Brown v. Board of Education Brief for the United States on the Further Argument of the Questions of Relief
Public Court Documents
November 1, 1954
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Brown v. Board of Education Brief for the United States on the Further Argument of the Questions of Relief, 1954. 2cd4ddd5-b69a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/15762fbf-39eb-4e13-adeb-ef65b51a7585/brown-v-board-of-education-brief-for-the-united-states-on-the-further-argument-of-the-questions-of-relief. Accessed November 23, 2025.
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. ■.. - r OCTOBER TERM, 1954
No. i
OLIVER BROWN, ET AL., APPELLANTS
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA, FT AL.
No. 2
HARRY BRIGGS, JR., ET AL., APPELLANTS
v.
AA R. W. ELLIOTT. ET AL.
: No, 3
DOROTHY E. DAVIS, ET AL., APPELLANTS
?■
COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD OF PRINCE EDWARD COUNTY, ET AL.
No. 4
SPOTTSWOOD THOMAS BOLLING, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
C. MELVIN SHARPE, ET AL.
No. 5
FRANCIS B. GEBHART, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
ETHEL LOUISE BELTON, ET AL.
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES ON THE FURTHER
ARGUMENT OF THE QUESTIONS OF RELIEF
HERBERT BROWNELL, Jr.,
Attorney General,
SIMON E. SOBELOFF,
Solicitor General,
J. LEE RANKIN,
Assistant Attorney General,
PHILIP ELMAN,
ALAN S. ROSENTHAL,
Special Assistants to the Attorney General,
Department of Justice, Washington 25, D. O.
I N D E X
Page
I. This Court has full power to direct such relief as
will be most effective and just----------------------- 3
II. The vindication of the constitutional rights in
volved should be as prompt as feasible---- ,— 4
III. The public interest requires an intelligent, orderly
and effective solution of the problems that
may be encountered in complying with this
Court’s decision in particular areas---------------- 6
IV. The nature and extent of the problems that the
desegregation of public school systems may.
entail will vary from area to area------1---------- 8
V. The formulation and execution of programs for
transition to nonsegregated school systems
should be undertaken by the responsible school
authorities under the supervision of the courts
of first instance______________________________ 22
VI. The cases should be remanded to the lower courts
with directions to carry out this Court’s de
cision as rapidly as the particular circum
stances permit_______________________________ 27
Conclusion_________________________________________ 29
CITATIONS
Cases:
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U. S.
483________________________________ _____ 2, 5, 6, 7, 8
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60______________ 19
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629_______________ 5
Federal Statutes:
Act of June 25, 1948, c. 646, § 39, 62 Stat. 992__ 23
E. S. 698 (28 U. S. C. (1946 ed.) 863)__________ 23
28 U. S. C. 2106_______________________________ 3
(i)
State Statutes: Page
D. C. Code (1951 ed.), § 31-670_______________ 10
§ 31-671________________ 10
§31-1110_______________ 10
§ 31-1112_______________ 10
Maryland Annotated Code (Flack ed., 1951), Art.
77, §§ 42 (4), 208_______ 10
Mississippi Code (1942 ed.) 6276______________ 10
South Carolina Code (1952) §§ 21—251, 290_____ 10
Miscellaneous:
Ashmore, The Negro and The Schools (1954), pp.
158-159__________________________________ 15
New York Times, June 30, 1954, p. 19__________ 30
Southern School Neivs, September 3, 1954, p. 3__ 10
Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50
Harv. L. Rev. 4 ______________________________ 19
U. S. Department of Commerce, Statistical
Abstract of the United States (1952), p. 355____ 9
Williams and Ryan, Schools in Transition (1954) _ 22
II
O ctober T e r m , 1954
No. 1 1
Oliver B rown et al., appellants
v.
B oard of E ducation of T opeka, Shawnee
County, K ansas, et al.
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES ON THE FURTHER
ARGUMENT OF THE QUESTIONS OF RELIEF
This brief is filed in response to the Court’s
invitation to the Attorney General of the United
States to participate in the further argument
of these cases on the questions of relief. It is
now the settled law of the land that segregation
of white and colored children in the public schools
of a State or of the District of Columbia is un
constitutional. There remain for consideration
and decision only the questions as to the de
crees that should be entered in these cases in
order to achieve compliance with the Court’s
ruling.
1 Together with No. 2, Harry Briggs, Jr., et al. v. R. W.
Elliott, et al.; No. 3, Dorothy E. Davis, et al. v. County
School Board o f Prince Edward County, et al.; No. 4, Spotts-
toood Thomas Bolling, et al. v. C. Melvin Sharpe, et al; and
No. 5, Francis B. Gelhart, et al. v. Ethel Louise Belton, et al.
(1)
2
The views of the Government on these questions
are set forth in this brief. At the outset it may be
helpful to state, in summary fashion, our answers
to the questions formulated by the Court (347 U. S.
