Shaw v Hunt Appendix to Jurisdictional Statement

    Nos.

IN THE
Suprem e Court o f tip  ^ n itrit S ta le s

October Term, 1994

No. 94-_____

R uraO . Shaw, etal.,

V.

Appellants,

James B. hunt, Jr ., et al, 

and
Ralph Gingles, et al.

Appellees,

Appellees.

No. 94-

James Arthur “Art” Pope, et al.,

V.

Appellants,

James B. Hunt, Jr ., et al, 

and
Ralph Gingles, et al.

Appellees,

Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court 
Eastern District of North Carolina, Raleigh Division

APPENDIX TO JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENTS



Robinson 0 . Everett 
Counsel o f Record 
for Shaw Appellants 

Pro se and as Attorney 
for the other Plaintiffs 
Suite 300
301 West Main Street 
Durham, North Carolina 
27707
(919)682-1591 

Of Counsel:

Cliff Dougherty, Esquire 
Bean, Kinney & 
Norman, P.C.

2000 N. Fourteenth St. 
Suite 100
Arlington, VA 22201

Michael A. Hess 
Counsel o f Record 
for Pope Appellants 

310 First Street, S.E. 
Washington, D.C. 20003 
(202)863-8638

Thomas F. Ellis 
Thomas A. Farr 
Sean C. Callinicos 
Craig D. Mills 
Maupin, Taylor, Ellis & 

Adams, P.A.
Highwoods Tower One 
3200 Beechleaf Court, 
Suite 500
Post Office Drawer 19764 
Raleigh, North Carolina 

27619-9764 
(919)981-4000



CONTENTS

APPENDIX A
August 1, 1994 Judgment................................................................. la

APPENDIX B
August 1, 1994 Order Reserving

Right to Revise Opinions............................................................... 4a

APPENDIX C
August 22, 1994 Amended Opinion.................................................6a

APPENDIX D
September 1, 1994 Order Denying Motion to Amend 

and Add Findings....................................................................... 155a

APPENDIX E
Plaintiffs’ August 29, 1994 Notice of Appeal..............................157a
Plaintiffs’ September 15, 1994

Supplemental Notice of Appeal................................................. 159a

APPENDIX F
Plaintiff-Intervenors’ August 18, 1994

Notice of Appeal........................................................................ 161a
Plaintiff-Intervenors’ September 16, 1994

Notice of Appeal........................................................................ 163 a
Plaintiff-Intervenors’ September 21, 1994 

Supplemental Notice of Appeal................................................. 165a

APPENDIX G
Order Extending Time for Filing Jurisdictional 

in A-252 (Pope v. Hunt) to November 21, 1994.....................167a

Order Extending Time for Filing Jurisdictional 
in A-253 (Show v. Hunt) to November 21, 1994....................168a

APPENDIX H
Chapter 7 (1991) (Extra Session) amend, to 
North Carolina Elections Code, C. 163, art. 17 169a



la

APPENDIX A

JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE 
No. 92-202-CIV-5-BR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

RALEIGH DIVISION

[FILED 
AUG 1 1994

DAVID W. DANIEL, CLERK
U.S. DISTRICT COURT 

E. DIST. NO. CAR.]

RUTH O. SHAW, MELVIN G. SHIMM, ROBINSON 0. 
EVERETT, JAMES M. EVERETT, and DOROTHY G. 
BULLOCK,

and
Plaintiffs,

JAMES ARTHUR "ART" POPE, BETTY S. JUSTICE, DORIS 
LAIL, JOYCE LAWING, NAT SWANSON, RICK WOODRUFF, 
J. RALPH HIXON, AUDREY McBANE, SIM A. DELAPP, JR., 
RICHARD S. SAHLIE and JACK HAWKE, individually,

Plaintiff-Intervenors,
v.

JAMES B. HUNT, in his official capacity as Governor of the State 
of North Carolina, DENNIS A. WICKER, in his official capacity 
as Lieutenant Governor of the State of North Carolina and President 
of the Senate, DANIEL T. BLUE, JR., in his official capacity as 
Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives, RUFUS 
L. EDMISTEN, in his official capacity as Secretary of the State of 
North Carolina, THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BOARD OF 
ELECTIONS, an official agency of the State of North Carolina,



2a
EDWARD J. HIGH, in his official capacity as Chairman of the 
North Carolina State Board of Elections, JEAN H. NELSON, in 
her official capacity as a member of the North Carolina State Board 
of Elections, LARRY LEAKE, in his official capacity as a member 
of the North Carolina State Board of Elections, DOROTHY 
PRESSER, in her official capacity as a member of the North 
Carolina State Board of Elections, and JUNE K. YOUNGBLOOD, 
in her official capacity as a member of the North Carolina State 
Board of Elections,

Defendants,

and

RALPH GINGLES, VIRGINIA NEWELL, GEORGE SIMKINS, 
N. A. SMITH, RON LEEPER, ALFRED SMALLWOOD, DR. 
OSCAR BLANKS, REVEREND DAVID MOORE, ROBERT L. 
DAVIS, C. R. WARD, JERRY B. ADAMS, JAN VALDER, 
BERNARD OFFERMAN, JENNIFER McGOVERN, CHARLES 
LAMBETH, ELLEN EMERSON, LAVONLA ALLISON, 
GEORGE KNIGHT, LETO COPELEY, WOODY CONNETTE, 
ROBERTA WADDLE and WILLIAM M. HODGES,

Defendant-Intervenors.

For the reasons set forth in the opinion of the court filed of 
even date herewith, it is the judgment of the court that the 
challenged congressional redistricting plan does not violate any 
rights of the plaintiffs or their supporting intervenors. IT IS 
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that this action is DISMISSED.

THIS JUDGMENT FILED AND ENTERED ON 1 AUGUST 
1994 WITH COPIES TO-

Robinson 0. Everett 
Attorney at Law 
P. 0. Box 586 
Durham, NC 27702



Thomas A. Fan- 
Attorney at Law 
P. O. Box 19764 
Raleigh, NC 27619-9764

Edwin M. Speas, Jr.
Tiare B. Smiley 
N. C. Department of Justice 
P. O. Box 629 
Raleigh, NC 27602

Adam Stein
Anita Hodgkiss
Attorneys at Law
700 E. Stonewall St., Suite 730
Charlotte, NC 28202

Janice M. Cole 
United States Attorney 
Raleigh, NC

3a

Dayna Cunningham 
NAACP Legal Defense Fund 
99 Hudson St., Suite 1600 
New York, NY 10013

August 1, 1994
DAVID W. DANIEL, CLERK

(By) Deputy Clerk
(~s~) Jane Skinner



4a
APPENDIX B

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

RALEIGH DIVISION

No: 92-202-CIV-5-BR

[FILED 
AUG 1 1994

DAVID W. DANIEL, CLERK 
U.S. DISTRICT COURT 

E. DIST. NO. CAR ]

RUTH 0 . SHAW, et al., 

Plaintiffs,

v.

GOVERNOR JAMES B. HUNT, JR , 
et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER

In filing the majority and dissenting opinions, the majority 
judges and the dissenting judge reserve the right to revise their 
respective opinions on or before 21 August 1994.

This 1st of August 1994.

FOR THE COURT

f-s-1 J. Dickson Phillips. Jr.
J. DICKSON PHILLIPS, JR. 
U.S. District Judge



5a
[I certify the foregoing to be a true and correct 
copy of the original.
David W. Daniel, Clerk 
United States District Court 
Eastern District of North Carolina

By (-s-) Jane Skinner 
Deputy Clerk



6a
APPENDIX C

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

RALEIGH DIVISION

No: 92-202-CIV-5-BR 
(THREE-JUDGE DISTRICT COURT)

[FILED 
AUG 22 1994

DAVID W. DANIEL, CLERK 
U.S. DISTRICT COURT 

E. DIST. NO. CAR ]

RUTHO. SHAW, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

GOVERNOR JAMES B. HUNT, JR., 
etal.,

Defendants.

Before PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge, BRITT, District Judge*, 
and VOORHEES, Chief District Judge**

* of the Eastern District of North Carolina 
** of the Western District of North Carolina

AMENDED OPINION

Judge Phillips delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Judge 
Britt joined. Judge Voorhees filed an opinion concurring in part and 
dissenting in part.



7a
PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge:

This action, brought by several white citizens and registered 
voters of the State of North Carolina against various state and 
federal officials, challenges the constitutionality of the congressional 
redistricting1 plan (the Plan) adopted by the North Carolina General 
Assembly following the 1990 decennial census.2 Plaintiffs now 
claim principally that the General Assembly's redistricting plan 
violates their rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, because it intentionally includes one or 
more congressional districts constructed along racial lines in order 
to assure the election of two African-American members of 
Congress, and is not narrowly tailored to further any compelling 
governmental interest. We initially dismissed that claim under Rule 
12(b)(6), Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461 (E.D.N.C. 1992), but the
Supreme Court reversed and remanded, Shaw v. Reno, ___U.S.
___, 113 S.Ct. 2816 (1993) (Shaw). On remand, we find that the
Plan's lines were deliberately drawn to produce one or more districts 
of a certain racial composition and that it is thus a "racial 
gerrymander" subject to strict scrutiny under Shaw. But we 
nonetheless conclude that the Plan passes constitutional muster 
under that standard, because it is narrowly tailored to further the 
state's compelling interest in complying with the Voting Rights Act. 
We therefore hold that the Plan does not violate the plaintiffs' Equal

1 Though the terms "reapportionment" and "redistricting" are often used 
interchangeably, see, e.g., Hays v. Louisiana, 839 F. Supp. 1188, 1190 n.l
(W.D.La. 1993), vacated,___U.S. ___  ,114 S.Ct. 2731 (1994), we believe
there is an important technical distinction between them. "Reapportionment" 
refers to the reallocation of a finite number of seats in a legislative body among a 
fixed number of political subunits. "Redistricting," by contrast, refers to the 
process by which the lines dividing those political subunits into separate 
electoral districts are redrawn in response to a reapportionment. See Carstens v. 
Lamm, 543 F. Supp. 68, 72 n. 3 (D. Colo. 1982). For the sake of precision, we 
use the term "redistricting" to refer to the specific legislative action under 
challenge here. See Gingles v. Edmiston, 590 F. Supp. 345, 349 n.l (E.D.N.C. 
1984) (drawing same distinction), aJJTd sub nom. Thornburg v Gingles 438 
U.S. 30(1986). ’

Jurisdiction of this three-judge district court is based o n 2 8 U S C  SS 1331 
1343, and 2284.



Protection rights in the manner alleged, and we give judgment for 
the defendants accordingly.

8a

I.

General Background and Procedural History

As a result of population increases reflected in the 1990 
decennial census, North Carolina became entitled to an additional 
seat in the United States House of Representatives, bringing its total 
number of seats to twelve. In July of 1991, the North Carolina 
General Assembly therefore enacted legislation to redistrict the state 
into twelve congressional districts. 1991 N.C. Sess. Laws Ch. 601. 
This redistricting plan included one district, the First, in which 
African-Americans constituted majorities of both the registered 
voters and the voting age population of the district. This proposed 
majority-minority district3 was located in the northeastern part of 
the state.

Because 40 of North Carolina's 100 counties are covered 
by the provisions of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 
U.S.C. § 1973c,4 the state submitted its proposed redistricting plan 
to the United States Attorney General for preclearance. On 
December 18, 1991, the Attorney General interposed formal 
objection to the proposed plan, finding that the state had not met its 
§ 5 burden of showing that the plan was free of racially 
discriminatory purpose.

Under § 5, the state could have challenged the Attorney 
General's objection to its original redistricting plan by filing a

3 As used here and throughout this opinion, the term "majority-minority district" 
refers to an electoral district in which a majority of both the registered voters and 
the voting age population are members of the same racial minority.

4 Section 5 forbids any jurisdiction within its coverage to implement any change 
in a "standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting" without first 
obtaining federal certification that the change "does not have the purpose and 
will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of 
race or color." 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. The jurisdiction may obtain such a 
certification from either the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia or the United States Department of Justice. Id.



9a
declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia. After debate, however, it elected not to do 
this, but instead to revise its original plan in order to meet the 
Attorney General's objection and secure his approval. In January of 
1992, the General Assembly therefore convened in special session 
and enacted a revised redistricting plan. 1991 N.C. Extra Sess. 
Laws Ch. 7. This revised plan, which is the Plan under attack here, 
creates two districts in which African-Americans constitute 
majorities of both the registered voters and the voting age 
populations. One of these majority-minority districts, the First, is 
centered in the rural northeastern part of the state, where a large, 
dense concentration of African-Americans has long existed, but 
contains extensions that reach deep into the rural southeastern part 
of the state. The other, the Twelfth, is located not in the southern 
part of the state, as the Justice Department had suggested, but runs 
diagonally across the Piedmont in a jagged band that stretches some 
160 miles from Durham to Gastonia, generally following the route 
of Interstate Highway 85, but with several extensions into the 
historic "black sections" of the Piedmont cities that lie along its 
course. The twelve districts created by the Plan are as equally 
populated as is mathematically possible,5 but their configurations 
are such that a number of precincts, townships, cities and counties 
of the state are split among two or even three congressional 
districts.

The state submitted its revised Plan to the Attorney General 
under § 5, and the Attorney General precleared it on February 6, 
1992. Almost immediately, the Republican Party of North Carolina 
and several individual voters associated with it filed suit in federal 
district court challenging the revised Plan under various provisions 
of the federal Constitution. Their primary claim was that the Plan 
violated their rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, because its lines were deliberately drawn to 
favor Democratic incumbents at the expense of Republican political 
interests. On April 16, 1992, a three-judge district court dismissed 
that claim under Rule 12(b)(6), holding that the plaintiffs had not, 
and could not, allege that the Plan had the requisite discriminatory

5 Seven of the twelve districts have a population of 552,386; the other five a 
population of 552,387.



10a
effect on an identifiable political group needed to state a valid 
political gerrymandering claim under Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 
109 (1986). Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392 (W.D.N.C. 1992).
The Supreme Court summarily affirmed. 506 U .S .___, 113 S.Ct.
30 (Oct. 5, 1992).

Shortly after the complaint in Pope v. Blue was filed, 
plaintiffs herein, five white residents of Durham County, North 
Carolina who are registered to vote in that county, filed this action 
challenging the constitutionality of the same congressional 
redistricting plan. Named as defendants in this action were the 
Governor, the Board of Elections, and various high-ranking officials 
of the state of North Carolina (the state defendants), as well as two 
federal officials who had participated in the § 5 preclearance 
process, the United States Attorney General and the Assistant 
Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division (the federal 
defendants).

Plaintiffs' principal constitutional claim against the state 
defendants in this action was that the General Assembly's revised 
Plan violated their rights under the Equal Protection Clause. They 
based that claim on allegations that the Plan deliberately "creates 
two Congressional Districts in which a majority of African- 
American voters was concentrated arbitrarily — without regard to 
any other considerations, such as compactness, contiguousness, 
geographical boundaries, or political subdivisions," with the 
purpose of "creat[ing] Congressional Districts along racial lines" 
and assuring the election of two African-American Representatives. 
Amended Complaint ^ 36(A). Two theories of Equal Protection 
violation were advanced. First, that the deliberate drawing of 
district lines so as to create one or more districts in which a 
particular race has a majority, even if required by the Voting Rights 
Act, was per se unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. 
Alternatively, that even if such race-based redistricting was not 
always unconstitutional, the specific redistricting plan at issue here 
was, because its lines did not observe such traditional districting 
considerations as geographic compactness, contiguity, and 
communities of interest, but were instead improperly 
"gerrymandered" to create two majority-minority districts and



11a
insure proportional representation of African-American citizens in 
North Carolina's congressional delegation.

In addition, plaintiffs alleged that the Plan violated rights 
secured to them by §§ 2 and 4 of Article I of the Constitution, the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
and the Fifteenth Amendment. Finally, they made a two-pronged 
attack on the constitutionality of the federal defendants' conduct in 
refusing to preclear a congressional redistricting plan for North 
Carolina that did not contain two majority-minority districts, 
arguing both that the federal defendants had misinterpreted amended 
§ 2 of the Voting Rights Act and in consequence applied it 
unconstitutionally, and, in the alternative, that if amended § 2 in 
fact required the creation of two majority-minority districts in North 
Carolina, it was itself unconstitutional.

As relief, plaintiffs sought a declaration that the Plan was 
unconstitutional, preliminary and permanent injunctive relief against 
its use by the appropriate state defendants to conduct congressional 
elections; a declaration that the federal defendants had acted 
unconstitutionally in demanding that North Carolina adopt a 
congressional redistricting plan with two majority-minority districts; 
and an injunction restraining the federal defendants from taking any 
action requiring North Carolina to enact such a plan.

Following designation of this three-judge court, both sets of 
defendants filed motions to dismiss. We dismissed the claims 
agamst the federal defendants, concluding that we lacked subject- 
matter jurisdiction over those claims.6 808 F. Supp. at 466-67

6 * at 1116 Claims aSainst ^  federal defendants were ones over
which § 14(b) of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 19731(b), gave the United 

es istnct Court for the District of Columbia exclusive jurisdiction 808 F 
Supp. at 466-67 (majority op.); id. at 474 (Voorhees, C J „  concurring in relevant 
P, m J W° ofus also bought that the claims against the federal defendants 
should be dismissed on a second, alternative ground: that they failed to state a 
cognizable claim for relief, because they sought judicial review of the Attorney

u T a J i  Which WaS b3ITed hy Morris v. Gressette, 432
tVoorhees n V ° 8 SUPP' ^  46? (maj°nty °P-)- But see id. at 474 
, , W  » d!s*entm§ m reIevant Part) (reasoning that because we lacked

bject matter junschcuon over the claims against the federal defendants we 
were without power to address those claims on the merits).



(majority op.); id. at 474 (Voorhees, C.J., concurring in relevant 
part).

12a

By a divided vote, we dismissed the claims against the state 
defendants as well. We were in agreement that to the extent those 
claims were based on § § 2 and 4 of Art. I and the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, they failed to 
state a legally cognizable claim. We were also agreed that 
plaintiffs' Fifteenth Amendment claim was essentially subsumed 
within their related claim under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and that to the extent plaintiffs' Equal 
Protection claim alleged that race-based redistricting was always 
unconstitutional, even when it was required by the Voting Rights 
Act, it was foreclosed by United Jewish Organizations, Inc. v. 
Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (WO). 808 F. Supp. at 470-72
(majority op.); id. at 473-74 (Voorhees, C.J., concurring in relevant 
part). We were divided as a court, however, on the proper 
disposition of plaintiffs' alternative Equal Protection claim: that 
even if race-based redistricting was not always unconstitutional, the 
specific redistricting plan at issue here was, because its lines were 
drawn to create two majority-minority districts and assure the 
election of two African-American members of Congress, without 
regard to such traditional districting considerations as geographical 
compactness, contiguity, and communities of interest.

Two of us thought UJO disposed of this claim as well. Id. 
at 472-73 (majority op.). We read the various opinions in UJO to 
stand for the proposition that a redistricting scheme violates the 
Equal Protection rights of white voters only if it is "adopted with the 
purpose and effect of discriminating against white voters . . .  on 
account of their race." Id. at 472, citing UJO, 430 U.S. at 165-68 
(plurality opinion); id. at 179-80 (Stewart, J., concurring). We 
concluded that plaintiffs had not alleged the requisite discriminatory 
purpose, because they had not alleged that the Plan was intended to 
disadvantage white voters — that is, to deprive them of a fair 
opportunity, on a state-wide basis, to participate in the political 
process and to elect candidates of their choice -- but only to give 
effect to African-American voting strength in order to comply with 
the Voting Rights Act. Id. at 472-73. We also concluded that 
plaintiffs had not, and could not, allege the requisite discriminatory



13a
effect, because they could not establish that the Plan unfairly diluted 
or canceled out white voting strength and led to proportional 
underrepresentation of white voters on a statewide basis. Id. at 473.

Judge Voorhees disagreed with this analysis. He read the 
plurality opinion in UJO to authorize the states to deliberately 
create majority-minority districts in order to comply with the Voting 
Rights Act only when they employ traditional districting principles 
such as compactness, contiguity, and communities of interest, id. at 
475-77 (Voorhees, C.J., dissenting in relevant part), which he 
believed were "of constitutional dimension," id. at 480. The Plan's 
alleged failure to respect these principles, in his view, "augurfed] a 
constitutionally suspect, and potentially unlawful, intent" on the 
part of the General Assembly sufficient to state an Equal Protection 
claim. Id. at 477.

Plaintiffs appealed our dismissal of their claims to the 
United States Supreme Court. In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that 
plaintiffs had stated a claim under the Equal Protection Clause by 
alleging that the General Assembly had adopted a redistricting plan 
that was "so irrational on its face that it can be understood only as 
an effort to segregate voters into separate voting districts because of 
their race, and that the separation lacks sufficient justification."
Shaw v. Reno,___U .S .___ , 113 S.Ct. 2816, 2832 (1993). If this
"allegation of racial gerrymandering remains uncontradicted," the 
Court held, the District Court further must determine whether the 
North Carolina plan is narrowly tailored to further a compelling
governmental interest." Id. a t ___,113 S.Ct. at 2832. The Court
therefore reversed our dismissal of the plaintiffs' Equal Protection 
claim and remanded that claim to this court for fbrther
consideration. Id. a t___,113 S.Ct. at 2832. The Court expressly
affirmed our dismissal of the claims against the federal defendants.
Id- a t ---- , 11 j  S.Ct. at 2823. It expressed no view on the validity
of plaintiffs' claims against the state defendants under Art. 1, § 2;

I, § 4, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the Fifteenth Amendment, id. a t ___, 113 S.Ct. at
2832, leaving our dismissal of those claims undisturbed but, 
because unreviewed, still open for possible reconsideration by this 
court or, if not reconsidered, for possible later review by that Court. 
In this posture of the case, our consideration has been confined on



14a
remand to the one claim found legally viable by the Supreme Court: 
the claim of improper "racial gerrymandering" in violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause.

Following the remand of that claim for further 
consideration, the state defendants filed an answer to the amended 
complaint, in which they admitted that one of their purposes in 
enacting the Plan was to respond to the objections interposed by the 
Attorney General in the § 5 preclearance process by creating two 
majority-minority districts. Answer to Amended Complaint at f  17; 
see id. at 6. But they contended that the Plan was not a "racial 
gerrymander" subject to strict scrutiny under Shaw, because it did 
not segregate voters into separate voting districts on the basis of 
race, but actually created integrated districts, and because its lines 
were the product of legitimate non-racial redistricting 
considerations, including compliance with constitutional "one 
person, one vote" requirements; the creation of communities of 
interest based on shared historical, social, and economic interests; 
and the protection of incumbents. Id. at 6. Alternatively, they 
asserted that even if the Plan was subject to strict scrutiny, it was 
nonetheless constitutional, because it was narrowly tailored to 
further the state's compelling interests in complying with the 
preclearance requirements of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, avoiding 
a violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, and eradicating the 
effects of past racial discrimination in the state. Id. at 7.

After the state defendants filed their answer, we permitted 
twenty-two persons registered to vote in North Carolina, both 
African-American and white, to intervene as defendants in support 
of the Plan (the defendant-intervenors). We also permitted eleven 
persons registered to vote as Republicans in North Carolina — 
including Art Pope, who had been the lead plaintiff in the earlier 
political gerrymandering challenge to the Plan — to intervene as 
plaintiffs (the plaintiff-intervenors), on the condition that they adopt 
as their own the amended complaint filed by the original plaintiffs.7

We denied motions to intervene filed by Americans for the Defense of 
Constitutional Rights, Inc. (ADCR), a non-profit corporation associated with the 
original plaintiffs; the North Carolina Republican Party, and Jack Hawke in his 
official capacity as Chairman of that Party.



15a
Finally, we permitted the United States, on its motion, to appear as 
amicus curiae by filing briefs in support of the legal positions of the 
state defendants.

After approximately four months of discovery, the plaintiff- 
intervenors filed motions, later joined by the original plaintiffs, for a 
preliminary injunction against further election proceedings under the 
existing congressional redistricting Plan and a temporary restraining 
order and preliminary injunction to extend the filing period for 
candidates for the 1994 congressional elections. We denied both the 
TRO application and the motion for preliminary injunction, the 
latter after hearing oral argument.

Following a final pre-trial conference, trial to the three- 
judge court was held from March 28, 1994 through April 4, 1994, 
pursuant to a duly adopted pre-trial order. At trial, the parties 
presented, and the court received, extensive oral and documentary 
evidence.8 We deferred decision pending the parties' submission of 
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, briefing, and 
concluding oral arguments of counsel, which we heard on April 18 
1994.

Having considered the evidence, the memoranda of law 
submitted by the parties, the stipulations of fact, the proposed 
findings and conclusions, and the oral arguments of counsel, we 
now make the following findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
pursuant to Fed. R.Civ. Proc. 52(a), prefaced by a discussion of our 
understanding of the governing law and its application in this 
context.

