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Ark. 395WILLIAMS v. STATE
Cite as 490 S.\V.2d 395
I'ri-State Insurance Company v.
D/B/A O & M Lumber Compa-
Ark. 1259, 483 S.W.2d 212, we fur-
i;lictl that a property damage limita-
,f liability is valid and that recovery
C,„jcnt upon the terms of the con-
■ r.ithcr than on the difference in the
. . anc] after value of the vehicle. If
• ..'lire had been equal to or less than
•launt necessary to repair the car, ap-
conld have recovered the difference
the before and after value. But
;5 not the case. The estimated cost
pairs was only $961.73A Of course,
• aiding would be different if the testi-
re fleeted the Wish automobile to
, |,ecu a total loss. But there is no evi-
•f to that effect in the record. The
evidence on this point by appellee’s
■ vsses was that a wrecked automobile
;h had been repaired was never as val-
'c for resale purposes as one which had
: been wrecked. Not a single person
:icd that the car was a total loss.
t follows from what has been said, that
■ trial court erred in its conclusions, and
• judgment is reversed with directions to
vr a judgment for appellee in the
•miit of $861.73.
It is so ordered.
i'.VRD, J., dissents.
the purport of Ills holding when he de-
hiroil to them in the course of the instruc-
■ ..«ns: ‘The Court has permitted the in-
'reduction of evidence as to what the fair
market value iof the plaintiff’s ear was
Mint'd lately before the collision and ns to
viiat the fair market value was immedi-
itely after the collision. The Court per
mitted the introduction of that evidence
' tily for the jury’s consideration in deter
mining the company’s liability under the
Provisions of the policy, as you have been
■nstrueted by other instructions herein.
Such is not the measure of the defend
ant's liability.’ ”
James WILLIAMS, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Arkansas', Appellee.
No. 5742.
Supreme Court of Arkansas.
July 2, KITH.
Proceeding for. postconviction relief.
Relief was denied by the Circuit Court,
Ashley County, G. B. Colvin, Jr., J., and
petitioner appealed. The Supreme Court,
Jones, J., held that where jury commission
ers simply went down the list of qualified
electors of the county and selected a jury
panel from among individuals with whom
they were personally acquainted, and the
commissioners were not as widely ac
quainted with Negroes as with whites in
the involved area and the result was a dis
parity between the races in jury selection,
the jury which tried defendant was not a
legally constituted jury.
Judgment reversed and case remanded
for new trial.
I. Jury €=>120
When prima facie case of purposeful
limitation in selection of jurors is proven
by defendant, burden shifts to state to
prove otherwise. Rules of Criminal Proce
dure, rule 1; Ark.Stats. §§ 3-107, 3-118,
39-206 to 39-208, 39-225.
4. The original estimate by Dean Chevrolet
was in the amount of $1,366.73 and there
is a dispute as to whether the adjuster
ever approved this figure. This estimate
included a new frame and the labor to in
stall same, but apparently after settlement
negotiations between the company and
appellee failed and Arendall said that the
frame could be repaired, the cost of re
pairs was reduced by the amount neces
sary for a new frame and the labor, to
the cost of repairing the frame on the
car. Of course, even if this figure had
been allowed by the court, the court's
judgment would still have been erroneous.
396 Ark. 496 SOUTH WESTERN REPORTER, 2cl SERIES
2. Ju ry <2=120
Where individuals are selected for
jury service from tax lists, or from any
source, where separate race is indicated,
and where there is large percentage of Ne
groes as compared with whites who are
presumed to have legal qualifications to
serve as jurors, prima facie case of racial
discrimination is presented when jury com
missioners select those to serve.on juries
only from among the individuals with
whom they are acquainted and such proce
dure results in small percentage of Ne
groes as compared with whites being se
lected for jury service. Ark.Stats. §§ 3-
107, 3-118, 39-206 to 39-208, 39-225. U.
S.C.A.Const Amend, 14.
3. Ju ry O l 20
Prior or systematic exclusion of Ne
groes from jury service is admissible in ev
idence in support of claim of intentional
exclusion because of race in given case.
Rules of Criminal Procedure, rule 1 ; Ark.
Stats. §§ 3-107, 3-118, 39-206 to 39-208,
39-225.
4. Jury 0=33(1)
Defendant in homicide case had no
constitutional right to have Negroes on
jury before whom he was tried and no
constitutional right to have Negroes on
panel from which jury was selected but
was entitled to be tried before legally con
stituted jury, excluding any jury from
which members of any race were excluded
simply because of their race. Ark.Stats.
