Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Education Reply Brief for Petitioners and Cross-Respondents

    i>uprmp Qlmtrt nf tlu' Inttpfc States
October Term, 1970

No. 281
James E. Swann, et al.,

Petitioners,
v.

Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, et al.,

Respondents.

No. 349
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, et al.,

Cross-Petitioners,
v.

James E. Swann, et al.,
Cross-Respondents.

on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals
APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

REPLY BRIEF FOR
PETITIONERS AND CROSS-RESPONDENTS

Jack Greenberg 
James M. Nabrit, III 
Norman J. Chachkin 

10 Columbus Circle 
New York, New York 10019

J. LeVonne Chambers 
A dam Stein

Chambers, Stein, Ferguson & Lanning 
216 West Tenth Street •
Charlotte, North Carolina 28202

C. O. Pearson
203% East Chapel Hill Street 
Durham, North Carolina 27702

Anthony G. A msterdam
Stanford University Law School 
Stanford, California 94305

Attorneys for Petitioners and 
Cross-Respondents



I N D E X

Preliminary Statement ....................................................... 1

A r g u m e n t :

I. The Charlotte-Mecklenburg County Schools Were 
Segregated by Unconstitutional Governmental 
Action ........................................................................... 3

II. The Assignment Plan Now in Effect Is Workable
and Desegregates the Schools .................................  17

III. The School Board Proposes No Viable Rule of
Law to Define the Goal of a Unitary System .....  24

IV. The District Court Was Correct in Not Attempt­
ing to Declare a General Rule of Law to Govern 
the Multitude of Varied Circumstances of School 
Segregation in Other Cities and Other Parts of 
the United States .......................................................  28

V. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 Does Not in Any 
Way Limit the Power of the Courts to Fashion 
Remedies for Unconstitutional Racial Segrega­
tion in Public Schools or Prohibit the Courts 
from Requiring Busing of Pupils to Disestab­
lish Dual Segregated School Systems ..................... 32

PAGE



11

T able op A uthorities

Cases:

Brewer v. School Board of the City of Norfolk, 397
F.2d 37 (4th Cir. 1968)...................................................  14

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)....3, 4, 8,
14, 24, 29, 

30,37
Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).......  3
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 

(1961) ................................................................................. 3

Carter v. West Feliciana Parish School Board, 396
U.S. 290 (1970)...................................................................  27

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. City of Philadel­
phia, 353 U.S. 230 (1957).................................................... 17

Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958)...............................  3
Coppedge v. Franklin County Board of Education, 394 

F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1968), affirming 273 F. Supp. 289 
(E.D. N.C. 1967).................................................................  17

Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile
County, O.T. 1970, No. 436 ......................................... 25, 27

Dowell v. Board of Education of the Oklahoma Public
Schools, 396 U.S. 269 (1969)...............................................  24

Dowell v. School Board of Oklahoma City, 244 F. Supp.
971 (W.D. Okla. 1965) affirmed 375 F.2d 158 (10th 
Cir. 1967), cert, den., 387 U.S. 931 (1967)...................  16

Eason v. Buffaloe, 198 N.C. 520, 152 S.E. 496 (1930).... 13

Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969),
affirming 338 F. Supp. 678 (D. D.C. 1968).................  17

Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960)...................  17

PAGE



Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 
391 U.S. 430 (1968)......................................................... 24

Henry v. Clarksdale Municipal Separate School Dis­
trict, 409 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1969) cert, den., 396 U.S. 
940 (1969) .......................................................................16,

Kemp v. Beasley, 423 F.2d 851 (8th Cir. 1970).............
Keyes v. School District Number One, Denver, 303 

F. Supp. 279 (D. Colo. 1969).........................................

Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939).............................17,
Local 189, Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United 

States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969)...........................

Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965)...........

Manning v. Board of Public Instruction of Hillsbor­
ough County, ——  F.2d ------  (5th Cir., No. 28643,
May 11, 1970) ................................................................. 16,

Monroe v. Board of Commissioners, 391 U.S. 450 
(1968) ...............................................................................24,

Northcross v. Board of Education, 397 U.S. 232 (1970)

Phillips v. Wearn, 226 N.C. 290, 37 S.E.2d 895 (1946)

Raney v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 443 (1968).....
Ross v. Eckels, ------  F.2d ------  (5th Cir., No. 30080,

August 25, 1970)............................................................. 16,

Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)...........................
Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School Dis­

trict, 419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1969), reversed sub 
nom. Carter v. West Feliciana Parish School Board, 
396 U.S. 290 (1970).........................................................

25

16

16

31

17

17

25

30

24

13

24

25

13

37



IV

United States v. Board of Education of Baldwin
County, 423 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1970).......................  16

United States v. Board of Education School District
No. 1, Tulsa, Okla.,------ F .2d------- (10th Cir. 1970).... 25

United States v. Greenwood Municipal Separate School 
District, 406 F.2d 1086 (5th Cir. 1969), cert, den.,
395 U.S. 907 (1969).........................................................  16

United States v. Indianola Municipal Separate School
District, 410 F.2d 626 (5th Cir., 1969), cert, den.,
396 U.S. 1011 (1970) ......................................... .............  16

United States v. Montgomery County Board of Educa­
tion, 395 U.S. 225 (1969).................................................  24

United States v. School District, 151 of Cook County, 
Illinois, 286 F. Supp. 786 (N.D. 111. 1968), affirmed,
404 F.2d 1125 (7th Cir. 1968)....................................... 16, 25

Valley v. Rapides Parish School Board, 423 F.2d 1132
(5th Cir. 1970) .................................................................

Vernon v. R. J. Reynolds Realty Co., 226 N.C. 58, 36 
S.E.2d 710 (1946) ...........................................................

PAGE

Statutes:

28 U.S.C. §1343 ...................................................................  35

42 U.S.C. §1983 ................................................................... 35

42 U.S.C. §2000c, Civil Rights Act of 1964, §401 ....2, 32, 33,
34, 35, 
39, 40

42 U.S.C. §2000c-6(a), Civil Rights Act of 1964, §407(a)
2, 32

42 U.S.C. §2000c-8, Civil Rights Act of 1964, §409 .......  35

42 U.S.C. §§3601 et seq., Civil Rights Act of 1968 .......  14

N. C. Gen. Stat. §115-176...................................................  6

16

13



V

PAGE

Other Authorities:

Charlotte Observer, Sept. 5, 1970 ...................................  14

110 Cong. Eec. 1598 ........................................................... 39

110 Cong. Eec. 2280 .........................................................39, 40



1 st t h e

Smumitr (Court of ttjr lluitrii ^tatrs
O ctober T erm , 1970

No. 281

J ames E . S w an n , et al.,
Petitioners,

v.

Charlotte-Mecklenburg B oard of E ducation, et al.,

Respondents.

No. 349

Charlotte-Mecklenburg B oard of E ducation, et al.,
Cross-Petitioners,

v.

J ames E . S w ann , et al.,
Cross-Respondents.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

REPLY BRIEF FOR
PETITIONERS AND CROSS-RESPONDENTS

Preliminary Statement

The respondents and cross-petitioners (hereinafter 
school hoard) seek to pose the issue in this case of whether 
a school board may continue to operate one or more pre­



2

dominantly black schools. We feel that the issue is more 
properly posed in the decision of the district court below, 
namely, whether in the context of the facts developed in 
this case, the pervasive role of the state and its agencies 
in creating and perpetuating a racially segregated system, 
a school board may continue to deny equal educational 
opportunities to black children on the pretext of preserving 
“neighborhood schools” or avoiding transportation of stu­
dents when a feasible alternative is available for complete 
desegregation. This reply is addressed to the activities 
and practices of the state, particularly those of the school 
board, which produced the segregated system which the 
district court sought to eliminate; the feasibility and prac­
ticability of the plan directed by the court; and the fact 
that the school board and the various amici who have sub­
mitted briefs in this matter suggest no viable alternative 
rule of law to that adopted by the district court and advo­
cated by the petitioners herein. We also discuss the pos­
sible applicability of the decision of the Court in this case 
to other jurisdictions and the applicability of §§401 (b) and 
407(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000c(b) 
and 42 U.S.C. §2000c-6(a).

For the Court’s information we are attaching as an ap­
pendix to this reply a copy of the interim report filed by 
the school board showing the results o f desegregation for 
the present school term under the plan directed by the 
district court. As the report demonstrates the plan elim­
inates all racially identifiable schools in the system with the 
exception of 3 elementary schools and as to these 3 schools 
some steps are now being taken in order to alleviate the 
overcrowded conditions and to prevent resegregation.



3

ARGUMENT

I.

The Charlotte-Mecklenburg County Schools Were 
Segregated by Unconstitutional Governmental Action.

The School Board and several amici1 challenge for the 
first time the district court’s findings of state created and 
perpetuated racially segregated housing and public schools.2 
They contend that the admitted segregation is merely 
adventitious. The record, however, clearly demonstrates 
the contrary. As the district court stated in its Memo­
randum Opinion of November 7, 1969, segregation of the 
races in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg system is not “ consti­
tutionally benign.”

In previous opinions the facts respecting [the location 
of schools] . . . their controlled size and their popu­

1 See, e.g,, Amicus Curiae Brief for the Classroom Teachers 
Association of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg School System, Incorpo­
rated, pp. 20-21.

2 The Commonwealth of Virginia suggests that such inquiry is 
irrelevant. See, e.g., Brief for the Commonwealth of Virginia, 
Amicus Curiae, pp. 8-10. The district court found, however, that 
the varied actions of the state, including the School Board, had 
resulted in racially segregated schools as condemned in Brown v. 
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 349 U.S. 294 (1955); 
that inquiry into the forces of the state creating or perpetuating 
racial discrimination were indeed appropriate and required by 
decisions of this Court; see, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking 
Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961), for the Fourteenth Amendment 
prohibits “ State support of segregated schools through any arrange­
ment, management, funds, or property.” Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 
1, 19 (1958). This Court further stated in Cooper, supra at 17: 
“ In short, the constitutional rights of children not to be discrim­
inated against in school admission on grounds of race or color 
declared by this Court in the Brown ease can neither be nullified 
openly and directly . . . nor nullified indirectly . . . through evasive 
schemes for segregation whether attempted ‘ingeniously’ or ‘ingenu­
ously.’ ”  Finding state imposed segregation and a feasible means 
to correct it, the district court was obligated by the Constitution to 
enforce the constitutional rights of the black children of this school 
system.



4

lation have already been found. Briefly summarized, 
these facts are that the present location of white schools 
in white areas and of black schools in black areas is 
the result of a varied group of elements of public and 
private action, all deriving their basic strength origi­
nally from public law or state or local governmental 
action. These elements include among others the legal 
separation of the races in schools, school buses, public 
accommodations and housing; racial restrictions in 
deeds to land; zoning ordinances; city planning; urban 
renewal; location of public low rent housing; and the 
actions of the present School Board and others, before 
and since 1954, in locating and controlling the capacity 
of schools so that there would usually be black schools 
handy to black neighborhoods and white schools for 
white neighborhoods. There is so much state action 
embedded in and shaping these events that the result­
ing segregation is not innocent or “ de facto,” and the 
resulting schools are not “unitary” or desegregated.3 
(657a, 661a-662a).

3 Contrary to the board’s assertion (see Briefs of Respondents 
and Cross-Petitioners, p. 46), this finding did not constitute a re­
versal of the previous findings of the court; rather it was at this 
point that the court was pointedly advised by the board, that the 
board had no intention of complying with the directives of the 
court. The district court has described its painstaking, patient, 
but unsuccessful efforts to encourage the board to discharge its 
affirmative duty to desegregate. (See Supplemental Memorandum 
1221a-1238a). It was the board’s recalcitrance which led Judge 
Sobeloff to note in dissent that “ this Board, through a majority 
of its members, far from making ‘every reasonable effort’ to ful­
fill its constitutional obligation, has resisted and delayed desegre­
gation at every turn.” (No. 9, 1291a-1293a) Moreover, the record 
clearly demonstrates that the constitutional violations which the 
district court sought to remedy resulted not just from practices 
of other governmental agencies but to a large extent from the 
board’s conduct and action in locating and controlling schools, 
school sites, capacities, attendance districts, etc., all taken in con­
junction with and in furtherance of the developing racial housing 
patterns, both before and after this Court’s decision in Brown.



5

We discuss below some of the record evidence supporting 
these findings.

In the district court’s findings of April 23, 1969 (285a, 
296a), the court described Charlotte and Mecklenburg 
County as follows:

The central city may be likened to an automobile hub­
cap, the perimeter area to a wheel, and the county area 
to the rubber tire. Tryon Street and Southern Rail­
road run generally through the county and the city 
from the northeast to the southwest. Trade Street runs 
generally northwest to southeast and crosses Tryon 
Street at the center of town at Independence Square. 
Charlotte originally grew along the Southern Railroad 
tracks. Textile mills with mill villages, once almost 
entirely white, were built. Business and other industry 
followed the highways and the railroad. The railroad 
and parallel highways and business and industrial de­
velopment formed something of a barrier between 
east and west.

