DeRonde v. University of California Regents Appendix to Brief Amicus Curiae

    UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION

RONALD BRADLEY, et al.,
Plaintiffs 

v . • - .

WILLIAM G. MILLIKEN, et al..
Defendants

and
DETROIT FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 
LOCAL NO. 231, AMERICAN FEDERATION 
OF TEACHERS, AFL-CIO•

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Defendant- 
Intervenor

and
DENISE MAGDOWSKI, et al.,

CIVIL ACTION NO: 
35257

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Defendants-
Intervener

J UN 141972
DAMON J. KEITH

u. S. DIST. JUDGE 
DETROIT, MICHIGAN 48226

et al.
)

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
IN SUPPORT OF RULING

ON DESEGREGATION AREA AND DEVELOPMENT OF PLAN
On the basis of the entire record in this action, 

including particularly the evidence heard by the court from 
March 28 through April 14, 1972, the court now makes the follow­
ing Supplementary Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. It 
should be noted that the court has taken no proofs with respect 
to the establishment of the.boundaries of the 86 public school 
districts in the counties of Wayne, Oakland and Macomb, nor 
on the issue of whether, with the exclusion of the city of 
Detroit school district, such school districts have committed 
acts of de jure segregation. . •

INTRODUCTION
X. On September 27,. 1971, this court issued its

Ruling on Issue of Segregation. On October 4, 1971, this court



issued from the bench guidelines to bind the parties in the 
submission of plans to remedy the constitutional violation 
found, jL.e., school segregation; and in particular this court 
noted that the primary objective before us was to develop and 
implement a plan which attempts to "achieve the greatest

. ■ • . . v
possible degree of actual desegregation, taking into account 
the practicalities of the situation." The same day this 
court reiterated these requirements by orders "that the Detroit 
Board of Education submit a plan for the desegregation of its 
schools within 60 days" and "that the State defendants submit 
a metropolitan plan of desegregation within 120 days." In 
response to these orders hearings were held, and thereafter 
rulings issued, on Detroit—only plans (see Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law on Detroit-Only Plans of Desegregation) 
and on the propriety of considering remedies which extend beyond 
the corpojL ete yeuyiaphic ixmits of ehe cxcy ox Detroit. x̂>ee 
Ruling on Propriety of Considering a Metropolitan Remedy to 
Accomplish Desegregation of the Public Schools of the City 
of Detroit.) Between March 28, 1972 and April 14, 1972, 
hearings were held on metropolitan proposals for desegregation 

of the Detroit public schools.
2. From the initial ruling on September 27, 1971, 

to this day, the basis of the proceedings has been and 
remains the violation: dejure school segregation. Since 
Brown v. Board of Education the Supreme Court has consistently 
held that the remedy for such illegal segregation is desegre­
gation. The racial history of this country is writ large by 
constitutional adjudication from Dred Scott v. Sanford to 
Plessy v. Ferguson to Brown. The message in Brown was simple: 
the Fourteenth Amendment was to be applied full force in 
public schooling. The Court held that "state-imposed" school 
segregation immeasurably taints the education received by all

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children in the public schools; perpetuates racial discrimination 
and a history of public action attaching a badge of inferiority 
to the black race in a public forum which importantly shapes 
the minds and hearts of succeeding generations of our young 
people; and amounts to an invidious racial classification.
Since Brown the Supreme Court has consistently, and with 
increasing force, held that the remedy upon finding de jure 
segregation is prompt and maximum actual desegregation of 
the public schools by all reasonable, feasible, and practicable 
means available. This court finds that there is nothing in 
the law, wisdom, or facts, and the particular circumstances 
and arguments, presented in this case which suggest anything 
except the affirmance of these principles in both fact and 

law.
3. The task before this court, therefore, is now,

and, since September 27, 1S71, has always been, how to
desegregate the Detroit public schools. The issue, despite
efforts of the intervenors to suggest a new rationale for

. 1 /a return to the discredited "separate but equal" policy,
is not whether to desegregate. That question has been
foreclosed by the prior and settled commands of the Supreme
Court and the Sixth circuit. Our duty now is to "grapple

2 / •with the flinty, intractable realities"—  of implementing the 

constitutional commands. .
4. In the most recent set of hearings, several 

issues were addressed generally, including appropriate methods 
of pupil reassignment to desegregate schools; quality and 
capacity of school facilities; transportation needs incioent
to school desegregation; the effects of new pchool construction, 
and judicially established controls thereon, on any plan of 

rdesegregation; the reassignment of faculty and restructuring 
of facilities incident to pupil reassignment to accomplish



school desegregation; appropriate and necessary interim and 
final administrative and financial arrangements; appropriate 
community, parental, staff, and pupil involvement in the 
desegregation process; and attention to individual, cultural, 
and ethnic values, respect, dignity and identity. But the 
primary question addressed hy these hearings, in the absence of 
submission of a complete desegregation plan by the state, 
remains the determination of the area necessary and practicable 
effectively to eliminate "root and branch" the effects of 
state-imposed and supported segregation and to desegregate 

the Detroit public schools. •

SUPPLEMENTARY FINDINGS OF FACT
A. The Desegregation Area

5. The State Board of Education filed six (6)
"plans" without recommendation or preference; intervening defendants 
Magdowski, et al., filed a proposal for metropoliean desegregation 
which included most of the tri-county area; the defendant Detroit 
Board of Education filed a proposal for metropolitan desegregation

3 / .which included the entire tri-county area. At the hearing 
plaintiffs presented a modification of the three proposals which 
actually described areas within which pupil desegregation was to 

be accomplished.
6. In the consideration of metropolitan plans of

desegregation of the Detroit public schools, the State defendants
stand as the primary defendants. They bear the initial burden
of coming forward with a proposal that promises to work. In

• ■ ,!_/the context of this case, they represent the "school authorities"
to whom equity courts traditionally have shown deference in

5 / .these matters.— Yet in its submission without recommendation
of six (6) "plans" the State Board of Education has failed to .
meet, or even attempt to meet, that burden and none of the other
State defendants has filled the void.

4 -



7. The State Board refused to make any recommendation 
to the court about the appropriate area for desegregation. In 
State Defendant Porter's words, the State Board "didn't make a 
decision, period." Defendants Milliken and Kelley merely filed 
objections to all six (6) plans.

8. -Three of the State "plans" merely proposed- 
concepts alternative to maximum actual desegregation. The 
Racial Proportion Plan described a statistical method of 
determining the number of transfers involved in achieving a 
particular racial ratio in each school once an area of desegrega­
tion had been chosen. The Equal Educational Opportunity and 
Quality Integration Plan was admitted to be a non-plan and 
described criteria for education which, in whole or part, might, 
or might not, be applicable to any school system.

9. Only one State "plan," the Metropolitan District 
Reorganization Plan, attempted to describe an area within 
which desegregation should occur, called the "initial operating 
zone" (sometimes referred to hereafter as the "State Proposal"). 
That "plan," however, was primarily concerned with discussing
a new governance structure for the desegregation area. Pupil 
reassignment was mentioned only in passing and no foundation 
was laid by State defendants for the particular area of 
desegregation described. Further, it suffered from the default 
of the State defendants by their stubborn insistence that under 
their self-serving, and therefore self-limiting, view of their 
powers they were free to ignore the clear order of this court 
and abdicate their responsibility vested in them by both the 
Michigan and Federal Constitution for supervision of public 
e-ucation and equal protection for all citizens.

10. From the very limited evidence in the record in 
support of the area in that state proposal, the primary 
foundation appears to be -the particular racial ratio attained in

5-



that plan, approximately 65% black, 35% white, with the provision 
that the area could be expanded if "white flight" ensued. In 
the absence of any other persuasive foundation, such area is 
not based on any definable or legally sustainable criteria for 
either inclusion or exclusion of particular areas; and the 
concept of an "initial operating zone" raises serious practical 
questions, which should be avoided if a more permanent solution 
is now possible. In short, the area described by the "initial 
operating zone" does not appear to be based primarily on 
relevant factors, like eliminating racially identifiable schools; 
accomplishing maximum actual desegregation of the Detroit public 
schools; or avoiding, where possible, maintaining a pattern of 
schools substantially disproportionate to the relevant school 
community's racial composition by force of deliberate action 
by public authority. Nor, on the evidence in this record, is 
the "initial operating zone" based on any practical limitation 
of reasonable times and distances for transportation of pupils. 
These factors seem to have played little part in the creation of 
the "initial operating zone" and are reflected less in its 
result.

