were not covered by the National Labor Relations Act (Pet. App. A-10 to A - l l) . B. THE BOARD’S DECISION The Board, adopting the decision of its Adminis trative Law Judge, found that Bayside and Poultry Processing were a single employer for purposes of the Act, and that, taken together, they “ constitute a multifaceted organization whose enterprises and pur poses go far beyond the bounds of traditional farm ing” (Pet. App. A-18). The Board further found that the operation of the Company’s feed mill was not farming within the meaning of the definition in Sec tion 3(f) of the FLSA, and that the work of the feed truck drivers was incident to the operation of that mill (Pet. App. A-18 to A-19). The Board found that the feed truck drivers are not “agricultural laborers,” that they constitute an appropriate unit for purposes of collective bargain- 85 10 ing, and that the Company violated Section 8(a) (5) and (1) of the Act by refusing to bargain with the Union which was the representative of the drivers. I t issued an appropriate remedial order. (Pet. App. A-7 to A-8, A-20 to A-22.) C. THE DECISION OE THE COURT OP APPEALS The court of appeals enforced the Board’s order. It found that “ the bulk of the capital and personnel of the Company is devoted to the feed mill and process ing plant operations, which are coneededly not farm ing” (Pet. App. A-4). Although the Company “does operate chick hatcheries and breeding farms which do constitute farming,” in respect to “the raising of chickens to maturity, the actual farming activity is done by the contract farmers” (ib id .). The feed truck drivers are not agricultural laborers, the court held, because they are not employed in work incidental to the Company’s own farming operations, but rather perform duties which are part of a “ feed delivery system” which functions as “a separate organization” (Pet. App. A-4 to A-5). SUMMARY O F ARGUMENT I The National Labor Relations Act does not apply to “ any individual employed as an agricultural laborer,” as defined in Section 3(f) of the Pair Labor Stand ards Act, which defines “ agriculture” to include “farming in all its branches and any practices * * * performed by a farmer or on a farm as an incident 86 11 to, or in conjunction with, such farming operations, including preparation for market.” The work per formed by the feed truck drivers whose status is at issue here does not come within either the “primary” branch of this exemption, covering actual farming operations, such as the cultivation of crops or the raising of poultry, or the “secondary” branch, com prising “ any practices” performed either “by a farmer or on a farm, incidently to or in conjunction with ‘such’ farming operations.” See F arm ers R eser vo ir & Irrig a tio n Co. v. M cComb, 337 U.S. 755, 762- 763. II 1. It is well settled that, in order to constitute “prac tices * * * performed by a farmer * * * as an inci dent to, or in conjunction with such farming opera tions,” the work in question must relate to the farming operations of the employer claiming the ex emption, as distinguished from the farming opera tions of other farmers. The Company’s farming oper ations are limited to its hatcheries and breeder farms and do not include the operations on the 119 contract farms where the independent growers raise the Com pany’s poultry. The Company’s contrary contention relies on deci sions by the Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits hold ing that, in similar contract farming relationships, the farming operations of the growers are the opera tions of the contracting company which owns the poultry. But these decisions are inconsistent with 87 12 an interpretive ruling by the Department of Labor (29 C.F.R. 780.126) and with court decisions dealing with contract farming arrangements for the produc tion of other agricultural and horticultural commod ities. Furthermore, the cases on which the Company relies oversimplify or misconceive important elements of the contract farming relationship, such as the divi sion of risk of loss and the existence of supervisory services. In the present case, the relationship between the Company and its growers indicates that the growers are independent contractors rather than agents or employees of the Company and that the Company is not the “farmer” raising the poultry. This conclusion is also consistent with the legislative history of a 1966 amendment of the FLSA relating to the agricultural exemption, which indicates that Con gress considers the growers, and not the integrated poultry producers with which they contract, to be the farm unit. 2. Since the Company’s farming is limited to its hatcheries and breeder farms, the feed delivery op eration is not “part of the [Company’s] agricultural venture” (see M aneja v. W aia lua A gricu ltu ra l Co., L td ., 349 U.S. 254, 264-265), and the drivers are not performing practices incident to the Company’s farm ing operations. Less than twenty percent of the Com pany’s workforce is involved in its actual farming- operations : the Company’s business, in the aggregate, is not farming. The record shows that the drivers in question have relatively little contact with the 88 13 small farming segment of the enterprise, and that they are supervised by individuals at the Company’s feed mill, which supplies feed to farms other than those which the Company owns and operates. I l l The drivers are not within the other half of the secondary branch of the agricultural exemption, since they do not perform work “on a farm as an incident to, or in conjunction with such farming operations”. The legislative history of that portion of the defini tion of agriculture in Section 3 (f) of the Fair Labor Standards Act reveals that Congress wished to ex empt work, such as the threshing of wheat, which is performed substantially, if not entirely, on a farm by an employee of a company performing a special ized agricultural function and which is carried out as part of actual farming operations, even though not performed by the farmer or his employees. The de livery of supplies such as poultry feed to a farmer is essentially the final phase of a separately organized manufacturing operation. Moreover, the most significant portion of the driv ers’ work takes place off the farm, and thus is not done “on a farm”. Since the National Labor Relations Act covers workers whose work is substantially non- agricultural, even though they perform some agri cultural work, the drivers’ on-farm work is not in any event sufficient to bring them within the agricul tural exemption. 89 14 ARGUMENT TRUCK DRIVERS WHO TRANSPORT FEED FROM THEIR EM PLOYER^ MTTL TO INDEPENDENT FARMS W HICH UNDER CONTRACT WITH THE EMPLOYER RAISE POULTRY HATCHED IN HIS HATCHERY FACILITIES ARE EMPLOYEES, RATHER THAN AGRICULTURAL LABORERS, AND THUS ARE COVERED UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT A . IN T R O D U C T IO N Section 2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act provides that the term “employee” shall exclude “any individual employed as an agricultural laborer.” Since 1946, the appropriation acts for the Board have car ried a rider which provides that the term “agricul tural laborer” shall be defined in accordance with Section 3(f) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, (“FLSA”).9 Section .3(f) of the. FLSA defines the term agriculture in pertinent part as follows: 9 As one court has observed, “The 1946 rider was the product of heated debate and of sharp conflict between the two-houses, which unfortunately sheds relatively little light on its interpretation.” National Labor Relations Board v. Killy Brothers Nurseries, Inc., 341 F. 2d 433, 435 n. 2 (C.A. 2). However, it is noteworthy that the version offered by Congressman Elliott, which the House first adopted, would have defined, “agricultural labor” as it was defined in the Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, 53 Slat. 1377. 92 Cong. Rec. 668-9-6692 (1946). (A modified version of that pro- vision is now codified in 42 U.S.C. 410(f).) As Senator Me- Carran later reported, however, the House and the Senate “were in complete disagreement * * * on what is known as the Elliott rider,” and the conference committee finally agreed to substitute a provision referring to the definition of agriculture in Section 3(f) of the FLSA. 92 Cong. Rec. 9514 (1946). Senator Ball, a member of the conference committee, characterized the definition of “agri cultural laborer” in the Social Security Act as “very broad” and 90 15 “Agriculture” includes farming in all its branches and among other things includes the cultivation and tillage of the soil * * the raising of livestock, bees, fur-bearing animals or poultry, and any practices * * * performed by a farmer or on a farm as an incident to or in conjunction with such farming operations, including preparation for market, delivery to storage or to market or to carriers for trans portation to market. As this Court noted in Farm ers R eservo ir & Irriga tion Co. v. M eComb, 337 U.S. 755, 762-763, this definition has “two distinct branches.” The “ primary” branch— “farming in all its branches”—includes actual farm ing operations such as the raising of produce from the soil or the raising of poultry; and the “secondary” branch includes “any practices, whether or not them selves farming practices, which are performed either by a farmer or on a farm, incidently to or in con junction with ‘such’ farming operations” (ib id .). Petitioners properly concede (Br. 6) that the feed truck drivers do not perform work that would bring them within the “primary” branch of the agricultural exemption, i.e., that delivering truckloads of poultiy the FLSA section as “a much narrower definition” to which coun sel for the National Labor Relations Board had no real objection because only “a few minor changes in [the Board s] present pro cedure and definition” would be called for. Ibid. The language of the state statutes construed in two cases relied upon by the Company (Br. 13) is virtually identical to language of the “broad” definition incorporated in the Elliott rider which the Senate rejected. See Etchechowy v. Avi-Simplot, Inc., 93 Idaho 438, 462 P. 2d 737, 739; Maplewood Poultry Co. v. Maine Employment Security Common, 151 Me. 467, 121 A. 2d 360, o61- 363. 