§§ 3-107, 3-118, 39-206 to 39-208, 39-225;
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
5. J u ry 0=33 (1 )
Where jury commissioners simply
went down list of qualified electors of
county and selected jury panel from among
individuals with whom they were pcrsonal-
I. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 83 S.Ct. 822
9 Ij.kM.2d 837; Townsend v. Sain, a i-
U.S. 293, S3 S.Ct. 745, 9 Tj.Ed.2d 770 and
Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 83
S.Ct. 1068, 10 L.Ed.2d 148. See also ar-
ly acquainted, and commissioners v.
as widely acquainted with Negro, ,
whites in the area and result was <
between races in jury selection, jut
tried defendant was not legally
jury. Ark.Stats. §§ 3—107, 3—1 IS,
39-208, 39-225; U.S.C.A.Const. Ai
Walker, Kaplan & Mays, P.A.
Rock, and Jack Greenberg, No;
Chachkin, New York City, for app<4
Ray Thornton, Atty. Gen., by :
Ginger, Deputy Atty. Gen., Little lb-
appellee.
)ONES, Justice.
James Williams wras charged wit",
degree murder committed in the pr
tion of rape. He was found gu
charged at a jury trial in the Ashley
ty Circuit Court and on December »
he was sentenced to death by electro
His conviction and sentence were at;
by this court on appeal, Williams v.
239 Ark. 1109, 396 S.W.2d 834, and 1
ecution date was set by the Govcr:
July 22, 1966. Execution was stayed
order of this court entered on Ju
1966, to permit Williams to seek po
viction relief under Criminal Fro:
Rule No. 1 promulgated and adopt,
cause of the tremendous increase in
corpus petitions being filed in the sb>'
federal courts by convicted felons / '
authorized and permitted under 1
States Supreme Court decisions.1
Following the Rule No. 1 hearing
Ashley County Circuit Court on Nov
9, 1967, the petition was denied by f"
tier filed on May 25, 1971, and W
now appeals from the trial court ord
nying relief on his petition to vaca
former judgment of conviction. In
tide “Accommodating State Criin
Procedure and Federal Post Con\i‘
Review” by Daniel J. Meador in Amcr
Bar Association Journal, October,
vol. 50, p. 1928.
:e s
immissioners w<~
with Negroes :
id result was d
y selection, jure
not legally cor.
5-107, 3-118, 3'i
C.A.Const. Am.
& Mays, P.A., I
reenberg, Norm
: City, for appetU
itty. Gen., by 1!
. Gen., Little Roc.
vas charged with '
nitted in the peri.
was found guilt;
ial in the Ashley 1
i on December 9,
death by electro.'
sentence were aff.
peal, Williams v. .v
s.W.2d 834, and hi
:t by the Governor
;ution was stayed 1
t entered on July
iliams to seek post .
:r 1 Criminal Procc
Igated and adoptee
.dous increase in li
ng filed in the state
invicted felons pro '
irmitted under l
irt decisions.1
tie No. 1 hearing if '
;uit Court on Novo
was denied by fit'1
25, 1971, and Will-
the trial court ordi't
5 petition to vacate
f conviction. In ’
ating State Crii"':
cdcral Post Convii'1
l J. Meador in Anr'U'
Journal, October, 1 ‘
WILLIAMS
C ite as 49G S
eight years since Williams was
. lr|ed and convicted, his death sen-
was commuted to life imprisonment
executive clemency. The appellant now
. .,„|s that the trial court erred in deny-
•„js petition for post-conviction relief
reasons stated as fo llow s:
\u'iellant’s unrebutted evidence that
•x'r'roes were systematically excluded
or included in token numbers only
,.Kin the jury venires of Ashley County,
Arkansas established a denial of his
• mirtccnth Amendment rights.
Appellant’s trial was conducted under
i,lCh intimidating conditions and after
„.fh adverse, hostile and prejudicial pub
licity as to deny him a fundamentally
i ,ir hearing, and thus his rights under
:u. due process clause of the Fourteenth
\mendment were denied him.”
j be appellant’s second assignment was
, vented, argued and considered on lus
4 appeal and we do not reach it here
.uise we find we must reverse his convic-
n under the first assignment.
j 11 The constitutional prohibition
mist exclusion of members of any race
:a jury service because of race has nev-
' been questioned in Arkansas. Williams
State, 229 Ark. 1022, 322 S.W.2d 86;
,:sey v. State, 219 Ark. 101, 240 S.W.2d
; Green v. Stale, 222 Ark. 222, 258 S.
-M 56; Maxwell v. State, 217 Ark. 691,
’ S.\V.2d 982; Bailey v. State, 227 Ark.
