Brown v. Board of Education Brief for the United States on the Further Argument of the Questions of Relief
Public Court Documents
November 1, 1954

Cite this item
-
Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Brown v. Board of Education Brief for the United States on the Further Argument of the Questions of Relief, 1954. 2cd4ddd5-b69a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/15762fbf-39eb-4e13-adeb-ef65b51a7585/brown-v-board-of-education-brief-for-the-united-states-on-the-further-argument-of-the-questions-of-relief. Accessed October 08, 2025.
Copied!
ISTos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 J it tfa j&prtmt fljjmtrt ijf tiw plates . ■.. - r OCTOBER TERM, 1954 No. i OLIVER BROWN, ET AL., APPELLANTS BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA, FT AL. No. 2 HARRY BRIGGS, JR., ET AL., APPELLANTS v. AA R. W. ELLIOTT. ET AL. : No, 3 DOROTHY E. DAVIS, ET AL., APPELLANTS ?■ COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD OF PRINCE EDWARD COUNTY, ET AL. No. 4 SPOTTSWOOD THOMAS BOLLING, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. C. MELVIN SHARPE, ET AL. No. 5 FRANCIS B. GEBHART, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. ETHEL LOUISE BELTON, ET AL. BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES ON THE FURTHER ARGUMENT OF THE QUESTIONS OF RELIEF HERBERT BROWNELL, Jr., Attorney General, SIMON E. SOBELOFF, Solicitor General, J. LEE RANKIN, Assistant Attorney General, PHILIP ELMAN, ALAN S. ROSENTHAL, Special Assistants to the Attorney General, Department of Justice, Washington 25, D. O. I N D E X Page I. This Court has full power to direct such relief as will be most effective and just----------------------- 3 II. The vindication of the constitutional rights in volved should be as prompt as feasible---- ,— 4 III. The public interest requires an intelligent, orderly and effective solution of the problems that may be encountered in complying with this Court’s decision in particular areas---------------- 6 IV. The nature and extent of the problems that the desegregation of public school systems may. entail will vary from area to area------1---------- 8 V. The formulation and execution of programs for transition to nonsegregated school systems should be undertaken by the responsible school authorities under the supervision of the courts of first instance______________________________ 22 VI. The cases should be remanded to the lower courts with directions to carry out this Court’s de cision as rapidly as the particular circum stances permit_______________________________ 27 Conclusion_________________________________________ 29 CITATIONS Cases: Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U. S. 483________________________________ _____ 2, 5, 6, 7, 8 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60______________ 19 Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629_______________ 5 Federal Statutes: Act of June 25, 1948, c. 646, § 39, 62 Stat. 992__ 23 E. S. 698 (28 U. S. C. (1946 ed.) 863)__________ 23 28 U. S. C. 2106_______________________________ 3 (i) State Statutes: Page D. C. Code (1951 ed.), § 31-670_______________ 10 § 31-671________________ 10 §31-1110_______________ 10 § 31-1112_______________ 10 Maryland Annotated Code (Flack ed., 1951), Art. 77, §§ 42 (4), 208_______ 10 Mississippi Code (1942 ed.) 6276______________ 10 South Carolina Code (1952) §§ 21—251, 290_____ 10 Miscellaneous: Ashmore, The Negro and The Schools (1954), pp. 158-159__________________________________ 15 New York Times, June 30, 1954, p. 19__________ 30 Southern School Neivs, September 3, 1954, p. 3__ 10 Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 4 ______________________________ 19 U. S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States (1952), p. 355____ 9 Williams and Ryan, Schools in Transition (1954) _ 22 II O ctober T e r m , 1954 No. 1 1 Oliver B rown et al., appellants v. B oard of E ducation of T opeka, Shawnee County, K ansas, et al. BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES ON THE FURTHER ARGUMENT OF THE QUESTIONS OF RELIEF This brief is filed in response to the Court’s invitation to the Attorney General of the United States to participate in the further argument of these cases on the questions of relief. It is now the settled law of the land that segregation of white and colored children in the public schools of a State or of the District of Columbia is un constitutional. There remain for consideration and decision only the questions as to the de crees that should be entered in these cases in order to achieve compliance with the Court’s ruling. 1 Together with No. 2, Harry Briggs, Jr., et al. v. R. W. Elliott, et al.; No. 3, Dorothy E. Davis, et al. v. County School Board o f Prince Edward County, et al.; No. 4, Spotts- toood Thomas Bolling, et al. v. C. Melvin Sharpe, et al; and No. 5, Francis B. Gelhart, et al. v. Ethel Louise Belton, et al. (1) 2 The views of the Government on these questions are set forth in this brief. At the outset it may be helpful to state, in summary fashion, our answers to the questions formulated by the Court (347 U. S. 483, 495-96): 4. Assuming it is decided that segrega tion in public schools violates the Four teenth Amendment (a) would a decree necessarily follow providing that, within the limits set by nor mal geographic, school districting, Negro children should forthwith be admitted to schools of their choice % No. (b) or may this Court, in the exercise of its equity powers, permit an effective grad ual adjustment to be brought about from existing segregated systems to a system not based on color distinctions ? Yes. 5. On the assumption on which questions 4 (a) and (b) are based, and assuming further that this Court will exercise its equity powers to the end described in ques tion 4 (b), (a) should