91 16 feed from a mill is not equivalent to raising poultry. Accordingly, petitioners must satisfy the “secondary” branch of the definition by showing that those drivers perform work by a farmer or on a farm, and also that the work is an incident to or in conjunction with the farming operations involved. As we show below, neither of these tests is met. B. T H E DRIVERS’ D U T IE S DO N O T C O N S T IT U T E PRA CTICES PER FO R M E D B Y A F A R M E R AS A N IN C ID E N T TO OR I N C O N JU N C T IO N W IT H H IS F A R M IN G O PERA TIO N S From the earliest days of the FL'SA the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor, which is responsible for administering the statute, and the courts have construed the phrase “practices * * * per formed by a farmer * * * as an incident to, or in con junction with, such farming operations” to refer to practices related to the farming operations of the farmer claiming the exemption, as distinct from the farming operations of other farmers. W aldo R ohnert Co. v. N ational Labor Relations B oard, 322 F. 2d 46, 48-49 (C.A. 9); M itchell v. H u n t, 263 F. 2d 913, 916- 917 (C.A. 5), quoting from Department of Labor In terpretive Bulletin No. 14, para. 10(f) (August 1939), 1940 WHM 185; N ational Labor R ela tions B oard v. Olaa S u gar Co., 242 F. 2d 714, 718 (C.A. 9) ; B ow ie v. Gonzales, 117 F. 2d 11, 18 (C.A. 1), cited with ap proval in F arm ers R eservo ir & Irr ig a tio n Co. v. McCornb, supra, 337 TT.S. at 766-767 n. 15; Depart ment of Labor Interpretive Bulletin, 29 C.F.R. 780.137. Indeed, the Company (Br. 11-12) concedes this point. Thus, the thrust of its argument (Br. 6, 7-10) 92 17 is that the raising of poultry on the contract farms is part of its own operations and that the duties of the truck drivers are performed as an incident to or in conjunction with this poultry raising. Stated other wise, it is the Company’s contention that the poultry feed delivery operation is a subordinate part of the Company’s agriculture venture—that venture being defined to include the raising of poultry by the grow ers on the contract farms. We submit that the Board and the court of appeals properly found, to the contrary, that the Company’s farming operations were limited to its own breeder farms and hatcheries, and that the duties of the truck drivers were practices incident to the operation of the Company’s feed mill rather than to its farming op erations. Cf. M aneja v. W aialua A gricu ltu ra l Co., L td ., 349 U.S. 254, 263, 265. 1. The independent growers, not the Company, raise the poultry on the contract farms The Company contracts with growers to raise its chickens in the growers’ facilities located on the grow ers’ farms. This operation is connected at one end to the Company’s hatcheries and feed mill and at the other end to the Company’s processing plant where the poultry is slaughtered and dressed for sale. In 1961, the Wage and Hour Division of the Depart ment of Labor issued an interpretive bulletin con cerning the status of such arrangements under Section 3(f) of the FLSA (26 Fed. Reg. 10386), and the interpretation is still adhered to by that agency in 93 18 substantially the same form. The interpretation pres ently states (29 C.F.R, 780.126) : § 780.126 Contract arrangements for raising poultry. Feed dealers and processors sometimes enter into contractual arrangements with farmers under which the latter agree to raise to market able size baby chicks supplied by the former who also undertake to furnish all the required feed and possibly additional items. Typically, the feed dealer or processor retains title to the chickens until they are sold. Under such an arrangement, the activities of the farmers and their employees in raising the poultry are clearly within section 3(f). The activities of the feed dealer or processor, on the other hand, are not “raising of poultry” and employees en gaged in them cannot be considered agricul tural employees on that ground. Employees of the feed dealer or processor who performs work on a farm as an incident to or in conjunction with the raising of poultry on the farm are em ployed in “secondary” agriculture (see §§ 780.- 137 et seq., [explaining that work must be per formed in connection with the farmer-employ er’s own farming to qualify as “secondary” agriculture by a farmer] and Johnston v. Cot ton Producers A ssn., 244 F. 2d 53).10 An interpretation such as this—made by the agency responsible for administering the statute in ques tion—is “ entitled to great weight.” U nited S ta tes v. A m erican T rucking A ssn., 310 U.S. 534, 549. As this 10 In Section C, infra, we show that the truck drivers are not employed in “secondary” agriculture by virtue of the fact that part of their work is performed on the growers’ farms. 94 19 Court has observed, interpretations of the FLSA by the Department of Labor, “ while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.” S kid m o re v. S w i f t <& Co., 323 TT.S. 134, 140. Both the court of appeals ( Pet. App. A-4 n. 4), and the Board thus properly relied on this interpretation.11 However, the administering agency’s conclusion that contractors like the Company are not themselves en gaged in the raising of poultry has been rejected by the Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits in decisions relied upon by the Company (Br. 8-10, 19). N ational Labor Relations B oard v. R yckebosch, Inc., 471 F. 2d 20 (C.A. 9); N ational Labor R ela tions B oard v. S tra in P o u ltry F arm s, Inc., 405 F. 2d 1025 (C.A. 5) ; W ir tz v. T yson’s P o u ltry , Inc ., 355 F. 2d 255 (C.A. 8).12 As 11 The Board’s decision does not cite the interpretation, but it relies on an earlier Board decision, McElrath Poultry Go., Inc., 206 NLRB 354, enforcement denied, 494 F. 2d 518 (C.A. 5), in which the interpretation is cited (206 NLRB at 355 n. 4). 12 Tyson's, the earliest of these decisions, is not flatly incon sistent with the Labor Department’s interpretation, since the con tracting arrangement there was somewhat different from the one described in the interpretation: the contractor placed laying hens with growers for the production of eggs, which were then handled, cooled, graded, candled, and packed by the contractor’s employees (who were found to be agricultural laborers). Moreover, as one state court has pointed out, only 27 percent of the eggs handled by the contractors’ employees were produced by the growers; the re maining 73 percent came from the contractor’s own farms. Fors Farms, Ino. v. Washington State Employment Security Dept., 75 Wash. 2d 383, 450 P. 2d 973, 977. However, Strain, supra, which 95 20 we show below, the Company’s contention, based on these authorities, that it is engaged in the raising of poultry by virtue of its arrangements with the con tract growers is inconsistent with court decisions dealing with contract farming arrangements for the production of other agricultural and horticultural commodities, and it misconceives the contract farming relationship. a. The division of risk between the grower and the Company indicates that the grower, not the Company, is the farming unit The Company (Br. 8-10), tracking the rationale of T yson’s, supra, 355 F. 2d at 260, and S tra in , supra, 405 F. 2d at 1033, stresses that it retains title to the chickens from the day they are hatched to the time they are sold as processed broilers. The Company does not—nor can it properly—-contend that continuing ownership of the poultry itself suffices to make the Company a farmer, for the courts have generally rejected this proposition.13 involved a contractor-feed dealer like those described in the inter pretation, relied and elaborated upon the Tyson’s rationale; and Ryckebosch, supra, in which the poultry contractor owned not only a feed mill, but also a processing plant and a few farms of its own (see Victor Ryckebosch, Inc., 189 NLRB 40, 41-42), relied on Strain without substantial discussion. The Fifth Circuit subse quently relied on Strain in Abbott Farms, Inc. v. National Laboi■> Relations Board, 487 F. 2d 904, and on Abbott Farms in McElrath Poultry Go., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 494 F. 2d 518. Neither decision turns on the extent of integration of the poultry contractor involved, although the court in Abbott noted that the contractor there owned no processing plant. 13 Waldo Rohnert Go. v. National Labor Relations Board, supra, 322 F. 2d at 47 (seed mill company not a farmer by virtue of its contracts with farmers to grow vegetable seed crops using com- 96 21 The Company instead asserts (Br. 9), again re flecting the analysis in T yso n ’s, supra, 355 F. 2d at 259-61 and S tra in , supra, 405 F. 2d at 1031, 1033, that, under its contracts with the growers, ownership of the poultry carries with it the entire risk of loss in the farming operations, whereas in the cases in which the contracting company was held not to be a farmer, “the farm product had to be marketable, saleable, or acceptable to the company and thus the risk of loss fell on the farmer.” In addition, the Company argues (Br. 9-10), citing S tra in , that, in a contract rela tionship like the one it maintains with its growers, the contractor, and not the growers, “assumes the risk of market fluctuations which affect the price of the birds.” Both of these arguments represent a consid erable over-simplification of the economic realities. The grower bears a substantial share of the risk of loss. He is able to enter into contracts with the pany-supplied seed, even though the company retained legal title to the growing crops and seed); Wirts v. Jackson & Perkhis Go., 312 F. 2d 48 (C.A. 2) (contractor not a farmer although it pro vided understock to growers raising plants for the contractor’s nursery business); Mitchell v. Huntsville 'Wholesale Nurseries, Inc., 267 F. 2d 286, 289 n. 2 (C.A. 5) (contractor not a farmer by virtue of its agreements with growers which provided “crop to be property of Huntsville at all times”). See also Parks v. Federal Crop Insurance Corp., 416 F. 2d 833 (C.A. 7) (farmers wTho grew corn from hybrid seed corn furnished by contractor that re tained legal title to portion of crops were the actual producers of all the corn under a provision of the Federal Crop Insurance Act, 7 U.S.C. 1508(c)); Elm Spring Farm v. United States, 127 F. 2d 920 (C.A. 1) (milk handling corporation that held title to dairy cows tended by farmers not a milk producer within the meaning of orders issued under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937,50 Stat. 246). 