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Ark. 395WILLIAMS v. STATE Cite as 490 S.\V.2d 395 I'ri-State Insurance Company v. D/B/A O & M Lumber Compa- Ark. 1259, 483 S.W.2d 212, we fur- i;lictl that a property damage limita- ,f liability is valid and that recovery C,„jcnt upon the terms of the con- ■ r.ithcr than on the difference in the . . anc] after value of the vehicle. If • ..'lire had been equal to or less than •launt necessary to repair the car, ap- conld have recovered the difference the before and after value. But ;5 not the case. The estimated cost pairs was only $961.73A Of course, • aiding would be different if the testi- re fleeted the Wish automobile to , |,ecu a total loss. But there is no evi- •f to that effect in the record. The evidence on this point by appellee’s ■ vsses was that a wrecked automobile ;h had been repaired was never as val- 'c for resale purposes as one which had : been wrecked. Not a single person :icd that the car was a total loss. t follows from what has been said, that ■ trial court erred in its conclusions, and • judgment is reversed with directions to vr a judgment for appellee in the •miit of $861.73. It is so ordered. i'.VRD, J., dissents. the purport of Ills holding when he de- hiroil to them in the course of the instruc- ■ ..«ns: ‘The Court has permitted the in- 'reduction of evidence as to what the fair market value iof the plaintiff’s ear was Mint'd lately before the collision and ns to viiat the fair market value was immedi- itely after the collision. The Court per mitted the introduction of that evidence ' tily for the jury’s consideration in deter mining the company’s liability under the Provisions of the policy, as you have been ■nstrueted by other instructions herein. Such is not the measure of the defend ant's liability.’ ” James WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas', Appellee. No. 5742. Supreme Court of Arkansas. July 2, KITH. Proceeding for. postconviction relief. Relief was denied by the Circuit Court, Ashley County, G. B. Colvin, Jr., J., and petitioner appealed. The Supreme Court, Jones, J., held that where jury commission ers simply went down the list of qualified electors of the county and selected a jury panel from among individuals with whom they were personally acquainted, and the commissioners were not as widely ac quainted with Negroes as with whites in the involved area and the result was a dis parity between the races in jury selection, the jury which tried defendant was not a legally constituted jury. Judgment reversed and case remanded for new trial. I. Jury €=>120 When prima facie case of purposeful limitation in selection of jurors is proven by defendant, burden shifts to state to prove otherwise. Rules of Criminal Proce dure, rule 1; Ark.Stats. §§ 3-107, 3-118, 39-206 to 39-208, 39-225. 4. The original estimate by Dean Chevrolet was in the amount of $1,366.73 and there is a dispute as to whether the adjuster ever approved this figure. This estimate included a new frame and the labor to in stall same, but apparently after settlement negotiations between the company and appellee failed and Arendall said that the frame could be repaired, the cost of re pairs was reduced by the amount neces sary for a new frame and the labor, to the cost of repairing the frame on the car. Of course, even if this figure had been allowed by the court, the court's judgment would still have been erroneous. 396 Ark. 496 SOUTH WESTERN REPORTER, 2cl SERIES 2. Ju ry <2=120 Where individuals are selected for jury service from tax lists, or from any source, where separate race is indicated, and where there is large percentage of Ne groes as compared with whites who are presumed to have legal qualifications to serve as jurors, prima facie case of racial discrimination is presented when jury com missioners select those to serve.on juries only from among the individuals with whom they are acquainted and such proce dure results in small percentage of Ne groes as compared with whites being se lected for jury service. Ark.Stats. §§ 3- 107, 3-118, 39-206 to 39-208, 39-225. U. S.C.A.Const Amend, 14. 3. Ju ry O l 20 Prior or systematic exclusion of Ne groes from jury service is admissible in ev idence in support of claim of intentional exclusion because of race in given case. Rules of Criminal Procedure, rule 1 ; Ark. Stats. §§ 3-107, 3-118, 39-206 to 39-208, 39-225. 4. Jury 0=33(1) Defendant in homicide case had no constitutional right to have Negroes on jury before whom he was tried and no constitutional right to have Negroes on panel from which jury was selected but was entitled to be tried before legally con stituted jury, excluding any jury from which members of any race were excluded simply because of their race. Ark.Stats. §§ 3-107, 3-118, 39-206 to 39-208, 39-225; U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14. 5. J u ry 0=33 (1 ) Where jury commissioners simply went down list of qualified electors of county and selected jury panel from among individuals with whom they were pcrsonal- I. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 83 S.Ct. 822 9 Ij.kM.2d 837; Townsend v. Sain, a i- U.S. 293, S3 S.Ct. 745, 9 Tj.Ed.2d 770 and Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 10 L.Ed.2d 148. See also ar- ly acquainted, and commissioners v. as widely acquainted with Negro, , whites in the area and result was < between races in jury selection, jut tried defendant was not legally jury. Ark.Stats. §§ 3—107, 3—1 IS, 39-208, 39-225; U.S.C.A.Const. Ai Walker, Kaplan & Mays, P.A. Rock, and Jack Greenberg, No; Chachkin, New York City, for app<4 Ray Thornton, Atty. Gen., by : Ginger, Deputy Atty. Gen., Little lb- appellee. )ONES, Justice. James Williams wras charged wit", degree murder committed in the pr tion of rape. He was found gu charged at a jury trial in the Ashley ty Circuit Court and on December » he was sentenced to death by electro His conviction and sentence were at; by this court on appeal, Williams v. 239 Ark. 1109, 396 S.W.2d 834, and 1 ecution date was set by the Govcr: July 22, 1966. Execution was stayed order of this court entered on Ju 1966, to permit Williams to seek po viction relief under Criminal Fro: Rule No. 1 promulgated and adopt, cause of the tremendous increase in corpus petitions being filed in the sb>' federal courts by convicted felons / ' authorized and permitted under 1 States Supreme Court decisions.1 Following the Rule No. 1 hearing Ashley County Circuit Court on Nov 9, 1967, the petition was denied by f" tier filed on May 25, 1971, and W now appeals from the trial court ord nying relief on his petition to vaca former judgment of conviction. In tide “Accommodating State Criin Procedure and Federal Post Con\i‘ Review” by Daniel J. Meador in Amcr Bar Association Journal, October, vol. 50, p. 1928. :e s immissioners w<~ with Negroes : id result was d y selection, jure not legally cor. 5-107, 3-118, 3'i C.A.Const. Am. & Mays, P.A., I reenberg, Norm : City, for appetU itty. Gen., by 1! . Gen., Little Roc. vas charged with ' nitted in the peri. was found guilt; ial in the Ashley 1 i on December 9, death by electro.' sentence were aff. peal, Williams v. .v s.W.2d 834, and hi :t by the Governor ;ution was stayed 1 t entered on July iliams to seek post . :r 1 Criminal Procc Igated and adoptee .dous increase in li ng filed in the state invicted felons pro ' irmitted under l irt decisions.1 tie No. 1 hearing if ' ;uit Court on Novo was denied by fit'1 25, 1971, and Will- the trial court ordi't 5 petition to vacate f conviction. In ’ ating State Crii"': cdcral Post Convii'1 l J. Meador in Anr'U' Journal, October, 1 ‘ WILLIAMS C ite as 49G S eight years since Williams was . lr|ed and convicted, his death sen- was commuted to life imprisonment executive clemency. The appellant now . .,„|s that the trial court erred in deny- •„js petition for post-conviction relief reasons stated as fo llow s: \u'iellant’s unrebutted evidence that •x'r'roes were systematically excluded or included in token numbers only ,.Kin the jury venires of Ashley County, Arkansas established a denial of his • mirtccnth Amendment rights. Appellant’s trial was conducted under i,lCh intimidating conditions and after „.fh adverse, hostile and prejudicial pub licity as to deny him a fundamentally i ,ir hearing, and thus his rights under :u. due process clause of the Fourteenth \mendment were denied him.” j be appellant’s second assignment was , vented, argued and considered on lus 4 appeal and we do not reach it here .uise we find we must reverse his convic- n under the first assignment. j 11 The constitutional prohibition mist exclusion of members of any race :a jury service because of race has nev- ' been questioned in Arkansas. Williams State, 229 Ark. 1022, 322 S.W.2d 86; ,:sey v. State, 219 Ark. 101, 240 S.W.2d ; Green v. Stale, 222 Ark. 222, 258 S. -M 56; Maxwell v. State, 217 Ark. 691, ’ S.\V.2d 982; Bailey v. State, 227 Ark. ■i. 302 SAV.2d 796. In Williams and <sey we pointed out that the burden of awing facts which permit an inference i purposeful limitation for jury service •'cause of race is on the defendant. It ly follows that when a prime facie case 1 Purposeful limitation is proven by the tendant, the bttrden then shifts to the to prove otherwise. The state offered ’ evidence whatever in the case at bar, so question before us is whether the ap- '•int made out a prima facie case of pur- efill exclusion of Negroes because of r race from the jury panel in this case. v. STATE Ark- 397 \V.2d 395 [2] There can be no question that this court, as well as the trial courts of this state, is bound by the decisions of the United Slates Supreme Court concerning rights and prohibitions under the provi sions of the United States Constitution and, there is no question that the United States Supreme Court has spoken clearly, and more than once, on the question of racial discrimination in the selection of juries in criminal cases. We shall not attempt to cite all the Supreme Court de cisions bearing on the subject nor shall we quote extensively from any of them, but the substance of these decisions is simply this: Where individuals are se lected for jury service from tax lists, or from any source, where separate race is in dicated, and where there is a large percent age of Negroes as compared with whites who are presumed to have the legal quali fications to serve as jurors; a prima facie case of racial discrimination is presented when jury commissioners select those to serve on juries only