this Court formulate detailed decrees in these cases ? No. (b) i f so, what specific issues should the decrees reach ? ___ (c) should this Court appoint a special master to hear evidence with a view to recommending specific terms for such de crees? No. (d) should this Court remand to the courts of first instance with directions to frame decrees in these cases, and, if so, what 3 general directions should the decrees of this Court include and what procedures should the courts of first instance follow in arriv ing at the specific terms of more detailed decrees'? Yes. The provisions suggested for inclusion in the decrees are outlined at pp. 27-29, infra. I THIS COURT HAS FULL POWER TO DIRECT SUCH RELIEF AS W ILL BE MOST EFFECTIVE AND JUST Question 4 need not detain the Court long. The Government, in its brief submitted on the previous reargument, reviewed the authorities bearing on the scope of the Court’s remedial powers (Br. 152—167), and concluded that the Court has “ undoubted power in these cases to enter such decrees as it determines will be most effective and just in relation to the interests, private and public, affected by its decision” (Br. 167). We noted that Congress has expressly empowered the Court, in fashioning effective re lief in eases coming before it, to enter “ such appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or re quire such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances” (28 IT. S. C. 2106). This provision reflects the breadth and flexibility of judicial remedies which are avail able to the Court. The shaping of appropriate relief in the present cases, as all will agree, in volves considerations of a most sensitive and 4 difficult nature. But, as was stated in our earlier brief (p. 154), “ we believe there can be no doubt of the Court’s power to grant such remedy as it finds to be most consonant with the interests of justice.” II THE VINDICATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL EIGHTS INVOLVED SHOULD BE AS PEOMPT AS FEASIBLE The fashioning of relief in these cases does not call for the formulation or application of new or unusual legal principles. On the contrary, the task confronting the Court is one which presents itself whenever it has been judicially found that legal rights have been, and are continuing to be, violated. The question is always one of deter mining how, in the light of the facts presented and within the limits of the power possessed by it, the Court can best insure the removal of the condition of illegality in a manner comporting not only with the interests of the parties but also, to the extent it may be involved, with the public interest. In many instances the solution to this problem is quite simple. The balancing of the relevant considerations may lead inescapably to the con clusion that the legitimate interests of all con cerned require only immediate termination of the • unlawful conduct. In such circumstances a court of equity normally does no more than to enter a decree enjoining that conduct. It is where the 5 scales are not so clearly tipped in that direction that the shaping of the appropriate remedy involves difficulties. The Court recognized, in restoring these cases to the docket for further argument (347 U. S. at 495), that “ the formulation of decrees in these cases presents problems of considerable complex ity.” These problems must be viewed in proper perspective. The starting point must be a recog nition that we are dealing here with basic con stitutional rights, and not merely those of a few children but o f millions. These are class actions. Under the Court’s decision the maintenance of segregated schools is in violation of the constitu tional rights not only of the individual plaintiffs but of all other “ similarly situated” colored chil dren upon whose behalf the suits were brought. Relief short of immediate admission to nonsegre- gated schools necessarily implies the continuing deprivation of these rights. The “ personal and present” right (cf. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629, 635) of a colored child not to be segregated while attending public school is one which, if not enforced while the child is of school age, loses its value. Hence any delay in granting relief is pra tanto an irretrievable loss of the right. The unconstitutionality of racial segregation in public schools is no longer in issue. However, in considering whether any delay in granting full relief is justifiable, it must be borne in mind that continuation of school segregation has harmful 6 effects both on the individuals concerned and on the public. The right of children not to be seg regated because of race or color is not a technical legal right of little significance or value. It is a fundamental human right, supported by consider ations of morality as well as law. “ To separate [colored children] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the com munity that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone” (347 U. S. at 494). Racial segregation affects the hearts and minds of those who segregate as well as those who are segre gated, and it is also detrimental to the community and the nation. In the absence of compelling reasons to the con trary, therefore, there should be no unnecessary delay in the full vindication of the constitutional rights involved in these eases, and if any delay is required, it should be kept to a minimum. I l l THE PUBLIC INTEREST BEQUIBES AN INTELLIGENT, ORDERLY AND EFFECTIVE SOLUTION OF THE PROB LEMS THAT M AY BE ENCOUNTERED IN COMPLYING W ITH THIS COURT’S DECISION IN PARTICULAR AREAS No objective examination of the problems of relief can overlook the fact that the impact of the Court’s decision holding racial segregation in public schools to be unconstitutional goes far beyond the areas and parties involved in