97 22 Company only after making a sizeable investment in land, poultry housing facilities, and related equip ment.14 Moreover, in carrying out his obligations under the contract, the grower incurs expenses not reimbursed by the Company under the contract. Thus, the grower pays the wages of any hired hands, the interest on any mortgage payments on the farm, any taxes other than local taxes on birds, and all main tenance and repair costs of his facilities and equip ment (Pet. App. A-28). While a grower is guaranteed a certain minimum payment based on square footage of his facilities supplied for housing the flock, he has no assurance that this fee will exceed his costs in any given con tract period, much less that he will recover his origi nal investment in land and farm facilities. More over, if for any reason the grower loses his farm, he is out of business, whereas the Company can simply switch to another contract grower or contract with the new owner of the farm for the raising of poultry. As 14 The growers’ combined investment probably exceeds that of the Company. A 1967 report issued by the U.S. Department of Agriculture stated that studies of broiler production in New Eng land showed that for an annual output of 19.76 million birds, the investment of the growers would be approximately 6.4 million dollars, v'hile the investment of the integrator (i.e., the poultry contractor) in its hatchery, feed mill and processing operation would be about 2.3 million dollars. Because of “the large invest ment required,” the report noted, “most integrators have not in vested greatly in growout operations.” U.S.D.A., Packers and Stockyards Administration, The Broiler Industry: An Economic Study of Structure, Practices and Problems (1967), p. 13 and Ap pendix 3. See also the description of grower investment in Ar kansas, id. at 14, n. 13. 98 23 the First Circuit noted in E lm S p rin g F arm v. U nited S ta te s , supra, 127 F. 2d at 927: [The company] might have become a producer by acquiring a farm and milk cows and going into the business of operating a dairy farm with the attendant risks of loss. “It chose to employ the scheme in question here. It con sidered it advantageous to avoid the risks of production and now must bear the burdens of a determination that other entities than itself are the producers.” G ray v. Pow ell, 1941, 314 U.S. 402, 414, 62 S. Ct, 326, 86 L. Ed —. The growers in the present case have significant risks of loss related to market shifts and to factors influencing the number and size of the chickens at maturity. Since the contracts between growers and the Company remain in effect only for such successive flocks “as may be placed by mutual agreement” (Pet. App. A-23), the Company is free to negotiate new terms, including the amount of the fixed fee, before placing a new flock. Thus, the rates negotiated will normally reflect market shifts in poultry prices; while the effects on the growers of market shifts may be delayed, they are not eliminated. See B. W. Marion and H. B. Arthur, D ynam ic Factors in V ertical Com m odity System s: A Case S tu d y o f the B ro iler S ystem , (Ohio Agricultural Research and Development Center, 1973), p. 44. Although there is no specific contract condition re quiring that the full-grown chickens be acceptable to the Company, that omission does not mean that the Company bears the full risk of loss from factors af- 99 24 fecting the survival and weight of the chickens. A grower’s compensation includes, in addition to the square footage guarantee, a bonus payment based in part on the weight of the poultry raised to maturity; the compensation can be calculated only after a given flock has been weighed and taken to the processing- plant. Thus, the grower is necessarily affected by any thing which reduces the weight or number of chickens still alive at the end of the grow-out period.15 In short, although some risks have been shifted from the grower to the Company under the contract governing their relationship, the grower still is sub ject to the turns of fortune which have always af fected those who invest their capital in farmland and their labor in farming. Accordingly, the grower, and not the Company, remains the farmer for pur poses of the agricultural exemption. 15 The contract does guarantee the grower a prorated payment in the event of certain calamities (Pet. App. A-27): “* * * the payment will be prorated on the basis of average mortality within a settlement, original flock density, and actual percentage salvaged when excessive bird losses resulted from: “a) An act of God (including, but not limited to, fire, winds, snow, or flooding). “b) OR, over 4% in excess of the average die as a result of lack of oxygen and/or heat exhaustion.” While the grower thus receives at least some payment in these circumstances, it is obviously less than he would receive had all the chickens lived to maturity. In other words, the loss in such circumstances is shared by grower and contractor. This provision does not cover mortality resulting from poultry diseases; the Com pany’s general manager explained (A. 30-31) that, although the Company volunteered to absorb losses resulting from an epidemic of laryngotraeheitis occuring shortly before the Board hearing, it was not obligated to do so under the contract. 100 25 b. The other factors in the relationship between the growers and the Company indicate the growers are independent farmers Even if this Court were to conclude, contrary to the foregoing, that the risk of loss in the poultry-raising venture had been shifted to the Company, it would not necessarily follow that the Company was raising the poultry on the contract farms. Another important factor to be considered is the nature of the relation ship between the growers and the Company—whether the growers are the agents or employees of the Com pany rather than independent contractors. M itchell v. H untsv ille W holesale N urseries, Inc ., supra, 267 P. 2d at 291. The Company (Br. 10) does not appear to be claim ing that the growers and their hired hands are its employees;16 it contends only that “[w]hether you define the relationship as an agency, subcontractor, or in substance as a lease by the company of the farm, equipment, and labor (A. 12), the elements of entre preneurship have been shifted by contractual agree ment from the farmer to the contractor company”. Although the Company provides some supervision of the growers,17 the record shows that it is not the 16 Indeed, the agreements explicitly state that they are not (Pet. App. A-28). 17 The contract provides that the grower will “follow instruc tions of the Bayside Supervisor in the care and management of Broiler, Roaster or Capon flocks” and will permit the Company’s personnel to enter “any facility pertinent to this contract at reasonable times” (Pet..App. A-26 to A-27). The Company also determines the composition of the feed supplied to the farms and the. scheduling of deliveries and provides certain disease-preven tion and other services. 1 0 1 26 kind of supervision generally associated with an em ployer-employee relationship. Thus, the Company’s general manager testified (A. 13) that the four field supervisors, or poultry servicemen, “called periodi cally on these farms on a routine basis or on a basis as the grower feels that he has a problem and needs their attention” (emphasis added). This suggests that some of the growers may encourage regular visits while others are content to call in the servicemen only in emergencies, such as conditions indicating the possible presence of disease. The existence of such supervision and auxiliary services has generally been held inadequate to show that the contractor is in fact engaged in farming.” The legislative history of Section 203(a)(6) of the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, 80 Stat. 833, 29 U.S.C. 213(a)(6) establishes that Congress, viewed growers for integrated poultry producers such as petitioners as independent contractors, and thus that the growers, not the integrated producers, are the 18 Waldo Rohnert Go. v. National Labor Relations Board, supra,. 322 F. 2d at 4f (contractor “given right to and does supervise the planting, inspects the growing crops * * * (removing undesirable plants) and decides when to irrigate * * *, when to weed, spray and finally when to harvest”) ; Mitchell v. Huntsville Wholesale Nurseries, Inc., supra, 267 F. 2d at 289 n. 2 (the crops were “under [the contractor’s] supervision as to the best methods of planting, production, digging, grading, packing, and shipping”) ; Mitchell v. Hertzke, 234 F. 2d 183, 190 (C.A. 10) (contractor determined “time and conditions of the planting [of bean crops], the condi tions under which the beans w'ere to be raised,” and the time for harvesting). See also Parks v. Federal Crop Insurance Gorp.,. supra, 416 F. 2d at 835 (contractor agreed to furnish to corn grow ers “a man to supervise the planting of the seed”). 102 27 farmers for purposes of that Section. It strongly sug gests the same conclusion under the related Section 3(f), 29 U.S.C. 203(f), involved here. Section 203(a) exempts “any employee employed in agriculture” from the minimum wage provisions of the FLSA under certain conditions. In explaining the effect of this exemption on farmers who contract with integrated poultry producers, Senator Yarborough, the floor manager of the bill, confirmed his question er’s belief in the continued applicability of “the tra ditional tests that have heretofore been applied under the Act in determining whether an independent con tractor or an employee relationship exists” between the grower and the company, under which the grower—and not the company—was the agricultural employer affected by the exemption. Senator Yar borough specifically identified the tests involved as those contained in the committee report. (112 Cong. Ree. 20819-20820 (1966).) That report, S. Rep. No. 1487, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), relies on R u th er fo rd Food Corp. v. McCornb, 331 U.S. 722, noting that “the total situation controls” in determining whether individuals are employees or independent contractors (S. Rep. No. 1487, supra, at 11).19 The report (ib id .) lists the following factors, 19 This is consistent with the Board’s test for determining in dependent contractor status. See National Labor Relations Board v. United Insurance Co., 390 U.S. 254, 258; National Labor Rela tions Board v. Deaton, Inc., 502 F. 2d 1221, 1223-1224 (C.A. 5), certiorari denied, 422 U.S. 1047. 