By the end of World War II many Negro families 
lived in the center of Charlotte just east of Independ­
ence Square in what is known as the First Ward- 
Second Ward-Cherry-Brooklyn area. However, the 
bulk of Charlotte’s black population lived west of the 
railroad and Tryon Street and north of Trade Street 
in the northwest part of town. The high-priced, al­
most exclusively white, country was east of Tryon 
Street and south of Trade in the Myers Park-Provi- 
dence-Sharon-Eastover area. Charlotte thus had a 
very high degree of segregation of housing before the 
first Brown decision.

Today, the degree of segregation in housing is even more 
pronounced. Some of the factors which have contributed 
to the school segregation follow:



6

1. Location and control of schools. Prior to 1954 all 
public schools in the City of Charlotte and Mecklenburg 
County were segregated pursuant to the state law and 
Constitution.4 The district court attached as an Exhibit 
to its Memorandum of Decision and Order of August 3, 
1970 a collection of segregation codes of the state which, 
as indicated by the Memorandum Decision (Br. A4), re­
mained in the state statutes as late as 1969. Schools were 
located and students and staff personnel were assigned to 
the various schools on the basis of race. Subsequent to the 
Brown decision and prior to the institution of this pro­
ceeding no affirmative steps were taken by the board to 
disestablish the racially segregated system. Some token 
integration did take place under the North Carolina Pupil 
Assignment Act, N. C. Gen. Stat. §115-176, pursuant to 
which a few black students requested transfer to previ­
ously all-white schools. The school board, however, con­
tinued to locate and control the various capacities of schools 
in order to maintain racial segregation.48- These practices 
have continued even through the present day.

In conjunction with the racially developing residential 
patterns, the school board built or made additions to the 
following schools subsequent to 1954 solely to accommo­
date black students.

4 Separate boards governed the city and county schools until 
1961, at which time the two school units were merged.

4a The board controlled grade structures to maintain segregation. 
In 1965 the system had a basically 6-3-3 grade structure, except 
that some black schools had different patterns to facilitate racial 
segregation such as grades: 1-4, 1-7, and 5-9, for example. (See 
Appellants’ Appendix in 1966 appeal to the 4th Circuit, No. 10207, 
pp. 25-29).



7

Schools Year of Construction Years of Additions
Burns 1968
Marie Davis 1951 1953

1957
1959

Double Oaks 1952 1955
1965

Druid Hills 1960 1964
First Ward 1912 1950)

1961)
1968) practically

complete new 
facilities.

Lincoln Heights 1956 1958
Oaklawn 1964
University Park 1957 1958

1964

(Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1 in original record; 124a-132a)5

Several white schools were built in white areas and pre­
dictably enrolled only white students:

Schools Year of Construction
Devonshire 1964
Albemarle Road 1968
Beverly Woods 1969

These examples are not meant to be exclusive but only 
exemplary of the practices followed by the board prior

5 “ Q. Dr. Self, when you built schools since 1954, what efforts 
did you make, other than what you testified to yesterday, to locate 
the schools in an area that would effect the greatest maximum 
integration of students in the system? A. The schools were lo­
cated in such a way as to house the youngsters, Mr. Chambers, 
not to effect a maximum amount of integration.

“ Q. You did not attempt to do it? A. We made an attempt to 
house the youngsters in the neighborhood.” (132a)

* * * *
“ Q. And I think that on your drawing board right now are 

plans to build more schools that are going to be all white and 
some that will be all black. A. I ’m sure that the enrollment in 
the schools will be affected by the neighborhood served.” (129a)



8

to and since Brown. (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 1 in original record; 
127a-129a). Even at the time of the March 1969 hearing 
the board was proceeding with construction of a new 
junior high school (Carmel Road) which under the board’s 
most recent attendance zone plan would have been 100 
per cent white (512a (designated “ Project 600” ), 747a).

Additionally, the board has added mobile units in order 
to accommodate any influx of black or white students in 
the segregated schools rather than redraw attendance dis­
tricts and assign either black or white students to schools 
of the opposite race (Pis’. Ex. 1 in original record). De­
fendants have controlled school districts in order to limit 
the race of students assigned to the various schools (Com­
pare Pis’. Exs. 1, 4, 24). As the court noted in its Opinion 
and Order of June 20, 1969:

“ [I]t may be timely to observe and the court finds 
as a fact that no zones have apparently been created 
or maintained for the purpose of promoting desegre­
gation ; that the whole plan of ‘building schools where 
the pupils are’ without further control promotes seg­
regation; and that certain schools, for example Bill- 
ingsville, Second Ward, Bruns Avenue and A may 
James obviously serve school zones which were either 
created or which have been controlled so as to sur­
round pockets of black students and that the result 
of these actions is discriminatory. These are not 
named as an exclusive list of such situations, but as 
illustrations of a long standing policy of control over 
the makeup of school population which scarcely fits 
any true ‘neighborhood school’ philosophy.”  (455a- 
456a) (see also note 5, supra; 132a).

Transportation has been arranged for students in order 
to perpetuate segregation. Even through the 1964-65 school 
1 ear, the board continued racially overlapping bus routes.



9

For students in the city and its immediate environs, black 
schools have been located within convenient walking dis­
tance of black residential areas. White schools have gen­
erally been located in outlying white residential areas 
necessitating bus transportation. Thus of the 23,384 stu­
dents provided transportation during the 1969-70 school 
year only 541 of such students were transported to black 
schools (1014a-1032a, 1203a-1204a). Coupled with these 
practices the school board continued freedom of choice to 
permit those students enclosed within school districts of 
the opposite race to transfer to other schools where their 
race would be in the majority.

2. Urban Renewal. Urban renewal has contributed to 
the residential segregation by relocating black families 
from urban renewal areas to black residential areas or 
areas rapidly changing to black. Principally, all of the 
black families relocated by the city urban renewal pro­
grams, principally all of which have taken place since 
1960, have been relocated in black residential areas and 
the few white families who have been relocated have been 
relocated in white residential areas. A  similar practice has 
prevailed in the relocation of families uprooted by new 
streets and highways (209a-214a, 282a-283a; Plaintiffs’ 
Exhibit 42). The court characterized this practice as 
follows:

Under the urban renewal program thousands of Ne­
groes were moved out of their shotgun houses in the 
center of town and have relocated in low rent areas 
to the west. This relocation of course involved many 
ad hoc decisions by individuals and by city, county, 
state and federal governments. Federal agencies 
(which hold the strings to large federal purses) re­
portedly disclaim any responsibility for the direction 
of the migration; they reportedly say that the selec­
tion of urban renewal sites and the relocation of dis­



10

placed persons are matters of decision ( “ freedom of 
choice” !) by local individuals and governments. This 
may be correct; the clear fact however is that the 
displacement occurred with heavy federal financing 
and with active participation by local governments, 
and it has further concentrated Negroes until 95% or 
so of the city’s Negroes live west of the Tryon-railroad 
area, or on its immediate eastern fringe (297a-298a).

The record demonstrates, however, that even this reloca­
tion did not afford the affected families a “ free”  choice 
for, as indicated below, homes in other areas were simply 
not available to black families (Plf. Exhs. 14, 19, 42 in the 
original record; 28a-64a, 208a-215a, 282a-283a). Moreover, 
with the overcrowding of schools which resulted from the 
relocations, the school board simply added additional 
rooms to existing black schools to accommodate the black 
students.

3. Public Housing. Consistent with the city’s zoning 
practices of locating multi-family and low income housing 
in black residential areas, all public housing, built prin­
cipally since 1960 and now generally occupied by blacks, 
has been located in black residential areas. Even pro­
jected public housing has been designated for black resi­
dential areas (Plf. Exhs. 14, 19, 29 and 42 in original 
record; 215a-217a). The effects of such practices in per­
petuating segregated housing is seen even in the most 
recent plan directed by the district court where three of 
the elementary schools and one of the junior high schools, 
projected to be predominantly white, have since the begin­
ning of this school year become predominantly black be­
cause of the relocation of additional black families in 
federally financed, low-income housing in black residential 
areas of the four school districts (Reply Brief App 10a- 
15a).



11

4. City Zoning. City zoning lias influenced separation 
o f the races by marking out and designating by land usage 
those areas of the city occupied by blacks and those occu­
pied by whites. Beginning in 1947, the city enacted its 
first zoning ordinance and in effect delineated the black and 
white residential areas. All white residential areas were 
zoned residential with restricted land usage. All black 
residential areas, with the exception of two small pockets 
adjacent to white residential areas, were zoned industrial 
for multi-land usage, including heavy industry, multi­
family homes and high density areas. Even the two ex­
cepted black areas were zoned for higher density use than 
the white residential areas (174a, 202a-207a, 251a, 268a, 
272a-283a). This difference in zoning practices for black 
and white residential areas has been carried forward to 
the present day in the major revisions of the zoning ordi­
nance in 1962.

Industrial zones have continued to be restricted to black 
residential areas. Additionally, the residential zoning au­
thorized for the black areas in the 1962 zoning ordinance 
has been limited to high density zones, R-6 and R-9 requir­
ing 6,000 square feet and 9,000 square feet, respectively, 
for a single family home. No black residential area in the 
City today has a higher density zoning than R-9 while 
principally all white residential areas have restricted zon­
ing of R-12, R-15 or above (206a-208a; Plf. Exh. 10 in 
original record (maps showing present zoning for city of 
Charlotte)). As testified by plaintiffs’ witness during the 
March 1969 hearing, the effect of such zoning makes the 
land in the black residential areas accessible to other 
uses; permits the rapid deterioration of the quality of the 
land—“ and this is clearly evident from the amount of 
industrial development which has taken place in areas of 
Negro residences;” reduces the housing value; and intro­
duces blighted and noxious usages into the area (204a).



12

It delineates for governmental and private developers, 
school officials and home buyers and renters those areas of 
the city for blacks and those for whites.

5. City Planning. City planning has further enforced 
segregation in housing. In a comprehensive proposal in 
1960 entitled “ The Next Twenty Years” (Plf. Exh. 12 in 
the original record), the City Planning Commission pro­
posed the continuation of basically the same racially dis­
criminatory zoning practices with high density and multi­
land usage in black residential areas and restricted zoning 
in the white residential areas. While the proposal itself, 
absent approval by the City Council, should have no con­
trolling effect, it nevertheless provided the blueprint for 
developers of what land usage would be permitted in the 
future. As plaintiffs’ witness testified:

The only elements of the plan which develop any com­
pelling force are those elements which relate to facili­
ties or land uses which are normally provided by 
government, things such as roads, or public buildings. 
Quite naturally, the development of residential or 
industrial land is subject to the decision-making of 
private developers within, of course, whatever the legal 
constraints are which the city imposes. But the plan 
very definitely sets a direction in the recoommenda- 
tions which it develops and it’s those recommendations 
which are particularly significant in this case (188a). 

# # *
This planning document [“ The Next Twenty Years” ] 
was developed in 1960 so that this is the major impact. 
The secondary effect of this document is the proposed 
interstate highway system and the major arterial 
streets in the Charlotte area. And again one can see 
that the major north-south route—1-77—tends to re­
inforce this north-south division by running adjacent



13

to and parallel to the industrial band which runs 
through the city [separating the black residential area 
on the west from the white residential area on the east] 
(195a, 196a).

The Planning Commission’s proposal was largely en­
acted by the City Council in the revised zoning code of 
1962 (202a, 220a).

6. Streets and Public Highways. Streets and public high­
ways have perpetuated barriers between the races. Streets 
have been designed to provide ease of communication only 
within the separate white or black residential areas with 
little means of communication between them. Additionally, 
one of the major federally financed interstate routes now 
being constructed through the city, the North-South Ex­
pressway (1-77), further marks, along with the Tryon 
Street-Southern Railroad, the division between the racially 
separate areas (195a, 216a-217a; Plf. Exh. 13 in original 
record).

7. Private Discrimination. Private discrimination has 
been pervasive in establishing and perpetuating the racially 
segregated housing that exists in the city. Blacks simply 
have been denied access or the right to purchase or rent 
in white residential areas. Construction firms and real 
estate agents and banking institutions, including the fed­
eral government, have planned and developed racially seg­
regated areas. As the court below noted (1264a), such 
developments were perpetuated by racially restrictive cove­
nants which were enforced by the North Carolina Supreme 
Court until this Court’s decision in Shelley v. Kraemer, 
334 U.S. 1 (1948). See, e.g., Phillip v. Wearn, 226 N.C.. 
290, 37 S.E. 2d 895 (1946); Eason v Buff aloe, 198 N.C. 
520, 152 S.E. 496 (1930); Vernon v. R. J. Reynolds Realty 
Co., 226 N.C. 58, 36 S.E. 2d 710 (1946). Such develop­
ments have been followed by the school board with con­



14

struction of new schools “ to house the youngsters in the 
neighborhood.” (132a) Black areas or developments have 
been purposely located west of the Tryon Street-Southern 
Railroad dividing line and white developments on the 
east side of the dividing line. Prior to the 1968 Civil 
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§3601 et seq., real estate agents 
were bound by their code of ethics to perpetuate this 
policy of discrimination (Plf. Exhs. 33, 34, 35, 36 in origi­
nal record; 28a-57a, 282a-283a). Limitations on the ability 
and freedom of blacks to purchase and rent homes in other 
areas of the city continue today.6

The school board now proposes to engraft on this 
segregated system, district and housing pattern zones 
which would leave the majority of the black and white 
students in racially segregated schools (See projected 
enrollment under board’s plan of February 2, 1970, 744a- 
748a). The pervasiveness of the state practices in creat­
ing and perpetuating the housing patterns and segregated 
schools is no different than the former constitutional pro­
visions compelling racial separation in public schools. It 
is clearly illusory to contend otherwise for the black stu­
dents in the all black and predominantly black schools 
would be locked into those schools just as effectively and 
with as much state control as they were under the former 
compulsory system rejected in Brown. Cf. Brewer v. 
School Board of City of Norfolk, 397 F.2d 37, 41-42 (4th 
Cir. 1968). The district court addressed this problem in 
its Memorandum Decision and Order of August 3, 1970.

