Harlem, New York City, 1964-1965, undated - 1 of 3
Photograph
January 1, 1964 - January 1, 1965

Wide World Photos
Cite this item
-
Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Harrison v. Dole Brief for Federal Cross/Appellees Reply Brief for Federal Appellants, 1983. ecc5658f-b59a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/928f824c-a940-48cb-bfb8-9b9f21375323/harrison-v-dole-brief-for-federal-crossappellees-reply-brief-for-federal-appellants. Accessed August 19, 2025.
Copied!
BRIEF FOR FEDERAL CROSS/APPELLEES REPLY BRIEF FOR FEDERAL APPELLANTS UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT No. No. 83-1678 83-1679 DENNIS HARRISON, et al. , Appellees-Cross/Appellants V. ELIZABETH DOLE, et al. , Appellants-Cross/Appellees ON CROSS-APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA STANLEY S. HARRIS, United States Attorney. ROYCE C. LAMBERTH, R. CRAIG LAWRENCE, JOHN H.E. BAYLY, JR., STUART H. NEWBERGER, Assistant United States Attorneys. OF COUNSEL: TIMOTHY SHEA Office of the Chief Counsel Maritime Administration U.S. Department of Transportation C. A. No. 79-1816 Date: November 18, 1983 I N D E X Page INTRODUCTION ........................................... 1 Plaintiff Class' Cross-Appeal .................... 1 MarAd's Appeal .......................... . . . . 2 FACTUAL BACKGROUND ..................................... 3 A. Plaintiff Spencer's Administrative Claim . . . 3 B. The "Destruction of Records" Claim .......... 4 C. Plaintiffs' Competitive Selection Analysis . . 5 D. MarAd's "Unvalidated Selection" System . . . . 5 E. The Anecdotal Evidence ...................... 8 F. MarAd's Statistical Analyses ................ 8 G. Plaintiffs' Statistical Analyses ............ 13 ARGUMENT............................................... 15 I. Plaintiffs' Cross-Appeal ..................... 15 A. The District Court Properly Held That MarAd Has Not Discriminated Against The Certified, Compound Class .............. 15 B. The District Court Properly Held That MarAd Has Not Discriminated Against Women Employees On the Basis of Sex . . . 17 C. The District Court Properly Refused to Review Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Statistical A n a l y s i s ............................... 18 D. The District Court Properly Held That the Affirmative Action Provisions of 42 U.S.C. §2000e-16 Do Not Create A Private Right Of Action ................ 20 E. The District Court Properly Limited The Class Relief to the Extent Challenged by Plaintiffs' .............. -23 II. MarAd's Appeal................................. 26 A. The District Court Erred In Certifying The Compound, Across-the-Board Class . . . . 26 B. The District Court Erred In Finding Partial Class (Race) Liability ........... 30 C. The District Court's Relief Order, Requiring A Validation Study, was Erroneous . . . .. ....................... 32 CONCLUSION............................................... 34 TABLE OF CASES Baca v. Butz, 394 F. Supp. 888 (D.N.M. 1975).......... 22 Borrell v. U.S. Intern. Communications Agency. 1T5TT.2d W L (D.C. Cir. 1982)— . . . .......... 20 Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. 820 (1977) .................... 31 Bush v. Lucas, U.S. , 103 S. Ct. 2104 ( T O T TT". . . T T ~ ........................... 22 Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 OT79) .— r ........................................... 21 Council of the Blind of Del. City Valley v. Regan, 709 F.2d 1521 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (en banc) ............ 20 Court v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975)........................ 20 Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, U.S. , S. Ct. , 1T> L. Ed. 2d 628~(T283) .~TT . . . . 23 East Texas Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 295 (1978) . ............... . . . . . . 26 *EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 698 F.2d 633 (4th Cir. 1983), cert, granted, sub, nom., Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 52 U.S.L.W. 3342 (October 31, 1983)(No. 83-185).................... 25, 28 ^General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 148 (1982) ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ................ Passim Lawler v. Alexander, 698 F.2d 439 (11th Cir. 1983) . . . 28 ZJ Cases chiefly relied upon. Page -ii- McKenzie v. Sawyer, 684 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1982) . . . . 31 Mervin v. F.T.C., 591 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1978) . . . . 25 Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 673 F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1982), cert, denied, U.S. , 103 S. Ct. 451 (1982)............................... 30 *Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 668 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1982) ................................. 31 Shivers v. Landrieu 674 F.2d 906 (D.C. Cir. 1981) . . . 21 Talev v. Reinhardt, 662 F.2d 888 (D.C. Cir. 1981) . . . 31 Toney v. Block, 705 F.2d 1364 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ........ 29 *Trout v. Lehman, 702 F.2d 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1983) cert. pet. pending, 52 U.S.L.W. 3387 (No. 83-706) ........ Passim *Valentino v. U.S. Postal Service, 674 F.2d 56 (D.C. Cir. 1982)..................................... Passim Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385 (1982)............................................... 23 OTHER AUTHORITIES 42 U.S.C. § 2000e—16 ................................... Passim 5 C.F.R. § 713.604 (1977) ............................. 29 5 C.F.R. § 1613.214(a) ................................. 25 5 C.F.R. § 1613.602 ................................. 25 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. . . 21 Rule 23, F.R. Civ. P.................................... Passim OPM X-118 Standards ................................... Passim Page -iii- BRIEF FOR FEDERAL CROSS/APPELLEES REPLY BRIEF FOR FEDERAL APPELLANTS UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT No. 83-1678 No. 83-1679 DENNIS HARRISON, et al. , Appellees-Cross/Appellants v. ELIZABETH DOLE, et al., Appellants-Cross/Appellees ON CROSS-APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA INTRODUCTION Federal cross-appellees (federal appellants) — ̂ hereby respond to the issues raised on the cross-appeal and, in addition, reply to appellees' (cross-appellants) — brief filed in the present case. The Plaintiff Class' Cross-Appeal In the pending cross-appeal, plaintiffs below challenge several adverse holdings of the District Court. More particularly, T7 As with their opening brief, federal cross-appellees will refer to themselves as "MarAd." 