103 28 derived from R u th er fo rd (331 U.S. at 730), to be considered: (1) The extent to which the services rendered are an integi*al part of the principal’s business; (2) The permanency of the relationship; (3) The opportunities for profit or loss; (4) The initiative, judgment, or foresight ex ercised by the one who performs the services; (4) The amount of investments; and (6) The degree of control which the principal has in the situation. The fact that the legislative history of Section 203(a) identifies these factors as the “traditional tests” for distinguishing between employees of farmers and in dependent contractors is strong evidence that they were also intended to apply in making the same dis tinction under Section 3(f) of the same statute. The first factor is, in a broad sense, a statement of the ultimate issue; but in the context of R u th er fo rd , where the individuals found to be employees were meat boners who “did a specialty job on the production line” in the employer’s slaughtering plant (331 U.S. at 730) it could be viewed as a factor weighing against employee status for the growers and their helpers. Al though the raising of the poultry is essential to the Company’s business and the supplies and services fur nished by the Company are necessary to the growers, the growers’ work is scarcely an integral part of the Company’s operation comparable to a single operation on an assembly line. With respect to “ the permanency of the relation ship,” the contracts are in effect only for a particular 104 29 grow-out period of seven to nine weeks and may be extended only “by mutual agreement.” As shown (pp. 21-24, supra ), the growers do have “opportunities for profit or loss” ; and insofar as their total compensa tion depends on their bonus payments, which are in turn dependent on how many pounds of poultry they have produed by the end of the grow-out period, it is incumbent upon them to exercise “ initiative, judg ment, or foresight.” Indeed, the Company’s General Manager testified (A. 31) that the contract ŵ as de signed so that “in a normal operating situation with normal mortalities, [a grower’s] income would be in fluenced by his capabilities.” As already discussed, the growers have considerable amounts invested in the poultry raising, since they must furnish the farms, facilities, and labor.20 Finally, although the contract enables the Company to exer cise some supervision of operations, it is not the kind of close daily supervision over details of work which would be typical of an employer-employee relation ship (see pp. 25-26 supra ), and there is no evidence to suggest the Company has a voice in hiring or firing a grower’s farmhands. Thus, the degree of control main tained by the principal is not such as to deprive the growers of independent contractor status. In the light of all of the circumstances, the growers are independent contractors, as the legislative history referred to above indicates Congress understood to be 20 In contrast, in Rutherford, supra, 331 U.S. at 725, the meat boner’s investment was limited to the cost of a hook on which to hang the meat, a knife, a knife sharpener, and a leather apron. 105 30 the case for typical contract growers in the broiler industry. £. The Company's feed delivery operation is not a subordinate part of its fanning operations Although the Company is not engaged in the raising of poultry on the contract farms, it does, as the Board found, engage in some farming operations coming within the primary branch of Section 3(f) of the FLSA.21 However, under the tests of M aneja v. W ai- alua A gricu ltura l Co., L td ., supra, 349 U.S. at 264-265, the feed delivery operation is not “part of [the Com- 21 In discussing the Company’s character as a vertically inte grated poultry enterprise (Br. 10-19), the Company misconceives the Board's position and the reasoning of the court of appeals. Although the Board (Pet. App. A-18) found that “Bayside and Poultry Processing constitute a multifaceted organization whose enterprises and jourposes go far beyond the bounds of traditional farming,” it was not concerned, as the Company asserts (Br. 13), with the Company’s “motivation,” nor was it seeking, as the Com pany suggests (Br. 18-19), to place the entire organization “in the commerce column” or hold it to be entirely “non-agricultural.” Kather the Board found, and the court agreed, that the Company consists of a number of different operations, some of which are agricultural and some of which are not—in other words, the orga nization as a whole was not placed in any “column” (Pet. App. A-4, A-18). The Board further found, and the court agreed, that the feed mill and feed delivery operations were not among the Company’s farming operations and that they were not incident to any of the operations which were. In reaching that conclusion, it was appropriate, contrary to the Company’s assertion (Br. 19), to look at each of the Company’s components in order to determine the size of the nonfarming operations relative to that of the farm ing operations and to determine the relationship between the work of the employees in question and the farming operations. Maneja v. Waialua Agricultural Co., supra, 349 U.S. at 264-265. 106 31 pany’s] agricultural venture” and the Board prop erly found that feed truck drivers do not perform duties incident to that venture. In W aialua, this Court held that, in determining whether a particular operation is incident to or in conjunction with farming, it is necessary to consider all of the facts, including the seven criteria develop ed by the Wage-Hour Administrator (349 IT.S. at 264-265): (a) The size of the ordinary farming opera- tions. * * * (b) The type of product resulting from the operation in question. * * * (c) The investment in the processing opera tion as opposed to the ordinary farming activi ties. * * * (d) The time spent in processing and in ordinary farming. * * * (e) The extent to which ordinary farmwork ers do processing. * * * (f) The degree of separation by the em ployer between the various operations. * * * (g) The degree of industrialization. These criteria indicate that the operation of the feed mill is not incidental to the Company’s farming operations, and that the feed delivery is incidental to the feed mill, and not the farming operations. The ordinary farming operations of the Company are only a small part of its total enterprise. The Com pany owns and operates approximately six breeder farms and two hatcheries, a commercial hatchery and 107 32 a pedigree hatchery.22 There are no more than 80 employees of these breeder farms and hatcheries, whereas the feed mill and processing plant employ more than 400 persons (A. 17, 60-62).23 Since less than twenty per cent of the Company’s workforce is engaged in actual farming operations, the Board (Pet. App. A-17) properly rejected the Company’s claim that its operations, in the aggregate, constituted farming. Nor do the other factors specified in W aialua, supra, indicate that the processing of the feed is in cidental to the company’s agricultural operations. The feed mill operation is separate from the ordinary farming operations; the mill itself is leased from the company that built it (A. 26-27), and is evidently operated by employees who have no ordinary agricul- 22 The six breeder farms are connected to the pedigree hatchery. The record indicates (A. 11) that there are eleven farms associated with the commercial hatchery, but the Company apparently does not own them. The Company did not specifically except to the Administrative Law Judge’s finding that it owned and operated “two hatcheries and six primary breeding farms,” and it asserted in its fact statement filed with the Board (A. 67) that “Bayside itself owns approximately seven farms ([Tr.] 130, 30) all of which at the present time are being used for the parent-grandparent operation ([Tr.] 133-34).” In its brief to the court of appeals (p. 2), the Company mentioned only the hatcheries, the 110 con tract farms, and “six or seven company-owned farms (used for breeding).” The Company’s Exhibit 5, a list of employees carried on the payroll of Bayside, the parent corporation (A. 60-62), has 80 names, but they include those of the Company’s General Manager and the feed truck drivers and their dispatcher who, as shown below, have very little to do with the Company’s own farms. 108 33 tural duties (A. 18, 45).84 Its function is to transform purchased ingredients—some of them, such as drugs and soybean meal, already in a manufactured state— into a manufactured agricultural product in a variety of forms (A. 14-15, 70). The mill produces about 120,000 tons of feed a year, and sells about a third of that to an unrelated company (A. 26). The produc tion of feed is thus a typical industrial operation. M aneja v. W aiahta A gricu ltu ra l Co., L td ., supra, 349 U.S. at 264-265; M itchell v. B udd , 350 U.S. 473; 481-482; H oltv ille A l f a l f a M ills v. W y a tt , 230 P. 2d 398, 403 (C.A. 9). The feed delivery is the final step in the feed pro duction process, and is thus incidental to the feed mill operation, not to the Company’s farming operations. The feed mill drivers have very little contact with the Company’s hatcheries and breeder farms. Most of the 24 Poultry farmers apparently ordinarily have not operated their own feed mills. A publication describing the Maine poultry in dustry during the 1960’s notes that, before 1963, “three-fourths of the manufactured feed was shipped in from out-of-state plants.” F. D. Reed, The Maine Poultry Industry: Its Impact, Growth and Competitive Position (Univ. of Maine, Cooperative Extension Service, Circular 394, Rev. July 1970), p. 9. Because of a change in rail rates in 1964 and because of “certain developments in mill ing technology,” it became more advantageous to use feed mills within the state, so that, as of December 31, 1969, approximately “85 to 90 percent of the feed” consumed by Maine poultry was manufactured in the state (id., Foreword and pp. 9-10). At this same time there were “13 commercial feed mills manufacturing poultry feeds” and only “a half-dozen small farm mills manu facturing feed for home use” (id. at 10), while there were then 737 broiler farms in the state (id. at 11; see also Tr. 75-76). 