from among the indi viduals with whom they arc acquainted and such procedure results in a small percent age of Negroes as compared with whites being selected for jury service. Such pri ma facie evidence may, of course, be rebut ted by evidence that the comparatively small percentage of Negroes selected was not because of their race. The burden of presenting'such evidence, however, rests on the state. - Wc need only mention in some detail two United States Supreme Court decisions from which the above rule is extracted. They are Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 70 S.Ct. 629, 94 L.Ed. 839; Whitus v. Geor gia, 385 U.S. 545, 87 S.Ct. 643, 17 L.Ed.2d 599. These decisions have been followed by the Federal Courts of Appeals in many cases but we deem it unnecessary to com ment on more than two or three of them including the case of Bailey v. Henslee, 8 Cir., 287 F.2d 936, which arose from this state. The background for the decision in Cas sell v. Texas, supra, arose in two prior cas- 398 Ark. 496 SOUTH WESTERN REPORTER, 2d SERIES es, Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 62 S.Ct.- 1159, 86 L.Ed. 1559 and Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 65 S.Ct. 1276, 89 L.Ed. 1692. In Hill no Negro had ever been selected for grand jury service in Dallas County, Texas, and the jury comissioners testified that they had summoned, for service on the grand jury which returned the indictment, members of the white race with 'whom they were acquainted and whom they knew to be qualified to serve. They said that they considered Negroes for selection but did not personally know a qualified Negro they thought would make a good grand juror. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner had made a prima facie case of racial dis crimination in the selection of jurors and after referring to Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, 59 S.Ct. 536, 83 L.Ed. 757, said: “We thought, as we think here, that had there been evidence obtainable to contra dict the inference to be drawn from this testimony, the State would not have re frained from introducing it, and that the evidence which was introduced suffi ciently showed that there were colored citizens of the county qualified and available for service on the grand jury. The Hill case was decided on June 1, 1942, and on June 4, 1945, the United States Supreme Court handed down the opinion in Akins v. Texas, supra, wherein the Texas State Court, in attempting to comply with the decision in Hill, selected one Negro on a 16 men grand jury panel from which 12 were chosen as a grand jury. In upholding the jury selection in Akins, the Supreme Court said: “Purposeful discrimination is not sus tained by a showing that on a single grand jury the number of members of one race is less than that race’s propor tion of the eligible individuals. . Defendants under our criminal statutes are not entitled to demand representa tives of their racial inheritance upon ju ries before whom they are tried. But such defendants arc entitled to require that those who are trusted with jury selection shall not pursue a com conduct which results in discrimi: ‘in the selection of jurors on grounds.’ Hill v. Texas, supra, ■ 316 U.S., 62 S.Ct. 1159. Our din. that indictments be quashed \\Tie groes, although numerous in the u nity, were excluded from grand ju. have been based on the theory thru continual exclusion indicated discr;. tion and not on the theory that : groups must be recognized. Nor; Alabama, supra, [294 U.S. 587, 55 579, 79 L.Ed. 1074]; Hill v. Tex a* pra; Smith v. Texas, supra, [311 128, 6r S.Ct. 164, 85 L.Ed. 84], Tin : fact of inequality in the number sc! does not in itself show discriminatio: purpose to discrimination mm: present which may be proven by st atic exclusion of eligible jurymen < prescribed race or by unequal applies of the law to such an extent as to intentional discrimination. Cf. Snov. v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8, 64 S.Ct. K L.Ed. 497.” The opinion in Cassell v. Texas, St' was rendered on April 24, 1950. In case an all white grand jury panel been selected and the Negro populate : Dallas County was approximately 1: There were 21 grand juries during tie riod between the Hill decision and the sell indictment, and of the 252 name- the panels, 17, or 6.7%, were Negro, payment of a poll tax was a qualifier for jury service and 6.5% of the poll payers were Negro. It was determini' the court that as a matter of proport percentages, a prima facie showing ot cial discrimination had not been six But in Cassell, the petitioner also coin ed that subsequent to the decision in * the grand jury commissioners, for 21 • secutive lists, had consistently limited groes selected for grand jury service t1 more than one on each grand jury, or theory that such limitation was perm under Akins provided the limitation r’ be approximately proportional to the selection shall not pursue a course conduct which results in discriinin.i: ‘in the selection of jurors on ra. grounds.’ Hill v. Texas, supra, 4 0 ; 316 U.S., 62 S.Ct. 1159. Our dirccr that indictments he quashed when ‘ groes, although numerous in the conn, nity, were excluded from grand jury ; have been based on the theory that t! continual exclusion indicated discrin;-,: tion and not on the theory that r,., groups must be recognized. Norris . Alabama, supra, [294 U.S. 587, 55 S.i • 579, 79 L.Ed. 1074]; Hill v. Texas, ... pra\ Smith v. Texas, supra, [311 V 128, 61 S.Ct. 164, 85 L.Ed. 84], The me: fact of inequality in the number select does not in itself show discrimination, purpose to discrimination must 1 present which may be proven by sysU; atic exclusion of eligible jurymen of t: prescribed race or by unequal applicant of the law to such an extent as to sho. ■ intentional discrimination. Cf. Snowdt v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8, 64 S.Ct. 397, :• L.Ed. 497.” The opinion in Cassell v. Texas, supra ■vas rendered on April 24, 1950. In that :ase an all white grand jury panel ha.. >een selected and the Negro population i Dallas County was approximately 15.5' There were 21 grand juries during the pc "iod between the Hill decision and the Car 'ell indictment, and of the 252 names or he panels, 17, or 6.7%, were Negro. The >ayment of a poll tax was a quali ficati. dr jury service and 6.5% of the poll t.v- >ayers were Negro. It was determined L he court that as a matter of proportion lercentages, a prima facie showing of n :ial discrimination had not been show: lut in Cassell, the petitioner also contend d that subsequent to the decision in Hi- he grand jury commissioners, for 21 con ecutive lists, had consistently limited Nc ;roes selected for grand jury service to m lore than one on each grand jury', on tin heory that such limitation was permissil indcr Akins provided the limitation shoo' e approximately proportional to the nun EPORTER, 2cl SERIES WILLIAMS Cite as 49l> S . „f Negroes eligible for grand jury ,i,e. In Cassell the Supreme Court . 1 : \n accused is entitled to have charges .gainst him considered by a jury in the Section of which there has been neither ..elusion nor exclusion because of race. , lur holding that there was discrimina- ,c,n in the selection of grand jurors in .his case, however, is based on another ,<round. In explaining the fact that no N'egroes appeared on this grand-jury list, (he commissioners said that they knew u.r.o available who qualified; at the ■ une time they said they chose jurymen only from those people with whom they were personally acquainted. It may be assumed that in ordinary activities in Dallas County, acquaintanceship between the races is not on a sufficiently familiar basis to give citizens eligible for appoint ment as jury' commissioners an opportu nity to know the qualifications for ^rand-jury service of many members of another race. An individual’s qualifica tions for grand-jury service, however, are not hard to ascertain, and with no evidence to the contrary, we must as sume that a large proportion of the Ne groes of Dallas County rrjet the statutory requirements for jury service. When the commissioners were appointed as ju dicial administrative officials, it was their duty to familiarize themselves fair ly with the qualifications of the eligible jurors of the county without regard to race and color. They did not do so here, and the result has been racial dis crimination. We repeat the recent state ment of Chief Justice Stone in Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 404, 62 S.Ct. 1159, 1161, 86 L.Ed. 1559: 'Discrimination can arise from the action of commissioners who exclude all ne groes whom they do not know to be qualified and who neither know nor seek to learn whether there are in fact any qualified to serve. In such a case, dis crimination necessarily results where v. STATE Ark. 399 ,\V.2d 305 there are qualified negroes available for jury service. With the large number of colored male residents of the county who are literate, and in the absence of any countervailing testimony, there is no room for inference that there are not among them householders of good moral character, who can read and write, quali fied and available for grand jury serv ice.’ The existence of the kind of discrimina tion described in the Hill case does not depend upon systematic exclusion con tinuing over a long period and practiced by a succession of jury commissioners. Since the issue must be whether there has been discrimination in the selection of the jury that has indicted petitioner, it is enough to have direct evidence based on the statements of the jury com missioners in the very case. Discrimina tion may be proved in other ways than by evidence of long-continued unex plained absence of Negroes from many panels. The statements of the jury com missioners that they chose only whom they knew, and that they knew no eligi ble Negroes in an area where Negroes made up so large a proportion of the population, prove the intentional exclu sion that is discrimination in violation of petitioner’s constitutional rights.” (Our emphasis). In Whitus v. Georgia, supra, the Negro population was 45% of the total population in the area involved; 27.1% of the taxpay ers were Negro and 42% of the males over 21 years of age were Negro. After the jury list was revised under court order in Whitus, only three of the 33 prospective jurors were Negro and none served on a 19 member grand jury. The jury commis sioners in that case made up the jury ve nires from tax records which were kept on a segregated basis and the jury commis sioners selected prospective jurors on the basis of personal acquaintance. Only sev en of the 90 persons from which the petit jury was selected were Negro and none were accepted on the petit jury. While the . i 400 Ark. 496 SOUTH WESTERN REPORTER, 2d SERIES Whitus case contained elements not present in the case at bar, the Supreme Court in Whitus said: “Under such a system the opportunity for discrimination was present and we cannot say on this record that it was not resorted to by the commissioners. In deed, the disparity between the' percent age of Negroes on the tax digest (27.