Motion for Order of Compliance; Order; Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Order of Compliance

    Cv 89-0360977S 

MILO SHEFF, et al SUPERIOR COURT 

' J.D. HARTFORD/NEW 

Plaintiffs NEW BRITAIN AT HARTFORD 

VY.» 

WILLIAM A. O'NEILL, et al 

Defendants MAY 14, 1992   MOTION FOR ORDER OF COMPLIANCE 
  

Pursuant to P.B. § 231 the defendants hereby seek an order     
of compliance requiring the plaintiffs to provide full and final 

Hl 
1 answers which are directly responsive to each of the following 

| 
questions in the defendants' first set of interrogatories which 

were served on the plaintiffs on or about July 13, 1990; 

QUESTIONS 1.2, 3, 4,.5, 6,7, 8, 9,:10,-11,:12, 13, 14, 

15, 16 and 19.   The answers which the plaintiffs have served upon the 

| defendants to date are largely unresponsive and wholly | 

incomplete. Furthermore, the objections which the plaintiffs 

have offered in response to questions 8, 9, and 10 are unfounded. 

WHEREFORE, the defendants ask that this motion for order of | 

compliance be granted, that the plaintiffs’ previous answers to 

  

    
 



  

interrogatories listed above be stricken, that a specific 

i deadline be set for the plaintiffs to provide full and final 

answers which are directly responsive to each of the questions 

listed above, and that the court schedule a status conference to 

take place three weeks after the plaintiffs have satisfied their 

obligations under this order of compliance to consider necessary 

modifications 1s the outstanding scheduling order. 

FOR THE DEFENDANTS 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL 
ATTORNEY/GENERAL, ~ 

] f / ii / 7s "4 [Los 7 
Po 4 a 

    
  
Johfi R. Whelan 

/ Assistant Attorney General 
{ 110 Sherman Street 

| \ “Hartford, Connecticut 06105 
| Telephone: 566-7173 

    
  

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Cv 89-0360977S 

MILO SHEFF, et al SUPERIOR COURT 

J.D. HARTFORD/NEW 

Plaintiffs NEW BRITAIN AT HARTFORD 

Ve. 

WILLIAM A. O'NEILL, et al 

Defendants May 14, 1992 

ORDER 

The defendants' motion for order of compliance is hereby 

granted and the following orders are entered: 

THAT, the plaintiffs answers to questions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 

7,11, 12, 13,314,115, 16 and 19 of the defendants’ first set of 

interrogatories are stricken;   
THAT, the plaintiffs' objections to questions 9, 10, and 11 

are overruled; 

THAT, that plaintiffs are ordered to provide full and final 

answers which are directly responsive to each of the above noted 

questions in the defendants' first set of interrogatories on or 

before ‘ 
  

THAT, the parties are ordered to appear at a status 

conference at on 1992, at which time the 
  

  

 



    
    

    

court will consider such modifications to the outstanding 

scheduling order as may be necessary. 

Entered the day of 
  

  

Hon. Harry Hammer 

Superior Court 

CERTIFICATION 
  

This is to certify that a copy of the foregoing was mailed 
postage prepaid to the following counsel of record on 

May 14, 1992: 

John Brittain, Esq. 
University of Connecticut 
School of Law 
65 Elizabeth Street 
Hartford, CT 06105 

Wilfred Rodriguez, Esq 
Hispanic Advocacy Project 
Neighborhood Legal Services 
1229 Albany Avenue 
Hartford, CT 06112 

Philip Tegeler, Esq. 
Martha Stone, Esq. 
Connecticut Civil Liberties Union 
32 Grand Street 

Hartford, CT 06106 

Wesley W. Horton, Esq. 
Mollier, Horton & Fineberg, P.C. 
90 Gillett Street   

  
  

 



      

Hartford, CT 06105 

Ruben Franco, Esq. 
Jenny Rivera, Esq. 
Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund 
99 Hudson Street 

14th Floor 

New York, NY 10013 

Julius L. Chambers, Esq 
Marianne Lado, Esq. 
Ronald Ellis, Esq. 
NAACP Legal Defense Fund and 
Educational Fund, Inc. 
99 Hudson Street 
New York, NY 10013 

John A. Powell, Esq. 
Helen Hershkoff, Esq. 
Adam S. Cohen, Esq. 
American Civil Liberties Union 
132 West 43rd Sireet, 

si i dd       

  

  

John R. Whelan 
Assistant Attorney General 

  
 



  

Wons for 
Marcella G. Williams 

 



    

Cv 89-0360977S 

MILO SHEFF, et al SUPERIOR COURT 
J.D. HARTFORD/NEW 

Plaintiffs NEW BRITAIN AT HARTFORD 

Ve 

WILLIAM A. O'NEILL, et al 

Defendants MAY 14, 1992 

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR ORDER OF 
COMPLIANCE 
  

  

According to one of the plaintiffs' attorneys the present 

case is "a unique educational lawsuit" which "presents a novel   theory" and is designed to open up "the opportunity to 

restructure all of education" in the State of Connecticut. 

Brittain, John C., "Educational and Racial Equity: Towards the 

Twenty-First Century - A Case Experiment in Connecticut," Civil 

| Rights Litigation and Attorney's Fees Annual Handbook, Vol. 6, 
  

Clark Boardman ‘Company, Ltd., New York, 1390, If this is true it]   is especially important that the trial record upon which the 

| 
court acts be as carefully developed as it can possibly be. It | 

would be foolhardy and reckless to begin considering steps to 

"restructure all of education" based upon a "novel" legal theory 

      
 



  

    

    

without the benefit of a record in which the parties have fully 

met on all of the critical issues.’ 

Pre-trial discovery is one way to assist in the careful 

development of the trial record. 1f, however, the purposes of 

discovery are frustrated by inadequate, unresponsive, or 

incomplete answers and unfounded objections to legitimate 

discovery requests the likelihood of a misguided decision which 

proves harmful to the educational interests of the children of 

this state becomes greater. 

To do their part to ensure that the record before the court 

is as complete as possible the defendants submitted a 

comprehensive set of interrogatories to the plaintiffs by way of 

a discovery request dated July 13, 1990. On September 20, 1990 

plaintiffs filed objections to four of the defendants’ 

interrogatories (Nos. 8, 9, 10 and 20). Plaintiffs served their 

first response to the remaining interrogatories on or about 

October 20, 1990. 

  

1/ Given the fact that plaintiffs’ legal theory is so "novel" 
there is risk enough in the already apparent uncertainties about 
what is and what is not a critical issue in the case; e.g., the 
relevance of the state's housing practices. 

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By letter dated November 7, 1990 defendants' counsel advised 

plaintiffs' counsel that that defendants considered the 

plaintiffs' responses inadequate because, inter alia, the 

plaintiffs’ answers were qualified and obviously incomplete. See 

Exhibit A. Plaintiffs responded to this letter by seeking an 

extension of time to provide "more detailed responses". See 

Exhibits B and C. The expressed purpose for seeking this 

extension of time was "to forestall a Motion to Compel". Exhibit 

B. 

On or about February 19, 1991 the plaintiffs provided the 

defendants with "Plaintiffs' Amended Response to Defendants’ 

First Set of Interrogatories.” Exhibit D. Virtually all of the 

answers contained in this amended response are qualified and 

incomplete. All of the answers are drafted so as to suggest that 

the plaintiffs would be providing more detailed answers at some 

later date.   
At the same time the defendants were pressing for answers to 

their interrogatories the plaintiffs were pursuing extensive | 

. : { 

discovery from the defendants. Through their discovery requests | 

| the plaintiffs have obtained boxes of documents, computer tapes 

  
 



  

  
  

    

with vast amounts of data on them, and access to thousands of 

additional pages of records maintained by the defendants. 

Presumably this discovery was undertaken for the purpose of 

assisting the plaintiffs in their case. preparation and for the 

purpose of making it possible for the plaintiffs to answer fully 

the defendants' first set of interrogatories. 

Despite the fact that it has been well over a year since the 

plaintiffs provided their amended but still qualified and 

incomplete answers to the defendants first set of 

interrogatories, and despite the fact that the plaintiffs have   
been given virtually unlimited access to the defendants' records, 

} 

! { 
I 

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the plaintiffs have not provided complete and final responses to 

the defendants first set of interrogatories. 

To the extent that the plaintiffs may at some point in the 

future amend their responses to answer fully the defendants’   interrogatories, the defendants will be prejudiced in that they | 
| 

will not have sufficient time to prepare appropriate responses to 

the plaintiffs' new claims unless the deadlines in the 

outstanding scheduling order are appropriately extended. 

  
 



  

    
    

By way of the present motion the defendants seek (1) an 

order requiring the plaintiffs to provide directly responsive 

answers to each of the defendants' interrogatories and (2) an 

order directing the plaintiffs to make their answers complete and 

final by a date certain. Only then will the defendants be able 

to complete their case preparation in a way which will insure, to 

the extent possible, that the court has a proper record on which 

to act. 

To prepare their interrogatories in a way which would flush 

out the issues which appear to be critical to this case based on 

the plaintiffs' complaint, the defendants broke their 

interrogatories down into several sections. Each section 

contains a number of questions designed to elicit responses from 

the plaintiffs which relate to the section topic. For the 

purposes of this motion the important section headings in the 

defendants' first set of interrogatories are as follows: Section 

1," PAST VIOLATIONS: AFFIRMATIVE ACTS": Section 11, "PAST 

VIOLATIONS: OMISSIONS"; Section III, "CURRENT OR ONGOING 

VIOLATIONS"; Section IV, "MINIMALLY ADEQUATE EDUCATION"; Section 

V, "EQUAL EDUCATION"; Section V1, "OTHER"; and Section Vill, 

"DATA COMPILATIONS". The deficiencies in the plaintiffs' answers 

  
 



    
  

  

to the questions under each of these section headings are 

discussed below. 

A. 

SECTION 1; "PAST VIOLATIONS: AFFIRMATIVE ACTS" 
  

(QUESTIONS 1-4, EXHIBIT D PAGES 1-22) 
  

Section I of the defendants' first set of interrogatories is 

entitled "Past Violations: Affirmative Acts". This section of 

defendants' interrogatories 1s designed to elicit from the 

plaintiffs a list of the affirmative acts by the defendants 
  

which, according to the plaintiffs, (a) have violated the 

constitution (Question 1), (b) have caused racial and ethnic 

isolation in the Hartford public schools (Question 2), (c) have 

caused socioeconomic isolation in the Hartford public schools 

(Question 3) and (d) have caused a concentration of "at risk" 

children in the Hartford public schools, (Question 4). Details 

regarding each affirmative act identified by the plaintiffs are 

also sought. 

Plaintiffs answers to the questions in this section of 

defendants' interrogatories are not responsive and incomplete. 

See Exhibit D, pg. 1-22, 

  
 



  

  

    

Given the position which the plaintiffs have taken in their 

replies to the defendants' motion to strike and motion for 

summary judgment one would expect the plaintiffs to answer 

question 1 of Section I by saying that the plaintiffs make no 

claim that the defendants' violated the constitution by any 

affirmative act. Instead the plaintiffs provide a confusing 

answer that identifies a large number of things which the state 

does or has done but without making any claim that these acts are 

2/ 
unconstitutional. The plaintiffs' answer to question 1 of 

Section I 1s clearly unresponsive. 

The plaintiffs answer questions 2, 3 and 4 in Section I by 

referencing their answer to question 1. The plaintiffs do not 

specifically and separately identify the affirmative acts 

allegedly taken by the defendants which they claim caused the 

racial and ethnic isolation (Question 2), those which they claim 

caused the socioeconomic isolation (Question 3), or those 

affirmative acts which they claim caused the concentration of "at 

  

2/. For example, the plaintiffs specifically concede that they 
"are not claiming in this lawsuit that any of the state's housing 
actions are unconstitutional", but they go on to list various 
housing practices as if that list were somehow responsive to the 
defendants' request that they identify unconstitutional 
affirmative acts. Exhibit D, pp. 18-20. 

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risk” students in the Hartford public schools (Question 4), 

Unless the plaintiffs make no claim that the racial, ethnic, and 

socioeconomic isolation and the concentration of "at risk" 

children which they complain about were caused by any affirmative 

acts on the part of the defendants, the defendants need to know 

what it is the plaintiffs are claiming they did to cause each of 

the conditions the plaintiffs are complaining about. Without 

this information the defendants cannot prepare their defense. 

Even if the plaintiffs' single answer to questions 1 through   4 of Section I were responsive to those questions their answer | 
| 

would still be defective. It would still be defective because it: 
f 

| 
is facially incomplete. On page 2 of their amended response to | 

the defendants' interrogatories the plaintiffs qualify their | 

answer by saying that the answer provides their response "as best. 

as can be determined at this stage of the case." On page 18 they, 

suggest that the facts which they will rely on at trial "will not, 

be limited to" those facts which are listed. On page 20 the 

plaintiffs represent that they "are continuing to investigate 

actions taken by the defendants that have contributed to the 

constitutional violations set out in the Complaint" and that | 

their investigation into certain matters is not complete. On 

  

 



  

  

    

page 21 the plaintiffs say that "[f]urther details in response to 

this interrogatory will be provided in a timely fashion, in 

advance of trial." 

More than a year has passed since those representatives were 

made. There has been no full and final supplementation of the 

plaintiffs qualified responses to defendants interrogatories nor 

have the plaintiffs requested an extension of time to provide the 

long overdue answers. Unless the plaintiffs seek an extension of 

time to file full and final answers to these and the other 

interrogatories in defendants' first set of interrogatories the 

court should rule that the answers provided to date are full and 

final and the court should limit the evidence which the 

plaintiffs may present at trial accordingly. If the plaintiffs 

seek an extension of time to file full and final answers the 

court should make such adjustments in the outstanding scheduling 

order as are necessary to give 1f defendants adequate opportunity 

to meet the issues raised by plaintiffs' amended response. 

B. 

SECTION 11: "PAST VIOLATIONS: OMISSIONS" 
  

(OUESTIONS 5-7, EXHIBIT D, PAGES 22-32) 
    
 



  

  

    

At various times throughout the proceedings which have taken 

place so far in this case the plaintiffs have represented to the 

court that this case is one in which the plaintiffs claim that 

the defendants have violated the constitution by failing to take 

appropriate action to address the concentration of minority 

children, poor children, and "at risk" children in Hartford 

public schools. Section 11 of the defendants' first set of 

interrogatories is designed, quite simply, to find out what it is 

the plaintiffs claim the defendants were obliged by the 

constitution to do but did not do. See Exhibit Db, pp. 22-32. 

This section contains three questions. The first, question 

5, is designed to elicit what it was the defendants should have 

done "to address the condition of racial and ethnic isolation”. 

The second question, question 6, is designed to elicit what it 

was the defendants should have done "to address the the condition 

of socioeconomic isolation." The third question, question 7, 1s 

designed to elicit what it was the defendants should have done 

"to address the conditions created by the concentration of 'at 

risk' children in the Hartford Public Schools." Some detail 

regarding what it was the plaintiffs claim the defendants should 

have done is also requested. 

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On pages 10-11 of "Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to 

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment" dated September 20, 

1991, the plaintiffs' attorneys represent that "plaintiffs are 

not complaining about what did or did not happen in the past.” 

Given this statement one would expect the plaintiffs to answer 

the questions in Section II, as well as the questions in Section 

1, by saying that they make no claim that the defendants were 

required by the constitution to address the conditions which they 

complain about in any specific way. But, once again, the 

plaintiffs offer a confusing and unresponsive answer. 