11. At the hearings, moreover, the State defendants 
did not purport to present evidence in support, or even in 
opposition, to the State Proposal. The State, despite prodding 
by the court, presented only one witness, who merely explained 
what appeared on the face of the various State "Plans" submitted. 
The State's cross examination of witnesses was of no assistance 
to the court in ascertaining any preference, legal or educational. 
Put bluntly, State defendants in this hearing deliberately chose 
not to assist the court in choosing an appropriate area for 
effective desegregation of the Detroit public schools. Their 
resistance and abdication of responsibility throughoiit has been 
consistent with the other failures to meet their obligations noted

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in the court's earlier rulings. Indeed, some of the submissions 
spoke as clearly in opposition to desegregation as did the
legislature in Sec. 12 of Act 48 ruled unconstitutional by 

the Sixth Circuit. .
12. In such circumstances little weight or deference

can be given to the unsupported submission of the State
/

Board of Education. In light of the available alternatives 
and the facts produced at the hearing bearing on the' issue, 
the court finds that State defendants offered no basis for 
ruling that the "initial operating zone" is the appropriate 
area within which to effectively desegregate the Detroit public 

schools.
13. Similarly, the newly intervening, defendant 

school districts did not attempt at the hearing to assist the 
court in determining which area was appropriate to accomplish
effective ue»egj.eg<*txon. Tney were given <-he cppui. >.uni , bj-
express written order and several admonitions during the course 
of the hearings, to assist the court in the task at hand but 
chose in their best judgment instead, in the main, to suggest 
their view that separate schools were preferable. The failure 
of the group of 40 districts to even comment that the court 
should exclude certain districts under any number of available 
rationales may in part be explained by the awkward position 
chosen by them and their counsel of having single representation 
for districts on different sides of the various suggested 

perimeters.
14. The plans of intervening defendants Magdowski, 

et al., and the defendant Detroit Board of Education are similar 
With slight variations they include the entire tri-county, 
metropolitan Detroit area, with that area divided into several 
.regions or clusters to make the planning for accomplishing 
desegregation more manageable. Although both have as their main

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objective desegregation, their larger area arises primarily 
from a heavy emphasis on such factors as white flight and an
appropriate socio-economic balance in each cluster and school.

15. The authors of the Detroit Board and Magdowski 
plans readily admit that the regions or clusters for pupil 
reassignment which involve Mt. Clemens and Pontiac are not 
directly related to desegregation of the Detroit public 
schools and may be disregarded without any substantial adverse 
effect on accomplishing our objective. No other party has 
expressed any disagreement with that view. And the court finds 
that these two regions or clusters, for purposes of pupil 
reassignment, need not be included at this time in the 

desegregation area.
16. With the elimination of these two clusters there are, 

then, three basic proposals to be considered for the desegregation
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proposal of defendant-intervenors Magdowski, et al. In addition, 
as noted, plaintiffs filed a modification of these three 

proposals.
17. Each of these proposals starts from the same

7 /two premises: (1) the tri-county area constitutes the
relevant school community which can serve as an initial 
benchmark in beginning the evaluation of how to effectively 
eliminate the racial segregation of Detroit schools;
(2) but in some instances reasonable time and distance 
limitations for pupil transportation, and in other instances 
the actual area required to eliminate the pattern of racially 
identifiable schools, limit the area within which pupil 
eassignm'"nt should occur. In terms of proof, putting aside 

arguments of impotence by the State defendants, there was 
absolutely no contradictory evidence on these two criteria.
The entire tri-county area includes areas, pupils, and

6_ /

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schools in 86 school districts; it includes approximately one
million students, of whom approximately 20% are black. Based

8_/on the evidence concerning school and non-school factors, 
and reasonable time and distance limitations for pupil 
transportation, the court finds that both premises are

2 J  • • 'accurate.
18. The State Proposal includes the areas, pupils 

and school in 36 school districts; approximately 550,000 
students are included of whom 36% are black. The Detroit 
Board Proposal (excluding clusters 8 and 12) includes the 
areas, pupils, and schools in 69 school districts; approximately.

. . + } ± J850,000 students are included, of whom 25% are minority.
The CCBE Proposal includes the areas, pupils, and schools in 
some 62 school districts; approximately 777,000 students are 
included of whom 197,000 (25.4%) are black. Plaintiffs'
Proposal includes .the areas, pupils, and schools in 54 school
districts; approximately 780,000 students are included, of 

whom 197,000 (25.3%) are black.
19. The State Proposal approaches what may be

considered a substantial disproportion in the context of this 
case. It is to be remembered that within any desegregation 
area, the racial composition of desegregated schools will vary 
from the area's racial mix. Given the variations in school 
plant, demographic and geographic factors, limiting the 
desegregation area to the State Proposal would result in some 
schools being substantially disproportionate in their racial 
composition to the tri-county area, and other schools racially 
identifiable, all without any justification in law or fact. 
This finding is supported by the lack of any apparent 
justification for the desegregation area described by the 
State Proposal except a desire to achieve an arbitrary racial 

ratio. .
9-



20. Transportation of children by school bus is a

common practice throughout the nation, in the state of 
Michigan, and in the tri-county area. Within appropriate 
time limits it is a considerably safer, more reliable, 
healthful and efficient means of getting children to school 
than either car pools or walking, and this is especially true 

for younger children.
21. In Michigan and the tri-county area,' pupils 

often spend upwards of one hour, and up to one and one half 
hours, one-way on the bus ride to school each day. Consistent 
with its interest in the health, welfare and safety of children 
and in avoiding impingement on the educational process, state 
educational authorities routinely fund such transportation
for school children. Such transportation of school children is 
a long-standing, sound practice in elementary and secondary
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court finds such transportation times, used by the state and 
recommended here, are reasonable in the circumstance here 
presented and will not endanger the health or safety of the 
child nor impinge on the educational process. For school 
authorities or private citizens to now object to such 
transportation practices raises the inference not of hostility 
to pupil transportation but rather racially motivated hostility 
to the desegregated school at the end of the ride.

22. The Plaintiffs’ Proposal made reference to 
P.M.8, based on the TALUS regional transportation and travel 
times study. Although there was dispute over the meaning of the 
study, such studies are deemed sufficiently reliable that major 
governmental agencies customarily rely on their projection for
a variety of planning functions. When used by the plaintiffs, 
P„M, 8, in conjunction with the Detroit Board's survey of , 
maximum school to school travel times, served as a rough guiae

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line within which the plaintiffs1 modification of other proposals 
attempted to stay in an effort to provide maximum desegregation 
without any more transportation time than is required to .
desegregate. This court finds that the utilization of these 
two factors, and the lower travel time estimates which should 
result, is a reasonable basis for the modification in the 
circumstances of this case. The court's duty and objective 
is not to maximize transportation but to maximize desegregation 
and within that standard it will always be reasonable to 
minimize transportation. To that end the court has accepted 
the more conservative perimeter for the desegregation area suggested 
as a modification by plaintiffs because it provides no less 
effective desegregation.

23. Based on these criteria, the State Proposal is 
too narrowly drawn.

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Board Proposal are too sweeping.
25. Based on these criteria, the CCBE proposal

and the Plaintiffs' Proposal, roughly approximate the area so
11/

described. '
26:. There is general agreement among the parties, 

and the court so finds, that on the west the areas, schools, and 
pupils in the Huron, Van Buren, Northville, Plymouth, and Novi

. I2 /districts (1) are beyond the rough 40-minute travel time line; 
(2) are not necessary to effectively desegregate schools involved 
in the regions and clusters abutting those schools; and, (3) at 
this writing, are not otherwise necessary, insofar as pupil 
assignment is concerned, to provide an effective remedy now 
and hereafter. (See Findings 63-69 below.)