these cases. As a binding precedent the decision re quires the termination of segregation in school 7 systems in more than one-third of the States and in the District of Columbia. Because public education is, as the Court has recognized (347 U. S. at 493), “ perhaps the most important function of state and local gov ernments,” there is a public interest to be served in p e r m ittin g the transition to be carried out in an orderly manner, so as to avoid needless dis location or other impairment of the effective operation of the school systems concerned. A prime consideration in dealing with the problems of desegregation must be that the systems of public education in the United States should not be adversely affected. Public education is one of the glories of the United States, and an in dispensable source of its power. The richest resources of the United States are its citizens, and, as the Court has observed (347 U. S. at 493), education “ is the very foundation of good citizenship.” It must be recognized that racial segregation in public schools is not a separate and distinct phenomenon. It is part of a larger social pat tern of racial relationships. The Court ’s decision in these cases has outlawed a social institution which has existed for a long time in many areas through out the country—an institution, it may be noted, which during its existence not only has had the sanction of decisions of this Court but has been fervently supported by great numbers of people as justifiable on legal and moral grounds. The Court’s holding in the present cases that segrega tion is a denial of constitutional rights involved an 322344— 54------ 2 8 express recognition of the importance of psycho logical and emotional factors; the impact of seg regation upon children, the Court found, can so affect their entire lives as to preclude their full enjoyment of constitutional rights. In similar fashion, psychological and emotional factors are involved—and must be met with understanding and good will—in the alterations that must now take place in order to bring about compliance with the Court’s decision. The practical difficul ties which may be met in effecting transition to nonsegregated public school systems should there fore be taken into account in determining the most effective means for ending school segrega tion in particular areas. The Court itself has recognized, in restoring these cases to the docket for further argument on the questions of relief, that these difficulties cannot be resolved by a single stroke of the judicial pen. Broadly speaking, therefore, the decrees in these cases should be framed to require a transi tion which achieves the most expeditious com pliance with the constitutional mandate and at the same time permits the intelligent, orderly, and effective solution of the problems that may be encountered in desegregating school systems in particular areas. IY THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE PROBLEMS THAT THE DESEGREGATION OF PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEMS M AY ENTAIL W ILL VARY FROM AREA TO AREA As the Court has noted (347 U. S. at 495), there is a “ great variety of local conditions,” 9 which will undoubtedly affect the nature and ex tent of the changes in public school systems and practices required to bring about compliance with its decision. Without elaborating in detail the structure and organization of the educational systems of the States and the District of Colum bia, it is not difficult to outline some of the kinds of problems which may arise in making a transi tion to nonsegregated systems. 1. The implementation of any program for the desegregation of public school facilities will be, of course, the responsibility of no single indi vidual or administrative body. Indeed, of all governmental activities, education is undoubtedly the most decentralized, its administrative and fi nancial base being shared between the states and their political subdivisions. And the extent of local participation is brought into perhaps sharper focus by the fact that of the approximately 120,000 governmental units tabulated by the Cen sus Bureau in 1951, more than 70,000 were school districts.2 The division of authority between state and local school officials customarily is delineated by the state legislature. In most jurisdictions, the state board of education and school superintend ent have the statutory duty of making the broad policy decisions affecting the state school system as a whole, enforcing state laws relating to the 3 3 U. S. Department o f Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States (1952), p. 355. 10 operation of schools and, in general, insuring that all school units meet certain minimal standards. Local authorities, within the framework of state educational policy as embodied in statutes, regu lations and directives, exercise control over the intimate details of school management within their district or other operating unit. The problems that will confront authorities on the state level thus will be principally ones of revising state laws and regulations which were tailored to fit the needs of a segregated school system. In South Carolina, for example, the statutory formula now employed in the distribu tion of state funds for teachers’ salaries re quires that minimum enrollment and average daily attendance in each district be determined separately for each race.3 In several jurisdic tions, the law provides for school officials whose duties are limited to the supervision of Negro schools; 3 4 * in others, the legislature has provided for entirely separate Negro and white school dis tricts encompassing the same area.6 3 South Carolina Code (1952), §.§21-251, 290. Cf. D. C. Code (1951 ed.), §§ 31-1110,31-1112. 4 See e. g., D. C. Code (1951 ed), §§ 31-670, 31-671; Anno. Code o f Maryland (Flack ed., 1951), Art. 77, §§ 42 (4 ), 208. 