“ The principle difference between New Kent County, 
Virginia, and Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, is

6 A black family which moved into a home in a white residential 
area of the city on September 4, 1970 was intimidated and 
threatened repeatedly and nightriders fired shotgun blasts into 
their home while the family was asleep. Charlotte Observer, Sept. 
5, 1970, at 1A.



15

that in New Kent County the number of children being 
denied access to equal education was only 740, where­
as in Mecklenburg that number exceeds 16,000. I f 
Brown and New Kent County and Griffin v. Prince 
Edward County and Alexander v. Holmes County are 
confined to small counties and to “ easy” situations, 
the constitutional right is indeed an illusory one. A 
black child in urban Charlotte whose education is be­
ing crippled by unlawful segregation is just as much 
entitled to relief as his contemporary on a Virginia 
farm.” (Br. A10)

Additionally, the court noted that the issue involved here 
is not the validity of a “ system” but the rights of indi­
vidual people:

I f  the rights of citizens are infringed by the system, 
the infringement is not excused because in the abstract 
the system may appear valid. “ Separate but equal” 
for a long time was thought to be a valid system but 
when it was finally admitted that individual rights 
were denied by the valid system, the system gave 
way to the rights of individuals.” (Br. A13)

The court again noted that “ the essence of the Brown 
decision is that segregation implies inferiority, reduces 
incentive, reduces morale, reduces opportunity for asso­
ciation and breadth of experience, and that segregated edu­
cation itself is inherently unequal.” (Br. A15)

Testing results which the court had noted in previous 
orders (see Order of August 15, 1969, 579a, 586a-590a; 
Opinion and Order of December 1, 1969, 698a, 702a-706a; 
Supplemental Findings of Fact of March 21, 1970, 1198a, 
1206a) further substantiated the adverse effect that ra­
cially segregated schools have on black children in the 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg school system.



16

It was this record o f state imposed segregation which 
led the court to reject any finding of de facto or consti­
tutionally benign racially segregated schools and housing 
in the Charlotte-Mecklenberg system. The Fourth Circuit 
held these findings to be “ supported by the evidence” and 
accepted “ them under familiar principles of appellate re­
view.” (264a).

It is these facts and findings which required that appro­
priate steps be taken by the school board to disestablish 
the state imposed segregated system.

Several lower court decision have held that school offi­
cials under these circumstances may not perpetuate seg­
regated schools under the guise of a neighborhood system. 
Henry v. Clarksdale Municipal Separate School District, 
409 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1969) cert. den. 396 U.S. 940 (1969); 
United States v. Greenivood Municipal Separate School 
District, 406 F.2d 1086 (5th Cir. 1969) cert. den. 395 U.S. 
907 (1969); United States v. Indianola Municipal Separate 
School District, 410 F.2d 626 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. den. 396 
U.S. 1011 (1970); Valley v. Rapides Parish School Board, 
423 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Board of 
Education of Baldwin County, 423 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 
1970); Mannings v. Board of Public Instruction of Hills­
borough County, 427 F.2cl 874 (5th Cir., No. 28643, May
11, 1970); Ross v. Eckels, ------  F.2d ------  (5th Cir. No.
30080, Aug. 25, 1970); Kemp v. Beasley, 423 F.2d 851 (8th 
Cir. 1970); United States v. School District, 151 of Cook 
County, Illinois, 286 F Supp. 786 (N.D. 111. 1968), affirmed 
404 F.2d 1125 (7th Cir. 1968); Dowell v. School Board of 
Oklahoma City, 244 F. Supp. 971 (W.D. Okla. 1965) affirmed 
375 F.2d 158 (10th Cir. 1967), cert, den., 387 U.S. 931 
(1967); Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, 303 F. 
Supp. 79 (D. Colo. 1969).



17

Such holdings are based on the long established princi­
ple that a state may not evade the prohibition of the 
Fourteenth Amendment by engrafting neutral, or otherwise 
unobjectionable practices upon constitutionally objection­
able ones, where the effects would perpetuate constitutional 
deprivations. See, e.g., Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 
(1939); Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. City of Phila­
delphia, 353 U.S. 230 (1957); Louisiana v. United States, 
380 U.S. 145 (1965); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 
(1960); cf. Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 
(1969), affirming 288 F. Supp. 678 (D.D.C. 1968). See 
also Coppedge v. Franklin County Board of Educ., 394 F.2d 
410 (4th Cir. 1968), affirming 273 F. Supp. 289 (E.D.N.C. 
1967); Local 189, Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United 
States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969); pp. 32-34 Brief 
Amicus Curiae for the National Education Association.

II.

The Assignment Plan Now in Effect Is Workable and 
Desegregates the Schools.

The school board urges here that the pupil assignment 
plan it offered to the district court on February 2, 1970, 
which has been rejected in every respect by both courts 
below, should have been approved. We have discussed 
at some length in our brief on the merits the court directed 
plan which is now in effect and the majority board plan.7

7 The board plan is actually the plan of five of the nine members 
of the board. Four members of the board offered an alternative 
plan for the complete desegregation of the system at the July, 1970 
hearing. Judge McMillan found that plan acceptable, but the board 
chose to implement the plan which had been directed on February 
5, 1970 (BR. A letseq.).



18

We respond here only to respondents’ discussion in sup­
port of their plans for junior and senior high schools, 
matters not directly addressed by our brief on the merits.

The Junior High School Plan. The board’s principal 
attack on the present assignment plan as ordered by the 
court is that it employs the technique of satellite zones 
while under the hoard plan all students would be assigned 
to a school within a zone which surrounds their school. 
The hoard therefore says that its plan maintains the 
“neighborhood school” concept. The court-ordered plan, 
it says, does not. We have previously demonstrated that 
the neighborhood school theory cannot be supported in 
history and tradition as a justification for continued 
segregation because it was widely and invariably dis­
regarded in order to promote segregation.8 Moreover, a 
comparison of the two plans shows that the board’s argu­
ments are entirely spurious.

At the junior high school level the court ordered plan 
draws zones around the twenty-one schools. In addition 
some smaller zones (satellites) are made in the black inner- 
city area which do not surround any schools. The black 
children in these zones are assigned to nine of the 21 
junior high schools ;9 12 of the schools have no satellites.10 
(See Bespondents-Cross Petitioners’ Brief Appendix, Map 
7.) The board’s plan includes no satellites. (See Respon­

8 See Brief for Petitioners, pp. 80-83. See also, Opinion and 
Order, April 23,1969, 305a-306a.

9 There are satellites for Eastway, Cochrane, Wilson, MeClint- 
lock, Albemarle Road, Carmel (sometimes referred to as P-600), 
Smith, Quail Hollow and Alexander Graham (sometimes referred 
to as “A.G.”).

10 The schools without satellites are: Alexander, Coulwood, Ran- 
son, Northeast (sometimes referred to as J. H. Gunn, Wilgrove or 
P-601), Williams, Northwest, Spaugh, Kennedy, Sedgefield, Pied­
mont, Hawthorne and Randolph.



19

dents’-Cross-Petitioners’ Brief Appendix, Map 6.) How­
ever, the board would leave 842 black children in Piedmont 
Junior High, a racially identifiable school (830a). This 
would nearly double the number of black students at Pied­
mont from the 1969-70 school year (Ibid). The board’s 
justification for leaving a segregated black junior high 
school is its adherence to what it calls the neighborhood 
school concept. We suppose a neighborhood school means 
that the children who attend the same school are “neigh­
bors.” A  close examination of the board’s maps shows that 
the white and black children attending the junior high 
schools are as much “neighbors” under one plan as under 
the other.

The board zones are drawn so that there are corridors 
which lead into and include portions of the black community 
in order to integrate the formerly white schools.11 Pour 
o f the five predominantly black schools were dealt with by 
extending the zones to include white areas. (Id. Map. No. 
g)ua ]rjve 0f  the predominantly white schools under the 
board’s plan would remain nearly all-white (830a).12

The court ordered plan, on the other hand, eliminates 
the board’s corridors leading from black neighborhoods 
to white schools and simply assigns the black students 
to the outlying white schools. In fact, some of the same 
students residing within satellites of five of the schools 
would be assigned to the same school under the board 
plan.13 Other black children were assigned from satellite

11 See, e.g., Coulwood, Ranson, Cochrane, Eastway, Wilson, Sedge- 
field, Smith and Randolph.

lla See, e.g., Hawthorne, Kennedy, Northwest, and Williams.
12 Albemarle Road, McClintock, Quail Hollow and the two schools 

opened for the 1970-71 year, Carmel (P-600) and Northeast (re­
ferred to variously as J. H. Gunn, Wilgrove and P-601).

13 Smith, Eastway, Cochrane, Wilson, and Alexander Graham 
(A.G.).



20

zones in the central city to predominantly white schools 
not desegregated by the board’s plan. Under both plans 
black children are assigned to outlying schools and white 
children are assigned to formerly black inner-city schools. 
The principal difference in technique therefore between 
the plans is that the court ordered plan does not have 
connecting corridors between the white schools and the 
black areas. The principal difference in result is that 
court’s plan is effective, complete and stable while the 
board’s plan is limited, incomplete and is subject to the 
problems of resegregation.14 We offer the following addi­
tional commitments about the board’s connecting corridors 
and the administrative workability of the plans.

The board’s connecting corridors bear no relationship 
to any conceivable neighborhood concept nor any relation­
ship to any natural landmarks such as major thorough­
fares. Therefore, the transportation system would be 
considerably more complex under the board’s plan than 
under the plan adopted by the court. Judge McMillan 
emphasized this point in the Supplemental Findings of 
Fact of March 21, 1970:

“ Two schools may be used to illustrate this point. 
Smith Junior High under the board plan would have 
a contiguous district six miles in length extending 4% 
miles north from the school itself. The district 
throughout the greater portion of its length is one-

14 This is emphasized by the board’s Interim Report on Desegre­
gation, of September 23, 1970 (printed as an appendix herein, 10a- 
15a), which describes a developing problem of resegregation at 
Spaugh caused by new public housing projects. The board’s limiting 
requirement that all students must reside within a zone surrounding 
a school would make it impossible to deal effectively with this situa­
tion caused by the policies and actions of governmental officials. 
By using the techniques of the court-ordered plan, the board can 
control the population at Spaugh so that it does not become a 
racially identifiable black school.



21

half mile wide and all roads in its one-half mile width 
are diagonal to its borders. Eastway Junior High 
presents a shape somewhat like a large wooden pistol 
with a fat handle surrounding the school off Central 
Avenue in East Charlotte and with a corridor extend­
ing three miles north and then extending at right 
angles four miles west to draw students from the 
Double Oaks area in northwest Charlotte. Obviously 
picking up students in narrow corridors along which 
no major road runs presents a considerable trans­
portation problem.

The Finger plan makes no unnecessary effort to 
maintain contiguous districts, but simply provides for 
the sending of busses from compact inner city atten­
dance zones, non-stop, to the outlying white junior 
high schools, thereby minimizing transportation tie- 
ups and making the pick-up and delivery of children 
efficient and time-saving. (1210a-1211a).

The district judge’s finding was supported by the testimony 
of the court consultant15 and the superintendent of 
schools :16

Dr. Self, the school superintendent, and Dr. Finger, 
the court appointed expert, both testified that the 
transportation required to implement the plan for 
junior highs would be less expensive and easier to ar­
range than the transportation proposed under the 
board plan. The court finds this to be a fact. (1210a).

He concluded his analysis of the plan in the following w ay:

In summary, as to junior high schools, the court finds 
that the plan chosen by the board and approved by the

16 957a-958a.
16 803a-804a.



22

court places no greater logistic or personal burden 
upon students or administrators than the plan pro­
posed by the school board; that the transportation 
called for by the approved plan is not substantially 
greater than the transportation called for by the board 
plan, that the approved plan will be more economical, 
efficient and cohesive and easier to administer and will 
fit in more nearly with the transportation problems 
involved in desegregating elementary and senior high 
schools, and that the board made a correct adminis­
trative and educational choice in choosing this plan in­
stead of one of the other three methods (1211a-1210a).