Instead of responding directly to the defendants' questions 

by identifying the specific action which the defendants were 

obliged to take to satisfy the requirements of the constitution, 

the plaintiffs have offered the defendants a list of reports and 

recommendations with the following qualifying language: 

Plaintiffs will not necessarily claim that if 

implemented, the specific programs and 

policies offered in such reports and 

recommendations would have been sufficient to 

address the constitutional violation. 

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Neither will plaintiffs necessarily claim 

that any one particular recommendation was 

required by the State Constitution. 

Exhibit D, pp. 23-24. This qualification to the plaintiffs’ 

answer negates the answer. The plaintiffs are, 1n effect, 

refusing to answer the defendants' questions. 

If the plaintiffs hope to establish liability in this case 

based upon the defendants failure to carry out an affirmative 

obligation imposed upon them by the constitution, the plaintiffs 

must specifically identify what it was the defendants should have 

done but 4id not do. ‘Unless it is Clear that the defendants 

could have done something specific to address the conditions 

which the plaintiffs complain about, that what they could have 

done would have been effective in preventing or changing the 

conditions the plaintiffs are complaining about, and that the 

defendants could have taken this action without adversely 

affecting other interests in a way which made this action unwise 

or illegal, the plaintiffs cannot ask the court to speculate on 

the existence of some unfulfilled affirmative obligation. The 

court must order the plaintiffs to respond in a direct and   
  
 



      

comprehensive fashion to Questions 5 through 7. The plaintiffs 

must identify the specific action which they claim the defendants 

should have taken in order to give the defendants the necessary 

opportunity to study the wisdom of the plaintiffs' claim and 

properly prepare the record upon vhich the court will act. 

As in the case of the plaintiffs' answers to the 

interrogatories found in Section I of the defendants' first set 

of interrogatories, the answers given in response to the 

questions in Section II are defective for the additional reason 

that they are facially incomplete. The plaintiffs make it clear 

on page 24 of Exhibit D that the recommendations which they 

suggest the defendants ought to have considered (even though they! 

may not have satisfied the alleged constitutional mandate) "may 

include but are not limited" to those which the plaintiffs have 

listed. On page 28 the plaintiffs make it clear that their 

answers are based on claims and information known to them "at 

this time", i.e. February 1991. (Also see pages 30 and 31 where 

the plaintiffs use the language "at this point".) The plaintiffs 

answers are not the full and final answers required by the rules 

of discovery. 

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The plaintiffs answers to Questions 5 through 7 in Section 

II of the defendants' first set of interrogatories are defective 

because they are not responsive and they are clearly incomplete. 

Cs 

SECTION III: "CURRENT OR ONGOING VIOLATIONS" 
  

(QUESTIONS 8-10, EXHIBIT D PAGES 32-33 AND EXHIBIT E) 
  

If it is true as the plaintiffs stated in "Plaintiffs 

Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary 

Judgment”, pp. 10-11 (September 20, 1991) that "plaintiffs are 

not complaining about what did or did not happen in the past", 

then liability in this case must turn on something other than 

wrongful acts (Section I of defendants interrogatories) or   wrongful omissions (Section II of defendants' interrogatories). 
| 

According to the "novel" legal theory on which the plaintiffs are! 
| 

| 

pursuing this case, liability in this case must turn on the 

existence of a "condition" which, by itself and without regard to 

how it came about, violates the constitution. | 

Assuming that a "condition" by itself can violate the 

constitution that "condition must violate the constitution 

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because it stands in contrast to a. different "condition” which is 

constitutionally required or acceptable. 

In Section 111 of the defendants' first set of 

interrogatories the defendants ask the plaintiffs to identify the 

conditions as they should be in order for there to be no 

violation of the constitution; i.e. no "CURRENT OR ONGOING 

VIOLATIONS" of the constitution. The necessity of- having this 

information from the plaintiffs should be obvious. The court 

will have no basis upon which to find that the "conditions" which 

exist violate the constitution unless the court first decides 

what "conditions" the constitution requires. To prove their case 

the plaintiffs must show how the existing conditions differ from 

the constitutionally required conditions. They must, therefore, 

have some alternate condition in mind.   
It appears that the condition which 1s required by the 

constitution according to the plaintiffs’ thinking is one which 

involves a different racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic mix of 

students in the public schools in the Hartford area and some form 

of de-concentration of "at risk" children. The questions in 

Section III of the defendants' interrogatories simply ask the 

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plaintiffs to identify the mix that they believe must exist in 

order to satisfy what they believe to be the requirements of the 

constitution. Question 8 asks the plaintiffs to identify the 

constitutionally required racial and ethnic mix. Question 9 asks 

the plaintiffs to identify the constitutionally required 

socioeconomic mix. Question 10 asks the plaintiffs to identify 

the constitutionally required mix of "at risk" children. 

Whether the mixes which the plaintiffs believe are 

constitutionally required are achievable or whether they are 

achievable only at an intolerable cost to other important 

interests is an important issue going to the merits of this case. 

The defendants need to know what the plaintiffs claim the 

conditions must be in order to satisfy the constitution so the 

defendants can bring to the court's attention all of the facts 

which the court needs to be aware of before the court can begin 

to consider whether the conditions which exist should be deemed 

unconstitutional. 

The plaintiffs have responded to the questions in Section 

III of the defendants' first set of interrogatories by objecting 

and refusing to answer the questions. Exhibit E. The substance 

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of the plaintiffs' objection is their argument that they are not 

required to answer these questions because the questions relate 

to remedy, not liability. The simple answer to the plaintiffs’ 

objection is that they are wrong. 

On their face the defendants' questions relate to "CURRENT 

OR ONGOING VIOLATIONS" of the constitution, not remedy. 

Furthermore, the discussion in the preceding paragraphs should 

make it evident that the questions in Section III bear a direct 

relationship to the issue of liability in this case. It is the 

defendants' position that the plaintiffs cannot prove that 

current conditions violate the constitution without first 

establishing what the constitutionally required conditions are. 

Given this position the defendants are entitled to discovery on 

these points as they are with any other matter that bears on the 

issue of liability. 

Finally, it should be noted that even if the defendants’ 

questions in this section of their interrogatories did relate to 

remedy, the plaintiffs' objection would be unfounded. Pre-trial 

discovery which relates to the remedy of damages 1s readily 

available; Susman v. The Hamden Chronicle, 17 Conn. Sup. 40 
  

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(1949); and there is no reason to treat a case which seeks 

discovery regarding other remedies any different. 

Recently the plaintiffs have disclosed two expert witnesses 

who they intend to rely on, in part, to offer testimony in regard 

to remedy. It appears that the plaintiffs now have the 

information they need to answer the questions in Section III of 

the defendants' interrogatories. There is no good reason to 

allow the plaintiffs to hide their proposed remedy in the closet 

until the court, at the plaintiffs invitation, has moved down a 

road that has never been travelled before and that has no certain 

end. 

Plaintiffs' objections to questions 8, 9, and 10 should be 

overruled and the plaintiffs ordered to submit full and final 

answers to each of these questions by a date certain. 

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D. 

SECTION IV: "MINIMALLY ADEQUATE EDUCATION" 
  

(QUESTIONS 11 AND 12, EXHIBIT D PAGES 33-36) 
  

In Sections IV and V of the etandants’ first set of 

interrogatories the defendants ask the plaintiffs to specify the 

basis for two separate claims made by the plaintiffs; i.e. the 

claim that Hartford school children are being denied a "minimally 

adequate education" and the claim that Hartford school children 

are not being provided with an "equal education" in comparison to 

other children. The plaintiffs answer the interrogatories in   
these separate sections as 1f they asked same thing. The 

plaintiffs' responses to the defendants' two questions in the 

section regarding "minimally adequate education" simply 

incorporate their answers to the questions in the section 

tH regarding "equal education". 

H The error in the plaintiffs response 1s evident from the 

Court's decision on the defendants' motion for summary judgment. 

In that decision the Court points to the plaintiffs' claim that 

Hartford schoolchildren are being denied a "minimally adequate 

education" and says that, as a result of that allegation, the 

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plaintiffs are "entitled to a judicial determination of whether 

the constitution requires a particular substantive level of 

education in the school districts in which they reside." 

Memorandum of Decision on the Defendants' Motion for Summary 

Judgment, p. 11 (February 24, 1992). Clearly this issue is very 

different than the plaintiffs' claim that Hartford schoolchildren 

are not being treated equally. 

Questions 11 and 12 in Section IV of defendants' first set 

of interrogatories focus directly on the issue of whether 

Hartford schoolchildren are being afforded a constitutionally 

37 
required minimum substantive level of education.” ’ To answer 

questions 11 and 12 the plaintiffs must define for the court and 

the defendants what they believe to be the constitutionally 

required minimum substantive level of education in terms of both 

"inputs" (Question 11) and "outputs" (Question 12). and then list 

the specific facts they will rely on in their attempt to prove 

  

3/ It should be noted that the defendants do not agree that the 
constitution establishes any judicially recognizable minimum 
substantive level of education. The constitution leaves it to 
the General Assembly to set minimum standards for education. 
This allows for the flexibility necessary to serve the problems 
and needs of the time. 

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that Hartford schoolchildren are not receiving this minimum 

substantive level of education. 

The plaintiffs have wholly failed to answer the questions in 

this Section IV of the defendants First set of interrogatories. 

Their reference to the answers they give to questions 13 and 14 

is irrelevant since the limited information provided in response 

to those questions deals with "disparities and inequities” when 

Hartford schoolchildren are compared to other schoolchildren. 

The questions 1n this Section relate to the alleged deprivation 

of a constitutionally mandated minimum substantive level of 

education. The questions call for a comparison between what 

Hartford schoolchildren get and whatever it is the plaintiffs 

claim the constitutional mandates as a minimum substantive level 

of education, not a comparison between what Hartford 

schoolchildren get and what some other group of schoolchildren 

get. 

The court should order the plaintiffs to provide full and 

complete responses which directly and separately address 

questions 11 and 12. 

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E. 

SECTION V: "EQUAL EDUCATION" 
  

(QUESTIONS 13 AND 14, EXHIBIT D PAGES 34-36) 
  

In their complaint the plaintiffs identify a group of cities 

and towns which they refer to as "suburbs" of Hartford. Since 

this group includes towns that are geographically more distant 

from Hartford then other towns which are not among the group 

(e.g. New Britain), the criteria the plaintiffs used to identify 

these suburban towns is not clear. Nevertheless, the plaintiffs 

rely, at least in part, on alleged inequalities between the 

Hartford public schools and the public schools in these cities 

and towns to state their case. The questions in Section V of the 

plaintiffs' first set of interrogatories are designed to force 

the plaintiffs to identify the specific inequalities between 

Hartford and the suburbs which the plaintiffs intend to rely on 

to prove their case. 

The plaintiffs have been provided with tremendous amounts of 

information from the defendants' records and, presumably, have 

looked elsewhere for information upon which to make their 

comparisons. Clearly the defendants need to know what 

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comparisons the plaintiffs will use to attempt to establish 

- constitutional inequalities, what the plaintiffs' comparisons 

show, and how the plaintiffs made those comparisons long before 

trial if the parties are to properly meet on these issues. The 

defendants need to examine plaintiffs’ comparisons to determine 

whether they were properly done and whether they are reliable. 

If they were not properly done or they are not reliable 

defendants may need to conduct their own comparative studies to   give the court the proper picture.   | 

| Plaintiffs answers to questions 13 and 14 are no answers at 

all. In these answers the plaintiffs indicate that they are 

. ! "compiling data and information on disparities and inequalities” 

and suggest some of the areas of comparison the "may" be looking 

into. They make it clear that their list of areas in which they   "may" be looking for comparisons does not necessarily include all 

  
of the areas in which they will be looking for comparisons. | 

| 

The fact that the defendants submitted their interrogatories, 

to the plaintiffs 22 months ago and that the plaintiffs have | 

made no serious effort to answer the basic questions which the | 

defendants have posed regarding disparities and inequities 

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between Hartford and the suburbs, demonstrates the inappropriate 

and abusive way in which the plaintiffs have responded to 

virtually all of the defendants' interrogatories. 

In order to comply with Connecticut Practice Book § 224 the 

plaintiffs must answer the defendants interrogatories, ask for 

more time in which to answer them, or file objections to them. 

It is not acceptable to file interim answers as the plaintiffs 

have done. The obligation imposed by Connecticut's rules of 

practice is to file the answer, upon which the defendants may 

rely. Conn. Practice Book § 232 which requires supplementation 

of answers under certain circumstances, neither contemplate nor 

allow a party to file an answer which it concedes from the start 

is incomplete. If the defendants cannot rely on information 

obtained through discovery as being full and complete, a major 

purpose of discovery, that is, to make a trial a fair contest 

with basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practical 

extent, is totally defeated. Sturdivant v. Yale-New Haven 
  

  

Hospital, 2 Conn. App. 103, 476 A.24 1074 (1984). Lacking 

responses which are complete and final, the defendants cannot 

prepare a defense, they can only shadow box with issues and 

information which may change before trial.   
  
 



      

It is worthy of note that information relating to the public 

schools in this state (other than personally identifiable student 

information and other privileged material) is generally available 

to the public under the state's Freedom of Information Act 

(FOIA). In fact the plaintiffs' attorneys used this FOIA to 

obtain information before they filed this suit. Now this suit is 

more than three years old and the defendants interrogatories 

asking the plaintiff to identify the comparisons upon which they 

base their conclusory allegations that Hartford schoolchildren 

are being denied an equal educational opportunity are almost two 

years old. But the plaintiffs have yet to disclose the specific 

comparisons they will rely on to support their allegations of 

unequal education. 

If the amount of time which it has taken the plaintiffs so 

far make the comparisons they will rely on to support their claim 

of unequal education is any indication of the time and effort the 

defendants will need to put into analyzing the plaintiffs' as yet 

undisclosed comparisons and preparing alternate comparisons, it 

ought to be clear that trial in this case is considerably further 

off than the outstanding Scheduling Order would lead one to 

suspect. It should also be clear that, unless trial is delayed 

-25- 

  
| 
| 

  
 



  

    
  

    

to give the defendants a proper opportunity to prepare evidence 

responsive to the answers which the platntires will ultimately 

offer to the defendants' interrogatories, the plaintiffs will 

have successfully subverted the discovery process by providing 

incomplete answers and failing to ask for more time to provide 

full and final answers. The plaintiffs gamesmanship will leave 

the court to decide this important case on a seriously 

underdeveloped record unless the court steps in now and makes 

those orders which are necessary to ensure proper responses to 

the defendants' interrogatories and a fair opportunity for the 

defendants to prepare their defense. 

MISCELLANEOUS INTERROGATORIES 
  

(QUESTIONS 15, 16 AND 19, EXHIBIT D PAGES 36-37, 39-41) 
  

In Questions 15, 16 and 19 of the defendants' first set of 

interrogatories are general questions designed to obtain facts 

and information which the plaintiffs will rely on at trial that 

may not fall within the more specific questions found in earlier 

interrogatories and facts and information the defendants need to 

know to properly analyze any data compilations plaintiffs intend 

-26- 

  
  

  
 



  

  

    

to rely on at trial. As with their other answers, it is clear 

from the plaintiffs' responses to questions 15, 16 and 19 that 

those responses are incomplete. Since the plaintiffs have not 

been given an extension of time to provide complete and final 

answers to these interrogatories the court should issue an order 

requiring full and final answers by a date certain. 

G. 