In order to expedite trial before the three-judge tribunal required by statute, 
our pre-trial order limited the fact and expert witnesses available to the parties 
for live testimony at trial and required that the testimony of all others be 
received m the form given m discovery or by written narrative statements subject 
to live cross-examination upon demand.



16a

II.

General Legal Principles

We begin by setting out our understanding of the nature of 
the Equal Protection claim recognized by the Supreme Court in this 
case, to serve as a framework for our findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. In the process, we consider conflicting 
contentions of the parties respecting various aspects of the claim.

A. General Nature of the Claim

At the outset of this action, plaintiffs' Equal Protection 
challenge to this congressional redistricting plan took two 
alternative forms. First, that any state redistricting plan that 
deliberately creates districts of a certain racial composition 
necessarily violates the Equal Protection Clause, regardless of its 
justification. Second, that even if such race-based redistricting is 
not unconstitutional in all circumstances, this particular redistricting 
plan is, because its lines do not observe traditional districting 
considerations such as geographical compactness, contiguity, and 
communities of interest, but are improperly "gerrymandered" to 
create two majority-minority districts and insure proportional 
representation of African-American citizens in North Carolina's 
congressional delegation.

The Supreme Court found the first claim foreclosed by its 
prior precedents, at least when the legislature's purpose was to 
comply with the remedial requirements of the Voting Rights Act. 
S£ e ___U.S. a t ____, 113 S.Ct. at 2824 (reaffirming that race­
conscious redistricting, like other forms of race-conscious state 
decisionmaking, is "not always unconstitutional"). The Court found 
legally viable, however, plaintiffs' alternative Equal Protection 
claim, which it characterized as a claim that the state's redistricting 
plan, though facially race-neutral, was "so irrational on its face that 
it can be understood only as an effort to segregate voters into 
separate voting districts because of their race, and that the
separation lacks sufficient justification." Id. a t ___, 113 S.Ct. at
2832. It is only that Equal Protection claim which plaintiffs and 
their supporting intervenors now press on remand.



17a
As we understand it, the claim is a newly recognized one in 

voting rights jurisprudence. Until Shaw, the Supreme Court had 
recognized only two grounds on which a redistricting plan might be 
subject to challenge under the Equal Protection Clause. The first, 
based on the "one person one vote" principle, was that its districts 
were not equal in population, so that the votes cast by individual 
voters in some districts had less weight than those cast by voters in 
other districts. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). The 
second was that though its districts were of equal population, they 
were drawn with the purpose and had the effect of unfairly 
"diluting" or canceling out the voting strength of an identified group 
of voters -- that is, of so diminishing their ability to influence the 
political process as essentially to shut them out of it, as opposed to 
merely making it more difficult for them to elect representatives of 
their choice in particular districts. See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 
755, 765-66 (1973) (racial and ethnic group); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 
403 U.S. 124, 153-55 (1971) (racial group); Davis v. Bandemer, 
478 U.S. 109, 131-33 (1986) (plurality opinion) (political group); 
id. at 151-52 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).9 Until Shaw, 
no majority opinion of the Supreme Court had held that a state 
redistricting plan that did not cause concrete, material harm to the 
voting strength of an identifiable group of citizens in one of these 
two ways could nonetheless be challenged under the Equal 
Protection Clause on the ground that it impermissibly took race into 
account in drawing district lines; the only intimations to that effect 
had come in separate opinions of single justices.10 And a majority

9 Of course, redistricting plans whose lines were drawn with the purpose and 
effect of actually denying otherwise qualified individuals the right to vote on 
account of their race were subject to challenge under the Fifteenth Amendment, 
which directly proscribes the denial or abridgment of the right to vote on racial 
grounds. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).

w See Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 349 (Whittaker, J., concurring) (suggesting that 
redistricting plan whose lines were deliberately drawn to exclude voters of a 
particular race from a particular district might be subject to challenge under 
Equal Protection Clause as "an unlawful segregation of [the] races"); Wright v. 
Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 59-67 (1964) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (suggesting that 
redistricting plan whose lines were deliberately drawn to concentrate voters of 
particular racial and ethnic groups in particular districts, while excluding them 
from others, was subject to challenge under the Equal Protection Clause as a 
form of state-sponsored segregation); id. at 67-74 (Goldberg, J., dissenting)



18a
of the Supreme Court had squarely held that the Equal Protection 
Clause did not prevent a jurisdiction subject to § 5 of the Voting 
Rights Act from deliberately creating districts in which racial 
minorities were a majority, so long as it did so with the purpose of 
complying with the Voting Rights Act and did not unfairly dilute or 
cancel out the voting strength of any other racial group. UJO v. 
Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 161-68 (1977) (plurality opinion); id. at 179- 
80 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Metro 
Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 584 (1990) ("a State 
subject to § 5 of the Voting Rights A c t... may 'deliberately creat[e] 
or preserv[e] black majorities in particular districts in order to 
ensure that its reapportionment plan complies with [the Voting 
Rights Act]") (quoting UJO, 430 U.S. at 161)).

The Supreme Court's decision in Shaw has now recognized 
a third way, characterized by the Court as analytically distinct from 
the two earlier recognized, in which a state redistricting plan might 
offend the Equal Protection Clause. It is that the plan was designed 
"to separate voters into different districts on the basis of race,"
without "sufficient justification." Shaw,___U.S. a t___ , 113 S.Ct.
at 2828. Such race-based redistricting legislation, said the Court, 
presents the same dangers as any other state law that deliberately 
classifies citizens by race: it threatens "to stigmatize individuals by 
reason of their membership in a racial group," "to incite racial 
hostilities]," and "to stimulate our society's latent race-
consciousness." Id. at ___, 113 S.Ct. at 2824-25 (internal
quotations omitted). It should therefore be subject to "the same 
close scrutiny that we give other state laws that classify citizens by
race," id. a t ___, 113 S.Ct. at 2825; that is, be upheld only if
"narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest."
Id. a t ___, 113 S.Ct. at 2832. The Court made clear that strict
scrutiny must be applied even to those race-based redistricting 
schemes that purport to have been enacted with the "benign" 
purpose of giving effect to minority voting strength in order to 
comply with the Voting Rights Act, "because without [strict 
scrutiny], a court cannot determine whether or not the 
discrimination truly is 'benign.'" Id. a t___, 113 S.Ct. at 2830; see

(same); City o f Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 86 (1980) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in judgment) (same).



id. a t___, 113 S.Ct. at 2826 ("district lines obviously drawn for the
purpose of separating voters by race require careful scrutiny under 
the Equal Protection Clause regardless of the motivations 
underlying their adoption"). Finally, the Court held that a plaintiff 
challenging a [state redistricting] plan under the Equal Protection 
Clause may state a claim by alleging that the legislation, though 
race-neutral on its face, rationally cannot be understood as anything 
other than an effort to separate voters into different districts on the 
basis of race, and that the separation lacks sufficient justification."
Id. a t___, 113 S.Ct. at 2828. Because plaintiffs had made such an
allegation in their Amended Complaint, the Court concluded, they 
had stated a valid Equal Protection claim.

This states our understanding of the general nature of the 
Equal Protection claim recognized by the Court in this case and 
remanded to us for trial. It is, in effect, the same basic claim that 
the Court has recognized in other contexts in which race-based 
remedial measures, or "affirmative action," undertaken by state 
actors have been challenged, typically by members of the majority 
race claiming "reverse discrimination." See Regents o f  the Univ. o f  
Calif v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (admission to public 
institution of higher learning); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. o f  Educ., 476 
U.S. 267 (1986) (public employment); and City o f  Richmond v. 
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (government contracting).11 
That being its general nature, there remain significant problems 
concerning how the substantive elements and procedural incidents 
of such a claim are to be transposed to the unique voting rights 
context: specifically, the problems of standing; the nature of the 
showing required to trigger strict scrutiny; the allocation of the 
burden of proof at the strict scrutiny stage; the types of compelling 
state interests that might justify such race-based action; and the 
meaning of narrowly tailored in this context. On all of these 
matters, the parties are in flat disagreement. We now turn to them.

19a

11 It would appear, however, that this claim, even when advanced by members 
of the majority race, cannot properly be referred to as one of "reverse 
discrimination," for it has no "reverse" aspect, but instead claims "equal" 
discrimination against all individuals. See infra at 25-27.



20a
B. Standing

Defendant-intervenors contend that the action should be 
dismissed for lack of standing. They point out that the Supreme 
Court's decision in this case technically held only that, as a matter 
o f  substantive Equal Protection doctrine, plaintiffs could state a 
valid Equal Protection challenge to the Plan without alleging that it 
had the purpose and effect of diluting their group voting strength. 
They emphasize that the Court did not hold that plaintiffs had 
standing to assert such a claim, nor did it purport to relieve them 
from the obligation to satisfy the normal requirements for standing: 
a showing that they have personally suffered, or are in immediate 
danger of suffering, some actual "injury in fact" that is "fairly 
traceable" to the challenged conduct and "likely to be redressed" by 
the relief they seek. See Lujan v. Defenders o f  Wildlife, 504 U.S.
___, ___, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992). And they argue that
plaintiffs have now failed to prove that the Plan has caused them the 
sort of "injury in fact" required to give them standing to challenge it. 
They concede that the clear implication, if not the actual holding, of 
the Supreme Court's decision is that plaintiffs need not show that 
the Plan has caused injury to their voting strength. But they read 
the Court's discussion of the other ways in which race-based
districting legislation can injure voters,___U.S. a t ___ , 113 S.Ct.
at 2827-28, as implying that a voter has standing to challenge such 
legislation only if he can show that it has actually injured his 
political interests in one of two other ways: (i) by causing the 
representative elected from his district to represent only the interests 
of a particular racial group of which he is not a member; or (ii) by 
exacerbating existing patterns of racial bloc voting by a racial 
group of which he is not a member. While they concede that the 
Supreme Court's decision can be read to hold that plaintiffs had 
sufficiently alleged one or both of these injuries to establish 
standing for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6), they say it cannot be read to 
foreclose the possibility that this action might yet be dismissed for 
lack of standing, should plaintiffs fail to prove those allegations at
trial. See Lujan, 504 U.S. a t ___, 112 S.Ct. at 2136-37 (while
generalized allegations of injury resulting from the challenged 
conduct may be adequate to establish standing at the pleading stage, 
when the court is obliged to accept all material allegations of the



complaint as true, they will not suffice to carry plaintiffs burden of 
proof on standing at trial),

Defendant-intervenors' argument is not without some force. 
The federal courts are not a general forum for the airing of any and 
all complaints a citizen may have about the way in which his 
government conducts its business, Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 
95, 112 (1983), and they do not have "an unconditioned authority to 
determine the constitutionality of legislative or executive acts." 
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 
464, 471 (1982). An unbroken line of Supreme Court decisions 
establishes that a federal court may decide the merits of a 
constitutional challenge to a legislative act only when asked to do so 
by a party who has personally suffered, or is in immediate danger of 
suffering, some actual "injury in fact" that is "fairly traceable" to 
the challenged act and "likely to be redressed" by the relief he seeks.
Lujan, 504 U.S. a t ___, 112 S.Ct. at 2136; Allen v. Wright, 468
U.S. 737, 750 (1984); Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472; Simon v. 
Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976); Worth 
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 
83, 97 (1968). These three elements — injury in fact, causation, and 
redressability — are the "irreducible constitutional minimum" for 
standing, derived directly from the Article III case-or-controversy 
limitation on the federal judicial power. Northeastern Florida
Contractors v. Jacksonville,___U.S. ___ , ___, 113 S.Ct. 2297
2301-02 (1993); Lujan, 504 U.S. a t ___, 112 S.Ct. at 2136. As
such, they are "an indispensable part of the plaintiffs case," which 
he must prove at trial "with the [same] manner and degree of 
evidence as any other matter on which [he] bears the burden of
proof," id. a t___, 112 S.Ct. at 2136, before he is entitled to have
the court rule on the merits of his claim. See Worth, 422 U S at 
499; Allen, 468 U.S. at 750.

At first blush, it would appear that plaintiffs have not even 
alleged, much less proved, the sort of "injury in fact" required by 
this line of decisions. The Supreme Court has emphasized that such 
a injury must be concrete in both a qualitative and a temporal 
sense, Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990), which 
means that it must be both "distinct and palpable" in naturq, Worth, 
422 U.S. at 501, as opposed to "[abstract," O'Shea v. Littleton,

21a



22a
414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974), and "real and immediate," as opposed to 
"conjectural" or "hypothetical," Lyons, 461 U.S. at 101-02. See 
generally Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 155. It surely is arguable that the 
injuries plaintiffs allege the Plan has inflicted upon them do not 
satisfy these criteria. Their primary claim is that the Plan "injures" 
them -- as well as all other citizens, residents, and registered voters 
of the State of North Carolina — because it threatens to perpetuate 
archaic racial stereotypes and to increase racial divisions in society. 
See Plaintiffs' Responses to Defendant-Intervenors' First Set of 
Interrogatories, Responses Nos. 1 and 2. In addition, the two 
plaintiffs who reside in districts in which African-Americans are a 
majority under the Plan — Shaw and Shimm — claim that it "injures" 
them in another way, by causing them to doubt the quality of their 
representation in Congress and making them feel "disenfranchised." 
See Shimm testimony, Tr. pp. 1084-93. All of these expressly 
claimed harms could be thought abstract, theoretical, and merely 
speculative, not concrete and palpable; all have the marks of the 
sort of "injury in perception" rather than "in fact," Powers v. Ohio, 
499 U.S. 400, 426-27 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting), that the 
Supreme Court has previously found insufficient to confer Article 
III standing.

Nevertheless, as we now understand the nature of the claim, 
we believe the Supreme Court would hold that the plaintiffs have 
adequately established their standing to assert it. That claim, as 
indicated, is that the Plan violates the Equal Protection Clause 
simply because it "classifies" voters — that is, assigns them to 
particular voting districts — on the basis of their race, without 
sufficiently compelling justification. In other contexts, the Supreme 
Court has recognized that a state's use of racial classifications 
necessarily inflicts "stigmatic" injury, Allen, 468 U.S. at 755, 
which, though "abstract" in the sense that it cannot easily be 
quantified, is sufficient "injury in fact" to give any citizen who has 
been "personally denied equal treatment" by such a classification 
standing to challenge it under the Equal Protection Clause. See 
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 281 n. 14 (opinion of Powell, J., joined by four 
other justices) (white male applicant to state medical school has 
standing to challenge admission program that sets aside a certain 
number of places in the class for minority applicants, even though 
he cannot show that he would have been admitted but for that set-



23a
aside program); Northeastern Florida Contractors, ___ U.S. at
___, 113 S.Ct. at 2303 (white contractors have standing to
challenge municipal ordinance that sets aside a certain percentage of 
city contracts for minority-owned businesses, even though they 
cannot show that they would have been awarded a contract but for 
the set-aside program); see also Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 
739-40 (1984) (applying same standing rule in action challenging 
federal government's use of gender-based classification under the 
equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment). On remand, plaintiffs seem to have added a claim of 
such "stigmatic" injury to the list of harms that they claim the Plan 
has inflicted upon them. See Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Brief at 4; 
Plaintiffs' Responses to Defendant-Intervenors' First Set of 
Interrogatories, Responses Nos. 1 and 2. Under the reasoning of 
Bakke and its progeny, this "stigmatic" injury would appear 
sufficient to give them standing to challenge the Plan, if they can 
show that they were "personally denied equal treatment" by it.

But difficulties remain, which in fairness must be 
recognized. It is not immediately obvious how this liberal rule of 
standing developed in Bakke and later cases challenging explicit 
racial classifications can be transposed to race-based districting. 
To date, all of the cases in which the dignitary injury resulting from 
a racial classification has been found sufficient to confer Article III 
standing have involved the use of race to disadvantage members of 
a particular racial group relative to other persons in the distribution 
of some governmental benefit. Bakke and Northeastern Florida 
Contractors, for example, involved explicit racial set-asides that 
prevented applicants of a certain race from being considered for a 
particular governmental benefit.12 In such cases, the classification 
clearly subjects the members of the disfavored group to "unequal 
treatment," because it makes it more difficult for them to obtain the 
benefit in question than it is for other persons. As the Court 
explained, "the 'injury in fact' in an Equal Protection case of th[at] 
variety is the denial of equal treatment resulting from the imposition

12 Though Heckler was a gender case rather than a race case, it too involved the 
use of a suspect classification to make it more difficult for certain otherwise 
qualified persons to obtain a particular government benefit. See 465 U.S. at 731 
(Social Security benefits).



24a
of the barrier" which denies members of one racial group the 
opportunity to compete for the benefit on an equal footing with 
members of other racial groups. Northeastern Florida
Contractors,___U.S. a t ____, 113 S.Ct. at 2303. But laws that
assign voters to particular districts on the basis of their race, unlike 
racial set-asides, do not appear to subject members of any racial 
group to "unequal treatment" vis-a-vis any other. So long as all 
citizens may vote, all individual votes receive the same weight, and 
no racial group's voting strength is unduly diluted, all racial groups 
are by definition given a fair opportunity to participate in the 
electoral process, even if some are better positioned than others to 
elect representatives of their choice in particular districts. See
Shaw,___U.S. a t___ & n.4, 113 S.Ct. at 2846 & n.4 (Souter, J.,
dissenting); see also Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. at 153-55 (fact 
that redistricting scheme causes members of a particular group to 
suffer repeated defeats at the polls and fails to provide them with 
proportional representation does not mean that it denies them an 
'equal opportunity" to participate in the electoral process); Davis v. 

Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 131-32 (same).

Despite this possible awkwardness, we think the Shaw 
Court must have intended to transpose to race-based districting the 
expansive concept of standing to challenge racial classifications 
bom in Bakke and brought to maturity in Northeastern Florida 
Contractors. The linchpin of the Court's analysis in Shaw was that 
race-based districting is no different than any other legislation that 
deliberately classifies citizens by race; it was on that basis that the 
Court held such legislation subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause. See Shaw,___U.S. a t___ , 113 S.Ct. at 2824-
25. Having equated race-based districting with legislation that 
explicitly classifies citizens on the basis of race for purposes of the 
underlying substantive law, it seems inconceivable that the Court 
would not also equate the two for purposes of standing, which 
serves merely to define the class of persons who have a sufficient 
personal stake in a particular substantive claim to litigate it in court. 
We therefore believe that the same expansive notion of standing 
developed in Bakke and other cases challenging explicit racial set- 
asides must also apply to cases challenging race-based districting; 
that is, that any person who can show that a redistricting plan has 
assigned him to vote in a particular district at least in part because



25a
of his race has standing to challenge it, even if he cannot show that 
it has caused any concrete injury to his political interests.13 In this 
context, the "injury in fact" presumably is the state's decision to deal 
with the voter as a member of a particular racial class, rather than 
as an individual, in assigning him to a voting district, which is an 
affront to his "personal dignity." See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel.
T .B .,___U .S .___ , ___,114 S.Ct. 1419, 1434 (1994) (Kennedy,
J., concurring in the judgment); Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC, 
497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("At the heart 
of the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection lies the simple 
command that the Government must treat citizens as 'individuals, 
not as simply components of a racial ... class'"). That race-based 
redistricting necessarily visits this indignity equally upon all races 
would appear to be of no consequence in the standing analysis, for 
"racial classifications do not become legitimate [because] all 
persons suffer them in equal degree." Powers, 499 U.S. at 410.

Such a broad standing principle concededly, and with all 
respect, has disquieting implications, which defendant-intervenors 
contend demonstrate its unacceptability. It would appear to mean 
that any person registered to vote in a jurisdiction with a districting 
plan that contains one or more districts which have been deliberately 
designed to have a certain racial composition has standing to 
challenge that plan, even if he is not assigned to vote in one of those

13 Defendant-intervenors' suggestion that plaintiffs lack standing to challenge 
the Plan unless they can show that it has either caused the representatives 
elected from their districts to represent only the interests of a particular racial 
group of which they are not members or exacerbated patterns of bloc voting by a 
racial group of which they are not members, see supra at 21, is effectively an 
effort to read back into the constitutional analysis (albeit in the guise of Article 
III standing, rather than substantive Equal Protection law) a threshold 
requirement that a plaintiff seeking to challenge a race-based redistricting plan 
demonstrate that it has caused some sort of concrete and material injury to his 
political interests. The Shaw Court expressly refused to impose such a threshold 
requirement as a matter of substantive Equal Protection law, and we cannot 
believe that it would countenance an effort to reintroduce it as a matter of 
standing law. We read the passage in the Shaw opinion upon which defendant-
intervenors rely,___U.S. a t___ , 113 S.Ct. at 2827-28, as not intended to limit
the class of voters who have standing to challenge race-based districting 
legislation, but merely to point out some of the pernicious effects that such 
legislation can have, in order to explain why it should be subject to the same 
strict scrutiny as other laws that deliberately classify citizens by race.



26a
districts himself.14 And its ultimate implication, as defendant- 
intervenors emphasize, is that any member or members of a racial 
minority for whose presumed benefit a majority-minority district 
has been created would have standing to challenge it as an improper 
"racial classification," even if they cannot prove the sort of injury to 
their group voting strength required to make out a constitutional or 
statutory vote-dilution claim. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 494 
(plurality) (all racial classifications immediately suspect under 
Equal Protection Clause, regardless of which race is benefitted or 
burdened).

Despite these difficulties, we understand Shaw necessarily 
to have implied a standing principle that accords standing to 
challenge a race-based redistricting plan to any voter who can show 
that it has assigned him to vote in a particular electoral district in 
part at least because of his race.

C. Proof Required to Trigger Strict Scrutiny

The threshold showing required by Shaw to establish that a 
particular districting plan is subject to strict scrutiny is not 
immediately clear, as the conflicting contentions of the parties 
illustrate.

Plaintiffs and their supporting intervenors contend that after 
Shaw, strict scrutiny applies to any districting plan in which 
consideration of race is shown to have played a "substantial" or 
"motivating" role in the line-drawing process, even if it was not the 
only factor that influenced that process. They note that it has long 
been established, outside the districting context, that strict scrutiny 
applies to any legislation in which a racially-discriminatory purpose 
is shown to have played a "substantial" or "motivating" role, even if 
it was not the "sole," "dominant," or even the "primary" purpose of 
the legislation. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing De\.

14 See Pildes & Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting 
Rights: Evaluating District Appearances after Shaw v. Reno, 92 Mich. L.Rev. 
483, 514-515 & n. 115 (1993); Aleinikoff & IssacharofF, Race and Redistricting: 
Drawing Constitutional Lines after Shaw v. Reno, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 588, 642 
(1993).



27a
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977); see Hunter v. Underwood, 
471 U.S. 222, 231 (1985). They contend that Shaw simply 
transposed the Arlington Heights "substantial" or "motivating" role 
test to the districting context, and that in this context, it is 
necessarily satisfied by proof that the lines of a particular plan were 
deliberately drawn so as to create one or more districts in which a 
particular racial group has a majority, even if factors other than 
race also played a substantial role in the location and shape of those 
districts. As they point out, this is the interpretation of Shaw 
adopted by all three members of the court in Hays v. Louisiana,
839 F. Supp. 1188 (W.D.La. 1993) (Hays I), vacated, ___U.S.
___, 114 S.Ct. 2731 (June 27, 1994),15 the first three-judge court

15 Hays I  struck down Louisiana's then-existing congressional redistricting plan, 
which contained two majority-minority districts designed to comply with the 
Voting Rights Act, as an unconstitutional racial gerrymander under Shaw. While 
an appeal from that decision was pending before the United States Supreme 
Court, the Louisiana legislature repealed the invalidated plan and enacted a 
revised congressional redistricting plan, which redrew the two majority-minority 
districts so as to correct some of the problems that the district court had 
identified in declaring the earlier plan unconstitutional. Act 1 of the Second 
Extraordinary Session of the 1994 Louisiana Legislature. The Hays plaintiffs 
promptly moved to amend their complaint to add a challenge to the revised plan, 
and the parties filed supplemental briefs in the Supreme Court addressing the 
effect of the enactment of the revised plan on the pending appeal from the 
decision invalidating its predecessor.

Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court issued a brief order vacating the
district court decision in Ways I . ___U.S.___ , 114 S.Ct. 2731 (June 27, 1994).
Though the State argued to the Court that the enactment of the revised plan 
rendered the appeal from the decision invalidating its predecessor moot, and that 
the Court should therefore vacate that decision under United States v. 
Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36 (1950), the Court’s order did not make clear that it 
was basing its decision to vacate on that ground. The order stated that "[t]he 
judgment [below] is vacated and the case is remanded to the United States 
District Court . . .  for further consideration in light of Act 1 of the Second 
Extraordinary Session of the 1994 Louisiana Legislature and the parties' filing*
in this Court concerning Act 1," id. a t___,114 S.Ct. at 2731, which is not the
language the Court normally uses when vacating a lower court decision under
Munsingwear. See, e.g., Gantt v. Skelos,___U .S .___ , 113 S.Ct. 30 (1992)
(direct appeal from three-judge district court in Voting Rights Act case) ("The 
judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the United States District Court 
... with instructions to dismiss the appeal as moot. United States v. 
Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36 (1950)."); Yellow Freight System Inc. v. United
States,---- U .S .___ , 113 S.Ct. 31 (1992) (petition for certiorari from United
States Court of Appeals) ("The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to



28a
to consider a Shaw-Yike challenge to a race-based redistricting plan 
in the aftermath of the Supreme Court's decision here. See id. at 
1202 & n. 46 (majority op.) (under Shaw, strict scrutiny is triggered 
by proof that race was an "important" or "significant[ ]" factor in 
the line-drawing process, even if it was not the only factor that 
influenced that process); id. at 1216 (Walter, J., concurring) (strict 
scrutiny applies if race was "a motivating factor" in the line­
drawing process); Jeffers v. Tucker, 847 F. Supp. 655, 671-72 
(E.D.Ark. 1994) (Eisele, J., concurring) (same).

The state and its allies, by contrast, argue that mere proof 
that the legislature deliberately drew district lines in order to create 
one or more districts in which a particular racial group has a 
majority is not sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny under Shaw. 
Instead, they read Shaw as holding that strict scrutiny applies only 
to plans that are shown to (i) create districts with highly irregular 
shapes; (ii) in which citizens of particular racial groups are 
concentrated in numbers disproportionate to their representation in 
the state's population as a whole; and (iii) whose shape and location 
cannot rationally be explained by reference to any districting factor 
other than race. While they concede that proof of the first two 
factors may give rise to an inference that a plan is a "racial 
gerrymander" triggering strict scrutiny, they maintain that the state 
may rebut that inference by presenting evidence that the location 
and shape of the districts can rationally be explained by reference to 
some districting principle other than race, and that if the state does

the United States Court of Appeals ... with directions to dismiss as moot.''). For 
this reason, the order of vacation could be read to indicate some doubt about the 
validity of the Hays I  court's rulings on the merits.

On remand, the district court permitted the Hays plaintiffs to amend 
their complaint to challenge the constitutionality of the revised plan, and then 
ruled that it too was unconstitutional under Shaw. Hays v. Louisiana, No. 92- 
1522 (W.D.La. Aug. 1, 1994) (Hays II). The court's brief opinion explaining 
this ruling stated that it continued to adhere to the interpretation of Shaw set 
forth in its Hays I  opinion, notwithstanding the uncertainty about the validity of 
that interpretation after the Supreme Court's action, and that it was adopting by 
reference the constitutional analysis set forth in that earlier opinion. Id. at _  
(slip op. at 2). Because Hays II  does not reiterate that analysis in any detail, but 
simply incorporates by reference the discussion in Hays I , we continue to cite to 
Hays I  here.



29a
this, strict scrutiny does not apply and the plan must be judged 
instead under the lenient rational basis test. In their view, the Shaw 
Court was concerned not about all deliberate use of race in 
redistricting, but only about a narrow category of "exceptional 
cases" in which race-based redistricting produces majority-minority 
districts so peculiar-looking that they call attention to their racial 
purpose and thereby serve to exacerbate, rather than to alleviate, the 
existing racial divisions in society.

It is certainly possible to read the majority opinion in Shaw 
as holding no more than the state and its allies say it does. See 
Dewitt v. Wilson, No. Civ.-5-93-535-EJG/JFM, 1994 WL 325415, 
at * 3-7 (E.D.Cal. June 27, 1994) (adopting this reading of Shaw). 
As they point out, the plaintiffs' reading of Shaw is hard to square 
with the nature of the Supreme Court's remand in this case. It was 
clear, on the record before the Court, that the desire to create two 
districts in which African-Americans were a majority of voting age 
population was indeed a substantial motivating factor behind the 
enactment of this particular plan. Our opinion below had indicated 
that the state had conceded this fact in the proceedings before us, 
808 F. Supp. at 470, and several of the dissents in the Supreme 
Court called this concession to the majority's attention. See _
U.S. a t ___, 113 S.Ct. at 2838 (White, J., dissenting); id. a t ___,
113 S.Ct. at 2843 (Stevens, J., dissenting). If the deliberate 
creation of majority-minority districts was all that it took to trigger 
strict scrutiny, the most logical thing for the Court to have done 
would have been to note the state's concession, announce that strict 
scrutiny was therefore applicable, and remand for application of 
that standard, since the factual record at that stage was not 
sufficiently well-developed to allow the Court to do so itself. But 
the Court did not do this; instead, it held only that plaintiffs' 
allegations were sufficient to state a claim that the Plan was a racial
gerrymander subject to strict scrutiny, id. a t___, 113 S.Ct. at 2832,
and it suggested several times that the state might yet avoid strict 
scrutiny on remand, by producing evidence that would somehow 
"rebut" or "contradict" that allegation of racial gerrymandering. Id.
at ___, 113 S.Ct. at 2832 ("If the allegation of racial
gerrymandering remains uncontradicted, the District Court further 
must determine whether the North Carolina plan is narrowly 
tailored to further a compelling governmental interest"); id. a t ___,



30a
113 S.Ct. at 2830 ("[I]f appellants' allegations of a racial 
gerrymander are not contradicted on remand, the District Court 
must determine whether the General Assembly's reapportionment 
plan satisfies strict scrutiny”). In addition, the majority explicitly 
reserved the question whether the deliberate creation of majority- 
minority districts, without more, always triggers strict scrutiny, id.
a t___, 113 S.Ct. at 2828 ("[W]e express no view as to whether 'the
intentional creation of majority-minority districts, without more,' 
always gives rise to an equal protection claim”). For these reasons, 
the state's reading of Shaw cannot be rejected out of hand.

Despite its surface plausibility, however, we do not think 
the state's interpretation of Shaw can be correct. If Shaw meant no 
more than the state says it does, it would have precious little 
practical effect on race-based districting, for it would require states 
to defend the deliberate creation of majority-minority districts under 
strict scrutiny only when they could not come up with any rational 
explanation for the location and shape of those districts other than 
race. This would seldom be the case, given the wide variety of 
other districting principles that may be used to justify even the most 
peculiar-looking districts. The language and structure of the 
Court's opinion, if not its actual holding, strongly suggest that the 
Court intended to do much more than this. As we read the opinion, 
it was intended to place race-based redistricting legislation into the 
same category as all other forms of race-based state action after 
Croson, for purposes of analysis under the Equal Protection Clause: 
subject to strict scrutiny upon a showing that the state's use of race 
to distinguish among citizens was deliberate, whether or not it can 
be said to have had a "benign" or "remedial" purpose. There are 
admittedly some problems with this reading, though, which the state 
defendants and their allies properly point out. We therefore analyze 
the relevant portions of the Court's opinion in some detail.

The whole thrust of the Court's description of the remanded 
claim is to locate it within post-Croson "color-blind" Equal 
Protection jurisprudence, in which strict scrutiny is triggered simply 
by the fact that legislation "classifies" citizens by race -- whatever 
its asserted purpose, however its presumed benefits and burdens are 
cast, and whether the racial classification is overt or implicit. The 
Court begins with a textbook exposition of the basic premises and



31a
precepts of that jurisprudence: The "central purpose" of the Equal 
Protection Clause is "to prevent the States from purposefully
discriminating between individuals on the basis of [their] race."___
U.S. a t ___, 113 S.Ct. at 2824. Laws that deliberately distinguish
between citizens on the basis of their race are "odious to a free 
people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of 
equality," because they "threaten to stigmatize individuals by reason 
of their membership in a racial group and to incite racial hostility."
Id. a t __ , 113 S.Ct. at 2824 (internal quotations omitted). 16 They
must therefore be subject to the strictest judicial scrutiny, even 
when claimed to have a "benign" or "remedial" purpose, for 
'"[ajbsent searching judicial inquiry ..., there is simply no way of 
determining wh[ich] [racial] classifications are "benign" or 
"remedial" and whfich] are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions
of racial inferiority or simple racial politics.'" Id. a t ___, 113 S.Ct.
at 2824 (iquoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (plurality)). This strict 
scrutiny applies not only to legislation that is overtly race-based — 
that is, that draws "explicit racial distinctions" on its face, as did the 
minority set-aside policy in Croson -  but also to legislation that 
employs a classification which, though facially race-neutral, is 
shown to be "'an obvious pretext for racial discrimination.'" Id. at
___, 113 S.Ct. at 2825. And one way to prove that a facially race-
neutral law is in fact a pretext for racial discrimination is to show 
that it draws distinctions that are "'unexplainable on grounds other 
than race.'" Id. a t___, 113 S.Ct. at 2825.

16 Throughout its opinion, the Court seems to be using the term "racial 
discrimination11 to mean simply deliberately distinguishing between people on 
the basis of their race, without regard to whether the distinction results in
disadvantageous treatment of one racial group vis-a-vis another. See id. a t ___,
113 S.Ct. at 2824-26 (using "discriminating" and "distinguishing" 
interchangeably). This is consistent with the Court's general shift, in recent 
years, from the "anti-discrimination" model of the Equal Protection Clause, 
under which strict scrutiny was warranted only when race was used to single out 
historically-disadvantaged minority groups for further adverse treatment, to the 
more individualistic “colorblind" model, under which any deliberate use of race 
to distinguish between citizens triggers strict scrutiny, regardless of whom it 
benefits or burdens, because race is presumptively irrelevant to legitimate 
governmental decisionmaking. See generally Klarman, An Interpretive History 
of Modem Equal Protection, 90 Mich. L.Rev. 213, 308-16 (1991).



32a
The Court then turns to a discussion of how these principles

apply in the context of electoral districting. Id. a t___, 113 S.Ct. at
2825-28. It begins by stating that "district lines obviously drawn 
for the purpose of separating voters by race require careful scrutiny 
under the Equal Protection Clause, regardless of the motivations
underlying their adoption." Id. at ___, 113 S.Ct. at 2826. It
observes that it is normally difficult to prove that a single-member 
districting plan "purposefully distinguishes between voters on the 
basis of race," because such plans "typically do[ ] not classify 
persons at all," but "tracts of land, or addresses," and there are 
many legitimate non-racial reasons why a legislature might choose 
to construct districts in a way that concentrated members of a
particular racial group in one or more of them. Id. a t ___, 113
S.Ct. at 2826. But it says there are a handful of "exceptional cases" 
in which proving that a redistricting plan "purposefully 
distinguishes between voters on the basis of race," hence is subject 
to strict scrutiny, "will not be difficult at all": those in which the 
plan contains district lines "so highly irregular" that they "rationally 
cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to 'segregate]
... voters' on the basis of race." Id. a t ___, 113 S.Ct. at 2826. Two
examples of plans that fall into this category are given: the actual 
plan in Gomillion, in which "a tortured municipal boundary line 
was drawn to exclude black voters," and a hypothetical plan that 
"concentrate[s] a dispersed minority population in a single district 
by disregarding traditional districting principles such as 
compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions." Id.
a t ___, 113 S.Ct. at 2826-27. In such cases, the Court explains, the
irregular shape of the districts serves as powerful circumstantial 
evidence that the legislature was in fact motivated by a racial
purpose when it drew them. See id. a t ___, 113 S.Ct. at 2827 (the
legislature's failure to observe "traditional districting principles" is 
"objective" evidence that the districts were "gerrymandered on racial
lines"); id. at ___, 113 S.Ct. at 2827 ('"dramatically irregular
shapes may have sufficient probative force to call for an 
explanation'") (quoting Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 755 
(1983) (Stevens, J., concurring)).17

17 As the Hays I  Court recognized, the Shaw majority apparently uses the term 
"racial gerrymander" to refer to districting legislation which, though race-neutral 
on its face, is in fact deliberately designed to produce one or more districts of a 
certain racial composition, so that it can be said to reflect a deliberate policy of



33a
We think it readily apparent from the Court's analysis that 

what it finds potentially offensive about the Plan under challenge 
here -- from a constitutional standpoint -- is not that it is 
aesthetically "ugly," but that its drafters may deliberately, and 
unjustifiably, have taken race into account in assigning voters to
particular districts. See___U.S. a t___ , 113 S.Ct. at 2832 ("race-
based districting by our state legislatures," like "[rjacial 
classifications of any sort," must be subject to "close judicial 
scrutiny," because it "reinforcejs] the belief, held by too many for 
too much of our history, that individuals should be judged by the 
color of their skin," and threatens to "balkanize us into competing

assigning citizens to voting districts on the basis of their race. Hays I, 839 F. 
Supp. at 1194 (majority op.) (defining a "racial gerrymander" under Shaw as a 
districting plan that "intentionally draws one or more districts along racial lines 
or otherwise intentionally segregates citizens into voting districts based on their 
race"); id. at 1214 (Walter, J., concurring) (defining a "racial gerrymander" 
under Shaw as "[districting] legislation that manipulates district lines to achieve 
a predetermined racial result"). This focus on deliberate manipulation of district 
lines to achieve an ulterior purpose is consistent with the traditional 
understanding of a "gerrymander." See Black's Law Dictionary at 618 (5th ed. 
1979) (defining "gerrymandering" as "the process of dividing a state or other 
territory into the authorized ... political divisions, but with such a geographical 
arrangement as to accomplish an ulterior or unlawful purpose, as, for instance, to 
secure a majority for a given political party in districts where the result would be 
otherwise if they were divided according to obvious natural lines”).

In its most extreme form, a "racial gerrymander" may result in districts 
that actually "segregate" or "separate" the races for voting purposes — the sort of 
redistricting plan that the Shaw majority characterizes as "political apartheid."
Shaw, U.S. a t___, 113 S.Ct at 2827. But it need not be this extreme to trigger
strict scrutiny, neither Gomillion nor Wright -  upon which the Shaw majority 
relies in reaching its conclusion that race-based redistricting plans are subject to 
strict scrutiny, and from which it draws the language about "segregating" voters 
by race — involved plans that completely separated the races for purposes of 
voting. See Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 341 (redistricting plan removed from 
particular electoral district all but "four or five" out of 400 voters of a particular 
racial minority); Wright, 376 U.S. at 59 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (redistricting 
plan resulted in "substantial, though not complete, segregation [of voters] by 
race"). The critical feature of a racial gerrymander is not that it completely 
separates the races for purposes of voting, but that it reflects the deliberate 
manipulation of district lines so as to accomplish a particular racial result. See
Shaw,___U.S. a t___ , 113 S.Ct. at 2823 (describing a "racial gerrymander" as
"the deliberate and arbitrary distortion of district boundaries ... for [racial] 
purposes") (internal citations omitted).



34a
racial factions"). The peculiar, "bizarre," or "ugly" shapes of its 
districts has some significance in the constitutional analysis at this 
stage, but only as circumstantial evidence that the disproportionate 
concentration of members of a particular race in certain districts 
was something the line-drawers deliberately set about to 
accomplish, as opposed to being simply an accidental consequence 
of a line-drawing process driven by other districting concerns. See 
id. a t___, 113 S.Ct. at 2827.

The necessary implication of this analysis is that strict 
scrutiny of an electoral redistricting plan is now triggered by proof - 
- by any means, including state concession, bizarre shape, or some 
combination of the various factors typically used to prove the 
"intent" element of an Equal Protection claim under Arlington 
Heights — that racial considerations played a "substantial" or 
"motivating" role in the line-drawing process, even if they were not 
the only factor that influenced that process. See Hays 7, 839 F. 
Supp. at 1202 & n. 46 (majority op.); id. at 1216 (Walter, J., 
concurring); Jeffers, 847 F.Supp, at 671-72 (Eisele, J., concurring). 
This "race-a-motivating-factor" triggering test is necessarily met by 
proof that the plan's lines were deliberately drawn so as to create 
one or more districts in which a particular racial group is a 
majority, even if factors other than race are shown to have played a 
significant role in the precise location and shape of those districts. 
If the line-drawing process is shown to have been infected by such a 
deliberate racial purpose, strict scrutiny cannot be avoided simply 
by demonstrating that the shape and location of the districts can 
rationally be explained by reference to some districting principle 
other than race, for the intentional classification of voters by race, 
though perhaps disguised, is still likely to reflect the "impermissible
racial stereotypes," Shaw, ___ U.S. at ___, 113 S.Ct. at 2827,
'"illegitimate notions of racial inferiority'" and "'simple racial
politics,"' id. at ___, 113 S.Ct. at 2824, that strict scrutiny is
designed to "'smoke out.'" Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (plurality).18

18 Of course, if a legislature could show that it would have enacted precisely the 
same plan even if it had not considered race at all, then it ought to be able to 
avoid strict scrutiny. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 270-71 n. 21; Mt. 
Healthy City School Dist. Bd. ofEdnc. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977). But 
that would be a rare case indeed.



35a
This is the obvious implication of the Shaw majority's effort to 
import post-Croson Equal Protection principles into the electoral 
districting context, see Aleinikoff & Tsaacharoff, supra, at 664-43, 
and it is the reading of Shaw most consistent with the views on 
Equal Protection expressed by the members of the Shaw majority in 
their various opinions in Wygant, Croson, and Metro
Broadcasting}9 See also Johnson v. DeGrandy,____U.S. ____,

62 U.S.L.W. 4755, 4764-65 (June 30, 1994) (Kennedy, J. 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (reading Shaw as 
applying "to the drawing of electoral and political boundaries" the 
Croson principle that "the sorting of persons with an intent to divide 
by reason of race raises the most serious constitutional questions," 
triggering strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause 
regardless of the race of those burdened or benefited by it, and 
therefore admonishing "state and federal officials with 
responsibilities related to redistricting, as well as reviewing courts, 
to recognize that explicit race-based districting ... must comply with 
the overriding demands of the Equal Protection Clause"). But, the 
state defendants and their allies fairly ask, if the Court intended the 
deliberate creation of majority-minority districts, standing alone, to 
trigger strict scrutiny, why did it not rest its remand simply on that 
ground, as it easily could have done here, given the state's 
concession? Why did it deliberately reserve the question whether 
the deliberate creation of majority-minority districts, without more, 
will always give rise to an Equal Protection claim, and write an 
opinion that can be read to confine strict scrutiny to cases in which 
the lines cannot rationally be explained on any ground other than 
race? 19

19 See, e.g., Wygant, 476 U.S. at 284-85 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) ('"Racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are 
inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination"') 
(quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291 (opinion of Powell, J.); Croson, 488 U.S. at 
493-94 (opinion of O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White and 
Kennedy, JJ.); id. at 518 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) ("The moral imperative of racial neutrality is the driving force of the 
Equal Protection Clause"); id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) ("to 
classify and judge men and women on the basis of ... the color of their skin" is 
"fatal to a Nation such as ours"); Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 602-10 
(O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia and Kennedy, JJ., 
dissenting); id. at 631-38 (Kennedy, J., joined by Scalia, J., dissenting).



36a
The question is by no means easily answered, but we think 

there must be an answer that does not undercut our previously- 
stated understanding of Shaw. Several can be ventured. First, a 
broad holding that strict scrutiny applies to any plan that 
deliberately creates majority-minority districts, even when those 
districts are not highly irregular, would have required the Court to 
overrule its earlier decision in UJO. By confining its discussion to 
bizarre-looking districts, the Court was able to distinguish UJO as 
involving a majority-minority district of relatively normal shape.
S e e ___U.S. a t ___ , 113 S.Ct. at 2829. Second, the Court may
have thought it unfair to hold the State of North Carolina, which 
had not yet even filed an answer in this action, to a concession it 
made in response to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion at a time when it had 
fair reason to believe that UJO, under which the concession would 
have made no difference, was still the controlling authority. Finally, 
the Court may have viewed the concession made by the state here as 
an aberration that was unlikely to occur in the vast majority of 
cases, and ignored it in order to announce a rule that would permit 
plaintiffs making comparable claims to prove the "intentional" use 
of race necessary to trigger strict scrutiny inferentially, when the 
state did not concede it. In any event, we have no need to identify 
the exact reason for this action by the Court; it suffices here simply 
to demonstrate that the state has not identified the only possible 
reason.

Before leaving this point, we also need, in fairness, to 
consider one other objection that the state and its allies raise to the 
reading of Shaw suggested by plaintiffs and their supporting 
intervenors: that it will require virtually all redistricting plans to be 
defended under strict scrutiny, since it is almost always possible to 
show that a legislature was aware to some degree of the racial 
impact of the lines it was drawing, particularly now that all 
redistricting is done with computers into which racial data is loaded.
See Shaw,___U.S. a t___ , 113 S.Ct. at 2826 ("redistricting differs
from other kinds of state decisionmaking in that the legislature 
always is aware of race when it draws district lines, just as it is 
aware of age, economic status, religious and political persuasion, 
and a variety of other demographic factors") (emphasis in original).



37a
We do not believe any such drastic consequence will result 

from our reading of Shaw. The Supreme Court's Equal Protection 
cases have long recognized that there is a critical distinction 
between "race-conscious" action and "race-based" action, and that 
the "intentional" use of race required to trigger strict scrutiny of 
legislative action cannot be established simply by showing that the 
legislature adopted a particular course of action with knowledge 
that it was likely to have a particular racial impact. See Personnel 
Adm. o f  Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (the sort of 
"discriminatory purpose" required to trigger strict scrutiny of a 
facially-neutral statute "implies more than intent as volition or intent 
as awareness of consequences"; it requires a showing "that the 
decisionmaker ... selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action 
at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse 
effects upon an identifiable group"). The Shaw majority 
specifically stated that the "intentional" or "deliberate" use of race 
required to trigger strict scrutiny in the redistricting context, as 
elsewhere, means not just taking action with knowledge or 
awareness that it is likely to have a particular racial impact, but 
taking it with the specific intent to bring about such an impact. See
___U.S. a t ___ , 113 S. Ct. at 2826 (noting that "the legislature
always is aware of race when it draws district lines," but that 
"[tjhat sort of race consciousness does not lead inevitably to 
impermissible race discrimination") (emphasis in original). 
Properly applied, this distinction between "race-conscious" and 
"race-based" districting should prevent legislatures from having to 
defend all districting plans under the strict scrutiny standard.20

20 As a practical matter, there will probably be only two types of redistricting 
cases in which plaintiffs will consistently be able to prove the intent necessary to 
trigger strict scrutiny: (i) those in which a redistricting plan creates more 
majority-minority districts than did the prior plan, and there is direct evidence 
that this has been done in response to either a private suit under the Voting 
Rights Act or a § 5 objection from the Justice Department; and (ii) those in 
which a plan creates one or more districts in which citizens of a particular racial 
group are concentrated in numbers disproportionate to their representation in the 
state's population as a whole, whose shapes are so highly irregular as to give rise 
to an inference that the concentration was something the legislature affirmatively 
set out to achieve, as opposed to being merely an accidental side-effect of a 
redistricting process in which racial considerations played no role.

In all other situations, proof of the requisite intent will be difficult 
indeed, since redistricting legislation is almost always facially race-neutral and



38a
Nor will our reading of Shaw condemn to constitutional 

invalidity all majority-minority districts drawn to give effect to 
minority voting strength in order to comply with the requirements of 
the Voting Rights Act. As the cases involving affirmative action in 
higher education and public employment demonstrate, although 
strict scrutiny places significant limitations on the ability of state 
actors to take race-based remedial action, it need not be "strict in 
theory, fatal in fact." Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 518-19 
(1980). Application of strict scrutiny to all redistricting proven to 
be race-based will certainly make state legislatures look before they 
leap when it comes to voluntary compliance with the Voting Rights 
Act. But it should not prevent them from attempting to comply with 
it altogether, so long as the "narrowly tailored to further a 
compelling state interest" standard is applied in a way that is 
sensitive not only to the state legislatures' statutory obligation to 
create majority-minority districts to give effect to minority voting 
strength in areas where minorities have been subjected to persistent 
discrimination in the political process, but also to the special 
compromises that they must make in order to pass plans that draw 
such districts.

With that in mind, we turn now to the problems of how, 
under Shaw, strict scrutiny is to be applied in the redistricting 
context.

proving the intent of a collective body like a legislature, which is notoriously 
difficult in the best of circumstances, is even more difficult when it is engaged in 
the highly political "horse-trading" that marks the redistricting process. See
Shaw,___U.S. a t ___ , 113 S.Ct. at 2826; see also Wright, 376 U.S. at 53-58
(finding that plaintiffs failed to prove that legislature was motivated by racial 
considerations when it drew congressional redistricting plan in which members 
of particular racial and ethnic minorities were concentrated in a single district in 
numbers disproportionate to their representation in the population as a whole, 
where that concentration could be explained by reference to existing patterns of 
residential segregation).



