Harris v. Gibson Brief for Intervenors-Appellants and Intervenors-Cross-Appellees

    In t h e

United (to rt uf Appmhz
F oe t h e  F if t h  C ircuit

No. 20871

Carolyn E leanor H arris, et al.,
Intervenors-AppeHants and 
Interne,nors-Cr oss-Appellees,

— v .—

L inda S ue  H ibson , et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees and 
Plaintiff s-Cross-Appellees,

Gl y n n  C ounty B oard of E ducation , e t al.,
Defendants-Appellees and 
Defendants-Cross-Appellants.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

BRIEF FOR INTERVENORS-APPELLANTS 
AND INTERVENORS-CROSS-APPELLEES

C onstance B aker M otley 
J ack Greenberg 
George B . S m ith :

10 Columbus Circle 
.New York 19, New York

D onald L. H ollowell 
H orace T. 'Ward

859% Hunter Street, N.'W. 
Atlanta, Georgia

Attorneys for Intervenors-Appellants
N orman C. A maker, 

Of Counsel



I N D E X

PA G E

Statement of the Case ......................................... .........  1

Specification of Errors ............................ .....................  4

A r g u m e n t :

I. The “Pre-Trial Order” of the District Court 
Is Appealable Under Section 1291 and Sec­
tion 1292(a)(1) of Title 28, United States 
Code.................................. ...............................  5

II. The District Court’s Order Wrongfully Re­
quires That the Intervenors-Appellants Pur­
sue State Remedies for Denial of the Federal 
Right to Attend Desegregated Schools ........  7

III. The Order Below Is Inconsistent With This
Court’s Holding in Stell v. Savannah-Chat- 
ham County Board of Education....... ........... 9

IV. There Was No Justification for Delay in the 
Desegregation of the Glynn County Schools .. 11

Conclusion ......................................................................  13

A ppen d ix  :

Ga. Code Ann. 32-910 ...............................................  15

Certificate of Service...... ...........................................   ig



11

T able of Cases

page

Armstrong v. Board of Education of the City of Bir­
mingham, 323 F. 2d 333 (5th Cir. 1963) ...... 7,8,10,11

Augustus v. Board of Public Instruction, 306 F. 2d 862 
(5th Cir. 1962) ................................................. ..........8,12

Baltimore and Ohio R.R. Co. v. United Fuel Gas Co.,
154 F. 2d 545 (4th Cir. 1946) ................................  5

Borders v. Rippy, 247 F. 2d 268 ................................  7
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 ....6, 7, 9,10,11
Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294 .................. 11
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S. 294 ..........  5
Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board, 308 F. 2d 491 

(5th Cir. 1962) .............................................................8,12

Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S.
541 ................................ ................................ ....... ....... 5

Cooper y . Aaron, 358 U. S. 1 ...... ...................... .......... 6,11

Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile 
County, Alabama, 322 F. 2d 356 (5th Cir. 1963) .... 11

Forgay v. Conrad, 6 How. (47 U. S.) 201.....................  5

Gayle v. Browder, 352 U. S. 903 ............ .......... ..... . 7
Gibson v. Board of Public Instruction of Dade County,

246 F. 2d 913 (5th Cir. 1957), on second appeal, 272
F. 2d 763 (5th Cir. 1959) ........................................... 8

Goss v. Board of Education of the City of Knoxville,
373 U. S. 683 ................................... ...................... ......6,11

Harris v. Gibson, 322 F. 2d 782 (5th Cir. 1963) ...... 5, 6,11
Hodges v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., 310 F. 2d 

438 (5th Cir. 1962) 5



PA G E

Holland v. Board of Public Instruction of Palm Beach 
County, Florida, 258 F. 2d 730 (5th Cir. 1958) .....8,11

Jones v. School Board of the City of Alexandria, 278 
F . 2d 72 (4th Cir. 1960) ...........................................  12

Kennedy v. Lynd, 306 F. 2d 222 (5th Cir. 1962) ....... 5

Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268 .......................................  7

Mannings v. Board of Public Instruction, 277 F. 2d 370
(5th Cir. 1960) ....................................... .....................  8

McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U. S. 668 ..........  7, 8
Missouri-Ivansas-Texas R.R. Co. v. Randolph, 182 F. 2d

996 (8th Cir. 1950) ..... ..................... ...........................  6
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 ..................................7, 8