■i. 302 SAV.2d 796. In Williams and
<sey we pointed out that the burden of
awing facts which permit an inference
i purposeful limitation for jury service
•'cause of race is on the defendant. It
ly follows that when a prime facie case
1 Purposeful limitation is proven by the
tendant, the bttrden then shifts to the
to prove otherwise. The state offered
’ evidence whatever in the case at bar, so
question before us is whether the ap-
'•int made out a prima facie case of pur-
efill exclusion of Negroes because of
r race from the jury panel in this case.
v. STATE Ark- 397
\V.2d 395
[2] There can be no question that this
court, as well as the trial courts of this
state, is bound by the decisions of the
United Slates Supreme Court concerning
rights and prohibitions under the provi
sions of the United States Constitution
and, there is no question that the United
States Supreme Court has spoken clearly,
and more than once, on the question of
racial discrimination in the selection of
juries in criminal cases. We shall not
attempt to cite all the Supreme Court de
cisions bearing on the subject nor shall
we quote extensively from any of them,
but the substance of these decisions is
simply this: Where individuals are se
lected for jury service from tax lists, or
from any source, where separate race is in
dicated, and where there is a large percent
age of Negroes as compared with whites
who are presumed to have the legal quali
fications to serve as jurors; a prima facie
case of racial discrimination is presented
when jury commissioners select those to
serve on juries only from among the indi
viduals with whom they arc acquainted and
such procedure results in a small percent
age of Negroes as compared with whites
being selected for jury service. Such pri
ma facie evidence may, of course, be rebut
ted by evidence that the comparatively
small percentage of Negroes selected was
not because of their race. The burden of
presenting'such evidence, however, rests on
the state. -
Wc need only mention in some detail
two United States Supreme Court decisions
from which the above rule is extracted.
They are Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 70
S.Ct. 629, 94 L.Ed. 839; Whitus v. Geor
gia, 385 U.S. 545, 87 S.Ct. 643, 17 L.Ed.2d
599. These decisions have been followed
by the Federal Courts of Appeals in many
cases but we deem it unnecessary to com
ment on more than two or three of them
including the case of Bailey v. Henslee, 8
Cir., 287 F.2d 936, which arose from this
state.
The background for the decision in Cas
sell v. Texas, supra, arose in two prior cas-
398 Ark. 496 SOUTH WESTERN REPORTER, 2d SERIES
es, Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 62 S.Ct.-
1159, 86 L.Ed. 1559 and Akins v. Texas,
325 U.S. 398, 65 S.Ct. 1276, 89 L.Ed. 1692.
In Hill no Negro had ever been selected
for grand jury service in Dallas County,
Texas, and the jury comissioners testified
that they had summoned, for service on the
grand jury which returned the indictment,
members of the white race with 'whom they
were acquainted and whom they knew to
be qualified to serve. They said that they
considered Negroes for selection but did
not personally know a qualified Negro they
thought would make a good grand juror.
The Supreme Court held that the petitioner
had made a prima facie case of racial dis
crimination in the selection of jurors and
after referring to Pierre v. Louisiana, 306
U.S. 354, 59 S.Ct. 536, 83 L.Ed. 757, said:
“We thought, as we think here, that had
there been evidence obtainable to contra
dict the inference to be drawn from this
testimony, the State would not have re
frained from introducing it, and that the
evidence which was introduced suffi
ciently showed that there were colored
citizens of the county qualified and
available for service on the grand jury.
The Hill case was decided on June 1,
1942, and on June 4, 1945, the United
States Supreme Court handed down the
opinion in Akins v. Texas, supra, wherein
the Texas State Court, in attempting to
comply with the decision in Hill, selected
one Negro on a 16 men grand jury panel
from which 12 were chosen as a grand
jury. In upholding the jury selection in
Akins, the Supreme Court said:
“Purposeful discrimination is not sus
tained by a showing that on a single
grand jury the number of members of
one race is less than that race’s propor
tion of the eligible individuals. .
Defendants under our criminal statutes
are not entitled to demand representa
tives of their racial inheritance upon ju
ries before whom they are tried. But
such defendants arc entitled to require
that those who are trusted with jury
selection shall not pursue a com
conduct which results in discrimi:
‘in the selection of jurors on
grounds.’ Hill v. Texas, supra, ■
316 U.S., 62 S.Ct. 1159. Our din.
that indictments be quashed \\Tie
groes, although numerous in the u
nity, were excluded from grand ju.
have been based on the theory thru
continual exclusion indicated discr;.
tion and not on the theory that :
groups must be recognized. Nor;
Alabama, supra, [294 U.S. 587, 55
579, 79 L.Ed. 1074]; Hill v. Tex a*
pra; Smith v. Texas, supra, [311
128, 6r S.Ct. 164, 85 L.Ed. 84], Tin :
fact of inequality in the number sc!
does not in itself show discriminatio:
purpose to discrimination mm:
present which may be proven by st
atic exclusion of eligible jurymen <
prescribed race or by unequal applies
of the law to such an extent as to
intentional discrimination. Cf. Snov.
v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8, 64 S.Ct. K
L.Ed. 497.”