39a
D. Application of The Strict Scrutiny Standard 

in the Redistricting Context

Shaw holds that any deliberately race-based state 
redistricting plan is subject to "strict scrutiny" under the Equal 
Protection Clause, and that it can survive that scrutiny only if its 
use of race is both justified by a "compelling governmental interest"
and "narrowly tailored" to further that interest. ___U.S. a t ____,
113 S.Ct. at 2832. But while Shaw offers some brief suggestions 
about what this standard might require in the redistricting context,
see id. a t___, 113 S.Ct. at 2830-32, it does not actually apply it to
this particular redistricting plan. Nor has any other decision of the 
Supreme Court ever applied strict scrutiny under the Equal 
Protection Clause to specific electoral redistricting legislation. In 
seeking to understand how that is to be done here, we must look for 
guidance primarily to the Court's decisions applying the strict 
scrutiny standard to race-based remedial measures voluntarily 
undertaken by state actors in other contexts: higher education, 
employment, and government contracting. See Regents o f  the Univ. 
o f  Calif, v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Wygantv. Jackson Bd. o f  
Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986), and City o f  Richmond v. J.A. Croson 
Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).21

Here again, we confront the problem of transposing to the 
redistricting context a legal standard developed in very different 
factual contexts. There are difficulties -- again emphasized by the 
parties' conflicting contentions — arising from the fact that race- 
based electoral redistricting differs, in several critical respects, from

21 In our view, a race-based redistricting plan enacted by a state, even tinder 
pressure from the Justice Department, is most closely analogous to an 
affirmative action plan voluntarily adopted by a state actor, for purposes of 
analysis under the Equal Protection Clause. By contrast, a race-based 
redistricting plan imposed upon a state by a federal court as a remedy for a found 
violation of federal law is analogous to a judicially-imposed affirmative action 
plan, which may require greater justification at the compelling interest stage of 
the strict scrutiny analysis than its voluntarily-adopted counterpart. See United 
States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 187 n. 2 (1987) (Powell, J„ concurring). Cf.
Voinovich v. Quilter, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 113 S.Ct. 1149, 1156-57 (1993)
(noting that a state legislature's power to create majority-minority districts 
voluntarily is considerably broader than a federal court's power to order it to do 
so).



40a
the race-based remedial measures which the Court has previously 
analyzed under the strict scrutiny standard. First, and most 
critically, unlike the use of racial preferences in educational 
admissions, employment, and government contracting, the drawing 
of district lines so as to give effect to minority voting strength is 
specifically mandated by a federal statute enacted by Congress 
under its broad constitutional authority to remedy the effects of past 
discrimination.22 Second, unlike discrimination in education,

22 The United States as amici suggests that the redistricting plan at issue here 
should be judged under the intermediate scrutiny standard applied to "benign" 
race-based measures mandated by Congress in Metro Broadcasting v. Federal 
Communications Comm'n, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) ("substantially related" to the 
achievement of an "important" governmental interest that is within the scope of 
Congress' legislative power), rather than the more exacting strict scrutiny 
standard generally applied to such measures when they are undertaken by state 
and local governments. The argument is apparently that because the Plan was 
enacted in direct response to a § 5 objection from the United States Justice 
Department, to whom Congress has delegated authority to enforce the Voting 
Rights Act, and was later approved by the Justice Department in the § 5 
preclearance process, it was "mandated by Congress" in the same sense as the 
minority-preference policies adopted and maintained by the FCC in Metro 
Broadcasting and thus should be evaluated under the more forgiving 
intermediate scrutiny standard announced in that case.

We disagree. Even if Metro Broadcasting's holding that race-based 
affirmative action programs mandated by Congress are not subject to strict 
scrutiny survives the retirement of Justices Brennan and Marshall, we do not 
think it can properly be applied in this context. The racial preference policies at 
issue in Metro Broadcasting had been specifically approved, indeed mandated, 
by Congress, in their exact form: though the FCC had developed them on its 
own, Congress had thereafter specifically directed the FCC to maintain them. 
See 497 U.S. at 560, 563. We do not think a race-based redistricting plan 
enacted by a state can be said to carry the same imprimatur of congressional 
approval, even when it is done with the purpose of complying with the Voting 
Rights Act or the Justice Department's interpretation thereof. The Voting Rights 
Act itself does not command a state to adopt a particular redistricting plan; 
instead, it simply forbids it to adopt plans that have the purpose or effect of 
diluting the voting strength of certain protected minority groups. Nor does the 
Justice Department have statutory authority to order a state to adopt a particular 
redistricting plan. Of course, the Justice Department may, and frequently does, 
tell a state, in the course of the § 5 preclearance process, that it believes its 
redistricting plan must contain a certain number of majority-minority districts in 
order to comply with the A ct. But such a statement cannot fairly be considered a 
mandate from Congress to enact a plan with that number of majority-minority 
districts, since Congress has specifically given the state the right to challenge the 
Justice Department's interpretation of the Act in the United States District Court



41a
employment, and government contracting, the specific type of 
discrimination that race-based redistricting is designed to redress — 
denial of fair and effective representation — threatens the very 
legitimacy of our nation's political system. Third, unlike most other 
types of affirmative action, race-based redistricting is a remedy 
whose benefits inure, in large part, to individuals who have 
themselves been victims of the discriminatory practices that it is 
designed to dismantle. See Grofinan, Would Vince Lombardi Have 
Been Right If  He Said: "When It Comes to Redistricting, Race Isn't 
Everything, It's the Only Thing?", 14 Cardozo L.Rev. 1237, 1246 
& n. 40 (1993). Finally, as noted in our standing discussion, unlike 
the use of racial preferences in making admissions to medical 
school, deciding which employees to lay off, and awarding 
government contracts, the drawing of district lines so as to give 
effect to minority voting strength does not necessarily disadvantage 
members of other racial groups. So long as all citizens may vote, 
all individual votes receive the same weight, and no racial group's 
voting strength is unduly diluted by the resulting districting scheme, 
there is no unequal treatment as between affected groups. See
Shaw, ___U.S. a t ___ , 113 S.Ct at 2846 (Souter, J., dissenting);
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 305 (Powell, J.) (noting that deliberate creation 
of majority-minority districts in order to give effect to existing 
minority voting strength "improve[s] the previously disadvantaged 
group's ability to participate without excluding individuals 
belonging to any other group from enjoyment of the relevant 
opportunity -- meaningful participation in the electoral process"). 
As discussed more fully below, these differences give rise to several 
specific difficulties in transposing developed strict scrutiny 
principles to the context of remedial redistricting.

for the District of Columbia. For these reasons, we believe that the Metro 
Broadcasting principle cannot be used to justify application of something less 
than strict scrutiny here.

This is not to say, however, that the fact that this particular race-based 
redistricting plan was enacted in response to a § 5 objection from the Justice 
Department has no relevance in the Equal Protection analysis. To the contrary, 
we think it has considerable relevance, in deciding whether the state has a 
compelling interest in creating majority-minority districts. See infra at 64-69.



42a

1. Burden of Proof

The parties disagree at the outset about the allocation of the 
burden of proof at the strict scrutiny stage of the Equal Protection 
analysis. Although plaintiffs and their supporting intervenors 
concede that they have the burden of proving the Plan is a "racial 
gerrymander" subject to strict scrutiny, they argue that if they 
succeed in doing this, the burden then shifts to the state to prove 
that the Plan's use of race is narrowly tailored to further a 
compelling governmental interest. According to them, this is how 
the three-judge court in Hays I  viewed the state's burden of 
justification at the strict scrutiny stage of a racial gerrymandering 
case like this one. The state and its allies, by contrast, maintain that 
the state's burden is merely to identify a compelling justification for 
its use of race, and that plaintiffs retain the ultimate burden of 
persuading the court that its preferred justification is not compelling 
or that the Plan is not narrowly tailored to further it.

We think the state has the better of this argument. The 
Supreme Court repeatedly has emphasized that when members of a 
racial minority bring an Equal Protection challenge to a state law or 
policy, they bear the ultimate burden of persuasion throughout the 
proceeding. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93-94 & 
n.18 (1986). The rule is no different for Equal Protection
challenges to state laws or policies brought by members of the 
majority race. Cf. Croson, 488 U.S. at 494 (plurality) ("the 
guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied 
to one individual and something else when applied to a person of 
another color"). In such a reverse-discrimination case, as in any 
other Equal Protection case, "[t]he ultimate burden remains with the 
[plaintiff] to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of [the] 
affirmative-action program." Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277-78 
(plurality); id. at 292 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) ("in 'reverse discrimination' suits, as in 
any other suit, it is the plaintiffs who must bear the burden of 
demonstrating that their rights have been violated"). Proof that the 
challenged law or policy is race-based gives rise to a presumption 
that it is unconstitutional and shifts to the state the burden of 
"demonstrating" that its use of race was justified by a compelling 
governmental interest. Croson, 488 U.S. at 505 (majority). But the



43a
burden thus shifted is one of production only, not persuasion; 
plaintiffs still "bear the ultimate burden of persuading the court that 
the [state's] evidence did not support an inference of prior 
discrimination and thus a remedial purpose, or that the [remedial 
action] instituted on the basis of this evidence was not sufficiently 
'narrowly tailored,"' and they can "establish a violation of their 
constitutional rights," and thus prevail on their Equal Protection 
claim, "[o]nly by meeting this burden." Wygant, 476 U.S. at 293 
(O'Connor, J., concurring).

Nothing in Shaw purports to alter these well-settled 
principles of Equal Protection jurisprudence. Nor do we read the 
passage in Hays I  upon which plaintiffs and their supporting 
intervenors rely as holding that the state bears the burden of 
persuasion with respect to either prong of the strict scrutiny inquiry. 
While the Hays I  court did remark that there was a rough 
"parallelism" between "the State's burden here of establishing the 
affirmative justification of a compelling state interest" and a 
"criminal defendant's burden -- at common law — of establishing an 
affirmative defense," 839 F. Supp. at 1206 (emphasis in original), it 
was very careful to point out that it was not using this analogy to 
make any point about the location of the burden of persuasion with 
respect to the presence or absence of such justification. Id. at 1206 
n. 59. We therefore conclude that in a Shaw-Wkc challenge to a 
race-based redistricting plan, as in any other sort of Equal 
Protection case, the state's burden at the strict scrutiny stage is 
producing evidence that the plans use of race is narrowly tailored to 
further a compelling state interest, and that plaintiffs retain the 
ultimate burden of persuading the court either that the preferred 
justification is not compelling or that the Plan is not narrowly 
tailored to further it. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 292-93 (O'Connor, 
J., concurring).

2. Compelling State Interest

We next consider the circumstances in which a state might 
have a "compelling interest" in engaging in race-based redistricting 
to give effect to minority voting strength. At the outset, we note 
that, contrary' to plaintiffs' suggestion, the critical question at this 
stage of the analysis is not whether the state had a compelling



44a
interest in enacting the particular race-based redistricting plan 
under challenge, with all of its twists and turns, but whether it had a 
compelling interest in enacting any race-based redistricting plan. 
Whether the particular plan under challenge takes race into account 
to a greater degree than necessary to further a compelling state 
interest is a question for the "narrowly tailored" prong of the strict 
scrutiny analysis, which examines the "fit" between the compelling 
state interest and the precise means chosen by the state to 
accomplish it. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 280 & n. 6 (opinion of 
Powell, J.); Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 507 (Powell, J., concurring). We 
therefore focus our attention here on the types of state interests that 
might be considered sufficiently "compelling" to justify race-based 
redistricting. The state and its allies have suggested two: 
compliance with the Voting Rights Act and eradicating the effects 
of past and present racial discrimination in North Carolina's 
political processes. We take these in turn.

a. Compliance with the Voting Rights Act

We agree that a state may have a "compelling" interest in 
engaging in race-based redistricting in order to comply with the 
substantive requirements of the Voting Rights Act. The Supreme 
Court has long recognized that a state's interest in eradicating the 
effects of its own past or present racial discrimination is sufficiently 
"compelling" to support its undertaking of race-based remedial
action. See Shaw,___U.S. a t___ , 113 S.Ct. at 2831; Croson, 488
U.S. at 491-93, 509-10 (plurality); id. at 518 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Wygant, 476 
U.S. at 280-82 (plurality); id. at 286 (O'Connor, J., concurring); 
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307 (opinion of Powell, J.). The Court also has 
recognized that this interest extends to remedying past or present 
violations of federal statutes that are designed to eradicate such 
discrimination in particular aspects of life. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 
500 (majority) ("constitutional or statutory violation[s]"); Wygant, 
476 U.S. at 274-75 (plurality) (Title VII); id. at 289 (O'Connor, J., 
concurring) ("violation[s] of federal statutory or constitutional 
requirements"); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307-09 (opinion of Powell, J.) 
("constitutional or statutory violations"). Finally, the Court has 
made clear that a state need not await a judicial finding that it is 
guilty of past or present discrimination before embarking on a



45a
voluntary program of remedial action designed to eradicate that 
discrimination, so long as it has a "strong basis in evidence" for 
concluding that such remedial action is "necessary." Croson, 488 
U.S. at 500 (majority); Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277 (plurality); id. at 
286 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("a firm basis for believing that 
remedial action is required").23 Indeed, the political branches of 
state government have an affirmative constitutional duty to take 
voluntary remedial action in the face of such evidence. See Wygant, 
476 U.S. at 277 (plurality); id. at 291 (O'Connor, J., concurring); 
Croson, 488 U.S. at 519 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

Under these principles, we think it clear that a state has a 
"compelling" interest in engaging in race-based redistricting to give 
effect to minority voting strength whenever it has a "strong basis in 
evidence" for concluding that such action is "necessary" to prevent 
its electoral districting scheme from violating the Voting Rights Act. 
If a state's interest in remedying a violation of the anti- 
discrimination provisions of Title VII is sufficiently "compelling" to 
support its undertaking of race-based affirmative action, see 
Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274-75 (plurality); id. at 289-93 (O'Connor, 
J., concurring), its interest in remedying a violation of the anti- 
discrimination provisions of the Voting Rights Act is even more 
compelling, for Title VII is based only on the commerce power, 
whereas the Voting Rights Act is a direct exercise of Congress' 
broad constitutional power to enforce the provisions of the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Indeed, the Supreme Court 
has recognized consistently that the Voting Rights Act is the single 
most important piece of federal anti-discrimination legislation ever 
passed by Congress — enacted, and then twice extended, with the 
avowed purpose of putting a stop to nearly a century of 
"'unremitting and ingenious defiance' of the commands of the

At one point, Justice Powell suggested that a state has a compelling interest in 
taking race-based remedial action only in the face of "judicial, legislative, or 
administrative findings of constitutional or statutory violations." Bakke, 438 
U.S. at 307 (opinion of Powell, J.) (emphasis added). But he later revised this 
view, concluding that it was sufficient that the state have a "strong basis in 
evidence for [the] conclusion that remedial action [is] necessary." Wygant, 476 
U.S. at 277 (plurality). A majority of the Court adopted this "strong basis in 
evidence test in Croson. See 488 U.S. at 500 (O'Connor, J., joined in relevant 
part by Rehnquist, C.J., and White, Stevens, and Kennedy, JJ.).



46a
Fifteenth Amendment" by the states and '"banishfing] the blight of 
racial discrimination in voting' once and for all." McCain v. 
Lybrand, 465 U.S. 236, 244 (1984) (quoting South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308-09 (1966)).

Nothing in Shaw suggests that a state's interest in 
complying with the Voting Rights Act is not sufficiently 
"compelling" to justify its engaging in race-based redistricting. 
Indeed, the Shaw majority specifically confirms that the states "have 
a very strong interest in complying with [the Voting Rights Act]," at 
least to the extent it is "constitutionally valid as interpreted and as
applied."___U.S. a t ___ , 113 S.Ct. at 2830. We do not believe
any of the provisions of the Voting Rights Act to be constitutionally 
infirm, at least when they are applied in accordance with the 
Supreme Court's established interpretation of them. The Court has 
specifically upheld the § 5 preclearance requirement as a legitimate 
exercise of Congress' power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment, 
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334-35 (1966); see 
City o f  Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 180-82 (1980) 
(finding 1975 extension of § 5 constitutional on same ground), and 
it has rejected a claim that the "effect" prong of § 5 exceeds 
Congress' power under the Fifteenth Amendment because it reaches 
conduct which may not itself have violated the Fifteenth 
Amendment. Id. at 185-87. The constitutionality of the "purpose" 
prongs of § 5 and § 2 cannot be doubted, since they merely 
reiterate the substantive standards imposed upon the states by the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments themselves. See Chisom v.
Roem er,___U.S. , ___ ,111 S.Ct. 2354, 2362 (1991). And we
think it clear that the "results" prong of amended § 2, as interpreted 
in Thornburg v. Gingles, is constitutional under the test set forth in 
South Carolina v. Katzenbach and City o f  Rome. See 446 U.S. at 
177 ("under section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, Congress may 
prohibit practices that in and of themselves do not violate § 1 of the 
Amendment, so long as the prohibitions attacking racial 
discrimination in voting are 'appropriate,' as that term is defined in 
McCulloch v. Maryland and Ex parte Virginia")-, see also Croson, 
488 U.S. at 490 (opinion of O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., 
and White, J) ("Congress ... has a specific constitutional mandate to 
enforce the dictates of the Fourteenth Amendment," which "may at 
times also include the power to define situations which Congress



47a
determines threaten principles of equality and to adopt prophylactic 
rules to deal with those situations") (emphasis in original).24 We 
therefore hold that a state necessarily has a "compelling" interest in 
engaging in race-based redistricting to whenever it has a firm basis 
for concluding that such action is necessary to bring its electoral 
districting scheme into compliance with the Voting Rights Act. 
Accord Hays I, 839 F. Supp. at 1217 (Walter, J., concurring).

As in other affirmative action contexts, a state need not 
await a judicial finding that its existing districting scheme (or a 
proposed revision thereof) actually violates the Voting Rights Act 
before it enacts a race-based redistricting plan designed to give 
effect to minority voting strength, so long as it has a "strong basis in 
evidence" for concluding that such action is "necessary" to avoid a 
violation of the Act. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 500 (majority); 
Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277 (plurality); id. at 286 (O'Connor, J., 
concurring). Nor must the state legislature make an explicit finding 
that the state's existing districting plan (or a proposed revision 
thereof) violates the Act before it draws one that deliberately gives 
greater effect to minority voting strength. See id. at 277-78 
(plurality); id. at 289-90 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Such a 
specific contemporaneous finding of discrimination is of course 
useful to a court, because it provides "a means by which it can be 
made absolutely certain that the governmental actor truly is 
attempting to remedy its own unlawful conduct when it adopts an 
affirmative action plan, rather than attempting to alleviate the

24 We recognize that the constitutionality of amended § 2 technically remains 
an open one, notwithstanding the magnitude of all that has been done under the 
authority of Gingles. See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 418 (1991) 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (writing separately solely to reserve this issue);
DeGrandy, ___U.S. a t ___ , 62 U.S.L.W. at 4764 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) (again reserving this point); see also Shaw,
___U.S. a t___ , 113 S.Ct. at 2831 (reserving question that "if § 2 did require
adoption of North Carolina's revised plan, § 2 is to that extent unconstitutional). 
But we believe that once legislation of such magnitude and consequential 
importance has been fully analyzed, interpreted, and applied by the Supreme
Court, as amended § 2 has been in Gingles, Voinovich v. Quilter,___U.S.
113 S.Ct. 1149 (1993), Growe v. Edmison,___U .S.___ , 113 S.Ct. 1075 (1993),
and DeGrandy, its constitutionality must be assumed by lower federal courts 
(and all other branches of state and federal government), even though the Court 
has never expressly confirmed it.



48a
wrongs suffered through general societal discrimination." Id. at 
289. But it is not essential; all that is required is evidence that the 
legislature "act[ed] on the basis of information which g[ave] [it] a 
sufficient basis for concluding that [such] remedial action [was] 
necessary." Id. at291.25 As Justice O'Connor has explained, a mle 
that a state actor must make an explicit finding that it is guilty of 
illegal discrimination before it can take voluntary steps to remedy 
that discrimination "would severely undermine [the state's] incentive 
to meet voluntarily [its] civil rights obligations," which would 
"clearly be at odds with [the] Court's and Congress' consistent 
emphasis on the value o f ... voluntary compliance" with the federal 
discrimination laws. Id. at 290 (internal citations omitted).

A state has a "strong basis in evidence" for concluding that 
it must engage in race-based redistricting in order to comply with 
the Voting Rights Act when it has information sufficient to support 
a prima facie showing that its failure to do so would violate the Act. 
See Croson, 488 U.S. at 500 (majority) (evidence "approaching a 
prima facie case of a constitutional or statutory violation"); Wygant, 
476 U.S. at 292 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("demonstrable evidence 
. . . .  sufficient to support a prima facie Title V I I . .  . claim by [the] 
minority"); see also Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 
616, 650-52 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(evidence sufficient for a "Title VII prima facie case" by the 
relevant minority).26 There are at least two situations in which this

25 Though Croson requires a state or local governmental actor to "identify" 
specific instances of past or present discrimination "with some specificity" 
before undertaking race-based remedial action, 488 U.S. at 504 (majority), it 
does not alter the Wygant rule that the governmental actor is not required to 
make a formal finding of such discrimination on the record before doing so. See 
id. at 500 (majority) (sufficient if state actor has '"a strong basis in evidence for 
its conclusion that remedial action was necessary'") (quoting Wygant, 476 U.S. at 
277 (plurality)). Instead, Croson holds only that the governmental actor must be 
able to demonstrate that it was attempting to remedy specific instances of past or 
present discrimination within its own jurisdiction, as opposed to general 
"societal discrimination." See id. at 504-05 (majority).

2S This does not mean, of course, that a state attempting to defend a race-based 
redistricting plan designed to comply with the Voting Rights Act must prove that
its existing plan (or a proposed revision thereof) actually violates the Act in 
order to meet its burden of justification at the strict scrutiny stage; nor does it 
mean that the court must make such a finding in order to uphold the plan under



might be the case, both of which are suggested by the state and its 
allies here.

The first is when the state has before it information 
sufficient to support a prima facie § 2 challenge to the existing 
districting plan by members of the relevant minority group. To 
make out a prima facie § 2 challenge to a single-member districting 
scheme, members of a protected racial minority must show three 
things: (i) that their population is "sufficiently large and 
geographically compact to constitute a majority" in more single­
member districts than the number in which they have a majority 
under the challenged scheme; (ii) that they are "politically cohesive," 
and (iii) that "the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to 
enable it ... usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate" in 
districts that are not majority-minority. See Growe v. Emison, _
U .S .___, ___, 113 S.Ct. 1075, 1084 (1993) (internal quotations
omitted); Voinovich v. Ouilter,___U .S .___ , ___, 113 S.Ct. 1149,
1157 (1993).27 When a state legislature has before it information

49a

strict scrutiny. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 292 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (a 
reverse-discrimination challenge to a state's voluntary affirmative action plan 
"does not automatically impose upon the [state] the burden of convincing the 
court of its liability for prior unlawful discrimination; nor does it mean that the 
court must make an actual finding of prior discrimination based upon the [state's] 
proof before [its] affirmative action plan will be upheld"); Johnson, 480 U.S. at 
652-53 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (same). Such a rule would 
impose an unfair burden of omniscience upon the state, which is "trapped 
between the competing hazards of liability to minorities if affirmative action is 
not taken to remedy apparent ... discrimination [in its electoral districting 
scheme] and liability to nonminorities if affirmative action is taken." Wygant, 
476 U.S. at 291 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Instead, the court need only find that 
the state enacted the race-based redistricting plan based on information which 
gave it "a strong basis in evidence for ... concluding] that [such] remedial action 
was necessary" to comply with the Voting Rights Act. Id. at 277 (plurality); id. 
at 292-93 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

27 DeGrandy does not alter this settled understanding of the nature of a prima 
facie case under § 2. The Court there made explicit the notion, already implicit 
in its earlier § 2 cases, that while proof of the three Gingles conditions is 
necessary to establish a § 2 violation, it is not necessarily sufficient, "either in 
the sense that a court's examination of relevant circumstances [is] complete once 
the three factors [are] found to exist, or in the sense that the three in combination
necessarily and in all circumstances demonstrate[ ] dilution." _ _  U.S. a t ___,
62 U.S.L.W. at 4759. Instead, proof that the three Gingles conditions exist with 
respect to a particular plan will support a finding that the plan violates § 2 only



50a
sufficient to permit it to conclude that the relevant minority group 
could make out such a prima facie § 2 challenge to the existing 
plan, then it has a "strong basis in evidence" for concluding that it 
needs to engage in race-based redistricting to comply with § 2, and 
it has necessarily established a compelling interest in doing so. 28 
See Hays I, 839 F. Supp. at 1217 (Walter, J., concurring); see also 
Croson, 488 U.S. at 500 (majority) (evidence "approaching a prima 
facie case of a constitutional or statutory violation"); Wygant, 476 
U.S. at 292 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (evidence "sufficient to 
support a prima facie Title VII ... claim by [the] minority"); 
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 650-52 (1987) 
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (evidence sufficient for a 
"Title VII prima facie case" by the relevant minority).29

if  the court further finds, after considering all other factors that "arguably bear[ ] 
on the issue of equal political opportunity," that the circumstances in totality 
show that the plan would deny minority voters an equal opportunity "to 
participate in the electoral process and to elect representatives of their choice."
Id. a t ___, 62 U.S.L.W. at 4759-60. The Court's holding that proof of the three
Gingles conditions does not necessarily compel a finding of a § 2 violation, 
however, cannot fairly be read to alter the settled understanding that such proof 
is sufficient to make out a prima facie case under § 2. Cf. St. Mary's Honor
Center v. Hicks, ___U.S. ____, 113 S.Ct. 2742 (1993) (proof of McDonnell
Douglas factors, though sufficient to make out a prima facie case of 
discrimination under Title VH, will not necessarily suffice to prove a Title VII 
violation, even if unrebutted).