483, 495-96):
4. Assuming it is decided that segrega
tion in public schools violates the Four
teenth Amendment
(a) would a decree necessarily follow
providing that, within the limits set by nor
mal geographic, school districting, Negro
children should forthwith be admitted to
schools of their choice % No.
(b) or may this Court, in the exercise of
its equity powers, permit an effective grad
ual adjustment to be brought about from
existing segregated systems to a system not
based on color distinctions ? Yes.
5. On the assumption on which questions
4 (a) and (b) are based, and assuming
further that this Court will exercise its
equity powers to the end described in ques
tion 4 (b),
(a) should this Court formulate detailed
decrees in these cases ? No.
(b) i f so, what specific issues should the
decrees reach ? ___
(c) should this Court appoint a special
master to hear evidence with a view to
recommending specific terms for such de
crees? No.
(d) should this Court remand to the
courts of first instance with directions to
frame decrees in these cases, and, if so, what
3
general directions should the decrees of this
Court include and what procedures should
the courts of first instance follow in arriv
ing at the specific terms of more detailed
decrees'? Yes. The provisions suggested
for inclusion in the decrees are outlined at
pp. 27-29, infra.
I
THIS COURT HAS FULL POWER TO DIRECT SUCH RELIEF
AS W ILL BE MOST EFFECTIVE AND JUST
Question 4 need not detain the Court long.
The Government, in its brief submitted on the
previous reargument, reviewed the authorities
bearing on the scope of the Court’s remedial
powers (Br. 152—167), and concluded that the
Court has “ undoubted power in these cases to
enter such decrees as it determines will be most
effective and just in relation to the interests,
private and public, affected by its decision” (Br.
167). We noted that Congress has expressly
empowered the Court, in fashioning effective re
lief in eases coming before it, to enter “ such
appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or re
quire such further proceedings to be had as may
be just under the circumstances” (28 IT. S. C.
2106). This provision reflects the breadth and
flexibility of judicial remedies which are avail
able to the Court. The shaping of appropriate
relief in the present cases, as all will agree, in
volves considerations of a most sensitive and
4
difficult nature. But, as was stated in our earlier
brief (p. 154), “ we believe there can be no doubt
of the Court’s power to grant such remedy as
it finds to be most consonant with the interests
of justice.”
II
THE VINDICATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL EIGHTS
INVOLVED SHOULD BE AS PEOMPT AS FEASIBLE
The fashioning of relief in these cases does not
call for the formulation or application of new or
unusual legal principles. On the contrary, the
task confronting the Court is one which presents
itself whenever it has been judicially found that
legal rights have been, and are continuing to be,
violated. The question is always one of deter
mining how, in the light of the facts presented
and within the limits of the power possessed by
it, the Court can best insure the removal of the
condition of illegality in a manner comporting
not only with the interests of the parties but also,
to the extent it may be involved, with the public
interest.
In many instances the solution to this problem
is quite simple. The balancing of the relevant
considerations may lead inescapably to the con
clusion that the legitimate interests of all con
cerned require only immediate termination of the •
unlawful conduct. In such circumstances a court
of equity normally does no more than to enter a
decree enjoining that conduct. It is where the
5
scales are not so clearly tipped in that direction that
the shaping of the appropriate remedy involves
difficulties.
The Court recognized, in restoring these cases
to the docket for further argument (347 U. S.
at 495), that “ the formulation of decrees in these
cases presents problems of considerable complex
ity.” These problems must be viewed in proper
perspective. The starting point must be a recog
nition that we are dealing here with basic con
stitutional rights, and not merely those of a few
children but o f millions. These are class actions.
Under the Court’s decision the maintenance of
segregated schools is in violation of the constitu
tional rights not only of the individual plaintiffs
but of all other “ similarly situated” colored chil
dren upon whose behalf the suits were brought.
Relief short of immediate admission to nonsegre-
gated schools necessarily implies the continuing
deprivation of these rights. The “ personal and
present” right (cf. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S.
629, 635) of a colored child not to be segregated
while attending public school is one which, if not
enforced while the child is of school age, loses its
value. Hence any delay in granting relief is pra
tanto an irretrievable loss of the right.
The unconstitutionality of racial segregation in
public schools is no longer in issue. However,
in considering whether any delay in granting full
relief is justifiable, it must be borne in mind that
continuation of school segregation has harmful
6
effects both on the individuals concerned and on
the public. The right of children not to be seg
regated because of race or color is not a technical
legal right of little significance or value. It is a
fundamental human right, supported by consider
ations of morality as well as law. “ To separate
[colored children] from others of similar age and
qualifications solely because of their race generates
a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the com
munity that may affect their hearts and minds in a
way unlikely ever to be undone” (347 U. S. at 494).