6 See e. g., Mississippi Code (1942 ed.) 6276. In some states separate Negro school districts are maintained even in the absence of a legislative requirement. In Delaware, for ex ample, there are at least 42 such districts. It has been re ported that at the next session o f the Delaware General Assembly, legislation will be introduced to merge them with white school districts. See Southern School Neios, Septem ber 3,1954, page 3. 11 2. Because local school authorities have consid erable discretion respecting many facets of school administration, and because there is a wide va riety in local conditions, it can he expected that, even within the same state, no two school dis tricts will be faced with precisely the same prob lems in accomplishing an effective transition to nonsegregated school systems. (a) In districts where there is more than one school, adjustments in the method employed for allocating students to particular schools may have to be made. In the majority of such districts, children are given little, if any, choice as to the school they are to attend. Instead, each school in the district is assigned a particular attendance area and the pupil must enroll in the facility within whose attendance boundaries he resides. Many factors are taken into consideration in drawing these boundaries, foremost among them being the size and character of the school, the geographical distribution of the school popula tion in the district, and the ease and safety of public travel to and from school. In the case of segregated school systems, boundaries are formu lated separately for white and colored facilities, with the result that the overall objective of mak ing the maximum use of total school facilities and minimizing travel difficulties is seldom achieved. Changes in the racial character of a neighbor hood frequently cause overcrowding in some schools while others operate at far below capacity. 12 Similarly, children of both races are often com pelled to travel long distances to reach the segre gated schools to which they are assigned. The extent of the boundary alterations re quired, in the reformulation of school attendance areas on a non-racial basis, will vary. This is illustrated by the recent experience in the Dis trict of' Columbia in recasting attendance bound aries on a wholly geographical basis. In the neighborhoods where there is little or no mixture of the races, and where school facilities have been fully utilized, it was found that the elimination of the racial factor did not work any material change in the territory served by each school. In biracial neighborhoods, however, the objective of securing maximum utilization of facilities, on a non-racial basis, could be achieved only by making radical revisions in the area covered by the formerly Negro and white schools. In connection with the formulation of new attendance boundaries, school districts may be called upon to review or alter prevailing prac tices regarding pupil transfers. Because it is almost impossible to fix boundaries which do not work a hardship on any pupils, many communi ties now permit enrollment outside the attendance area of residence in exceptional circumstances. Pupils on the secondary school level occasionally are allowed to attend a school at a distance from their homes because it offers courses of instruc tion not otherwise available. Specialized needs of 13 mentally or physically handicapped children may cause them to be grouped together for instruc tional purposes. And pupils not possessing an adequate knowledge of the English language sometimes are placed in separate schools until that knowledge is acquired. While the allowance of transfers and special assignments for reasons of this character is fully warranted and un doubtedly will be continued, some districts may be confronted with efforts by students to attend schools in other areas for the sole and unjusti fiable purpose of avoiding enrollment in a bi- racial facility. (b) At the same time that procedures are de vised for the assignment of pupils to schools on a basis not involving distinctions of color, some districts may have to readjust the use of their facilities. In low population rural areas now maintaining two schools solely by reason of the dual system, educational and economic considera tions may dictate consolidation. There are sev eral ways in which this consolidation might be accomplished. Where existing structures are small or otherwise inadequate, a new school might be constructed to accommodate all children. An other solution might be to close one of the schools and transfer its pupils to the other. In areas where there is a considerable dis parity in the quality and curricula of the former white and Negro schools, the problem of read justment may be more troublesome. Parents will 14 be understandably reluctant to send their chil dren to schools markedly inferior to those previ ously attended, or which do not provide courses of instruction that would have been begun or con tinued if no transfer had been required. While the long-range answer to a substantial part of this problem may be the improvement of sub standard schools, or the construction of new ones, school administrators may have to devise stop gap methods—not involving continuation of ra cial segregation—to protect the interests of chil dren now in school. .