28 That is, unless the existing plan already creates majority-minority districts in 
substantial proportion to the minority's share of voting-age population. In such a 
case, a state will not have a "strong basis in evidence" for concluding that further 
race-based remedial action is necessary to bring its electoral scheme into 
compliance with § 2, unless it has some compelling evidence that the existing 
plan's lines, though appearing to confer political and electoral power upon the 
minority in rough proportion to its share of the relevant population, nonetheless 
deny the minority an equal opportunity to participate in the electoral process and
to elect representatives of its choice. Cf. DeGrandy,__U.S. at _ ,  62 U.S.L.W.
at 4760-62 (in a § 2 challenge to a single-member districting plan, a showing 
that the plan "[creates] majority-minority districts in substantial proportion to the 
minority's share of voting-age population" should make a court reluctant to 
conclude that it denies minority voters equal opportunity to participate in the 
political process and to elect representatives of their choice, hence violates § 2).

29 If the Justice Department has denied preclearance to an earlier plan on the 
ground that it was in "clear violation" of § 2, as its § 5 regulations permit it to 
do, see 28 C.F.R. § 51.55(bX2), this fact, standing alone, would probably be 
sufficient to give the state a "substantial basis in evidence" for concluding that it



51a
The second, which is a possibility only in jurisdictions 

subject to the preclearance requirements of § 5, is that a plan 
previously proposed by the state for the same round of redistricting 
has been denied preclearance on the ground that it fails to give 
sufficient effect to minority voting strength to satisfy § 5. Section 5 
forbids a covered jurisdiction to put a redistricting plan into effect 
unless it proves, to the satisfaction of either the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia or its surrogate, the 
United States Department of Justice, that the proposed plan had 
neither the "purpose ... [nor] the effect of denying or abridging the 
right to vote on account of race or color." 42 U.S.C. § 1973c; see 
Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 531-35 (1973); McDaniel 
v. Sanchez, 452 U.S. 130, 137 (1981). The Supreme Court has 
consistently held that the § 5 standard has two prongs, a “purpose" 
prong and an "effect" prong, and that a plan cannot be precleared 
unless it satisfies both of them. McCain v. Lybrand, 465 U.S. 236, 
247 (1984); City o f  Lockhart v. United States, 460 U.S. 125, 130 
& n. 4 (1983); City o f  Port Arthur v. United States, 459 U.S. 159, 
168 (1982); City o f  Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 172 
(1980); Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 136 n. 7, 141 (1976); 
City o f  Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 372-73 (1975). 
As currently interpreted by the Supreme Court, the "effect" prong of 
§ 5 is relatively toothless, being satisfied -- at least in the context of 
legislative reapportionment — simply by proof that the proposed 
plan will not "lead to a retrogression in the position of racial 
minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral 
franchise." Beer, 425 U.S. at 141.30 The "purpose" prong, by

needed to engage in race-based redistricting in order to avoid a violation of § 2. 
See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 305 (opinion of Powell, J.) (§ 5 objection by Justice 
Department is properly viewed as "an administrative finding of discrimination," 
which is sufficient to give the state a compelling interest in taking race-based 
remedial action). But that issue is not presented in this case, since the Justice 
Department's denial of preclearance was not based on the ground that the 
proposed plan was in clear violation of § 2, but on the ground that the state had 
failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that the plan did not violate the 
"purpose" prong of § 5 itself. Accordingly, we need not address plaintiff- 
intervenors' argument that the Justice Department has exceeded its authority 
under § 5 by incorporating the § 2 "results" standard into the § 5 preclearance 
analysis.

30 The Justice Department has argued elsewhere that Congress intended the 
1982 amendments to § 2 to alter Beer’s interpretation of the "effect" prong of §



52a
contrast, requires a showing that the proposed plan was not 
designed to dilute minority voting strength in the sense forbidden by 
the Constitution. City o f Port Arthur, 459 U.S. at 168; City o f  
Richmond, 422 U.S. at 372, 378-79.* 31 The Supreme Court has 
previously upheld the denial of preclearance to redistricting plans 
which, though non-retrogressive, have not been shown to be free 
from such a racially discriminatory purpose. See, e.g., Busbee v. 
Smith, 549 F. Supp. 494, 516 (D.D.C. 1982) (three-judge court), 
affd, 459 U.S. 1166 (1983); see also City o f  Richmond, 422 U.S. 
at 372, 378-79.32

5. The Supreme Court has specifically reserved this question, City o f Lockhart, 
460 U.S. at 133 n.9, and we do not reach it here.

31 The "purpose" prong of § 5 thus essentially duplicates the constitutional vote 
dilution standard, except that it shifts the burden of proof with respect to the 
constitutionality of a proposed redistricting plan from affected minority groups to 
the covered jurisdiction. See Beer, 425 U.S. at 147-48 (Marshall, J., dissenting); 
Days, Section 5 and the Role of the Justice Department, in Controversies in 
Minority Voting: The Voting Rights Act in Perspective (ed. B. Grofman and C. 
Davidson, 1993), at 53.

32 As did the three-judge court in Hays I, see 839 F. Supp. at 1207 (majority); id. 
at 1218 (Walter, J., concurring), plaintiffs and their supporting intervenors read 
Beer as holding that the § 5 standard is necessarily satisfied so long as the 
proposed plan is not "retrogressive." With all respect, this is simply incorrect. 
Beer held only that the "effect" prong of § 5 is satisfied by proof that a proposed 
plan does not have a retrogressive effect; it did not purport to define the meaning 
of the "purpose" prong. Indeed, the Beer Court specifically stated that even a 
nonretrogressive redistricting plan would fail to satisfy § 5 if it "so discriminates 
on the basis of race or color as to violate the Constitution." Beer, 425 U.S. at
141; see also id. at 142 n. 14. The discussion of § 5 in Shaw,___U.S. a t___ ,
113 S.Ct. at 2830-31, does not cast doubt on this settled understanding of the 
two-pronged nature of the § 5 standard. Though the Court indicates that a state 
would have a firm basis for concluding that § 5 required it to give greater effect 
to minority voting strength if it had evidence that its proposed plan would have a
"retrogressive" effect on the position of minority voters, id. a t ___, 113 S.Ct. at
2830, the Court does not say this is the only basis on which a state might 
properly conclude that further race-based remedial action was necessary to 
comply with § 5.

The interpretation of § 5 suggested by plaintiffs, which would allow 
jurisdictions whose existing districting schemes were already unconstitutionally 
diluting minority voting strength to obtain preclearance of plans that deliberately 
perpetuated that constitutional wrong, so long as they did not make it worse, 
would undermine the central purpose of § 5, which was to break the cycle of



53a
When an earlier version of a state's redistricting plan is 

denied preclearance by the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia on the ground that it fails to satisfy either the 
"purpose" or "effect" prong of the § 5 test, the state obviously has a 
"strong basis in evidence" for concluding that the Voting Rights Act 
requires it to engage in race-based redistricting in order to remedy 
that problem. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307 (opinion of Powell, J.) 
(judicial finding of statutory violation sufficient to give state a 
compelling interest in taking race-based remedial action). The same 
is normally true when preclearance is denied by the Justice 
Department, which Congress has authorized to serve as a surrogate 
for the District Court in reviewing § 5 submissions. See id. at 305 
(opinion of Powell, J.) (§ 5 objection by Justice Department is 
properly viewed as "an administrative finding of discrimination," 
which is sufficient to give the state a compelling interest in taking 
race-based remedial action). Contrary to plaintiffs' suggestion, the 
Equal Protection Clause does not require a state to challenge a 
Justice Department denial of preclearance in the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia, and lose, before it may 
safely conclude that it has a compelling interest in adopting a new 
plan to address the concerns upon which the Department's denial of 
preclearance was based. Such a rule would indicate disrespect for 
the judgment of the Attorney General, who has been authorized by 
Congress to serve as a surrogate for the District Court in reviewing 
§ 5 submissions. It would also be inconsistent with the general 
federal policy of encouraging the states to comply voluntarily with 
their obligations under the federal civil rights laws. See Wygant, 
476 U.S. at 29091 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Finally, it would 
encourage needless litigation, which would undermine the central 
purpose of the § 5 preclearance requirement: to prevent 
jurisdictions whose electoral systems have been infected with 
official racial discrimination in the recent past 33 from avoiding

"unremitting and ingenious defiance" of the constitutional guarantees of 
nondiscrimination in voting by covered states. See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 309.

33 Coverage under § 5 is tantamount to a congressional finding that the 
jurisdiction in question has committed identified violations of the Fifteenth 
Amendment in the relatively recent past, see McCain v. Lybrand, 465 U.S. at 
244-45; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 302 n. 41 (opinion of Powell, J.), which could 
conceivably be regarded as sufficient, in and of itself, to give that jurisdiction a 
"strong basis in evidence" for thinking that it must engage in race-based



54a
their constitutional duty to remedy the effects of that discrimination 
by engaging in protracted litigation over the nature of that 
obligation. See McCain, 465 U.S. at 244-46; see also South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 335. Instead, we believe that 
a state has a "strong basis in evidence" for concluding that it must 
engage in race-based redistricting to comply with § 5 whenever the 
Justice Department has refused to preclear a plan it has proposed 
for the same round of redistricting on the ground that it fails to 
satisfy the § 5 standard, and the state reasonably concludes, after 
conducting its own independent reassessment of the rejected plan in 
light of the concerns identified by the Justice Department, that the 
Justice Department's conclusion is legally and factually 
supportable.34

redistricting to avoid a violation of the Voting Rights Act, leaving only the 
question whether the particular race-based plan it enacts is "narrowly tailored" to 
further that interest. See id. at 307 (legislative finding of identified past 
discrimination sufficient to trigger compelling interest in taking race-based 
remedial action). Compare Croson, 488 U.S. at 504 (majority) (general 
congressional finding that there had been past discrimination in the nation's 
construction industry as a whole was not sufficiently "specific” or 
"particularized" to give city a strong basis for believing that race-based remedial 
action was required to remedy the effects of that discrimination within its own 
jurisdiction). But we need not decide here whether § 5 coverage, standing 
alone, is sufficient to give a state a "strong basis in evidence" for concluding that 
it must engage in race-based redistricting to comply with the Voting Rights Act, 
for in this case, the state’s conclusion that it had to engage in race-based 
redistricting to comply with § 5 was based not merely on the fact that it was 
subject to § 5, but on an explicit finding by the Justice Department that its 
proposed plan did not satisfy § 5.

34 This is not to say, of course, that a state which has submitted a proposed 
redistricting plan to the Justice Department for administrative preclearance, and 
been denied it, may not challenge the Department's denial of preclearance in the 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia, if  it believes it to be 
unfounded, before enacting a race-based alternative plan. It is only to say that a 
state may properly regard the Justice Department's denial of preclearance as an 
"administrative finding" that its proposed plan violates the anti-discrimination 
provisions of the Voting Rights Act, which is sufficient — unless clearly legally 
and factually unsupportable — to justify its adoption of a race-based alternative 
plan designed to remedy that violation. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 305-07 (opinion 
of Powell, J.).



55a
b. Eradicating Effects of Past or Present Discrimination In North 

Carolina's Political Processes

The state and its allies also argue that a state may have a 
"compelling" interest in engaging in race-based redistricting to 
eradicate the effects of past or present racial discrimination in its 
political processes, even when it has no basis for believing that the 
Voting Rights Act requires it to do so. We agree.

The Supreme Court has recognized repeatedly that a state 
has a compelling interest in taking race-based affirmative action 
where it has a firm basis for concluding that such action is 
necessary to eradicate the effects of past or present racial 
discrimination within its own jurisdiction, even when it has no 
federal statutory mandate to do so. See, e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 
491-93 (opinion of O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and 
White, J.); id. at 509 (plurality); id. at 518 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring); Wygant, 476 U.S. at 280-82 (plurality); id. at 286 
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Of course, generalized evidence that 
past "societal discrimination" has continuing effects within the state 
is not sufficient to trigger this compelling interest. See Croson, 488 
U.S. at 504-06 (majority); Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276 (plurality) 
("Societal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis 
for imposing a racially classified remedy"); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 308- 
09 (Powell, J., concurring). Instead, the state must demonstrate that 
it had a "strong basis in evidence" for believing that race-based 
remedial action was "necessary" to remedy specific instances of 
racial discrimination, either public or private, within its own 
jurisdiction. Croson, 488 U.S. at 500-06 (majority); see id. at 518 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). While the state must "identify that 
discrimination, public or private, with some particularity" before it 
may take race-based remedial action, id. at 504, it need not make an 
explicit finding of discrimination on the record, so long as it can 
demonstrate that it acted on the basis of evidence that would have 
permitted it to do so. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 289-91 (O'Connor, 
J., concurring).

Under these principles, we think it clear that a state may 
have a compelling interest in engaging in race-based redistricting to 
give effect to minority voting strength, even when it has no reason to



56a
believe that the Voting Rights Act requires it to do so, where it has 
a substantial basis in evidence for concluding that such action is 
necessary to eradicate the effects of identified past or present racial 
discrimination in its own political processes.35 Accord Hays I, 839 
F.Supp. at 1215 (Walter, J., concurring). As a practical matter, a 
state defending a race-based redistricting plan against a Shaw-like 
challenge will seldom need to rely very heavily on this particular 
justification, for the evidence required to establish the existence of 
this compelling interest will normally be sufficient to demonstrate 
that the State had a firm basis for believing that race-based 
redistricting was required to avoid a potential § 2 violation, and 
thus that it had a compelling interest in taking such action to comply 
with the Voting Rights Act. But there may be cases in which a state 
will have a compelling interest in engaging in race-based 
redistricting to remedy identified instances of discrimination in its 
own political processes, even when it has no firm basis for 
concluding that § 2 requires it to do so: for example, when it has a 
history of official racial discrimination in its electoral system, which 
has resulted in the virtual exclusion of members of a particular 
racial minority from participation in its political processes, but it 
knows that the creation of majority-minority districts is not required 
by the "effects" prong of § 5, because it has never had such districts 
before, and that the relevant minority group cannot show that § 2

35 The Shaw majority recognized the possibility that a State might have a 
compelling interest in engaging in race-based redistricting to eradicate the 
effects of past discrimination in its electoral processes that was "entirely distinct
from the Voting Rights Act." ___U.S. a t___ , 113 S.Ct. at 2931-32. It is true
that the Court remarked that "only three Justices in UJO were prepared to say 
that States have a significant interest in minimizing the consequences of racial 
bloc voting apart from the requirements of the Voting Rights Act," and that those 
three Justices "specifically concluded" that race-based redistricting could be 
justified on this ground "only when the State *employ[s] sound districting
principles.*" Id. a t ___, 113 S.Ct. at 2832 (citing UJO, 430 U.S. at 167-68
(White, J., joined by Stevens and Rehnquist, JJ.)). But we do not read this 
statement as implying that a state cannot have a compelling interest in engaging 
in race-based redistricting to remedy the effects of identified instances of past or 
prevent discrimination in its own political processes unless it has reason to 
believe that the Voting Rights Act requires it to do so. Instead, we think the 
Court meant only that a race-based redistricting plan adopted to further this 
interest, like any other type of redistricting plan, must be based on rational 
districting principles that ensure that all citizens covered by it receive fair and 
effective representation. See infra at 87-88 & n.44.



57a
requires the creation of any majority-minority districts, because it is 
too widely dispersed to constitute a majority in a single-member 
district that is "geographically compact" under Gingles. For that 
reason, we think it important to recognize this as an independent 
compelling interest that may justify race-based redistricting.

3. Narrowly Tailored

We turn, finally, to the question of how to determine 
whether a particular race-based redistricting plan, if supported by a 
compelling state interest, is "narrowly tailored" to the achievement 
of that interest. Shaw itself has very little to say about this aspect 
of the strict scrutiny analysis, except to indicate that a plan which 
deliberately creates majority-minority districts in order to comply 
with the Voting Rights Act would not be "narrowly tailored" to that 
goal if it "went beyond what was reasonably necessary to avoid" a
violation of the Act. ___U.S. a t ____, 113 S.Ct. at 2831. We
therefore seek guidance in the Court's decisions applying the 
narrowly tailored" standard to other types of race-based remedial 

measures.

In other contexts, the Supreme Court has looked to five 
basic factors to decide whether a race-based affirmative action 
program is "narrowly tailored" to further a compelling state interest 
in remedying identified discrimination: (i) the efficacy of alternative 
remedies; (ii) whether the program imposes a rigid racial "quota" or 
just a flexible racial "goal"; (iii) the planned duration of the 
program; (iv) the relationship between the program's goal for 
minority representation in the pool of individuals ultimately selected 
to receive the benefit in question and the percentage of minorities in 
the relevant pool of eligible candidates; and (v) the impact of the 
program on the rights of innocent third parties. See United States 
v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171-85 (1987) (plurality); id. at 186-89 
(Powell, J., concurring); Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 
421, 485-89 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment); see also Croson, 488 U.S. at 507-08 (majority); 
Wygant, 476 U.S. at 279-84 (plurality); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 
US. 448, 510-15 (1980) (opinion of Powell, J.) (applying same 
strict scrutiny analysis to affirmative action plan adopted by



58a
Congress).36 Though these factors were developed in the context of 
affirmative action programs in public employment and government 
contracting, we think they can be transposed fairly easily to the 
context of race-based redistricting. See Hays 1, 839 F. Supp. at 
1206-09 (majority) (looking to same five factors in deciding 
whether a race-based redistricting plan is "narrowly tailored" under 
Shaw)\ id. at 1215 (Walter, J., concurring) (same).

The first factor requires the court to decide whether the 
state could have accomplished its compelling purpose just as well 
by some alternative means that was either completely race-neutral 
or made less extensive use of racial classifications. See Wygant 
476 U.S. at 280 n. 6 (plurality) ('"whether a nonracial approach or 
a more narrowly-tailored racial classification could promote the 
[compelling] interest about as well and at tolerable administrative 
expense'"); Croson, 488 U.S. at 507 (majority); see also Sheet 
Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 486-87 (Powell, J., concurring); 
Paradise, 480 U.S. at 171-77 (plurality); id. at 188 (Powell, J., 
concurring); id. at 199-201 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). A state that 
has a compelling interest in engaging in race-based redistricting to 
comply with the Voting Rights Act obviously has no completely

36 Applying these factors, the Court has held that three race-based affirmative 
action programs were sufficiently "narrowly tailored" to pass constitutional 
muster, see Paradise, 480 U.S. at 171-86 (plurality); id. at 187-89 (Powell, J., 
concurring); Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 479-81 (plurality); id. at 485-89 
(Powell, J., concurring); Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 480-92 (opinion of Burger, J.); id. 
at 510-15 (Powell, J., concurring); and that two others were not, one because it 
imposed a rigid racial quota and was adopted without consideration of race- 
neutral alternatives, see Croson, 488 U.S. at 507-08 (majority), and the other 
because it unduly burdened third-party interests, see Wygant, 476 U.S. at 279-84 
(plurality); id. at 293-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

Paradise and Sheet Metal Workers involved Equal protection 
challenges to affirmative actions plans that were judicially-imposed; Wygant and 
Fullilove challenges to ones that were voluntarily-adopted. But the distinction is 
of no consequence at this stage of the analysis, for the Court has applied the 
same "narrowly tailored" analysis — derived essentially from Justice Powell's 
plurality opinion in Wygant and his earlier concurrence in Fullilove — to both 
types of plans. Compare Paradise, 480 U.S. at 171-85 (plurality); id. at 186-89 
(Powell, J., concurring); and Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 479-81 
(plurality); id. at 485-89 (Powell, J., concurring) with Wygant, 476 U.S. at 279- 
84 (plurality); and Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 510-15 (Powell, J., concurring).



59a
race-neutral alternative means of accomplishing that end.37 
Compare Croson, 488 U.S. at 510 (plurality). In such a case, the 
primary inquiry with respect to this factor will therefore be whether 
the state could have complied with the Act by enacting a 
redistricting plan which, though race-based, made less extensive use 
of racial classifications than the one it chose. 38 Because the "racial 
classification" at issue here is the use of race to assign voters to 
districts, we agree with the three-judge court in Hays I  that inquiry 
here is properly confined to two questions: whether the plan creates 
more majority-minority districts than is reasonably necessary to 
comply with the Act, and whether the majority-minority districts it 
creates contain substantially larger concentrations of minority 
voters than is reasonably necessary to give minority voters a 
realistic opportunity to elect representatives of their choice in those 
districts. See Hays I, 839 F. Supp. at 1206-08 (majority); id. at 
1218 (Walter, J., concurring).39

37 This does not mean that any race-based redistricting plan adopted to comply 
with the Voting Rights Act necessarily fails constitutional scrutiny for want of 
proper consideration of race-neutral alternative means of remedying the 
discrimination in question. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 507 (majority). Congress 
itself carefully considered and rejected race-neutral alternatives for remedying 
discrimination in the states' electoral processes when it enacted, and then twice 
extended, the provisions of the Voting Rights Act that require the states to 
consider race in redistricting. See UJO, 430 U.S. at 175-76 (Brennan, J., 
concurring in part) ("[T]he history of the Voting Rights Act provides reassurance 
that ... the congressional decision to authorize the use of race-oriented remedies 
in this context was the product of substantial and careful deliberations ... [and] 
represents an unequivocal and well-defined congressional consensus on the 
national need for 'sterner and more elaborate measures' to secure the promise of 
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments with respect to the exercise of the 
franchise''); see also McCain v. Lybrand, 465 U.S. 236, 243A8 (1984); City o f  
Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 172-78, 180-83 (1980); South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308-09 (1966).

38 The same cannot necessarily be said for a state that engages in race-based 
redistricting not to further a compelling interest in complying with the Voting 
Rights Act, but to further an independent interest in eradicating the effects of 
past or present racial discrimination in its political processes. See supra at 69- 
72.

39 The race-based redistricting plan at issue in Hays I  was found to be not 
"narrowly tailored" to the state's asserted interest in complying with the Voting 
Rights Act chiefly because it "packed" minority voters into majority-minority 
districts in percentages "well in excess" of those reasonably necessary to give



60a
The second factor requires a court to determine whether the 

challenged plan imposes a "strict racial quota" designed "to achieve 
and maintain racial balance," or simply a "flexible goal" to be used 
as a "benchmark" for gauging the success of the state's efforts to 
eliminate the particular discrimination in question. Sheet Metal 
Workers, 478 U.S. at 477-78 (plurality); see id. at 487-88 & n. 4 
(Powell, J., concurring). As Justice O'Connor has explained 
repeatedly, a rigid racial quota is constitutionally impermissible, 
even to further a compelling interest in remedying identified 
discrimination, because it rests upon the "'completely unrealistic' 
assumption" that members of various racial groups would be 
represented in particular positions "in lockstep proportion to their 
proportion in the [general] population," were it not for unlawful 
discrimination. Croson, 488 U.S. at 507 (majority); see Paradise, 
480 U.S. at 197 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). But race-based 
redistricting plans will seldom be invalid on this ground, for they do 
not impose the sort of "rigid racial quota" that the Court has 
previously found constitutionally infirm. Unlike the racial set-aside 
provisions invalidated in Bakke and Croson, a redistricting plan 
which creates a certain number of electoral districts in which 
members of a racial minority constitute a majority of the voting age 
population (or even of registered voters) does not guarantee 
members of that race a fixed percentage of the benefit ultimately at 
stake (here, membership in the relevant legislative body), for it does 
not prevent nonminority candidates for running for office in such 
districts, nor does it guarantee that they will not be elected from
them.40 See DeGrandy, ___U.S. a t ____, 62 U.S.L.W. at 4764
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
("The assumption that majority-minority districts elect only 
minority representatives ... is false as an empirical matter"). While 
such a plan guarantees the minority a fair opportunity to elect a 
certain number of representatives of their choice, that number 
cannot fairly be termed a "quota," since there is no guarantee that it 
will be achieved; instead, can only be viewed as a flexible "goal" for

them a fair opportunity to elect candidates of their choice in those districts. See 
839 F. Supp. at 1207-08 (majority); id. at 1218 (Walter, J., concurring).

40 The North Carolina General Assembly, for example, has three white 
members elected from majority-minority districts created by the Gingles 
redistricting. See infra at 145.