The Senior High School Plan. The board also complains 
about the approval by the courts below of the satellite zone 
for Independence High School from which 300 black chil­
dren are assigned to a school which would have had only 
23 blacks enrolled under the board plan. Judge Butzner 
in approving this portion of the plan observed that:

The transportation of 300 high school students from 
the black residential area to suburban Independence 
School will tend to stabilize the system by eliminating 
an almost totally white school in a zone to which other 
whites might move with consequent “ tipping”  or re­
segregation of other schools (1273a).

He also noted that the non-stop bus trips for these students 
compares favorably in terms of distance with the trans­
portation of other students assigned to Independence “ and 
is substantially shorter than the systems average one-way 
trip of 17 miles” (1273a, n. 6).

The distance involved is also substantially equivalent 
to the distance to be traveled under the board’s high school



23

plan by inner-city black students assigned to South Meck­
lenburg, East Mecklenburg, and West Mecklenburg and 
by which students are assigned to the formerly all-black 
West Charlotte School. (See Respondents-Cross-Peti- 
tioners’ Brief Appendix, Map No. 8.)

Moreover, the children living within the Independence 
satellite zone would, under the board’s plan, be assigned 
to Harding and West Mecklenburg high schools serving 
the area which the board reports is experiencing greater 
black enrollment than expected at the elementary and 
junior high school levels because of recently completed 
public housing.17 . If the 300 black children now going to 
Independence were, instead, going to Harding and West 
Mecklenburg, we would expect that the board would be re­
porting the anticipated resegregation at the high school 
level which they now expect at Spaugh Junior High School. 
Spaugh now has a 38.4% black enrollment. Under the board 
plan the combined enrollment at Harding and West Meck­
lenburg High Schools would be 39% black.18 The combined 
enrollment is now only 31% black. Presumably the forces 
which the board expects to create resegregation at Spaugh 
Junior High School, if not corrected, including the antici­
pated early occupancy o f 240 additional public housing 
units at Little Rock Homes would also have had the same 
effect upon Harding and West Mecklenburg High School 
if  the district court had not required the assignments to 
Independence.

17 See appendix to this brief, 10a-15a.
18 This figure is computed by adding 300 black students to the 

September 23, 1970 enrollments reported at Harding and West 
Mecklenburg.



24

III.

The School Board Proposes No Viable Rule of Law 
to Define the Goal of a Unitary System.

The board asks this Court to “ give instruction and guid­
ance to school hoards” as to the requirements of a unitary 
school system. (Brief of Respondents p. 32; hereinafter 
referred to as “Brief” ) They offer, however, no standard 
or rule which would clarify the law.

The school hoard’s position, as we understand it, is that 
the legal conclusions drawn by the Fourth Circuit are cor­
rect (Id. p. 36). The hoard supports the court’s rule of 
reasonableness (Ibid.) which was stated as follows:

“ [SJchool hoards must use all reasonable means to inte­
grate the schools in their jurisdictions.” (1267a)

The hoard does not seem to deny that it has some affirma­
tive duty to desegregate.19 Indeed, it quotes with approval

19 Respondents are not clear as to what they view as their minimal 
obligations to desegregate. They claim that “In formulating its 
plan, the Board to a very significant degree has elected to exceed 
Constitutional requirements” (Brief, p. 80). However, we do not 
understand them to adopt the position of several of the amici that 
a unitary system is created by engrafting upon a dual school sys­
tem an ostensibly neutral geographic assignment plan, which leaves 
racial segregation intact. Amicus Curiae Brief for the Classroom 
Teachers Association of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg School System, 
Incorporated; Amicus Curiae Brief of the State of Florida; cf. 
Amicus Curiae Brief of William C. Cramer, et al. Such a position 
clearly conflicts, we think, with the decisions of this Court in Brown 
v Board of Education, supra; Green v. Country School Board of 
New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Monroe v. Board of Com- 
mmumers, 391 U.S. 450 (1968); Raney v. Board of Education, 
3. 1 U.S. 443 (1968); United States v. Montgomery County Board 
of Education, 395 U.S. 225 (1969) ; Dowell v. Board of Education 
of the Oklahoma City Public Schools, 396 U.S. 269 (1969) and 
Northcross v. Board of Education, 397 U.S. 232 (1970). The other 
circuits are in agreement with the court below that a dual school



25

the conclusion of the court that smaller school districts are 
required to desegregate completely: “All schools in towns, 
small cities, and rural areas generally can be integrated 
by pairing, zoning, clustering or consolidating schools and 
transporting pupils.” (1267a quoted at p. 36, Brief for Re­
spondents).

In our brief on the merits we have criticized the “ reason­
able means” test (pp. 58-65) on the ground that it is a sub­
jective standard which portends a new era of litigation and 
which sanctions a great deal of continuing segregation. 
The board’s position underscores what we have said. They 
would have this Court adopt the rule of the Court of Ap­
peals, but reject its application to the facts of this case. 
The board thus argues that its affirmative duty to eliminate 
the vestiges of segregation would be satisfied by its de­
segregation plan of February 2 (726a-748a) even though 
more than one-half of the black children would still be at­
tending racially identifiable black schools because it says 
its plan employs all reasonable means. In concluding their 
brief, the hoard asserts that the means they have chosen 
are reasonable because their choices represent the “value 
judgments of the elected school hoard and the educators or 
its administrative staff” {Id., at 100).

At bottom, the board is arguing that locally elected 
school hoards must be vested with the discretion to deter­
mine not only the means hut also the extent of desegrega-

system is not dismantled by simply drawing zone lines which leave 
racial segregation in the schools undisturbed. See, e.g., Henry v. 
Clarksdale Municipal Separate School District supra; Mannings v. 
Board of Public Instruction of Hillsborough County, supra; Boss 
v. Eckels, supra; see analysis of Fifth Circuit’s “Neighborhood 
School” concept in Brief for Petitioners Davis v. Board of School 
Commissioners of Mobile County, O.T. 1970, No. 436; United States 
v. School District, 151 of Cook County, Illinois, supra; United 
States v. Board of Education, School District No. F, Tulsa, Okla.,
------  F.2d ------  (10th Cir. 1970). We therefore do not address
further the arguments of the above amici.



26

tion which is to occur within their jurisdictions. This plea 
for school board discretion is echoed in several amicus 
curiae briefs filed in this case. Brief for the Commonwealth 
of Virginia, Amicus Curiae, p. 27; Brief of the City of 
Chattanooga, Tenn., Amicus Curiae, p. 28; Amicus Curiae 
Brief of David E. Allgood, An Infant etc., et al., p. 13.S0

I f  the constitutional rights of black children to a de­
segregated school are to he left to the best judgments of 
local school hoards, then, of course, many of the legal 
problems will he solved. A  unitary school system would be 
whatever a local school board determines it to be. It would 
also, almost inevitably, be a segregated school system. 
Judge Sobeloff spoke to the matter of school board dis­
cretion in his dissent below:

In making policy decisions that are not constitutionally 
dictated, state authorities are free to decide in their 
discretion that a proposed measure is worth the cost 
involved or that the cost is unreasonable, and accord­
ingly they may adopt or reject the proposal. This is 
not such a case. Vindication of the plaintiffs’ constitu­
tional rights does not rest in the school board’s discre­
tion as the Supreme Court authoritatively decided six­
teen years ago and has repeated with increasing 
emphasis (1288a).

The board offers no rule which would resolve the questions 
which it claims need answers,51 other than its request that

N Some of these amici seem also to argue for a “ colorblind" test 
of the variety described in the preceding footnoote.

51 The State of Florida. Governor Claude R. Kirk. Jr.. The Com­
monwealth of Virginia. The Chattanooga Board of Education, the 
Concerned Ciurens of Norfolk. Virginia and the Classroom Teachers 
Amciatiun o f the Charlotte Mecklenburg School System. Inc., as 
tM h earw, join In respondents insistence that there are important 
questions to be answered. We perceive no viable answers in their



27

the discretionary decision of school boards be honored by 
the courts. We cannot believe that these crucial constitu­
tional rights are to be left to a majority vote.

The school board offers no viable definition of a unitary 
school system. The Fourth Circuit’s reasonable means test 
is “ inherently ambiguous” (1289a) and is “ a new litigable 
issue” which, as the board’s brief makes clear would he 
“ exploit[ed] . . .  to the hilt.” (1290a). Petitioners urge 
this Court to reject the reasonableness test either as an­
nounced in the court below or as would be further limited 
by the school board. The only thing certain about “ reason­
ableness” as a standard in this context is that it sanctions 
a significant amount of continued segregation in the public 
schools.

Petitioners find no warrant in Brown or its progeny for 
any standard or test which at the outset assumes that 
segregation will remain. We submit that a dual school 
system must he required to reorganize so that every black 
child is to he free from assignment to a racially identifiable 
“black” school, at every grade of his education. The only 
exception to this general rule would be where eliminating 
all black schools is absolutely unworkable.* 22 The plan or­

submissions. They would either have the Court adopt a “ color 
blind” standard which would leave segregation intact (see note, 20, 
supra, and accompanying text) or a rule placing great emphasis on 
school board discretion (see note 19, supra, and accompanying text.)

22 See the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan in Carter v. 
West Feliciana Parish School Board, 396 U.S. 290, 292 (1970).

See also the dissenting opinion of Judge Sobeloff below:
Of course it goes without saying that school boards are not 

obligated to do the impossible. Federal courts do not joust at 
windmills. Thus it is proper to ask whether a plan is feasible, 
whether it can be accomplished ( 1284a).



28

dered by the district court in this case accomplishes the 
goal23 which we urge. And it works.24

IV.

The District Court Was Correct in Not Attempting 
to Declare a General Rule of Law to Govern the Multi­
tude of Varied Circumstances of School Segregation in 
Other Cities and Other Parts of the United States.

The school board’s brief suggests that Judge McMillan 
relied upon grounds to support his desegregation order 
which would apply to Chicago (or other large northern 
cities) as well as to Charlotte-Mecklenburg. The board 
thereby attempts to precipitate this Court into considera­
tion of the enormously complicated problem that is some­
times termed “ de facto” school segregation.25 The Court 
is neither required nor able to consider that problem in 
this case.

Judge McMillan did not base his order on general prin­
ciples applicable out of the context of classical school 
segregation under state segregation laws and practices— 
de jure segregation—nor, indeed, upon broad principles of

23 See Brief for Petitioner, Davis v. Board of School Commis­
sioners of Mobile County, 0. T. 1970, No. 436, pp. 63-49, for a full 
discussion of the general principle we ask this Court to announce.

24 See Report, etc., which is printed as an Appendix to this Brief, 
4a-9a (showing enrollment in the schools as of September 21, 1970).

25 We think the labels “ de facto” and “ de jure” are somewhat 
unhelpful and confusing because the terminology tends to beg the 
question at issue, i.e., whether the government is responsible for 
the segregation to a sufficient extent that the Fourteenth Amend­
ment prohibits its continuance. The terminology tends to assume 
that there is a distinction between the causes of segregated schools 
in tlie North as opposed to the South. That is a question which 
must in the final analysis be decided in the concrete circumstances 
of cases which present the issues.



29

any sort applied out of the context of the particular school 
system of Charlotte. What Judge McMillan did, as he 
was legally and realistically obliged to do was to consider 
all of the factors in the Charlotte situation that were 
relevant to determining whether the school board had ful­
filled its obligations under Brown v. Board of Education, 
347 U.S. 483 (1954), and, if not, what steps were neces­
sary to require it to fulfill those obligations.

That is also the only question before this Court. Noth­
ing in this case obliges the Court to consider questions of 
so-called de facto segregation, for in this case we deal with 
an archetype of de jure segregation and a question of the 
proper remedies for it.

Prior to 1954, public schools in Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
were segregated pursuant to the state constitution and 
laws of North Carolina. Judge McMillan’s opinion of Au­
gust 3, 1970, attaches as an appendix the elaborate code 
of segregation laws adopted in North Carolina, including 
about sixty-five sections of the General Statutes and two 
sections of the Constitution. (This exhibit of the segrega­
tion laws has not been printed in the appendices, but is 
contained in the original record attached to the opinion of 
August 3, 1970.) Under this segregation code racial segre­
gation of pupils and faculties and all aspects of the system 
was complete. A  dual system of schools for whites and 
Negroes was maintained throughout the state under the 
compulsion of these laws. As Judge McMillan has noted 
many of these laws were still on the books in North Car­
olina when his April 23,1969, opinion was written, although 
many were repealed thereafter by the 1969 General A s­
sembly.

Although segregation in schools was unconstitutional 
from 1954 to 1970, as a practical and a legal matter, racial 
segregation has continued in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg



30

schools through the 1969-1970 school year. The board main­
tained until June 1969 a pupil assignment system based 
on geographic zones and freedom of transfer which was 
substantially the same as that held unconstitutional by this 
Court in Monroe v. Board of Commissioners of Jackson, 
Tenn., 391 U.S. 450 (1968). Thus Judge McMillan found 
last year that the 9,216 pupils “ in 100% black situations 
are considerably more than the number of black students 
in Charlotte in 1954 at the time of the first Brown decision” 
(661a). Judge McMillan has been addressing a problem 
of how to desegregate all-black schools in Charlotte which 
remained in the pre-1954 pattern.