27. In the southwest the school districts of Woodhaven, 
Gilbralter, Flat Rock, Grosse Xle and Trenton are within 
reasonable time and distance criteria set forth above. These

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virtually all-white districts are included in the Detroit 
Board Proposal but excluded from the plaintiffs' modif iceition.
The areas, schools and pupils in such school districts are _
similarly not necessary to effectively desegregate. (Clusters 
13, 14, and 15 in Plaintiffs' proposal are 20.5%, 24.4% and 
22.7% black respectively.) There is nothing in the record 
which suggests that these districts need be included in the 
desegregation area in order to disestablish the racial 
identiflability of the Detroit public schools. From the 
evidence, the primary reason for the Detroit School Board's 
interest in the inclusion of these school districts is not 
racial desegregation but to increase the average socio-economic 
balance of all the schools in the abutting regions and clusters.
In terms of what this court views as the primary obligation established 
by the Constitution— racial desegregation— the court deems the

approach is to be more c/■-x v \  r-* o v x.4— *» TVwX v 4 - V x  , M l  v > 4 -  -P n  *» ■

appropriate to confine the desegregation area to its smallest
effective limits. This court weighs more heavily the judicially
recognized concern for limiting the time and distance of pupil
transportation as much as possible, consistent with the
constitutional requirement to eliminate racially identifiable
schools, than a concern for expanding the desegregation area to
raise somewhat the average socio-economic balance of a

13 /relatively few clusters of schools.
28. To the north and northeast, the only major 

disagreement among the Detroit Board Proposal and plaintiffs1 
modification relates to the areas, schools, and pupils in the 
Utica School District. This district is a virtually all-white, 
long, relatively narrow area extending several miles in a 
north-south direction away from the city of Detroit. Only 
the southern part of the district is within the rough, TALUS 

40-minute travel time line.

12



29. The Detroit Board argues that Utica should

be included in order to raise the average socio-economic 
balance of the abutting clusters and schools. In this 
instance, however, the overall racial composition of the 
cluster, 27.0% black, may tend toward disproportionate •
black relative to the tri-county starting point.

30. Mr. Henrickson, the planner for the Board, 
also suggested that Cluster 3 of Plaintiffs' proposal, because 
of its omission of Utica, might present some problems, which 
he admitted could be solved, in designing a plan of pupil 
reassignment for the desegregation of schools. (See 

Findings 34-39 below.).
31. In light of these relevant, and competing, 

considerations the question presented by the Utica situation 
is close; however, at this writing, the court determines
that the areas, schools, and pupils m  the Utica School District
need not be included, and therefore, should not be included in

. 14/the desegregation area.
• 32. The court finds that the appropriate desegre­

gation area is described by plaintiffs' modification of the 
three primary proposals, within that area the racial 
identifiability of schools may be disestablished by implementa­
tion of an appropriate pupil desegregation plan. The area 
as a whole is substantially proportionate to the tri—county 
starting point. Within the area it is practicable, feasible, 
and sound to effectively desegregate all schools without 
imposing any undue transportation burden on the children or 
on the state's system of public schooling. The time or 
distance children need be transported to desegregate schools 
in the area will impose no risk to the children's health and 
will not significantly impinge on the educational process.



B. Clusters

33. The Detroit Board Proposal makes use of 16 
regions or clusters. These clusters range from 36,000 to
105.000 pupils and from 17.5% to 29.7% "minority." The 
clusters are arranged along major surface arteries and , 
utilize the "skip," or noncontiguous zoning, technique to 
minimize the time and distance any child need spend in 
transit. The use of these clusters basically subdivides the 
planning for pupil reassignment within the desegregation area 
into a series of smaller, manageable and basically independent 
plans. Thus, although as the new intervenors suggest devising 
a desegregation plan for a system with some 800,000 pupils 
has never been attempted, the practical and manageable reality 
is that desegregation plans for systems with from 36,000 to
100.000 pupils has been done and such plans have been 
implemented.

34. Plaintiffs' Proposal uses the same cluster 
technique and the same clusters, modified to fit the desegrega­
tion area. The 15 clusters range from 27,000 to 93,000 pupils 
and from 20.5% to 30.8% black. Only three relevant objections 
were raised by Mr. Henrickson, to the clusters as modified.

35. First, Cluster 4 was challenged as "concealing" 
a "problem," namely effective desegregation of other schools 
resulting from the omission of Utica from plaintiffs' modifica­
tion. On cross-examination Mr. Henrickson admitted that the 
"problem" of actual pupil desegregation for these other 
schools could be "solved," that all schools within Cluster 4 
could be effectively desegregated, and that Cluster 4 was 
smaller than the Detroit Board Cluster 6. The objection was 
thus narrowed to the possibility that a suburban high school 
constellation feeder pattern might have to be split between two

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Detroit high school constellation feeder patterns in order to 
desegregate. Several of the Detroit Board's clusters, however, 
also contain two Detroit high school feeder patterns.

36. This objection, splitting an existing feeder 
pattern, was raised directly in reference to Cluster 12. In 
neither instance, however, did Mr. Henrickson suggest that the 
time or distance of transportation involved was too long or 
that it would present administrative difficulty in_devising 
a pupil assignment plan for either cluster. The objection 
relates solely to a matter of administrative convenience, 
namely the use of existing feeder patterns in preparing 
pupil assignments. , For example, Mr. Henrickson previously 
admitted that in drawing a pupil assignment plan, an 
alternative to use of existing feeder patterns would be to 
"wipe the slate clean," and disregard existing feeder patterns. 
In fact one of the State plans suggested vise of census tracts

1 5  /  • • ^  4-as an alternative.--- On numerous occasions in tne past
Mr. Henrickson himself has reassigned parts of one feeder 
pattern to another school in order to relieve overcrowding and/ 
or accomplish desegregation. The objection to such practice, 

therefore, is admittedly insubstantial.
37. The third objection relates to the exchange 

of Detroit Northern for Detroit Murray in Clusters 6 and 15 
requiring that the students transported, if they proceed on 
their entire journey by way of the expressway, encounter an 
interchange which tends to be rather slow—moving. Such 
transportation time and distance, however, is well within the 
rough criteria for reasonableness and is shorter than or 

^comparable to the maximum trips required in the Detroit Board's 
clusters. In other instances, Mr. Henrickson admitted that 
pupils in the Detroit proposal might also have to travel 
through similar interchanges. Moreover, the objection to this

15-



particular increase in travel time must be weighed against the 
apparent general decrease in time which would be required in 
plaintiffs' modified clusters as compared with the Detroit 
Board's clusters. In any event the desegregation panel, 
based on its investigation of all aspects of pupil assignment, 
remains free to suggest a modification of these clusters in 
order to reduce the time and number of children requiring 

transportation.
38. With that caveat, the court finds that 

plaintiffs' modification of the Detroit Board's clusters 
provides a workable, practicable, and sound framework for the 
design of a plan to desegregate the Detroit public schools.

C. Pupil Assignment and Transportation
39. Example of various methods of pupil assignment 

to accomplish desegregation have been brought to the attention
of the court by the parties: pairing, grouping, and clustering 
of schools; various strip, skip, island, and non-contiguous 
zoning; various lotteries based on combinations of present 
school assignment, geographic location, name, or birthday. 
Judicious use of these techniques— coupled with reasonable
staggering of school hours and maximizing use of existing 
transportation facilities— can lead to maximum actual desegregation 
with a minimum of additional transportation.

40. Quite apart from desegregation, under any 
circumstances, transportation for secondary pupils living 
more than 1 1/2 miles, and elementary pupils living more 
than 1 mile from school, is often demanded by parents and 
should t- provided. Moreoever, it is essential to the 
effectiveness of'any desegregation plan that transportation 
be provided free to all students requiring it under that
^criteria. (Brewer v. Norfolk Board of Education, P . 2d.

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(April 1972) (4th Cir.).) .
41. In the recent past more than 300,000 pupils 

in the tri—county area regularly rode to school on some type 
of bus; this figure excludes the countless children who
arrive at school in car pools, which are many, many times

• - - » more dangerous than riding on the school bus.
42. Throughout the state approximately 35-40% of 

all students arrive at school on a bus. In school- districts 
eligible for state reimbursement of transportation costs in 
the three affected counties, the percent of pupils transported

in 1969-70 ranged from 42 to 52%.
43. In' comparison approximately 40%, or 310,000, 

of the 780,000 children within the desegregation area will 
require transportation in order to accomplish maximum 

actual desegregation.
44 Hence, any increase in the numbers of puerls 

to be transported upon implementation of a complete desegrega 
tion plan over the number presently transported, relative to 
the state and the tri-county area, should be minimal. Indeed, 
any increase may only reflect the greater numbers of pupils 
who would be transported in any event but for the state 
practice, which affected the segregation found in this 
case, and which denies state reimbrusement to students and 
districts wholly within city limits regardless of the 
distance of the child from the school to which assigned. 
(Ruling on Issue of Segregation at 14.) The greatest change

is the direction of the buses.
45. There is uncontradicted evidence that the

actual cost of transportation for a two-way plan of
desegregation should be no greater than 50 to 60 dollars per

1.7 /pupil transported,---comparable to the present costs per
pupil through the state. Increases in the total costs

- 17 -



of pupil transportation in the desegregation area, therefore, 
will result primarily from providing all chiIdrerrrequiring 
transportation a free ride instead of imposing the costs of 
transportation for many on the families in districts which are 
ineligible for state reimbursement and which fail to provide 
transportation. - • >

46, By multiple use of buses, careful routing, and 
economies of scale resulting from a comprehensive system of 
pupil transportation, it may be possible to achieve savings 
in per pupil costs. For example in 1969-1970 many school 
districts in the tri-county area which used the same bus for 
even two loads per day lowered their per pupil costs to $40 
or less. In a coordinated, urban pupil transportation system 
it may be possible to raise the bus use factor to three or 
more. (See "First Report" State Survey and Evaluation.)