The opinion in Cassell v. Texas, St'
was rendered on April 24, 1950. In
case an all white grand jury panel
been selected and the Negro populate :
Dallas County was approximately 1:
There were 21 grand juries during tie
riod between the Hill decision and the
sell indictment, and of the 252 name-
the panels, 17, or 6.7%, were Negro,
payment of a poll tax was a qualifier
for jury service and 6.5% of the poll
payers were Negro. It was determini'
the court that as a matter of proport
percentages, a prima facie showing ot
cial discrimination had not been six
But in Cassell, the petitioner also coin
ed that subsequent to the decision in *
the grand jury commissioners, for 21 •
secutive lists, had consistently limited
groes selected for grand jury service t1
more than one on each grand jury, or
theory that such limitation was perm
under Akins provided the limitation r’
be approximately proportional to the
selection shall not pursue a course
conduct which results in discriinin.i:
‘in the selection of jurors on ra.
grounds.’ Hill v. Texas, supra, 4 0 ;
316 U.S., 62 S.Ct. 1159. Our dirccr
that indictments he quashed when ‘
groes, although numerous in the conn,
nity, were excluded from grand jury ;
have been based on the theory that t!
continual exclusion indicated discrin;-,:
tion and not on the theory that r,.,
groups must be recognized. Norris .
Alabama, supra, [294 U.S. 587, 55 S.i •
579, 79 L.Ed. 1074]; Hill v. Texas, ...
pra\ Smith v. Texas, supra, [311 V
128, 61 S.Ct. 164, 85 L.Ed. 84], The me:
fact of inequality in the number select
does not in itself show discrimination,
purpose to discrimination must 1
present which may be proven by sysU;
atic exclusion of eligible jurymen of t:
prescribed race or by unequal applicant
of the law to such an extent as to sho.
■ intentional discrimination. Cf. Snowdt
v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8, 64 S.Ct. 397, :•
L.Ed. 497.”
The opinion in Cassell v. Texas, supra
■vas rendered on April 24, 1950. In that
:ase an all white grand jury panel ha..
>een selected and the Negro population i
Dallas County was approximately 15.5'
There were 21 grand juries during the pc
"iod between the Hill decision and the Car
'ell indictment, and of the 252 names or
he panels, 17, or 6.7%, were Negro. The
>ayment of a poll tax was a quali ficati.
dr jury service and 6.5% of the poll t.v-
>ayers were Negro. It was determined L
he court that as a matter of proportion
lercentages, a prima facie showing of n
:ial discrimination had not been show:
lut in Cassell, the petitioner also contend
d that subsequent to the decision in Hi-
he grand jury commissioners, for 21 con
ecutive lists, had consistently limited Nc
;roes selected for grand jury service to m
lore than one on each grand jury', on tin
heory that such limitation was permissil
indcr Akins provided the limitation shoo'
e approximately proportional to the nun
EPORTER, 2cl SERIES WILLIAMS
Cite as 49l> S
. „f Negroes eligible for grand jury
,i,e. In Cassell the Supreme Court
. 1 :
\n accused is entitled to have charges
.gainst him considered by a jury in the
Section of which there has been neither
..elusion nor exclusion because of race.
, lur holding that there was discrimina-
,c,n in the selection of grand jurors in
.his case, however, is based on another
,<round. In explaining the fact that no
N'egroes appeared on this grand-jury list,
(he commissioners said that they knew
u.r.o available who qualified; at the
■ une time they said they chose jurymen
only from those people with whom they
were personally acquainted. It may be
assumed that in ordinary activities in
Dallas County, acquaintanceship between
the races is not on a sufficiently familiar
basis to give citizens eligible for appoint
ment as jury' commissioners an opportu
nity to know the qualifications for
^rand-jury service of many members of
another race. An individual’s qualifica
tions for grand-jury service, however,
are not hard to ascertain, and with no
evidence to the contrary, we must as
sume that a large proportion of the Ne
groes of Dallas County rrjet the statutory
requirements for jury service. When
the commissioners were appointed as ju
dicial administrative officials, it was
their duty to familiarize themselves fair
ly with the qualifications of the eligible
jurors of the county without regard to
race and color. They did not do so
here, and the result has been racial dis
crimination. We repeat the recent state
ment of Chief Justice Stone in Hill v.
Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 404, 62 S.Ct. 1159,
1161, 86 L.Ed. 1559:
'Discrimination can arise from the action
of commissioners who exclude all ne
groes whom they do not know to be
qualified and who neither know nor seek
to learn whether there are in fact any
qualified to serve. In such a case, dis
crimination necessarily results where
v. STATE Ark. 399
,\V.2d 305
there are qualified negroes available for
jury service. With the large number of
colored male residents of the county who
are literate, and in the absence of any
countervailing testimony, there is no
room for inference that there are not
among them householders of good moral
character, who can read and write, quali
fied and available for grand jury serv
ice.’
The existence of the kind of discrimina
tion described in the Hill case does not
depend upon systematic exclusion con
tinuing over a long period and practiced
by a succession of jury commissioners.
Since the issue must be whether there
has been discrimination in the selection
of the jury that has indicted petitioner,
it is enough to have direct evidence
based on the statements of the jury com
missioners in the very case. Discrimina
tion may be proved in other ways than
by evidence of long-continued unex
plained absence of Negroes from many
panels. The statements of the jury com
missioners that they chose only whom
they knew, and that they knew no eligi
ble Negroes in an area where Negroes
made up so large a proportion of the
population, prove the intentional exclu
sion that is discrimination in violation of
petitioner’s constitutional rights.” (Our
emphasis).