CONCLUSION 
  

The plaintiffs' answers to the defendants' first set of 

interrogatories are largely unresponsive and wholly incomplete. 

The defendants answers to questions ll, 2, 3, 4,5, 6, 7, 11,12, 

13, 14, 15, 16 and 19 should be stricken and the plaintiffs 

ordered to provide full and final answers which are directly 

responsive to each of those questions by a date certain. The 

plaintiffs’ objections to questions 8, 9 and 10 are unfounded and 

should be overruled with the plaintiffs being ordered to provide 

full and final answers which are directly responsive to each of 

those questions by a date certain as well. After the plaintiffs 

have provided full and final responses to each of the defendants’ 

interrogatories and the defendants have had an opportunity to 

-27-   
 



      

review these answers to determine what they need to do to respond 

at trial the court should schedule a status conference for the 

purposes of considering necessary changes in the outstanding 

scheduling order. 

By: 

FOR THE DEFENDANTS 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 

Bernard F. McGovern, Jr. 
id Attorney General 

reine SE 
ihe, Fi gh 7 

Johh R. “Abe Tan’ 
Assistant Attorney General 

  

110 Sherman Street 
‘Hartford, Connecticut 06105 
Telephone: 566-7173 

CERTIFICATION 
  

This is to certify that a copy of the foregoing was mailed 

postage prepaid to the following counsel of record on 

May /i, 1992: 

John Brittain, Esq. 
University of Connecticut 
School of Law 
65 Elizabeth Street 
Hartford, CT 06105 

Wilfred Rodriguez, Esq 
Hispanic Advocacy Project 
Neighborhood Legal Services 
1229 Albany Avenue 

-28- 

  

 



      

Hartford, CT 06112 

Philip Tegeler, Esq. 
Martha Stone, Esq. 
Connecticut Civil Liberties Union 
32 Grand Street 
Hartford, CT 06106 

Wesley W. Horton, Esq. 
Mollier, Horton & Fineberg, P.C. 
90 Gillett Street 
Hartford, CT 06105 

Ruben Franco, Esq. 
Jenny Rivera, Esq. 
Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund 

99 Hudson Street 
l4th Floor 
New York, NY 10013 

Julius L. Chambers, Esq 
Marianne Lado, Esq. 
Ronald Ellis, Esq. 
NAACP Legal Defense Fund and 
Educational Fund, Inc. 
99 Hudson Street 
New York, NY 10013 

John A. Powell, Esq. 
Helen Hershkoff, Esq. 
Adam S. Cohen, Esq. 
American Civil Liberties Union 
132 West 43rd Street 
New York, NY 10036 

7 z 5d 

/ z / y / 
[ £7 4 rd hh 

{ : ul At / ly 2 ~ Al 
/ A ~ 

5 i «70 ; Vil. 

Joh R. Whelan 
Assistant Attorney General 

<
N
 

  

-29- 

  

 



  

State of Connectient 
a     

CLARINE NARDI RIDDLE 
~ ATTORNEY GENERAL 

Office of The Attorney General 

MacKENZIE HALL 
110 SHERMAN STREET 

; HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT 06105 
566-7140 TELECOPIER (203) 523-5536 

November 7, 1990 

Philip Tegeler, Esq. 
CCLU 
32 Grand Street 
Hartford, CT 06106 

RE: Sheff v. O'Neill 

Docket No. CV 89-030977S 
  

Dear Phil: 

Thank you for the copy of "Plaintiffs' Responses to Defendants 
First Set of Interogatories"™ which we received recently. I am 
sure it is no surprise to you that we find your responses grossly 
inadequate. For the most part our questions have gone unanswered 
and those answers which have been provided have been extremely 
limited or unresponsive. 

It is clear from your answers that, with regard to most matters, 
you are not prepared to offer us final responses. Under these 
circumstances it is appropriate for you to seek an extension of 
time to provide full and final responses. The questions which we 
have posed are critical and we cannot begin to focus our energies 
toward preparing an appropriate defense until we have full and 
complete answers. It is inappropriate for you to provide answers 
to our questions in the form which suggests that you have met 
your obligation to respond to our discovery, leaving us with only 
naked representations that you will provide us with a full and 
final response to our discovery in what the plaintiffs would 
consider to be a timely fashion prior to trial. I have no doubt 
that what the plaintiffs would consider to be timely would not be 
in line with what the defendants would consider timely. For the 
most part our work will begin when we receive final responses to 

our Interrogatories. I can envision the defendants' needing as 

much time as you will have taken to prepare our responsive 
information and material for the trial.  



Philip Tegeler, Esq. 
November 7, 1990 

- Page 2 

The time limits for responding to discovery are there for a 
purpose. This purpose would entirely defeated if parties could 
file an answer, as you have done, saying they intend to answer 
some time in the future. If full and final answers cannot be 
provided, the party to whom the discovery has been submitted 
should seek an appropriate extension. In this case we would have 
no objection to whatever extension of time you think you need to 
provide final answers, so long as it is understood the defendants 
will need at least as much time to analyze your responses and 
prepare their defense. 

The purpose of this letter is to find out whether you intend to 
seek the necessary extension of time. If not we will have no 
choice but to file a motion to compel since you have, in effect, 
failed to answer our discovery. We ask that you please respond 
to our question in writing. 

Very truly yours, 

CLARINE NARDI RIDDLE 
GENERAL 

Jf 
Whelan 

Assigtant Attorney General 

John Brittain, Esq. 
Wilfred Rodiguez, Esq. 
Martha Stone, Esq. 
Wesley Horton, Esq. 
Jenny Rivera, Esq. 
Julius L. Chambers, Esq. 
Marianne Lado, Esq. : 
Ronald Ellis, Esq. 
Adam S. Cohen 
John Powell, Esq. 
Helen Hershkoff, Esq.. 
Susan T. Pearlman, Assistant Attorney General 
Diane W. Whitney, Assistant Attorney General 
Lloyd Calvert  



    connecticut civil 
liberties union foundation 

- 32 grand street 

hartford, connecticut 06106 

telephone: 247-9823 

  

December 10, 1990 

Mr. John Whelan 
Assistant Attorney General 
MacKenzie Hall 
110 Sherman Street 
Hartford, CT 06105 

RE: Sheff v. O'Neill 
  

Dear John, 

Thank you for your letter of November 7th regarding 
Plaintiffs’ Responses to Defendants’ First Set of 
Interrogatories. 

We are willing to comply with your suggestion that we seek 
an extension of time to respond to defendants’ interrogatories. 
Therefore, as we have discussed, I am enclosing a Motion for 
Extension of Time to January 30, 1991. This extension will 
permit us to give you more detailed responses and may also permit 
us to amend our earlier responses. 

As you know, we are seeking this extension of time to 
forestall a Motion to Compel and to further clarify the issues in 
dispute, and we do not concede any inadequacy in our earlier 
response to Defendants’ First Set of Interrogatories. 

Please call me if you have any further questions. 

Sincerely, 

735. 2 Ge Ne
 

/ {7 & ! (fear ££ 4%) 

Philip D. Tegeler 

Attorney for Plaintiffs 
PDT/dmt 
Enclosure  



      

Cv89-0360977S 

  

MILO SHEFF, et al. SUPERIOR COURT 

Plaintiffs 

JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 

HARTFORD/NEW BRITAIN 
AT HARTFORD 

Ve. 

WILLIAM A. O'NEILL, et al. 

Defendants DECEMBER 10, 1990 

  

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO RESPOND 
TO DEFENDANTS' FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES 
  

  

Plaintiffs respectfully request an extension of time until 

January 30, 1991 in which to respond to Defendants’ First Set of 

Interrogatories. In support of this motion, plaintiffs state the 

following: 

l. Plaintiffs served their responses to Defendants’ First 

Set of Interrogatories on October 31, 1990. 

2. After consultation with defendants, plaintiffs seek to 

respond in more detail to certain interrogatories, and may also 

seek to amend certain interrogatory responses to clarify the 

issues in dispute. 

3. Defendants have been contacted and have no objection to 

the granting of this Motion. 

ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED 
TESTIMONY NOT REQUIRED 

  

  

   



    
Wesley W. Horton 
Moller, Horton, & Fineberg 
90 Gillett Street 
Hartford, CT 06105 

Julius L. Chambers 
Marianne Lado 
Ron Ellis 
NAACP Legal Defense & 

Educational Fund, Inc. 
99 Hudson Street 
New York, NY 10013 

Helen Hershkoff 
John A. Powell 
Adam Cohen 
American Civil Liberties 

Union Foundation 
132 West 43rd Street 
New York, NY 10036 

Respectfully Submitted, 

YL. JEELLrc 
  

Philip D. Tegeler 
Martha Stone 
Connecticut Civil Liberties 

Union Foundation 
32 Grand Street 
Hartford, CT 06106 

Wilfred Rodriguez 
Hispanic Advocacy Project 
Neighborhood Legal Services 
1229 Albany Avenue 
Hartford, CT 06112 

John Brittain 
University of Connecticut 

School of Law 
65 Elizabeth Street 
Hartford, CT 06105 

Jenny Rivera 
Puerto Rican Legal Defense 

and Education Fund 
99 Hudson Street 
New York, NY 10013 

  

  

  

 



      

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
  

This is to certify that one copy of the foregoing has been 

mailed postage prepaid to John R. Whelan and Diane W. Whitney, 

Assistant Attorney Generals, MacKenzie Hall, 110 Sherman Street, 

Hartford, CT 06105 this /9 Tay of December, 1990. 

  

Philip D. Tegeler 

  

  

  
 



      

Cv89-0360977S 

  

MILO SHEFF, et al. SUPERIOR COURT 

Plaintiffs - 

Y. JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 

HARTFORD/NEW BRITAIN 

WILLIAM A. O'NEILL, et al. AT HARTFORD 

Defendants DECEMBER 10, 1990 

00
 

00
 

@0
 

00
 

00
 

00
 

00
 

90
 

00
 

00
 

00
 

00
 

  

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO RESPOND 
TO DEFENDANTS’ FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES 
  

  

Plaintiffs respectfully request an extension of time until 

January 30, 1991 in which to respond to Defendants’ First Set of 

Interrogatories. In support of this motion, plaintiffs state the 

following: 

1. Plaintiffs served their responses to Defendants’ First 

Set of Interrogatories on October 31, 1990. 

2. After consultation with defendants, plaintiffs seek to 

respond in more detail to certain interrogatories, and may also 

seek tc amend certain interrogatory responses to clarify the 

issues in dispute. 

3. Defendants have been contacted and have no objection to 

the granting of this Motion. 

ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED 
TESTIMONY NOT REQUIRED 

  

  

  

 



      

Wesley W. Horton 
Moller, Horton, & Fineberg 
90 Gillett Street 
Hartford, CT 06105 

Julius L. Chambers 
Marianne Lado 
Ron Ellis 
NAACP Legal Defense & 

Educational Fund, Inc. 
99 Hudson Street 
New York, NY 10013 

Helen Hershkoff 
John A. Powell 
Adam Cohen 
American Civil Liberties 

Union Foundation 
132 West 43rd Street 
New York, NY 10036 

Respectfully Submitted, 

  

HY f. VEEfzrc 
Philip D. Tegeler 
Martha Stone 
Connecticut Civil Liberties 

Union Foundation 
32 Grand Street 
Hartford, CT 06106 

Wilfred Rodriguez 
Hispanic Advocacy Project 
Neighborhood Legal Services 
1229 Albany Avenue 
Hartford, CT 06112 

John Brittain 
University of Connecticut 

School of Law 
65 Elizabeth Street 
Hartford, CT 06105 

i 
i 

Jenny Rivera 
Puerto Rican Legal Defense 

and Education Fund 
99 Hudson Street 
New York, NY 10013 

  

  

  
 



      

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
  

This is to certify that one copy of the foregoing has been 

mailed postage prepaid to John R. Whelan and Diane W. Whitney, 

Assistant Attorney Generals, MacKenzie Hall, 110 Sherman Street, 

Hartford, CT 06105 this /¢ ay of December, 1990. 

WY J EEL 
  

Philip D. Tegeler 

LJ
 

  
 



      

CvB89-03609778S 

  

| MIT,0 SHEFF, et al. : SUPERIOR COURT 

Plaintiffs : 

Vv. JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
HARTFORD/NEW BRITAIN 
AT HARTFORD WILLIAM A. O'NEILL, et al. 

Defendants FEBRUARY 19, 1591 

  

PLAINTIFFS’ AMENDED RESPONSES TO DEFENDANTS’ 
FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES 
  

  

PAST VIOLATIONS: AFFIRMATIVE ACTS 
  

1. Please identify each and every affirmative act by the 

defendants, their predecessors, or any other state officer, 

agency or other body which the plaintiffs will claim at trial 
violated the State Constitution. For each such act provide the 
date the act occurred, the person, agency or other body 
responsible for the act, and any and all information the 

plaintiffs will claim that person, agency or other body had or 

should have had at that time which would have apprised them of 

the consequences of that act. 

  

RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORIES 1, 2, 3, 4: 
  

As plaintiffs have repeatedly maintained, it is the present 

condition of racial segregation in the region’s schools that 

violates the Connecticut Constitution as a matter of law, and the 

harms that flow from the present condition of racial and economic 

  

   



      

segregation that in fact deprive Hartford area school children of 

their right to equality of educational opportunity. 

Defendants have claimed that the requisite “state action” is 

not present here, because, as they argue, the state has taken no 

affirmative steps to cause segregation. As plaintiffs have tried 

to impress upon the court, the state's argument has no basis in 

law. The state controls public education, and the state has an 

affirmative duty to guarantee equal educational opportunity. The 

extensive involvement of the state satisfies every standard of 

state action of which plaintiffs are aware. 

Nonetheless, if defendants persist in this line of argument, 

plaintiffs are prepared to show that defendants have taken 

numerous actions that have “caused” or “contributed to” 

segregation, and that defendants are responsible for existing 

school boundaries that exacerbate segregation. Taken together, 

in whole or in part, these actions by the state can be said to be 

unconstitutional to the extent that they have led to or have 

contributed to the unconstitutional system of racial and economic 

segregation and the concomitant harm that flows from that system. 

A summary of plaintiffs’ proof on these points is set out below, 

as best as can be determined at this stage of the case. 

Plaintiffs reserve the right to amend or supplement their 

responses. 

  
 



      

a. Detendants are legally responsible for the 

creation, maintenance, approval, funding, 

supervision and control of public education. 

  

  

  

Defendants discharge a broad range of statutory 

obligations that demonstrate their control over and 

responsibility for Connecticut's system of public education. 

Defendants provide substantial financial support to schools 

throughout the State to finance school operations. See §§10-262, 

et seg. They also approve, fund, and oversee local school 

building projects, see §§10-282, et seq., and reimburse towns for 

student transportation expenses. See §10-273a. 

Defendant State Board of Education has "general 

supervision and control [over] the educational interests of the 

state,” §10-4, and exercises broad supervision over schools 

throughout the State. It prepares courses of study and curricula 

for the schools, develops evaluation and assessment programs, and 

conducts annual assessments of public schools. See id. The 

Board also prepares a comprehensive plan of long-term goals and 

short-term objectives for the Connecticut public school system 

every five years. See id. 

Defendants exert broad control over school attendance 

and school calendar requirements. They establish the ages at 

which school attendance is mandatory throughout the State. See 

§10-184. They determine the minimum number of school days that 

public schools must be in session each year, and have the 

  
 



      

authority to authorize exceptions to this requirement. See §10- 

15. They also set the minimum number of hours of actual school 

work per school day. See §10-16. In addition, defendants 

promulgate a list of holidays and special days that must be 

suitably observed in the public schools. See §10-29a. 