109 34 feed deliveries to the breeder farms are made by drivers working for the KLF feed mill rather than by the Company’s drivers (A. 25). There is no exchange of duties between the feed truck drivers and the Company’s farm employees. Instead, the drivers’ duties in addition to loading their trucks and deliver ing feed to the contract farms are related solely to the feed mill operation; as shown (pp. 8-9, supra ), the drivers sometimes transport feed ingredients to the mill from places as distant as Gloucester, Massachusetts. The drivers report to the mill for work and return there when deliveries are completed to wash down their trucks. See V ives v. Serralles, 145 F. 2d 552, 555 (C.A. 1); Calaf v. Gonzales, 127 F. 2d 934, 937 (C.A. 1). They are supervised by a dispatcher at the mill, and, although the dispatcher consults with the Company’s broiler department manager—whose re sponsibilities include the supervision of the growers (A. 40-41)—regarding feed composition and schedul ing, the dispatcher’s “day-to-day” supervisor is, as he testified (A. 47), Merle Weymouth, the assistant manager of the feed mill, who is in charge of mixing the feed (A. 45, 47). Moreover, the undisputed testimony of a former Company feed truck driver shows that Weymouth hired and fired the drivers (A. 52-53, 58-59).25 In sum, the Company’s farming operations consti tute only a small proportion of its total enterprise, 25 Although the drivers and the dispatcher were carried on the payroll of Bayside, the parent corporation (A. 60-62), Weymouth was identified as an employee of the subsidiary, Poultry Proc essing, which operated the mill (A. 32). 110 35 and the feed truck drivers do not perform work “inci dent to or in conjunction with” those operations, hut instead work in conjunction with the independent feed production operation. The delivery of feed to the con tract farms is not part of the Company’s “agricultural venture.” C. T H E DRIVERS DO N O T PER FO R M W O R K O N A F A R M AS A N IN C ID E N T TO OR I N C O N JU N C T IO N W IT H F A R M IN G O PE R A T IO N S W IT H IN T H E M E A N IN G O F T H E FLSA A G R IC U LT U R A L E X E M P T IO N Neither petitioners nor the cases upon which they rely have suggested that the truck drivers’ work might be within the secondary branch of the definition of agriculture in Section 3(f) on the theory that it in volves “ practices * * * on a farm as an incident to,, or in conjunction with, such farming operations.” Although the drivers’ work requires them to spend some time daily on the growers’ farms, that fact does not suffice to bring them within this part of the defini tion. This is so because first, the work the drivers per form on the farm is not of the type contemplated by this part of the definition, and second, in any event,, the drivers are not “on the farm” for most of their working hours.26 26 At least one court in addition to the court below has evidently concluded that the requirement that the agricultural work must be incidental to the employer's farming operations {supra, p. 16) applies to work claimed to be exempt because performed “on a farm” as well as to that performed “by a farmer.” See National Labor Relations Board v. Olaa Sugar Company, 242 F. 2d 714T 718 (C.A. #9) ; Pet. App. A-3. I l l 36 1. The delivery of supplies is not work “on a farm” within the agricultural exemption As this Court observed in F arm ers R eservo ir dc Irriga tion Co. v. M cComb, supra, 337 U.S. at 767, the secondary branch of the definition of agriculture in Section 3(f) as originally proposed would have included only “practices * * * performed by a farmer as an incident to, or in conjunction with, such farm ing operations * * On an amendment offered by Senator McGill, the phrase “or on a farm” was in serted immediately following “by a farmer.” 81 Cong. Rec. 7888 (1937). The concern prompting the amend ment, as this Court noted (337 U.S. at 767), was that the definition of agriculture would otherwise not cover “the threshing of wheat or other functions necessary to the farmer if those functions were not performed by the farmer and his hands, but by separate com panies organised fo r and devoted solely to tha t par ticular job” (emphasis supplied).27 27 The following colloquy, quoted by the Court, 337 U.S. at 7G7 n. 16, took place between Senators Tydings and Borah (Senator Borah was a member of the Senate Committee on Education and Labor which reported out S. 2475, eventually enacted into law as the FLSA) : “Mr. T ydings. * * * In the case I visualize * * * the farmer is not performing the service. The man to whom I refer makes a business of doing nothing but threshing. He owns his own ma chine, and hauls it from farm to farm, and enters into contracts with farmers to thresh their crops; the point being that while he is dealing with an agricultural commodity, he is not necessarily a farmer, and he is not doing work ordinarily done by a farmer. “Mr. B oraii. lie is doing the exact work which the farmer did before he took it up. “Mr. T ydings. That is true, but I do not think the bill is drawn 112 37 Thus, the practices performed “on a farm” to which the exemption was intended to refer are activities, such as threshing, performed substantially, if not en tirely, on a farm by employees of a company provid ing specialized agricultural services, and carried out as part of a traditional farming activity, such as har vesting. Accordingly, the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor has issued the following interpretation of “employment in practices on farm” (29 C.F.R. 780.136) : § 780.136 Employment in practices o:n a farm. Employees engaged in building terraces or threshing wheat and other grain, employees en gaged in the erection of silos and granaries, employees engaged in digging wells or building dams for farm ponds, employees engaged in inspecting and culling flocks of poultry, and pilots and flagmen engaged in the aerial dust ing and spraying of crops are examples of the types of employees of independent contractors who may be considered employed in practices performed “on a farm”. Whether such em ployees are engaged in “ agriculture” depends, of course, on whether the practices are per formed as an incident to or in conjunction with the farming operations on the particular farm, as discussed in §§ 780.141-780.147; that is, whether they are carried on as a part of the agricultural function or as a separately orga- in sufficient detail to bring the man to whom I refer under its pro visions of exemption.” (81 Cong. Rec. 7653 (1937).) See also the comments of Senator Bone, id. at 7659, and the colloquy between Senators McGill, George and Black, id. at 7888. 113 38 nized productive activity (§§780.104-780.144). Even though an employee may work on several farms during a workweek, he is regarded as em ployed “ on a farm” for the entire workweek if his work on each farm pertains solely to farming operations on that farm. The fact that a minor and incidental part of the work of such an employee occurs off the farm will not affect this conclusion. Thus, an employee may spend a small amount of time within the workweek in transporting necessary equipment for work to be done on farms. Field employees of a can- ner or processor of farm products who work on farms during the planting and growing sea son where they supervise the planting opera tions and consult with the grower on problems of cultivation are employed in practices per formed “on a farm” so long as such work is done entirely on farms save for an incidental amount of reporting to their employer’s plant. Other employees of the above employers em ployed away from the farm would not come within Section 3(f) . For example, airport em ployees such as mechanics, loaders, and officer workers employed by a crop dusting firm would not be agriculture employees [citations omitted]. The decisions on the status of activities allegedly •exempt by reason of being “practices performed on a farm” as an incident to farming operations have been consistent with this interpretation. See, e.g., B oyls v. W irtz , 352 F. 2d 63 (C.A. 5) (pilot and flagman en gaged in aerial crop dusting within the exemption, but not their off-farm support personnel) ; H oltv ille 114 39 Al f a l f a M ills v. W y a tt , supra, 230 F. 2d at 402- 403 (remanded on theory that transportation of chopped alfalfa from field to mill by drivers who did not handle product at mill but returned immediately to field with empty trucks would be exempt as on-the- farm activity only if factual findings showed that transportation was actually a continuous part of harvesting) ; T ip to n v. Associated M ilk Producers, Inc., 398 F. Supp. 743 (N.D. Tex.) (employees who installed and repaired milk cooling equipment on farms are within the exemption where off-farm work was only occasional, minor, and incidental). But see W ir t2 v. Osceola F arm s Co., 372 F. 2d 584, 589 (C.A. 5) (exemption applied to drivers employed by sugar mill to transport farm laborers to farm of inde pendent growers and to bring meals to the laborers during harvesting). By contrast to the types of activities exempt under the principles set forth above, the delivery of sup plies such as poultry feed to a farmer is essentially the final phase of the operation by which supplies are produced and distributed, rather than an incident of the poultry-feeding process.28 This distinction is 28 The situation might be different if, for example, the drivers had significant responsibilities for the care of the chickens or even for assuring the proper operation of the feeding equipment. In stead, although they take certain precautions on the farms to avoid spreading disease or spoiling the feed, they have no direct contact with the poultry and are no more involved in actual farm activities than truck drivers who took care to avoid causing fires when delivering crude oil to oil refineries would be involved in oil refining. 