In determining whether the promise of Brown I  that 
such segregation would be eliminated “ root and branch” 
is applicable, Judge McMillan and this Court should prop­
erly give weight to the impact of all factors which operate 
within the school system of Charlotte-Mecklenburg to bring 
about its present condition or enable its change. It was 
for this reason that Judge McMillan considered—and we 
invite this Court to consider—such matters as housing 
demographic patterns effected by public housing, urban 
renewal, city zoning, racial restrictive covenants enforced 
by state laws, and by school planning decisions (school loca­
tion, school size, grade structure, school attendance areas, 
etc.). All of these factors are related in determining the 
school system that Charlotte has today, and in appraising 
whether it meets the requirements of a desegregated sys­
tem. Judge McMillan recognized, as this Court must, that 
the present system is the result of many factors. For ex­
ample, decisions about whether to build schools, where to 
build schools, and the capacity of the schools to be built, 
shape neighborhood and demographic patterns over many 
years. Now that the schools have shaped the neighborhood, 
Judge McMillan reasonably took the view that a school 
system was not meeting its obligation to desegregate if  it



31

now permitted the neighborhoods to shape the schools. The 
neighborhoods to which respondents advert as the basis of 
the “neighborhood school principle” are themselves the 
product of state planning and state action of many sorts, 
by the board of education and other state organs over many 
years. One can no more say that a neighborhood school 
principle in this setting achieves desegregation because it 
is “color blind” than one could sustain the operation of 
“color blind” Grandfather Clauses used by many states to 
perpetuate voting discrimination after this Court voided 
more obvious forms of denying black citizens the franchise. 
Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939).

But this does not mean that any of the factors considered 
by Judge McMillan here urged on this Court would have 
the same significance in another context, particularly with 
relation to a different question: for example, the question 
whether the City of Chicago has an unconstitutionally seg­
regated school system in the first instance. This Court 
should be exceedingly cautious in indulging the assumption 
suggested by respondents that Chicago does pose the same 
— or indeed a different—problem than does Charlotte. We 
simply do not know, respondents do not know, and the 
Court does not know what problems Chicago may pose. 
One thing that the Court does know is that school deseg­
regation problems are very complex, and arise against the 
full, complicated factual situations in different localities. 
What appears to be “ de facto” in one context may be “de 
jure” in another. It is wholly inappropriate for the Court 
to decide this case in light of fears or concerns as to how 
problems in Chicago might be resolved, when there is not 
now a record before the Court suggesting either what the 
issues in Chicago might be or what the full set of com­
plicated factual circumstances in Chicago, relevant to those
issues, are.



32

y .

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 Does Not in Any W a y  
Limit the Power of the Courts to Fashion Remedies 
for Unconstitutional Racial Segregation in Public 
Schools or Prohibit the Courts from Requiring Busing 
of Pupils to Disestablish Dual Segregated School 
Systems.

The school board and some of the amicus curiae have 
argued that two provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964—sections 401(b) and 407(a), codified as 42 U.S.C. 
§§2000c(b)28 and 2000c-6(a)27—justify reversal of the dis- * 1 2 * * * * *

28 §2000e. Definitions 
As used in this subchapter—

# # #
(b) “Desegregation” means the assignment of students to 

public schools and within such schools without regard to 
their race, color, religion, or national origin, but “desegre­
gation” shall not mean the assignment of students to public 
schools in order to overcome racial imbalance.

Pub.L. 88-352, Title IV, §401, July 2, 1964, 78 Stat 246.
27 §2000c-6. Civil actions by the Attorney General— Complaint;

certification; notice to school board or college 
authority; institution of civil action; relief re­
quested; jurisdiction; transportation of pupils to 
achieve racial balance; judicial power to insure 
compliance with constitutional standards;  im­
pleading additional parties as defendants 

(a) Whenever the Attorney General receives a complaint in 
writing—

(1) signed by a parent or group of parents to the effect 
that his or their minor children, as members of a class of 
persons similarly situated, are being deprived by a school 
hoard of the equal protection of the laws, or

(2) signed by an individual, or his parent, to the effect
that he has been denied admission to or not permitted to
continue in attendance at a public college by reason of race,
eolor, religion, or national origin,

and the Attorney General believes the complaint is meritorious
and certifies that the signer or signers of such complaint are



33

trict court’s desegregation plan. The board’s brief argues 
that the Civil Eights Act of 1964 “ expressly prohibits a 
United States Court to order transportation to achieve 
racial balance in schools” (School Board brief herein, 
Argument I.-E-4). This audacious effort to convert the 
Civil Eights Act into a sword against school desegrega­
tion has been rejected by every court of appeals which 
has been confronted with the argument, including the 
decision below by Judge Butzner (A. 1274a). See peti­
tioners’ brief herein at pp. 65-66 and cases cited. Judge 
Butzner concluded for the court below:

Those provisions are not limitations on the power of 
school boards or courts to remedy unconstitutional 
segregation. They were designed to remove any im­
plication that the Civil Eights Act conferred new juris­
diction on courts to deal with the question of whether

unable, in his judgment, to initiate and maintain appropriate 
legal proceedings for relief and that the institution of an action 
will materially further the orderly achievement of desegrega­
tion in public education, the Attorney G-eneral is authorized, 
after giving notice of such complaint to the appropriate school 
board or college authority and after certifying that he is satis­
fied that such board or authority has had a reasonable time to 
adjust the conditions alleged in such complaint, to institute 
for or in the name of the United States a civil action in any 
appropriate district court of the United States against such 
parties and for such relief as may be appropriate, and such 
court shall have and shall exercise jurisdiction of proceedings 
instituted pursuant to this section, provided that nothing herein 
shall empower any official or court of the United States to issue 
any order seeking to achieve a racial balance in any school by 
requiring the transportation of pupils or students from one 
school to another or one school district to another in order to 
achieve such racial balance, or otherwise enlarge the existing 
power of the court to insure compliance with constitutional 
standards. The Attorney General may implead as defendants 
such additional parties as are or become necessary to the 
grant of effective relief hereunder.

# * #
Pub.L. 88-352, Title IV, §407, July 2, 1964, 78 Stat. 248.



34

school hoards were obligated to overcome de facto 
segregation (1274a).

The board’s argument is entirely untenable because it 
is in conflict with the plain language of the Civil Rights 
Act and with the legislative purpose of the Congress.

The language of section 407(a) makes it clear that the 
relevant proviso was added merely to insure that the law 
was not interpreted to enlarge the powers of the federal 
courts. There is no language in the section which prohibits 
the courts from doing anything. Section 407 authorizes 
the attorney general to institute school segregation cases 
in the name of the United States in the federal courts 
upon receiving complaints of aggrieved citizens that they 
were “ deprived by a school board of the equal protection 
of the laws.” The section provides that the United States 
may sue “ for such relief as may be appropriate” and that 
the appropriate district courts “ shall have and shall exer­
cise jurisdiction of proceedings instituted pursuant to this 
section.” Immediately after this grant of jurisdiction over 
suits brought by the attorney general, section 402 states 
the proviso that the board relies on, which says that 
nothing therein empowers any official or court of the 
United States “ to issue any order seeking to achieve a 
racial balance in any school by requiring the transportation 
of pupils or students from one school to another or one 
such school district to another in order to achieve such 
racial balance, or otherwise enlarge the existing power of 
the court to insure compliance with constitutional stan­
dards” (emphasis added).

There is simply nothing in this language that prohibits 
the federal courts from doing anything. It certainly does 
not forbid anything the courts find necessary to “ insure 
compliance with constitutional standards” (section 407).



35

The whole purpose of §407 is to enable the federal govern­
ment to institute suits to “ further the orderly achievement 
of desegregation in public education” by enforcing the 
Equal Protection Clause through suits in the federal courts.

The proviso applies only to suits instituted pursuant to 
the section—that is, where the federal courts exercise the 
jurisdiction conferred to entertain school desegregation 
cases instituted by the attorney general. The provision has 
no application whatsoever to this Charlotte school case 
which was not instituted by the attorney general but was 
filed by petitioners who invoked the district court’s juris­
diction under 28 IT.S.C. §1343 to enforce their rights under 
42 IJ.S.C. §1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
United States is not even a party to this case. Section 409 
of the Act (42 U.S.C. §2000c-8) provides that “Nothing in 
this title shall affect adversely the right of any person to 
sue for or obtain relief in any court against discrimination 
in public education or in any facility covered by this title.” 
Thus, the Congress made plain that any limitation placed 
on suits brought by the attorney general would not “ ad­
versely affect” suits brought by private litigants.

But even assuming arguendo that the section does apply 
to suits initiated by private citizens seeking desegregation, 
there is nothing in the language or in the legislative his­
tory which suggests that it was the purpose of the Con­
gress to restrict the power of the federal courts in decid­
ing constitutional issues in school desegregation contro­
versies. On the contrary, Senator Humphrey, the manager 
of the bill in the Senate (where the provision originated), 
explained its purpose quite clearly. His statement dispels 
any possibility of ambiguity about the purposes of the 
proponents of the provision:

M e . H umphrey. Mr. President, this matter requires 
a statement. Therefore, I take this time to state, for



36

the proponents of the bill, that the language of title IV  
which provides that nothing in the title shall empower 
any Federal court or official to issue an order requir­
ing the transportation of school children to correct 
racial imbalance in the schools has been the subject 
of considerable discussion. This provision of title TV 
recognizes that the problems of racial imbalance and 
school transportation are presently the subjects of 
considerable court consideration and local administra­
tive action, as well as a great deal of discussion, often 
heated, among parents and educators. In some in­
stances, courts have decided that racial imbalances 
may constitute a denial of equal protection of the 
laws. Balaban v. Rubin, 32 U.S. L.W. 2465; Blocker v. 
Board of Education, 32 U.S. L.W. 2465; Jackson v. 
Pasadena School Board, 382 F.2d 878. On the other 
hand, relief has been denied on the grounds that school 
racial imbalance resulting from de facto segregation 
is not per se unconstitutional. Bell v. City of Gary, 
324 F.2d 309, certiorari denied, 32 U.S. L.W. 3384. 
Some communities are attempting to correct racial im­
balances by the transporting of children; others refuse 
to do so. The purpose of the pending Dirksen-Mans- 
field-Humphrey-Kuchel substitute is to make clear that 
the resolution of these problems is to be left where it 
is now, namely, in the hands of local school officials 
and the courts. This bill is made neutral on the res­
olution of these problems by the language of title IV. 
It is to be used as the vehicle to require transportation 
to correct racial imbalances; it is not to be used as 
an excuse for local officials to refuse to carry out their 
obligations. Obviously this provision could not affect 
a court’s determination concerning racial imbalance 
and possible corrective measures; this is dependent 
upon the court’s interpretation of the 14th amendment.



37

As floor manager of this legislation, I wish to note 
the intention of those who sought to deal with the vex­
ing problem of de facto segregation through the lan­
guage contained in Dirksen substitute amendment.

Thus it is entirely clear that the Congress intended to 
he neutral on the question whether racial imbalances vi­
olated the Fourteenth Amendment and to leave that and 
related questions about transportation for the courts to 
decide in interpreting the Constitution. We have studied 
the entire legislative history of the provision, including all 
the matters cited by the hoard and the amici curiae, and 
we find that quite simply there is nothing which indicates 
that the Congress sought to limit the power of the federal 
courts to interpret the Constitution and apply the doctrine 
of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The 
Department of Justice reached the same conclusion in a 
detailed memorandum filed in November 1969 in fourteen 
school cases submitted before the Fifth Circuit sitting en 
banc. We quote at length from the Justice Department 
study of the legislative history in the margin below.28

28 See Memorandum of the United States filed in Singleton v. 
Jackson Municipal Separate School District, 5th Cir., No. 26285 
(and other en banc school eases), 419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1969), 
reversed as to desegregation delay sub nom. Carter v. West Felici­
ana Parish School Board, 396 U.S. 290 (1970). The following 
summary appears at pp. 5-8 of that Memorandum:

“ Summary
“ The meaning of the proviso in section 407(a) regarding 

transportation and of the qualifying language in section 401 (b) 
depends upon the phrase ‘racial imbalance.’ The latter phrase 
was used, in a different context, in the original version of H.R. 
7152, the bill which became the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The 
bill as introduced provided that the Commissioner of Educa­
tion could award grants and render technical assistance to (1) 
school districts undergoing desegregation and (2) districts 
faced with problems of racial imbalance. The authority of the



38

Lengthy discussions in some of the amicus briefs about 
what Congress meant by the statutory term “ racial bal­
ance” are essentially beside the point because—whatever 
that phrase may mean— Congress has not prohibited the 
courts from doing anything with respect to “ racial bal­
ance.”

There is even less reason to think that section 401(b) 
has anything to do with this case. The definition of “ de-

Attorney General to initiate lawsuits was limited to actions 
to achieve desegregation.