Northcross v. Board of Education, 302 F. 2d 818 (6th 
Cir. 1962)  ............................ ...................................... 12

Pan American World Airways v. Flight Engineers’
Int’l Ass’n, 306 F. 2d 840 (2nd Cir. 1962) .............. 6

Rippy v. Borders, 250 F. 2d 690 (5th Cir. 1957) ..........  11

Sears, Roebuck and Company v. Mackey, 351 U. S. 427 .. 5
Sims v. Greene, 160 F. 2d 512 (3rd Cir. 1947) ..........  6
Stack v. Boyle, 342 IT. S. 1 ........ ............................ ...... 5
Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Board of Educa­

tion, 318 F. 2d 425 (5th Cir. 1963) ................. 9,10,11,12
Swift and Co. v. Compania Colombiana, 339 U. S. 684 .. 5

United States v. Wood, 295 F . 2d 772 (5th Cir. 1961) ... 5

Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U. S. 526 ..................6,11
Woods v. Wright, -----  F. 2d —— (5th Cir. May 22,

1963)

Ill

5



I n t h e

llntteb Btuttz (Emirt nf Appeals
F oe t h e  F if t h  C ircuit  

No. 20871

Carolyn E leanor H arris, et al.,
Intervenors-Appellants and 
Intervenor s-Cross-Appellees,

L inda  S u e  G ibson , et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees and 
Plaintiff‘s-Cross-Appellees,

—v.—

Gl y n n  C ounty  B oard of E ducation , et al.,
Defendants-Appellees and 
Defendants-Cross-Appellants.

appeal from  t h e  u n ited  states district court
FO R  T H E  S O U T H E R N  D IST R IC T  OF GEORGIA

BRIEF FOR INTERVENORS-APPELLANTS 
AND INTERVENORS-CROSS-APPELLEES

Statement of the Case

Unlike the usual and customary school desegregation 
case, this action was instituted below by parents of white 
pupils enrolled in the Glynn County, Georgia public school 
system to enjoin the local Board of Education from volun­
tarily commencing school desegregation by the transfer of



2

six Negro high school students from the Negro high school 
to Glynn Academy, the white high school, in August 1963. 
This action was commenced on August 27, 1963, one day 
before the opening of school. On that day, the District 
Judge issued a temporary restraining order without no­
tice enjoining the proposed transfers. The parents of the 
six minor Negro pupils intervened in the action to protect 
their rights and to secure desegregation of the entire school 
system.

Intervenors below (hereinafter intervenors-appellants) 
are appealing from that part of an order of the District 
Court entered on September 6, 1963 entitled “Pre-Trial 
Order” (R. 55). That order, in effect, denied intervenors- 
appellants’ motion to vacate the temporary restraining 
order, thus barring the transfer of the six Negro pupils. 
The order also referred the question of desegregation of the 
Glynn County schools back to the Glynn County Board of 
Education (hereinafter defendants-appellees) for exhaus­
tion of an elaborate administrative procedure. Moreover, 
the order below continued, in effect, a temporary restrain­
ing order beyond the permissible statutory period making 
it a preliminary injunction.

This case has been here before on a motion by the inter­
venors-appellants for an injunction pending appeal. On 
September 12, 1963 this court granted such a motion and 
required defendants-appellees to transfer the six minor 
Negro intervenors-appellants to the Glynn Academy be­
ginning September 16, 1963 (R. 57). They have been trans­
ferred.

On August 1, 1963 defendants-appellees announced plans 
to commence desegregation of the schools of Glynn County, 
Georgia during the 1963-64 school year by accepting the 
transfer applications of the six minor Negro intervenors- 
appellants. This intention was thwarted on August 27,



3

1963, the day before school opened, when plaintiffs-appel- 
lees (parents of white pupils) obtained the temporary re­
straining order. In their complaint (E. 1-21), plaintiffs- 
appellees alleged that desegregation would be detrimental 
to both races (see especially paragraphs 6-21 of their com­
plaint, E. 5-16a) and asked for a preliminary and permanent 
injunction, enjoining the operation of an integrated school 
system in Glynn County or, in the alternative, a plan re­
organizing the schools into a tertiary system—one part for 
whites, another for Negroes, and a third for whites and 
Negroes (E. 16a, 17).