2/ "Plaintiffs" or "Class members". the issues on cross-appeal include: (1) whether the District Court properly found that MarAd had not discriminated in its employment practices on the basis of sex or race either against (a) a compound, across-the-board class of all non-white males, or (b) that portion of the compound class consisting of women; (2) whether the District Court properly refused to consider a statisti cal report prepared by plaintiffs' experts after the trial on the merits had been completed; (3) whether the District Court properly held that the affirmative action provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 do not provide federal employees with an independent, private cause of action against the employing agency; and (4) whether the District Court properly denied certain class relief. As dis cussed below, the District Court correctly ruled on all the issues raised in the cross-appeal and its judgment should be affirmed to that extent. MarAd's Appeal As noted in MarAd's opening brief, the District Court incorrectly ruled on several critical issues. These issues include: (1) the District Court's error in certifying an across- the-board, compound class in contravention of the strict require ments of Rule 23, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Supreme Court's ruling in General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 148 (1982) (Falcon); (2) the District Court's error in bifurcating the compound class,after trial, notwith standing its finding on the merits that MarAd had not discrimi nated against the certified, compound class; (3) the District Court's error in ordering agency-wide validation of MarAd.'s 2 promotion criteria (a) where plaintiffs had concededly failed to prove intentional, disparate treatment of black employees in promotions, and (b) where MarAd (like all federal agencies) was required to follow the promotion criteria set down by the Office of Personnel Management, (a non-party) in the OPM X-118 Standards; and (4) the District Court's overbroad inclusion of black class members in its order providing individual class member relief. To that extent, the District Court's findings should be reversed and remanded. FACTUAL BACKGROUND These cross-appeals arise out of District Judge Louis B. Oberdorfer's findings in a Title VII class action wherein all black and women applicants and employees of the Maritime Admini stration challenged that agency's employment practices and policies. After certifying an "across-the-board" class, conducting extensive pretrial proceedings, and holding a two-week trial, the District Court found that MarAd had not engaged in discriminatory practices against women but had against blacks. Thereafter, various types of relief issued. MarAd's opening brief extensively discussed the factual background of the present appeals, (Brief pp. 9-42). Consequently, MarAds responds to plaintiffs' brief's numerous factual statements only as they require a response. A. Plaintiff Spencer's Administrative Claim Plaintiffs' assertion that Ms. Spencer was promoted after the class claim was filed apparently suggests that it was only because of the claim that she was promoted. On the contrary, 3 when Ms. Spencer (and other employees) complained about a posi tion selection in March 1977 MarAd agreed, in writing, to re advertise the position and designate a new selecting official. This position was readvertised on April 13, 1977 and closed in May 1977. Thus, Ms. Spencer's selection in August 1977 was the result of the April 1977 compromise wherein the position was readvertised. (DX 98, 110, and 132 Is 357-364). Because this position was not filled until Ms. Spencer was selected, she could not have any individual backpay claim relating to the present case. In response to Ms. Spencer's "separate claim" regarding failure to re-classify her position in early 1977, MarAd recom mended that she be promoted by reclassification but, under established agency rules, had to refer the recommendation to the Department of Commerce. The Department denied the request shortly before Ms. Spencer was selected for the readvertised position in August 1977. DX 130, Is 152-154. B. The "Destruction of Records" Claim Plaintiffs suggest that MarAd was engaged in a careless and broad effort to dispose of relevant employee records. However, the only relevant records that were unavailable were the SF-171 application forms which MarAd continued to return to rejected applicants. This practice had little or no impact on the reliabi lity of either party's statistical analysis. — Plaintiffs' claim on this "issue" is, therefore, unsupported by the record. J7 Plaintiffs speculate that, if only they had available more information on the race of applicants, the results of their (FOOTNOTE CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE) 4 C. Plaintiffs' Competitive Selection Analysis_______________ Plaintiffs' treatment of competitive selections confuses the process. Their analysis describes MarAd's decisions on assignment of job series as involving substantial employer discretion and judgment. However, assigning the job series is the process of associating, i.e.; an accountant position with the appropriate federal job series, i.e. , series 510. Although there was evidence bearing on the degree of discretion involved in applying the OPM X-118 standards (see DX-129; 197 and 193; Op. at 7, 8 and 35) (JA 204, 205 and 235), there was no testimony suggesting that the assignment of the series involved any substantial discretion. To the contrary, there was substantial evidence that these decisions are subject to detailed, government-wide guidance from OPM. See DX-130; Is 95-105. 3/ (FOOTNONTE CONTINUED FROM PREVIOUS PAGE) statistical analyses might change to their advantage. (Plain tiffs' Brief p. 16) Yet, there was no testimony that the avail able data was insufficient to permit reliable conclusions. MarAd's expert, Dr. Michelson, specifically undertook analyses to measure the sensitivity of the data and fairly adopted conserva tive methodologies. (DX 120). Plaintiffs seek to blame MarAd's temporary continuance of its practice of returning Form SF 171's to applicants for this information loss. However, plaintiffs make no attempt to quantify the significance of the lost infor mation. Of course this would be quite a task, given that the SF 171 Forms do not list race identification. Because all of the returned SF-171's would be from non-MarAd applicants, race information would have been obtainable from the only other available source, OPM (DX 120 p. 10 and 18) . However, cross checking applicants of unknown race with OPM records yielded racial identification for only a small fraction of applicants. Id. 5 In addition, plaintiffs assert that the number of candidates who may be referred to a selecting official is nearly unlimited. However, this is clearly not the case. Certificates usually include three to five candidates, with ten the maximum number that may be referred when meaningful distinctions cannot be made. (See DX 104, MAO 730-335 section 10 (1979); MAO 730-733 section 11 (1969)). A larger number of candidates may be referred when multiple selections are made from the same certificate. (See, e.g., PX 180) . D. MarAd1s "Unvalidated" Selection System Plaintiffs' suggest that MarAd somehow was required to undertake a validation of its selection system prior to trial. This claim is utterly without support. Up until January 1980, collection of adverse impact data from applicants was prohibited by 0PM. Once the prohibition was removed, MarAd (along with the Department of Commerce), proceeded to develop a data collection and storage system. This system was developed and put into operation by late 1980. (DX-129, 2s 231-233). In the same vein, MarAd offered extensive testimony about the job relatedness of its selection systems and its conformity with 0PM requirements. This evidence showed that, at the initial stage, the basic (or "minimum") qualifications were taken from the OPM X-118 and, since 1977, MarAd had added basic qualifica tions beyond the X-118 on only one occasion. (DX 129, 2 193). At the next stages, (rating and ranking), the primary criteria were always training, education and prior experience. Prior to 1979, awards and appraisals were given some consideration but 6 afterwards, not at all. DX-129 5s 198-200. These criteria are job related by definition. Because the data collection system was the first step in any formal evaluation, that process had not advanced to a validation by the time of trial (early 1982). In order to bolster their unsupported suspicion that the MarAd personnel system was subject to supervisory manipulation, plaintiffs exaggerate the number and significance of positions they describe as "unique" (Brief p. 12) The District Court, however, did not find that there were a substantial