Racial segregation affects the hearts and minds of
those who segregate as well as those who are segre
gated, and it is also detrimental to the community
and the nation.
In the absence of compelling reasons to the con
trary, therefore, there should be no unnecessary
delay in the full vindication of the constitutional
rights involved in these eases, and if any delay
is required, it should be kept to a minimum.
I l l
THE PUBLIC INTEREST BEQUIBES AN INTELLIGENT,
ORDERLY AND EFFECTIVE SOLUTION OF THE PROB
LEMS THAT M AY BE ENCOUNTERED IN COMPLYING
W ITH THIS COURT’S DECISION IN PARTICULAR AREAS
No objective examination of the problems of
relief can overlook the fact that the impact of
the Court’s decision holding racial segregation
in public schools to be unconstitutional goes far
beyond the areas and parties involved in these
cases. As a binding precedent the decision re
quires the termination of segregation in school
7
systems in more than one-third of the States and
in the District of Columbia.
Because public education is, as the Court has
recognized (347 U. S. at 493), “ perhaps the
most important function of state and local gov
ernments,” there is a public interest to be served
in p e r m ittin g the transition to be carried out in
an orderly manner, so as to avoid needless dis
location or other impairment of the effective
operation of the school systems concerned. A
prime consideration in dealing with the problems
of desegregation must be that the systems of
public education in the United States should not
be adversely affected. Public education is one
of the glories of the United States, and an in
dispensable source of its power. The richest
resources of the United States are its citizens,
and, as the Court has observed (347 U. S. at 493),
education “ is the very foundation of good
citizenship.”
It must be recognized that racial segregation
in public schools is not a separate and distinct
phenomenon. It is part of a larger social pat
tern of racial relationships. The Court ’s decision
in these cases has outlawed a social institution which
has existed for a long time in many areas through
out the country—an institution, it may be noted,
which during its existence not only has had the
sanction of decisions of this Court but has been
fervently supported by great numbers of people as
justifiable on legal and moral grounds. The
Court’s holding in the present cases that segrega
tion is a denial of constitutional rights involved an
322344— 54------ 2
8
express recognition of the importance of psycho
logical and emotional factors; the impact of seg
regation upon children, the Court found, can so
affect their entire lives as to preclude their full
enjoyment of constitutional rights. In similar
fashion, psychological and emotional factors are
involved—and must be met with understanding
and good will—in the alterations that must
now take place in order to bring about compliance
with the Court’s decision. The practical difficul
ties which may be met in effecting transition to
nonsegregated public school systems should there
fore be taken into account in determining the
most effective means for ending school segrega
tion in particular areas. The Court itself has
recognized, in restoring these cases to the docket
for further argument on the questions of relief,
that these difficulties cannot be resolved by a
single stroke of the judicial pen.
Broadly speaking, therefore, the decrees in
these cases should be framed to require a transi
tion which achieves the most expeditious com
pliance with the constitutional mandate and at
the same time permits the intelligent, orderly,
and effective solution of the problems that may
be encountered in desegregating school systems in
particular areas.
IY
THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE PROBLEMS THAT
THE DESEGREGATION OF PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEMS
M AY ENTAIL W ILL VARY FROM AREA TO AREA
As the Court has noted (347 U. S. at 495),
there is a “ great variety of local conditions,”
9
which will undoubtedly affect the nature and ex
tent of the changes in public school systems and
practices required to bring about compliance
with its decision. Without elaborating in detail
the structure and organization of the educational
systems of the States and the District of Colum
bia, it is not difficult to outline some of the kinds
of problems which may arise in making a transi
tion to nonsegregated systems.
1. The implementation of any program for the
desegregation of public school facilities will be,
of course, the responsibility of no single indi
vidual or administrative body. Indeed, of all
governmental activities, education is undoubtedly
the most decentralized, its administrative and fi
nancial base being shared between the states and
their political subdivisions. And the extent of
local participation is brought into perhaps sharper
focus by the fact that of the approximately
120,000 governmental units tabulated by the Cen
sus Bureau in 1951, more than 70,000 were school
districts.2
The division of authority between state and
local school officials customarily is delineated by
the state legislature. In most jurisdictions, the
state board of education and school superintend
ent have the statutory duty of making the broad
policy decisions affecting the state school system
as a whole, enforcing state laws relating to the 3
3 U. S. Department o f Commerce, Statistical Abstract of
the United States (1952), p. 355.
10
operation of schools and, in general, insuring that
all school units meet certain minimal standards.
Local authorities, within the framework of state
educational policy as embodied in statutes, regu
lations and directives, exercise control over the
intimate details of school management within their
district or other operating unit.