47. In the tri-county area in the recent past there 
were approximately 1,800 buses (and another 100 smaller vans) 
used for the transportation of pupils. Assuming a rough 
average of 50 pupils per bus carrying three loads of students 
per day, this transportation fleet may prove sufficient to 
carry some 270,000 pupils.

48. Various public transit authorities now transport 
an additional 60,000 pupils on their regular public runs.

49. The degree to which these plausible bus-use 
factors can be realized to their maximum, and whether these 
public transit facilities may be fully utilized in a plan of 
desegregation, must be answered upon careful investigation by 
a panelof experts.

50. There is no disagreement among the parties, and 
the court so finds, that additional transportation facilities, 
at least to the number of 350 buses, will have to be purchased 
to meet the increase in the number of students who should be

- 18-



provided transportation for either an interim or final plan of 

desegregation.
51. For all the reasons stated heretofore— including 

time, distance, and transportation factors— desegregation within 
the area described is physically easier and more practicable
and feasible, than desegregation efforts limited to the corporate 

geographic limits of the city of Detroit.
52. The issue of transportation of kindergarten 

children, and their inclusion in part or in full in the 
desegregation plan, may require further study. There was 
general agreement among the experts who testified that kinder­
garten, but for "political" considerations, should be included, 
if practicable, in the desegregation plan. Kindergarten, 
however, is generally a half—day program. Transportation of 
kindergarten children for upwards of 45 minutes, one-way, does 
not appear unreasonable, narmtul, or unsare in any way. in 
the absence of some compelling justification, which does not 
yet appear, kindergarten children should be included in the 
final plan of desegregation.

53. Every effort should be made to .insure that 
transportation and reassignment of students to accomplish 
desegregation is "two-way" and falls as fairly as possible
on both races. Although the number of black and white children 
transported and reassigned at the outset will be roughly equal, 
it is inevitable that a larger proportion of black children will 
be transported for a greater proportion of their school years 
than white children, if transportation overall is to be 
minimized. To mitigate this disproportion, every effort should 
be made at the outset to randomize the location of particular 
grade centers. In the short term, full utilization of vastly 
'under—capacity inner-city schools may also help to mitigate the 
disproportion for some black children; and in the long term,



I

new school capacity, consistent with other constitutional 
commands and the overall needs of the desegregation area and 
the surrounding area, should be added in Detroit, in relative 
proximity to concentrations of black student residence.

D. Restructuring of Facilities and Reassignment of Teachers
54. In the reassignment of pupils to accomplish 

desegregation the court finds that facilities must be substantially 
reallocated and faculty substantially reassigned by reason of
the clustering, pairing and grouping of schools.

55. In order to make the pupil desegregation process 
fully effective the court finds that it is essential to integrate 
faculty and staff and to insure that black faculty and staff 
representation at every school is more than token. The court 
has previously found and reaffirms that "a quota or racial 
balance in each school which is equivalent to the system-wide 
ratio and without more" is educationally unsound, and that
the desideratum is the balance of staff by qualifications for 
subject and grade level, and then by race, experience and 
sex. It is obvious, given the racial composition of the 
faculty and staff in the schools in the metropolitan plan 
area, and the adjusted racial composition of the students, 
that vacancies and increases and reductions in faculty and 
staff cannot effectively achieve the needed racial balance 
in this area of the school operation. Active steps must be 
taken to even out the distribution of black teachers and staff 

throughout the system.
56. In the desegregation area approximately 16% of 

the faculty and 12% of the principals and assistant principals 
are black. In this context "token" means roughly less than 
10% black. Moreover, where there is more than one building 
administrator in any school, a bi-racial administrative team

- 20-



is required wherever possible.
57. Every effort should be made to hire and promote,

and to increase such on-going efforts as there may be to hire 
and promote, additional black faculty and staff. Because of 
the systematic and substantial under-employment of black 
administrators and teachers in the tri-county area, an 
affirmative program for black employment should be developed 

and implemented. '
I

58. The rated capacity of classrooms in the Detroit 
public schools is 32; in some of the suourban districts the 
average rated capacity is as low as 24 or 25. Utilization 
should be redetermined on a uniform basis.

59. In respect to faculty and staff, school 
facilities, and the utilization of existing school capacity, 
normal administrative practice in handling the substantial 
reallocation and reassignment incident to pupil desegregation 
should produce schools substantially alike.

60. la the circumstances of this case, the pairing, 
grouping and clustering of schools to accomplish desegregation 
with minimum transportation often requires use of grade 
arrangements such as K-4, K-5, or even K-6. In so planning 
pupil reassignments, it is sometimes necessary, and often 
administratively practicable, to include grades K-8 or even 
K-9 to achieve the maximum actual desegregation with the 
minimum transportation. Grade structures in most elementary 
schools in the desegregation area is a basic K-6; however, 
almost all other combinations are found. They differ within 

and among various districts.
> - gp. In the reassignments of pupils and teachers
and the reallocation of equipment and facilities required to 
accomplish desegregation, the elementary grades and schools 
present relatively few administrative oifficulties, while the

- 21-



high school grades and facilities present the greater 
difficulties, particularly with respect to scheduling and 

curriculum.
62. For these reasons, if it develops that 

interim choices must be made because of the impossibility of 
immediate desegregation of all grades, schools, and clusters 
in the desegregation area, the weight of the evidence is, and 
the court so finds, that desegregation should begin first 
at the earliest grades for entire elementary school groupings 
throughout as many clusters as possible.

E. School Construction
63. Relative to suburban districts the Detroit 

public schools, as a whole, are considerably over-capacity.
(See also Finding 58, supra.) To alleviate this overcrowding, 
equalize rated capacity and minimize and equalize transportation 
burdens borne by black pupils in the city, neecied new school 
capacity, consistent with other requirements of a desegregation, 
plan, should be added on a priority basis in the city of 

Detroit.
64. Relevant to the court's choice of a desegregation 

area more limited than the Detroit Board Proposal is the 
testimony, elicited on cross-examination from two of the 
primary authors of that proposal, related to the effects of 
controlling new school construction. The broader area in the 
EeUroit proposal was chosen without any real consideration
of the impact of controlling school construction in an area 
larger than the desegregation area. Upon reflection, both 
Dr. Flynn and Mr. Henrickson admitted that closely 
scrutinizing and limiting the addition of capacity to areas 
outside the desegregation area might lead them to re-evaluate 
the need, in the context of maintaining now arid hereafter a 
unitary system, to include an area as sweeping as recommended



by the Detroit Board proposal,
65. In our Ruling on Issue of Segregation, pp. 8-10, 

this court found that the "residential segregation throughout 
the larger metropolitan area is substantial, pervasive and of 
long standing" and that "governmental actions and inaction at 
all levels, Federal, State and local, have combined with 
those of private organizations, such as loaning institutions 
and real estate associations and brokerage firms, to establish 
and to maintain the pattern of associations and brokerage 
firms, to establish and to maintain the pattern of residential 
segregation through the Detroit metropolitan area." We also 
noted that this deliberate setting of residential patterns had 
an important effect not only on the racial composition of 
inner-city schools but the entire School District of the City 
of Detroit. (Ruling on Issue of Segregation at 3-10.) Just 
as evident is the fact that suburban school districts in the 
main contain virtually all-white schools. The white population 
of the city declined and in the suburbs grew; the black 
population in the city grew, and largely, was contained therein 
by force of public and private racial discrimination at all 

levels.
66. We also noted the important interaction of 

school and residential segregation: "Just as there is an inter­
action between residential patterns and the racial composition 
of the schools, so there is a corresponding effect on the ,
residential pattern by the racial composition of schools."
Ruling on Issue of Segregregation at 10. Cf. Swann v .
Charlotte-Mecklenberg, 402 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1971); "People 
gravitate toward school facilities, just as schools are located 
in response to the needs of people. The location of schools 
may thus influence the patterns of residential development of a 
metropolitan area and have important impact on composition



of inner city neighborhoods."
67. Within the context of the segregatory housing

market, it is obvious that the white families who left the
city schools would not be as likely to leave in the absence of
schools, not to mention white schools, to attract, or at least

18/serve, their children. Immigrating families were affected
in their school and housing choices in a similar manner. Between
1950 and 1969 in the tri-county area, approximately 13,900
"regular classrooms," capable of serving and attracting over

19/400,000 pupils, were added xn school districts which were less 
than 2% black in their pupil racial composition in the 1970-71 
school year. (P.M. 14; P.M. 15).•

68. The precise effect of this massive school
construction on the racial composition of Detroit area public
schools cannot be measured. It is clear, however, that the

20 /effect has been substantial." “ Unfortunately, the State, 
despite its awareness of the important impact of school 
construction and announced policy to contr-ol it, acted "in 
keeping generally, with the discriminatory practices which 
advanced or perpetuated racial segregation in these schools." 
Ruling on Issue of Segregation at 15; see also id., at 13.