On August 31, 1963 intervenors-appellants filed a com­
plaint and motion for order to show cause praying the 
court, inter alia, to allow them to intervene in the action, 
to vacate and dissolve the temporary restraining order of 
August 27, 1963, to require admission of the Negro students 
to Glynn Academy, and to require the school board to sub­
mit a plan for the reorganization of the entire school sys­
tem on a nonracial basis (E. 29-31). They subsequently filed 
a motion for preliminary injunction which is still pending 
(E. 38).

No objection is made to that part of the order appealed 
from permitting the intervenors-appellants to intervene 
(E. 56). The order referring the whole matter of school 
desegregation back to the school board cited an elaborate 
state administrative and court procedure established by 
Ga. Code Ann. §32-910 (see Appendix, p. 15, infra). Al­
though the order ostensibly included a direction for the 
formulation of a plan for reorganization of the Glynn 
County schools “along nonracial lines” (E. 56), the only 
specific requirement was that no transfer request be re­
fused on the sole basis of race (E. 56). Thus, there was no 
requirement to eliminate initial racial assignments, racial 
attendance areas, or to desegregate teachers and other pro­



4

fessional school personnel. Hearings were to be held by the 
defendants-appellees, the school board, on the plan and the 
plaintiffs-appellees given an opportunity to present evi­
dence that desegregation would be detrimental to both 
whites and Negroes (R. 57). After a decision by the school 
board, an appeal would lie, under §32-910, to the State 
Board of Education and, presumably, to the state courts. 
All other matters were “held in abeyance” until these pro­
cedures were completed (R. 58).

The intervenors-appellants immediately filed notice of 
appeal and a motion with this court for an injunction pend­
ing appeal. In granting such a motion on September 12, 
1963, this court held that, “The ‘Pre-Trial Order’ of Sep­
tember 6, 1963 was, in effect, the granting of a preliminary 
injunction” (R. 61), as well as a “final” order (R. 62). 
The orders of the district court were vacated and the six 
minor Negro intervenors-appellants ordered into the Glynn 
Academy (R. 63). All six entered the said school on Sep­
tember 16, 1963 and are presently in attendance there.

Specification o f Errors

The district court erred in :
1. Enjoining the school authorities from transferring 

the six Negro students to the Glynn Academy,

2. Referring the whole matter of school desegregation 
back to the school board for elaborate state administrative 
and court proceedings,

3. Permitting the contentions of the plaintiffs-appellees 
that desegregation would be detrimental to both races to 
delay the attendance of Negroes at the Glynn Academy,



5

4. In failing to require that the school hoard bring in 
a plan for desegregation of the entire Glynn County school 
system.

ARGUMENT

I
T he “ Pre-Trial O rder”  o f  the D istrict Court Is Ap­

pealab le U nder Section  1 2 9 1  and Section  1 2 9 2 (a ) (1 )  
of T itle 2 8 , U nited  States Code.

Section 1291 of Title 28, United States Code, provides 
that the courts of appeals shall have “jurisdiction of ap­
peals from all final decisions of the district courts of the 
United States.” The “final” decision clause has long been 
given a practical rather than technical construction. Brown 
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S. 294, 306; For gay v. 
Conrad, 6 How. (47 U. S.) 201, 202; United States v. Wood, 
295 F. 2d 772, 778 (5th Cir. 1961); Baltimore and Ohio 
R.R. Co. v. United Fuel Gas Co., 154 F. 2d 545, 546 (4th 
Cir. 1946). Thus the “pre-trial order” of the district court 
falls within the rule of United States v. Wood, supra, at 
778, permitting appeals from an order “determining sub­
stantial rights of the parties which will be irreparably lost 
if review is delayed until final judgment. . . . ” 1

1 Other decisions have permitted appeals from orders not tech­
nically final where irreparable harm would render worthless a 
delayed appeal. Harris v. Gibson, 322 F. 2d 782 (5th Cir. 1963);
Woods v. W right,---- F. 2 d --------(5th Cir. May 22, 1963) ; Stack
v. Boyle, 342 U. S. 1, appeal possible from denial of motion to 
reduce bail ; Sw ift and Co, v. Compania Colombiana, 339 U. S. 684, 
appeal from an order vacating the attachment of a ship in a libel 
action for lost cargo; Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 
337, U. S. 541, appeal from the denial of a request to require 
the plaintiff to give security for reasonable expenses and counsel 
fees in a stockholder’s derivative action. See also Sears, Roebuck 
and Company v. Mackey, 351 U. S. 427; Forgay v. Conrad, 6 How. 
(47 IT. S.) 201; Kennedy v. Lynd, 306 F. 2d 222 (5th Cir. 1962) ; 
Hodges v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., 310 F. 2d 438 (5th 
Cir. 1962).