- 1%) and that of the grand jury venire (9.1%) and the petit jury venire (7.7%) strongly points to this conclusion. Al though the system of selection used here had been specifically condemned by the Court of Appeals, the State offered no testimony as to why it was continued on retrial. The State offered no explana tion for the disparity between the per centage of Negroes on the tax digest and those on the venires, although the digest must have included the names of large numbers of ‘upright and intelligent’ Ne groes as the statutory qualification re quired. In any event the State failed to offer any testimony indicating that the 27.1% of Negroes on the tax digest were not fully qualified. The State, there fore, failed to meet the burden of rebut ting the petitioners’ prima facie case.” (Our emphasis). In the case of Bailey v. Henslee, 287 F. 2d 936, above referred to, the Eighth Cir cuit Court of Appeals in granting habeas corpus said: “In avoiding racial discrimination in the selection of jurors it is not enough for the jury commissioners or any other se lecting agency to be content with persons of their personal acquaintance. Smith v. State of Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 132, 61 S. Ct. 164, 85 L.Ed. 84; Hill v. State of Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 404, 62 S.Ct. 1159, 86 L.Ed. 1559. It is ‘their duty to fami liarize themselves fairly with the qualifi cations of the eligible jurors of the county without regard to race and color.’ Cassell v. State of Texas, supra, at page 289 of 339.U.S., at page 633 of 70 S.Ct.” In the 1940 case of Smith v. Tex:, U.S. 128, 61 S.Ct. 164, 85 L.Ed. 84, t;, preme Court said: “Where jury commissioners limi: from whom grand juries are seic. their own personal acquaintance crimination can arise from comm: ers who know no negroes as \u- from commissioners who know but < nate them. If there has been discri: tion, whether accomplished ingem or ingenuously, the conviction r, stand.” In Vanleeward v. Rutledge, 5 Cir. F.2d 584, the court citing from the 1 Circuit case of Scott v. Walker, 358 561, said: “ ‘It is plain from the record here the commissioners put on the list those personally known to them. 1 made no especial effort to ascer whether there were qualified Negm the parish for jury service. In faili. do so they violated the rule, annou by the Supreme Court through Mr, tice Reed in Cassell v. Texas, when was said, “When the commissioners v appointed as judicial administrative cials, it was their duty to farnil. - themselves fairly with the qualified of the eligible jurors of the county " out regard to race and color. The; not do so here, and the result has racial discrimination.” 339 U.S. 2̂ 289, [70 S.Ct. 629, 633, 94 L.Ed. 85 Returning now to the facts and evkk in the case at bar; at the time of liams’ trial, the payment of a poll tax necessary' under the statute (Ark.Stat § 3-107 [Repl.1956]) to become a qua! elector in Arkansas. Under Ark.Stat. § 3-118 (Repl.1956) the tax collector required to file with the county chr> list containing the correct names, alp! ically arranged (according to the p«‘ or voting townships, and according t(i or) of all persons who have up to am eluding October 1st of that year pa"1 < t I 4 <1 ■' t . .W * . ic 1940 case of Smith v. Tex !8, 61 S.Ct. 164, 85 L.Ed. 84, Court said: ere jury commissioners limit whom grand juries are select own personal acquaintance :nation can arise from commi who know no negroes as « ,,- commissioners who know hut them. If there has been discn: whether accomplished ingei: lgenuously, the conviction c.v If anleeward v. Rutledge, 5 Car., >4, the court citing from the 1 case of Scott v. Walker, 358 i d: is plain from the record here : ommissioners put on the list i personally known to them, 'P no especial effort to ascer: ter there were qualified Negroc Irish for jury service. In failiu i they violated the rule annou:. e Supreme Court through Mr. i leed in Cassell v. Texas, where aid, “When the commissioners \\t nted as judicial administrative of it was their duty to familiar:, elves fairly with the qualificatu ; eligible jurors of the county w ' ;gard to race and color. They □ so here, and the result has h discrimination.” 