69. In addition to the interim re-evaluation of new 
school construction required in the order, pursuant to the 
State Board's own requirements, the final plan will consider 
other appropriate provisions for future construction throughout • 
the metropolitan area.

F. Governance, Finance and Administrative Arrangements
70. The plans submitted by the State Board, the

Detroit Board, and the intervening defendants Magdowski, et al., 
discuss generally possible governance, finance, and administrative 
arrangements which maY be appropriate for operation of an
interim or final plan of desegregation. Without parsing in detail

- 24-



the interesting, and sometimes sensible, concepts introduced 
by each plan, it is sufficient to note that each contemplates 
overlaying some broad educational authority over the area, 
creating or using some regional arrangement (with continued 
use or eventual redrawing of existing districts) , and 
considerable input at the individual school level. The court 
has made no decision in this regard and will consider the 
matter at a subsequent hearing.

72_# Each concept needs to be "fleshed-out" in the 

hard prospect of implementation of a final plan of 
desegregation and what is necessary and essential, and only 
that, for the successful operation of that plan of school 
desegregation now on an interim basis and hereafter on a 

permanent footing.
72. There are now some 86 school districts in the 

tri-county area of varying size, numbers of pupils, shapes, 

and wealth.
73 # in another context, the State Board of Education 

found each related to a "metropolitan core city" (Detroit) as 
"city," "town," or "urban fringe" districts.

74. The boundaries of these school districts in
general bear no relationship to other municipal, county,

22 /
or special district governments, needs or services';

75. Some educational services are already 
provided to students on an interdistrict, county, inter­
county, or metropolitan basis; and many support services 
are provided by the intermediate school districts and the 
State Department of Education. For various reasons many
pupils already cross school district lines to attend school

23 /
or receive educational services. ~

76. In many respects— patterns of economic life, work, 
play, population, planning, transportation, health services the

- 25-



tri-county area constitutes a rough series of interrelated 
communities constituting, in the view of the United States 
Census Bureau, a single standard metropolitan statistical area.

77. Local units of government in the metropolitan 
area have in many instances joined together for the purpose 
of providing better solutions to problems confronting them.
In such instances various units of government have either 
disregarded local boundaries or have concluded that the 
problems were such as to call for a metropolitan solution.
In some cases they have created overlay organizations.
SEMCOG, recreational authorities, a metropolitan sewage system, 
SEMTA, and the Detroit Water System are examples of these 

metropolitan approaches. '
78. Indeed, the State defendants at this very

moment are attempting in state court to strike down one 
irrationality, and the -discriminatory effect, or the exisuing 
school district arrangement, i_.e_. , finance, apparently in the 
hope of moving to a virtual state—wide assumption of costs.

79 In such circumstances there has been no showing 
that the existing school district boundaries are rationally 
related to any legitimate purpose; and the court finds that the 
particular welter of existing boundaries for 86 school districts 
is not necessary to the promotion of any compelling state 

interest.
80. On the basis of the present record, the court 

is of the view that the shifts in faculty, staff, resources 
and equipment and the exchanges of pupils necessary to 
accomplish maximum actual desegregation may be made, at least 
, -n an interim basis, by contractual agreements or otherwise 
among and between the existing school districts. The court 
has serious reservations, however, whether such procedures 
will inevitably threaten the continuing effectiveness of a

-26



plan -of desegregation over the long-term. On these issues 
more evidence and further heax'ings will be necessary before 
reaching a final decision.

81, The State defendants, and in particular the 
State Board of Education which is charged with the primary 
responsibility for public education in Michigan, are the 
primary parties to be charged with responsibility to undertake 
that vital inquiry and return with recommendations about those 
governance, financial, and administrative arrangements which 
are necessary and essential to the successful implementation 
of a plan of desegregation on an interim and continuing basis.

G. Involvement of Affected Persons and Communities and 
Protection Against Racial Discrimination in the 
Desegregation Process

82. The court has received uncontroverted evidence 
in the plans filed by every party and in testimony, and 
advice in several•Briefs amicus curiae, and the court rinds, 
that the following additional factors are essential to 
implementation and operation of an effective plan of 
desegregation in the circumstances of this case:

(a) Bi-racial councils made up of the parents and 
staff, and, where appropriate, pupils, should 
be set up at each school; the persons most 
affected must be encouraged and given every 
opportunity to participate in the implementation 
of desegregation.

(b) Curriculum content, and all curriculum materials 
and student codes, must be re-evaluated and 
reflect the diversity of ethnic and cultural 
backgrounds of the children now in the schools.
As far as possible, those immediately affected 
by these decisions at the individual, school 
level should participate in that process.

(c) In-service training for faculty and staff for 
multi-ethnic studies and human relations should 
be required; we must, after all, rely primarily 
on our teachers and children to respect, nurture, 
and deal with the diversity of students present 
in the desegregated school.

(d) The entire grading, reporting, counselling., and 
testing program should be reviewed in light of

- 27 -



desegregated schools compared to traditional 
schools and to avoid imposing the effects of 
past discrimination on the children. Tracking, 
whether so labeled or by any test, which has 
racial effects should not be utilized; within 
schools a pattern of classes which are 
substantially disproportionate in their racial 
composition from the relevant school or grade 
mix should be closely scrutinized and maintained 
only if necessary to promote a compelling 

. educational objective. .
83. In making the finding above, we remind the 

parties that this court's task is to enforce constitutional 
rights not to act as a schoolmaster; the court's task is to 
protect the constitutional rights here found violated with as 
little intrusion into the education process as possible. The 
court's objective is to establish the minimum constitutional 
framework within which the system of public schools may operate 
now and hereafter in a racially unified, non-discriminatory 
fashion. Within that framework the body politic, educators, 
parents, and most particularly the children must be given the 
maximum opportunity to experiment and secure a high quality, 
and equal, educational opportunity. However, experience has 
proven that specific goals, deadlines and methods of 
reporting and review must be required in all desegregation 
cases to insure compliance. <

H. Timing
84. The burden remains with State defendants to 

show why desegregation for all schools, grades, classrooms, 
and pupils in the desegregation area should not proceed now, 
jL,e _ . , in the context of this litigation, for the 1972 fall
term. The design and implementation of desegregation plans 
for all grades in 15 clusters— including pupil assignments, 
necessary reassignment of faculty and restructuring of 
facilities, planning and acquiring the needed transportation 
facilities— is conceded by all parties to be a major undertaking 
Yet next fall will already be a full year, not just four or six



or even eight weeks, Cf. Carter v. West Feliciano Parish
School. Bd., 396 U0S. 290 (1970) , after the initial ruling 
by this court of the need for maximum feasible desegregation 
"now." In such circumstances the burden to prove the 
infeasibility of implementation of complete relief is high.

85. The desegregation panel, therefore, must make 
every effort to plan to implement as much actual desegregation, 
for as many clusters, schools, grades, classrooms, and students 
as possible.

86. At a minimum, there is agreement among, and 
evidence from, the experts that desegregating several grades, 
and more particularly entire elementary schools, within many, 
if not all, clusters may be accomplished in the fall.

87. In view of Findings 60 to 62, supra, if 
hard choices must be made for the fall, any interim plan 
should attempt to desegregate grades k ~6, K~6, or K-9
in as many entire clusters as possible; and, in the absence
of some other showing, there appears no reason why a complete

24 /
plan may not be implemented by fall 1973.

88. A heavy burden rests with those who seek delay 
in any way, shape, kind, degree or extent to convince the 
court that maximum actual desegregation cannot proceed 
effectively forthwith.