During hearings on the bill before a House subcommittee, 
the term ‘racial imbalance’ was equated with de facto segrega­
tion, the situation existing in a city where, solely because of 
residential patterns, certain schools were attended largely by 
members of one race. Some members of the subcommittee ex­
pressed opposition to Federal action with regard to de facto 
segregation. The bill as reported by the House Judiciary Com­
mittee deleted the references to ‘racial imbalance.’ Thus, both 
the authority of Commissioner of Education to render assis­
tance and the authority of the Attorney General to bring suit 
were limited to desegregation.

“Despite the removal of references to ‘racial imbalance,’ Con­
gressman Cramer offered and the House adopted an amend­
ment adding to the definition of ‘desegregation’ in section 
401(b) the statement that ‘ “ desegregation” shall not mean the 
assignment of students . . .  in order to overcome racial imbal­
ance.’ Congressman Cramer wished to make clear that Title IV 
was not to apply to de facto segregation. The purpose of Title 
IV was to implement the Fourteenth Amendment.

“ In the Senate, as in the House, the proponents of the bill 
stated that Title IV  was intended to reach unconstitutional 
state action and that it would not affect racial imbalance in 
schools which resulted exclusively from housing patterns. The 
compromise bill offered in the Senate, which was ultimately 
enacted, added to section 407(a) the proviso concerning ‘racial 
balance.’ The purpose of the change was to reemphasize that 
the Congress was not authorizing Federal intervention, e.g., 
requiring busing, with respect to school systems which were in 
compliance with the Fourteenth Amendment.

“ Senator Humphrey, the floor manager for the bill, and other 
members of Congress expressly recognized that the provisions 
of Title IV  would not affect judicial construction of the Four­
teenth Amendment.



39

segregation” in section 401(b) provides a meaning for the 
term “ as used in this title”— or in the code: “as used in 
this subchapter.”  The reference is to Title IV o f the Act 
which, in addition to authorizing suits by the attorney gen­
eral (as indicated above in the discussion of section 407), 
does nothing else except authorizing activities of the Com­
missioner of Education: to conduct a survey and make a 
report on the lack of educational opportunities (section 
402), to grant technical assistance to school boards and 
other units implementing “desegregation” of public schools 
(section 403), to conduct training institutes (section 404), 
and to make financial grants to school boards for dealing 
with desegregation problems (section 405). Thus the defini­
tion of desegregation in Title IV  has only to do with suits 
by the attorney general (and he is authorized to enforce 
the equal protection guarantee) and the activities of the 
Commissioner of Education. None of this has anything to 
do with this lawsuit by private citizens—pupils and parents 
—filed in a district court pursuant to the civil rights juris­
diction of the district courts to enforce their rights under 
the Fourteenth Amendment. There was no effort by the 
Congress to define the meaning of the Equal Protection 
Clause in section 401(b), and nothing in the Act indicates 
that any such thing was intended.29

29 Congressman Cramer, who sponsored an amendment adding 
the last clause in section 401(b), proposed the idea on the House 
floor on February 1,1964 (110 Cong. Eec. 1598), stating he favored 
putting “something specific in it [the bill] saying that it is not the 
intention of Congress to include racial imbalance or de facto seg­
regation. I think we should consider an amendment to that effect.” 
The amendment was offered and agreed to February 6, 1964 (110 
Cong. Bee. 2280), following Mr. Cramer’s assertion that its pur­
pose was merely “ to strike ‘racial imbalance’ from the bill and from 
this title which I. otherwise, in its present form, believe is still in 
the bill as I have said before many times.” He said:

“ The purpose is to prevent any semblance of congressional 
acceptance or approval of the concept of ‘de facto’ segregation 
or to include in the definition of ‘desegregation’ any balancing 
of school attendance by moving students across school district



40

In addition, of course, there is no prohibitory language 
of any kind in section 401. It defines desegregation but 
does not attempt to limit— or even refer—the federal 
courts to that definition. There is nothing in Title IV  (or 
elsewhere in the Act) indicating that the definition is to 
have any force at all in the courts. Nor is there any legis­
lative history suggesting that the definition related to the 
courts’ powers.

Respectfully submitted,

J ack Greenberg
J ames M. Nabrit, III
N orman J. Ch ach kin  

10 Columbus Circle 
New York, New York 10019

J. L eV onne C hambers
A dam S tein
Chambers, S tein , F erguson & L anning 

216 West Tenth Street 
Charlotte, North Carolina 28202

C. O. P earson
203% East Chapel Hill Street 
Durham, North Carolina 27702

A nthony  G. A msterdam
Stanford University Law School 
Stanford, California 94305

Attorneys for Petitioners and
Cross-Respondents

lines to level off percentages where one race outweighs another” 
(110 Cong. Ree. 2280) (emphasis added).

Mr. Cramer’s brief in this Court distorts this simple history by 
editing the above quoted remarks to delete— with ellipses— the mat­
ter which we have italicized in the last quoted speech. Amicus 
Curiae Brief of William C. Cramer, in this case, p. 13. Mr. Cramer’s 
brief now asserts that his amendment was not concerned with the 
problem of racial balance in de facto areas but with his own con­
stituency. Brief of Mr. Cramer, p. 22. It would seem that Mr. 
Cramer’s style of argument is rather disingenuous, both on the 
House floor and in his brief in this Court.



A P P E N D I X



I n the

U nited S tates D istrict Court 

F or the W estern D istrict of N orth Carolina 

Charlotte D ivision 

Civil Action No. 1974

J ames E . S w ann , et al.,

vs.
Plaintiffs,

Charlotte-M ecklenburg B oard of E ducation, et al.,
Defendants.

Interim Report on Desegregation,
September 23, 1970

In accordance with the prior tiling by the defendants 
herein, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education 
furnishes the following information to the Court:

1. Transportation has posed the greatest impediment 
to opening of schools on a full day schedule. The system 
has received from the State of North Carolina 185 buses, of 
which 35 have been renovated and now permit the system 
to operate a total of 398 school buses. In addition, 39 city 
transit and nine Trailways buses are operating so that 71 
schools may operate on a full-day basis by staggering open­
ing and closings and 32 schools are operating on a part-day 
schedule, two hours in the afternoon. School openings range 
from 7:30 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. The condition of the buses 
loaned through the offices of the State Board of Education 
are not in as good condition as represented, thereby im­
peding the ability of the system to put them into service.

la



2a
Interim Report on Desegregation, September 23, 1970

Arrangements have been made for 17 buses to be repaired 
by other school districts.

By the end of this week, it is expected that 82 of the 103 
schools will he on full-day schedules, though their opening 
and closing hours will be staggered. An additional 21 
schools will await satisfactory transportation arrange­
ments. Efforts are being made to involve parents in car 
pools so that these schools may open on a full-time basis.

2. The attachment designated Exhibit 1 reflects the an­
ticipated membership, actual membership or enrollment and 
actual attendance by race on September 21, 1970, for junior 
and senior high schools.

3. The attachment designated Exhibit 2 reflects the an­
ticipated membership, actual membership or enrollment 
and actual attendance by race on September 21, 1970, for 
elementary schools.

4. Attached marked Exhibit 3 is a report on the distribu­
tion of professional staff by school and race as of Septem­
ber 21, 1970.

5. With respect to elementary schools, it is noted that as 
a result of movement of residents, three elementary schools, 
Barringer, Berryhill and Amay James, now house a pre­
dominantly black student body. The Board of Education 
instructed the staff to review the racial condition of these 
schools and make recommendations. Attached marked Ex­
hibit 4 is a copy of the report of the staff to the Board of 
Education. No action has been taken with reference to this 
report.

6. Attached marked Exhibit 5 the court will find an 
elementary attendance map on which the new housing de­
velopments have been located within the various attendance 
districts.



3a

Interim Report on Desegregation, September 23, 1970

7. The change of the residential neighborhood gives rise 
to possible problems in the Spaugh Junior High School 
attendance district because of rapid changes occuring with­
in the district. At the direction of the Board, the staff 
studied this condition and presented its report, a copy of 
which is attached, marked Exhibit 6. No action has been 
taken with reference to this report.

Respectfully submitted this 23rd day of September, 1970.

/ s /  W illiam  J. W aggoner 
William J. Waggoner 
W einstein , W aggoner, S ttxrges, 

Odom and B igger 
1100 Barringer Office Tower 
Charlotte, North Carolina

/ s /  B enjam in  S. H orace:
Benjamin S. Horack 
E rvin, H orace and M cCartha 
806 East Trade Street 
Charlotte, North Carolina

Attorneys for Defendants



Exhibit 1 Attached to Interim Report

(See Opposite) US?"



CHARLOTTE - MECKLENBURG SECONDARY SCHOOLS 

REPORT OF MEMBERSHIP AND ATTENDANCE

JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOLS

SCHOOL ANTICIPATED
MEMBERSHIP

Albemarle  Rd.
Alexander
Carmel
Cochrane
Coulwood
Eastway
Alexander-Graham
Hawthorne
Kennedy
McC lin tock
Northeast
Northwest
Piedmont
Quai l  Hollow
Randolph
Ranson
S e d g e f i e l d
Smith
Spaugh
Wil l iam s
Wilson

ACTUAL 
9 -

W T

MEMBERSHIP 
21 - 70

SB

ACTUAL 
9 -

W

ATTENDANCE 
21 - 70

1134 330 762 1092 96.2 30.2 i 289 727 ! 1016 89.5 29 .31041 317 720 1037 99.6 30.5 290 671 961 92.3 30.1634 186 464 650 102.5 28 .6 158 439 ! 597 94 .1 26.41291 336 94 5 1281 99.2 26.2 300 915 1215 94.1 2 4 .6783 233 555 788 100 .6 29.5 225 527 752 96 .0 29 91108 361 793 1154 98.8 31.2 327 764 1 1091 93.4 2 9 .9107 6 272 707 979 9 0 .9 27.7 241 680 921 85. 5 26.1988
842

339
206

563 
54 5

902
751

91.2
89.1

37.5
27.4

312
199

498
481

| 810
680

8 1 .9
80.7

38.5
29 .21326 316 964 1280 96.5 24.6 287 940 1227 92.5 23 .3612 SI 562 613 100.1 8 .3 5 0 524 574 93.7 8 71161 433 521 954 82.1 4 5 .3 408 474 882 75.9 46 .2693 15 3 518 671 96.8 22.8 130 446 576 83.1 22 51481 383 1138 1521 102 .7 2 5.1 34 3 1101 1444 97 .5 23.71023 253 731 984 96.1 25 .7 242 700 942 92 .0 25 681 () 273 568 841 103 .8 32.4 266 532 798 98. 5 33 31031 304 718 1022 99.1 29.7 265 668 933 90.4 28 41304 422 893 1315 100 .8 32.0 38 5 862 1247 95.6 30.81110 440 715 1155 104 .0 38.0 404 602 1006 90.6 4 0 .11038 307 641 948 91 .3 32.3 294 613 907 87.3 32.1854 320 611 931 109 .0 34.3 281 58 3 864 101.1 32 .5

,400 6 ,2  35 14,634 20,869 97 .5 29.8 5,696 13,747 19,443 90.8 29.2

2097 505 1603 2108 100.5 23 .9 469 1512 1981 94.4 2 3 .62 34 4 64 8 1 716 2364 100.8 27.4 588 1585 2173 92.7 2 7 .01107 343 71 0 105 3 95.1 32.5 298 631 929 8 3 .9 32.016 7 2 345 12 73 1618 96.7 21 .3 265 1219 1484 88.7 17.82303 495 1782 2277 98.8 21.7 448 1705 2153 93.4 20 814 61 417 936 1353 92.6 30.8 378 867 1245 85.2 30 .31283 284 1021 1305 101.7 21.7 251 959 1210 94.3 20 .72 2 00 493 1585 2078 94.4 23.7 434 1497 1931 87.7 22.4

1769
1529

606
467

84 5 
1075

1451
1542

82.0
100.8

41.7
30.2

588
423

7 53 
984

1341
1407

75.8
92 .0

43.8
30.0

,764 1

______i
4 ,603

[ . . .
12 ,546 17,149

i
96.5

L.
26.8 4,142 11,712 15,854 89.2 26.1

TOTAL !l
SENIOR HIGH SCHOOLS

East Mecklenburg
Garinger
Harding
Independence
Myers Park
North Mecklenburg
Olympic
South Mecklenburg)

West C h a r lo t t e  
West Mecklenburg j



5a



6a

Exhibit 2 Attached to Interim Report

(See Opposite) 23?°



Cii a r 1 o 11 e-Me cklenbur g Elementary Schools
Report of Membership and Attendance

9 - 2 1 - 7 0  9 - 2 1 r 7 0
S c h o o l  A n t i c .  A c t u a l  Membership A c t u a l  A t t e n d a n c e
____________  R W T % %B B . W T 7. 7 E

A l b e m a r l e  Road 486 154 358 512 1 0 5 . 3 3 0 . 1 135. . 323 458 9 4 . 2 2 9 - 5

A l l e n b r o o k 519 142 355 497 9 5 . 8 2 8 . 6 13 Q 346 476 9 1 , 7 2 7 . 3
A s h l e y  Park 571 228 359 587 1 0 2 . 8 3 8 . 8 221 358 579 . 0 1 , 4 3 8 . 2
Bain 780 22 733 755 9 6 . 8 2 . 9 .22 699 721 9 2 . 4