In Whitus v. Georgia, supra, the Negro
population was 45% of the total population
in the area involved; 27.1% of the taxpay
ers were Negro and 42% of the males over
21 years of age were Negro. After the
jury list was revised under court order in
Whitus, only three of the 33 prospective
jurors were Negro and none served on a
19 member grand jury. The jury commis
sioners in that case made up the jury ve
nires from tax records which were kept on
a segregated basis and the jury commis
sioners selected prospective jurors on the
basis of personal acquaintance. Only sev
en of the 90 persons from which the petit
jury was selected were Negro and none
were accepted on the petit jury. While the
. i
400 Ark. 496 SOUTH WESTERN REPORTER, 2d SERIES
Whitus case contained elements not present
in the case at bar, the Supreme Court in
Whitus said:
“Under such a system the opportunity
for discrimination was present and we
cannot say on this record that it was not
resorted to by the commissioners. In
deed, the disparity between the' percent
age of Negroes on the tax digest (27.-
1%) and that of the grand jury venire
(9.1%) and the petit jury venire (7.7%)
strongly points to this conclusion. Al
though the system of selection used here
had been specifically condemned by the
Court of Appeals, the State offered no
testimony as to why it was continued on
retrial. The State offered no explana
tion for the disparity between the per
centage of Negroes on the tax digest and
those on the venires, although the digest
must have included the names of large
numbers of ‘upright and intelligent’ Ne
groes as the statutory qualification re
quired. In any event the State failed to
offer any testimony indicating that the
27.1% of Negroes on the tax digest were
not fully qualified. The State, there
fore, failed to meet the burden of rebut
ting the petitioners’ prima facie case.”
(Our emphasis).
In the case of Bailey v. Henslee, 287 F.
2d 936, above referred to, the Eighth Cir
cuit Court of Appeals in granting habeas
corpus said:
“In avoiding racial discrimination in the
selection of jurors it is not enough for
the jury commissioners or any other se
lecting agency to be content with persons
of their personal acquaintance. Smith v.
State of Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 132, 61 S.
Ct. 164, 85 L.Ed. 84; Hill v. State of
Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 404, 62 S.Ct. 1159,
86 L.Ed. 1559. It is ‘their duty to fami
liarize themselves fairly with the qualifi
cations of the eligible jurors of the
county without regard to race and color.’
Cassell v. State of Texas, supra, at page
289 of 339.U.S., at page 633 of 70 S.Ct.”
In the 1940 case of Smith v. Tex:,
U.S. 128, 61 S.Ct. 164, 85 L.Ed. 84, t;,
preme Court said:
“Where jury commissioners limi:
from whom grand juries are seic.
their own personal acquaintance
crimination can arise from comm:
ers who know no negroes as \u-
from commissioners who know but <
nate them. If there has been discri:
tion, whether accomplished ingem
or ingenuously, the conviction r,
stand.”
In Vanleeward v. Rutledge, 5 Cir.
F.2d 584, the court citing from the 1
Circuit case of Scott v. Walker, 358
561, said:
“ ‘It is plain from the record here
the commissioners put on the list
those personally known to them. 1
made no especial effort to ascer
whether there were qualified Negm
the parish for jury service. In faili.
do so they violated the rule, annou
by the Supreme Court through Mr,
tice Reed in Cassell v. Texas, when
was said, “When the commissioners v
appointed as judicial administrative
cials, it was their duty to farnil. -
themselves fairly with the qualified
of the eligible jurors of the county "
out regard to race and color. The;
not do so here, and the result has
racial discrimination.” 339 U.S. 2̂
289, [70 S.Ct. 629, 633, 94 L.Ed. 85
Returning now to the facts and evkk
in the case at bar; at the time of
liams’ trial, the payment of a poll tax
necessary' under the statute (Ark.Stat
§ 3-107 [Repl.1956]) to become a qua!
elector in Arkansas. Under Ark.Stat.
§ 3-118 (Repl.1956) the tax collector
required to file with the county chr>
list containing the correct names, alp!
ically arranged (according to the p«‘
or voting townships, and according t(i
or) of all persons who have up to am
eluding October 1st of that year pa"1
<
t
I
4
<1
■' t
. .W * .
ic 1940 case of Smith v. Tex
!8, 61 S.Ct. 164, 85 L.Ed. 84,
Court said:
ere jury commissioners limit
whom grand juries are select
own personal acquaintance
:nation can arise from commi
who know no negroes as « ,,-
commissioners who know hut
them. If there has been discn:
whether accomplished ingei:
lgenuously, the conviction c.v
If
anleeward v. Rutledge, 5 Car.,
>4, the court citing from the 1
case of Scott v. Walker, 358 i
d:
is plain from the record here :
ommissioners put on the list i
personally known to them, 'P
no especial effort to ascer:
ter there were qualified Negroc
Irish for jury service. In failiu
i they violated the rule annou:.