Defendants are directly involved in the planning and 

implementation of required curricula for the State's public 

schools. They promulgate a list of courses that must be part of 

the program of instruction in all public schools, see §10-16b, 

and they make available curriculum materials to assist local 

schools in providing course offerings in these areas. See id. 

Defendants impose minimum graduation requirements on high schools 

throughout the State, see §10-221a, and they exercise supervisory 

authority over textbook selection in all of the State's public 

schools. See §10-221. In addition, defendants require that all 

public schools teach students at every grade level about the 

effects of alcohol, tobacco, and drugs, see §10-19, and that they 

provide students and teachers with an opportunity for silent 

meditation at the start of every school day. See §10-16a. 

Defendants exert broad authority over the hiring, 

retention, and retirement, of teachers and other school 

personnel. They set minimum teacher standards, see §10-145a, and 

administer a system of testing prospective teachers before they 

are certified by the State. See §10-145f. Certification by 

  
 



      

defendants is a condition of employment for all teachers in the 

Connecticut public school system. See §10-145. All school 

business administrators, see §10-145d, and intramural and 

interscholastic coaches hired must also be certified by 

defendants. See §10-149. Defendants also prescribe statewide 

rules governing teacher tenure, see §10-151, and teacher 

unionization, see §10-153a, and maintain a statewide teachers’ 

retirement program. See §10-183c. 

Defendants supervise a system of proficiency 

examinations for students throughout the State. See §10-14n. 

These examinations, provided and administered by the State Board 

of Education, test all students enrolled in public schools. See 

id. Defendants require students who do not meet State standards 

to continue to take the examinations until they meet or exceed 

expected performance levels. See id. Defendants also promulgate 

procedures for the discipline and expulsion of public school 

students throughout the State. See §10-233a et seq. 

Defendants also exert broad authority over language of 

instruction in public schools throughout the State. They mandate 

that English must be the medium of instruction and administration 

in all public schools in the State. See §10-17. But they also 

require local school districts to classify all students according 

to their dominant language, and to meet the language needs of 

bilingual students. See §10-17f. Defendants require each school 

  
 



        

implementing a program of bilingual education for the first time 

to prepare and submit a plan for implementing such a program to 

the State Commissioner of Education. See id. 

The Connecticut Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that 

public education is, in every respect, a responsibility of the 

state. See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to 

Respondents’ Motion to Strike (November 9, 1989) (pp. 7-15). 

While certain aspects of administration are delegated to local 

districts, such delegation is only at the pleasure of the state, 

and in no way diminishes the state’s ultimate duty to provide 

public education. Plaintiffs will present evidence of the 

history of state control over local education in Connecticut 

through their expert historical witness, Professor Christopher 

Collier. 

b. The state requires, pursuant to C.G.S. §10-240, that 
school district boundaries be coterminous with municipal 

boundaries. 

  

  

  

The requirement that town and school district boundaries 

be coterminous was imposed by the state in 1909. Prior to 1909, 

there was no state requirement that town and school district 

lines be the same, and many school districts crossed town lines. 

Since 1909, there has been no change in school district 

boundaries in the Hartford region, even as those school districts 

became increasingly segregated. Thus, the state-imposed system 

of coterminous town and school district boundaries served as a 

  
 



      

legal template on which the pattern of school segregation was 

laid out. 

Even in 1909, although Connecticut’s black population 

was very small, the pattern of black migration and racially 

identifiable housing was already becoming established. By 1909, 

roughly 92% of Connecticut blacks were living in the cities. 

Thus, restriction of school districts to city boundaries had the 

foreseeable impact of limiting black access to suburban schools. 

The modern pattern of school segregation also traces its 

foundations to a system of official segregation in the 19th 

century. 

The only exception to the requirement of coterminous 

town and school district boundaries is where two or more 

districts voluntarily enter into a regional school district with 

state approval, pursuant to C.G.S. §10-39 et seq. However, 

regionalization requires voluntary suburban participation. 

There is no constitutional basis for the legal 

requirement that town and school district boundaries be 

coterminous. Nor is there any practical basis for the 

requirement. Indeed, the requirement, as applied to the Hartford 

metropolitan area, operates to maintain a system of racial and 

economic segregation. School districts throughout the United 

States are organized on other than a town-by-town basis. In 

Connecticut, intertown arrangements have been approved, 

  
 



  

| encouraged, or mandated by the state, in the areas of sewer, 

water, transportation, and education. In the area of education, 

the state has established regional vocational-educational 

schools, and has encouraged interdistrict cooperative 

arrangements among suburban communities in special education 

programs. However, since 1954, with the exception of Project 

Concern, which the state has failed to adequately fund (see 

response to Interrogatory 5), the state provided little or no 

funding for urban/suburban interdistrict programs in regular 

education until after the present lawsuit was announced. 

c. The state requires, pursuant to C.G.S. §10-184, 
that school-age children attend public school 
within the school district wherein the child 

resides. 

  

  

  

  

Pursuant to C.G.S. 10-184, parents are required to send 

their children seven and over and under sixteen to a school “in 

the district wherein such child resides.” Defendants have 

enforced this statute to prevent children living in the city of 

Hartford from attending school in suburban districts. For 

example, in 1985, four parents living in Hartford sent their 

children across town lines to the Bloomfield school system in 

order to secure an integrated and minimally adequate education 

for their children. The State, with the knowledge that the 

system of education these children were receiving was better in 

Bloomfield, employed the criminal process and had the parents       
 



  

    

      

arrested for larceny pursuant to C.G.S. 53a-119. See State v. 
  

Saundra Foster, et al. (spring 1985). 
  

Plaintiffs will also present historical evidence that 

prior to the adoption of C.G.S. §10-184, school children in 

Connecticut, and particularly, in the Hartford region, often 

crossed district lines to obtain education. 

d. From approximately 1954 to the present, the State 
Department of Education and the State Board of 
Education have engaged in a massive program of new 

school construction and school additions or 
renovations in Hartford and the surrounding 
communities, with direct knowledge of the 
increasing segregation in Hartford area schools. 

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

By 1954, defendants were well aware of the growing 

pattern of racial segregation in education and its alleged harm 

to black children. Between 1954 and the present, defendants 

approved and funded the construbtion of over ninety new schools 

in virtually all-white suburban communities, representing over 

50% of the total school enrollment in the region. [Source: H.C. 

Planning Associates Survey and local reports] During the same 

time period, defendants financed a major expansion of school 

capacity within the increasingly racially isolated Hartford 

school district. 

  
 



      

30. 

e. The state's adoption and implementation of the "Racial 
Imbalance” law and requlations has contributed to and 
authorized racial segregation in Hartford schools. 

  

  

  

1. Public Act 173, "An Act Concerning Racial Imbalance 

in the Public Schools” codified as §10-226a-e was passed in July 

1969, requiring “racial balance” among schools within individual 

districts. The state adopted the intra-district racial imbalance 

law with knowledge that segregation was increasingly an inter- 

district phenomenon. As the minutes of a meeting of the 

Legislative Committee on Human Rights and Opportunities on 

December 5, 1969 reflect, by 1969 it was well established that it 

was no longer possible to remedy the problem of racially and 

economically segregated schools by desegregating or balancing 

city schools, where minorities were already in the majority. To 

mandate only intra-district desegregation was to get the suburbs 

off "scot free.” (at 1). By 1969, the state was aware of the 

multiple reports, including those that gave rise to Project 

Concern in 1966, that concluded that racial and economic 

isolation was an inter-district problem that demanded an inter- 

district remedy. The state was well aware that solutions 

restricted by town boundaries would only burden urban areas and 

plague them with further racial polarization. 

2. The State Board of Education’s delay, from 1969 

until 1980, in the adoption of regulations to implement the state 

racial imbalance law required by C.G.S. §226e foreseeably 

  
 



  

    

    

-11 = 

contributed to racial and ethnic segregation of the schools. In 

September, 1969, racial imbalance regulations were prepared and 

presented to the State Board of Education. School districts were 

notified and the State Board declared its intent to adopt the 

regulations. At a time when urban areas were racially polarized, 

these actions also notified non-minorities living in the city of 

fariford that desegregation of their schools was imminent. By 

delaying the adoption of the controversial regulations, the 

state’s white citizens were given ample time to find alternative 

arrangements for the schooling of their children. 

Although time was of the essence and the racial 

composition of city schools were rapidly changing, in March, 1970 

after public hearings held in Hartford, the proposed regulations 

were rejected. From 1971 to 1975 nothing was done to correct the 

problem. Not until 1976 were efforts even renewed to draft 

regulations in compliance with the mandate of §10-226. 

In May, 1977, the State Board of Education adopted a 

Policy and Guidelines for the development of regulations, in 

accordance with the Board's stated belief that segregated schools 

could not provide truly equitable learning opportunities. 

Defendants had knowledge of both the inter-district nature of 

segregation in the Hartford area and the continuing fast pace of 

change in the racial composition of schools in the city of 

Hartford. Nevertheless, no regulations were adopted in 1977. 

  
 



        

-12'4 

Significantly, the ethnic distribution of the 

student population changed markedly during the state's delay. 

From 1970 to 1980, the white student population in city schools 

decreased dramatically, while the non-white population increased. 

while the trend toward increasing racial isolation within the 

city of Hartford had been clear in 1969, the concept of an intra- 

district remedy had quickly become irrelevant. 

3. In April, 1980, more than ten years after the 

passage of the racial imbalance law and long after school 

desegregation within the city of Hartford might have had meaning, 

the state prepared and adopted racial imbalance regulations. The 

regulations established that a school was ”imbalanced” if its 

minority enrollment was more that 25 percentage points above or 

below the district-wide proportion of minority students in that 

grade range. 

As the State has itself reported, “the statute and 

regulations have always placed a heavy burden on those school 

districts having large minority student enrollments.” State 

Department of Education, "A Report Providing Background 

Information Concerning the Chronology and Status of Statutes, 

Regulations and Processes Regarding Racial Imbalance in 

Connecticut Schools” (January, 1984), at 1. Not only did the 

passage of the racial imbalance law and delay in promulgation of 

its regulations contribute to racial, ethnic, and economic 

  
 



        

-"13 - 

segregation in the Hartford metropolitan area, but enforcement of 

the racial imbalance law, with its punitive measures for racial 

imbalance, places an undue and unfair burden on Hartford and 

other urban school districts with high proportions of African 

American and Latino students, while releasing suburban districts 

from their responsibility to ensure equity and racial balance. 

In addition, as the State further reported in 1984, "as the 

overall percentage of minority students in the three largest 

cities continues to grow, the concepts on which the statute is 

predicated become questionable.” Id. 

Hartford was one of the seven urban districts found 

by the State Board of Education in 1979 to be in violation of the 

racial imbalance law. In March, 1981, the Equal Education and 

Racial Balance Task Force, established by the Hartford Board of 

Education to assist in the development of a plan to comply with 

the new law, not only arrived at a plan but also recommended 

changes in the racial imbalance law and regulations to make them 

applicable and workable in the City of Hartford. In April, 1981, 

Hartford's plan to correct racial imbalance within the school 

district was approved by the State Board of Education. In June, 

1981, over eleven years after the passage of the racial imbalance 

law, defendants began to monitor the Hartford schools for 

compliance with the law. In 1988, the State Department again 

notified the Hartford schools that Kennelly and Naylor, with 

  
 



        

minority enrollments of 38.2% and 32.9% respectively, were, by 

definition, racially imbalanced, since they were more than 25 

percentage points below the city-wide average of 90.5%. Yet, as 

the Hartford public schools stated in its "Alternate Proposal to 

Address Racial Imbalance,” "[i]t is clear that the establish ed 

definition of racial balance is meaningless for the city of 

Hartford. As long as the boundaries of the attendance district 

of the Hartford schools is coterminous with the boundaries of the 

city, no meaningful numerical balance can be achieved, and it 

would be an exercise in futility to develop proposals to seek 

racial balance.” “Alternate Proposal,” (1988) at 6. (The 

Alternate Proposal was approved by the state.) 

f. The state has further contributed to segregation by 
authorizing and/or requiring payment of transportation 
costs by local districts for students attending private 
schools, and by reimbursing local districts for said 

costs. 

  

  

  

  

l. Pursuant to C.G.S. §10-281, the state requires 
school districts to provide transportation to 
private nonprofit schools and provides reimbursement 
for expenses incurred by the district in providing 
this transportation. 

Pursuant C.G.S. §10-281, the state requires school 

districts to provide transportation to a private nonprofit school 

in the district whenever a majority of the students attending the 

private school are residents of Connecticut and provides for the 

reimbursement of expenses incurred by districts providing this 

transportation. Plaintiffs intend to produce evidence that the 

  
 



        

implementation of this law by defendants caused and contributed 

to increased racial, ethnic, and economic concentration in the 

Hartford metropolitan area, in violation of the Connecticut 

Constitution. 

Since 1971, the state has required districts to 

provide transportation to private schools when a majority of 

students live in the district. P.A. 653 §§1,2. Defendants have 

implemented and enforced this statute with direct knowledge of 

its segregative effect. In 1971, the relative percentages of 

African American and Latino group enrollment in the public and 

non-public schools in the Hartford area were enormously 

different. In essence, defendants not only supported a private 

school system that, through its admissions policies, effectively 

excluded the poor, but also subsidized the transfer of white 

school children out of the public school system and into these 

private schools at the same time that intra-district 

desegregation of the public schools was planned. 

In 1974, the state expanded the mandate of §10-281, 

requiring districts to provide transportation for students at 

private schools when a majority of students attending the schools 

are from Connecticut, versus from the particular district. P.A. 

74-257 §1. Defendants implemented this expansion, thereby 

subsidizing the transfer of white students out of the Hartford 

public schools, with a full awareness of its discriminatory 

  
 



        

- 16 - 

effect. Defendants continue to require and subsidize the 

transportation of students to non-public schools in the Hartford 

metropolitan area. 

2. Pursuant to §10-280a, the state permits school 
districts to provide transportation to private 
nonprofit schools in other districts and, between 
1978 and 1989, provided reimbursement for expenses 
incurred for transportation to contiguous districts 
within Connecticut. 

From 1978 through 1989, pursuant to §10-280a, the 

state also reimbursed school districts in the Hartford area for 

transportation of students to private schools in contiguous 

Connecticut districts, thus facilitating the attendance of a 

predominantly white, relatively well-off group of students at 

non-public schools. The state adopted §10-280a in 1978 with 

knowledge of the problem of segregation in Connecticut’s urban 

areas and awareness of the damage to be incurred to the 

desegregation process by the flight of these schoolchildren to 

private schools. See e.g., 21 S. Proc., Pt. 5, 1978 Sess., pp. 
  

1916 (Sen Hudson). 

g. The state contributed to racial and economic 
segregation, and unequal, inadequate educational 
conditions by establishing and maintaining an unequal 
and unconstitutional system of educational financing. 

  

  

  

  

Until 1979 the principal source of school funding came 

from local property taxes, which depended on the wealth of the 

town. This principal source was supplemented by the state by a 

$250 flat grant principal, which applied to the poorest and the 

  
 



        

x7 - 

wealthiest towns. There was great wealth disparity which was 

reflected in widely varying funds available for local education 

and consequently widely varying quality of education among towns. 