89. In view of the time constraints, the need 
to discharge this burden forthwith, the State defendants' 
default in assisting this court to determine the appropriate 
desegregation area, and the State defendants' asserted and 
evident lack of available planning capacity suited to the 
task, the court finds that some additional entity must be 
charged with the task of preparing a pupil assignment plan to 
accomplish maximum actual desegregation and a transportation 
Plan within the framework this day established. To that end

- 29 -



a panel of skilled experts, broadly representative of the 
parties and their interests, appointed by the‘court and 
assigned that task, is required to discharge effectively 

and promptly these two tasks. -
90. State defendants remain charged with the duty, 

however,-of coming forward with other necessary reports and 
plans concerning those governance, administrative, and 
financial arrangements necessary and essential to the 
implementation of an effective plan of desegregation on an 

interim and on-going basis.

. I. The Plan
91. Based on the entire evidence amassed in this 

case, the court finds that an educationally sound, 
administratively feasible, constitutionally adequate, 
practicable and effective plan of desegregation may be developed, 
implemented and operated hereafter for' the desegregation area

as set forth in findings 1-90 above.

- 30-



CQUCItUS IONS—Q£—LAW

1. The court has continuing jurisdiction of this 
action for all purposes, including the granting of effective 
relief. Bradley v. Milliken, Ruling on Issue of Segregation, 
September 27, 1971; Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
on Detroit-Only Plans of Desegregation, March 28, 1972.

2. A de jure segregation violation having been found,
the minimum remedy is maximum actual desegregation, taking

. 25 y
into account the practicalities of the situation. Bradley v.
Milliken, Oral Order, October 4, 1971; Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Lav/ on Detroit-Only Plans of Desegregation,
March 28, 1972; Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U0S. 383 (1954), 
349 U„So 294 (1954); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S0 430
(1968) ; Alexander v. Holmes County Bd, of Ed., 396 U.S. 19
(1969) ; Carter v. West Feliciano School Bd., 396 U 0S0 290 (1970); 
Swann v. Charlotte Mecklenberg Bd. of Ed., 402 U 0S. 1 (1971); 
Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile, 402 U0S. 33 
(1971); Davis v. School District of City of Pontiac, 443 F.2d 

573, cert, denied, 925 U0S. 233 (1971).

3. The remedial obligation rests with school 
authorities; but where in any way they fail, or are unable 
because of the circumstances of the case, to fulfill any part 
of the obligation promptly and fully, the court has broad 
equity power, and the duty, to insure that demonstrable progress 
be made now; that a schedule for planning be adopted forthwith; 
and that necessary planning be specifically ordered and 
immediately undertaken in order that a constitutionally adequate 
plan may be fashioned and finally ordered implemented as soon
as possible. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberq Board of Education, 
311 F. Supp. 265 (VkDJLC„ 1970) , aff 8d f 402 U*S„ 1 (1971); 

Carter v. West Feliciano School Bd., 396 U.S« 226, 227-228



(1969), 336 U0SC 290 (1970); flcree v. County Board of 
Education, No. 72-1211 (5th Cir. March 31, 1972); Rule 53,
Fed. R. Civ. P.; P 0A cR0C0 v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1247, 
1266-7 (E.D. Pa. 1971). Only then will the court in this 
case be apprised fully of the practicalities of the situation, 
and what is reasonable and feasible, in order that a final 
order may issue. School authorities, of course., will be given 
an opportunity to (1) raise relevant objections, (2) make -
suggestions for modifications, (3) or present an alternative 
plan of desegregation; and their judgment and expertise will 
be considered and given appropriate weight by the court.

4. Funds must either be raised or reallocated, where 
necessary, to remedy the deprivation of plaintiffs' constitutional 
rights and to insure that no such unconstitutional neglect 
recurs again. Shapiro v. Thompson, 397 U„S. 254, 265-266 (1970); 
Boddie v. Connecticut, 91 S.Ct. 780, 788 (1971); Griffin v. ■
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U 0S0 
365, 374-375 (1971); Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 197 (1971); 
Griffin v. Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Hoosier v. 
Evans, 314 F. Supp. 316, 320-321 (D„St. Croix, 1970); United 
States v. School District 151, 301 F. Supp. 201, 232 (N.D„
1 1 1 . 1969), aff'd as modified, 432 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir. 1970), 
cert, denied, 402 U„S. 943 (1971); Plaquemines Parish School 
Board v. U 0S., 415 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1970); Bradley v.
Richmond, _____F. Supp.______ (April 1971); Brewer v. Norfolk,
No. 71-1900 (4th Cir., March 7, 1972)(Slip op. at pp. 7-8).
It would be a cruel mockery of constitutional law if a 
different rule were to be applied to school desegregation cases. 
After all schooling is this nation's biggest industry and the 
most important task of government left to the states by the 
Constitution. In this .ease, were a different rule to be 
applied, it would constitute a gigantic hypocrisy: After all

-32



the money which has been spent over the years creating and 
maintaining the segregated condition, the relatively small 
amounts of money required to undo that segregation can be 
found. The law, surely, requires at least that. And the 
application of the commands of Swann does require that in almost 
every school desegregation case which has been brought to this 
court's attention.

5. In the substantial reassignment of faculty and 
restructuring of facilities required by the clustering, pairing, 
and grouping of schools to accomplish pupil desegregation, 
normal administrative practice should lead to schools with 
substantially like facilities, faculty and staff, and equipment. 
.S-h?a..nllf SHP.r.a.» 402 U.So at 18-20. Moreover, special care should 
be taken in the necessary reassignment of faculty to avoid 
creating or maintaining the racial, identification of schools 
'•simply by reference to the racial composition of teachers and 
staff." Swann, supra, 402 U.S0 at 18. In any event, the 
equitable discretion of the court is broad enough to insure 
that those aspects of faculty desegregation and equalization 
of facilities which are essential to the effective operation of 
a desegregation plan are included in the planning and final 
order, Swarm, supra, 402 U0S. at 15; U CS. v, Montgomery County 
Board .of.. Ed. , 395 U„S0 225 (1969); Hecht v. Bowles. 321 U.S. 
329—330 (1944); and no contract, union agreement or otherwise, 
or Board policy or practice may impede these Fourteenth 
Amendment obligations. U.S. v. Greenwood Municipal Separate 
Sell0.01 District, 406 F.2d 1086, 1094 (5th Cir.), cert, denied,
39q U.S. 907 (1969); Berry v. Benton Harbor, _____F. Supp. _____
(W.D. Mich. 1971).

6. The Federal courts have repeatedly rejected plaps 
exempting the lower grades from integration, relying less on



educational data than upon the hard legal fact that segregation
at any age is a denial of the equal protection of the law. See, 
e_.g_. , United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ. , 372 
F.2d 836 (9th Cir. 1966), aff'd on rehearing en banc, 380 ,
F .2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967). To leave grades K through 3 exempt 
from a desegregation plan is not to eliminate segregation 
"root and branch." Green v. County School Board of New Kent 
County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968). .

7. The consistent application of settled consti- 
tuional lav/ invests this court with the equitable power, and 
the duty, to order preparation, and thereafter implementation, 
of a practicable and sound plan which embodies the principles 
set forth in these findings and conclusions and the attached 
memorandum and order. See, generally, Ruling on Propriety of 
Considering a Metropolitan Remedy to Accomplish Desegregation 
of the Public Schools of the City of Detroit, March 24, 1972; 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Detroit-Only
Plans, March 24, 1972; oral ruling on offers of proof, April 13, 
1972; and the cases cited therein.

8. School construction practices throughout the 
metropolitan area have added to and reinforced the pattern of 
segregation referred to. Although there were vacant seats 
throughout the city to which students could have been assigned 
at lesser cost and with the achievement of integration, 
continued sums were expended for construction of new schools 
designed to service particular areas of racial concentration, and 
such schools opened as and have continued to be racially 
identifiable in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Swann v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S0 1, 18-20 (1971); 
United States v. School Dist. 151, 404 F.2d 1125, 1132-33
(7th Cir. 1968); Davis v. School Dist. of Pontiac, 309 F. Supp.