e Supreme Court through Mr. i
leed in Cassell v. Texas, where
aid, “When the commissioners \\t
nted as judicial administrative of
it was their duty to familiar:,
elves fairly with the qualificatu
; eligible jurors of the county w '
;gard to race and color. They
□ so here, and the result has h
discrimination.” 339 U.S. 283 ■
70 S.Ct. 629, 633, 94 L.Ed. 839.]"
ning now to the facts and evide:
case at bar; at the time of V,
rial, the payment of a poll tax w
y under the statute (Ark.Stat.A1
[Repl.1956]) to become a qualii'
n Arkansas. Under Ark.Stat.A:
(Repl.1956) the tax collector v.
. to file with the county clerk
aining the correct names, alpha!
■ranged (according to the polite
g townships, and according to c
ill persons who have up to and 1
October 1st of that year paid t
TER, 2d SERIES WILLIAMS
Cite as 400 S
assessed against them respective-
;he county clerk was then required
d the list in a bound book and to
. same to the county election com-
, (.ri for use in ascertaining the qual-
lectors as they appeared at polling
(,,r casting ballots.
statutory qualifications for grand
tit jurors under Ark.Stat.Ann. §§
,, 10 39-208 (Repl.1962) required that
[E] lectors of the county
persons of good character, of
•.■roved integrity, sound judgment and
„aable information. . . . ”
circuit judge was required to select
.: jury commissioners of statutory qual-
uiotis whose duty it was to select the
I and petit juror list. Ark.Stat.Ann. §
V5 (Repl.1962) provided that any per-
- who served on the regular panel of the
: jury would be ineligible to serve on a
rijuent panel for a period of two years,
'cquently, the jury commissioners in
at bar followed the usual and cus-
>ry procedure of using the poll tax list
:Sc most convenient and accurate aid in
nmining who are “electors of the coun-
m selecting jury veniremen and also
i prior jury lists in determining who is
. edified by recent prior service.
. i j Returning now to the selection of
>uy panel in this case, it was stipulat
'd the Rule No. 1 hearing that the
-1 65 poll tax list used by the jury com
biners in selecting the jury panel for
i!,64 October term of the circuit court
Ashley County, contained the names of
6 qualified electors and that 25% of
’ were Negro. The jury panel for the
' her 1964 term of court here involved
■:sted of 60 members. Four of the
'diet's, or 6.67% of the panel, were Ne
llie important, question then is
'’her this disparity between the 25%
’ died Negro electors in Ashley' County
’he 6.67% selected for jury service,
’he result of excluding Negroes from
S.W.2d—26
v. STATE Ark. 401
,W.2d 395
jury service because of their color or race.
Of course, unexplained prior, or “systemat
ic,” exclusion of Negroes from jury serv
ice would leave the inference they were
excluded because of their race if no other
explanation is given; consequently, prior,
or systematic, exclusion is admissible m ev
idence in support of a claim of intentional
exclusion because of race in a given case.
Tire evidence on this point, in the case-at
bar, includes the percentage of Negroes on
the jury panels for a ten year period prior
to the October 1964 term here involved.
These percentages vary from none in two
adjourned March 1960 terms to 24% in one
adjourned March term, but they average
only 9.42%.
The three jury commissioners who se
lected the jury panel from which the jury
was selected in this case were called by the
appellant and testified at his Rule No. 1
hearing. On direct examination all thi ec
were questioned on collateral matters ap
parently aimed at bringing to the surface
any personal feeling that could be inter
preted as racial prejudice, such as to their
membership in the NAACP or any pre
dominately Negro civic and social organi
zations, and as to whether the membership
of the churches to which they belong were
predominately' black or white. As to the
actual question involved on this appeal, we
deem it unnecessary to set out the testimo
ny of the commissioners in detail but, Mr.
Charles Grassi, one of the commissioners,
testified that in selecting the jury panel the
commissioners were furnished a list of the
jurors for the past several years which
they used in determining who was eligible
to serve. lie testified that they were also
furnished with a county poll tax list and
that as he recalls, the poll tax list did des
ignate the race beside the name of each of
the qualified electors. He then said:
“Of course, there was three of us. We
went down the lists and if one or three
of us knew -the man that was under dis
cussion and knew who he was, we would
see if he was qualified, a registered vot
er.”
402 Ark. 496 SOUTH WESTERN REPORTER, 2d SERIES
Mr. Grassi testified that they tried to
pick the members of the jury panel from
different sections of the county, and that
he was acquainted with Negroes who lived
in and around Crossett. He said that he
did not know them personally but knows
them by name and when he sees them. He
said he did not know them well enough, to
know what occupation they were engaged
in but did know 20 or 25 of them well
enough to know their general character,
lie said that the trial judge instructed the
commissioners to select people of sound
judgment, proven integrity and reasonable
information, and that the jurors should be
selected without regard of race, creed or
color. He said that in determining the
qualifications of the members of the jury
panel he based his opinion mainly on his
personal observations of the ones selected.