The property-rich towns through higher per pupil expenditures 

were able to provide a substantially wider range and higher 

quality of education services than property-poor towns even as 

taxpayers in those towns were paying higher taxes than taxpayers 

in property-rich towns. All this was happening even though the 

state had the non-delegable responsibility to insure the students 

throughout the state received a substantially equal educational 

opportunity. Thus prior to 1979, the system of funding public 

education in the state violated the state constitution. 

In 1979, the state adopted a guaranteed tax base to 

rectify in part the financing inequities. Subsequent delays 

between 1980 and 1985 in implementing the 1979 act and the 

unjustified use of obsolete data made the formula more 

disequalizing and exacerbated disparities in per pupil 

expenditures. These conditions denied students their rights to 

substantially equal educational opportunities under the state 

constitution. [Sources for this section include Horton v. 
  

Meekill, 31 Conn. Sup. 377, 332 A.2d 113 (1974); 1d., 172 Conn. 

615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977); Supreme Court Record in previous case, 

(No. 8127); Horton v. Meskill, 195 Conn. 24, 486 A.2d 1099 
  

(1985); Supreme Court Record in previous case, Nos. 12499-12502) 

  
 



    
he hE 

h. The state has contributed to racial and economic 

| segregation in housing. 
  

  

Plaintiffs are not claiming in this lawsuit that any of 

the state’s housing actions are unconstitutional. Any such 

claims are expressly reserved. However, the state has played an 

important causal role in the process of residential segregation 

in the Hartford region, and plaintiffs will describe, through 

expert testimony, some of the ways that the state of Connecticut 

has contributed to segregated housing patterns. Plaintiffs’ 

testimony on these issues may include but will not be limited to 

the following areas: 

Location of Assisted Housing: At least 73% of 

Hartford-area subsidized family housing units are located in the 

City of Hartford. The state has played a direct role in the 

creation, funding, approval, siting, or administration of many of 

these units over the past 40 years. 

Transportation: During the same time period, the 
  

state has engaged in a series of transportation decisions that 

have increased “white flight” from Hartford, limited minority 

access to employment opportunities, and exacerbated racial and 

economic residential segregation in the Hartford region. 

Affirmative Marketing: In its administration of 
  

state housing programs, the state has failed to monitor and 

enforce affirmative marketing plans for state-funded suburban 

housing developments, including, on information and belief,       
 



        

failure to require affirmative marketing during initial 

occupancy, failure to provide adequate numbers of staff to 

monitor and enforce affirmative marketing requirements, failure 

to conduct surveys of racial occupancy, and failure to require 

affirmative marketing plans until 1988. 

Statutory Barriers: The state has provided suburban 
  

towns with veto power over state-subsidized projects through 

C.G.S. §8-120, which prohibits the Connecticut Housing Authority 

from developing new housing, including Section 8 developments, in 

any municipality without a finding of need or approval by the 

local governing body of the municipality, and through C.G.S. §§8- 

39(a) and 8-40, which prohibit local housing authorities from 

constructing, rehabilitating or financing a housing development 

in a neighboring municipality without that municipality's 

permission. 

Rental Assistance: Another way in which the state   

has contributed to residential segregation through its 

administration of state housing programs is through its 

administration and oversight of state and federal rental 

assistance programs, and its failure to permit or encourage such 

certificates to be used in a portable manner to permit 

certificate holders to cross municipal lines. 

Residency Preferences: The state has officially   

permitted the use of residency preferences by suburban public 

  
 



        

housing authorities, including certain PHAs in the Hartford area. 

Residency preferences have a discriminatory impact in white 

suburban communities, limiting the access of low income minority 

residents to suburban housing opportunities and suburban schools. 

Exclusionary Zoning: The state has been repeatedly 
  

advised of the discriminatory and exclusionary effects of its 

system of planning, zoning and land use laws and regulations, 

which have permitted local governments to erect zoning and other 

land use barriers to the construction of multifamily housing, 

rental housing, manufactured housing, and subsidized low and 

moderate income housing. 

* %* * * %* 

At the present time, plaintiffs are continuing to 

investigate actions taken by defendants that have contributed to 

the constitutional violations set out in the Complaint. 

Plaintiffs’ $nvestigation is ongoing and is subject to amendment 

in a timely fashion. At this time, except as set out above, 

plaintiffs have not completed investigation as to what specific 

"information [defendants]...had or should have had” at particular 

times which would have "apprised defendants of the consequences 

of particular actions.” Plaintiffs’ position is that although 

proof of such “notice” is not necessary for plaintiffs to 

prevail, nonetheless the increasing racial and economic 

segregation in area schools was obvious, and numerous reports and 

  
 



        

-31 

studies put the state on notice of the problems and possible 

causes and solutions. See response to Interrogatory 5. Further 

details in response to this interrogatory will be provided in a 

timely fashion. in advance of trial. 

2. Please identify each and every affirmative act by the 
defendants, their predecessors or any other state officer, agency 
or other body which the plaintiffs will claim at trial caused the 
conditions of racial and ethnic isolation in the Hartford Public 
Schools and/or the identified suburban school districts. For 
each such act provide the date the act occurred, the person, 
agency or other body responsible for the act, and any and all 
information the plaintiffs will claim that person, agency or 
other body had or should have had at that time which would have 
apprised them of the consequences of that act. 

  

RESPONSE: [Please see response to Interrogatory 1] 

  

3. Please identify each and every affirmative act by the 
defendants, their predecessors or any other state officer, agency 
or other body which the plaintiffs will claim at trial caused the 
condition of socio-economic isolation in the Hartford Public 
Schools and/or the identified suburban school districts. For 
each such act provide the date the act occurred, the person, 
agency or other body responsible for the act, and any and all 
information the plaintiffs will claim that person, agency or 
other body had or should have had at that time which would have 
apprised them of the consequences of the act. 

RESPONSE: [Please see response to Interrogatory 1] 

4. Please identify each and every affirmative act by the 
defendants, their predecessors or any other state officer, agency 
or other body which the plaintiffs will claim at trial cause the 
concentration of "at risk” children in the Hartford Public 
Schools. For each such act provide the date the act occurred, 
the person, agency or other body responsible for that act, and 
any and all information the plaintiffs will claim that person, 
agency or other body had or should have had at that time which 
would have apprised them of the consequences of that act. 

  

RESPONSE: [Please see response to Interrogatory 1] 

  
 



        

-02 

PAST VIOLATIONS: OMISSIONS 

5. Please identify each and every affirmative act, step, or 
plan which the plaintiffs will claim at trial the defendants, 
their predecessors, or any other state officer, agency or other 
body were required by the State Constitution to take or implement 
to address the condition of racial and ethnic isolation in the 
Hartford Public Schools and the identified suburban school 
districts, but which was not in fact taken or implemented. For 
each such act, step, or plan provide the following: 

a) The last possible date upon which that act, step or 
plan would necessarily have been taken or 
implemented in order to have avoided a violation 
that the Constitution; 

b) The specific details of how such act, step or plan 
should have been carried out, including (1) the 
specific methods of accomplishing the objectives of 
the act, step or plan, (2) an estimate of how long 
it would have taken to carry out the act, step, or 
plan, and (3) an estimate of the cost of carrying 
out the act, step or plan; 

c) For Hartford and each of the identified suburban 
school districts, the specific number and percentage 
of black, Hispanic and white students who would, of 
necessity, have attended school outside of the then 
existing school district in which they resided in 
order for that act, step or plan to successfully 
address the requirements of the Constitution. 

RESPONSE: As set out in the Complaint, defendants’ failure to 
  

act in the face of defendants’ awareness of the educational 

necessity for racial, ethnic, and economic integration in the 

public schools, defendants’ recognition of the lasting harm 

inflicted on poor and minority students concentrated in urban 

school districts, and defendants’ knowledge of the array of legal 

tools available to defendants to remedy the problem, is violative 

of the State Constitution. Plaintiffs challenge defendants’ 

  
 



  

    

    

- gio 

failure to provide plaintiffs with the equal educational 

opportunities to which the defendants were obligated to ensure. 

Since at least 1965, when the United States Civil Rights 

Commission reported to Connecticut’s Commissioner of Education, 

defendants have had knowledge of the increasing racial, ethnic, 

and economic segregation in the Hartford metropolitan area and 

the power and authority to remedy this school segregation. Not 

only did defendants fail to take comprehensive or effective steps 

to ameliorate the increasing segregation in and among the 

region’s schools, but defendants also failed to provide equal 

access to educational resources to students in the schools in the 

Hartford metropolitan area. Such resources include, but are not 

limited to, number and qualification of staff; facilities; 

materials, books, and supplies; and curriculum offerings. 

Specifically, plaintiffs may present evidence at trial of 

the many reports and recommendations presented to Defendants 

which documented the widespread existence of racial, ethnic, and 

economic segregation and isolation among the school districts and 

which proposed or endorsed remedial efforts to eliminate such 

segregation. Plaintiffs will not necessarily claim that if 

implemented, the specific programs and policies offered in such 

reports and recommendations would have been sufficient to address 

the constitutional violation. Neither will plaintiffs 

necessarily claim that any one particular recommendation was 

  
 



  

- 94 

= required by the State Constitution. These reports and 

| recommendations may include but are not limited to the following: 

a. United States Civil Rights Commission, Report to 
Connecticut's Commissioner of Education (1965); 

b. Center for Field Studies, Harvard Graduate School 
of Education, Schools for Hartford (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University, 1965); 
  

c. "Equality and Quality in the Public Schools,” 
Report of a Conference Sponsored Jointly by the 
Connecticut Commission on Civil Rights and the 
Connecticut State Board of Education,” (1966). 

d. Request by the Connecticut Civil Rights Commission 
to the Governor (request that the Governor take a 
stand against de facto segregation and publish a 
statement on the drawbacks of de facto segregation 
in the schools) (1966). 

e. Committee of Greater Hartford School 
Superintendents, Proposal to Establish a 
Metropolitan Effort Toward Regional Opportunity 
(METRO) (1966); 

f. Legislative Commission on Human Rights and 
Opportunities, Plan for the Creation and Funding of 
Educational Parks (Hartford, December, 1968); 

g. Task Force, Regional Advisory Committee for the 
Capitol Region, “The Suburbs and the Poverty 
Problems of Greater Hartford,” (Hartford, September 
30, 1968); 

h. Irving L. Allen and J. David Colfax, Urban Problems 
and Public Opinion in Four Cities (Urban Research 
Report No. 14, Community Structure Series No. 3; 
Storrs, Conn.: University of Connecticut, 1968); 

  

  

i. Walter R. Boland, et al., De Facto School 
Segregation and The Student: A Study of the 
Schools in Connecticut's Five Major Cities (Urban 

  

  

  

Research Report No. 15, Community Structure Series 
No. 4; Storrs, Conn.: University of Connecticut, 
1968); |       
 



      

- 25 

Educational Resources and Development Center, The 
School of Education and Continuing Education 
Service, University of Connecticut, A Study of 
Urban School Needs in the Five Largest Cities of 

  

  

Connecticut (Storrs, Conn.: University of 
  

Connecticut, 1969); 

Edward A. Lehan, Executive Secretary to the 
Hartford City Manager, Report on Racial Composition 
of Hartford Schools to the State Board of Education 
(Hartford, 1969); 

Joint Committee of the Hartford Board of Education 
and the Human Relations Commission, Hartford, 
Report, (July, 1869); 

City of Hartford, "Community Development Action 
Plan: Education 1971-1975,” (Sept. 1, 1970); 

Hartford Board of Education, “Recommended Revision 
in School Building Program,” (May 18, 1970); 

Local Government: Schools and Property, "The 
  

Report of the Governor's Commission on Tax Reforms, 
Submitted to Governor Thomas J. Meskill Pursuant to 
Executive Order 13 of 1972,” (Hartford, : 
Connecticut, December 18, 1972); 

Commission to Study School Finance and Equal 
Educational Opportunity, Financing Connecticut 
Schools: Final Report of the Commission (Hartford, 

  

  

Conn., January, 1975); 

Equal Education and Racial Balance Task Force, 
appointed by the Hartford Board of Education, 
"Advisory Report,” (Hartford, March, 1981); 

Connecticut State Department of Education, "A Report 
Providing Background Information Concerning the 
Chronology and Status of Statutes, Regulations and 
Processes Regarding Racial Imbalance in Connecticut’s 
Public Schools,” (February 6, 1986); 

Connecticut State Department of Education, “The Issue of 
Racial Imbalance and Quality Education in Connecticut's 
Public Schools,” (February 5, 1986); 

  
 



  

-—n5 

u. “State Board of Education Policy Statement on Equal 
Educational Opportunity,” Connecticut State Board of 
Education, (Hartford, October 27, 1986); 

v. "Report on Racial/Ethnic Equity and Desegregation 
in Connecticut’s Public Schools,” Connecticut 
State Department of Education (1988); and 

w. "Quality and Integrated Education: Options for 
Connecticut,” Connecticut State Department of 
Education (1989). 

Xx. Governor's Commission Report 1990. 

In addition to the recommendations and reports set out 

above, the State failed to adequately supplement the funding of a 

known successful integration program, Project Concern, beginning 

in 1980 when federal funding cutbacks and Hartford Board of 

Education cutbacks forced a reduction in the numbers of children 

participating in the program and in the numbers of staff hired to 

service these children (e.g. paraprofessionals, resource 

teachers, bus stop aides). The State has also failed to take ap- 

propriate steps to increase the numbers of children participating 

over and above the approximately 730+ students now enrolled in 

the program, despite knowledge that receiving school districts 

would increase their participation if the State provided funding. 

The following studies and documents, among others, have repeated- 

ly demonstrated to the Defendants that Project Concern is one of 

a number of programs to successfully provide an equal educational       
 



      

iD 

opportunity and a meaningful integrated experience for some urban 

and suburban children: 

a. Mahan, Thomas W. The Impact of Schools on Learning: 
Inner-City Children in Suburban Schools. 
  

  

Mahan, Thomas W. Project Concern 1966-1968, A Report on 
the Effectiveness of Suburban School Placement for 
Inner-City Youth (1968). 

  

  

  

Ninety-First Congress, Second Session on Equal Education 
Opportunity. “Hearing Before the Select Committee on 
Equal Educational Opportunity of the United States 
Senate.” 1970. 

Connecticut State Department of Education, “Reaction to 
Racial Imbalance Guidelines for Hartford Public 
Schools.” April 20, 1970. 

State Board of Education Minutes (Capital Region 
Planning Agency Endorses the Expansion of Project 
Concern) January 7, 1970. 

Gable, R. and Iwanicki, E., A Synthesis of the 
Evaluation Findings from 1976-1980 (May 1981) 

Gable, Thompson, Iwanicki, The Effects of Voluntary 
Desegregation on Occupational Outcomes, The Vocational 
Guidance Quarterly 31, 230-239 (1983) 

  

  

Gable, R.and Iwanicki, E. The Longitudinal Effects of a 
Voluntary School Desegregation Program on the Basic 
  

  

Skill Progress of Participants. 1 Metropolitan 
  

Education 65. - Spring, 1986. 

Gable, R. and Iwanicki, E., Project Concern Evaluation. 
October, 1986. 

  

Gable, R. and Iwanicki, E., Final Evaluation Report 
1986-87 Hartford Project Concern Program (December 
1987) 
  

Gable, R. and Iwanicki, E., Final Evaluation Report 
1988-89: Hartford Project Concern Program (Nov. 1989) 

  

  

  
 



  

    

    

- 28 

l. Crain, R., et al., Finding Niches: Desegregated 
Students Sixteen Years Later, Rand Reports, (1985); 
revised 1990 

  

  

m. Crain, R., et al., School Desegregation and Black 
Occupational Attainment: Results from a Long Term 
Experiment; (1985). 
  