11
J 3 . 0 5

a a r r i n g e r 527 290 235 525 1 0 0 . 4 5 5 . 2 286 2 20 506 9 6 . 0 5 6 . 5
B e r r y h i l l 866 688 386 1074 8 0 . 6 6 4 . 1 640 352 992 . 1 4 . 5 6 4 . 5
B e v e r l y  Woods 605 172 413 585 9 6 , 7 2 9 . 4 151 400 551 9 1 . 1 2 7 . 4
B i l l i n g s v i l l e 383 125 289 414 1 0 8 . 1 3 0 . 2 123 268 391 . 0 2 . 1 3 1 . 5
B riarw ood 670 219 450 669 9 9 . 9 3 2 . 7 2.0 2.. 426 628 9 3 . 7 3 2 . 2
Bruns Avenue 762 251 U 3  . 664 8 7 . 1 3 7 . 8 2 36.. 383 619 8 1 . 2 3 8 . 1
C h a n t i l l y 445 122 ..134., 456 1 0 2 . 5 2 6 . 8 116 319 435 9 7 . 8 2 6 . 7

C l e a r  Creek 306 66 335 1 0 9 . 5 1 9 . 7 6 4.. 255 319

—

L 04 .2 2 0 . 1

C o l l i n s w o o d 717 321 421 742 1 0 3 . 5 4 3 . 3 .3 1 2... 407 719 l o o . : 4 3 . 4

C o r n e l i u s 442 154 304 458 1 0 3 . 6 3 3 . 6 149 291  , 440 9 9 . 5 3 3 . 9
Co tsw oId 522 124 417 541 1 0 3 . 6 2 2 . 9 1 23 4 04  ! 527 LOO. 9 2 3 . 3
D av id son 247 112 147 259 1 0 4 . 9 4 3 . 2 108 144 252 . 0 2 . 0  j 4 2 . 9
Marie  Davis 668 189 422 611 9 1 . 5 3 0 . 9 177

1
4 03  ' 580 8 6 . 8  ! 3 0 . 5

D e r i t a 813 640 797 9 8 . 0 150 612  ■762

-- ----------

9 3 . 7  l 1 9 . 7
D e v o n s h i r e 853 259 607 866 1 0 1 . 5 2 9 . 9 247 571  | 818

------------f
9 5 . 9  S 3 0 . 2

D i lw o r t h 447 160 369 529 L1 8 . 3 3 0 . 2 153 34 7 |

—
i

500

— — .— .
1 1 . 8  i 3 0 . 6

D ouble  Oaks 705 _,!9.4. 372 566 3 0 . 3 - .3 .4.3 188 357  i 5 4 5 ! 7 7 . 3 'M i .  r\
Druid H i l l s 444 L..U.0 265 415 9 3 . 5 3 6 . 1 146

j
25 7 |

—

403

---
9 0 . 8  | 9 f , 9

Eas t ove r
I

514 u.U,Q.. 371 491 ? ? , s 2 4 . 4 107 j367  ! 4 74 9 2 . 2  ! 9 9 A

E l i z a b e t h ! 627 181 394 575 9 1 . 7 3 1 . 4 173 374 547

----- - 4

8 7 . 2 3 1 . 6

E n a e r l y  Park 451 256 276 532  1 1 7 . 9 4 8 . 1 229 251 4 80 10 6.4 4 7 . 7



9 -2 1 -7 0  9 -2 1 -7 0
S c h o o l  A n t i c .  A c t u a l  Mem bership  A c t u a l  A t t e n d a n c e

Charlotte-Mecklenburg Elementary Schools
Report of Membership and Attendance

Mem. B W T % %B B W T % %B

Fi rst Ward

00 2 26 435 661 84.9 34. 1 187 402 589 75.7 3 1 .7

Hickory Grove 560 203 356 559 9 9 .8 36.3 191 337 528 9 4 .3 36.2

H i dden Va1 ley 928 271 617 888 95.6 30.5 258 603 861 106.4 29.96

Hi ghland 426 138 291 429 100.7 3 2 . 1 127 2 7 8 405 95.1 3 1 .4

Hoski ns 263 113 165 278 105.7 40.6 108 160 268 9 6 .5 40.3

Huntersv i 11e 687 150 5 2 1 671 9 7 .6 22.3 147 501 648 94.3 2 2 .7

Huntingtowne Farms 574 191 380 571 9 9 .4 3 3 .4 183 371 554 96.5 3 3 .0

1 d 1 ew iId 671 167 455 622 9 2 .6 2 6 . 8 149 439 588 8 7 . 6 25.3

Amay James 320 449 99 548 171 . 2 81 .9 416 80 496 155.0 83.9

Lakeview 400 114 253 367 9 1 .7 31.0 103 238 341 85.3 30.2

Lansdowne 669 274 468 742 110.9 36.9 2 29 443 672 100.4 34.1

Lincoln Heights 727 189 402 591 8 1 .2 31.9 183 382 565 77.7 3 2 .4

Long Creek 821 325 505 830 101.0 39.1 320 481 801 97.6 39.95

Matthews 878 92

CO00 929 1 0 5 . 8 9-9 86 808 894 101.8 9 .6

Merry Oaks 445 116 316 432 9 7 .0 2 6 .8 112 305 417 9 3 .7 26.9

M i dwood 558 103 431 534 9 5 .6 19.2 98 399 497 8 9 .0 19.7
Montcla i re 603 164 421 585 9 7 .0 2 8 .0 164 421 585 97-0 2 8 . 0

Myers Park Elem. 538 144 378 5 2 2 9 7 .0 27.5 128 367 495 9 2 .0 2 5 . 6

Nations Ford 889 212 725 937 105.3 22.6 200 673 873 98.2 22.9

Newe11 608 62 544 6 06 9 9 .6 10.2 57 515 572 94.1 10.0

Oakdale 680 171 505 676 9 9 .4 25.2 170 477 647 95.1 26.3

Oakhurs t 698 253 537 790 113.1 32.0 194 516 7 1 0 101.7 27.3

Oak lawn 595 180 296 476 8 0 . 0 37.8 175 290 465 78.2 37.6

Olde Providence 540 91 365 456 84.4 19.5 85 353 438 8 1 . 1 19.4

Park Road 530 158 1357 515 97.1 145
» j

3 3 0  ! 4 7 5  j

—

£9.6 30.5



Char l o t  t e - M e c k l e n b u r g  T. l e i . e n t a r y  S c h o o l s  

•c p o r t  o f  Membership and A t t e n d a n c e
'it.- , • .

9 - 2 1 - 7 0  9 - 2 1 - 7 0
S c h o o l  Ant i.c. A c t u a l  Membership Actual A t t e n d a n c e

i i e n .  n u  t  v  ? r  * u  r

Paw Creek

—

578

—

109
(

362 966 80.6

D

22.3

n

95

W

352

1

447 77.3 2) .2

Paw Creek Annex 345 97 220......- - 317 9 1 . 8 30.5 95 216 311 90. 1 30.5

Pinevi 1 le 527 _ 136 365 501 9 5 .0 27. 1

------ -

136 365 501 95.1 ' 27.1

Pi newood 837 293 5 2 5 768 9 1 .7 31.6 233 509

----------- ?---- -------
■

737 i 88.1 I 31.6

Plaza Road 521 192
r
.. 259 501 96.1 28.3 136

-------

329 465 89.3
I

29.2

Rama Road 746 277 990 767 102.8 36.1 277 983

--------— ,— —- —

760 1101.9 3 6 .9

Sedgefield Elem. 637 205 906 611 9 5 .9 33.5 192 390 582 | 9 1 .9 3 2 .9

Selwyn 182 390 5 2 2 103.3 3 4 .8 173 338
j

511 Si 01 .2 3 3 .8

Shamrock Gardens .......... ....... .............................. 485 98 390 988 100.6 2 0 .0 93

— — —

376
i

469 i 9 6 .7

----- —...—

19.8

Sha ron 295 ------____ 186 282 95.5 34.0 91
r— 1------

180 2 7 1  ! 9 1 .9 r 7 T T

Starmount ___6^2____-JQ .7  ..■-996 653 9 9 .0 31.6 181

—

930 611 j

----- —— --------------
i

9 2 .7  i 2 9 .6

S t a te s v i1le Road ...6 9 .L 180 | 996 676 9 / . 8 26.6 176 973 j 699 1
.

93.9 2 1 . 7

Steele Creek 607 29b 396 690 105.4 38.1 226
I

383 '
1

609 i100.3 3 7 . 1

Thomasboro 664 176 978 659 9 8 .4 26.9 163

~~£*-- -----

966 ■:
---------- 1---------—

629 ; 9 9 . 7 2 5 . 9

Jryon Hills 299 286 530 103.9 4 6 .0 226
1

268 999 j 9 6 .9 9 5 .7

Tuckaseegee 599 181 376 557 9 3 .7 3 2 .4 177 361 | 538 1 9 ° .6 _ j 3 2 .8

University Park 759 259 355 614 8 0 . 8 42.1 251 331 582 76.7 93.1

Vi l la  Heights 751 239 976 7 1 0 94.5 32.9

,

196 994 690 i 8 5 . 2  : 30 .6

Westerly Hil ls 6bb 235 40i 7 7 9 8 .7 36.9 220 389 ; 609 j
'

99.6  ; 36.1
WiImore 398A . 197 213 103.0 9 8 .0 186 198 i

—.........

389 j

—-------4

96.5  i 9 8 . 9

Windsor Park ! 733 188 517 705 96.1 26.6 176
1 " j
50 3 : 6 79  ; 9 2 . 6  ! 2 5 .9

W interf ield I 695
[
, 239 ; 982 103.7 33.1 208 1+59 !

. ; 
667 PC 9 ! 31 1

' :  :  i ;  
___________ i______ i___  i • ■! !

if >
i---------- i

92,399 27541 *
92,337 Ji„*576 .28.823 98.7 32.0 12,710 90,251 93.7 31.8Tota 1



7a



8a

Exhibit 3 Attached to Interim Report

(See Opposite) BSP



DISTRIBUTION OF PROFESSIONAL STAFF
S e p t e m b e r  2 1 ,  1 9 7 0

Black White Total
Per Cent 
Black

Elementary Schools 482 1318 1800 26.7

Junior High Schools 229 707 936 24.4

Senior High Schools 190 684 874 21.7

TOTAL STAFFING 
FULLY ASSIGNED TO 
SCHOOLS GRADES 1-12 901 2709 3610 24.9

3



DISTRIBUTION' OF PROFESSIONAL STAFF
September 2 1 ,  1970 “

Elementary
School Black White Total

Per Cent 
Black

Albemarle Road 5 16 21 23.8
Ailenbrook 6 16 22 27.2
Ashley Park 5 19 24 20.8
Bain 8 24 32 25.0
Barringer 7 15 22 31.8
Berryhill 9 27 36 25.0
Beverly Woods 6 18 24 25.0
Billingsville 6 16 22 27.2
Briarwood 7 20 27 25.9
Bruns Avenue 10 20 30 33.3
Chantilly 5 15 20 25.0
Clear Creek 4 13 17 23.5
Collinswood 6 21 27 22.2
Cornelius 5 13 18 27.7
Cotswold 5 16 21 23.8
Davidson 3 9 12 25.0
Marie Davis 11 20 31 35.4
Derita 8 26 34 23.5
Devonshire 10 24 34 29.4
Dilworth 6 21 27 22.2
Double Oaks 8 17 25 32.0
Druid Hills 5 13 18 27.7
Eastover 7 18 25 28.0
Elizabeth 8 17 25 32.0



Elementary
School Black White Total

Per Cent 
Black

Enderly Park 5 15 20 25.0
First Ward 10 20 30 33.3
Hickorv Grove ------- 1_________________ 6 17 23 26.0
Hidden Valley 10 28 38 26.3
Highland 4 14 18 22.2
Hoskins 3 10 13 23.0
Huntersville 7 19 26 26.9
Huntingtowne Farms 5 18 23 21.7
Idlewild 7 22 29 24.1
Amay James 6 15 21 28.5
Lakeview 6 14 20 30.0
Lansdovme 7 22 29 24.1

Lincoln Heights 7 19 26 26.9

Long Creek 8 23 31 25.8

Matthews 10 28 38 26.3
Merry Oaks 5 13 18 27.7
Midwood 6 18 24 25.0
Montclaire 7 19 26 26.9
Myers Park 6 19 25 24.0
Nations Ford 8 25 33 24.2
Newell 6 20 26 23.0
Oakdale 7 20 27 25.9
Oakhurst 6 20 26 23.0
Oaklawn 8 17 25 32.0
Olde Providence 6 18 24 25.0