The problems that will confront authorities
on the state level thus will be principally ones
of revising state laws and regulations which were
tailored to fit the needs of a segregated school
system. In South Carolina, for example, the
statutory formula now employed in the distribu
tion of state funds for teachers’ salaries re
quires that minimum enrollment and average
daily attendance in each district be determined
separately for each race.3 In several jurisdic
tions, the law provides for school officials whose
duties are limited to the supervision of Negro
schools; 3 4 * in others, the legislature has provided
for entirely separate Negro and white school dis
tricts encompassing the same area.6
3 South Carolina Code (1952), §.§21-251, 290. Cf. D. C.
Code (1951 ed.), §§ 31-1110,31-1112.
4 See e. g., D. C. Code (1951 ed), §§ 31-670, 31-671; Anno.
Code o f Maryland (Flack ed., 1951), Art. 77, §§ 42 (4 ), 208.
6 See e. g., Mississippi Code (1942 ed.) 6276. In some states
separate Negro school districts are maintained even in the
absence of a legislative requirement. In Delaware, for ex
ample, there are at least 42 such districts. It has been re
ported that at the next session o f the Delaware General
Assembly, legislation will be introduced to merge them with
white school districts. See Southern School Neios, Septem
ber 3,1954, page 3.
11
2. Because local school authorities have consid
erable discretion respecting many facets of school
administration, and because there is a wide va
riety in local conditions, it can he expected that,
even within the same state, no two school dis
tricts will be faced with precisely the same prob
lems in accomplishing an effective transition to
nonsegregated school systems.
(a) In districts where there is more than one
school, adjustments in the method employed for
allocating students to particular schools may have
to be made. In the majority of such districts,
children are given little, if any, choice as to the
school they are to attend. Instead, each school
in the district is assigned a particular attendance
area and the pupil must enroll in the facility
within whose attendance boundaries he resides.
Many factors are taken into consideration in
drawing these boundaries, foremost among them
being the size and character of the school, the
geographical distribution of the school popula
tion in the district, and the ease and safety of
public travel to and from school. In the case of
segregated school systems, boundaries are formu
lated separately for white and colored facilities,
with the result that the overall objective of mak
ing the maximum use of total school facilities and
minimizing travel difficulties is seldom achieved.
Changes in the racial character of a neighbor
hood frequently cause overcrowding in some
schools while others operate at far below capacity.
12
Similarly, children of both races are often com
pelled to travel long distances to reach the segre
gated schools to which they are assigned.
The extent of the boundary alterations re
quired, in the reformulation of school attendance
areas on a non-racial basis, will vary. This is
illustrated by the recent experience in the Dis
trict of' Columbia in recasting attendance bound
aries on a wholly geographical basis. In the
neighborhoods where there is little or no mixture
of the races, and where school facilities have been
fully utilized, it was found that the elimination
of the racial factor did not work any material
change in the territory served by each school.
In biracial neighborhoods, however, the objective
of securing maximum utilization of facilities, on
a non-racial basis, could be achieved only by
making radical revisions in the area covered by
the formerly Negro and white schools.
In connection with the formulation of new
attendance boundaries, school districts may be
called upon to review or alter prevailing prac
tices regarding pupil transfers. Because it is
almost impossible to fix boundaries which do not
work a hardship on any pupils, many communi
ties now permit enrollment outside the attendance
area of residence in exceptional circumstances.
Pupils on the secondary school level occasionally
are allowed to attend a school at a distance from
their homes because it offers courses of instruc
tion not otherwise available. Specialized needs of
13
mentally or physically handicapped children may
cause them to be grouped together for instruc
tional purposes. And pupils not possessing an
adequate knowledge of the English language
sometimes are placed in separate schools until
that knowledge is acquired. While the allowance
of transfers and special assignments for reasons
of this character is fully warranted and un
doubtedly will be continued, some districts may
be confronted with efforts by students to attend
schools in other areas for the sole and unjusti
fiable purpose of avoiding enrollment in a bi-
racial facility.
(b) At the same time that procedures are de
vised for the assignment of pupils to schools on
a basis not involving distinctions of color, some
districts may have to readjust the use of their
facilities. In low population rural areas now
maintaining two schools solely by reason of the
dual system, educational and economic considera
tions may dictate consolidation. There are sev
eral ways in which this consolidation might be
accomplished. Where existing structures are
small or otherwise inadequate, a new school might
be constructed to accommodate all children. An
other solution might be to close one of the schools
and transfer its pupils to the other.
In areas where there is a considerable dis
parity in the quality and curricula of the former
white and Negro schools, the problem of read
justment may be more troublesome. Parents will
14
be understandably reluctant to send their chil
dren to schools markedly inferior to those previ
ously attended, or which do not provide courses
of instruction that would have been begun or con
tinued if no transfer had been required. While
the long-range answer to a substantial part of
this problem may be the improvement of sub
standard schools, or the construction of new ones,
school administrators may have to devise stop
gap methods—not involving continuation of ra
cial segregation—to protect the interests of chil
dren now in school.