  

n. "Project Concern Enrollment 1966-1990,” (Defs'’ Response 
to Plaintiffs’ First Request for Production, 13(b)). 

o. Iwanicki, E., and Gable, R., Almost Twenty-Five Years of 
Project Concern: An Overview of the Program and Its 
Accomplishments, (1990) (and sources cited therein) 
(Defs' Response to Plaintiffs’ First Request for 
Production, .12 (g)- 

  

  

  

In addition, Plaintiffs’ evidence at trial may include 

but will not be limited to testimony and reports demonstrating 

defendants’ failure to eliminate exclusionary zoning and housing 

policies; defendants’ failure to promote integrated housing in 

the Hartford region; and defendants’ failure to establish a 

constitutional system of educational financing (see response to 

Interrogatory 1). 

In regard to questions 5 a, b, and c, as set out in 

Defendants’ Interrogatory 5, Plaintiffs have not determined and 

are, at least at this time, unable to estimate the "last possible 

date” upon which individual actions, steps, or plans would 

necessarily have had to have been implemented in order to have 

avoided violation of the State Constitution, nor do plaintiffs 

concede the relevance of such an inquiry. Likewise, plaintiffs 

are not required to specify which methods would have cured the 

constitutional violation at particular moments in time, how long 

  
 



      

such methods would have taken to implement, or the cost of 

implementation. Such questions, including the number and 

percentage of African American, Latino, and white students who 

may seek to attend school outside of the boundaries of the city 

of Hartford, are issues which plaintiffs expect would be 

addressed by plaintiffs’ expert witnesses on desegregation 

remedies after a determination is made by the court as-to the 

state's liability. 

6. Please identify each and every affirmative act, step or 
plan which the plaintiffs will claim at trial the defendants, 
their predecessors, or any other state officer, agency br other 
body were required by the State Constitution to take or implement 
to address the condition of socio-economic isolation in the 
Hartford Public Schools and the identified suburban school 
districts, but which was not in fact taken or implemented. For 
each such act, step or plan provide the following: 

a) The last possible date upon which that act, step or 
plan would necessarily have been taken or 
implemented in order to have avoided a violation of 
the Constitution; : 

b) The specific details of how such act, step or plan 
should have been carried out including, (1) the 
specific methods of accomplishing the objectives of 
the act, step or plan, (2) an estimate of how long 
it would have taken to carry out the act, step or 
plan, and (3) an estimate of the cost of carrying 
out the act, step or plan; 

c) For Hartford and each of the identified suburban 
school districts, the specific number and percentage 
of poor, middle, and/or upper class students who 
would, of necessity, have attended school outside of 
the then existing school district in which they 
resided in order for that act, step, or plan to 
successfully address the requirements of the 
Constitution; 

  
 



      

igi 

d) The specific criteria which should have been used to 
identify those students who would, of necessity, 
have attended school outside the then existing 
school district in which they resided, so that the 
concentration of students from poor families in 
Hartford Public Schools would be low enough to 
satisfy the requirements of the Constitution. 

RESPONSE: Please see response to Interrogatory 5. Plaintiffs 
  

have not, at this point, alleged that one specific criterion or 

indicator must be used to identify students who “would, of 

necessity” be transferred to another school district. As stated 

in the Complaint, rates of family verticipation in the federal 

Aid to Families with Dependent Children program is widely 

accepted as a measure closely correlated with family Poverty, 

Participation in the federal school lunch program is also an 

index of poverty status. 

7. Please identify each and every affirmative act, step or 
plan which the plaintiffs will claim at trial the defendants, 
their predecessors, or any other state officer, agency or other 
body were required by the State Constitution to take or implement 
to address the conditions created by the concentration of "at 
risk” children in the Hartford Public Schools but which were not 
in fact taken or implemented. For each such act, step, or plan 
provide the following: 

a) The last possible date upon which that act, step or 
plan would necessarily have been taken or 
implemented in order to have avoided a violation of 
the constitution; 

b) The specific details of how such act, step or plan 
should have been carried out including (1) the 
specific methods of accomplishing the objective of 
the act, step or plan, (2) an estimate as to how 
long it would have taken to carry out the act, step 
or plan, and (3) an estimate of the cost of carrying 
out the act, step or plan; 

  
 



  

ine 
a
 

  
    

“31 = 

c) The specific number and percentage of "at risk” 
Hartford students who would, of necessity, have 
attended school outside of the existing school 
district in which they resided in order for that 
act, step or plan to successfully address the 
requirements of the Constitution. 

d) The specific criteria which should have been used to 
identify those students who would, of necessity, 
have attended school outside the then existing 
school district in which they resided so that the 
concentration of “at risk” students in Hartford 
Public Schools would be low enough to satisfy the 
requirements of the Constitution. 

RESPONSE: Please see response to Interrogatory 5. As set out in   

the Complaint in this action, all children, including those 

deemed at risk of lower educational achievement, have the 

capacity to learn if given a suitable education. Yet, the 

Hartford public schools operate at a severe educational 

disadvantage in addressing the educational needs of all students, 

due in part to the sheer proportion of students who bear the 

burdens and challenges of living in poverty. The increased need 

for special programs, such as compensatory education, stretches 

Hartford school resources even further. As also stated in the 

Complaint, the demographic characteristics of the students in the 

Hartford public schools differ sharply from students in the 

suburban schools by a number of relevant measures, such as 

poverty status, whether a child has limited English proficiency, 

and whether a child is from a single-parent family. Plaintiffs 

have not, at this point, alleged that one specific criterion or  



  

e
o
n
 il
 

-37 - 

indicator must be used to identify students who “would, of 

necessity” be transferred to another school district. 

CURRENT OR ONGOING VIOLATIONS 
  

8. Using the 1987-88 data as a base, for Hartford and each 
of the identified suburban school districts please specify the 
number and percentage of black, Hispanic and white students who 
must, of a necessity, attend school in a location outside of the 
existing school district in which they reside in order to address 
the condition of racial and ethnic isolation which now exists in 
accordance with the requirements of the Constitution. 

RESPONSE: Objection [Please see plaintiffs’ objection to 

Interrogatory 8, Plaintiffs’ Objections To Interrogatories, Filed 

September 20, 1990, attached hereto. ] 

9. Using the 1987-88 data as a base, for Hartford and each 
of the identified suburban school districts please specify the 
number and percentage of poor, middle and/or upper class students 
who must, of necessity, attend school outside of the existing 
school district in which they reside in order to address the 
condition of socio-economic isolation which exists in Hartford 
and the identified suburban school districts in accordance with 
the requirements of the Constitution. Also identify the specific 
criteria which must be used to identify the pool of poor Hartford 
students from which those students who would be required to 
attend schools outside of the existing district in which they 
reside must be chosen so as to address the condition of socio- 
economic isolation in accordance with the requirements of the 
Constitution. 

RESPONSE: Objection [Please see plaintiffs!’ objection to       Interrogatory 9, Plaintiffs’ Objections To Interrogatories, Filed 

September 20, 1990, attached hereto. ] 

  
 



  

10. Using the 1987-88 data as a base, identify the number 
and percentage of "at risk” children in the Hartford Public 
Schools who must, of necessity, attend school at a location 
outside the existing Hartford School District lines in order to 
address the concentration of “at risk” children in the Hartford 
Public Schools in accordance with the requirements of the 
Constitution. Also identify the specific criteria which must be 
used to identify the pool of Hartford students from which those 
who would be required to attend schools in the suburban school 
districts must be chosen so as to address the concentration of 
"at risk” children in the Hartford Public Schools. 

  

RESPONSE: Objection [Please see plaintiffs’ objection to 

Interrogatory 10, Plaintiffs’ Objections To Interrogatories, 

Filed September 20, 1990, attached hereto. ] 

MINIMALLY ADEQUATE EDUCATION 

11. Please identify each and every statistic the 
plaintiffs’ will rely on at trial to support any claim they 
intend to make that the educational “inputs” (i.e. resources, 
staff, facilities, curriculum, etc.) in the Hartford Public 
Schools are so deficient that the children in Hartford are being 
denied a "minimally adequate education.” For each such fact 
specify the source(s) and/or name and address of the person(s) 
that will be called upon to attest to that statistic at trial. 

RESPONSE: [Please see response to Interrogatory 13.) 
  

12. Please identify each and every statistic, other than the 
results of the Mastery Test, which the plaintiffs will rely on at 
trial to support any claim they intend to make that children in 
Hartford are being denied a “minimally adequate education” 
because of the educational “outputs” for Hartford. For each such 
fact specify the source(s) and/or name and address of the 
person(s) that will be called upon to attest to that statistic at 
trial, 

RESPONSE: [Please see response to Interrogatory 14.] 
        
 



  

- 34 = 

EQUAL EDUCATION 

13. Please identify each and every category of educational 
“inputs” which the plaintiffs will rely on at trial in their 
effort to establish that the educational “inputs” in Hartford are 
not equal to the educational “inputs” of the suburban school 
districts. For each such category identify each and every 
statistical comparison between Hartford and any or all of the 
suburban school districts which the plaintiffs will rely on to 
show the alleged inequality. For each such comparison identify 
the source(s) and/or name and address of the person(s) that will 
be called upon to attest to the accuracy of that statistical 
comparison at trial. 

RESPONSE: As of the date of this response, plaintiffs are 
  

    
compiling data and information on disparities and inequities in 

“educational inputs” and resources among Hartford and the 

surrounding districts. This data may include, but may not be 

limited to comparisons in the following areas: 

a. Facilities -- data may include, but may not be 
limited to comparisons of the condition and size of 
school buildings, the condition and size of school 
grounds, overcrowding and school capacity, 
maintenance, the availability of specific 
instructional facilities and physical education 
facilities, and special function areas (e.g. types 
of counselling, libraries); 

b. Equipment and Supplies; 

c. Personnel -- data may include, but may not be 
limited to comparisons of student teacher ratios, 
teaching staff characteristics, and non-teacher 
staff number and characteristics; 

d. Curriculum -- data may include, but may not be 
limited to comparisons of course offerings, 
textbooks and course levels, and special programs; 

e. Extracurricular Opportunities; and 

  
 



  

    

    
  

Le 

f. School experience -- data may include, but may not 
be limited to comparisons of counselling services, 
disciplinary rates, absentee rates, retention 
rates, tardy rates, and the concentration of 
poverty. : 

At the present time, plaintiffs’ investigation and analysis 

of these categories has not been completed. The data and 

information concerning disparity in “inputs” upon which 

plaintiffs rely is equally available to defendants. 

Nevertheless, plaintiffs will disclose such information in a 

timely manner prior to trial. 

14. Please identify each and every category of educational 
“outputs” other than the Mastery Test, which the plaintiffs will 
rely on at trial in their effort to establish that the 
educational “outputs” in Hartford are not equal to the 
educational “outputs” of the suburban school districts. For each 
such category identify each and every statistical comparison 
between Hartford and any one or all of the suburban school 
districts which the plaintiffs will rely on to show the alleged 
inequality. For each such comparison identify the source(s) 
and/or name and address of the person(s) that will be called upon 
to attest to the accuracy of that statistical comparison at 
trial. 

RESPONSE: As listed in plaintiffs’ response to Interrogatory 18, 
  

Professor Robert Crain is expected to testify to the following 

areas of comparison: the likelihood of (1) dropping out of high 

school; (2) early teenage pregnancy; (3) unfavorable interactions 

with the police; (4) college retention; (5) working in private 

sector professional and managerial jobs; (6) interracial contact, 

occupationally and otherwise; and (7) favorable interracial 

attitudes. Plaintiffs are also compiling data and information on  



    

disparities and inequities in other measures of achievement or 

educational quality among Hartford and the surrounding districts, 

including but not limited to percentage of students receiving a 

diploma; PSAT and SAT scores; employment outcomes; and career and 

life outcomes. At the present time, plaintiffs’ investigation 

and analysis of these and other categories have not been 

completed. Plaintiffs have not yet identified who will present 

analyses of such data at trial, other than those experts listed 

in plaintiffs’ response to Interrogatories 18 and 19. Plaintiffs 

will disclose such information in a timely manner prior to trial. 

OTHER 

15. Please identify each and every study, other document, 
or information or person the plaintiffs will rely upon or call 
upon at trial to support the claim that better integration will 
improve the performance of urban black, Hispanic and/or socio- 
economically disadvantaged children on standardized tests such as 
the Mastery Test. 

RESPONSE: As set out in the complaint, racial and economic 
  

isolation in the schools adversely affects both educational 

attainment and the life chances of children. The studies, 

documents, information, and persons upon whom the plaintiffs will 

rely at trial may include, but are not limited to information 

listed in the response to Interrogatory 19 and the following: 

Crain, R.L., and Braddock, J.H., McPartland, J.M., "A 
Long Term View of School Desegregation: Some Recent 
Studies of Graduates as Adults,” 66 Phi Delta Kappan 
259-264 (1984); | 

     



  

- 375 

    
Crain, R.L., and Hawes, J.A., Miller, R.L., Peichert, 
J.R., "Finding Niches: Desegregated Students Sixteen 
Years Later,” R-3243-NIE, Rand (January, 1985); 

Crain, R.L., and Strauss, J., “School Desegregation and 
Black Occupational Attainments: Results from a Long- 
term Experiment,” Reprinted from CSOS Report No. 359 
(1985); ; 

Levine, D.U., Keeny, J., Kukuk, C., O'Hara Fort, B., 
Mares, K.R., Stephenson, R.S., "Concentrated Poverty 
and Reading Achievement in Seven Big Cities,” 11 Urban 
Review 63 (1979). 

“Poverty, Achievement and the Distribution of 
Compensatory Education Services,” National Assessment 
of Chapter 1, Office of Educational Research and 
Improvement, U.S. Dept. of Ed. (1986); 

"Report on Negative Factors Affecting the Learning 
Process,” Hartford Board of Education (1987); 

Connecticut State Department of Education (various 
reports, past and present, including but not limited to 
reports on racial, ethnic, and economic segregation, 
racial balance, school resources, and educational 
outcomes). 

See also reports listed in Plaintiffs’ Identification of 
Expert Witnesses Pursuant to Practice Book §220 (D) (January 
15, 1991), attached hereto. 

  

16. Please identify each and every study, other document, 
or information or person the plaintiffs will rely upon or call 
upon at trial to support the claim that better integration will 
improve the performance of urban black, Hispanic and/or socio- 
economically disadvantaged children on any basis other than 
standardized tests. 

RESPONSE: [Please see response to Interrogatory 15.]       
 



  

    

    

-i38 

17. Please describe the precise mathematical formula used 
by the plaintiffs to compute the ratios set forth in paragraph 42 
of the complaint. 

RESPONSE: Plaintiffs recognize that the computation set out in 

942 of the Complaint may be inaccurate. Plaintiffs have 

indicated their willingness to discuss stipulation as to 

aggregate city vs. suburban mastery test scores. 

EXPERT WITNESSES 
  

18. Please specify the name and address of each and every 
person the plaintiffs expect to call as an expert witness at 
trial. For each such person please provide the following: 

a) The date on which that person is expected to 
complete the review, analysis, or consideration 
necessary to formulate the opinions which that 
person will be called upon to offer at trial; 

b) The subject matter upon which that person is 
expected to testify; and 

c) The substance of the facts and opinions to which 
that person is expected to testify and a summary of 
the grounds for each opinion. 