61a
minority representation in the relevant legislative body. See Sheet 
Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 487-88 & n. 4 (Powell, J., concurring). 
Compare Ravitch v. City o f  New York, 1992 WL 196735 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 1992), at * 7 (provision in city charter requiring 
racial minorities to be represented on appointed city commission in 
direct proportion to their percentage in the city's population as a 
whole was not "narrowly tailored" to city's compelling interest in 
remedying past discrimination, because it imposed a "rigid" racial 
quota).

The third factor asks whether the challenged affirmative 
action plan is a temporary measure with some built-in mechanism to 
prevent it from lasting longer than is reasonably necessary to 
eliminate the effects of the particular discrimination it is designed to 
redress. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 513 (Powell, J., concurring) (a 
"temporary" measure that "will not last longer than the 
discriminatory effects it is designed to eliminate"); Sheet Metal 
Workers, 478 U.S. at 479 (plurality) (a "temporary tool for 
remedying [identified] discrimination" that "will end as soon as ... it 
is no longer needed to remedy [that] discrimination"); id. at 487 
(Powell, J., concurring) ("of limited duration"); Paradise, 480 U.S. 
at 178 ("temporary in application," with a term "contingent upon the 
[state's] own conduct"); see also Croson, 488 U.S. at 498 
(plurality) (not "timeless in its ability to affect the future"). A race- 
based redistricting plan governing elections to the United States 
Congress or a state legislature will almost always satisfy this 
requirement: such plans are inherently temporary in nature, because 
the states are, as a practical matter, required to redraw them after 
each decennial census, in order to even out irregularities in district 
population caused by intervening demographic changes. See 
Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 731 (1983) (congressional 
districting); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973) (districting for 
state legislature). When the state legislature undertakes this 
redistricting process after each census, it will of course be forced, 
by considerations of suits like this one, to re-evaluate the continued 
need for race-based redistricting in light of the electoral experiences 
under the prior plan. Compare Ravitch, supra, at * 7 (provision in 
city charter that required appointments to city commission to be 
made on basis of race was not "narrowly tailored" to its compelling 
purpose in remedying past discrimination, because it "made no



provision whatsoever for its termination" but was of "indefinite" 
duration) 41

The fourth factor asks whether there is a reasonable 
relationship between the challenged plan's goal for minority 
representation in the pool of individuals ultimately selected to 
receive the benefit in question (be it a government contract, a place 
in a medical school class, or a job) and the percentage of minorities 
in the relevant pool of eligible candidates. See Paradise, 480 U.S. 
at 187 (Powell, J., concurring) (such a goal must be directly related 
to "the percentage of minority group members in the relevant 
population or work force"); id. at 198-99 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) 
("of vital importance" that such a goal "not substantially exceed the 
percentage of [eligible] minority group members in the relevant 
population or work force"). In the redistricting context, we think 
this factor is satisfied so long as the percentage of majority-minority 
districts created by the plan — which, as indicated earlier, is best 
seen as a flexible goal for minority representation in the pool of 
individuals selected to receive the ultimate benefit of membership in 
the relevant legislative body -- does not substantially exceed the

62a

41 Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, which serves as the impetus for most 
race-based redistricting, is itself a temporary remedy, both generally and in its 
application to particular jurisdictions. The Voting Rights Act provides that § 5 
will expire of its own accord in 2007, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(aX7) (Supp. 1994), 
and specifically requires Congress to reconsider it in 1997, id. § 1973b(aX8). 
And the Act's "bailout" provisions ensure that no jurisdiction will labor under § 
5's mandate for any longer than reasonably necessary to eliminate the effects of 
the particular discrimination which it is designed to eradicate. See id. § 
1973b(aXl) (authorizing any jurisdiction subject to § 5 coverage to escape from 
that coverage by persuading the District Court for the District of Columbia that it 
has been free from the sort of discrimination that triggered its § 5 coverage for a 
certain number of years).

Though amended § 2 has no expiration date, it too has a built-in 
mechanism which ensures that its race-based remedies will not be available any 
longer than is reasonably necessary to eliminate the effects of the particular 
discrimination which they are designed to redress. That mechanism is § 2's 
substantive requirement that the relevant minority prove the continued existence 
of racial bloc voting in order to obtain race-based relief under it. In application, 
this requirement means that § 2 can be used to compel race-based remedial 
redistricting only so long as its elections continue to be characterized by 
significant racial bloc voting — the most lasting effect of the official 
discrimination which § 2 is designed to remedy.



63a
percentage of minority voters in the jurisdiction as a whole. C f
DeGrandy, ___ U.S. at ___, 62 U.S.L.W. at 4760 & n. 11
(endorsing this notion of "proportionality" between the number of 
majority-minority voting districts and the number of minorities in 
the relevant population group as a rough proxy for the equality of 
political and electoral opportunity that the Voting Rights Act
guarantees); id. at ___, 62 U.S.L.W. at 4763 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (same).

The fifth and final factor asks whether the challenged plan 
"impose[s] an unacceptable burden on innocent third parties." 
Paradise, 480 U.S. at 182 (plurality); see Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 
514-15 (Powell, J., concurring). The Court has invalidated the use 
of racial preferences in selecting employees for layoff on this 
ground, because it "imposes the entire burden of achieving racial 
equality" on innocent individuals and causes "serious disruption" to 
their lives and "settled expectations." Wygant, 476 U.S. at 283 
(plurality). But the Court has held that an affirmative action plan 
may be "narrowly tailored" to its goal of remedying identified 
discrimination even though it requires innocent third parties to bear 
some of the burden of eradicating the effects of that discrimination. 
See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 280-81 (plurality) ("As part of this 
Nation's dedication to eradicating racial discrimination, innocent 
persons may be called upon to bear some of the burden of the 
remedy"); id. at 287 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (an affirmative 
action program designed "to further a legitimate remedial purpose" 
is not constitutionally invalid because it forces "innocent 
individuals" to bear some of the burden of the remedy, so long as it 
"do[es] not impose disproportionate harm on the interests, or 
unnecessarily trammel the rights, of innocent individuals directly 
and adversely affected by [its] racial preference"); Fullilove, 448 
U.S. at 484 (opinion of Burger, C.J.) ("such a sharing of the burden 
[of remedying the effects of past discrimination] by innocent parties 
is not impermissible"); id. at 514-15 (Powell, J., concurring); see 
also Croson, 488 U.S. at 509 (plurality); id. at 518-19 (Kennedy, 
J., concurring). The Court has specifically found affirmative action 
plans which burdened innocent individuals to some degree to be 
"narrowly tailored" to a compelling interest in remedying the effects 
of past discrimination, where those burdens were "relatively light" 
and "diffuse" ones that "foreclos[ed] only one of several



64a
opportunities" and did not result in "serious disruption" of their lives 
or "settled expectations." See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 484 (opinion 
of Burger, J.) (racial set-aside in government contracting); id. at 
515 (Powell, J., concurring); Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 479 
(plurality) (racial goals in union membership); id. at 488 (Powell, 
J., concurring); Paradise, 480 U.S. at 182-83 (plurality) (racial 
hiring and promotion goals in public employment); id. at 188-89 
(Powell, J., concurring). See generally Wygant, 476 U.S. at 283 
(plurality). In such cases, the "marginal unfairness" to innocent 
third parties is "outweigh[ed]" by the compelling interest in 
eradicating the effects of past or present discrimination. Id:, see 
Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 515 (Powell, J., concurring).

Plaintiffs and their supporting intervenors contend that, as 
the panel majority in Hays I  held, a race-based redistricting plan 
imposes an undue burden on innocent third parties, hence is not 
"narrowly tailored," if it deviates from traditional notions of 
geographical compactness, contiguity, and respect for the integrity 
of political subdivisions to a greater degree than is necessary to 
accomplish its compelling purpose. See 839 F. Supp. at 1208-09 
(majority). In their view, strict scrutiny requires a court to 
invalidate a race-based redistricting plan whenever it finds that the 
legislature could have drawn some alternative plan that would have 
accomplished its compelling purpose while "doing] substantially 
less violence to traditional redistricting principles" -  both those that 
are constitutionally-mandated, like the "one-person, one-vote" 
standard, and those that are not, like geographical compactness, 
contiguity, and respect for the integrity of political subdivisions Id 
at 1208.

We agree with the district court in Hays I  that a race-based 
redistricting plan imposes an unacceptable burden upon third 
parties, hence is not sufficiently "narrowly tailored" to survive 
constitutional muster, if it fails to comply with redistricting 
principles that are themselves constitutionally-mandated, like the 
"one person, one vote" standard and the prohibition against undue 
dilution of the voting strength of any identifiable group of voters. A 
plan which causes concrete and material harm to the voting rights of 
an identified group of persons in one of these two ways certainly 
imposes the sort of "unacceptable burden" on third party interests



65a
which cannot survive strict scrutiny, even when supported by a 
compelling state interest. But we cannot agree that a race-based 
redistricting plan imposes an unacceptable burden upon third parties 
simply because it deviates from traditional notions of geographical 
compactness, contiguity, and respect for the integrity of political 
subdivisions, which are not themselves constitutionally-mandated 
districting principles, to a greater degree than a federal court may 
think was necessary to accomplish the state's compelling purpose.

As the Supreme Court has emphasized time and again, 
there is no general constitutional requirement that the states design 
their redistricting plans to produce districts that are compact and 
contiguous and that maintain the integrity of political subdivisions. 
See, e.g., Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 752 n. 18 (1973); 
White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 793-97 (1973); see also Cline v. 
Robb, 548 F. Supp. 128, 132-33 (E.D.Va. 1982) (three-judge 
court); Cook v. Luckett, 735 F.2d 912, 920 (5th Cir. 1984). 
Compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions are 
of course rational districting principles which the states may take 
into account in designing redistricting plans. See Reynolds v. Sims, 
377 U.S. 533, 578 {1964,), Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 320-30 
(1973). But they are not constitutional imperatives, see Gaffney, 
412 U.S. at 752 n. 18 ("compactness or attractiveness has never 
been held to constitute an independent federal constitutional 
requirement" for state redistricting schemes), and the Court has 
repeatedly rejected claims that a state redistricting plan violates the 
Equal Protection Clause because it sacrifices these considerations in 
order to achieve other legitimate redistricting objectives, such as 
protecting incumbents, preserving the integrity of established 
neighborhoods, and recognizing the voting strength of various 
political parties.42

See, e.g., Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 752 n. 18 (rejecting claim that plan for 
redistricting of state legislature violated Equal Protection Clause because it 
created districts whose shapes were "indecent" and split many political 
subdivisions, where these oddities were the result of state's legitimate policy of 
allocating seats in the legislature between major political parties in rough 
proportion to their statewide political strength); Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 
52 (1964) (rejecting claim that congressional redistricting plan violated Equal 
Protection clause because its "zigzag, tortuous lines" resulted in districts with 
highly irregular shapes and an 11-sided, step-shaped boundary between two 
districts, where those lines were designed to preserve the integrity of established



66a
In Shaw itself, all nine members of the Court expressly 

reaffirmed the long-standing rule that adherence to traditional 
notions of compactness, contiguity, and respect for political 
subdivisions is not a general constitutional requirement for state
redistricting plans. See ___ U.S. at ___, 113 S.Ct. at 2827
(majority); id. a t ___, 113 S.Ct. at 2841 (White, J., joined by
Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. a t___, 113 S.Ct. at 2843 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); id. a t ___, 113 S.Ct. at 2849 (Souter, J., dissenting).
And we find no indication that the Shaw majority intended to create 
an exception to this general rule that would make adherence to 
traditional notions of compactness, contiguity, and respect for 
political subdivisions a constitutional imperative for a certain class 
of redistricting plans: those designed to give effect to minority 
voting strength in order to further a compelling state interest in 
remedying identified discrimination in the state's electoral processes. 
The majority held that a state legislature's disregard of traditional 
notions of compactness, contiguity, and respect for the integrity of 
political subdivisions in crafting a plan which creates majority- 
minority districts is of some relevance in the Equal Protection 
analysis, because it serves (when combined with evidence of the 
racial makeup of the districts) as circumstantial proof that race 
played a sufficiently important role in the plan's design to warrant
application of strict scrutiny. Id. a t___, 113 S.Ct. at 2826-27. But
it made clear that compliance with these criteria was not to be used
as the ultimate test of the plan's constitutionality. See id. a t ___,
113 S.Ct. at 2826-27 ("We emphasize that [adherence to] these 
criteria [is] important not because they are constitutionally required 
--they are not, c f  Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 752, n. 18 
(1973) — but because they are objective factors that may serve to 
defeat a claim that a district has been gerrymandered on racial
lines"); see also id. a t ___, 113 S.Ct. at 2827 ("'One need not use
[adherence to these criteria] ... as an ultimate standard for judging 
the constitutionality of a gerrymander to recognize that dramatically 
irregular shapes may have sufficient probative force to call for an

neighborhoods); see also White, 412 U.S. at 793-97 (in crafting a remedy for a 
"one person, one vote" violation, district court abused its discretion in ordering 
state to adopt a redistricting plan that failed to respect "the districting 
preferences of the state legislature" — including its policy of preserving the core 
constituencies of incumbents -  simply because it was "significantly more 
compact and contiguous" than the proposed alternatives).



67a
explanation'") (quoting Karcher, 462 U.S. at 755 (Stevens, J., 
concurring))43 And while the Court remarked in dicta that a race- 
based redistricting plan designed to further an interest in remedying 
identified discrimination apart from the Voting Rights Act is 
"constitutionally permissible only when the State 'employ[s] sound
districting principles,'" id. a t ___, 113 S.Ct. at 2832(quoting UJO,
430 U.S. at 167-68 (opinion of White, J., joined by Stevens and 
Rehnquist, JJ.)), we think it meant only that such a plan, like any 
other redistricting plan, must employ rational districting principles 
that ensure fair and effective representation to all citizens, see 
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 568 (redistricting plan that was a "crazy 
quilt[ ] completely lacking in rationality, ...could be found invalid 
on that basis alone"), be they compactness, contiguity, and respect 
for political subdivisions, or any of a host of other race-neutral 
principles -- including preservation of the core constituencies of 
incumbents and recognition of distinctive urban and rural interests - 
- which a state may legitimately and rationally take into account in 
designing electoral districts. 44 We therefore conclude that Shaw

43 The passage from Justice Stevens' concurrence in Karcher upon which the 
Shaw majority relies explains that "drastic departures from compactness" and 
"extensive deviation for established political boundaries" are "signals] that 
something may be amiss,” which, when coupled with evidence that the plan has 
"a significant adverse impact upon a defined ... group of voters," will suffice to 
establish a "prima facie showing of gerrymandering" and "shift the task of 
justification to the state," 462 U.S. at 754-61. But it expressly warns against 
using adherence to traditional notions of compactness and respect for the 
integrity of political subdivisions as an "ultimate standard for judging the 
constitutionality of a gerrymander." Id. at 755 & n. 15.

44 The passage in UJO from which the Shaw majority quotes reads in full that 
"we think it ... permissible for a State, employing sound districting principles 
such as compactness and population equality, to attempt to prevent racial 
minorities from being repeatedly outvoted by creating districts that will afford 
fair representation to the members of those racial groups who are sufficiently 
numerous and whose residential patterns afford the opportunity of creating 
districts in which they will be in the majority." UJO, 430 U.S. at 167-68 
(opinion of White, J., joined by Stevens and Rehnquist, JJ.)) (emphasis added). 
Neither the UJO plurality nor the Shaw majority indicates that compactness, 
contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions are the only districting 
principles which can be considered "sound," and longstanding Supreme Court 
precedent makes clear that they are not. See Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 754 
(recognizing the voting strength of political parties); White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. at 
791 (preserving the core constituencies of incumbents); Bums v. Richardson, 
384 U.S. 73, 89 n. 16 (1966) (avoiding contests between incumbents).



68a
itself cannot be read to hold that a race-based redistricting plan is 
not "narrowly tailored" if it deviates from traditional notions of 
compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions to a 
greater degree than a federal court thinks is necessary to accomplish 
the state's compelling purpose.

Nor do we believe that the Supreme Court will ultimately 
adopt a definition of "narrow tailoring" in the redistricting context 
that requires consideration of whether the challenged plan deviates 
from traditional notions of compactness, contiguity, and respect for 
political subdivisions to a greater degree than is necessary to 
accomplish the state's compelling purpose. As one set of 
commentators has suggested, such a rule would "confuse the 
purpose of Shaw's strict scrutiny standard," which is not to ensure 
that the state creates wise or aesthetically-pleasing districts, but to 
ensure that it "is not covertly pursuing forbidden ends" when it 
draws district lines. Pildes & Niemi, supra, at 584-85. It would 
also make little sense from a practical standpoint, for several 
reasons.

In the first place, compactness, contiguity, and respect for 
political subdivisions have little inherent value in the districting 
process. The ultimate purpose of legislative apportionment and 
redistricting is to ensure "'fair and effective representation for all 
citizens.'" Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 748 {quoting Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 
565-66). Districts that are compact, contiguous, and respect 
existing political subdivisions have traditionally been thought to 
facilitate the realization of that goal, because they link together 
citizens who are likely to share common needs and interests, reduce 
the cost of campaigning, and make it easier for legislators to 
maintain close contact with their constituents. See Prosser v. 
Elections Bd., 793 F.Supp. 859, 863 (W.D.Wis. 1992) (three-judge 
court). But, as plaintiffs' own experts have testified, there is no 
consensus, nor even any empirical evidence, that adherence to these 
criteria is necessary to ensure fair and effective representation. See 
O'Rourke testimony, Tr. pp. 274-75; Hofeller testimony, Tr. pp. 
139-42; Niemi Dep. at 83; O'Rourke Dep. at 89-93. As the Court 
explained in Reynolds, arguments that "geographic considerations" 
should receive primary emphasis in redistricting, while perhaps



69a
valid at one point in our history, are "unconvincing" today, because 
"[m]odem developments and improvements in transportation and 
communications" mean that small and compact legislative districts 
are no longer necessary to insure that all citizens have access to 
their representatives. 377 U.S. at 580. 45 Nor are compact and

45 There appears to be general agreement in both the United States Congress 
and the state legislatures that strict adherence to traditional notions of 
compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions in designing 
congressional districts is no longer appropriate today.

From 1842 to 1929, federal statutory law required that all single­
member congressional districts be composed of ''contiguous territory." Wood v. 
Broom, 287 U.S. 1, 6 (1932) (citing Reapportionment Acts of 1842, 1872, 1882, 
1891, 1901, and 1911). From 1901 until 1929, federal statutory law also 
required them to be geographically compact. Reapportionment Act of 1901, ch. 
93, § 3, 31 Stat. 733, 734; Reapportionment Act of 1911, ch. 5, § 3, 37 Stat. 13, 
14. In the Reapportionment Act of 1929; however, Congress repealed both the 
contiguity requirement and the compactness requirement. Wood, 287 U.S. at 6- 
7. Since 1929, there have been a number of bills introduced in Congress to 
reimpose requirements of compactness and contiguity for all single-member 
congressional districts, but all have been defeated by substantial margins. See, 
e.g., H.R. 2648, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); H.R. 970, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1965); H.R. 2508, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). Federal statutory law has 
never required that congressional districts respect the integrity of political 
subdivisions.

Roughly half of the states -  including North Carolina -  impose 
requirements of compactness, contiguity, and/or respect for the integrity of 
political subdivision lines upon their state legislative districts. See Pildes & 
Niemi, supra, at 528; N.C. Constit. Art. H. §§ 3 and 5. But only a handful 
impose such requirements upon their congressional districts, Pildes & Niemi, 
supra, at 528 & n. 140, and North Carolina is not among them. Stip. 20. And 
while contiguity and respect for the integrity of precincts and census blocks were 
among the general criteria adopted by the North Carolina General Assembly's 
redistricting committees for consideration in designing the 1990 congressional 
redistricting plan, neither compactness nor respect for county or municipal 
boundaries were. See Stip. Ex. 9; Fitch Testimony, Tr. pp. 719; Cohen 
Testimony, Tr. pp. 319.

This general legislative unwillingness to impose requirements of 
compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions upon 
congressional districts may represent nothing more than a recognition that it is 
virtually impossible to adhere strictly to these conventions in designing 
congressional districts, as opposed to state legislative districts, since the former 
stretch over a much larger geographic area and are subject to a more stringent 
one person, one vote standard than the latter. But it may also represent a 

consensus that there is less correlation between adherence to these principles



70a
contiguous districts which respect the integrity of political 
subdivisions any guarantee of fair and effective representation. As 
Reynolds demonstrates, and plaintiffs' expert has conceded, even the 
most perfectly-shaped districts may "do great harm to fair 
representation," O'Rourke Dep. at 89, and "the use of highly 
compact districts may be the most effective way to shut out a 
minority from equal participation." Comment, Constitutional 
Challenges to Gerrymanders, 45 U.Chi.L.Rev. 845, 879 (1978). 
Requiring states to adhere strictly to these criteria in crafting 
remedial redistricting plans would thus serve "no obvious purpose." 
Pildes & Niemi, supra, at 584-85.

Second, even if compactness, contiguity, and respect for 
political subdivisions had some inherent value, there is no 
"relatively simple and judicially manageable" standard, Davis v. 
Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 149 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the 
judgment), for determining whether a particular redistricting plan 
deviates from these principles to a greater extent than is necessary 
to accomplish the state's compelling interest.* 46 While it is easy 
enough to determine whether a district is technically "contiguous" or 
not, there is no principled means of determining whether a district 
which satisfies this threshold requirement is still less contiguous 
than it needs to be. Nor is there any principled means of 
determining whether a congressional redistricting plan, which must 
deviate from the boundaries of established political subdivisions to 
some extent in order to comply with the constitutional command 
that it create districts which are as nearly equal in population as is 
mathematically possible, see Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 
(1969); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983), nonetheless fails

and the creation of districts whose citizens share common political interests 
when the redistricting is for the national legislature than the state legislature, 
since the former deals almost exclusively with legislation that affects the state as 
a whole, whereas the latter is more apt to deal with legislation that affects only 
certain discrete geographic areas within it.

46 Compare the Reynolds v. Sims rule of mathematical equality in district 
population, which serves as a "relatively simple and judicially manageable" 
standard for determining whether a state legislative apportionment scheme 
complies with the Equal Protection Clause's requirement that the votes of all 
citizens be given equal weight. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 149 (O'Connor, J., 
concurring).



71a
adequately to respect the integrity of those political subdivisions. 
Finally, there is no generally-accepted definition of what it means 
for a district to be "compact." See Pildes & Niemi, supra, at 540- 
59. While plaintiffs' experts and others have suggested a number of 
different ways in which district compactness can be measured 
mathematically, see Hofeller testimony, Tr. pp. 118-20; O'Rourke 
testimony, Tr. pp. 212-14; see also Karcher, 462 U.S. at 756-57 n. 
19 (Stevens, J., concurring); R. Niemi, B. Grofman, C. Carlucci, & 
T. Hofeller, Measuring Compactness and the Role of a 
Compactness Standard in a Test for Partisan and Racial 
Gerrymandering, 52 J. Pol. 1155 (1990); Pildes & Niemi, supra at 
553-59, there is admittedly no consensus as to which of these is 
most valid. See B. Grofman, Criteria for Districting: A Social 
Science Perspective, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 77, 85 (1985) ("There are 
many different ways of applying a compactness requirement but 
none is generally accepted as definitive."). And even if there were, 
the long experience with state-law requirements of district 
compactness stands as vivid testimony to the fact that these 
proposed measures of compactness are not "judicially manageable." 
See Karcher, 462 U.S. at 756 (Stevens, J., concurring) (state 
compactness requirements "have been of limited utility because they 
have not been defined and applied with rigor and precision"); Pildes 
& Niemi, supra, at 529-31 (state compactness requirements have 
been "ineffective" in producing more compact districts, because the 
courts have been either unwilling or unable to enforce them).47 The 
inquiry suggested by the Hays 1 Court thus promises to be "so 
standardless as to make the [principled] adjudication of [racial 
gerrymandering] claims impossible," Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 157 
(O'Connor, J., concurring), which in turn will make it virtually 
impossible for the state legislatures to determine what is required to 
make a race-based remedial plan comply with the Constitution.

4’ The same lack of a meaningful objective measure of compactness has plagued 
courts attempting to implement the "geographic compactness" prong of the 
Gingles prima facie case under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. See Pildes & 
Niemi, supra, at 532-46 (noting "considerable inconsistency" in approach and 
widespread use of "intuitive, eyeball assessments" in decisions of lower federal 
courts attempting to implement this requirement); P. Karlan, Maps and 
Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution 
Litigation, 24 Harv.C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 173, 204-13 (1989) (same).