Elementary-
School Black White Total

Per Cent 
Black

Park Road 6 18 24 25.0

Paw Creek 6 17 23 26.0

Paw Creek Annex 3 9 12 25.0

Pineville 6 17 23 26.0

Pinewood 10 23 33 30.3

Plaza Road 6 17 23 26.0

Rama Road 6 22 28 21.4

Sedgef ield 7 20 27 25.9
Selwyn 5 17 22 22.7

Shamrock Gardens 5 14 19 26.3

Sharon 5 10 15 33.3

Starmount 7 20 27 25.9

Statesville Road 9 18 27 33.3

Steele Creek 6 19 25 24.0

Thomasboro 7 20 27 25.9

Tryon Hills 6 16 22 27.2

Tuckaseegee 6 19 25 24.0

University Park 10 16 26 38.4

Villa Heights 12 20 32 37.5

Westerly Hills 7 19 26 26.9

Wilmore 5 14 19 26.3

Windsor Park 9 23 32 28.1

Winterfield 7 23 30 23.3

Total 482 1318 1800 26.7



DISTRIBUTION OF PROFESSIONAL STAFF
S e p t e m b e r  2 1 ,  1 9 7'0

Junior High 
School Black White Total

Per Cent 
Black

Albemarle Road 12 41 53 22.6
Alexander 8 35 43 18.6
Carmel 8 20 28 28.5
Cochrane 14 43 57 24.5
Coulwood 7 28 35 20.0
Eastway 13 40 53 24.5
Alexander Graham 12 34 46 26.0
Hawthorne 12 30 42 28.5
Kennedy 9 29 38 23.6

McClintock 14 42 56 25.0

Northeast 7 22 29 24.1

Northwest 13 35 48 27.0

Piedmont 9 24 33 27.2
Quail Hollow 14 50 64 21.8
Randolph 11 35 46 23.9
Ranson 10 26 36 27.7
Sedgefield 11 33 44 25.0
Smith 13 41 54 24.0
Spaugh 11 36 47 23.4
Williams 12 33 45 26.6
Wilson 9 30 39 23.0

Total 229 707 936 24.4





DISTRIBUTION OF PROFESSIONAL STAFF
S e p t e m b e r  2 1 ,  T5TD

Senior High 
School Black White Total

Per Cent 
Black

East Mecklenburg 20 82 102 19.6

Garinger 26 87 113 23.0

Harding 13 50.5 63.5 20.4
Independence 22 63 85 25.8

Myers Park 23 83 106 21.6
North Mecklenburg 15 56 71 21.1

Olympic 15 49.5 64.5 23.2
South Mecklenburg 20 81 101 19.8
West Charlotte 22 66 88 25.0

West Mecklenburg 14 66 80 17.5

Total 190 684 874 21.7



9a



10a

Exhibit 4  Attached to Interim Report

(See Opposite)



Charlotte-Mecklenburg Elementary Schools

AN ANALYSIS OF ENROLLMENT AND HOUSING PROBLEMS

September 21, 1970

The Prob1em:

The enrollments o f  three elementary schools in the western section
of the county are turning out to be majority black. There is a strong
p o s s i b i l i t y  that the schools wil l  become t o t a l l y  black unless some
preventive measures are taken. The anticipated enrollment for the three
schools in question are as fo l lows:

B1 ack

Barri nger 296

Berryh i 11 640

Amay James 458

The Cause:

Wh i te Total Capac i tv %

262 558 513 53

441 1081 810 59

133 591 405 77

Majority black enrollment in these three schools is the result o f
changing neighborhoods and the location of  three public housing projects
in the area. The projects  are:

Hal ton Vi 11 age 1
2
3
4
5

Bedroom
Bedrooms

I I 
I I 
I I

40 Units
75 "
93 "
72 "
20 "

300 Units

Boulevard Homes 1
2
3
4
5

Bedroom
Bedrooms

I I 
I I 
I I

40 Units
74 "
98 11
68 "

20 "

300 Units

Li t t l e  Rock Homes 1
2
3
4
5

Bedroom
Bedrooms

i I 
I I 
I I

15 Units
90 "
95 "
20 "

20 "

240 Units

*4

B1 ack



Both Dalton Vi l lage  and Boulevard Homes are completed. Both are 
75% occupied now. One hundred percent occupancy is anticipated by 
November 1, 1970.

Ninety units of L i t t l e  Rock Homes are scheduled to be completed 
by December 31, 1970. Completion date for the remaining 150 units is 
Scheduled for February 1, 1971-

Dalton Vil lage is located in the Amay James attendance area. As 
of September 16, 1970, 329 children had been enrolled at Amay James 
from the pr oject .  Enrollment by grade was: Grade 1 -  57,  Grade 2 -
61,  Grade 3 - 63.  Grade 4 -  50, Grade 5 -  53,  and Grade 6 -  4 5 .

Boulevard Homes and L i t t l e  Rock Homes are both located in the 
Berryhill d i s t r i c t .  As of September 16, 1970, 358 children had enrolled  
at Berryhill School from Boulevard Homes. None have been registered  
from L it t le  Rock Homes. Enrollment by grades from Boulevard Homes was: 
Grade 1 -  74, Grade 2 - 72,  Grade 3 -  53,  Grade 4 -  59,  Grade 5 -  56,  
and Grade 6 -  4 4 .

In addition to the three public housing pr ojects ,  a large private  
housing project  is located in the area in the Steele Creek d i s t r i c t .
This development, named Roseland 1 and 2,  contains 504 units ,  a l l  of 
which are completed. The s izes  of the 504 units are as fo l low s ;  one 
bedroom -  176 units ,  two bedrooms -  224 units ,  three bedrooms -  104 
units.  A representative of the owner indicated that 50% of the units  
were occupied at this time. As of September 16, 1970, 81 had enrolled  
at Steele Creek from Roseland 1 and 2.

Several small private housing projects  are located in the Barringer 
d i s t r i c t .  One such project ,  Keyway, located on Maiden Street ,  has ju s t  
been completed. The project contains 56 units .  One hundred and three 
pupils from this project  have enrolled at Barringer.

The Parker Heights housing project  o f f  Remount Road is located in 
the Ashley Park attendance area. Parker Heights contains 100 units .  
Thirty pupils from this project  attend Ashley Park.



Information on Housing Projects
September 17,, 1970

School Attendance No. Completed Completion Per Cent No.
Project Area No. Units 9-15-70 Date Occupancy Pupils

Dalton Village Amay James 300 300 75 * 329

Boulevard Homes Berry hill 300 300 75 * 358

Little Rock Homes Berry hill 240 -0 - 90-12/31/70
150-2/1/71

-0 - -0 -

Roseland (l & 2) Steele Creek 504 504 50 81

Keyway Barringer 56 56 100 *103

Parker Heights Ashley Park 100 100 100 30

* Reports from  school principals indicate by September 21 the almost totally occupied 
count of number of pupils:

Dalton Village 340
Boulevard Homes 419 
Keyway 123



Page 4

The Alternatives

If  it  is determined that preventive measures need to be taken in order 

to relieve the s i tu at ion ,  several a lternatives should be considered.

la To rel ieve overcrowding at Berryhil l ,  reassign elementary

students as fo l lows:

(a) 140 pupils from Thomasboro's downtown s a t e l l i t e  
d i s t r i c t  to Clear Creek.

(b) 240 pupils from B e rry h i l l ' s  Boulevard Homes 
d i s t r i c t  to Thomasboro.

(c) Another 179 pupi ls :  47 each to Allenbrook 1-5 and Tuckaseegee
1-5 ;  60 to Paw Creek (1-4)  and 25 to Druid H i l l s  (Gr 6 ) .

As a result o f  these moves the fol lowing enrollment pattern would be 
establi  shed:

W B T %B

Clear Creek 246 203 449 45

Thomasboro 525 259 784 33

A11enbrook 379 206 584 35

Dru id H i l l s 301 177 478 37

Paw Creek 434 194 628 31

Tuckaseegee 428 238 666 36

Berryh i 11 441 244 685 36



lb

Page 5

To relieve  overcrowding at Amay James redraw the Nations Ford 

attendance l ine so as to include 280 o f  Dalton V i l lag e ;  and, 

s a t e l l i t e  60 pupils to Shamrock Gardens from the remainder 

of Dal ton Vi 11age.

As a result of  this move the fol lowing enrollment pattern would be 
establi  shed:

W B T 7oB

Shamrock Gardens 381 164 525 31

Nations Ford 674 495 1169 42

Amay James 133 118 251 47

This move would transfer an additional 280 pupils to Nations Ford. 

These pupils would be accommodated by using mobile units at Nations Ford or 

by using portions o f  Sterling Child Development Center. (8 rooms).



Page 6

lc To rel ieve conditions at Barringer, send the 123 pupils  
from Keyway Apts:

(a) 1A0 pupils from Oakhurst's downtown s a t e l l i t e  d i s t r i c t  
to Bain.

(b) 123 pupils from Keyway to Oakhurst.

As a result of  these moves the enrollment would be:

W B T %B

Ba i n 752 163 915 18

Barr i nger 262 173 A35 AO

Oakhurst 565 195 760 26



11a



12a

Exhibit 5 Attached to Interim Report

(See Opposite) US?"





13a



14a

Exhibit 6  Attached to Interim Report

(See Opposite) IKS'"



CHARLCTTL-MECKLENBURG SECONDARY SCHOOLS 

ENROLLMENT PROBLEMS
September 1970

1. The Problem:

The major enrollment problem in the secondary schools is in the 
Spaugn area. Inis problem is a result of the large number of p u b ­
lic anu private low rent housing in the western area. These p r o ­
jects are now distributed among the junior high school attendance 
areas as follows:

Quail Hollow-------------Roseland

Smith...................................... Keywav

Wi l s o n .............. ......Dalton Village

Carmel----- ---------------Parker Heights

Spaugh........... ........ Boulevard Homes and
Little Rock Homes

Tiie school in the greatest potential difficulty is Spaugh. The 
present racial ratio at Spaugh is 38.41 black. Little Reck Homes 
is not yet occupied. When this is occupied, together with other 
changes in the Spaugh area, Spaugh Junior High could become, before 
the en^ of this school year, a predominately black school.

2 . Suggested Remedy^! I

a. The Independence High School satellite area is new served, 
primarily, by Wilson and Spaugh Junior High Schools. It would be 
desirable to relate this area to the junior high schools which 
serve Independence.

o. Northeast Junior High School, with a black ratio of 8.41 is 
an oovious imbalance. Elementary and senior high students are now 
being transported the same distance that would be n e c e s s a r y  if a 
satellite area were created for Northeast.

c. It is suggested that the Wilson satellite (which serves the 
Independence area) in the Johnson C. Smith University area be 
transferred to McClintcck and Albemarle Road Junior High School.

d. It is suggested that the part of the Spaugh attendance area 
which serves the Independence satellite be transferred to Northeast 
and Albemarle Road Junior High Schools.

e. It is suggested that the Little Rock Homes development be 
assigned to the Wilson Junior High School attendance area.



2/

..'.e following cnart shows the present data for these junior high 
sc.iocls and the anticipated data should these changes be adopted:

PRESENT MEMBERSHIP

Anticipated Actual Membership 9/18/70
School C a p . Enrollment B V T SB

McCiintock 1100 15 26 515  ̂j 0 1271 24.7
Albemarle Rd. 1158 1154 506 -49 1055 29.0
Ncrtheast 6 70 c 12 51 5 5 2 605 8.4
Wilscn 1555 854 5 26 5 5 6 912 55.7
Spaugh 1091 1110 440 - ' 4 1144 58.4

PROPOSED ADJUSTMENTS - Sect -1 970

School C a ^
Anticipated
Enrollment

Proposed Membership
B *•.: T SB*

M c C 1intock 1100 1526 593 9 56 1349 29.1
Albemarle Rd. 1158 1158 550 ■ 49 1099 31.8
Northeast 6 70 ol2 129 5 5 2 681 18.9

i'i i i s on 12 55 8 54 248 555 834 29.7

Spaugh 1091 1110 518 7 0 4 1022 31.1

PROFC5ED ADJUSTMENT ■- February 1971
(with full occupancy of Little .-.o c k  homes)

School C a p .
Anticipated
Enrollment

Propos
B

6 C
w

‘Membership
T SB

i i s c n 1255 S54 353 5 56 919 36.



3 /

Su j e s t e d  Remedy #2

Assign the Little Rock Her. 
A'ortneast Junior High School a 
a blue*, population of approxin 
Junior nigh at the 58.4 ratio, 
quiring any pupils to be moved 
vantage of causing bussing of 
It dees not relate junior high 
gree that plan =1 does. It do 
solution to the problem at Sea

es project (not now occupied) to 
s a satellite. This would create 
ately 1 9 . 5 % .  It would leave Spaugh 

It has the advantage of not re- 
at this time. It has the disad- 

a greater distance than reciedv #1.
and senior high areas to the" de- 

e5_ n °t offer a very r e m a n e n t

.r.e rollowing chart skov 
schools involved: tae effect of this plan on the

Pk£5u.\ . MEMBERSHIP

School Cap-
Anticipated
Enrollment Actual .Membership 

B T
9 / 1 8 / 7 0
% E

Northeast 6 7 0 oil 51 5 5 2  6 0 3 8 . 4

PROPOSED ADJUSTMENT

Ncrtheast 6 70 o i l 1 5 6  5 5 2  6 8 8 I S  . 8



15a



MEILEN PRESS INC. —  N. Y. C. 219