  

RESPONSE: On January 15, 1991, the plaintiffs disclosed their 

initial list of expert witnesses anticipated to testify at trial, 

pursuant to Practice Book §220 (D), as modified by this Court's 

Order of October 31, 1990 and the parties’ Joint Motion for 

Extension of Time to Disclose Expert Witnesses filed December 3, 

1990. See Plaintiffs’ Identification of Expert Witnesses 

Pursuant to Practice Book §220 (D) (January 15, 1991); attached 

hereto and incorporated herein by reference. In addition, 

  
 



  

      

= 30 « 

plaintiffs have identified other possible witnesses who may 

testify at the trial in this action, but whose analyses are not 

sufficiently complete to respond to defendants’ interrogatory or 

to confirm whether plaintiffs expect to call such witnesses. 

Additional expert witnesses will be identified as set out in the 

parties’ December 3, 1990 Joint Motion, as they become available. 

DATA COMPILATIONS 
  

19. In the event the plaintiffs intend to offer into 
evidence at trial any data compilations or analyses which have 
been produced by the plaintiffs or on the plaintiffs’ behalf by 
any mechanical or electronic means please describe the nature and 
results of each such compilation and/or analysis and provide the 
following additional information. 

a) 

b) 

£) 

g) 

The specific kind of hardware used to produce each 
compilation and/or analysis; 

The specific software package or programming 
language which was used to produce each compilation 
and/or analysis; 

A complete list of all specific data elements used 
to produce each compilation and/or analysis; 

The specific methods of analyses and/or questions 
used to create the data base for each compilation 
and/or analysis; 

A complete list of the specific questions, tests, 
measures, or other means of analysis applied to the 
data base to produce each compilation and/or 
analysis; 

Any and all other information the defendants would 
need to duplicate the compilation or analysis; 

The name, address, educational background and role 
of each and every person who participated in the 
development of the data base and/or program used to 

  
 



  

    

    

- 40" = 

analyze the data for each compilation and/or 
p 

Anal VvEI 8: ana 

h) The name and address of each and every person 
expected to testify at trial who examined the 
results of the compilation or analysis and who 
reached any conclusions in whole or in part from 
those results regarding the defendants’ compliance 
with the law, and, for each such person, provide a 
complete list of the conclusions that person 
reached. 

RESPONSE: Plaintiffs may offer into evidence compilations and 
  

analyses including but not limited to analyses of data on the 

educational and long-term effects of racial, ethnic, and economic 

segregation. In addition, plaintiffs may offer into evidence 

compilations and analyses on other elements of plaintiffs’ case, 

including the disparity in resources between Hartford and the 

suburban schools. Plaintiffs are still compiling and analyzing 

data drawn from the following sources and will provide more 

detailed information in such research when it is available. Such 

information will be provided in a timely fashion, in advance of 

trial. 

The data sets which form the basis for the analyses of the 

educational and long-term effects of racial, ethnic, and economic 

segregation include, but will not be limited to the following: 

(1) The National Longitudinal Survey of Labor Force 
~ Behavior -- Youth Cohort, an annual survey 
sponsored by the U.S. Departments of Labor and 
Defense of 12,686 young persons throughout the 
United States. Data available and used in this 
research begins in 1979 and extends through 1987. 

  

 



  

  

    

- 4] -~ 

(2) The National Survey of Black Americans, a national 
rvey of 2,107 African Americans who are 18 year 

of age or older. The survey was designed and 
conducted by the survey Research Center, Institute 
for Social Research at the University of Michigan. 
Data was collected between 1979 and 1980. 

(3) The High School and Beyond Study, a national 
longitudinal probability sample of more than 58,000 
1980 high school sophomores and seniors. Surveys 
were conducted in 1980, 1982, 1984, and 1986. 

(4) The National Longitudinal Survey of Employers, a 
national probability sample of 4,087 employers. 
Surveys were conducted in the 1970's. 

Further sources of data are set out in Plaintiffs’ 

Identification of Expert Witnesses Pursuant to Practice Book §220 

(D), served on January 15, 1991, and incorporated herein by 

reference. 

With respect to defendants’ questions a-d, at this time, 

plaintiffs’ counsel are aware that some experts conducted 

regression analyses using SPSS software on IBM computers. Beyond 

this, plaintiffs are currently unable to specify the kind of 

hardware used to produce each analysis, the specific software 

package used, the complete list of specific data elements used; 

and specific methods of analysis. Plaintiffs will provide such 

information in a timely fashion as it becomes available to the 

plaintiffs, in advance of trial. 

  

 



    

    

MISCELLANEOUS 
  

20. For each of the above listed interrogatories please 
provide the names and address of each person who assisted in the 
preparation of the answer to that interrogatory and describe the 
nature of the assistance which that person provided. 

RESPONSE: Objection. [See plaintiffs’ Objection to 
  

Interrogatory 20, Plaintiffs’ Objections to Interrogatories, 

Filed September 20, 1990.] Without waiving their objection, 

plaintiffs respond that the responses to the foregoing 

interrogatories were prepared by counsel in consultation with 

experts identified in Plaintiffs’ Identification of Expert 

Witnesses Pursuant to Practice Book §220 (D), served on January 

15, 1991, as well as additional experts to be identified pursuant 

to the parties’ Joint Motion for Extension of Time to Disclose 

Expert Witnesses filed December 3, 1990. 

   



  

  

    

PLAINTIFFS, MILO SHEFF, ET AL 

HAVE [AD 

-id3 

  

MARIANNE ENGELMAN LADO 
RONALD ELLIS 

NAACP Legal Defense & 
Educational Fund, Inc. 

99 Hudson Street 
New York, NY 10013 
(212) 219-1900 
Pro Hac Vice 

MARTHA STONE 

CONNECTICUT CIVIL LIBERTIES 

UNION FOUNDATION 

32 Grand Street 
Hartford, CT. 06106 
(203) 247-9823 
Juris No. 61506 

WILFRED RODRIGUEZ 

HISPANIC ADVOCACY PROJECT 

Neighborhood Legal Services 
1229 Albany Avenue 
Hartford, CT 06102 
(203) 278-6850 
Juris No. 302827 

ADAM S. COHEN 
HELEN HERSHKOFF 
JOHN A. POWELL 
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 

UNION FOUNDATION 
132 West 43rd Street 
New York, NY 10036 
(212) 944-9800 
Pro Hac Vice 

PHILIP D. TEGELER b. 
CONNECTICUT CIVIL LIBERTIES 

UNION FOUNDATION 

32 Grand Street 
Hartford, CT 06105 
(203) 247-9823 
Juris No. 102537 

WESLEY W. HORTON 

MOLLER, HORTON & 
FINEBERG, P.C. 

90 Gillett Street 
Hartford, CT 06105 
(203) 522-8338 
Juris No. 38478 

JOHN BRITTAIN 

UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT 

SCHOOL OF LAW 

65 Elizabeth Street 
Hartford, CT 06105 
(203) 241-4664 
Juris No. 101153 

JENNY RIVERA 
PUERTO RICAN LEGAL 

DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND 
99 Hudson Street 

New York, NY 10013 
(212) 219-3360 
Pro Hac Vice 

  
 



  

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Plaintiffs 

JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
HARTFORD/NEW BRITAIN 
AT HARTFORD 

Ve 

WILLIAM A. O'NEILL, et al. 

Defendants JANUARY 15, 1991 

  

PLAINTIFFS’ IDENTIFICATION OF EXPERT WITNESSES 

PURSUANT TO PRACTICE BOOK §220 (D) 
  

  

Pursuant to Practice Book §220(D), as modified by this 

Court’s Order of October 31, 1990 and the parties’ Joint Motion 

for Extension of Time to Disclose Expert Witnesses filed December 

3, 1990, the plaintiffs herein disclose their initial list of 

expert witnesses anticipated to testify at trial, in response to 

Defendants’ First Set of Interrogatories. In addition, 

plaintiffs have identified other possible witnesses who may 

testify at the trial in this action, but whose analyses are not 

sufficiently complete to respond to defendants’ interrogatory or 

to confirm whether plaintiffs expect to call such witnesses. As 

set out in the parties’ Joint Motion for Extension of Time to 

Disclose Expert Witnesses filed December 3, 1990, such additional 

expert witnesses may be identified in sixty days or thereafter. 

 



  

Interrogatory 18. Please specify the name and address of 
  

each and every person the plaintiffs expect to call as an expert 

witness at trial. For each such person please provide the 

following: 

a. The date on which that person is expected to complete 

the review, analysis, or consideration necessary to formulate the 

opinions which that person will be called upon to offer at trial; 

b. The subject matter upon which that person is expected to 

testify; and 

Cc. The substance of the facts and opinions to which that 

person is expected to testify and a summary of the grounds for 

each opinion. 

RESPONSE: Experts whom the plaintiffs expect to call at trial 
  

are listed below, pursuant to Practice Book Section 220(D), as 

modified by the Court: 

Dr. Jomills Henry Braddock, II, Center for Social 
Organization of Schools, Johns Hopkins University, 3505 
North Charles Street, Baltimore, Maryland, 21218. Dr. 
Braddock is expected to testify to (1) the adverse 
educational and long-term effects of racial, ethnic, 
and economic segregation; (2) the adverse effects of 
racial, ethnic, and economic segregation on the 
educational process within schools. Specifically, Dr. 
Braddock is expected to testify that school segregation 
tends to perpetuate segregation in adult life, that 
school desegregation helps to transcend systemic 
reinforcement of inequality of opportunity, and that 
segregation affects the educational process within 
schools. In his testimony, the materials on which Dr. 
Braddock is expected to rely include his published 
works, as well as research currently being conducted on 
the educational and long-term effects of racial, 
ethnic, and economic segregation by Dr. Marvin P. 

  

 



  

«3 

Dawkins and Dr. William Trent. (See descriptions 
below.) Dr. Braddock is expected to base his testimony 
on (1) Braddock, "The Perpetuation of Segregation 
Across Levels of Education: A Behavioral Assessment of 
the Contact-Hypothesis,” 53 Sociology of Education 178- 
186 (1980); (2) Braddock, Crain, McPartland, “A Long- 
Term View of School Desegregation: Some Recent Studies 
of Graduates as Adults.” Phi Delta Kappan 259-264 
(1984); (3) Braddock, "Segregated High School 
Experiences and Black Students’ College and Major Field. 
Choices,” Paper Presented at the National Conference on 
School Desegregation, University of Chicago (1987); (4) 
Braddock, McPartland, “How Minorities Continue to be 
Excluded from Equal Employment Opportunities: Research 
on Labor Market and Institutional Barriers,” 43 Journal 
of Social Issues 5-39 (1887); and (5) Braddock, 

  

  

  

McPartland, “Social-Psychological Processes that 
Perpetuate Racial Segregation:. The Relationship 
Between School and Employment Desegregation,” 19 
Journal of Black Studies 267-289 (1989). Dr. Braddock 
  

is expected to complete his review by April 1, 1991. 

Christopher Collier, Connecticut State Historian, 876 
  

Orange Center "Road, Orange, Connecticut, 06477. 
Professor Collier is expected to testify regarding (1) 
the historical lack of autonomy of Connecticut towns 
and school districts and the history of state control 
over local education; (2) the historical development of 
the system of town-by-town school districts including 
legislation passed in 1856, 1866, and 1909; (3) the 
existence and prevalence of school districts and 
student attendance patterns crossing town lines prior 
to 1909 legislation mandating consolidation; (4) the 
existence of de jure school segregation in Connecticut 
from 1830 through 1868; (5) the origins and historical 
interpretation of the equal protection and education 
clauses of the 1965 Constitution; (6) a historical 
overview of the options for school desegregation 
presented to the state but not acted upon, 1954 to 
1980. In his testimony, the materials upon which 
Professor Collier may rely will include numerous 
historical sources, including primarily but not limited 
to Helen Martin Walker, Development of State Support 
and Control of Education in Connecticut (State Board of 
  

  

Education, Connecticut Bulletin #4, Series 1925-16); 
Keith W. Atkinson, The Legal Pattern of Public 
Education in Connecticut (Unpublished Doctoral 
  

  

 



  

Dissertation, University of Connecticut, 1950); Annual 
Reports of the Superintendent of the Common Schools, 
  

1838-1955; Jodziewicz, Dual Localism in 17th Century 
Connecticut, Relations Between the General Court and 
the Towns, (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, William 

  

  

  

& Mary, 1974); Bruce C. Daniels, The Connecticut Town: 
Growth and Development, 1635-1790, Middletown 

  

  

Connecticut, Wesleyan University; Trumbull, Public 
Records of the Colony of Connecticut; Public Records of 
  

the State of Connecticut; Proceedings of the 
  

Constitutional Convention of 1965; as well as the   

documents listed in response to defendants’ 
interrogatory 5, Plaintiffs’ Responses to Defendants’ 
First Set of Interrogatories (October 30, 1990), and 
the sources referenced in plaintiff's supplemental 
submission to Judge Hammer dated February 23, 1990. 
Additional historical documents upon which Professor 
Collier relies will be identified upon request at or 
before the time of his deposition. Professor Collier 
is expected to complete his review by March 1, 1991. 

Pr... Robert L. Crain, Professor of Sociology and   

Education, Teachers College, Columbia University, 525 
West 120th Street, Box 211, New York, New York, 10027. 
Dr. Crain lis expected to testify to the adverse 
educational and long-term effects of racial, ethnic, 
and economic segregation in the Hartford metropolitan 
area. Specifically, Dr. Crain is expected to testify 
that the effects of Project Concern participation for 
students in the Hartford metropolitan area have been to 
reduce the likelihood of (1) dropping out of high 
school, (2) early teenage pregnancy, and (3) 
unfavorable interactions with the police. Dr. Crain is 
expected to testify, further, that the effects of 
Project Concern participation for students in the 
Hartford metropolitan area have been to increase (1) 
college retention, (2) the probability of working in 
private sector professional and managerial jobs, $3) 
the probability of interracial contact, and (4) 
favorable attitudes toward whites. In his testimony, 
Dr. Crain is expected to base his testimony on his 
published works and his analyses of Project Concern. 
Specifically, Dr. Crain is expected to rely on (1) 
Crain, Strauss, "School Desegregation and Black 
Occupational Attainments: Results from a Long-Term 
Experiment,” Center for Social Organization of Schools, 
Report No. 359 (1985); (2) Crain, Hawes, Miller, and 

 



Peichert, “Finding Niches: Desegregated Students 
Sixteen Years Later,” Unpublished Manuscript, Institute 
for Urban and Minority Education, Teachers College 
(revised 1990); and (3) Gable, Thompson, Iwanicki, “The 
Effects of Voluntary Desegregation on Occupational 
Outcomes,” The Vocational Guidance Quarterly 230-239 
(1983). Dr. Crain is expected to complete his review 
by April 1, 1981. 