He testified that he made no effort to
familiarize himself with the character,
judgment and integrity of the Negroes in
the county with whom he was not already
personally acquainted. He said he was
personally acquainted with perhaps 20 or
25 Negroes and perhaps 250 white people
in and around Crossett well enough to ac
curately estimate their character.
Mr. Allen Cameron, another one of the
commissioners, testified that he had lived
in Ashley County since 1953 and is person
ally acquainted with 40 or 50 Negroes who
live outside the city of Crossett, and that a
majority of these individuals work for the
same company he works for. He said he
is acquainted with perhaps six or 12 Ne
groes who live inside the city of Crossett.
He said he is personally acquainted with
150 or 200 white people living in Ashley
County outside the city of Crossett and
perhaps 1,000 living inside Crossett. He
said he had no knowledge of the education
or qualifications of the Negroes he knows
in Crossett and does not know whether any
of them have criminal records or not. He
testified that he made no particular effort
to ascertain the qualifications of Negroes
or whites living in the community with
whom he was not already acquainted.
Mr. Ray Phillips, the third coir
testified that he is a general men
ing in Fountain Hill, and had bee:,
chant in Ashley County for 42 y<
er being asked if the member
church were all white or all N,
Phillips readily admitted that he
believe in white and black people .
school or eating in cafes together,
Mr. Phillips just as readily testifu
lows:
“Q. So, you tell me whether y
a negro man or a number of
should be able to sit in judgm
white man accused of a capita'
A. Well, if he is qualified, IV
soon have him as some of the
The substance of the remainder
Phillips’ testimony was to the ei‘
he knew the people in his comma:
assumed that the other two comm
knew the people in their respect:
munities; that he recommended
service the ones from his comm;
knew to be high class citizens and
the other commissioners did likeu
From the overall testimony of
missioners there is no question
procedure they followed in selc<'
jury panel in this case. They s:t
amined the list of qualified electoi
lected the jury panel from among
viduals on the list some membra
commission knew. When they wc
to a name of a person one of the
sioners knew, that individual's
tions (other than being a qualifier'
would be discussed by the three
sioners and he would either be
for jury service or passed over,
commissioners would then contm
the list to the next person with "
of them was acquainted.
Crossett precinct is by far the r
ulated precinct in the county conic
names of 4,420 qualified electors 1
16.0% were Negro according to h"
list in evidence. There were 2.i "
_____ __2______— _UfiM «___ A v t d M k
R, 2d SERIES
V Phillips, the third commi
hat he is a general mere!',
untain Ilill, and had been
Ashley County for 42 yearv
asked if the members ,
ere all white or all Meg?
eadily admitted that he 4
white and black people at!
eating in cafes together, h
ps just as readily testified
>, you tell me whether you '
i man or a number of n>
be able to sit in judgment
tan accused of a capital c-
ell, if he is qualified, I’d ji
ve him as some of the oil
:ance of the remainder oi
estimony was to the effect
:he people in his communit;.
hat the other two commissi
people in their respective
that he recommended for
e ones from his communit
e high class citizens and as*
commissioners did likewise.
le overall testimony of the
there is no question as t
they followed in selecti:
1 in this case. They simpl;
5 list of qualified electors ar
jury panel from among the
i the list some member o:
n knew. When they would
of a person one of the cor
tew, that individual’s qua!
:r than being a qualified elc
discussed by the three cor.
id he would either be acc>;
service or passed over, and
tiers would then continue !
the next person with whom
is acquainted.
precinct is by far the most
:inct in the county container
4,420 qualified electors of
e Negro according to the v
lence. There were 25 whin
WILLIAMS v. STATE
Cite as 498 S.W.2d 393
. , ,1 jurors selected from this town-
going down the list” in selecting
mors from this township, the com-
i(!> started with R. L. Brooks, a
,. and ended with Richard Ro-
is Negro. From the name of R.
, ks as it alphabetically appears on
list, to and including Richard
there are 2,414 white and 475 Ne
stors listed. Consequently, the num-
electors the commissioners were
• to have considered between the
, t){ R. L. Brooks and Richard Rogers
(td nf slightly less than 13% Negro
:-iuly more than 87% white. Of the
hviduals selected 25 were white and
...u, Negro, making slightly less than
Negro and slightly more than 96%
vviburg is the next largest voting pre-
• containing 1,720 qualified electors of
; 11.3 were Negro. By the same proc-
■ ctween the first and last name select-
tn this township, the commissioners
• iutind to have considered the names of
- white and 180 Negro electors, making
v.d of 1,555 individual names of whom
vdy less than 12% were Negro and
:iy more than 8S% were white. There
• 15 jurors selected from this precinct
f whom were white.
here was a total of 322 qualified elec-
> listed in Fountain Hill precinct of
:n 44, or 13.7%, were Negro. There
c 12 members of the jury panel selected
'n this precinct, all of whom were
;e. The remaining seven jurors were
' ted from Wilmot, Boydell, Portland
1’arkdale precincts, with two Negroes
two whites being selected from Wilmot
met which contains 143 listed white
'ors and 122 Negro electors.