.(c) Teachers may have to be reassigned and
changes made in the method of their selection,
with due regard to the safeguarding of seniority
and tenure rights. In areas which now have sep
arate eligibility lists for white and colored
teachers, new lists combining applicants of both
races may be established.6 Salary differentials
6 This step was taken in both the District o f Columbia
and in Baltimore. In the former, under the segregated sys
tem, ISTegro and white applicants for teaching positions took
separate examinations conducted by separate boards o f ex
aminers. Performance on these qualifying examinations de
termined position on the eligibility lists maintained for
applicants o f each race and the lists in turn provided the
sole basis o f appointment. In June 1954, the boards of ex
aminers were merged into a single board under the direct
chairmanship of the superintendent o f schools, teacher ex
aminations were held on an integrated basis for the first time,
and eligibility lists were consolidated. For each level o f
15
may have to be eliminated.* 7 8 And, on the super
visory level, in communities maintaining separate
supervisors for Negro schools a general realign
ment of duties may he necessary.®
(d) Most rural and some urban areas provide
transportation to and from schools. Communi
ties which have maintained separate transporta
tion facilities for the two races may have to
reorganize schedules and routes. And some lo
calities may discover that there will he a need
instruction, there is now but a single list on which no ref
erence is made to the race o f any o f the named individuals.
In Baltimore, the compilation o f separate lists involved not
only the grade received on a written examination, adminis
tered to white and colored alike, but in addition the results
o f an oral interview and the evaluation o f the applicant’s
previous experience. In combining the lists, Baltimore did
not disturb these criteria; nor was a change made in the
established practice o f selecting any one o f the five highest
ranking qualified individuals to fill a vacancy.
7 In 1952, the average annual salaries of white and Negro
classroom teachers in 12 Southern states were $2,740 and
$2,389, respectively. A part of this differential may be ex
plained by the fact that the average amount o f college train
ing possessed by the white teachers was slightly higher.
And between 1940 and 1952, the gaps in both salary and
training averages were substantially diminished. See Ash
more, The Negro and The Schools (1954), pp. 158-159.
8 Baltimore’s dual system, for example, had five assistant
school superintendents serving on a systemwide basis and one
assistant superintendent for Negro schools.
322844— 54 ■3
16
for additional vehicles or, conversely, that less
equipment will be necessary.9
(e) A few school districts may have to com
pensate for differences in the educational back
grounds of newly integrated pupils. In localities
where the segregated Negro facilities were in
ferior, colored students may find it difficult to
pursue satisfactorily the same studies as white
students in the same grades. School authorities
faced with that problem may desire to give
tests to determine the grade to which each student
should be assigned. Or such tests might be em
ployed for the purpose of selecting students for
additional and intensified instruction in subjects
in which they are deficient.
3. Because, as has been noted, the responsi
bility for the financial support of public educa
tion is distributed between the state and its
subdivisions, the economic burdens incident to
the implementation of integration also will fall
upon several levels of' government. These bur
dens, however, will flow largely from the present
inequality, in a physical sense, of separate Negro
schools. As a consequence, even if the dual sys
tem were to continue, many areas would be faced
9 The requirement o f additional equipment will be gen
erally restricted, of course, to places where present facilities
have not been sufficient to provide adequate transportation
for all pupils. It cannot therefore be regarded as, in any
real sense, a problem arising from the elimination of
segregation.
17
with the necessity of making substantial outlays
for capital improvements.
Indeed, the financial cost of an “ equalization”
program for separate schools unquestionably
would be far greater. No matter how small the
Negro population in the particular area, it would
have to be provided with facilities and equipment
equivalent in all respects to those provided in
white schools. In similar circumstances, a non-
segregated school system may find that the educa
tional needs of all children will be satisfied by
merely closing down the former Negro school
and transferring its pupils to other facilities.
While, placed in perspective, economic con
siderations would seem to furnish less of an ob
stacle to the maintenance of integrated schools
than to “ separate but equal” schools, it should
be noted that if expenditures per classroom unit
are to be continued at current levels for white
children, an additional annual expenditure of over
160 million dollars will be required in the states
involved and the District of Columbia. In respect
to pupil transportation services, the estimated
capital outlay is 40 million dollars. And the
estimated cost of “ equalizing” Negro schools is
in excess of two billion dollars.10
4. In addition to problems of a purely ad
ministrative or fiscal character, school authorities
10 These estimates have been furnished by the Office of
Education, U. S. Department o f Health, Education and
Welfare.