number of positions at MarAd that were unique to it but found, instead, that there were "a number of unique or one of a kind jobs." (Op. 7) (JA 204) Neither plaintiffs' nor the Court ever identify these positions. MarAd identified them as those classified as examiners in the 301 job series (DX 130 1 139) . Inspection of PX-1 indicates that this is not a substantial number of positions. Plaintiffs then confuse the differing nature of the two sets of standards that are applied to these "unique" positions. Classification standards for these jobs are constructed by a cross-comparison of closely related functions. (DX 130, 5 141). On the other hand, qualification standards for the 301 series have requirements that call for general and specialized experi ence. (DX 129, 5 192). Contrary to plaintiffs' assertion (p. 12), MarAd has never contended that career-ladder positions must be "professional". However, at the GS levels upon which plaintiffs' statistical analysis focused (GS 7-15) , all career-ladder positions were 7 professional. The District Court found that "[wjhile nonpro fessional jobs at MarAd could possibly be designated career ladder, there is no evidence that failure to do so is in any way discriminatory." (Op. 29 and 30) (JA 229-230). Finally, defendants note that plaintiffs' claim of inade quate training (p. 14) fails to recognize that OPM requires training to be job related. DX-131, fs 276-278. - E. The Anecdotal Evidence Plaintiffs' discussion of the anecdotal evidence overstates the record. (pp. 14-15). The only testimony offered by plaintiffs relating to individual discrimination was proffered by nine class 5 /members (other than the three named plaintiffs). — 4/ Plaintiffs devote undue attention to awards data with little explanation for its prominence. They assert that MarAd's awards data indicates a significant disproportion in favor of white males. This is in error. In all cash awards, no significant disproportion was observed. (DX-120, Appendix D). MarAd admitted that a disproportion of honorary awards (bronze medals) went to white males but explained that such awards carried no consequences in compensation. Because honorary awards are made only for significant contributions to agency programs over a long period of time, the type of position held bears on the award distribu tion. (DX-104, MAO 740-451, section b). Plaintiffs seek to argue that their awards totals should be adopted. Defendants objected to receipt of plaintiffs' awards totals because it was unsponsored by a competent witness. Conversely, MarAd's awards totals, sponsored by Maxine Anderson (the personnel specialist who maintained the data), is more reliable and must be accepted. See Tr. 664-676. 5/ These witnesses were John Blackburn; Gerald Brown; Mary Duckett; Joan Forman; Vontell Frost; Sharon Howard; Freddie Johnson; Rona LaPrade & James White. Ms. Forman and Ms. Frost did not testify — facts relating to their claims were admitted by MarAd. Plaintiffs had offered testimony from Mary Arter, Jessie Fernanders and Joyce Campbell but these persons did not assert that they were victims of discrimination. See Tr. 267- 404, 480-543. See also Plaintiffs' Substituted Pre-Trial Brief, pp. 6, 9, 12, 72, 76 and 116-118. (R 151). 8 For its part, MarAd vigorously opposed each of these asser tions of discrimination. —^ F. MarAd1s Statistical Analyses MarAd offered two statistical studies that were recognized by the District Court to be "more reliable" than plaintiffs'. (Op. 28) (JA 228). One of its studies was a survival analysis of non-competitive promotions that separately compared time-in-grade (tenure) by race, sex and white males against others for career ladder and non-career ladder jobs. In addition, a strict joint test was undertaken that sought to combine all the positions while preserving the differences. (DX-119). For competitive selections MarAd's expert, Dr. Michelson, offered a multiple pools analysis of over 400 vacancy announce ments over the period from 1977 to early 1981. (DX-120 p. 17). — The advantage of the multiple pools analysis was that it correctly identified the rejected applicants for each vacancy as 6/ See Defendants' Post-Trial Brief P. 11-63-75) (R 205); Tr. pp. 631-770, 776-817, 881-894. l_l While MarAd's expert did recognize that a multiple pools analysis might not be appropriate for candidates competing against a standard (as is the case at the qualification stage) , this does not compel the concludion that plaintiffs aggregation of all qualification decisions was appropriate. After all, applicants were competing against scores of standards. See DX-3. Plaintiffs, of course, made no attempt to allocate qualification success rates either by series or job type. In any event, where applicants are competing against each other at the ranking and certification stage, the use of the multiple pools analysis is wholly appropriate. (Op. 22 and 28) (JA 222 and 228) 9 only those who applied for the vacancy. Statistical techniques, such as plaintiffs, that lump together applicants for different vacancy announcements result in treating disappointed applicants from all announcements as "rejects"-- where the racial or sexual mix of the applicants varies from announcement to announcement, the difference in the results are substantial. (DX-120 Appendix B). The multiple pools analysis included breakdowns for clerical, non-clerical, low-level (GS-12 and below), career-ladder, and upper-level positions. Dr. Michelson's analysis separately compared the "success" rates of applicants by race, sex and white males against others, analyzing: (1) applicants vs. selectees; (2) qualifieds vs. selectees; (3) certifieds v. selectees. After all of these permutations, the only area where any results remotely favorable to plaintiffs emerged was the disproportionate failure of black clericals to meet minimum qualifications. (DX 120 pp. 60-63). Moreover, the survival analysis of career ladder promotions (which are non-competitive) indicated no statistically signifi cant differences for any race/sex subgroup. The data indicated that, with only one exception, the differences in median time to promotion ranged from 12.6 to 13.3 months for grades 7, 9 and 11 regarding any race/sex subgroup. In a white males v. others, the median times to promotion differed by only .2 months for any grades. (DX 119 pp. 13-20). To meet plaintiffs' claim that MarAd unduly disaggregated the data, Dr. Wyant also performed a joint test where the pro fessional (e.g., career-ladder) and non-professional tenures were 10 all included and adjusted for their being in different groups. This analysis treated all positions within the two respective groups (professional v. non-professional) as equally promotable. Because of its complexity and its conservative assumptions, this strict analysis established, in effect, the outer perimeter for statistical speculation. The results of this analysis showed an unlikely, but still not statistically significant, .05 level. (DX. 119 p. 33-36). ^ Dr. Michelson's analysis of the competitive promotions strongly rebutted plaintiffs' claims. The analysis of the success rate of applicants by sex for grades GS-13 through 18 showed that the probability of selecting the observed number of females (or fewer) from among those determined to be eligible — ̂ was .99 -- indicating a statistically significant overselection of women. For GS-12s and below, Dr. Michelson likewise found that the probability of selecting the observed number of females (or fewer) was again .99. Similarly, Dr. Michelson found that the success rate of eligible females competing for entry into career ladder positions was .90. (DX-120 pp. 33-37). 