’■ is obvious that in selecting a jury ve-
f of 60 from a list of 8,656 qualified ju-
■' in a county, there are many times
rt individuals eligible for jury service
• there are positions to be filled. It is,
course, a matter of common knowledge
Ark. 4 0 3
that there are many reasons why many
qualified electors would be passed up for
jury service‘in preference to the ones se
lected. It may be that jury commissioners
would pass up some individuals for jury
service for economic reasons in recognition
of unusual hardships in individuals sacri
ficing their daily wages for the amount
paid for jury service. It is entirely possi
ble that persons working in industry who
have the qualifications for good juror
would also be working at jobs on which
other jobs depend and in many instances
jobs not easily filled by temporary assign
ment while the regular employee serves on
a jury. It may be that jury commissioners
take into consideration the handicap to the
employer as well as to the employee in
such cases in requiring the individual to
leave his job and serve on juries. The
same situation may apply in agricultural
sections of the state in the so-called "busy
season” of the year (planting and harvest
time) and, of course, many legally quali
fied electors may not possess the education,
sound judgment, experience or tempera
ment to sit as jurors and intelligently apply
the law as given in instructions to intricate
and complicated facts and render a fair
and impartial verdict in a given case. Be
that as it may, no such reasons were given
for excluding anyone for jury service in
the case at bar. As a matter of fact the
substance of the commissioners’ testimony
in the case at bar places them squarely
within the prohibition announced in the
cases above cited. They simply went down
the list of the qualified electors of the
county and selected the jury panel from
among the individuals with whom they
were personally acquainted. As already
pointed out, this procedure has been con
demned by the United States Supreme
Court when it results in considerable dis
parity between the races. Consequently,
when jury commissioners select jury panels
only from the people with whom they are
acquainted, they should he prepared to
show that they are as widely acquainted
with one race as with the other in the in-
404 Ark. 496 SOUTH WESTERN REPORTER, 2d SERIES
volved area; and when they select a high
percentage of white jurors from a list con
taining the names of a high percentage of
Negroes, the state must be prepared to ex
plain the discrepancy and affirmatively
show why the names of eligible Negroes
were passed over in preference of eligible
whites. I his was not done in the case at
bar.
BEN M. HOGAN COMPANY, cy,
Appellants,
v.
Will E. NICHOLS ct al., A ppr
No. 5-GI68.
Supreme Court of Arkan .i
July 2, 1973.
[4, Sj We regret that at this late date
Ashley County must be put'to the expense,
inconvenience and ordeal of again trying
Williams for that county’s most brutal
crime which occurred more than eight
years ago. The question of whether Wil-
Hams was guilty of the crime for which he
was convicted, or whether he was tried by
a fair and impartial jury, or whether his
rights were prejudiced by a trial before an
all white jury, is not involved on this ap
peal. Williams Jiad no constitutional right
to have Negroes on the jury before whom
he was tried and he had no constitutional
right to have Negroes on the panel from
which the jury was selected for his trial.
He was, however, entitled to be tried be
fore a legally constituted jury and a jury
from which members of any race have
been excluded simply because of their race,
is not a legally constituted jury.
It is clear that under the United States
Supreme Court decisions, supra, a prima
facie case of racial discrimination appears
on the face of the record in this case and
there was no evidence offered to rebut it.
Therefore, it is also clear, that we have no
other alternative, under the United States
Supreme Court decisions, than to reverse
the judgment in this case because of unre
butted. evidence of racial discrimination in
the selection of the panel notwithstanding
the fact that the selection was made under
a jury selection system that has now been
abandoned by appropriate legislation in Ar
kansas.
The judgment is reversed and this case
remanded for a new trial.
Subcontractor’s'employee’s t:
action against general contractor
other. A judgment was entered
defendants in the Franklin Circa
Ozark District, David Partain, ]..
defendants appealed. The Suprcnr
Foglcman, J., held that where the
plaintiff’s attorney had referred •
to a medical expert, not for treatte
the expert’s medical examination \
ducted in the presence of the j>\
wife and his attorney, and the ex;
quiries were answered in part by ::
and attorney, the expert’s opinion !
substantial part on such hearsay ,r
serving information was inadmissf
was specially prejudicial where the :
physician did not testify. The Co.:
held that admission of the terms
general contractor’s liability policy
ror.
Judgment reversed and cause r
ed.
I. Evidence <2=128
Generally, statements by injur
diseased person as to his current or
and symptoms, or as to past condit:
symptoms, made to physician cor.
examination for purpose of qualify
expert witness, and not for treatmc:
inadmissible.
2. Evidence <2=550(2), 555
Medical expert may base his <
as to prognosis of injury based up"
mony given at trial by another physic