- 34 -



734, 741-42 (E.D. Mich. 1970), aff u'i . 443 > . th Cir. 
1971); Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 311 F. Supp.
501, 517-18 (C.D. Calif. 1970); Johnson v. San Francisco 
Unified School Dist., Civ. No. C-70-1331 (N.DC Calif.
April 28, 1971); Brewer v. School Board of the City of 
Norfolk, 397 F'.2d 37, 42 (4th Cir. 1968) ; Cf_. Sloan v. Tenth
School Dist. of Wilson County, _____F.2d_____ (6th Cir. 1970);
United States v. Board of Educ. of Polk County, _____F .2d_____
(4th Cir. 1968); Kelley v. Altheimer, _____F.2d (8th Cir.
1967); Bradley v. School Bd. , ____ _F. Supp._____ (E0D 0 Va.
1971); Clark v. Board of Educ. of Little Rock, 401 U„S. 971 

(1971) .

9. The legal effects of racially discriminatory 
confinement to a school district are not different from the 
effects of such containment within a district. E.cj_. , Lee v. 
Macon County board of Education, 555 F.2u 746 (5th Cir. 1371); 
Haney v. County Board Sevier, 410 F.2d 920 (8th Cir. 1969), 429

F .2d 364 (8th Cir. 1970).

10. Where the actions of state defendants and local 
school authorities throughout the metropolitan area have had 
the natural, foreseeable, and actual effect of building upon, 
taking advantage of, and encouraging racially segregated 
demographic patterns deliberately fixed by governmental action 
at all levels with the effect of creating and maintaining racial 
segregation in the public schools, there is a present obligation 
to eliminate the continuing effects of such violation; and 
the District Court has the duty, upon default by school 
authorities, to intervene to secure compliance with the 
Constitution pursuant to the sound exercise of traditional equity 
powers consistent with the practicalities of the local situaf i*on. 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg, 402 U.S. 1, 15-16, 20-21, 31-32



(3.971.) . Cf. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lav/ on 
Detroit-Only Plans of Desegregation, p. 5, Conclusion 4. In 
devising remedies where state-imposed segregation has been 
established, it is the responsibility of school authorities and 
district courts to see to it that future school construction and 
abandonment is not used and does not serve to perpetuate or 
re-establish the violation. Swann, supra, 402 U 0S 0 at 21.

11. Moreover, where the State, and named defendants, 
are substantially implicated in the segregation violation found 
and are ultimately responsible for public schooling throughout 
the state, the consistent application of constitutional 
principles requires that this court take all steps necessary 
and essential to require them to desegregate the Detroit public 
schools effectively and maintain, now and hereafter, a racially 
unified, non-discriminatory system in the absence of a showing 
tnar m e  judicial intervention here contemplated will trustrate 
the promotion of a legitimate and compelling state policy or 
interest. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U 0S0 533, 575 (1964); Hunter v. 
City of Pittsburg, 207 U.S. 161, 178-179 (1907) ; Phoenix v. 
Kolodziejski, 399 U0S. 204, 212-213 (1970) ; Kramer v. Union 
Free School District, 395 U»S. 621, 633 (1969); Williams v. 
Illinois, 399 UoS„ 235, 244-45 (1970); Shelton v. Tucker,
364 UoS. 479, 488 (1966); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U 0S0 
430, 439, 442; Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg, 402 U0S. 1 (1971) 
Davis v. Bd. of School Commissioners, 402 U 0S0 33 (1971) ;
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U 0S0 483 (1954) ; Brown v. Board 
of Education, 349 U0S. 292, 300 (1955) ; .Monroe v. Board of
Commissioners, 391 U.S. 450, 459 (1968).



•A ' .V . , - • ■ •.
FOOTNOTES

1. In the main such proof entirely misses the point: 
the violation here found has to do with school segregation 
caused in substantial part by force of public authority and 
action; yet the intervening defendants' questions and offer of 
proof speak mainly to educational theory and recent and some­
times contradictory research about narrowly measured educational 
effects, mostly on achievement test scores, of quite limited 
beginnings of racial, or socio-economic integration of various 
types and as compared with the effects of dollar or other 
resource inputs and continued segregation. This court does 
not understand, however, that such research, from the Coleman 
report to its many reanalyses, formed the primary bases for 
the Brown decision or any of its progeny. See, e.g.‘, Brunson v. 
Bd. of Trustees, 429 F.2d 820, 826 (4th Cir. 1970) (J. Sobeloff,
concurring). In a context similar to newly intervening 
defendants' objections to desegregation, the Supreme Court in 
Swann specifically held that such factors constitute an 
impermissible limit upon the duty to desegregate. 402 U 0S„ 
at 24, Fn. 8. Citation to such research, either in support 
or rejection of school desegregation, misses the primary point: 
insofar as pupil assignments are concerned, the system of 
public schooling in every state must be operated in a racially 
non-discriminatory, unified fashion; until that objective is 
met, the very system of public schooling constitutes an invidious 
racial classification. The adoption of an education theory 
having the effect of maintaining a pattern of de jure segre­
gation is therefore clearly impermissible. (Whether such 
theories, research, or evidence on educational quality or
x i x j l. j - 1 y  j _ C j . m u int  i n o x s  i _ w j .  ^ w t j . ^  j  *x c •*- v  u

and relief in the absence of a finding of de jure segregation 
is a question this court need not face.)

In any event, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit held, on June 19, 1970, that greater, not less, 
desegregation is the proper manner to alleviate the problem of 
disparity in achievement. Monroe v. Board of Commissioners, 
Jackson, Tenn., 427 F.2d 1005, 1008 (C0A 0 6 , 1970).

2. Chief Justice Burger in Swann v. 
Bd. of Educ., 402 U CS. 1, 6.

Charlotte-Mecklenberg

3. Defendants Magdowski, et al., originally opposed to 
desegregation, during the course of the taking of proofs on 
the issue of segregation, conceded that the public schools of 
the city of Detroit were in fact segregated, and took the 
early lead in suggesting that the only effective avenue for 
desegregation was a metropolitan plan. The Detroit Board of 
Education, while continuing to deny that it has been guilty of 
any act of segregation, took the position that if desegregation 
were to be undertaken it could be done only on a metropolitan 
basis. So that now the white parents of the city of Detroit and 
its Board of Education— the parties most directly involved with 
the lot of the students in the Detroit school system— see no 
alternative to, and, for all practical purposes seek a 
metropolitan solution to the basic Detroit school problem.

4. In the context of this hearing, the defendant Detroit 
Board of Education is not in a position to act as the usual

x



"school authority" primarily responsible for suggesting an 
appropriate desegregation area simply because its authority 
does not extend beyond the geographic limits of the city of 
Detroit. The competence, knowledge of local conditions, and 
expertise of those schoolmen who helped prepare the Detroit 
Board's proposal, however, may be utilized and given appropriate 
weight.

5. In Oliver v. Kalamazoo Board of Education, #K88~71,
Judge Fox pointed out the primary responsibility of the state: 
"The State of Michigan is represented by two entities, but 
the entity is an agent of the State . . . [T]he Constitution
says something about your [the State's] responsibility."
The court went on to order the State to take an active role. 
Pre-trial order and transcript, May 1, 1972.

6. The Detroit Board plan places heavier reliance on 
white flight and socio-economic factors, while the Magdowski 
•proposal in addition places an emphasis on maintaining a minimum 
percentage black in each school. These considerations in
no way determine the court's choice of a desegregation area 
necessary to meet constitutional requirements. In fairness, 
however, it also should be noted that the desegregation area, 
which the court deems to best meet constitutional requirements, 
also happens in the main, to meet the other concerns expressed 
in these two proposals. That the Board's interest in socio­
economic integration is largely met by racial desegregation 
is not surprising.. There is uncontroverted evidence in the 
record, and the court so finds, that there is a high correlation 
hPHipen blacks and persons of a low socio-economic status, the 
result, in the main, of the cumulative effects of past and 
present racial discrimination including discrimination in 
education. At some point hereafter, of course, school 
authorities with responsibility for implementation and operation 
of the racially-unified non-discriminatory school system 
contemplated, or parts thereof, may and should include in its 
plan other educational goals and needs whether or not they are 
required by the law or any court. Swann v. Charlotte— 
Mecklenberg, 402 U.S. at 16.

7 . If a state is constitutionally forbidden to institute 
a system of racial segregation by the use of artifical 
boundary lines, it is likewise forbidden to perpetuate a system 
whose effect is to maintain segregation. "There is no legally 
protected vested interest in segregation. If there were, then 
Brown v. Board of Education and the numerous decisions based
on that case would be pointless. Courts will not say in one 
breath that public school systems may not practice segregation, 
and in the next that they may do nothing to eliminate it." 
Wanner v. School Bd. of Arlington County, 357 F.2d 452,
(Soboloff, Cir. J.), pp. 454 and 455. The historic fact is 
that existing conditions are based on a design to segregate 
the races. To hold that segregation, once accomplished, is 
sacrosanct and beyond constitutional reach, is to say that the 
United States Constitution and its Amendments, and their 
provisions for equality, are mere rhetoric.