6

The minor intervenors-appellants were irreparably- 
harmed by being barred from the all-white Glynn Academy, 
since the exclusion of Negroes from public schools solely 
on the basis of race is a flagrant violation of their consti­
tutional rights. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 IT. S. 
483; Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1; Watson v. City of 
Memphis, 373 U. S. 526; Coss v. Board of Education of the 
City of Knoxville, 373 U. S. 683.

The “pre-trial order” of September 6, 1963 was also 
appealable as an order granting a preliminary injunction 
under §1292(a)(l). Since that order in effect extended the 
temporary restraining order of August 27 past the statu­
torily permissible period, the temporary restraining order 
became a preliminary injunction. Harris v. Gibson, supra 
at 781, Sims v. Greene, 160 F. 2d 512 (3rd Cir. 1947) (a 
temporary restraining order enjoining interference with 
the plaintiffs as presiding bishop of a district of the African 
Methodist Episcopal Church held a preliminary injunction 
when continued past the statutorily permissible period); 
Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co. v. Randolph, 182 F. 2d 996 
(8tli Cir. 1950) (temporary restraining order enjoining the 
cancellation of a collective bargaining agreement held a pre­
liminary injunction when a motion to dissolve it was de­
nied) ; Pan American World Airways v. Flight Engineers’ 
Int’l Ass’n, 306 F. 2d 840 (2nd Cir. 1962) (a temporary re­
straining order against a strike which had twice been ex­
tended held a preliminary injunction).

In Sims the court said (at page 517):
When a restraining order, purporting to be Tempo­

rary’ is continued for a substantial length of time past 
the period prescribed by §381 of 28 U. S. C. A. without 
the consent of the party against which it issued and 
without the safeguards prescribed by Eule 65(b) it 
ceases to be a Temporary restraining order’ within



7

the purview of that section and becomes a preliminary 
injunction which cannot be maintained unless the court 
issuing it sets out the findings of fact and the conclu­
sions of law which constitute the grounds for its action 
as required by Buie 52(a).

II

The D istrict Court’s Order W rongfu lly  R equires That 
the Intervenors-A ppellants P ursue State Rem edies for 
Denial o f  th e  Federal R ight to  A ttend Desegregated 
Schools.

It is now too clear for argument that the attendance by 
Negro students at schools free of discrimination based 
solely on color is a federal right. Brown v. Board of Edu­
cation, supra; McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U. S. 
668, 10 L. Ed.. 2d 622, 626; Armstrong v. Board of Educa­
tion of the City of Birmingham, 323 F. 2d 333, 336 (5th 
Cir. 1963). Claims of denial of that right are entitled to 
be adjudicated in the federal courts without first seeking 
relief from state administrative bodies or courts. McNeese 
v. Board of Education, supra; Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 
167,183; Gayle v. Browder, 352 U. S. 903, aff’g 142 F, Supp. 
707, 713 (M. D. Ala. 1956); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268, 
274; Armstrong v. Board of Education, supra at 336, 337; 
Borders v. Rippy, 247 F. 2d 268 (5th Cir. 1957). The Su­
preme Court made this principle clear in McNeese where 
Negro students sought to enter desegregated schools in 
Illinois (supra at pp. 624-625):

“We have previously indicated that relief under the 
Civil Rights Act may not be defeated because relief 
was not first sought under state law which provided a 
remedy. We stated in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 
183, 5 L. ed. 2d 492, 503, 81 S. Ct. 473:



8

‘It is no answer that the State has a law which if 
enforced would give relief. The federal remedy is 
supplementary to the state remedy and the latter 
need not be first sought and refused before the fed­
eral one is invoked.’

(At pp. 626, 627)
“It is immaterial whether respondents’ conduct is 

legal or illegal as a matter of state law. Monroe v. 
Pape, supra (365 TJ. S. 171-187). Such claims are en­
titled to be adjudicated in the federal courts.”