17 The probabilities are expressed here in hundredths. Low probabilities indicate underselection. The .50 figure would represent the "expected" value. Figures over .50 indicate overselection. Plaintiffs, who are reduced to arguing that this analysis "comes within a hair" of showing statistical significance, ignore the severity of the test. 9/ Dr. Michelson testified that the relevant comparison was between qualified applicants vs. selectees because this compared applicants who were interested and minimally qualified. See generally Tr. 896-993. However, he also displayed data comparing applicants and selectees as well. Id. 11 This data firmly refuted any notion of sex discrimination. The District Court agreed, noting that [a]s the analysis of Dr. Michelson shows women have, if anything, been selected in disproportionately greater numbers in competi tive appointments at MarAd. Though some of this overselection of women disappears if the apparent bias in favor of applicants from within MarAd is factored in [footnote omit ted) , there remains a slight, statistically insignificant preference for women. (emphasis in original) Op. 33. (JA 223) Dr. Michelson's analysis of the success rate of black eligibles at GS-13 and above arrived at a .31 level, a figure that is fully consistent with an unbiased selection process. The success rate of black eligibles at GS-12 and below was determined to be effectively zero owing entirely to underselection of blacks in clerical positions. Thus, the probability of selecting the observed number (or fewer) of black clericals was .01. However, for blacks competing for career ladder positions the figure was .57 and for all low level announcements (excluding clericals) it was .22. Because of the number of clerical selections, its results predominated the low level announcement results. Dr. Michelson's review of the clerical selections of blacks indicated that they were underselected by 12 positions to the benefit of white females and non-black minorities. (DX-120, pp. 40-55). Thus, only one isolated, statistically significant outcome was observed — blacks competing for clerical positions. Finally, Dr. Michelson also performed three white males against others analyses which yielded results quite favorable to MarAd. The first analysis yielded probabilities of .19 for GS-1 12 through 12 and .97 for grades GS 13 through 18 for the success rates of non-white male eligibles using only applicants whose race was known. The second analysis assigned race to males of unknown race in proportion to the race composition of the rejected applicants. This yielded probabilities of .68 for GS-1 through 12 and .96 for GS-13 and above. (DX-120 pp. 58-71). Finally, Dr. Michelson conducted a third white males against others analysis wherein he "increased the representation of blacks among males of unknown race by 10%." Even this indicated no underselection of non-white males. (See pp. 15-17 of Attach ment 1 to Defendants Post-Trial Brief) (R 205). — ^ G. Plaintiffs' Statistical Analysis Plaintiffs' statistical data was greatly inferior to MarAd's for one basic reason: they carelessly lumped all MarAd Head quarters employees together without making any distinction between job classifications. It is undisputed that MarAd has many different types of professional and non-professional posi tions and that basic parameters of the job types vary greatly. Specifically, clericals and administrative positions usually range from GS-2 entry levels to GS -7 full performance levels, whereas professionals may enter at the GS-5 level and advance to 10/ Plaintiffs argue that the District Court was sympathetic to their argument that Dr. Michelson's multiple pools analysis was weakened because applicant pools with only one racial group of applicants would not influence the results. The District Court recognized that Dr. Michelson's additional analysis (imputing race to the race-unknown applicants based on and thereby increas ing the numbers of racially mixed pools), improved the results for MarAd. Op. 23 (JA 223) (DX-120 pp. 51 and 53). Thus, use of race known data was demonstrated to be more conservative and reliable. 13 the full performance level at GS-12. (DX-130 2 128) . The District Court's observation that "it would be irrational to assume equal promotability" (Op. 29) (JA 229) among the posi tions examined by plaintiffs is plainly correct. It is notable that when plaintiffs' studies examined more homogeneous positions the results were favorable to MarAd. For example, career ladder promotions are available only up to GS-12. Plaintiffs' analysis of tenure and frequencies of promotions (competitive and noncompetitive together) to GS-13 and 14 show that non-white males advanced faster and more frequently than white males though not to a statistically significant extent. (DX-4 p. 10). The only analysis presented by plaintiffs that purported to address qualifications were its regressions analyses. — ̂ Plain tiffs' regression analyses, like the rest of their analytical data, never factored in occupational classifications. As MarAd pointed out and the District Court found, regression analyses such as the ones proffered by plaintiffs "show[ ] little about how the agency became the way it is" and concluded that they 11/ These regressions used information from MarAd personnel computer tapes, supplied pursuant to defendants' Answers to Plaintiffs' Fourth Interrogatories in June 1980 (later updated), to attempt to identify the impact of race/sex characteristics on salary. Despite plaintiffs' ability to prepare regression analyses early in the case their first did not appear until one month before trial. (See PX 4 (printouts); DX-120 Appendix C, p. 20; Deposition of J. Van Ryzin (R 202)). 14 "tell[ ] little about whether this situation came about as a result of actionable discrimination." (Op. 30) (JA 230); (DX- Appendix C, p. 11-14). — ^ ARGUMENT I. Plaintiffs' Cross-Appeal A. The District Court Properly Held That MarAd Had Not Discriminated Against the Certified, Compound Class________ As more fully discussed in MarAd's opening brief (pp. 34-37, 68-71, 74-75, 78-82), the District Court rejected the class members' allegations of compound discrimination -- the cold numbers pur portedly reflecting the "white-maleness" of MarAd's hiring and promotional system were simply not found to have any discrimina tory basis. In challenging this finding, the plaintiff class again recites the same statistical analyses — reviewed and rejected by the District Court — which purport to prove that MarAd discriminated in favor of white males. (Plaintiffs' brief, at pp. 17-33). However, the District Court's findings on this issue are unassailable. 12/ The only analysis which purported to account for job clas sifications was plaintiffs' untimely (and rejected) post-trial submission. However, this last analysis merely identified all positions that plaintiffs' expert identified as requiring only "specific (rather than general) educational degrees or courses." Affidavit of J. Van Ryzin dated April 20, 1982, at p. 4 (R 334). It was further rife with fatal defects — job series with specific educational requirements (e.q., accountant-series 510; operational research analyst-series 1515) were ommitted while jobs without such requirements (e.g., engineering techician-series 802; statistical assistant-series 1531) were misidentified as requiring specific education. Id.; DX-3. 