72a
Finally, and most critically, the "narrowly tailored" inquiry 

suggested by plaintiffs would result in undue interference by the 
federal judiciary in matters that have long been thought to be the 
primary province of the state legislatures. From its earliest ventures 
into the "political thicket" of legislative reapportionment, Colegrove 
v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.), the 
Supreme Court has hewed fast to the view that the task of 
redistricting is fundamentally a political one for the state 
legislatures, see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. at 586; Burns v. 
Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 84-85, 92 (1966); Gaffney v. Cummings, 
412 U.S. at 749; Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. at 327; White v. 
Weiser, 412 U.S. at 794-95; Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 539- 
40 (1978), into which the unelected federal judiciary should not 
intrude any more than is absolutely necessary to protect 
constitutional rights. White, 412 U.S. at 795. This "hands o ff  
approach is not some accident of history, but a deliberate 
recognition of the fact that the process of redistricting "is 
fundamentally a political affair," Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 145 
(O'Connor, J., concurring), and that the state legislatures, as the 
very "fountainhead of representative government in this country," 
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 564, are the organs of government best 
situated to identify and strike an appropriate balance between the 
many different — and often conflicting — considerations that are at 
stake in it. Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 414-15 (1977); see
Growe v. Emison, ___ U.S. at ___, 113 S.Ct. at 1081
("[RJeapportionment is primarily the duty and responsibility of the 
State through its legislature or other body, rather than of a federal
court") (internal quotations omitted); Voinovich v. Quilter, ___
U.S. a t ___, 113 S.Ct. at 1157 ("Because the States do not derive
their reapportionment authority from the Voting Rights Act, but 
rather from independent provisions of state and federal law, the 
federal courts are bound to respect the States' apportionment 
choices unless those choices contravene federal requirements.") 
(internal quotations omitted)48 The "narrowly tailored" analysis

It is for this reason that the federal courts, upon finding that redistricting is 
necessary to remedy a proven violation of federal law, have traditionally given 
the state legislature an opportunity to devise a plan that will remedy the 
violation found, before undertaking to fashion one themselves. See White v. 
Weiser, 412 U.S. at 794-95; Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27 (1975); McGhee 
v. Granville County, 860 F.2d 110 (4th Cir. 1988).



73a
suggested by plaintiffs, which would force the federal courts "to 
attempt to recreate the complex process of legislative apportionment 
in the context of adversary litigation" and embroil them in after-the- 
fact "second-guessing" of the wisdom of legislative judgments about 
how best to balance competing districting considerations that are 
not themselves of constitutional stature, Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 
146-47 (O'Connor, J., concurring), is fundamentally inconsistent 
with this principle. We do not believe the Shaw majority intended to 
"open[ ] the door to [such] pervasive and unwarranted judicial 
superintendence of the legislative task of [redistricting]," id. at 147, 
and "bog[ ] [the federal courts] down in [such] a vast, intractable ... 
slough, particularly when there is little, if  anything, to be 
accomplished by doing so." Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 750.49

It is one thing to tell the states that the Voting Rights Act 
does not give them license to engage in race-based redistricting, 
even with the "benign" purpose of giving effect to minority voting 
strength, unless they have a substantial basis for believing that such 
remedial action is required to comply with the Act; and that they 
must take care, even then, not to take race into account in drawing 
district lines any more than is reasonably necessary to provide 
minority voters the "equal political opportunity," DeGrandy, _
U.S. a t ___, 62 U.S.L.W. at 4760, that the Voting Rights Act
requires. That is the fundamental point of Shaw, and it is a point 
well worth making, if this nation is ever to attain the goal that the 
Voting Rights Act itself was designed to bring about — that is, to 
overcome its long history of racial discrimination in electoral 
politics and transform its political system into one in which the 
color of an individual's skin has no bearing on his ability to 
participate effectively in the political process. But it is another 
thing entirely to tell a state which does have a substantial basis for 
concluding that it must engage in race-based redistricting to comply 
with the Voting Rights Act that it can do so only if it draws districts 
whose lines are sufficiently "regular" or "pleasing" in their

49 The voluminous evidentiary record developed by the parties in this case, 
which attempts to reconstruct -  some years after the fact -  the complex and 
compromise-ridden legislative process that led to the enactment of the 
challenged Plan, in order to somehow divine the precise reason for each dip and 
turn in the district lines, is a perfect illustration of the inadvisability of adopting 
the "narrowly tailored" inquiry suggested by the plaintiffs.



74a
appearance to satisfy the aesthetic sensibilities of a handful of 
unelected federal judges. Shaw itself holds no such thing, and we do 
not believe its reasoning compels us to do so here.

For all these reasons, we cannot agree with the Hays I  court 
that a race-based redistricting plan enacted to further a compelling 
state interest in complying with the Voting Rights Act imposes an 
unacceptable burden upon innocent third parties, hence is not 
sufficiently "narrowly tailored" to survive constitutional muster, 
simply because it deviates from traditional notions of geographical 
compactness, contiguity, and respect for the integrity of political 
subdivisions to a greater degree than a federal court later concludes 
was necessary to accomplish the state's compelling purpose. 
Instead, we believe that such a plan imposes an undue burden on 
innocent third parties only if it fails to give equal weight to the votes 
of all individuals, see Reynolds, unconstitutionally dilutes the voting 
strength of any identified group of voters, see Whitcomb, 
Bandemer, or is not grounded in rational districting principles 
which ensure that all citizens receive "fair and effective 
representation," see Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 568. So long as the 
plan stays within these basic constitutional boundaries, it "unsettles 
no legitimate, firmly-rooted expectation" on the part of any voter, 
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 638 (1987), 
including the nonminority voters it places in majority-minority 
districts, for no voter has a legitimate right to expect that he will be 
placed in a district in which he is part of the majority or that his 
preferred candidate will win, see Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 149, 154; 
UJO, 430 U.S. at 166, nor does he have a legitimate right to expect 
that his district will have a certain shape, see infra n. 60.50

50 We do not agree with the dissent's suggestion, post at 176-77, 190-91, that to 
be "narrowly tailored" to a compelling interest in avoiding a violation of 
amended § 2, a plan which creates majority-minority districts must "incorporate" 
in those majority-minority districts the specific "geographically compact" 
minority population which led the state to believe that§ 2 required it to engage 
in race-based redistricting in the first place. With all respect, this argument is 
based on a fundamental misconception of the nature of the "wrong" which § 2 
forbids, and the role that the Gingles "geographical compactness" inquiry plays 
in establishing a § 2 violation.

As amended, § 2 of the Voting Rights Act forbids a state to adopt or 
maintain any districting plan that "results in a denial or abridgement of the right 
of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color." 42



75a
Of course, on current doctrine, a race-based redistricting 

plan that complies with these requirements may cause some 
"stigmatic" or "dignitary" harm to the voters — both minority and 
nonminority -  that it "classifies" by race. Though we believe this 
harm is sufficient, on that doctrine, to give those voters standing to 
challenge the plan, see supra at 20-30, we do not think it suffices to

U.S.C. § 1973(a). Section 2(b) provides that such an impermissible "denial or 
abridgement of the right ... to vote" occurs where, "based on the totality of 
circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or 
election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation 
by members of [the relevant minority group] ... in that its members have less 
opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political 
process and to elect representatives of their choice." Id. § 1973(b). To make out 
a claim that a single-member districting plan results in such an impermissible 
"dilution" of minority voting strength, a plaintiff must show, among other things, 
that the relevant minority group is "sufficiently large and geographically 
compact" to constitute a majority in more single-member districts than the
number in which it has a majority under the challenged plan. Growe, ___U.S.
a t___, 113 S.Ct. at 1084 (citing Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50-51). Such a showing
that it is possible to draw more majority-minority districts than the challenged 
plan does, together with evidence that the minority is "politically cohesive" and 
that the white majority "votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it ... usually to 
defeat the minoritys preferred candidate" in districts that are not majority- 
minority, is necessary to establish that the plan impermissibly "dilutes" the 
voting strength of a distinctive minority group, hence violates § 2. Id. But such 
a showing is not necessarily sufficient to establish that the challenged plan 
results in an impermissible dilution of minority voting strength; instead, the 
court may properly find a violation of § 2 only if it further finds, after assessing 
the probative significance of the inference arising from the three Gingles factors 
in light of all other circumstances "with arguable bearing on the issue of equal 
political opportunity," that the plan's lines do in fact operate to deny the minority 
an equal opportunity to participate in the electoral process and to elect
candidates of their choice. DeGrandy,___U.S. at _ ,  62 U.S.L.W. at 4758-61.
The "wrong" which constitutes a violation of § 2 is therefore not that the plan 
fails to make a majority-minority district out of every pocket of minority voters 
that is sufficiently large and geographically compact, as the dissent seems to 
think, but that its lines, considered in light of all relevant circumstances, operate 
to deny the members of the relevant minority group equal political opportunity, 
its failure to create as many majority-minority districts as the minority's 
residential patterns will permit is merely one of the telltale symptoms of that
wrong. Id. a t___, 62 U.S.L.W. at 4758-61. It therefore makes no sense to say
that a race-based redistricting plan designed to avoid a potential § 2 violation 
cannot be "narrowly tailored" to that particular "wrong" unless the majority- 
minority districts which it creates incorporate the specific "geographically 
compact' minority population which first led the state to suspect that its existing 
districting scheme might violate § 2.



76a
establish that the plan imposes an "unacceptable" burden on 
innocent third parties for purposes of the "narrowly tailored" prong 
of the strict scrutiny analysis. Congress carefully considered the 
burdens that the drawing of district lines to give effect to minority 
voting strength would impose upon the citizenry when it enacted, 
amended, and extended the provisions of the Voting Rights Act that 
require the states to take such action to remedy the effects of past 
and present discrimination in their electoral processes. See UJO, 
430 U.S. at 175-78 (Brennan, J., concurring in part); Gingles v. 
Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. at 356-57 & nn. 17-20. See generally Boyd 
& Markman, The 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act: A 
Legislative History, 40 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1347 (1983). And it 
made "a considered decision," Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 473 (opinion 
of Burger, C.J., joined by White and Powell, JJ.), after "substantial 
and careful deliberations," UJO, 430 U.S. at 176 (Brennan, J., 
concurring in part), that these burdens were not unacceptable, given 
the national consensus on the compelling need for "sterner and more 
elaborate measures" to eradicate the effects of the states' 
"unremitting and ingenious defiance" of the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments' guarantees of racial equality in the exercise 
of the franchise. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308- 
09 (1966); see McCain, 465 U.S. at 243-48; City o f  Rome, 446 
U.S. at 172-78, 180-83. We are obligated to give considerable 
deference to Congress' judgment on that score, see Fullilove, 448 
U.S. at 472 (opinion of Burger, C.J.), given its "specially informed 
legislative competence" in the area of voting rights, Katzenbach v. 
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 656 (1966), and the fact that the Voting 
Rights Act is an exercise of its "specific constitutional mandate" to 
enforce by "appropriate" legislation the guarantees of racial equality 
in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, Croson, 488 U.S. at 
490 (opinion of O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White, 
J.), a mandate which the Supreme Court has consistently recognized 
gives it unique and far-reaching remedial powers. Id. at 488; see 
Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 483 (opinion of Burger, C.J.) ("[I]n no organ 
of government, state or federal, does there repose a more 
comprehensive remedial power than in the Congress, expressly 
charged by the Constitution with competence and authority to 
enforce the equal protection guarantees" of the Civil War 
Amendments); id. at 516 (Powell, J., concurring); see also Metro 
Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 605 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist,



77a
C.J., and Scalia and Kennedy, JJ., dissenting) ("Congress has 
considerable latitude, presenting special concerns for judicial 
review, when it exercises its 'unique remedial powers ... under § 5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment"'). We believe that Congress 
"adequately struck th[e] balance" between the need for race-based 
redistricting as a remedy for past and present discrimination in the 
states' electoral processes and the burden that such measures impose 
upon innocent third parties when it enacted, and twice extended, 
"the carefully conceived remedial scheme embodied in the Voting 
Rights Act." UJO, 430 U.S. at 175 (Brennan, J., concurring). Any 
argument that the passage of time has thrown that balance out of 
kilter, or that those measures have accomplished their purpose and 
outlived their usefulness, is properly addressed to Congress, which 
has the power to call an end to the extraordinary remedial effort 
embodied in the Voting Rights Act, rather than to the federal courts. 
See City o f  Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. at 180-82 (specifically 
refusing "to overrule Congress'judgment that the 1975 extension [of 
§ 5's preclearance requirement] was warranted" in order "to counter 
the perpetuation of 95 years of pervasive voting discrimination," 
despite "undeniable" increases in the number of African-Americans 
registered to vote and elected to public office since it was first 
enacted).



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III.

Findings of Fact51 

A. General Background 

The Legislative Setting

As the General Assembly of North Carolina went about the 
task of congressional redistricting required by the 1990 decennial 
census, several extra-legislative factors, newly at work, crucially 
shaped its deliberative process and the legislative decisions that 
emerged.

First off, population growth had produced a new seat to 
work into the ultimate plan, hence a need to divide the state 
geographically into twelve districts rather than the former eleven. 
Stip. 19. The legislature could not, therefore, start with the then- 
existing congressional districts and adjust them only as required by 
the one-person-one-vote principle coupled with the eternal problems 
of incumbency protection and raw partisan politics.52 As plaintiff- 
intervenor's expert witness testified, gaining a new (or losing an

51 At intervals in our narrative findings we cite to particular items in the 
evidentiary record. These references are intended to identify the most critical 
evidentiary support for the immediately preceding finding(s), not necessarily the 
exclusive support. We received much of the evidence in the record — 
testimonial, documentary, witness statements, discovery materials — subject to 
objections, and reserved rulings pending our written decision. In keeping with 
customary practice in bench trials, we have considered all the evidence in the 
record (with one exception to be noted), exercising our judgment and discretion 
respecting that which properly could be relied upon. See generally 1 
McCormick on Evidence, § 60 (4th ed. 1992). For purposes of the record, 
therefore, all objections by the parties to any evidence received by the court can 
be considered now overruled by the court. The one exception is certain evidence 
concerning an official investigation of campaign practices during the 1990 
political campaign for the United States Senate in North Carolina which, on 
motion of the United States, was sealed by the court. Objection to the 
admissibility of that evidence is sustained. It has not been considered by the 
court.

52 That is, if  it wanted to have a redistricting plan in place in time for the 1992 
congressional primary and general elections. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 2a(c); 2c.



79a
existing) seat always creates its own "turbulence" in the redistricting 
process. Hofeller testimony, Tr. pp. 135-36.

Next, new developments in the way that census data was 
organized geographically, both by the U. S. Bureau of Census and 
by state legislative staff, coupled with new computer technology for 
processing and using that data in redistricting, had created new 
capabilities for rapid, accurate consideration and adjustments of 
proposed plans, and for line-drawing not so bound, as formerly, to 
existing political boundaries.

Without attempting a full description of these interrelated 
technical developments, the dramatic new capabilities they provided 
for the redistricting process can be summarized. In the first place, 
the critical redistricting data -- total population, voting age 
population by race or national origin, voter registration by party and 
race -- was now made available by the Census Bureau and state 
legislative staff not only at traditional governmental levels down to 
townships and precincts, but even further down to the level of the 
"census block," a geographical unit usually smaller than precincts. 
Incorporated into a newly acquired computer software program 
along with digital map files, these allowed the rapid call-up and 
visual display on computer terminals of critical demographic and 
statistical data down to the census block level, along with 
geographic features — highways, streets, rivers, railroads — and 
political boundaries, including the 1980's congressional district 
lines, throughout the state. And, in a further refinement developed 
by legislative staff, precinct election results in a number of recent 
statewide elections were included in the computer database, making 
available at the precinct level partisan voting patterns that might 
affect particular candidacies in potential districts. The capability 
thus provided to call up demographic and statistical data and on its 
basis to make district line adjustments at this geographic level had 
therefore significantly increased the flexibility of the redistricting 
process, freeing up the planners from their former confinement to 
existing political boundaries in attempting to "get the numbers 
right," whether for basic one-person-one-vote purposes, incumbency 
protection, or for other purposes. Around 229,000 of these census 
blocks, with their associated demographic and statistical data, were 
now newly available for use as basic building blocks in the



80a
redistricting process. This not only made possible a new degree of 
refinement in getting the numbers right (including the rather 
incredible achievement of mathematically perfect equal population 
districts), it also encouraged the drawing of boundary lines with 
more obvious irregularities and facial oddities than typically 
occurred under the less sophisticated methodology formerly 
available. For the new capability made it more possible than 
formerly it had been for the planners to yield to specific
importunings for special treatment of narrowly confined local 
situations (such as incumbent residency) or to shift quite small 
numbers of desired types of voters (whether by party affiliation or 
race) in drawing district lines. And because the census block 
boundaries were either visible physical features or existing
governmental unit lines, it was now possible to use them as
boundary-defining portions of a district and thereby to split
governmental units down to the precinct level between districts 
when the demands of numbers, or incumbency protection, or 
partisan political advantage were thought to require it. Stip. 29-33; 
Cohen testimony, Tr. pp. 283-86, 289-98, 412-13; Cohen Dep. 96- 
113; Cohen Dep. Ex. 7; generally, D. Exs. 405, 416-35.

A third factor heavily influencing the redistricting process 
was a recently developed perception by the Republican Party of 
North Carolina and members of that Party in the General Assembly, 
freely conceded in this litigation, that it and they could derive 
partisan political advantage from the creation of as many majority- 
minority districts as arguably could be justified by the requirements 
of federal voting rights law. Pope testimony, Tr. pp. 1046; Hawke 
Dep. pp. 15, 18-19; Farr closing arg. Tr. p. 15. This perception, 
and Republican legislator action upon it, gave rise to powerful 
political cross-currents and unusual political alignments that figured 
critically in the redistricting process and that in turn bear 
significantly upon the issues in this case.

The bicameral state legislature that developed and enacted 
the challenged plan was heavily white by race, Democratic by party. 
In the Senate there were 36 Democrats, 14 Republicans; in the 
House, 81 Democrats, 39 Republicans. By race, the Senate had 45 
white members, 5 African-American members; the House, 105 
white members, 14 African-American members and one Native



81a
American member. Stips. 10-16. Congressional redistricting 
(unlike that for state legislative seats) was carried out as a shared 
responsibility of both houses. Bipartisan and bi-racial 
congressional redistricting committees were appointed for both 
Senate and House, that in the Senate being a sub-committee of a 
general redistricting committee chaired by Senator Dennis J. 
Winner. Senator Russell G. Walker was chairman of the Senate 
sub-committee, and Representatives Milton "Toby" Fitch, R. 
Samuel Hunt, III and Edward C. Bowen were co-chairman of the 
House Committee. All of these but Fitch, an African-American, 
were white, and all were Democrats. Stips. 24-27. They, together 
with House Speaker Dan Blue, an African-American, and Senator 
Dennis Winner, who was white, constituted what came to be the 
generally recognized "Democratic leadership" in devising the 
congressional redistricting Plan now challenged. Cohen testimony, 
Tr. pp. 308; Fitch testimony, Tr. pp. 661-663.

This "Democratic leadership" group, acting through the 
Senate and House redistricting committees, effectively directed the 
process that led ultimately to enactment of the challenged Plan. 
Their decisions from time to time as the Plan evolved were 
implemented at the mechanical, "line-drawing" level by the Director 
of the Bill Drafting Division of the General Assembly, Gerry 
Cohen, to whom that responsibility had been delegated. Using the 
computer resources above described, Cohen took his instructions 
from this group and translated them into district configurations that 
were then submitted for consideration to the redistricting 
committees and ultimately to the floors of the House and Senate for 
vote.53 Cohen testimony, Tr. pp. 359, 379-80.

53 Cohen's role in the redistricting process, though that of staff employee 
without decisional authority, was nevertheless singular, and critical. Ultimately, 
every legislative decision respecting the configuration of the evolving 
congressional redistricting Plan was communicated to him in the form of 
instructions by members of the Democratic "leadership group" exercising the 
ultimate power of the majority party in the General Assembly. The 
congressional district lines that finally emerged in the challenged Plan were thus 
all originally drawn by Cohen, acting upon these instructions. The lines that he 
drew and the instructions upon which he acted therefore directly reflect the 
legislative intent behind their drawing and the private and public interests they 
were intended by the legislative majority to serve. See Voinovich v. Quilter, _
U.S. a t___, 113 S. Ct. at 1158-59 (looking to evidence of intent of individual
employed by state legislature to draft its redistricting plan as evidence of the



82a
Basic Geographic and Demographic Features Affecting the 
Statewide Congressional Redistricting Process

Certain basic geographic and demographic features of the 
State — knowledge of whose essentials by the General Assembly we 
must assume — provided essential background for the statewide 
congressional redistricting process.

Total state population, by the 1990 census, was 6,628,637. 
Of that total, 5,008,491 (75.6%) were white; 1,456,323 (22%) were 
African-American; and 80,135 (1.2%) were Native American. Stip. 
19; 1990 Census. This meant that each of the state's twelve 
districts was required by constitutional "one person, one vote" 
principles to have a population as close as practicable to the "ideal" 
district population of 552,386. Stip. Ex. 10 p. 117. See supra n. 5.

North Carolina has three distinctive geographic regions, 
each with its equally distinctive history, culture, and economy: the 
Mountain region, the Piedmont region, and the Coastal Plain region.

The Coastal Plain, extending inland from the Atlantic coast 
roughly to the geologic fall line, historically has been and remains 
essentially rural and agricultural. It has no city with a population of 
100,000 or more, and though it has a number of smaller cities such 
as Rocky Mount, Wilson, Goldsboro, Kinston, New Bern, 
Fayetteville and Wilmington, it is not as a region heavily populated. 
The Mountain region, running generally westward from the front 
range of the Appalachians to the Tennessee line, is also 
predominantly rural and sparsely populated, with only one city, 
Asheville, of any size.

The Piedmont, the foothill region lying between the fall line 
and the front range of the mountains, is by far the most heavily 
populated of the three regions. As of 1990, it contained 54.7% of 
the state's population, all five of the State's cities with populations

legislative intent behind the plan). Cohen's testimony, in deposition and at trial, 
describing his role, the instructions he received, the reasons given him, and the 
action he took upon the instructions, has been extensively relied upon as an 
accurate, credible description of the process in which he was involved.



83a
greater than 100,000, and 47 of its 84 smaller cities and towns with 
populations greater than 5,000. Stuart Rpt., Fig. 1; id. pp. 15, 23- 
24. Within the Piedmont region, the "Piedmont Urban Crescent" 
constitutes a long-recognized distinctive subregion. Stip. Exs. 44- 
47. Extending through eleven counties in a general arc from Wake 
County at its eastern end southwestwardly to Gaston County at its 
western, it includes the State's five largest cities, Raleigh, Durham, 
Greensboro, Winston-Salem and Charlotte. Stip. Ex. 47. 
Substantially industrialized, predominantly urban, and containing 
most of the State's institutions of higher learning (including its three 
largest), it is rightly described as "the urban, economic and cultural 
heart and soul of the State." Goldfield Dep. Ex. 1, p. 2.

Of great significance to the issues in this case is the location 
within the state of the 22% of its population that is African- 
American. While African-American citizens reside in every region 
of the State, they are by no means evenly dispersed throughout any, 
nor throughout the whole state. Instead, there are major, discrete 
concentrations of African-American population throughout the 
state, the most significant ones of which, reflecting historical forces 
dating from slavery, are in the Coastal Plain and the Piedmont. 
Within the Coastal Plain, there remains a large, dense concentration 
(50% or above of census tract total populations), long in place, in 
the heavily rural, agricultural northeast; and smaller dense 
concentrations, also long in place, in other rural areas further south 
in the region and in the historic "black sections" of the country 
towns that are scattered across this agricultural region. Within the 
Piedmont, there are dense concentrations in the historic "black 
sections" of the state's five largest cities and of the other smaller 
cities — Burlington, High Point, Thomasville, Lexington, Salisbury, 
Statesville, and Gastonia ~  that are scattered across the Piedmont 
Urban Crescent, with no significant concentration in the rural areas 
between those cities. D. Ex. 415; Goldfield Dep. Ex. 1, pp. 8-11.



84a
B. The Legislative Redistricting Process as Revealing of 

Legislative Intent and Purpose54 
Before developing any specific redistricting proposals, the 

House and Senate redistricting committees conducted a total of 
fifteen public hearings around the state during the spring of 1991. 
At these, they received citizen comments and suggestions, which 
had been invited by public notice, about the criteria the General 
Assembly should use in the redistricting process, and the ethnic, 
geographic, economic or other communities of interest it should 
consider. Stips. 38-42; Stip. Ex. 200, pp. 2-3, 8; Fitch testimony, 
Tr. pp. 665-67.

In mid-April, 1991, the committees jointly adopted written 
standards to guide the congressional redistricting process. These 
included compliance with one-person-one-vote requirements, the 
federal Voting Rights Act, the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments, and 2 U.S.C. § 2c's requirement of single-member 
districts; the use of contiguous territory; and the retention of 
precinct and census block integrity where compatible with the 
redistricting computer database. Stip. 43.