339 U.S. 283 ■ 70 S.Ct. 629, 633, 94 L.Ed. 839.]" ning now to the facts and evide: case at bar; at the time of V, rial, the payment of a poll tax w y under the statute (Ark.Stat.A1 [Repl.1956]) to become a qualii' n Arkansas. Under Ark.Stat.A: (Repl.1956) the tax collector v. . to file with the county clerk aining the correct names, alpha! ■ranged (according to the polite g townships, and according to c ill persons who have up to and 1 October 1st of that year paid t TER, 2d SERIES WILLIAMS Cite as 400 S assessed against them respective- ;he county clerk was then required d the list in a bound book and to . same to the county election com- , (.ri for use in ascertaining the qual- lectors as they appeared at polling (,,r casting ballots. statutory qualifications for grand tit jurors under Ark.Stat.Ann. §§ ,, 10 39-208 (Repl.1962) required that [E] lectors of the county persons of good character, of •.■roved integrity, sound judgment and „aable information. . . . ” circuit judge was required to select .: jury commissioners of statutory qual- uiotis whose duty it was to select the I and petit juror list. Ark.Stat.Ann. § V5 (Repl.1962) provided that any per- - who served on the regular panel of the : jury would be ineligible to serve on a rijuent panel for a period of two years, 'cquently, the jury commissioners in at bar followed the usual and cus- >ry procedure of using the poll tax list :Sc most convenient and accurate aid in nmining who are “electors of the coun- m selecting jury veniremen and also i prior jury lists in determining who is . edified by recent prior service. . i j Returning now to the selection of >uy panel in this case, it was stipulat 'd the Rule No. 1 hearing that the -1 65 poll tax list used by the jury com biners in selecting the jury panel for i!,64 October term of the circuit court Ashley County, contained the names of 6 qualified electors and that 25% of ’ were Negro. The jury panel for the ' her 1964 term of court here involved ■:sted of 60 members. Four of the 'diet's, or 6.67% of the panel, were Ne llie important, question then is '’her this disparity between the 25% ’ died Negro electors in Ashley' County ’he 6.67% selected for jury service, ’he result of excluding Negroes from S.W.2d—26 v. STATE Ark. 401 ,W.2d 395 jury service because of their color or race. Of course, unexplained prior, or “systemat ic,” exclusion of Negroes from jury serv ice would leave the inference they were excluded because of their race if no other explanation is given; consequently, prior, or systematic, exclusion is admissible m ev idence in support of a claim of intentional exclusion because of race in a given case. Tire evidence on this point, in the case-at bar, includes the percentage of Negroes on the jury panels for a ten year period prior to the October 1964 term here involved. These percentages vary from none in two adjourned March 1960 terms to 24% in one adjourned March term, but they average only 9.42%. The three jury commissioners who se lected the jury panel from which the jury was selected in this case were called by the appellant and testified at his Rule No. 1 hearing. On direct examination all thi ec were questioned on collateral matters ap parently aimed at bringing to the surface any personal feeling that could be inter preted as racial prejudice, such as to their membership in the NAACP or any pre dominately Negro civic and social organi zations, and as to whether the membership of the churches to which they belong were predominately' black or white. As to the actual question involved on this appeal, we deem it unnecessary to set out the testimo ny of the commissioners in detail but, Mr. Charles Grassi, one of the commissioners, testified that in selecting the jury panel the commissioners were furnished a list of the jurors for the past several years which they used in determining who was eligible to serve. lie testified that they were also furnished with a county poll tax list and that as he recalls, the poll tax list did des ignate the race beside the name of each of the qualified electors. He then said: “Of course, there was three of us. We went down the lists and if one or three of us knew -the man that was under dis cussion and knew who he was, we would see if he was qualified, a registered vot er.” 402 Ark. 496 SOUTH WESTERN REPORTER, 2d SERIES Mr. Grassi testified that they tried to pick the members of the jury panel from different sections of the county, and that he was acquainted with Negroes who lived in and around Crossett. He said that he did not know them personally but knows them by name and when he sees them. He said he did not know them well enough, to know what occupation they were engaged in but did know 20 or 25 of them well enough to know their general character, lie said that the trial judge instructed the commissioners to select people of sound judgment, proven integrity and reasonable information, and that the jurors should be selected without regard of race, creed or color. He said that in determining the qualifications of the members of the jury panel he based his opinion mainly on his personal observations of the ones selected. He testified that he made no effort to familiarize himself with the character, judgment and integrity of the Negroes in the county with whom he was not already personally acquainted. He said he was personally acquainted with perhaps 20 or 25 Negroes and perhaps 250 white people in and around Crossett well enough to ac curately estimate their character. Mr. Allen Cameron, another one of the commissioners, testified that he had lived in Ashley County since 1953 and is person ally acquainted with 40 or 