15 First, the statistical evidence introduced at trial clearly demonstrated that a large portion of the compound class (e.g., women) were overselected for promotion. Op. at 33. (JA 233). Consequently, any notion of compound class discrimination is absurd. Second, the statistical evidence proffered by the class at trial — in an effort to prove compound class discrimination — was found to be less reliable than that presented by MarAd. Op. at 28 (JA 228) . For instance, plaintiffs' statistical experts failed to separately examine statistics regarding career-ladder against non-career-ladder positions. The District Court termed this failure "irrational", finding that such separate analyses were an absolute requirement given the unequal promotability between these two types of positions. Id. at 29 (JA 229). In addition, the class members' regression analyses were accorded "relatively little weight" by the District Court, which noted that such a study, "repeating a static view of the agency's distribution of salary and similar benefits, shows little about how the agency became the way it is." Id. at 30-31 (JA 230-31). Indeed, the District Court opined: It is not unusual that at an established agency like MarAd white males dominate the higher level, higher paying jobs. Many cases have dealt with just such a situation and concluded that it tells little about whether this situation came about as a result of presently actionable discrimination. Id. (See also MarAd's brief at pp. 34-37). — / For the same _1_3/ The class members' expert presented three regression analyses at trial. See Plaintiffs' brief at 28, n. 26. None of these analyses addressed or considered how promotions requiring specialized skills, education or training- would affect the (FOOTNOTE CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE) 16 reasons, the class members' "descriptive" statistics — providing "snapshots" of MarAd's workforce on an annual basis — are even less reliable than the rejected regression analyses. (See Plain tiffs' brief at pp. 17-22) . Simply counting the number of "groups at issue" (e.g,, white-males, black-females, etc.) in particular GS slots, in a particular time period, tells nothing about the underlying claim — whether any significant statistical disparity (e.g., more white males in higher positions) was caused by a MarAd discriminatory policy or practice during the relevant time frame. Moreover, the class members' survival analysis, tracking the relative promotion rates of the respective sex/race groups (and lumping together all types of promotions), again failed to address the minimum objective qualifications neces sarily at issue in various promotions. See Valentino, and Trout, supra. Therefore, there is no evidence in the record on which to set aside the District Court's refusal to grant relief to the compound class. 13/ (FOOTNOTE CONTINUED FROM PREVIOUS PAGE) statistical promotabilities. Indeed, the only analysis attempting to address these latter requirements was prepared after trial and post-trial briefing, although even that study failed to adequately account for objective minimum qualifications. Indeed, this last regression analysis failed to factor in the position type at issue, even though this information was available in the data base. Instead, plaintiffs assumed that all positions could be lumped together for comparison sake. Id. The District Court properly refused to consider this untimely submission. See generally Valentino v. U.S. Postal Service, 674 F.2d 56 (D.C. Cir. 1982), and Trout v. Lehman, 702 F.2d 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert pet, pending, 52 U.S.L.W. 3387 (No. 83-706). 17 B. The District Court Properly Held That MarAd Had Not Discriminated Against Women Employees On The Basis of Sex As noted, the District Court held that plaintiffs had "not proven either disparate treatment or a disparate impact on the basis of sex from the hiring and promotional practices at MarAd." Op. at 33 (JA 233). In relying on the more probative statistical study submitted by MarAd, the Court stated: ...women have, if anything, been selected in disproportionately greater numbers in com petitive appointments at MarAd. Though some of this overselection of women disappears if the apparent bias in favor of applicants from within MarAd is factored in **_/ there remains a slight, statically insignificant preference for women. Such a result is obviously inconsistent with a pattern and practice of discrimination against women. And [MarAd's expert] found only a small, statistically insignificant difference in the time to promotion of women in career ladder positions and in other noncompetitive promotions.... Taken as- a whole, the evidence does not indicate the significant difference between the promotion and hiring rates of men and women required either to create an inference of discriminatory intent or a duty to validate the selection practices of the agency . . . J7 By use of the term "bias," the Court does not imply that there is anything improper in the fact that MarAd employees have a better chance than others of being hired for higher level jobs. In fact, one would expect that persons already employed at MarAd would be more likely than others to have the qualifica tions for other positions at MarAd. Op. at 33-34 (JA 233-34). This finding was clearly based on the more reliable evidence proffered by MarAd. In support of its appeal from this ruling, the plaintiff class again relies on its 18 "white-maleness" statistics discussed above. Of course that evidence -- whether viewed by itself or in conjunction with MarAd's more reliable evidence -- simply failed to meet the prerequisites for proving class-wide discrimination. C. The District Court Properly Refused To Review Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Statistical Analysis________________________________ The class assigns as error the District Court's refusal to consider an untimely statistical report which they attempted to "introduce" after trial and submission of post-trial briefs. (Plaintiffs' brief at p. 65, n. 59). This report, they assert, was prepared in light of this Court's decision in Valentino, supra, which, they further claim, "clearly defined the legal standards governing [class statistical analyses] in this circuit for the first time . . . " ^d. This self-serving statement fails to explain why the class failed to file this untimely evidence during the trial -- Valentino merely held that statis tical proof alleging class-wide discrimination in promotions and hiring must necessarily account for the specific objective minimum qualifications of the jobs at issue in order to meet plaintiff's prima facie burden under Title VII. That burden, of course, was on plaintiffs' shoulders long before this Court's decision in Valentino. — ^ 14/ Indeed this Court Tn Trout severely criticized this very sort of post-trial effort to reopen the evidence through introduction of yet another statistical analysis. Trout, surpa, 702 F. 2d at 1106-1107. ----- --- 19 Significantly, the "post-Valentino11 analysis was critically flawed and still failed to account for the specific minimum objective qualifications at issue in the promotion scheme. See p. 14, n. 12, supra. As such, even its post-trial consideration of this study could not have altered the District Court's adverse sex discrimination finding. In any event, plaintiffs fail to show that the District Court abused its discretion in refusing to credit these belated statistics. D. The District Court Properly Held That The Affirmative Action Provisions Of 42 U.S.C. §2000e-16 Do Not Create A Private Right of Action______________ The class members challenge the District Court's holding that the affirmative action provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(b) do not give rise to a private right of action. Op. at 3 7 (JA 237) (Plaintiffs' brief, pp. 66-68). However, this challenge is only supported by the generalized legislative history cited at length in their brief and the absence of any relevant judicial authority. The traditional test for creation of private rights of action was articulated in Court v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975) and was restated recently in this Circuit in Council of the Blind of Del. Cty. Valley v. Regan, 709 F.2d 1521-26 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (en banc): First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose special benefit the statute was enacted," . . . that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? . . . Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of 20 the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? . . . And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law? Although analyses of this issue typically address all four issues, "[legislative intent has proved to be the preeminent test‘" Sorrell v. U.S. Intern. Communications Agency, 682 F.2d 981, 986 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Generally, it is the burden of the plaintiff to demonstrate the presence of the requisite factors -- especially the legisla tive intent. See Shivers v. Landrieu, 674 F.2d 906, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("without some palpable indication of legislative intent we would be most ill-advised to discover an implied cause of action"). Similarly in Council for the Blind of Del. Cty. Valley, the government prevailed by demonstrating that in enact ing the legislation at issue Congress "chose to authorize private suits principally against the state or local government . . . rather than the [federal agency]." _Id. at 1530-31. Plaintiffs point to no legislative intent to create such a cause of action. The District Court flatly rejected the notion that §2000e- 16(b) creates a private cause of action, holding ...there is no evidence that Congress intended that this [affirmative action] obligation, as opposed to the general obligation to be free from discrimination, was to be privately enforceable. Nor is it clear how such a duty could be measured for the purpose of, e.g., awarding back pay. 21 Op. at 37 (JA). — / In rejecting plaintiffs' reliance on Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), the District Court noted that a judicially-created private cause of action, such as sought here, would raise serious questions of reviewability: While it is difficult to determine which individuals would have received employment had a given workforce been free of discrimi nation, it is impossible to determine who would have benefited had a proper amount of affirmative action been instituted. Op. at 37 (JA 237). Indeed, the only other court to have addressed this issue also refused to find a private cause of action. See Baca v * Butz, 394 F. Supp. 888, 894 n. 11 (D.N.M. 1975). Cannon v. University of Chicago, supra, addressed an entirely aspect of federal civil rights law — governmental distribution of federal funds to educational programs — under Title IX of the 1972 amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Here, however, it is the government's own role as employer that is at issue. Pursuant to the various administrative and judicial procedures expressly provided in Title VII, an aggrieved federal employee, (or class of employees) has wholly adequate remedies _15/ In making its findings on this issue, the District Court also found that judicial review of MarAd's affirmative action obligations was available under the narrow and limited provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.’C. § 701 et seq. Op. at 37-39 (JA 237-39). However, the Court deferred ruling on the merits of APA review and, subsequently, incorporated certain aspects of the affirmative action issues into its relief orders. It did specifically find that plaintiffs had failed to prove that MarAd's affirmative action plan was "arbitrary and capricious." Sea 559 F. Supp. at 951; see also Inj. at 7 (JA 260). 22 where he or she has suffered discriminatory treatment. Where Congress has expressly provided for such relief in the federal sector, the Courts should refuse to create additional remedies. See e.g., Bush v. Lucas, ____ U.S. ____, 103 S. Ct. 2104 (1983) (courts will not create direct, constitutional cause of action for aggrieved federal employees where Congress established specific scheme for review under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978). The District Court's ruling on this issue was therefore correct and should be affirmed. E. The District Court Properly Limited The Class Relief To The Extent Challenged By Plaintiffs___________ The plaintiff class challenges three aspects of the District Court's relief order. (Plaintiffs' brief pp. 69 and 70) These challenges center on (1) the tolling of the statutory limitations period for non-prevailing class members to file individual discrimination complaints in the future; (2) the preclusive effect of the District Court's adverse class rulings on non prevailing class members who might later raise individual dis crimination claims; and (3) the scope of prevailing class relief. These claims are without merit. First, plaintiffs apparently argue that members of the non prevailing class are not time-barred from filing individual complaints of their own where, in relying on the pendency of the class action, they failed to previously file such claims. In effect, they assert that the pendency of the class action tolled 23 the limitation period set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. See Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, ___ U.S. ___, ___ S. Ct. ___, 76 L.Ed.2d 628 (1983); — ̂ see also Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385 (1982) (filing requirements of Title VII are not jurisdictional but are statutorily limited). In order to protect these as yet unfiled claims, plaintiffs unsuccessfully moved the District Court to amend its relief order (pursuant to Rule 59(e), F.R. Civ. P.) so that nonprevailing class members would receive notice of their right to pursue individual complaints of discrimination independently of the class action. This question, of course, is entirely speculative and premature where such unidentified individual claims have yet to make their way to the District Court. The question of whether such claims are time-barred, (or were grandfathered in because of the pending class action), can only be resolved if and when such persons actually file claims. — ^ Second, plaintiffs apparently seek a determination that the adverse class findings are in no way binding on any non-prevailing individual class member's claims of discrimination. They sought to establish this declaratory ruling through their unsuccessful motion to alter or amend the District Court's judgment. Again, 16/ Of course, Crown, Cork addressed class decertification. 17/ The basis for plaintiffs' claim is itself confusing. The District Court did provide in its relief that plaintiffs' counsel could, if they so chose, send out a notice to non-prevailing women class members. The only condition was that MarAd was not obligated to either provide the notice or pay the expense. Inj. at 6 (JA 259). While not part of the record, such a notice was sent out by plaintiffs. 24 however, this claim is highly speculative given the lack of identifiable, non-prevailing class members who have filed com plaints. In any event, to the extent that individual complaints are later filed by non-prevailing class members and rely on the same claims and/or evidence raised during the class proceedings, such persons are not entitled to any relief based on the doctrine of res .judicata. See EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. 698 F .2d 633, 674-75 (4th Cir. 1983), cert, granted sub. nom., Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. 