8. See Findings 70-78, infra.



•or.- . " .. wT.̂ -rvs-*- WSjWfs®, . yc? -»*. xts& *~ **

'- SV

9. The interplay of these two factors summarizes two 
other guideposts or starting points: maximum feasible desegregation 
and eliminating racially identifiable schools. Factors such as 
time and distance limitations, together with the rough definitions 
of substantial disproportion with the relevant school community's 
pupil racial composition, in turn largely determine the meaning 
of "eliminating racially identifiable schools" and what con­
stitutes "maximum feasible desegregation," in the particular 
circumstances here present and in the- context of a prior finding 
of segregation.

10, The Detroit Board Proposal contemplates desegregation 
on a "minority"-white basis. The proof in this cause, however, 
has been aimed at the segregation of black children and white 
children; similarly the remedy has been so defined, argued, 
and in the main presented by parties. The court finds, 
therefore, that the area, and further planning, should, in the 
main, be confined to a black-white breakdown.

11. To the Southwest, Plaintiffs’ Proposal falls on the 
side of less time in transit than the 40-minute guideline 
because inclusion of more area is'not required to desegregate. 
(See Finding 27, infra.)

12. Moreover, in the main, the areas, schools, and pupils 
in these districts are not as fully members of the greater 
Detroit school community: many are less urban; they are the 
furthest in terms of time, distance, and contact from the 
Detroit area's economic' and social acitivitj.es; and many are 
more oriented, if anything, to urban areas other than Detroit, 
for example, the Ann Arbor - Ypsilanti area.

13. The court notes, however, that the range of average 
socio-economic status for the various regions or clusters 
in Plaintiffs' Proposal is similar to that in the Detroit Board 
Proposal: based on the Michigan Assessment the range in 
Plaintiffs' Proposal happens to be 44.7 to 53.7, while in the 
Detroit Board Proposal the range is 46.3 to 53; and only three 
of the 15 clusters of schools in Plaintiffs' Proposal fall 
below 46.3.

14. Because of the closeness of the question, particularly
as it relates to any problems which may arise hereafter in 
establishing a pupil desegregation plan, the court feels that .
some opportunity should be given to the expert panel to suggest
a modification of this tentative resolution. See also Findings 34­
38 below.

15. A common practice in other cases is the use of "pupil
locator" maps. See Northcross v. School Board of City of 
Memphis, ____F.2d____ (6th Cir. 1971).

16. For years these city-contained school districts, 
which include some suburban districts in the desegregation area, 
as well as the Detroit Public Schools, have demanded without 
success That this inequitable state practice be changed so that 
all districts could be reimbursed on the same basis for pupil
transportation. in



17. The figure almost twice that which appears in 
several of the State "plans" was based on the assumption that 
busing would be "one-way" with black children, being assigned to 
suburban schools. Mr. Wagner, the state official in charge of 
pupil transportation, provided the information on which that 
estimate v/as based and also informed his superiors that a two­
way plan of desegregation and transportation would cost much 
less per pupil. ■ The State defendants did not bring this .
important fact to the court's attention in any of their 
submissions; it was uncovered and fully explored in the 
deposition of Mr. Wagner taken by plaintiffs.

18. This phenomenon was noted in Swann, 402 U.S. 1, 20-21. 
The principle was long known, and actively, supported by the 
F.H.A. For example, consider that public agency's early 
understanding in its 1936 manual that white subdivision 
developments require white schools: "if the children of
people living in such area are compelled to attend school 
where the majority or a good number of the pupils represent 
a far lower level of society or an incompatible racial element, 
the neighborhood, under consideration will prove far less stable 
and desirable than if the condition did not exist."

19. This figure assumes 30 children/regular classroom. 
Although rated capacities may be lower, the figure for 
regular classrooms does not include several types of 
instructional, recreational, laboratory, and other rooms which 
add overall pupil capacity to schools.

20. The resulting pattern is unmistakable: "Residential 
segregation within the city and throughout the larger 
metropolitan area is substantial, pervasive and of long standing. 
Black citizens are located in separate and distinct areas within 
the city, and are not generally found in the suburbs. While the 
racially unrestricted choice of black persons and economic 
factors may have played some part in the development of this 
pattern of residential segregation, it is, in the main, the 
result of past and present practices and customs or racial 
discrimination, both public and private, which have and do 
restrict the housing opportunities of black people. Perhaps
the most that can be said is that all of them [various 
governmental units], including school authorities, are, in 
part, responsible for the segregated condition which exists." 
Ruling on Issue of Segregation, 8 and 10. Moreover.- an 
examination of PX 181, 192 and 185 shows that black children often 
remain isolated in predominately black schools in the few 
suburban school districts with any numbers of black pupils.
In the last several weeks the local press has reported that 
the United States Office of Education cut off funds for one 
such district.

21. Included in this set of arrangements are contract
relationships of various types concerning personnel, property 
and debts. •

22. The defendant, William G. Milliken, Governor of the 
State of Michigan, in his amicus brief filed in the Supreme 
Court of the United States, No. 71—1332, San Antonio Independent 
School District v. Demetrio P. Rodriguez, says, page II:

IV



"1. Amici, whose individual and particular interests 
are set forth in more detail below, are the Governors of the 
above-listed States. As Governors and chief executive 
officers of their respective States, Amici are responsible 
for upholding and carrying out the commands of the 
Constitutions and laws of their various States, including 
the provisions thereof requiring the establishment of 
public schools and school districts and commanding the 
children of their States to attend school. Amici are 
responsible for financial decisions affecting all State 
operations/ including those pertaining to support and 
financing of the public schools.

"Amici are deeply concerned about the ongoing and 
continuing crisis in public education and the difficulties 
facing public educational systems in their States and around 
the nation. Amici recognize that grave inequities exist 
because of variation 5.n local property tax bases upon which 
local school districts must rely in order to support their 
school systems. Amici believe that these inequalities in 
educational resources violate the requirements of the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and that these inequalities 
must be eliminated* *  *  *"

The Governors® amicus brief, speaking of the 
State of Texas, could as well be said of the State of Michigan, when 
it used these words:

"It is also undisputed that the local school districts and 
their boundaries, and hence the aggregate value of the property 
thev contain, are entirely the creation of and their main­
tenance is the responsibility of the State of Texas. Further­
more, the detailed regulation of public education financing 
in Texas * * * is a state not a loceil responsibility.
Indeed, the school districts have the power to raise funds 
for education only as a result of delegation by the State of 
its own power to t£ix for the general welfare." (Page 8 of 
brief.)

"Since the State could not discriminate directly against 
students residing in,poorer localities, it should not be 
permitted to accomplish the same result by dividing its 
responsibility for equal education with local school districts 
and failing to supplement the funds raised by the school 
districts sufficiently to eliminate discrimination." (Page 11 
of brief.)

* Compare Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U.S. 218 (1964). 
While a State may delegate certain of its functions to smaller 
subdivisions such as cities or counties, it cannot escape 
accountability for their actions. Such subdivisions are "created 
as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental 
powers of the State as may be entrusted to them* * * * The 
number, nature, and duration of [their] powers * * * and 
the territory over which they shall be exeircised rests in the 
absolute discretion of the State." Hunter v. City of Pittsburg,
207 u oS 0 161, 178 (1907) .

23. For years black children in the Carver School District 
were assigned to black schools in the inner city because no white 
suburban district (or white school in the city) would take the 
children..

v



24. The 
record and ar 
may be develc 
tion are face

25. See 
CCA 6, Nos. 7

"Pe
decided 
residual 
and the 
white an 
practica 
black sc 
are repr

Kelley, et al. v. Metropolitan Bd. of Educ., 
1-1778-79, page 22, slip opinion, May 30, 1972:
rhaps the primary thing that the Swann case 
was that in devising plans to terminate such 
effects, it is appropriate for the school system 

District Judge to take note of the proportion of 
d black students within the area* and seek as 
1 a plan as may be for ending white schools and 
hools and substituting therefor schools which 
esentative of the area in which the students live.

*The area referred to in this case is all of Davidson 
County, including the City of Nashville, which is 
included in the jurisdiction of defendant 
Metropolitan Board of Education.

se findings are made on the basis of the present 
e subject to modification based on evidence which 
ped once the specific problems of actual desegrega 
d in the planning process.

v i