50 Negroes who live outside the city of Crossett, and that a majority of these individuals work for the same company he works for. He said he is acquainted with perhaps six or 12 Ne groes who live inside the city of Crossett. He said he is personally acquainted with 150 or 200 white people living in Ashley County outside the city of Crossett and perhaps 1,000 living inside Crossett. He said he had no knowledge of the education or qualifications of the Negroes he knows in Crossett and does not know whether any of them have criminal records or not. He testified that he made no particular effort to ascertain the qualifications of Negroes or whites living in the community with whom he was not already acquainted. Mr. Ray Phillips, the third coir testified that he is a general men ing in Fountain Hill, and had bee:, chant in Ashley County for 42 y< er being asked if the member church were all white or all N, Phillips readily admitted that he believe in white and black people . school or eating in cafes together, Mr. Phillips just as readily testifu lows: “Q. So, you tell me whether y a negro man or a number of should be able to sit in judgm white man accused of a capita' A. Well, if he is qualified, IV soon have him as some of the The substance of the remainder Phillips’ testimony was to the ei‘ he knew the people in his comma: assumed that the other two comm knew the people in their respect: munities; that he recommended service the ones from his comm; knew to be high class citizens and the other commissioners did likeu From the overall testimony of missioners there is no question procedure they followed in selc<' jury panel in this case. They s:t amined the list of qualified electoi lected the jury panel from among viduals on the list some membra commission knew. When they wc to a name of a person one of the sioners knew, that individual's tions (other than being a qualifier' would be discussed by the three sioners and he would either be for jury service or passed over, commissioners would then contm the list to the next person with " of them was acquainted. Crossett precinct is by far the r ulated precinct in the county conic names of 4,420 qualified electors 1 16.0% were Negro according to h" list in evidence. There were 2.i " _____ __2______— _UfiM «___ A v t d M k R, 2d SERIES V Phillips, the third commi hat he is a general mere!', untain Ilill, and had been Ashley County for 42 yearv asked if the members , ere all white or all Meg? eadily admitted that he 4 white and black people at! eating in cafes together, h ps just as readily testified >, you tell me whether you ' i man or a number of n> be able to sit in judgment tan accused of a capital c- ell, if he is qualified, I’d ji ve him as some of the oil :ance of the remainder oi estimony was to the effect :he people in his communit;. hat the other two commissi people in their respective that he recommended for e ones from his communit e high class citizens and as* commissioners did likewise. le overall testimony of the there is no question as t they followed in selecti: 1 in this case. They simpl; 5 list of qualified electors ar jury panel from among the i the list some member o: n knew. When they would of a person one of the cor tew, that individual’s qua! :r than being a qualified elc discussed by the three cor. id he would either be acc>; service or passed over, and tiers would then continue ! the next person with whom is acquainted. precinct is by far the most :inct in the county container 4,420 qualified electors of e Negro according to the v lence. There were 25 whin WILLIAMS v. STATE Cite as 498 S.W.2d 393 . , ,1 jurors selected from this town- going down the list” in selecting mors from this township, the com- i(!> started with R. L. Brooks, a ,. and ended with Richard Ro- is Negro. From the name of R. , ks as it alphabetically appears on list, to and including Richard there are 2,414 white and 475 Ne stors listed. Consequently, the num- electors the commissioners were • to have considered between the , t){ R. L. Brooks and Richard Rogers (td nf slightly less than 13% Negro :-iuly more than 87% white. Of the hviduals selected 25 were white and ...u, Negro, making slightly less than Negro and slightly more than 96% vviburg is the next largest voting pre- • containing 1,720 qualified electors of ; 11.3 were Negro. By the same proc- ■ ctween the first and last name select- tn this township, the commissioners • iutind to have considered the names of - white and 180 Negro electors, making v.d of 1,555 individual names of whom vdy less than 12% were Negro and :iy more than 8S% were white. There • 15 jurors selected from this precinct f whom were white. here was a total of 322 qualified elec- > listed in Fountain Hill precinct of :n 44, or 13.7%, were Negro. There c 12 members of the jury panel selected 'n this precinct, all of whom were ;e. The remaining seven jurors were ' ted from Wilmot, Boydell, Portland 1’arkdale precincts, with two Negroes two whites being selected from Wilmot met which contains 143 listed white 'ors and 122 Negro electors. ’■ is obvious that in selecting a jury ve- f of 60 from a list of 8,656 qualified ju- ■' in a county, there are many times rt individuals eligible for jury service • there are positions