52 U.S.L.W. 3342 (October 31, 1983) (No. 83-185). — ̂ See also, Mervin v. F.T.C., 591 F.2d 821, 830 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Third, plaintiffs assert that, in establishing the scope of prevailing class relief, the District Court (1) erred in apparent ly relying upon the individual complaint regulations (5 C.F.R. §1613.214 (a)) -- providing a 30-day throw-back period for filing individual, prevailing class claims -- rather than the class com plaint regulations (5 C.F.R. § 1613.602), which set forth a 135-day throw-back period, and (2) was correct in permitting prevailing in dividual class claims to go back two years prior to the filing of the administrative complaint. (Plaintiffs' brief at 70). With regard to the first claim, MarAd has already noted in its brief (pp. 83-84) that the class complaint regulations are, in fact, the appropriate provisions for any relief here. However, as also set forth in MarAd' s earlier brief, (id.) the District Court erred in providing relief for claims arising prior to March 21, 1977 -- 135 days prior to the filing of the administrative class complaint in this case. T57 The Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari in that case in order to address this very issue. 25 II. MarAd's Appeal A. The District Court Erred In Certifying The Compound, Across-the-Board Class In its opening brief, MarAd extensively examined the District Court's error in certifying (and subsequently failing to modify) the compound, across-the-board class. (Brief at pp. 45-63). Several arguments raised by plaintiffs on this issue require a response. First, plaintiffs claim that they satisfied the concededly strict requisites of Rule 23, F.R.Civ. P. at the original class certification hearing. Impliedly, they claim that any subsequent modification of the certified class was improper because "the propriety of a class certification [is not judged] by hindsight." Plaintiffs' brief at p. 44, quoting Falcon, 457 U.S. at 160. However, this argument totally misses the point of MarAd's appeal. Notwithstanding the impropriety of the District Court's original certification, — its subsequent refusal to modify the class in any manner — in light of MarAd's twice demonstrating the inherent conflicts, untypical and uncommon claims raised in the class — flies in the face of the Supreme Court's ruling in Falcon. It is not hindsight upon which MarAd raises this appeal but, instead, the District Court's failure to (1) specifically 19/ At the original certification hearing, plaintiffs merely introduced unsponsored raw data lacking any statistical analysis or significance. (R. 333). 26 address and resolve the strict requirements of Rule 23 at the original certification stage, and (2) modify or otherwise limit the plaintiff class before trial so that MarAd could properly address the issues at trial. In the former situation, the District Court's class certification order is devoid of any such analysis, and merely sets forth the compound class' definition. (JA 152) In the latter, the District Court's failure deprived MarAd of an opportunity to meet the issues squarely at trial. Additionally, the District Court again failed to set forth the reasons for its failure to limit the class, despite extensive documentation supporting the need to do so. Second, contrary to plaintiffs' claim, (Brief pp. 44-46) the Supreme Court in Falcon effectively ruled that across-the board classes — at least those raising inconsistent and conflicting claims such as present here — are legally deficient given Rule 23's strict requirements. Id. 457 U.S. at 155-56. See also East Texas Motor Freight System, Inc, v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 295 (1978) . If anything, Falcon and East Texas Motor Frieght were based on class certifications presenting fewer and simpler inconsistencies and conflicts than are present here. — ̂ Indeed, 20/ Plaintiffs also claim that, unlike Falcon and East Texas Motor Freight, the District Court here held an evidentiary hearing on certification, thereby legitamizing the process. However, that claim holds little water when the record is examined more closely — the hearing in this case centered almost exclusively on MarAd's claim that plaintiff Lawrence was not suitable'to represent the class. (JA 26-150). There is little, if any, indication that the District Judge even considered the evidence submitted by plaintiff in certifying the class. Moreover, the District Court's failure to even generally analyze or discuss the requirements of.Rule 23 in its certification order only further underline the problems inherent in this case even at the threshhold point of certification. (JA 152) 27 plaintiffs' half-heartedly rationalize that the issues in Falcon which were fatal to certification -- inherent conflicts between promotion claims and hiring claims -- are somehow not relevant here. Such an argument, however, ignores a much more critical (and fatal) factor: challenges to MarAd's promotion and hiring systems not only raised inconsistent claims themselves, but also raised conflicting interests within each system -- competitive v. non-competitive, professional v. clerical, etc. Merely investi gating "all the steps in the procedure" (Plaintiffs' brief at p. 46) begs the question where there are several very different O 1 /procedures being challenged. — Third, plaintiffs' discussion of Rule 23' s typicality requirement ignores the fact that the named plaintiffs -- pro fessional, high-ranking employees-- presented claims wholly untypical from the main portion of the class. Instead, this lack of typicality is justified based on their allegation that all applicants and employees -- regardless of the concededly diverse and specialized positions at issue -- were subject to the "same discriminatory policies." Plaintiffs' brief at pp. 47-49. As in Valentino, the three named plaintiffs here could not present 21/ The fatal flaw to this argument is that the District Court Held that a statistical analysis would necessarily have to examine separately competitive v. non-competitive promotion procedures. Lumping the two together only further confuses the fset-finder's inquiry. See EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, supra. But see Lawler v. Alexander, 698 F.2d ST5 Ml i-hClrV 1983). ------- 28 claims typical of the far-ranging, diverse and specialized professional and administrative occupations concededly present at MarAd. * Fourth, plaintiffs' brief analysis of Rule 23's commonality requirement again generally refers to an "overall pattern of discriminatory practices" and "pervasive discriminatory employ ment policy." Brief at 50-51. Such a perfunctory response to MarAd's argument does not create or justify a class consisting of "common" claims where the many uncommon claims are evident. Finally, plaintiffs' analysis of Rule 23' s adequacy of representation requirement again fails specifically to address the inherent conflicts present in the compound class, already discussed at length in MarAd's opening brief. (pp. 58-63). For all the these reasons, the class certification was improper and should be reversed. — ^ 22/ Plaintiffs' further rationalize that the typicality requirement was met because "all three named plaintiffs made out a prima facie case of individual discrimination on the basis of evidence presented at trial." Brief at p. 49. Notwithstanding the undisputed fact that none of the three individually named plaintiffs were successful on the merits (or even established a prima facie case of disparate treatment), the proof of such claims was wholly different from the sort of evidence necessary to establish a class-wide, disparate impact case. See Trout, 702 F.2d at 1112. The named plaintiffs -- who.only presented disparate treatment claims at trial -- have never indicated that they were alleging disparate impact claims as part of their case. 23/ The significance which plaintiffs attach to the acceptance of the class