(c) Teachers may have to be reassigned and changes made in the method of their selection, with due regard to the safeguarding of seniority and tenure rights. In areas which now have sep arate eligibility lists for white and colored teachers, new lists combining applicants of both races may be established.6 Salary differentials 6 This step was taken in both the District o f Columbia and in Baltimore. In the former, under the segregated sys tem, ISTegro and white applicants for teaching positions took separate examinations conducted by separate boards o f ex aminers. Performance on these qualifying examinations de termined position on the eligibility lists maintained for applicants o f each race and the lists in turn provided the sole basis o f appointment. In June 1954, the boards of ex aminers were merged into a single board under the direct chairmanship of the superintendent o f schools, teacher ex aminations were held on an integrated basis for the first time, and eligibility lists were consolidated. For each level o f 15 may have to be eliminated.* 7 8 And, on the super visory level, in communities maintaining separate supervisors for Negro schools a general realign ment of duties may he necessary.® (d) Most rural and some urban areas provide transportation to and from schools. Communi ties which have maintained separate transporta tion facilities for the two races may have to reorganize schedules and routes. And some lo calities may discover that there will he a need instruction, there is now but a single list on which no ref erence is made to the race o f any o f the named individuals. In Baltimore, the compilation o f separate lists involved not only the grade received on a written examination, adminis tered to white and colored alike, but in addition the results o f an oral interview and the evaluation o f the applicant’s previous experience. In combining the lists, Baltimore did not disturb these criteria; nor was a change made in the established practice o f selecting any one o f the five highest ranking qualified individuals to fill a vacancy. 7 In 1952, the average annual salaries of white and Negro classroom teachers in 12 Southern states were $2,740 and $2,389, respectively. A part of this differential may be ex plained by the fact that the average amount o f college train ing possessed by the white teachers was slightly higher. And between 1940 and 1952, the gaps in both salary and training averages were substantially diminished. See Ash more, The Negro and The Schools (1954), pp. 158-159. 8 Baltimore’s dual system, for example, had five assistant school superintendents serving on a systemwide basis and one assistant superintendent for Negro schools. 322844— 54 ■3 16 for additional vehicles or, conversely, that less equipment will be necessary.9 (e) A few school districts may have to com pensate for differences in the educational back grounds of newly integrated pupils. In localities where the segregated Negro facilities were in ferior, colored students may find it difficult to pursue satisfactorily the same studies as white students in the same grades. School authorities faced with that problem may desire to give tests to determine the grade to which each student should be assigned. Or such tests might be em ployed for the purpose of selecting students for additional and intensified instruction in subjects in which they are deficient. 3. Because, as has been noted, the responsi bility for the financial support of public educa tion is distributed between the state and its subdivisions, the economic burdens incident to the implementation of integration also will fall upon several levels of' government. These bur dens, however, will flow largely from the present inequality, in a physical sense, of separate Negro schools. As a consequence, even if the dual sys tem were to continue, many areas would be faced 9 The requirement o f additional equipment will be gen erally restricted, of course, to places where present facilities have not been sufficient to provide adequate transportation for all pupils. It cannot therefore be regarded as, in any real sense, a problem arising from the elimination of segregation. 17 with the necessity of making substantial outlays for capital improvements. Indeed, the financial cost of an “ equalization” program for separate schools unquestionably would be far greater. No matter how small the Negro population in the particular area, it would have to be provided with facilities and equipment equivalent in all respects to those provided in white schools. In similar circumstances, a non- segregated school system may find that the educa tional needs of all children will be satisfied by merely closing down the former Negro school and transferring its pupils to other facilities. While, placed in perspective, economic con siderations would seem to furnish less of an ob stacle to the maintenance of integrated schools than to “ separate but equal” schools, it should be noted that if expenditures per classroom unit are to be continued at current levels for white children, an additional annual expenditure of over 160 million dollars will be required in the states involved and the District of Columbia. In respect to pupil transportation services, the estimated capital outlay is 40 million dollars. And the estimated cost of “ equalizing” Negro schools is in excess of two billion dollars.10 4. In addition to problems of a purely ad ministrative or fiscal character, school authorities 10 These estimates have been furnished by the Office of Education, U. S. Department o f Health, Education and Welfare. 