to be filled. It is, course, a matter of common knowledge Ark. 4 0 3 that there are many reasons why many qualified electors would be passed up for jury service‘in preference to the ones se lected. It may be that jury commissioners would pass up some individuals for jury service for economic reasons in recognition of unusual hardships in individuals sacri ficing their daily wages for the amount paid for jury service. It is entirely possi ble that persons working in industry who have the qualifications for good juror would also be working at jobs on which other jobs depend and in many instances jobs not easily filled by temporary assign ment while the regular employee serves on a jury. It may be that jury commissioners take into consideration the handicap to the employer as well as to the employee in such cases in requiring the individual to leave his job and serve on juries. The same situation may apply in agricultural sections of the state in the so-called "busy season” of the year (planting and harvest time) and, of course, many legally quali fied electors may not possess the education, sound judgment, experience or tempera ment to sit as jurors and intelligently apply the law as given in instructions to intricate and complicated facts and render a fair and impartial verdict in a given case. Be that as it may, no such reasons were given for excluding anyone for jury service in the case at bar. As a matter of fact the substance of the commissioners’ testimony in the case at bar places them squarely within the prohibition announced in the cases above cited. They simply went down the list of the qualified electors of the county and selected the jury panel from among the individuals with whom they were personally acquainted. As already pointed out, this procedure has been con demned by the United States Supreme Court when it results in considerable dis parity between the races. Consequently, when jury commissioners select jury panels only from the people with whom they are acquainted, they should he prepared to show that they are as widely acquainted with one race as with the other in the in- 404 Ark. 496 SOUTH WESTERN REPORTER, 2d SERIES volved area; and when they select a high percentage of white jurors from a list con taining the names of a high percentage of Negroes, the state must be prepared to ex plain the discrepancy and affirmatively show why the names of eligible Negroes were passed over in preference of eligible whites. I his was not done in the case at bar. BEN M. HOGAN COMPANY, cy, Appellants, v. Will E. NICHOLS ct al., A ppr No. 5-GI68. Supreme Court of Arkan .i July 2, 1973. [4, Sj We regret that at this late date Ashley County must be put'to the expense, inconvenience and ordeal of again trying Williams for that county’s most brutal crime which occurred more than eight years ago. The question of whether Wil- Hams was guilty of the crime for which he was convicted, or whether he was tried by a fair and impartial jury, or whether his rights were prejudiced by a trial before an all white jury, is not involved on this ap peal. Williams Jiad no constitutional right to have Negroes on the jury before whom he was tried and he had no constitutional right to have Negroes on the panel from which the jury was selected for his trial. He was, however, entitled to be tried be fore a legally constituted jury and a jury from which members of any race have been excluded simply because of their race, is not a legally constituted jury. It is clear that under the United States Supreme Court decisions, supra, a prima facie case of racial discrimination appears on the face of the record in this case and there was no evidence offered to rebut it. Therefore, it is also clear, that we have no other alternative, under the United States Supreme Court decisions, than to reverse the judgment in this case because of unre butted. evidence of racial discrimination in the selection of the panel notwithstanding the fact that the selection was made under a jury selection system that has now been abandoned by appropriate legislation in Ar kansas. The judgment is reversed and this case remanded for a new trial. Subcontractor’s'employee’s t: action against general contractor other. A judgment was entered defendants in the Franklin Circa Ozark District, David Partain, ].. defendants appealed. The Suprcnr Foglcman, J., held that where the plaintiff’s attorney had referred • to a medical expert, not for treatte the expert’s medical examination \ ducted in the presence of the j>\ wife and his attorney, and the ex; quiries were answered in part by :: and attorney, the expert’s opinion ! substantial part on such hearsay ,r serving information was inadmissf was specially prejudicial where the : physician did not testify. The Co.: held that admission of the terms general contractor’s liability policy ror. Judgment reversed and cause r ed. I. Evidence <2=128 Generally, statements by injur diseased person as to his current or and symptoms, or as to past condit: symptoms, made to physician cor. examination for purpose of qualify expert witness, and not for treatmc: inadmissible. 2. Evidence <2=550(2), 555 Medical expert may base his < as to prognosis of injury based up" mony given at trial by another physic