  

Dr. Marvin P. Dawkins, 17627 N.W. 62nd Place, North, 
Hialeah, Florida, 33015. Dr. Dawkins is expected to 
testify to the adverse educational and long-term 
effects of racial, ethnic, and economic segregation on 
African Americans. Specifically, Dr. Dawkins is 
expected to testify that African Americans who have 
attended segregated schools have a lower probability of 
attending predominantly white colleges and 
universities, maintaining interracial contacts, and 
working in desegregated settings. Dr. Dawkins is 
expected to base his testimony on (1) his analysis of 
data from the National Survey of Black Americans, a 
nationally representative survey of African Americans 
conducted over a period of seven months between 1979 
and 1980 at the Survey Research Center, Institute for 
Social Research, University of Michigan, and funded by 
the Center for the Study of Minority Group Mental 
Health, at the National Institute of Mental Health; (2) 
Dawkins, "Black Students’ Occupational Expectations: A 
National Study of the Impact of School Desegregation,’ 
18 Urban PFduecation 98-113 (1983): . (3) 'Braddock, 
Dawkins, "Predicting Black Academic Achievement in 
Higher Education,” 50 Journal of Negro Education 319- 
327 (1981); (4) Braddock, Dawkins, “Long-Term Effects 
of School Desegregation on Southern Blacks,” 4 
Sociological Spectrum 365-381 (1984); and (5) Dawkins, 
"Persistence of Plans for Professional Careers Among 
Blacks in Early Adulthood,” 58 Journal of Negro 
Education 220-231 (1989). Dr. Dawkins is expected to 
complete his analysis by March 15, 1991. 

  

  

  

  

  

  

Dr. Mary Kennedy, Director, National Center for 
Research: on Teacher Evaluation, Michigan State 
University, 513 Ardson Road, East Lansing, Michigan, 
48823. Dr. Kennedy will testify about the relationship 
of family poverty and high concentrations of poverty to 
educational outcomes. Specifically, Dr. Kennedy will 

   



  

testify that two of the most important measures of 
poverty which have a strong relationship to educational 
outcomes are intensity of family poverty (measured by 
number of years of sustained poverty of the child and 
his family), and attendance at a school with a high 
concentration of poor children. Her conclusions show 
that: (1) Students are increasingly likely to fall 
behind grade levels as their families experience longer 
spells of poverty; (2) Achievement scores of all 
students - not just poor students - decline as the 
proportion of poor students in a school increases; (3) 
The relationship between school poverty concentration 
and school achievement averages is even stronger than 
the relationship between family poverty status and 
student achievement. In fact, non-poor students who 
attend schools with a high concentration of poor 
students are more likely to fall behind than are poor 
students who attend a school with a small proportion of 
poor students; and (4) Increases in the proportion of 
poor children in a school are associated with decreases 
in average starting achievement and even occasionally 
with decreases in learning rates over time. Dr. 
Kennedy's opinions are based on her research and that 
of others as contained in reports, including, but not 
limited to Kennedy, M.M., Jung, R.K., and Orland, M.E. 
(1986), Poverty, Achievement and the Distribution of 
Compensatory Education Services, U.S. Department of 
Education, 1986. Dr. Kennedy is expected to complete 
her review by May 1, 1991. 

  

  

Dr. William Trent, FPS, 368 Education Building, 
University: of Illinois, . 1310 South Sixth Street, 
Champagne, Illinois, 61820. Dr. Trent is expected to 
testify to the adverse educational and long-term 
effects of racial, ethnic, and economic segregation on 
Latinos, African Americans, and white Americans. 
Specifically Dr. Trent 1s expected to testify that 
economic school segregation has adverse long-term 
outcomes for Latinos, African Americans, and white 
Americans, that desegregation has beneficial results on 
the aspirations and expectations of Latino students and 
on their likelihood ‘of working . in interracial 
environments, and that white Americans who have 
experienced desegregated schools are more likely to 
work with and to have positive attitudes toward African 
American co-workers. Dr. Trent is expected to base his 
testimony on his published work and his analysis of 

  

 



  

data from (1) the National Longitudinal Survey of Labor 
Force Behavior -- Youth Cohort, an annual survey 
sponsored by the United States Departments of Labor and 
Defense of 12,686 young persons throughout the United 
States, with data available for 1979-1987; (2) the High 
School and Beyond Study, a national longitudinal 
probability sample of more than 58,000 1980 high school 
sophomores and seniors, conducted in 1980, 1982, 1984, 
and 1986; and (3) the National Longitudinal Survey of 
Employers, a national probability sample of 4,087 
employers, conducted in the 1970's. Dr. Trent. is 
expected to complete his analysis by April 1, 1991. 

In addition to the areas of testimony set out above, 

plaintiffs’ experts are also expected to interpret and comment on 

the testimony and research of other experts, including both 

plaintiffs’ and defendants’ experts. With respect to documents 

listed herein, plaintiffs have included some of the primary 

sources upon which these experts base their opinions, but have 

not provided a comprehensive list of all documents reviewed or 

relied on. If any other additional areas of testimony are 

identified for the foregoing experts or other documents upon 

which they primarily rely are identified, plaintiffs will 

identify such testimony and documents in a timely fashion, 

pursuant to the parties’ Joint Motion for Extension of Time to 

Disclose Expert Witnesses filed December 3, 1990. 

 



  

BY: 

Wesley W. Horton 
Moller, Horton, & Fineberg 
90 Gillett Street 
Hartford, C7 06105 

Julius L. Chambers 

Marianne Lado 

Ron Ellis 
NAACP Legal Defense & 

Educational Fund, 

99 Hudson Street 
New York, NY 10013 

Inc. 

Helen Hershkoff 
John A. Powell 

Adam Cohen 

American Civil Liberties 
Union Foundation 

132 West 43rd Street 

New York, NY 10036 

Respectfully Submitted, 

  

Philip D. Tegeler 
Martha Stone 
Connecticut Civil Liberties 

Union Foundation 
32 Grand Street 
Hartford, C7 06106 

Wilfred Rodriguez 
Hispanic Advocacy Project 
Neighborhood Legal Services 
1229 Albany Avenue 
Hartford, CT 06112 

John Brittain 
University of Connecticut 

School of Law 
65 Elizabeth Street 
Bartford, CT 06105 

Jenny Rivera 
Puerto Rican Legal Defense 

and Education Fund 

99 Hudson Street 
New York, NY 10013 

 



    

    
   

  
    

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
  

This is to certify that one copy of the foregoing has been 

SS niin i 
    

aye PLopa     
  SENS 

a Tt Het] 3 

mn 110 mao rm CT 06105 this 15th day of 

VA 4 
January, 1991. 

  

Philip D. Tegeler 

  
 



. ATTACHMENT B 

  

  
, CV89-03609778 

| MILO SHEFF, ET AL SUPERIOR COURT 

VS. : JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF HARTFORD/ 
NEW BRITAIN AT HARTFORD 

WILLIAM A. O’/NEILL, ET AL : SEPTEMBER 20, 1990 

PLAINTIFFS’ OBJECTION TO INTERROGATORIES 
  

Pursuant to §228 of the Connecticut Practice Book, the Plaintiffs 

herewith object to the following interrogatories dated July 13, 1990: 

8. Using the 1987-1988 data as a base, for Hartford and each of 
the identified suburban school districts please specify the number and 
percentage of black, Hispanic and white students who must, of a 
necessity, attend school in a location outside of the existing school 
district in which they reside in order to address the condition of 
racial and ethnic isolation which now exists in accordance with the 
requirements of the Constitution. 

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OBJECTION: Defendants’ interrogatory seeks information from 
plaintiffs in regard to the specific remedy that plaintiffs seek if they 
prevail in this lawsuit. To that extent, defendants do not seek 
information relating to the liability phase but the remedial phase of 
this lawsuit. Plaintiffs object on the grounds that such information is 
premature, and beyond the scope of the lawsuit at this present time. 

  

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9. Using the 1987-88 data as a base, for Hartford and each of the 
identified suburban school districts please specify the number and 
percentage of poor, middle and/or upper class students who must, of 
necessity, attend school outside of the existing school district in 
which they reside in order to address the condition of socio-economic 
isolation which exists in Hartford and the identified suburban school 
districts in accordance with requirements of the Constitution. Also 
identify the specific criteria which must be used to identify the pool 
of poor Hartford students from which those students who would be 
required to attend schools outside of the existing district in which 
they reside must be chose so as to address the condition of 
socio-economic isolation in accordance with the requirements of the 
Constitution. 

OBJECTION: See objection to Interrogatory 8. 
      
 



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("4 Using the 1987-88 data as a base, identify the number and 

percentage of "at risk" children in the Hartford Public Schools who 
must, of necessity, attend school at a location outside the existing 
Hartford School District lines in order to address the concentration of 
"at risk" children in the Hartford Public Schools in accordance with the 
requirements of the Constitution. Also identify the specific criteria 
which must be used to identify the pool of Hartford students from which 
those who would be required to attend schools in the suburban school 
districts must be chosen so as to address the concentration of "at risk" 
children in the Hartford Public School.s 

OBJECTION: See objection to Interrogatory 8. 
  

20. For each of the above listed interrogatories please provide 
the name and address of each person who assisted in the preparation of 
the answer to that interrogatory and describe the nature of the 
assistance which that person provided. 

OBJECTION: To the extent it requires the disclosure concerning 
experts who will not testify at trial, it is not provided for under P.B. 
  

  

  

§220(a) (1). 

PLAINTIFFS, MILO SHEFF, ET AL 

MARTHA STONE 

CONNECTICUT CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 

FOUNDATION 

32 Grand Street 

Hartford, CT 06106 

(203)247-9823 

Juris No. 61506 

PHILIP D. TEGELER 

CONNECTICUT CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 
FOUNDATION 

32 Grand Street 

Hartford, CT 

(203)247-9823 
Juris No. 102537 

06106 

WAS   
WESZEY W. HORTON 
MOLLER, HORTON & 
FINEBERG, P.C. 

90 Gillett Street 
Hartford, CT 06105 
(203) 522-8338 
Juris No. 38478 

WILFRED RODRIGUEZ 

HISPANIC ADVOCACY PROJECT 

Neighborhood Legal Services 
1229 Albany Avenue 
Hartford, CT 06102 
(203)278-6850 

Juris No. 302827 

  

 



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BL ts & durin, 2k 

RONALD ELLIS 

MAACP Tegal Defense & 
Educational Fund, Inc. 

99 Hudson Street 

New York, NY 10013 

(212)219-1900 
Pro Hac Vice 

HELEN HERSHKOFF 

ADAM S. COHEN 

JOHN A. POWELL 

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 

FOUNDATION 

132 West 43rd Street 

New York, NY 10036 

(212)944-9800 

Pro Hac Vice 

JOEN BRITTAIN 

UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT 

SCHOOL OF LAW 

65 Elizabeth Street 
Hartford, CT 06105 

(203) 241-4664 

Juris No. 101153 

JENNY RIVERA 

PUERTO RICAN LEGAL DEFENSE 

AND EDUCATION FUND 

99 Hudson Street 

New York, NY 10013 

  
 



  

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CERTIFICATION 

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was mailed to all 

counsel of record on September 20, 1990. 

  

Wes , Horton 

  
 



  

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
  

This is to certify that one copy of the foregoing has been 

mailed postage prepaid to John R. Whelan and Diane W. Whitney, 

Assistant Attorney Generals, MacKenzie Hall, 110 Sherman Street, 

™w 
Hartford, CT 06105 this |/7 day of February, 1991 

IY J 7A 
  

Philip D. Tegeler 

      
 



  

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CV89-0360977S 

MILO SHEFF, ET AL SUPERIOR COURT 

VS. : JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF HARTFORD/ 
NEW BRITAIN AT HARTFORD 

WILLIAM A. O’NEILL, ET AL : SEPTEMBER 20, 1990 

PLAINTIFFS’ OBJECTION TO INTERROGATORIES 
  

Pursuant to §228 of the Connecticut Practice Book, the Plaintiffs 

herewith object to the following interrogatories dated July 13, 1990: 

8. Using the 1987-1988 data as a base, for Hartford and each of 
the identified suburban school districts Please specify the number and 
percentage of black, Hispanic and white students who must, of a 
necessity, attend school in a location outside of the existing school 
district in which they reside in order to address the condition of 
racial and ethnic isolation which now exists in accordance with the 
requirements of the Constitution. 

OBJECTION: Defendants’ interrogatory seeks information from 
Plaintiffs in regard to the specific remedy that plaintiffs seek if they 
prevail in this lawsuit. To that extent, defendants do not seek 
information relating to the liability phase but the remedial phase of 
this lawsuit. Plaintiffs object on the grounds that such information is 
premature, and beyond the scope of the lawsuit at this present time. 

  

9. Using the 1987-88 data as a base, for Hartford and each of the 
identified suburban school districts please specify the number and 
percentage of poor, middle and/or upper class students who must, of 
necessity, attend school outside of the existing school district in 
which they reside in order to address the condition of socio-economic 
isolation which exists in Hartford and the identified suburban school 
districts in accordance with requirements of the Constitution. Also 
identify the specific criteria which must be used to identify the pool 
of poor Hartford students from which those students who would be 
reguired to attend schools outside of the existing district in which 
they reside must be chose so as to address the condition of 
sccio-economic isolation in accordance with the requirements of the 
Constitution. 

OBJECTION: See objection to Interrogatory s.   

  
   



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9. Using the 1987-88 data as a base, identify the number and 
percentage of "at risk!" children in the Hartford Public Schools who 
must, of necessity, attend school at a location outside the existing 
Hartford School District lines in order to address the concentration of 
"at risk" children in the Hartford Public Schools in accordance with the 
requirements of the Constitution. Also identify the specific criteria 
which must be used to identify the pool of Hartford students from which 
those who would be required to attend schools in the suburban school 
districts must be chosen so as to address the concentration of "at risk" 
children in the Hartford Public School.s 

OBJECTION: See objection to Interrogatory 8. 

20. For each of the above listed interrogatories please provide 
the name and address of each person who assisted in the preparation of 
the answer to that interrogatory and describe the nature of the 
assistance which that person provided. 

OBJECTION: 
  

To the extent it requires the disclosure concerning 
experts who will not testify at trial, it is not provided for under P.B. 
§220(A) (1). 

PLAINTIFFS, MILO SHEFF, ET AL 

MARTHA STONE 
CONNECTICUT CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 

FOUNDATION 
32 Grand Street 

Hartford, CT 06106 

(203)247-9823 
Juris No. 61506 

PHILIP D. TEGELER 

CONNECTICUT CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 

FOUNDATION 

32 Grand Street 

06106 

(203)247-9823 

Juris No. 102537 

  REL ETEN 
q 

WESZEY W. HORTON 
MOLLER, HORTON & 

FINEBERG, P.C. 

90 Gillett Street 
Hartford, CT 06105 

(203)522-8338 

Juris No. 38478 

WILFRED RODRIGUEZ 

HISPANIC ADVOCACY PROJECT 

Neighborhood Legal Services 
1229 Albany Avenue 
Hartford, CT 06102 
(203)278-6850 

Juris No. 302827    



| 8) 

  

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‘MARIANNE LADO 
RONALD ELLIS 

NAACP Legal Defense & 
Educational Fund, Inc. 

99 Hudson Street 

New York, NY 10013 

(212)219-1900 

Pro Hac Vice 

HELEN HERSHKOFF 
ADAM S. COHEN 
JOHN A. POWELL 
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 

FOUNDATION 
132 West 43rd Street 

New York, NY 10036 

(212)944-9800 
Pro Hac Vice 

JOHN BRITTAIN 

UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT 

SCHOOL OF LAW 

65 Elizabeth Street 
Hartford, CT 06105 

(203) 241-4664 

Juris No. 101153 

JENNY RIVERA 

PUERTO RICAN LEGAL DEFENSE 

AND EDUCATION FUND 

99 Hudson Street 

New York, NY 10013 

  

   



  

CERTIFICATION 

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was mailed to all 

counsel of record on September 20, 1990. 

  

Wes . ‘Horton 

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