18 may have to cope with a certain amount of popular hostility towards the elimination of segre gation in public schools. This results from the fact that in each of the areas involved the dual system has existed for generations and is accepted by many as being a part of the “way of life” of the area. And the fear has been expressed in some quarters that the opposition to any de parture from the existing pattern will mani fest itself in the withdrawal of state aid to education and in other action on state and local levels designed to prevent or impair the effective operation of public schools on a nonsegregated basis. We do not believe that there is warrant for presuming that responsible officials and citizens will tolerate violations of the Constitution.11 The solutions to these problems, like all others in a democracy, will emerge from the “ sober second 11 The well-publicized student disturbances which occurred recently in some localities certainly provide no basis for such a presumption. For one thing, these disturbances were isolated; in the overwhelming majority o f the areas which have begun or completed compliance with this Court’s deci sion, the adjustment has been remarkably free of untoward incident. Moreover, it appears to be the fact that the mis conduct was in substantial measure incited by a small num ber o f reckless and irresponsible individuals and groups, many from without the community, who took full advantage o f some students’ immaturity. And, as is so often true in such circumstances, where school and law enforcement au thorities made clear their determination neither to counte nance nor to capitulate to lawlessness, the disturbances ended as abruptly as they had started. 19 thought of the community, which is the firm base on which all law must ultimately rest.” (Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 25.) Popular hostility, where found to exist, is a problem that needs to be recognized and faced with understanding, but it can afford no legal justification for a failure to end school segregation. Racial segregation in public schools is unconstitutional and will have to be termi nated as quickly as feasible, regardless of how much it may be favored by some people in the community. There can be no “ local option” on that question, which has now been finally settled by the tribunal empowered under the Constitution to decide it.12 While general community hostility cannot serve as justification for avoiding or postponing com pliance with the constitutional mandate, it is relevant in determining the most effective method for ending segregation in the particular 12 “ That there exists a serious and difficult problem arising from a feeling o f race hostility which the law is powerless to control, and to which it must give a measure o f consideration, may be freely admitted. But its solution cannot be promoted by depriving citizens o f their constitutional rights and privi leges.” Buchanan v. Warley, 245 IT. S. 60,80-81. In any event, this would not be the proper occasion or time to adjudicate possible, attempts to evade or circumvent this Court’s decision. Such questions, like all other ques tions o f constitutional law, must be resolved when they arise concretely, in a factual setting, and when this Court can have the benefit o f findings of fact and the judgment •of the lower courts. 20 locality. School administrators will have an ob vious concern in obtaining public support and acceptance of the transition. The extent of the difficulties which may be encountered will de pend, of course, upon the state of local opinion, which in turn is influenced by such varied factors as the economic structure, geographical location, and relative numbers of whites and Negroes in the community. There is, however, a general recognition of the need for thoughtful advance preparations to resolve the problems of desegrega tion with as few disruptions as possible. I f any lesson can be derived from past experiences in ending segregated school systems, it is the im portance of public confidence in the ability of school administrators to accomplish the adjust ment without, in the process, losing sight of or sacrificing the basic and continuing educational needs of all the children affected.13 13 In presenting his program for integration for the ap proval of the Board o f Education, the Superintendent of Schools of the District o f Columbia laid emphasis on the consideration o f the educational growth and welfare o f the school child. Thus, in justification of the proposal that each presently enrolled pupil be granted a limited option to remain in the school he now attends even though he does not reside within its new attendance boundaries, the Superintendent enumerated the ways in which this would provide “ stability, continuity and security in the educational experiences o f pupils during the transition period.” ( See brief for respond ents in No. 4, p. 13.) While we do not describe the District o f Columbia pro- 21 In some areas it may be found advisable to preface the desegregation process with programs, not extending for more than a few months, designed to promote interracial understanding among students, teachers, and parents. Such preparatory measures were taken in many of the localities which have abolished segregated school systems in recent years. In one Hew Jersey community, for example, funds were appropriated to allow several selected teachers to attend a special workshop on human relations conducted at a state university. In addition, an extension course on the same subject was offered by school authorities during the year preceding desegrega tion and was well attended by teachers. In other areas civic, P-TA, religious, and fraternal groups took the initiative in establishing a favorable climate for making the transition. It was found that the efforts o f these groups were instrumental in reducing many of the pre-existing racial ten sions in the community, with the result that gram in detail here, since this is undertaken in the brief for respondents in No. 4, we think it reflects credit upon those responsible for its formulation and execution. In every significant respect, the plan evidences painstaking care on the part o f school officials to realize the expressed objective o f an expeditious transition calculated “ to make the best use of the total resources of the school system in plant and per sonnel, to serve the best interest o f all the pupils, and to promote the general welfare o f the community.” (See brief for respondents in No. 4, p. 11.) 