This language was cited with approval by this Court in 
Armstrong v. Board of Education, supra at 336, 337. Mc- 
Neese, however, only added support to previous decisions of 
this court holding it unnecessary, in a school desegregation 
case, to exhaust state administrative remedies before seek­
ing relief in the federal courts. Bush v. Orleans Parish 
School Board, 308 F. 2d 491, 499-501 (5th Cir. 1962); 
Augustus v. Board of Public Instruction, 306 F. 2d 862, 869 
(5th Cir. 1962); Mannings v. Board of Public Instruction, 
277 F. 2d 370, 372, 373 (5th Cir. 1960); Holland v. Board 
of Public Instruction of Palm Beach County, Florida, 258 
F. 2d 730, 732 (5th Cir. 1958); Gibson v. Board of Public 
Instruction' of Dade County, 246 F. 2d 913, 914 (5th Cir. 
1957), on second appeal 272 F. 2d 763, 767 (5th Cir. 1959).

The pre-trial order of the district court flies in the face 
of these decisions by referring the issue of school desegre­
gation back to the defendant-appellee school board for ex­
tended proceedings under Ca. Code Ann. 32-910. Not only 
does §32-910 require hearings and a decision by the school 
board, but it also requires an appeal to the State Board of 
Education and, presumably, to the state courts. The order 
of the district court is no less a requirement of exhaustion 
because the transfer applications of the intervenors-appel- 
lants were accepted by the school board. The crucial factor



9

is that the district court has required the intervenors-ap- 
pellants to begin anew in their quest for constitutional 
rights and to begin with state remedies.

Ill
The Order Below Is Inconsistent With This Court’s 

Holding in Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Board of 
Education.

In Stell v. Savannah-CIiatham County Board of Educa­
tion, 318 F. 2d 425 (5th Cir. 1963), a suit by Negro students 
seeking to desegregate the schools of Savannah-Chatham 
County, Georgia, the trial court permitted intervention by 
certain white persons whose only purpose was to introduce 
evidence to support the thesis that compliance with Brown 
v. Board of Education, supra, would be detrimental to both 
white and Negro students. On the basis of this evidence 
the motion by the Negro students for a preliminary injunc­
tion was denied. In reversing the lower court, this court 
held (at p. 247):

“ . . . [T]he trial court permitted an intervention by 
parties whose sole purpose for intervening was to 
adduce proof as a factual basis for an effort to ask the 
Supreme Court to reverse its decision in Brown v. 
Topeka Board of Education. The court then permitted 
evidence in support of this approach by the inter- 
venors, and denied the appellants’ motion for prelimi­
nary injunction solely on the basis of such evidence, 
which, briefly stated, tended to support the thesis that 
compliance with the Supreme Court’s decision would 
be detrimental to both the Negro plaintiffs and to 
white students in the Savannah-Chatham County 
School system.

The district court for the Southern District of 
Georgia is bound by the decision of the United States



10

Supreme Court, as we are. Unless and until that court 
overrules its decision in Brotvn v. Topeka, no trial court 
may, upon finding the existence of a segregated school 
system, refrain from acting as required by the Su­
preme Court merely because such district court may 
conclude that the Supreme Court erred either as to its 
facts or as to the law.

See also Armstrong v. Board of Education, supra at 219, 
220, rejecting a similar contention.

Here, seeking to forestall the imminent desegregation of 
the Glynn Academy, plaintiffs-appellees filed an original 
complaint, making the same allegations as those found in 
St ell. (See particularly paragraphs 6-21 of their complaint, 
R. 5-16a.) On the basis of these allegations the court below 
issued a temporary restraining order (R. 21) and a pre­
trial order requiring that the plaintiffs-appellees be given 
“full opportunity” to introduce evidence in support of their 
contentions (R. 57). Just as it was error for the district 
court to deny the motion for preliminary injunction and 
delay desegregation of schools in Stell on the basis of such 
allegations, it was error here.



11

IV

There Was No Justification for Delay in the Desegre­
gation of the Glynn County Schools.

In 1954, the United States Supreme Court announced for 
the first time that the operation of public schools on a ra­
cially segregated basis deprived Negro children of their con­
stitutional rights. Brown v. Board of Education, supra. In 
1955, the court stated that while administrative problems 
might be taken into consideration, the public schools must 
be desegregated “with all deliberate speed.” Brown v. 
Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294. In Watson v. City of 
Memphis, 373 U. S. 526, the Supreme Court clarified the 
concept of all deliberate speed by reaffirming the principle 
that deprivation of constitutional rights called for prompt 
rectification and emphasizing that plans or programs for 
desegregation of public schools which might have been 
sufficient eight years ago might not be so today. See also 
Goss v. Board of Education, supra at 636. This court has 
consistently followed these principles by refusing on 
several occasions to delay integration of schools. Harris v. 
Gibson, supra; Armstrong v. Board of Education, supra; 
Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County, 
Alabama, 322 F. 2d 356 (5th Cir. 1963); Stell v. Savannah- 
Chatham County Board of Education, supra.