115 40 reflected in the language of Section 3(f) . In defining the practices included in the secondary branch of agriculture, Congress specifically identified “delivery to storage or to market or to carriers for transpor tation to market.” Such deliveries of farm products are the final phase of the agricultural venture. On the other hand, the delivery of supplies to the farm is the final phase of their production. And the off-farm production of such supplies is a separately organized nonagricultural function, even when the supplies are essential to farming.29 Their distribution to farms is hardly akin to wheat threshing, even if a portion of the activity takes place on the farm. Thus, in Johnston v. C otton P roducers A ssn ., 244 F. 2d 553 (C.A. 5), in which the employee in ques tion worked for an organization which, like the Com pany, placed its chicks on contract growers’ farms to be raised into broilers, the court held (id . at 555) that the empolyee’s work in supervising the growing of the chicks and catching and cooping them for market was, to the extent done on the farms, within the agricultural exemption of the FLSA. However, the same employee’s work in “hauling a load of fer tilizer from the car in which it wTas shipped from outside the state to a farmer customer” was “in con nection with and incidental to a retail sale” (ib id .) and 28 See, e.ff., Wirtz v. Ti Ti Peat Ilumus Go., 373 F. 2d 209, 213 (C.A. 4), certiorari denied, 389 U.S. 834 (production of peat moss used as a soil conditioner and fertilizer) ; McConnb v. Super-A Fertilizer Works, Inc., 165 F. 2d 824, 828 (C.A, 1) (production of fertilizer), cited with approval in Farmers Reservoir & Irriga tion Co. v. McCornb, supra, 337 U.S. at 761. 116 41 thus within the retail establishment exemption, not the agricultural exemption, of the FLSA. In the pres ent ease, there is no formal retail sale of poultry feed because the feed cost is simply figured into the form ula by which the grower’s total compensation is cal culated; nevertheless, the Board’s finding (Pet. App. A-19) that the delivery of the feed was incident to the feed milling operation is analogous to the finding in Johnston that the delivery was incident to the sale. Nor is F arm ers R eservo ir &, Irrig a tio n Co. v. Mc- Comb, supra, authority for the view that a simple supply function, like the feed mill drivers’, is within the agricultural exemption. There this Court indicated (337 U.S. at 766) that the work of employees of a company that collects, stores and distributes irrigation water would be exempt as “a practice performed as an incident to or in conjunction with farming” if per formed by a farmer or on a farm. This is because irrigation of the farm itself, as opposed to simply delivering water to floodgates at the edges of the farm, would result in the actual watering of crops.80 The exemption of the irrigation workers would not follow because, like the truck drivers here, they simply de livered supplies to the farm. The fact that the truck drivers, unlike the irrigation workers, must enter the 3<> The Court emphasized this distinction in concluding that the. irrigation workers were not farmers: “the responsibility of the company’s employees ceases when they so release the water. The water is supplied to the farmer at the head gates and he takes it over there and uses it, in his own laterals as he sees fit, to irrigate his crops” (id. at 763). 117 42 farm in order to make their deliveries, does not suffice to bring the basic delivery function within the exemp tion. 2. The drivers work is not substantially 'performed “on a farm” Even if the truck drivers’ deliveries to the growers are considered to be incidental to the growers’ farm ing operations, the drivers are not working “on the farm” in any substantial sense. Their on-farm work is instead simply incidental to their main job, both in terms of importance and of the time consumed. They are drivers, not feed bin loaders—their primary function is to transport the feed to the growers, and that function cannot be performed on a farm. See 29 C.F.R. 780.134.31 Moreover, they are physically on a farm for only one-half to one hour at a time, or a total of one and a half to four hours out of the usual nine-hour work day (A. 21, 54, 57-58). Thus, most of their work time is not spent on a farm, and is not within the agricultural exemption. Originally, the Board declined to assert jurisdiction over employees who regularly spend part of their time in agricultural work. See C linton Foods, Inc., 108 NLRB 85; N ational Labor R ela tions B oard v. Olaa Sugar Com pany, supra, 242 F. 2d at 71,9-721. 31 In contrast, in Wirtz v. Lyon Flying Service, 16 WH Cases 414 (W.D. La.), the agricultural exemption applied to employees of a crop dusting company who drove with fertilizers and insecti cides from the company office to farms where they spent the day loading the crop dusting planes, returning to the office at the end of the day to wa-sh their trucks. In that case, the employees were loaders, not drivers; their on-farm work was more significant than their transportation responsibilities. 118 43 The Board has, however, formally abandoned the C linton Foods doctrine, and now follows the rule that the National Labor Relations Act covers em ployees who regularly perform non-agricultural work, in addition to some agricultural work. I I . A . R id er & Sons, 117 NLRB 517; Olaa Sugar Com pany, 118 NLRB 1442, 1443 (on remand from N ational Labor R ela tions B oard v. Olaa Sugar, su p ra ).32 This rule was disapproved in N ational Labor R elations B oard v. K e lly B ro thers N urseries, Inc., 341 F. 2d 433 (C.A. 2) when applied to bring within the coverage of the Act employees spending more than eighty-five percent of their time in agricultural work. But the court empha sized the soundness of a rule which would cover employees whose work was substantially non-agricul tural. In K elly B ro thers, the objection was simply that the “small proportions (of non-agricultural work) are inadequate to tip the scales in favor of bringing these men, who would be regarded as farmers on any realistic view, within the National Labor Relations 32 It is settled that the exemptions to the Fair Labor Standards Act, including the agricultural exemption, are not applicable if the workweek includes any nonexempt work at all. Thus, Mitchell v. Hunt, 263 F. 2d 913 (C.A. 5) held that the FSLA applied to all work of empoyees who worked in admittedly exempt farming operations every day of the wreek, but worked at the farmer’s auc tion barn on Saturday, where he sold livestock of other farmers as well as his own. Accord, Hodgson v. Wittenburg, 464 F. 2d 1219, 1220-21 (C.A. 5); HearnsVerger v. Gillespie, 435 F. 2d 926, 930 (C.A. 8); Wirtz v. Von Carstedt, 362 F. 2d 67, 69-70 (C.A, 9); Tobin v. Blw Channel Corp., 198 F. 2d 245, 248 (C.A. 4) ; 1Vabash Radio Corp. v. Walling, 162 F. 2d 391, 394 (C.A. 6) ; 29 C.F.E. 780.11. 119 44 Act'-’ {id. at 439) A Here the converse situation exists: the small proportions of their agricultural work are inadequate to bring the feed truck drivers, who would not be regarded as farmers on any realistic view, within the agricultural exemption to the Act. CONCLUSION The judgment of the court of appeals should be affirmed. Respectfully submitted. R obert H . B okk, Solic itor General. J ohn S. I rving, General Counsel, J ohn E. H iggins, Jr., D epu ty General Counsel, Carl L. T aylor, Associate General Counsel, N orton J . Come, D ep u ty Associate General Counsel, E linor H adley Stillman, A tto rney . N ational Labor R elations Board. September 1976. 33 Recent Board decisions involving the mixed work rule are essentially consistent with this reasoning. See, e.g., Aquaculture Research Coi'p., 215 NLRB No. 1, 87 LRRM 1496 (jurisdiction asserted where agricultural and nonagricultural work intermixed and nonagricultural work was substantial); Light's Tree Go., 194 NLRB 229 (jurisdiction not asserted where ninety per cent of total worktime was spent in agricultural work). 120 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OCTOBER TERM , 1976 No. 75-1267 BAYSIDE ENTERPRISES, INC., et al„ Petitioners, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD. On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE AND BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF GEORGIA POULTRY FEDERATION, INC. Of Counsel ALSTON, M ILLER & GAINES MICHAEL A. DOYLE FREDERICK H. VON UNWERTH 1200 Citizens and Southern National Bank Building Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Counsel for Georgia Poultry Federation, Inc. November, 1976 121 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OCTOBER TERM , 1976 No. 75-1267 BAYSIDE ENTERPRISES, INC., et ai„ Petitioners, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD. On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF GEORGIA POULTRY FEDERATION, INC. Georgia Poultry Federation, Inc. hereby respectfully moves for leave to file the attached brief amicus curiae in this case. The consent of the attorney for the Petitioner has been obtained. Counsel has been advised that the Solicitor General, as attorney for the Respondent, will not oppose the filing of the brief if filed sufficiently prior to oral argument. 