22 integration was accomplished speedily and with little or no serious friction or incident.14 Y THE FORMULATION AND EXECUTION OF PROGRAMS FOR TRANSITION TO NONSEGREGATED SCHOOL SYS TEMS SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN BY THE RESPONSIBLE SCHOOL AUTHORITIES UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE For the reasons which have been summarized, it is clear that no single formula or blueprint is readily susceptible of application to all localities which must end segregation in their school sys tems. The measures essential to bringing about an expeditious, orderly, and effective transition in any given area will depend on the special conditions and problems in that area. And since there is wide variance in local conditions, what may be practicable in one community may be wholly inappropriate in another. A prerequisite to the formulation, initiation, and supervision o f any practicable program for ending segregation is a knowledge of the special problems and needs of the particular community. It is the responsible school authorities and the courts of first instance in each area who will have the greatest familiarity with local conditions and 14 The transitional experiences o f twenty-four communities in six states which within the past ten years desegregated their public school systems are the subject o f a study con ducted under the auspices of the Fund for the Advancement of Education o f the Ford Foundation. Williams and Eyan, Schools in Transition (1954). 23 who will be in the best position to evaluate their significance and effect in accomplishing desegre gation in as short a period as feasible. For this reason, this Court should not, either itself or with the assistance of a special master appointed, by it,15 delineate the precise steps that each of the defendants should take in ending segregation in the public school systems. Instead, the pri mary responsibility for both devising and carry ing out programs for the expeditious accomplish ment o f the required transition should be placed upon the defendants, to be exercised under the continuing direct supervision of the district courts or appropriate state courts. This Court, we believe, should lay down stand ards for the guidance of the lower courts in carrying out its decision. A remand for further proceedings, without more, would add to the un certainty and doubt which already exist and would only serve to make the process of adjustment more difficult. Specifically, the lower courts should be in structed to require the defendants either to admit 15 While we do not believe that the Court should appoint a special master to hear evidence, there can be no question of its power to do so. In the 1948 revision o f the Judicial Code, Congress expressly repealed R. S. 698 [28 U. S. C. (1946 ed.) 863] which had provided that “ [u]pon the appeal of any cause in equity, * * * no new evidence shall be received in the Supreme Court.” Act of June 25, 1948, c. 646, § 39, 62 Stat. 992. We find nothing to suggest that the legislative purpose was other than to remove the restriction entirely. 24 the plaintiffs, and other Negro children similarly situated, forthwith to public schools on a non- segregated basis or to propose promptly, for the court’s consideration and approval, an effective program for accomplishing the transition as soon as practicable. In passing upon the acceptability of proposed programs, the criterion should be whether the defendants have sustained the bur den of showing that their particular program will bring about the total elimination of racial consid erations in the admission of pupils to public schools as rapidly as local conditions allow. And in determining whether the projected plan repre sents the most expeditious means of accomplishing an effective transition, the courts should be per mitted to take into account the scope of the administrative adjustments that are called for and the particular conditions existing in the com munity. Where there are no solid obstacles to desegregation, delay is not justified and should not be permitted. It is only where the lowTer court finds, upon clear and convincing evidence, that the defendants have met the burden of show ing that immediate (i. e., at the beginning of the next school term) completion of the desegre gation program is impracticable, that any delay is justifiable. And, in such a situation, the dis trict court should fix the shortest practicable pe riod for completing desegregation. Although it would be helpful if this Court could 25 specify outside limits for the period of desegrega tion, we do not think it would be feasible to do so at this time. Apart from the fact that there is no way of judging at this point what integration will involve in the particular area, maximum periods tend to become minimum pe riods. This Court should not enter any order which might have the practical effect of slowing down desegregation where it could he swiftly ac complished. The Court, however, should make it clear that any proposal for desegregation over an indefinite period will be unacceptable, and that there can be no justification anywhere for failure to make an immediate and substantial start to ward desegregation, in a good-faith effort to end segregation as soon as feasible. Further, the lower courts should be instructed to be insistent that any interval permitted for the accomplishment of desegregation is being fully utilized. Any period during which little or nothing is being done to further the transition would serve no useful purpose and, indeed, would only intensify the difficulties. Whether time will be useful will depend on how it is used; delay solely for the sake of delay is intolerable. Where a period of time is allowed