By accepting the transfer applications of the six Negro 
students, the defendants-appellants recognized that no 
administrative problems justified further delay in school 
desegregation. Primary responsibility for desegregation 
was in their hands. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 
294, 298; Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1, 7; Armstrong v. 
Board of Education, supra at 337; Davis v. Board of Educa­
tion, 318 F. 2d 63, 64; Holland v. Board of Public Instruc­
tion, supra at 733; Rippy v. Borders, 250 F. 2d 690, 693



12

(5th Cir. 1957). Since the district court issued its orders 
on the basis of allegations unconnected with administrative 
problems, it abused its discretion in overruling the decision 
of the school board. St ell v. Savannah-Chatham County 
Board of Education, supra.

Delay would be unjustified even if the reorganization 
plan called for by the district court required desegregation. 
It does not, however, do this. The pre-trial order of the 
district court stated (B. 56):

Defendants shall prepare and submit to the court 
with reasonable promptness a plan for reorganization 
of the schools subject to their jurisdiction along non- 
racial lines which shall not exclude from transfer 
between schools any applicant, therefore (sic), solely on 
the grounds of color or other criterion unrelated to the 
educational and physical advancement and well being 
of the children concerned.

The only provision clearly required in the plan is one 
that no transfer request be refused on the sole basis of 
race. But the acceptance of transfer requests cannot serve 
as a means of implementing desegregation for, “Negro 
children cannot be required to apply for that to which they 
are entitled as a matter of right.” Northcross v. Board of 
Education, 302 F. 2d 818 (6th Cir. 1962). Without a provi­
sion eliminating initial assignments and school attendance 
lines on the sole basis of race, the plan ordered by the 
lower court could not meet constitutional requirements. 
Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board, supra at 499; 
Augustus v. Board of Public Instruction, supra at 869; 
Northcross v. Board of Education of the City of Memphis, 
supra at 823; Jones v. School Board of the City of Alexan­
dria, 278 F. 2d 72, 76 (4th Cir. 1960).



13

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons the decision below should  
be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

C onstance B aker M otley 
J ack Greenberg  
George B . S m it h

10 Columbus Circle 
New York 19, New York

D onald L . H ollo w ell 
H orace T. W ard

859% Hunter Street, N.W. 
Atlanta, Georgia

Attorneys for Intervenors-Appellants

N orman C. A maker 
Of Counsel



APPENDIX



APPENDIX

Gta. Code A n n . 32-910 Powers of County or other local
boards as school court.

The county, city or other independent board of education 
shall constitute a tribunal for hearing and determining any 
matter of local controversy in reference to the construction 
or administration of the school law, with power to summon 
witnesses and take testimony if necessary, and when such 
board has made a decision, it shall be binding on the par­
ties: Provided however, either party shall have the right 
to appeal to the State Board of Education, which appeal 
shall be made through the local superintendent of schools 
in writing and shall distinctly set forth the question in dis­
pute, the decision of the local board, a transcript of the 
testimony and other evidence adduced before the board 
certified as true and correct by the local superintendent, 
and a concise statement of the reasons why the decision be­
low is complained of. This section shall apply to all county, 
city, or independent school systems in this State, regard­
less of when created. The State Board shall provide by 
regulation for notice to the parties and hearing on the 
appeal. (Acts 1919, p. 324, 1947, pp. 1189, 1190; 1961, p. 
39.)



16

Certificate o f  Service

This is to certify that on the 31st day of January, 1964 
I served copies of the foregoing Brief for Intervenors-Ap- 
pellants upon Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellees, Alan B. 
Smith, P. 0. Box 518, Brunswick, Georgia and upon At­
torney for Defendants-Appellees, B. N. Nightingale, P. 0. 
Box 1496, Brunswick, Georgia, by depositing copies ad­
dressed to them as indicated herein in the United States 
Mail, airmail, postage prepaid.

Attorney for Intervenors-Appellants



3 8