18
may have to cope with a certain amount of
popular hostility towards the elimination of segre
gation in public schools. This results from the
fact that in each of the areas involved the dual
system has existed for generations and is accepted
by many as being a part of the “way of life”
of the area. And the fear has been expressed in
some quarters that the opposition to any de
parture from the existing pattern will mani
fest itself in the withdrawal of state aid to
education and in other action on state and local
levels designed to prevent or impair the effective
operation of public schools on a nonsegregated
basis.
We do not believe that there is warrant for
presuming that responsible officials and citizens
will tolerate violations of the Constitution.11 The
solutions to these problems, like all others in a
democracy, will emerge from the “ sober second
11 The well-publicized student disturbances which occurred
recently in some localities certainly provide no basis for such
a presumption. For one thing, these disturbances were
isolated; in the overwhelming majority o f the areas which
have begun or completed compliance with this Court’s deci
sion, the adjustment has been remarkably free of untoward
incident. Moreover, it appears to be the fact that the mis
conduct was in substantial measure incited by a small num
ber o f reckless and irresponsible individuals and groups,
many from without the community, who took full advantage
o f some students’ immaturity. And, as is so often true in
such circumstances, where school and law enforcement au
thorities made clear their determination neither to counte
nance nor to capitulate to lawlessness, the disturbances ended
as abruptly as they had started.
19
thought of the community, which is the firm base
on which all law must ultimately rest.” (Stone,
The Common Law in the United States, 50 Harv.
L. Rev. 4, 25.) Popular hostility, where found
to exist, is a problem that needs to be recognized
and faced with understanding, but it can afford
no legal justification for a failure to end school
segregation. Racial segregation in public schools
is unconstitutional and will have to be termi
nated as quickly as feasible, regardless of how
much it may be favored by some people in the
community. There can be no “ local option” on
that question, which has now been finally settled
by the tribunal empowered under the Constitution
to decide it.12
While general community hostility cannot serve
as justification for avoiding or postponing com
pliance with the constitutional mandate, it is
relevant in determining the most effective
method for ending segregation in the particular
12 “ That there exists a serious and difficult problem arising
from a feeling o f race hostility which the law is powerless to
control, and to which it must give a measure o f consideration,
may be freely admitted. But its solution cannot be promoted
by depriving citizens o f their constitutional rights and privi
leges.” Buchanan v. Warley, 245 IT. S. 60,80-81.
In any event, this would not be the proper occasion or
time to adjudicate possible, attempts to evade or circumvent
this Court’s decision. Such questions, like all other ques
tions o f constitutional law, must be resolved when they
arise concretely, in a factual setting, and when this Court
can have the benefit o f findings of fact and the judgment
•of the lower courts.
20
locality. School administrators will have an ob
vious concern in obtaining public support and
acceptance of the transition. The extent of the
difficulties which may be encountered will de
pend, of course, upon the state of local opinion,
which in turn is influenced by such varied factors
as the economic structure, geographical location,
and relative numbers of whites and Negroes in
the community. There is, however, a general
recognition of the need for thoughtful advance
preparations to resolve the problems of desegrega
tion with as few disruptions as possible. I f any
lesson can be derived from past experiences in
ending segregated school systems, it is the im
portance of public confidence in the ability of
school administrators to accomplish the adjust
ment without, in the process, losing sight of or
sacrificing the basic and continuing educational
needs of all the children affected.13
13 In presenting his program for integration for the ap
proval of the Board o f Education, the Superintendent of
Schools of the District o f Columbia laid emphasis on the
consideration o f the educational growth and welfare o f the
school child. Thus, in justification of the proposal that each
presently enrolled pupil be granted a limited option to remain
in the school he now attends even though he does not reside
within its new attendance boundaries, the Superintendent
enumerated the ways in which this would provide “ stability,
continuity and security in the educational experiences o f
pupils during the transition period.” ( See brief for respond
ents in No. 4, p. 13.)
While we do not describe the District o f Columbia pro-
21
In some areas it may be found advisable to
preface the desegregation process with programs,
not extending for more than a few months,
designed to promote interracial understanding
among students, teachers, and parents. Such
preparatory measures were taken in many of the
localities which have abolished segregated school
systems in recent years. In one Hew Jersey
community, for example, funds were appropriated
to allow several selected teachers to attend a
special workshop on human relations conducted
at a state university. In addition, an extension
course on the same subject was offered by school
authorities during the year preceding desegrega
tion and was well attended by teachers. In other
areas civic, P-TA, religious, and fraternal groups
took the initiative in establishing a favorable
climate for making the transition. It was found
that the efforts o f these groups were instrumental
in reducing many of the pre-existing racial ten
sions in the community, with the result that
gram in detail here, since this is undertaken in the brief for
respondents in No. 4, we think it reflects credit upon those
responsible for its formulation and execution. In every
significant respect, the plan evidences painstaking care on the
part o f school officials to realize the expressed objective o f
an expeditious transition calculated “ to make the best use
of the total resources of the school system in plant and per
sonnel, to serve the best interest o f all the pupils, and to
promote the general welfare o f the community.” (See brief
for respondents in No. 4, p. 11.)