complaint by the Department of Commerce Office of Civil Rights is greatly overstated. First, under the applicable regula tions (5 C.F.R. t 713.604) (1977) that decision was made without the benefit of any argument by or on behalf of MarAd. Second, the District Court never purported to attach any significance to that action -- there is little doubt that it had an independent obligation under Rule 23 to review the applicable legal require ments. Third, the final decisions of agency civil rights officers may be supplemented or rebutted by agencies in subsequent litiga tion. See Toney v. Block, 705 F.2d 1364, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 29 B. The District Court Erred In Finding Partial Class (Race) Liability_____ Plaintiffs criticism (Brief pp. 56-58, 62-64) of MarAd's claim that the District Court erred in finding partial class liability — race discrimination at least below the GS-13 level — is based on the same flawed analysis relied upon by the trial court. While these issues have been discussed at length in MarAd's opening brief (pp. 68-82), certain arguments raised by plaintiffs require a brief response. First, plaintiffs assert that the District Court's class race discrimination finding was correct because it relied on both the alleged subjective selection standards ( e.q., disparate treatment) and the "facially neutral" (e.g., disparate impact) selection criteria used by MarAd. (Brief at 56-57) In support thereof, plaintiffs cite Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc. 673 F. 2d 798 (5th Cir. 1982), cert, denied, ___ U.S. ___, 103 S. Ct. 451 (1982) . — However unlike Payne, the District Court here specifically and exclusively relied upon a disparate impact theory to find partial (race) class liability and never made a finding of intent. 559 F. Supp. at 948-950. (JA 245-47). Conse quently, because there has been no finding that MarAd disparately treated its black employees in the selection process, the "same facts" which purportedly made out the disparate impact analysis are irrelevant when examining rejected claims of disparate treatment. 24/ Contrary to plaintiffs' assertion, the Court in Payne noted that after the disparate impact issue was resolved adversely to plaintiffs, the case was "dramatically" transformed because proof of intent was "crucial." Id., 673 F.2d at 817. 30 Second, the District Court's use of a disparate impact analysis here was clearly in error. Indeed, Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 668 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1982) is directly on point where plaintiffs -- in mounting an across-the-board attack against MarAd's entire personnel system -- sought relief even broader and more unfocused than that sought in Pouncy. — ̂ The fact that MarAd is a federal employer rather than a private sector employer is a distinction without a difference. The burden of proof requirements under Title VII are concededly the same regardless of the defendant's identity. See generally Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. 820 (1977). In any event, neither the affirma tive action provisions of the statute (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(b)) nor the various regulations and executive orders promulgated thereunder supplant plaintiffs' burden to prove their case on the merits. Third, even if an impact analysis were somehow appropriate, plaintiffs' statistical evidence -- purporting to show that MarAd's "subjective" promotion decisions had as their goal the exclusion of blacks -- is not supported by the evidence. No signficant disparity in the number of blacks ultimately selected from eligibles was demonstrated. (MarAd's Brief at pp. 80-81). 25/ Plaintiffs' insistence that Pouncy not be followed in this Circuit, based on two previous cases before this Court, is totally misplaced. In Talev v. Reinhardt, 662 F.2d 888 (D.C. Cir. 1981), an individual plaintiff unsuccessfully challenged his failure to receive a promotion. In McKenzie v. Sawyer, 684 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1982), the plaintiff class was limited to a very specific section of the defendant agency. Contrary to plain tiffs' claim here, those cases do not remotely suggest that this Court has condoned the sort of relief proscribed in Pouncy. 31 Moreover, plaintiffs' reliance on statistics focusing on the applicant to eligible stage -- where plaintiffs see significant racial disparity -- are legally deficient because that evidence failed to account for the minimum objective qualifications necessary to be considered for selection for many of the con- cededly specialized jobs at issue. See Valentino. 674 F.2d at 67-68 and Trout, 702 F.2d at 1102. Fourth, with regard to non-competitive (e.g., career ladder) promotions, plaintifffs suggest that some disparity was demon strated. However, plaintiffs never produced any analysis of carreer ladder promotions. MarAd's analysis clearly demonstrated that there was no statistically significant differences among the race/sex subgroups. (DX 119, pp. 17-20). Moreover, MarAd's competitive promotion analysis proved that blacks and women (either together or separately) were slightly over-selected in competing for entry into career ladders. C. The District Court's Relief Order, Requiring A Validation Study, was Erroneous_________________________ In response to MarAd's claim that it could not be held accountable for binding 0PM position selection/promotion criteria (Brief at p. 82), plaintiffs assert that the validation study ordered by the Court is appropriate class relief. (Brief at pp. 59-62). They base this assertion on their view that: The starting point for the carrying out of a competitive selection at MarAd is the drawing up by MarAd supervisors of a position descrip tion that describes the duties of the job in question. This process is one involving a degree of judgment and subjectivity and is 32 carried out at MarAd by a virtually all-white supervisory workforce. [footnote omitted]. From the position description all else flows. Brief at 59. Notwithstanding the District Court's refusal to condemn the "whiteness" of the higher level positions plaintiffs' argument actually supports MarAd's claim. First, to the extent that MarAd subjectively treats black applicants and employees seeking promotions in a disparate manner (as plaintiffs allege), the District Court's liability finding -- based on a disparate impact model -- is wholly inconsistent with this sort of relief. Indeed, the only "facially neutral" selection standards at issue are those found in the 0PM X-118, which were concededly not challenged in this case. See Plaintiffs' Brief at 62, n. 56. Where the District Court held MarAd liable under a disparate impact theory, relief addressing the alleged subjective, inten tionally discriminatory employment practices of MarAd -- a disparate treatment theory -- is simply misplaced. Second, to the extent the District Court ordered such relief based on the binding effect of the 0PM X-118 standards (the "facially neutral" criteria) on its selection process -- for which there is ample evidence in the record -- MarAd simply can not be held accountable for such standards. See Trout, 702 F.2d at 1105-14. Therefore, the validation study is inconsistent with the District Court's findings and should be reversed. 33 CONCLUSION For all the reasons stated above and in MarAd's opening brief, the District Court's findings should be affirmed in part and reversed in part. STANLEY S. HARRIS, United States Attorney. ROYCE C. LAMBERTH, R. CRAIG LAWRENCE, JOHN H.E. BAYLY, JR., STUART H. NEWBERGER, Assistant United States OF COUNSEL: TIMOTHY SHEA Office of the Chief Counsel Maritime Administration U.S. Department of Transportation Attorneys. I t 34 ■v %