123 11 The interest of the Georgia Poultry Federation in this case arises from the fact that it is an association whose membership includes all integrated poultry producers in the State of Geor gia, each of whom will be substantially affected by the ruling in this case. Like the Petitioners herein, these members of the Georgia Poultry Federation are companies engaged in the pro duction of poultry who use contract growers during the growout phase of production, but who generally own the poultry through out all stages of production, supply the initiative for and major investment in the production, and make all the important de cisions with respect to both production and marketing of the agricultural product. These integrated producers thus perform the critical functions and face the traditional risks which are inherent in the role of the farmer producing an agricultural product. The qualification of integrated poultry producers as agri cultural producers entitled to the special consideration afforded by Congress to such producers under a supportive national agri culture policy implemented by a comprehensive statutory scheme, including the labor exemption at issue here, is a matter of paramount importance to all poultry producers. It is likely that the decision in this case will control the application of agricultural exemptions to integrated poultry producers in a variety of contexts, including federal and state taxation and anti trust laws in addition to the Fair Labor Standards Act and the National Labor Relations Act. The character of integrated poultry production operations as “agriculture” and “farming” has been recognized and affirmed repeatedly by the Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits. This case offers the Court an opportunity to make the practical reasoning of those circuits binding and conclusive in all areas where poultry is produced in the United States. The Petitioners have relied upon a distinction between a “pri mary” and “secondary” meaning of agriculture drawn by the 124 iii Court below from this Court’s decision in Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. McComb, 337 U.S. 755 (1949), and have limited their argument before this Court to a contention that Bayside and its employees fall only within the “secondary branch of farming”. (Pet. Br. at 6). It is believed that Bayside and other integrated poultry producers fall within the “primary” meaning of agriculture as this Court intended the definition to be read, and the attached brief which amicus curiae is request ing permission to file develops this argument for the Court’s con sideration. The “primary” definition argument offered by ami cus curiae, which is not otherwise developed in briefs before the Court, would be dispositive of this case if accepted. Respectfully submitted, MICHAEL A. DOYLE FREDERICK H. VON UNWERTH 1200 Citizens and Southern National Bank Building 35 Broad Street Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Counsel for Georgia Poultry- Federation, Inc. 125 V INDEX Page Interest of the Amicus Curiae........................................ 1 Argument ....................................................................... 3 A. Poultry “farming” today is carried on almost ex clusively by integrated producers who own the birds, initiate and direct production, and bear the risks of production and marketing .............. 3 B. Integrated broiler producers such as Bayside are engaged in “agriculture” in its primary meaning— “The raising of poultry” ..................................... 5 Conclusion .................................................................... 11 CITATIONS Cases Abbott Farms, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 487 1 .2d 904 .................................................................. 6, 9 Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. McComb, 337 U.S. 775 ............................................................................ 5 Garth, 56 T.C. 6 1 0 ........................................................ 9 Maple Leaf Farms, Inc., 64 T.C. 438 ............................. 9 McElrath Poultry Co., Inc., 206 NLRB 354 enforcement denied, 494 F.2d 518 ................................................. 6, 9 National Labor Relations Board v. Ryckebosch, Inc., 471 F.2d 20 ............................... ................................. .6, 8, 9 127 VI National Labor Relations Board v. Strain Poultry Farms, Inc., 405 F.2d 1025 .....................................6, 7, 8, 9, 10 Nix v. Farmers’ Mutual Exchange of Calhoun, Inc., 218 F.2d 642 .................................................................... 6 United States v. Chemell, 243 F,2d 944 ......................... 6, 9 Wirtz v. Tyson’s Poultry, Inc., 355 F.2d 255 ................. 6 Statutes and Regulations Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Section 3(f), 52 Stat. 1060, as amended, 29 U.S.C. 203 (f) ......................... 3, 5, 7 National Labor Relations Act, Section 2(3), as amended (61 Stat. 136, 73 Stat. 519, 29 U.S.C. 152(3))............. 7 128 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OCTOBER TERM , 1976 No. 75-1267 BAYSIDE ENTERPRISES, INC., et al„ Petitioners, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD. On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF GEORGIA POULTRY FEDERATION, INC. INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE The Georgia Poultry Federation includes in its membership all integrated producers of broilers, eggs and turkeys in Georgia. Georgia is the poultry capital of the world, leading all states in total income from poultry and poultry products. 129 2 The integrated poultry producers who are members of the Georgia Poultry Federation have a vital interest in the decision of this case for two reasons: (a) it will directly affect the right of all of them to claim the specific exemption at issue here, and (b) the decision in this case is likely to control indirectly the application of agricultural exemptions to integrated poultry producers in a variety of contexts, including federal and state taxation and antitrust, in addition to imposing upon them the broad requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the National Labor Relations Act. 130 3 ARGUMENT A. Poultry “Farming” Today Is Carried on Almost Exclu sively by Integrated Producers Who Own the Birds, Initiate and Direct Production, and Bear the Risks of Production and Marketing. The question of overriding general importance presented by this case is whether or not integrated poultry production as it is carried on today is “farming” or “agriculture”. The techniques and organization of the poultry system are unique in agricultural production, and their uniqueness poses certain analytical prob lems in statutory application. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that the result is an agricultural product, and the inte grated poultry producer faces the same agricultural risks and problems which gave rise to the congressional concern for farm ers underlying the creation of a comprehensive statutory scheme of protection for agricultural producers. “Agriculture”, in the terms of Fair Labor Standards Act Sec tion 3(f), 29 U.S.C. 203(f), includes “farming in all its branches,” including “the raising of . . . poultry.” If what integrated poultry producers do is “farming”, then they are exempt from a variety of requirements imposed generally upon employers un der the Fair Labor Standards Act and the National Labor Rela tions Act. Poultry “farming” today involves several stages and opera tions. For broiler chickens such as Bayside produces, it includes (a) the placement, raising and breeding of breeder flocks to pro duce eggs for hatching as broiler chicks, (b) the hatching of these eggs and the placement of the chicks for growout to maturity, (c) the growing of the broiler chicks to the age of maturity, (d) the catching, cooping and hauling of the grown-out birds to processing facilities, and (e) the operation of facilities to process and prepare the broilers for market. 131 — 4 — In the present day broiler system, all or most of these opera tions are carried on by integrated producers through various kinds of employees and, during the growout stage, contract growers. The integrated producer provides the initiative for production in the first instance, directs the production operations in all phases, supplies inputs accounting for more than 90% of the production costs, makes all important production and market ing decisions, and bears the risk of being unable to market the agricultural product at a price adequate to cover the production and marketing costs. During the growout phase, where contract growers are em ployed to house and care for the birds until they reach maturity, ownership of the birds remains in the integrators. In addition to owning the birds, the integrated producers choose the breed or type of broiler to be produced and make all decisions with respect to the number and timing of chick placements; supply the feed and make all decisions with regard to diet and type of feed; supply the medicines, vaccines and other health supplies for the birds; supply all veterinary services during the growout period; transport the chickens and feed to the growers, and transport the grown-out chickens from the growers to the processing plants; provide the equipment and some or all of the labor for catching, cooping and loading the live birds; and make all decisions with regard to the age and size at which the birds shall be marketed. Fieldmen or supervisors employed by the integrators provide supervision of the growout operation to assure that the grower is properly feeding, watering and otherwise caring for the producer’s birds. Having initiated, paid for and directed the production of broilers, the integrated producer must then market his product in a typical agricultural market. There is no live market for broilers today, and broilers are marketed in fresh, ready-to-cook form by the integrated producers. The product is highly perishable, and once production is committed, the integrator must either sell his 132 5 product or destroy it. Pricing is characterized by volatility and instability, a characteristic which is harmful to producers and consumers alike, and the product is distributed through middle men intervening between the integrator and the consumer. In tegrated broiler producers are scattered and largely uninformed with respect to inventories and demand, and the market is con sequently highly susceptible to over-production. The demand for broilers is seasonal and cyclical, the market price fluctuates weekly and sometimes hourly, and the market is dominated by concentrated buyers. It is apparent from all of this that integrated broiler producers occupy the traditional role of “farmers” in producing and marketing an agricultural product. B. Integrated Broiler Producers Such as Bayside Are En gaged in “Agriculture” in Its Primary Meaning—“The Raising of . . , Poultry.” The decision of the First Circuit Court of Appeals below was based on a misreading of this Court’s decision in Farmers Reser voir & Irrigation Co. v. McComb, 337 U.S. 755 (1949). In Farmers Irrigation Co., this Court indeed observed that the sec tion 3(f) definition of “agriculture” has two branches. “Farm ing in all its branches” was said to be the “primary meaning”, and “practices performed either by a farmer or on a farm” fell within the “broader meaning” of agriculture. Id. at 762, 763. The Farmers Irrigation Company was organized solely to