22
integration was accomplished speedily and with
little or no serious friction or incident.14
Y
THE FORMULATION AND EXECUTION OF PROGRAMS
FOR TRANSITION TO NONSEGREGATED SCHOOL SYS
TEMS SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN BY THE RESPONSIBLE
SCHOOL AUTHORITIES UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF
THE COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE
For the reasons which have been summarized,
it is clear that no single formula or blueprint is
readily susceptible of application to all localities
which must end segregation in their school sys
tems. The measures essential to bringing about
an expeditious, orderly, and effective transition
in any given area will depend on the special
conditions and problems in that area. And since
there is wide variance in local conditions, what
may be practicable in one community may be
wholly inappropriate in another.
A prerequisite to the formulation, initiation,
and supervision o f any practicable program for
ending segregation is a knowledge of the special
problems and needs of the particular community.
It is the responsible school authorities and the
courts of first instance in each area who will have
the greatest familiarity with local conditions and
14 The transitional experiences o f twenty-four communities
in six states which within the past ten years desegregated
their public school systems are the subject o f a study con
ducted under the auspices of the Fund for the Advancement
of Education o f the Ford Foundation. Williams and Eyan,
Schools in Transition (1954).
23
who will be in the best position to evaluate their
significance and effect in accomplishing desegre
gation in as short a period as feasible. For this
reason, this Court should not, either itself or
with the assistance of a special master appointed,
by it,15 delineate the precise steps that each of
the defendants should take in ending segregation
in the public school systems. Instead, the pri
mary responsibility for both devising and carry
ing out programs for the expeditious accomplish
ment o f the required transition should be placed
upon the defendants, to be exercised under the
continuing direct supervision of the district courts
or appropriate state courts.
This Court, we believe, should lay down stand
ards for the guidance of the lower courts in
carrying out its decision. A remand for further
proceedings, without more, would add to the un
certainty and doubt which already exist and would
only serve to make the process of adjustment
more difficult.
Specifically, the lower courts should be in
structed to require the defendants either to admit
15 While we do not believe that the Court should appoint a
special master to hear evidence, there can be no question of
its power to do so. In the 1948 revision o f the Judicial Code,
Congress expressly repealed R. S. 698 [28 U. S. C. (1946 ed.)
863] which had provided that “ [u]pon the appeal of any
cause in equity, * * * no new evidence shall be received in
the Supreme Court.” Act of June 25, 1948, c. 646, § 39, 62
Stat. 992. We find nothing to suggest that the legislative
purpose was other than to remove the restriction entirely.
24
the plaintiffs, and other Negro children similarly
situated, forthwith to public schools on a non-
segregated basis or to propose promptly, for the
court’s consideration and approval, an effective
program for accomplishing the transition as soon
as practicable. In passing upon the acceptability
of proposed programs, the criterion should be
whether the defendants have sustained the bur
den of showing that their particular program will
bring about the total elimination of racial consid
erations in the admission of pupils to public
schools as rapidly as local conditions allow. And
in determining whether the projected plan repre
sents the most expeditious means of accomplishing
an effective transition, the courts should be per
mitted to take into account the scope of the
administrative adjustments that are called for
and the particular conditions existing in the com
munity. Where there are no solid obstacles to
desegregation, delay is not justified and should
not be permitted. It is only where the lowTer
court finds, upon clear and convincing evidence,
that the defendants have met the burden of show
ing that immediate (i. e., at the beginning of
the next school term) completion of the desegre
gation program is impracticable, that any delay
is justifiable. And, in such a situation, the dis
trict court should fix the shortest practicable pe
riod for completing desegregation.
Although it would be helpful if this Court could
25
specify outside limits for the period of desegrega
tion, we do not think it would be feasible to
do so at this time. Apart from the fact that
there is no way of judging at this point what
integration will involve in the particular area,
maximum periods tend to become minimum pe
riods. This Court should not enter any order
which might have the practical effect of slowing
down desegregation where it could he swiftly ac
complished. The Court, however, should make
it clear that any proposal for desegregation over
an indefinite period will be unacceptable, and that
there can be no justification anywhere for failure
to make an immediate and substantial start to
ward desegregation, in a good-faith effort to end
segregation as soon as feasible.
Further, the lower courts should be instructed
to be insistent that any interval permitted for the
accomplishment of desegregation is being fully
utilized. Any period during which little or
nothing is being done to further the transition
would serve no useful purpose and, indeed, would
only intensify the difficulties. Whether time will
be useful will depend on how it is used; delay
solely for the sake of delay is intolerable. Where
a period of time is allowed for transition, it
should be for the sole purpose of enabling neces
sary constructive measures to be taken, and not
for the purpose of permitting postponement
per se.