for transition, it should be for the sole purpose of enabling neces sary constructive measures to be taken, and not for the purpose of permitting postponement per se. 26 I f the program for desegregation formulated by the defendants will remove, as expeditiously as possible, state-imposed or state-supported racial classifications of pupils in public schools, the lower courts should not substitute their judgment re specting the administrative features of the pro gram for that of the school authorities. The Constitution prohibits the maintenance of segre- gaged school systems. It does not compel the adoption of any specific type of nonsegregated system. The decisive inquiry is whether race or color has been entirely eliminated as a criterion in the admission of pupils to public schools. The essence of the Court’s decision in these cases is that there be no governmental action which en forces or supports school segregation. This Court, we believe, should not in its present decrees give blanket approval to any particular programs for desegregation. The determination of the necessity for, and constitutionality of, any specific plan should not be made in vacuo. Flexi bility in responding to developing circumstances may become important. The experience in carry ing out a plan, once it is begun, may alter the assumptions on which it was based. For example, it may develop, after a plan is in operation, that it can be carried out more quickly than was anticipated at the outset, as has been demon- 27 strafed by the experience in the District of Columbia. V I THE CASES SHOULD BE REMANDED TO THE LOWER COURTS W IT H DIRECTIONS TO CARRY OUT THIS COURTIS DECISION AS RAPIDLY AS THE PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES PERMIT For the reasons outlined above, the Government suggests that the Court should enter decrees (a) declaring that racial segregation in public schools is unconstitutional and that all provisions of law requiring or permitting such segregation are in valid, and (b) remanding the cases to the appro priate courts of first instance for such further proceedings and orders as are necessary and proper to carry out this Court’s decision.16 The decrees should contain specific provisions sub stantially as follows: (1) That the lower court shall forthwith enter orders directing the defendants to submit within 90 days a plan for ending, as soon as feasible, racial segregation of pupils in public schools sub ject to their authority or control. 16 In the Delaware case, No. 5, Gebhart v. Belton, the Attor ney General of Delaware, in his brief for petitioners (pp. 17- 18), now agrees that the judgment o f the state Supreme Court should be affirmed. Accordingly, since the respond ents did not file a cross-petition for certiorari, it would appear that in the Delaware case this Court should simply enter an order of affirmance. 28 (2) That, unless a satisfactory plan is sub mitted to and approved by the lower court, it shall forthwith enter appropriate orders, by way of injunction or otherwise, directing admission of the plaintiffs and other children similarly situ ated to nonsegregated public schools at the be ginning of the next school term. (3) That, upon submission of a plan by the defendants, the lower court shall promptly hold a hearing to determine whether it provides for transition to a nonsegregated school system as expeditiously as the circumstances permit. The defendants shall have the burden of proof on the question of whether, and how long, an interval of time in carrying out full desegregation is re quired. In approving any proposed program, the court shall make such modifications as may be required, and shall fix the earliest practicable date for completion of the program. And no program shall be sanctioned which does not call for the immediate commencement of the proced ures necessary to the accomplishment of the transition. (4) That during the period, if any, allowed for completion of the program for transition to a nonsegregated system, the lower court shall require the defendants to submit detailed pe riodic reports showing the progress made in end ing segregation. The court shall enter such fur- 29 tiier orders as may be required from time to time in order to insure against unnecessary delay in the execution of the program. (5) That this Court shall retain jurisdiction for the purpose of making such further orders, if any, as may become necessary for carrying out its mandate. To this end the lower courts should be required to submit information reports to this Court at specified intervals showing in detail the actions taken in bringing about compliance with the requirements of the Constitution. (The Court may wish to appoint a special master to review such reports and to make appropriate recom mendations thereon to this Court and to the lower courts.) CONCLUSION The responsibility for achieving compliance with the Court’s decision in these cases does not rest on the judiciary alone. Every officer and agency of government, federal, state, and local, is likewise charged with the duty of enforcing the Constitution and the rights guaranteed under it. And, ultimately, it is the obligation of every citizen to respect and abide by the law, once it is authoritatively declared. We have no doubt that the American people and the officials through whom they act will meet these responsibilities 30 in the spirit, to quote the words of the Presi dent, of “ patience without compromise of principle.” 17 Respectfully submitted. H erbert B rownell, J r., Attorney General. Simon E. Sqbelofe, Solicitor General. J. L ee R ankin , Assistant Attorney General. P hilip Elman , A lan S. R osenthal, Special Assistants to the Attorney General. November 1954. 17 New York Times, June 30,1954, p. 19. U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1954