supply irrigation water to farmers, and it produced no product of its own at all, unless irrigation water is considered a product. Thus this Court observed that the Company for whose employees the exemption was claimed “owns no farms and raises no crops . Id. at 763. As the Court further noted: “The ditch company, then, is not engaged in cultivating or tilling the soil or in grow ing any agricultural commodity”. Id. at 764. It is obvious there fore that the employer in Farmers Irrigation Co. was not “farming” in any branch, and the Court relied on the character 133 6 — of the employer’s activity to determine that its employees were not employed in agriculture under the “primary meaning” of the word. Just the opposite is true with the Petitioner here and with all integrated poultry producers. Bayside is engaged in “growing an agricultural commodity”—fresh dressed broilers—as its principal and overriding function. All of its activities, from breeder farm to processing and marketing, are a part of its main business activity of producing and marketing broilers. The entire investment and effort of the integrated broiler producer are devoted principally to “agriculture” in one of its important branches—“the raising of . . . poultry”. To hold otherwise is to ignore the purpose of the integrated operation entirely. This practical reasoning underlies the view held by the Fifth,1 Eighth2 and Ninth3 Circuits, which is directly contrary to the holding of the First Circuit in this case. In the Tyson’s Poultry case, the Eighth Circuit held that employees who worked in an egg assembly plant operated by an integrated egg producing firm were “employed in agriculture” and thus exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act. The appellees in Tyson's Poultry, Inc. (whose assembly plant employees were the workers involved), Poultry Growers, Inc., an affiliated corporation which produced eggs through contract growers similar to Bayside's broiler grow ers, a parent corporation which owned all the stock of the first 1 McElrath Poultry Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 494 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1974); Abbott Farms, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 487 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1973); National Labor Relations Board v. Strain Poultry Farms, Inc., 405 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Chemell, 243 F.2d 944 (5th Cir. 1957); Nix v. Farmers’ Mutual Exchange of Calhoun, Inc., 218 F.2d 642 (5th Cir. 1955). 2 Wirtz v. Tyson’s Poultry, Inc., 355 F.2d 255 (8th Cir. 1966). 3 National Labor Relations Board v. Victor Ryckebosch, Inc., 471 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1972). 134 7 — two, and an individual who was president of all three corpora tions. The Eighth Circuit held as follows: “We are here concerned with a single and completely integrated farming operation carried on and headed up by appellees through their affiliated corporation, Poultry Grow ers, Inc. As found by the District Court, the appellees are farmers and are the ones who initiated the farming opera tions here involved. Without appellees the independent growers arguably would never have undertaken the initial and continuing cost of acquiring the birds and producing the eggs. The contract growers merely aid the appellees, who the District Court found to be the ones qualified to claim the agricultural exemption under the Act as to their employees engaged in the ‘handling, cooling, grading, can dling and packing’ of eggs.” 355 F.2d at 258. The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Strain Poultry Farms, Inc. is directly in point, and directly contrary to the decision of the Court of Appeals in this case. Strain was an integrated broiler producer, and the National Labor Relations Board found Strain guilty of unfair labor practices under the National Labor Rela tions Act. The NLRB petitioned for an enforcement order, and the Fifth Circuit denied enforcement on the ground that the employees involved—truck drivers employed by Strain to haul live chickens to processing plants—were “agricultural em ployees” within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. 152(3) (NLRA Sec tion 2(3)) and 29 U.S.C. 203(0 (FLSA Section 3(f)). In Strain, as in this case, the integrated producer employed inde pendent contract growers during the growout phase of broiler production. The Board in Strain argued that the broilers were “the results of someone else’s farming efforts—the independent growers,” contending that the fact that Strain used independent growers destroyed its claim to having raised the birds. 405 F.2d at 135 1030. After carefully analyzing the applicable law and the form and function of Strain's integrated operation, the Court con cluded as follows: “In summary, the Board’s finding that the employees were not agricultural employees can only be sustained if re spondent’s arrangement with the independent growers is viewed as removing it from the primary definition of agri culture pertinent here, ‘the raising of poultry’. Since we have concluded that this is not the case, there was no warrant in the record or a reasonable basis in law for the Board’s con clusion that the employees were not ‘agricultural laborers within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the NLRA.’” Id. at 1033. As was the case with the delivery truck drivers in Strain, the activities of the feedtruck drivers in this case are not only inci dental but are absolutely essential to the integrated poultry raising operation here. These drivers deliver the feed rations— specified and mixed by Bayside—to Bayside’s broiler chickens housed in the contract growers’ facilities. They are delivering Bayside’s feed to Bayside’s birds during the growout process. Delivering the feed to the birds is clearly an essential part of the integrated poultry-raising operation. This was the conclusion of the Fifth Circuit in Strain'. “Furthermore, the trucking activities were part of Strain’s poultry-raising venture. They were performed incident to or in conjunction with Strain’s poultry-raising operations and Strain was not a poultry raiser conducting a trucking operation on the side. The trucking operation was a part of an integrated poultry-raising operation and, although unlike poultry farms of the past, it is today a typical broiler raising operation.” Id. at 1032. The reasoning of Strain was adopted, on “substantially iden tical” facts, by the Ninth Circuit in NLRB v. Victor Rycke- 9 — bosch, Inc., 471 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1972). In Ryckebosch, the integrator also owned and operated a processing plant. See Victor Ryckebosch, Inc., 189 NLRB 40, 41-42. The Strain reasoning has been reaffirmed twice more by the Fifth Circuit in recent years. Abbott Farms. Inc., and McElrath Poultry Co., supra, p. 5, n. 1. The same recognition of the realities of modern broiler pro duction and its “farming” character underlies a number of deci sions allowing integrated poultry producers to take advantage of various provisions of the Internal Revenue Code available only to “farmers”. See United States v. Chemell, 243 F.2d 944 (5th Cir. 1957); Maple Leaf Farms, Inc., 64 T.C. 438 (1975); Garth, 56 T.C. 610 (1971). Respondent has made a point of arguing that contract growers bear some risks of loss in connection with the poultry raising operations at issue here. The Brief cites studies which indicate that growers make a sizable investment in land, poultry housing facilities, and related equipment. (Respondent’s Br. 22, n. 14). What the Respondent fails to mention is that the integrated broiler producers supply the birds themselves and inputs which together account for more than 90% of the cost per pound of producing broilers on an operating basis, including feed which accounts for more than half the total cost of producing broilers. Moreover, the growers are guaranteed a return for their labor and facilities, while the integrated producer must find a buyer for the agricultural product in the open market if he is to re cover for his efforts and investment. It is true that growers bear some risks during the growout phase ot broiler production. Nevertheless, there is nothing in the law to suggest that a farmer must bear 100% of the risk of producing and marketing his product in order to engage in “agriculture” or “farming”. With the variety of crop mortgage financing available to farmers today, shared risk is more the 137 — 10 rule than the exception in modem farming. Moreover, the Fifth Circuit in Strain was not at all bothered by the fact that the poultry raising was “shared” with independent growers: “As in all the other cases cited by the Board on this point, the distinction between those situations and the present one is that these birds belonged to the respondent and, although the raising of them was shared with inde pendent growers, Strain’s activities were more nearly that of one engaged in the ‘raising of . . . poultry’ than that of a purchaser, jobber, etc.” 405 F.2d at 1033. There is no reason to conclude that contract growers, just be cause they may share some of the functions and some of the risks of poultry raising, are the only persons engaged in “agri culture”. 138 11 — CONCLUSION Integrated poultry operations are organized and operated for one purpose: the production and marketing of broilers. As the Strain court observed of the integrated broiler producing operations before it, “although unlike poultry farms of the past, it is today a typical broiler raising operation”. Integrated broiler production is within the “primary” definition of agriculture, and Bayside’s feed truck drivers, who deliver the rations mixed and supplied by Bayside to the location where Bayside’s broiler chickens are housed, are clearly essential to Bayside’s integrated poultry raising operation. For this reason, the drivers are “agri cultural laborers” within the meaning of the exemption, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be reversed. Respectfully submitted, MICHAEL A. DOYLE FREDERICK H. VON UNWERTH 1200 Citizens and Southern National Bank Building 35 Broad Street Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Counsel for Georgia Poultry Federation, Inc. November, 1976 139 LawReprints pub,ications 37 WEST 20 STREET*NEW YORK. N Y. 1001S