26
I f the program for desegregation formulated
by the defendants will remove, as expeditiously
as possible, state-imposed or state-supported racial
classifications of pupils in public schools, the lower
courts should not substitute their judgment re
specting the administrative features of the pro
gram for that of the school authorities. The
Constitution prohibits the maintenance of segre-
gaged school systems. It does not compel the
adoption of any specific type of nonsegregated
system. The decisive inquiry is whether race or
color has been entirely eliminated as a criterion in
the admission of pupils to public schools. The
essence of the Court’s decision in these cases is
that there be no governmental action which en
forces or supports school segregation.
This Court, we believe, should not in its present
decrees give blanket approval to any particular
programs for desegregation. The determination
of the necessity for, and constitutionality of, any
specific plan should not be made in vacuo. Flexi
bility in responding to developing circumstances
may become important. The experience in carry
ing out a plan, once it is begun, may alter the
assumptions on which it was based. For example,
it may develop, after a plan is in operation,
that it can be carried out more quickly than was
anticipated at the outset, as has been demon-
27
strafed by the experience in the District of
Columbia.
V I
THE CASES SHOULD BE REMANDED TO THE LOWER
COURTS W IT H DIRECTIONS TO CARRY OUT THIS
COURTIS DECISION AS RAPIDLY AS THE PARTICULAR
CIRCUMSTANCES PERMIT
For the reasons outlined above, the Government
suggests that the Court should enter decrees (a)
declaring that racial segregation in public schools
is unconstitutional and that all provisions of law
requiring or permitting such segregation are in
valid, and (b) remanding the cases to the appro
priate courts of first instance for such further
proceedings and orders as are necessary and
proper to carry out this Court’s decision.16 The
decrees should contain specific provisions sub
stantially as follows:
(1) That the lower court shall forthwith enter
orders directing the defendants to submit within
90 days a plan for ending, as soon as feasible,
racial segregation of pupils in public schools sub
ject to their authority or control.
16 In the Delaware case, No. 5, Gebhart v. Belton, the Attor
ney General of Delaware, in his brief for petitioners (pp. 17-
18), now agrees that the judgment o f the state Supreme
Court should be affirmed. Accordingly, since the respond
ents did not file a cross-petition for certiorari, it would
appear that in the Delaware case this Court should simply
enter an order of affirmance.
28
(2) That, unless a satisfactory plan is sub
mitted to and approved by the lower court, it
shall forthwith enter appropriate orders, by way
of injunction or otherwise, directing admission
of the plaintiffs and other children similarly situ
ated to nonsegregated public schools at the be
ginning of the next school term.
(3) That, upon submission of a plan by the
defendants, the lower court shall promptly hold
a hearing to determine whether it provides for
transition to a nonsegregated school system as
expeditiously as the circumstances permit. The
defendants shall have the burden of proof on the
question of whether, and how long, an interval
of time in carrying out full desegregation is re
quired. In approving any proposed program, the
court shall make such modifications as may be
required, and shall fix the earliest practicable
date for completion of the program. And no
program shall be sanctioned which does not call
for the immediate commencement of the proced
ures necessary to the accomplishment of the
transition.
(4) That during the period, if any, allowed
for completion of the program for transition to
a nonsegregated system, the lower court shall
require the defendants to submit detailed pe
riodic reports showing the progress made in end
ing segregation. The court shall enter such fur-
29
tiier orders as may be required from time to time
in order to insure against unnecessary delay in
the execution of the program.
(5) That this Court shall retain jurisdiction for
the purpose of making such further orders, if
any, as may become necessary for carrying out
its mandate. To this end the lower courts should
be required to submit information reports to this
Court at specified intervals showing in detail the
actions taken in bringing about compliance with
the requirements of the Constitution. (The Court
may wish to appoint a special master to review
such reports and to make appropriate recom
mendations thereon to this Court and to the lower
courts.)
CONCLUSION
The responsibility for achieving compliance
with the Court’s decision in these cases does not
rest on the judiciary alone. Every officer and
agency of government, federal, state, and local,
is likewise charged with the duty of enforcing
the Constitution and the rights guaranteed under
it. And, ultimately, it is the obligation of every
citizen to respect and abide by the law, once it
is authoritatively declared. We have no doubt
that the American people and the officials through
whom they act will meet these responsibilities
30
in the spirit, to quote the words of the Presi
dent, of “ patience without compromise of
principle.” 17
Respectfully submitted.
H erbert B rownell, J r.,
Attorney General.
Simon E. Sqbelofe,
Solicitor General.
J. L ee R ankin ,
Assistant Attorney General.
P hilip Elman ,
A lan S. R osenthal,
Special Assistants to the Attorney General.
November 1954.
17 New York Times, June 30,1954, p. 19.
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1954