54 A large part of the voluminous evidentiary record produced in this case by 
four months of discovery, extensive stipulations of fact, and the deliberately 
liberal reception of testimonial and documentary evidence during a six-day trial, 
is devoted to the ins and outs of the laborious legislative process that led finally 
to enactment of the challenged Plan. The process revealed inevitably was a 
complicated, highly politically-charged, and' ultimately, in many of its details, 
obscure one. The evidence depicting it was correspondingly exhaustive in its 
detail, as are the proposed findings of fact based upon it that have been 
submitted by the parties at our request. Inevitably, much of that evidence and 
many of the proposed findings of fact are now revealed to be in much of their 
detail only marginally, if  at all, material to the dispositive legal issues we have 
identified: (1) whether the congressional redistricting Plan reflects a legislative 
intent deliberately to include one or more districts having a particular racial 
composition of voters, and (2) whether, if so, the districting so done was 
"narrowly tailored" to serve one or more "compelling state interests."

Our findings of fact in this section, being confined to those we consider 
necessary and material to resolution of those issues, are, in consequence, much 
more selective and "ultimate" than are the findings proposed by any of the 
various parties.



85a
As these adopted criteria indicate, the committees were well 

aware that one of their principal considerations must be compliance 
with provisions of the Voting Rights Act and the federal constitution 
that protect racial minorities in matters of redistricting. To give 
special guidance in this area, the General Assembly had, in fact, 
employed special legal counsel experienced in voting rights 
litigation, who worked closely throughout with those directing the 
redistricting process. L. Winner Dep. pp. 38-39.

In the early stages of their deliberations, there was division 
within the councils of the Democratic leadership as to whether any 
majority-minority congressional districts need, and should, be 
drawn. There was sentiment within the Senate leadership group 
that none should be drawn, in the main because it would benefit the 
Republican Party. D. Winner Dep. pp. 13-15; Fitch testimony, Tr. 
pp. 665. There was opposing sentiment in the House committee 
that two could, and must under the Voting Rights Act, be drawn. 
And on the Republican side, there was a concerted move to 
encourage the drawing of two. Stips. 49, 54, 61; Cohen testimony, 
Tr. p. 461.

<

In the end, the Democratic leadership group came to the 
conclusion, presumably driven in part by the advice of legal 
counsel, that at least one such district must be included in the plan. 
Fitch testimony, Tr. pp. 665, 670-671. To this end, the redistricting 
committee chairmen then prepared a number of "base plans" which, 
beginning in May 1991, were presented to these committees, at a 
public hearing, and finally on the House and Senate floors. All 
included one majority-minority district centered on the large rural 
area of proportionately dense African-American population in the 
northeastern portion of the Coastal Plain, with an arm extending 
westwardly to include an African-American population 
concentration in the inner-city of Durham, on the eastern end of the 
"Piedmont Urban Crescent," and another arm extending 
southwardly into the center of the Coastal Plain. Stip. Ex. 10, pp. 
44-49. At the same time that these committee base plans were 
being considered, several Republican-sponsored alternative plans 
with two majority-minority districts were also being considered. In 
each of these plans, one of those majority-minority districts was 
located in the same area as the one included in all the committee-



86a
proposed base plans — in the northeastern and central portion of the 
Coastal Plain. Location of the second such district varied among 
the Republican plans, but the one receiving most support was that 
in the "Balmer Congressional 6.2" plan, which ran from downtown 
Charlotte at the western end of the Piedmont Urban Crescent 
southeastwardly approximately 200 miles through all or portions of 
a number of rural counties along the South Carolina border (Union, 
Anson, Richmond, Scotland, Robeson, Columbus, Brunswick, and 
New Hanover) across the Coastal Plain into downtown Wilmington 
on the coast. Stip. Ex. 10, 23, 27. The achievement of a majority 
of minority voters in this proposed district depended upon 
aggregating the African-American voter population with the 
substantial Native-American (Lumbee Indian) population primarily 
concentrated in Robeson County. Cohen testimony, Tr. p. 412; 
Fitch testimony, Tr. pp. 682-684.

In any event, all of the Republican-sponsored two-majority- 
minority-district plans which went to floor vote were rejected on 
party-line votes, with all the African-American legislators voting 
against them. The plan eventually enacted, in mid-summer 1991, as 
Chapter 601 of the 1991 Session Laws, was a conference committee 
modification of the redistricting committees' several base plans 
which included the single majority-minority district centered in the 
rural northeast and central portions of the Coastal Plan with an arm 
extending westward into the inner-city precincts of Durham. Stip. 
Ex. 10, pp. 44-49. This plan was supported by an overwhelming 
majority of the Democratic legislators, including all the African- 
American legislators. Stips. 55-60, 62-63. Stip. Exs. 17-18.

In submitting Chapter 601's redistricting plan for 
preclearance by the Attorney General under § 5 of the Voting 
Rights Act, the state's supporting materials defended its provision of 
a single majority-minority district against objections lodged to it by 
the ACLU, national and state Republican Party officials, 
Republican members of the General Assembly, and other groups, 
that its failure to provide two such districts should deny it 
preclearance. The thrust of the State's submission was that the 
enacted plan, with its single majority-minority district, should pass 
muster under § 5 because it neither reflected a racially 
discriminatory purpose nor any retrogressive effect, nor would it



87a
result in a clear violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Stips. 
64-65, 67-68; Stip. Ex. 21. In advancing this position, the State 
also emphasized the negative aspects of the various two-majority- 
minority district plans that had been proposed as alternatives to the 
enacted plan, and contended that adoption of none of those plans 
was required to warrant preclearance under § 5. Cohen testimony, 
Tr. pp. 311-17; Stip. Exs. 24-26.

Following up on the State's written submission, members of 
the Democratic leadership group, Speaker Dan Blue, Senator 
Dennis Winner and Representative Toby Fitch, met with U.S. 
Department of Justice officials on two occasions, in September and 
December, 1991, to press for preclearance. Stips. 70, 71. All 
members of this delegation urged that preclearance was warranted 
under § 5, despite Senator Winner's continued private belief that no 
majority-minority districts were legally required, D. Winner Dep. 
pp. 13-15, and Representative Fitch's private belief that two should 
have been included and might yet be required to comply with the 
Voting Rights Act. Fitch testimony, Tr. p. 665. During this same 
period, the Republican leadership in the General Assembly and 
Republican Party officials at the state and national levels were 
actively urging Justice Department officials to deny preclearance on 
the basis that the plan failed to include two majority-minority 
districts, which they believed to be required by the Voting Rights 
Act. Pope testimony, Tr. pp. 1048-54; Pope Dep. pp. 139-47; Stip. 
69; Stip. Exs. 22, 23.

On December 18, 1991, the Attorney General objected to 
and refused to preclear the congressional redistricting plan enacted 
as Chapter 601 (as well as the State's House and Senate 
redistricting plans), finding that the state had not met its burden, 
under § 5, of proving that the Plan did not have a racially- 
discriminatory purpose. The Attorney General's objection letter 
explained the basis for this conclusion. The letter began by noting 
that "the proposed configuration of the district boundary lines in the 
south-central to southeastern part of the state appear to minimize 
minority voting strength given the significant minority population in 
this area." It noted further that the General Assembly "was well 
aware of the significant interest on the part of the minority 
community in creating a second majority-minority congressional



88a
district in North Carolina," and that it had before it several 
alternative plans that provided for a second majority-minority 
district in the south-central to southeastern part of the state -- some 
of which utilized "boundary lines that were no more irregular than 
[those] found elsewhere in the proposed plan" -- but that it had 
dismissed the possibility of creating two majority-minority districts 
for reasons that appeared to be "pretextual." The letter concluded 
that the General Assembly's "decision to place the concentration of 
minority voters in the southern part of the state into white majority 
districts" appeared to be designed "to ensure the election of white 
incumbents while minimizing minority electoral strength." Stip. 72, 
Stip. Ex. 27.

The Attorney General's contemporaneous objection to and 
refusal to preclear the State's House and Senate redistricting plans 
also emphasized a belief that the legislature intentionally had acted 
to protect white incumbent interests by improperly minimizing 
minority voting strength in a number of identified instances. Stip. 
72; Stip. Ex. 27.

The Attorney General's refusal to preclear the congressional 
redistricting plan in Chapter 601 presented the legislature with a 
difficult decision. It could yield to the official objection and enact a 
new plan with two majority-minority districts, or it could seek a 
declaratory judgment from the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia preclearing Chapter 601. Stip. Ex. 21. On 
this difficult issue, powerful conflicting views were brought to bear 
both from within the legislature and from without. From outside, 
several of the incumbent Democratic Congressmen who feared any 
revisions of their present districts encouraged the State to litigate, 
Stip. Ex. 20, while the Republican congressional delegation, which 
welcomed the prospect of such revisions, actively discouraged it. 
Stip. 73; Stip. Ex. 200, pp. 594-596. Within legislative ranks, there 
were comparable conflicting views, from a variety of motives. The 
Democratic leadership was not as one on the matter. While its 
members had come together, despite some private misgivings, to 
support preclearance of the Chapter 601 single majority-minority 
district plan, those misgivings now led them to be of different minds 
about the proper course of action now that preclearance had been 
denied. Some, believing that the Justice Department itself was



89a
simply trying to further partisan Republican interests by requiring 
two remedial districts, favored litigating the issue. Cohen 
testimony, Tr. pp. 321-322. Others, who had favored two districts 
all along as simply the right thing to do, but had been willing to 
compromise on one to achieve party consensus, now urged yielding 
to the Attorney General's objection. Fitch testimony, Tr. pp. 674- 
675.

In the end, the decision was made not to challenge by 
litigation the Attorney General's refusal to preclear. Various 
factors, reflecting various viewpoints shared by different groups of 
legislators, dictated the decision. A principal one was the sheer 
expense and uncertainty of seeking preclearance by litigation, 
carrying as it would the unavoidable twin risks that the State's 
declaratory judgment action might fail, and that even if it succeeded, 
it might only result in the State's then being faced with further 
litigation in the form of an action by minority voters challenging the 
now-precleared Plan under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Stip. Ex. 
200, pp. 596-98 (Ballinger, Hunter statements). Another factor 
strongly urged by both Democratic and Republican legislators and 
Congressmen (though undoubtedly from different motives) was the 
need to have a Plan in place in time for the regularly scheduled 
1992 electoral process. Fitch testimony, Tr. p. 675; Stip. Ex. 200, 
pp. 596-97 (Ballinger, Hunter statements). Finally, there was a 
substantial body of opinion that the Attorney General's objection 
should be yielded to simply because it was legally right or so 
probably right that it should in prudence and right be accepted as 
dispositive. Fitch testimony, Tr. p. 674; Stip. Ex. 200, pp. 907 
(remarks of Sen. D. Winner), 1242 (remarks of Rep. Balmer).

Inevitably, a variety of individual and group views and 
motives lay behind the General Assembly's decision to forego 
declaratory judgment litigation and proceed to enact a congressional 
redistricting plan that deliberately would include two majority- 
minority districts. There was some patently honest sentiment, 
among both white and African-American legislators, that in view of 
the State's long history of race discrimination in voting matters 
persisting down to the present time, simple racial justice warranted 
it. Stip. Ex. 200, p. 921 (remarks of Sen. Hunt in floor debate); pp. 
923-24 (remarks of Sen. Ballance in floor debate); p. 932 (remarks



90a
of Sen. Walker in floor debate). This was, indeed, the sentiment 
expressed in debate by those Republican legislators who then 
favored that course of action, whatever their true motivation, as 
later revealed in this litigation, may have been. Stip. Ex. 200, p. 
1268 (remarks of Rep. Flaherty in floor debate); id. p. 919 (remarks 
of Sen. Shaw in floor debate).

Beyond any question, however, the dominant concern 
driving the decision not to challenge the denial of preclearance in 
court was a perception that -- contrary to the position taken by the 
Democratic leadership at the time the Chapter 601 plan was enacted 
(and the position advanced by the state in its efforts to obtain 
preclearance for it) — the Chapter 601 plan, and any other 
congressional redistricting plan which did not contain at least two 
majority-minority districts, would in fact violate the Voting Rights 
Act (or be so likely to violate the Act that in prudence it must be 
assumed to do so). The General Assembly that decided to abandon 
Chapter 601 and enact Chapter 7 in its stead was without doubt 
aware of the circumstances under which a congressional 
redistricting plan could be found to violate the Voting Rights Act. 
This was, after all, a General Assembly with powerful, recent 
institutional and individual memories of the Act's rigor in 
redistricting matters. Well over half the members of the 1991 
General Assembly had been members of the 1986 General 
Assembly, which had been required by a federal court in the 
Gingles litigation to create 8 State House and Senate majority- 
minority districts in order to remedy violations of amended § 2. 
N.C. Manual, 1991-92. In addition, 58 had been members of the 
1981 General Assembly, id., whose original congressional 
redistricting plan had been denied § 5 preclearance on the ground 
that its exclusion of Durham County, with its politically-active 
black community, from then-Congressional District 2 appeared to 
have both the purpose and the effect of diluting minority voting 
strength. D.I. Ex. 501, pp. 34-53 (Kousser Rpt.); Stip. Ex. 195 
(letter denying preclearance).55 Finally, all were aware that the

55 As the denial letter by then-Assistant Attorney General William Bradford 
Reynolds explained, during a period when black population was increasing 
statewide, that in Congressional District 2 — "the only district where black voters 
could have the potential for electing a candidate of their choice" — had been 
decreasing over the past several redistrictings — from 43% before the 1971



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Republican Party, the ACLU, and other groups had contended that 
the Chapter 601 plan did not comply with the Act because it failed 
to include two majority-minority districts, and that the Justice 
Department, the agency assigned by Congress to enforce the Act, 
had declared, after reviewing these objections, that the plan actually 
did fail to pass muster under § 5. Stip. Ex. 27. Because of these 
recent experiences with Voting Rights challenges to earlier 
redistricting plans, the General Assembly that enacted Chapter 7 
was necessarily aware of the general nature of the showing required 
to make out a prima facie § 2 challenge to a congressional 
redistricting plan, as well as the general nature of the showing that a 
state must make to establish that such a plan satisfies the § 5 
standard.

The General Assembly that enacted Chapter 7 was also 
specifically aware -- from evidence presented to it by the 
Republican Party, the ACLU, and others; from advice received 
from the Justice Department and its own redistricting experts; and 
from its members' own personal knowledge of North Carolina 
politics -- that conditions in North Carolina were such that the 
African-American minority could very likely make out a prima 
facie § 2 challenge to the Chapter 601 plan or, for that matter, to 
any other Plan that did not contain two majority-minority districts. 
Numerous plans presented to the General Assembly had 
demonstrated that the state's African-American population was 
sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a 
majority in two congressional districts. See Stip. Ex. 10, pp. 50-54 
("Balmer Congress 7.8"); pp. 55-59 ("Balmer Congress 8.1"); pp. 
60-65 ("Optimum Congressional II-Zero"); pp. 66-72 ("92 
Congress l-"Peeler Plan"); pp. 81-94 ("1992 Congressional Base 
Plans ##7 and 8"); pp. 95-106 ("Representative Flaherty's Congress 
Plan"); pp. 107-120 ("1992 Congressional Base Plans M 9  and 10"). 
Members of the legislative leadership stated in floor debate that they 
believed the state's African-American population was large enough 
to constitute a majority in two congressional districts, that it was 
politically cohesive, and that pervasive bloc voting by the white 
majority allowed it usually to defeat candidates supported by the 
African-American minority in districts that were not majority-

redistricting to 40.2% after it, and down to 36.7% under the 1981 plan as 
submitted. Stip. Ex. 195 (Reynolds ltr. to Brock, p. 3).



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minority. See Stip. Ex. 200, pp. 921, 923-24, 932 (Senate floor 
debate statements of Senators Hunt, Ballance, Simpson, and 
Walker). Special counsel to the Republican Party, experienced in 
redistricting litigation, specifically warned the General Assembly at 
a public hearing that conditions in the state were such that failure to 
create two majority-minority congressional districts might well 
result in "turning over the drawing of districts to a federal court." 
Stip. Ex. 200, pp. 597-98 (statement of Robert Hunter). The 
Justice Department's letter denying preclearance to the Chapter 601 
plan stated that it believed that two majority-minority congressional 
districts meeting the Gingles criteria could be drawn in North 
Carolina, and that the Chapter 601 plan's failure to do so 
constituted an impermissible dilution of minority voting strength. 
Stip. Ex. 27. In addition, the General Assembly was necessarily 
aware, from its members' own personal experiences in North 
Carolina politics, that conditions in North Carolina were such that 
the African-American minority could likely prove many of the other 
factors that are relevant to establishing a § 2 violation under the 
statute's "totality of the circumstances" approach: the state had a 
long history of official voting-related discrimination; its African- 
American minority continued to bear the socio-economic effects of 
past discrimination, which hindered its ability to participate 
effectively in the electoral process; racial appeals continued to be 
used in its electoral campaigns; African-Americans were still not 
being elected to political office in the state in numbers even 
remotely approaching their representation in the general population, 
despite the fact that capable and experienced African-American 
candidates were running for election; and the Chapter 601 plan (or 
any other plan that created only one district in which African- 
Americans were a majority) would not give African-Americans a 
majority in a number of congressional districts that was anywhere 
close to proportional to their share of the state's population as a 
whole. See Stip. Ex. 200, pp. 921, 923-24, 932 (excerpts of Senate 
floor debates); Daughtry Dep. pp. 54-60, 63; Fitch Dep. pp. 65-69.

The validity of this general perception by the legislature (or 
at least its leadership) that the African-American minority could 
make out a prima facie § 2 case with respect to any congressional 
redistricting plan that did not include two majority-minority districts



was confirmed by objective evidence adduced at trial.56 The 
overwhelming evidence established that the state's African- 
American population was sufficiently large and geographically 
compact to constitute a majority in two congressional districts; 
numerous examples of plans drawing two majority-minority 
districts were presented to the court, see Stip. Ex. 10, including 
several prepared by the PlaintifF-Intervenors in which the majority- 
minority districts themselves were "geographically compact" under 
any reading of Gingles. P.I. Ex. 301, Tabs 2 and 3 ("Shaw II" and 
"Shaw III"). There was undisputed evidence that the state's 
African-American population was politically cohesive. D. Ex. 404 
(Engstrom Rpt.). Finally, there was considerable evidence that, 
although African-American electoral candidates' success, or near 
success, in both state-wide and local elections had continued the 
gradual improvement noted by the Gingles district court in 1984, 
see 590 F.Supp. 345, 364-65 (E.D.N.C. 1984) (three-judge court), 
a ff  d in part, rev'd in part on unrelated grounds sub nom., 
Thornburg v. Gingles, 438 U.S. 30 (1986), racial bloc voting still 
persisted to a significant degree across the state in both local and 
statewide elections, including those for United States Congress. D. 
Ex. 404 (Engstrom Rpt.);Watson Dep.; Weber Dep. pp. 668-71. 
So also did racial appeals and tactics in political campaigning.57

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56 Plaintiffs and Plaintiff-Intervenors objected to the admission of any evidence 
of continued racial bloc-voting, racial appeals in political campaigns, or other 
factors relevant to the establishment of a § 2 violation that was not specifically 
before the General Assembly, on the basis that it was irrelevant to any issue of 
legislative purpose or intent at the time the challenged Plan was enacted. We 
disagree. The evidence is relevant for the purpose of validating as non- 
pretextual the contemporaneously expressed belief of the legislative leadership 
that the Voting Rights Act compelled its action. Surely, had there been contrary 
evidence -  that there was no objective basis for believing the action compelled 
by § 2 or § 5 of the Voting Rights Act — it would have been highly relevant — 
and surely preferred — to demonstrate that there was no basis in fact for such an 
assumption. We have therefore considered the evidence as relevant for this 
purpose, though we do not believe it critical to proof of the material fact at issue 
-  whether the legislature had a firm basis for believing its action legally 
compelled.

57 Though there are other examples in the record, two suffice to demonstrate 
this regrettable fact. In the closing stages of the 1990 general election campaign 
for the United States Senate between the white incumbent, Jesse Helms, and his 
African-American opponent, Harvey Gantt, the Helms campaign made extensive



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In addition, the General Assembly that enacted Chapter 7 

was obviously specifically aware that the Justice Department had 
denied preclearance to its predecessor, the Chapter 601 plan, on the 
express ground that it failed to satisfy the "purpose" prong of § 5. 
Stip. Ex. 27. And it was aware — from evidence presented to it by 
the Republican Party, the ACLU, and others; from advice received 
from the Justice Department and its own redistricting experts; and 
from its members' own personal knowledge of the factors that went 
into the creation of the Chapter 601 plan -- that the Justice 
Department's conclusion was legally and factually supportable. See 
Stip. Ex. 200, pp. 921, 923-24, 932 (excerpts of Senate floor 
debates).

A final factor may well have tipped the decision of the 
Democratic leadership to accept the Attorney General's refusal to 
preclear the Chapter 601 plan and enact an alternative plan that 
would address the Attorney General's concerns by creating two 
majority-minority districts. It concerned the location of the 
additional remedial district that would have to be provided in such a 
plan. All the Republican-sponsored two majority-minority district 
plans that had been formally proposed during the 1991 Session and 
were again being proposed located that second district in areas 
decidedly unfavorable to Democratic interests. Particularly 
unfavorable was the one specifically suggested by the Attorney 
General, the Charlotte-to Wilmington district of the "Balmer 
Congressional 6.2" plan. Such a district would take critical areas of 
the then Seventh District of Democratic Congressman Rose and the 
Eighth District of Democratic Congressman Hefner and threaten 
their seats. Stip. Ex. 10, pp. 27-37. Furthermore, it was disfavored 
by African-American legislators who believed -- with good reason -- 
that the African-American and Native American voting populations 
whose aggregation was required to yield an effective voting majority 
in the proposed district were not in fact politically cohesive. Cohen 
testimony, Tr. pp. 380-81, 385-86. Concern about the location of

use of a television ad which directly appealed to white voter resentment of 
affirmative action programs in employment. D.I. Ex. 549; Watt testimony, Tr. p. 
920. During that same campaign, African-American voters were targeted with a 
massive mailing of post-cards which identified the sender as the Republican 
Party and contained misinformation about state voting law residence 
requirements that was deliberately designed to chill African-American voting. 
D.I. Ex. 522-24.



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the additional district therefore was a significant factor in the 
Democratic leadership's debate over whether to yield to the Attorney 
General's refusal to preclear their single remedial district plan.

During the critical period of this debate, an alternative 
location that favored rather than disfavored partisan Democratic 
interests surfaced. Ironically, it had been first suggested in a plan 
proposed by Republican Representative Balmer to the House 
Redistricting Committee co-chairmen back during the 1991 regular 
session. Never formally considered at that time, but made a part of 
the legislative record by Balmer as "Balmer Congress 8.1," it 
located a second remedial district in a narrow band running through 
the Piedmont Crescent, linking the historic "black neighborhoods" of 
the Piedmont cities along its course. Stip. Ex. 10, pp. 55-59. As 
described by Balmer in a letter to the Attorney General urging 
denial of preclearance to the Chapter 601 plan with its single 
remedial district, it "stretched from the black neighborhoods of 
Charlotte to the black neighborhoods of Durham." And, according 
to Balmer's letter, its configuration demonstrated how the Chapter 
601 plan, by failing to include such a district, "submerged black 
voting potential” in this area. Stip. Ex. 23 (Balmer-Dunne ltr., pp. 
7-8).

This idea of locating the second remedial district entirely 
within the Piedmont Crescent was picked up at some point during 
the interval by Democratic Representative Hardaway. He included 
a slight variant of the Balmer 8.1 districts along with a variant of 
the Chapter 601 First District in a plan, "Optimum Congressional 
II-Zero," which he submitted for committee consideration in its 
ongoing debate. Stip. Ex. 10, p. 60-65. Once revealed, the basic 
design of the Hardaway plan attracted immediate support among the 
Democratic leadership group, incumbent Democratic congressmen 
threatened by the Charlotte-to-Wilmington district, and civil rights 
organizations. A modified version containing variants of both 
districts in the plan quickly emerged as the result of consultations 
among aides to incumbent congressmen and members of the 
redistricting committees. Endorsed by the National Committee for 
an Effective Congress and the North Carolina NAACP, this 
modified plan, now popularly referred to as the "Merritt Plan" (for 
John Merritt, a political ally of Congressman Rose who had worked



96a
extensively on it) or the "Peeler Plan" (for Mary Peeler, Executive 
Director of the North Carolina NAACP), it was formally proposed 
by Ms. Peeler at a public hearing conducted by the redistricting 
committee on January 8, 1992. Stip. 85, Cohen testimony, Tr. pp. 
324-29; Stip. Ex. 10, pp. 60-65.

For the Democratic leadership, this Merritt/Peeler Plan had 
two great virtues which figured significantly in the decision to enact 
a plan with two remedial districts rather than challenge the denial of 
preclearance in court.

First, this plan perfectly trumped the Republican-favored 
plan with its Charlotte-to-Wilmington district which would 
effectively have packed the bulk of the state's heavily Democratic 
African-American vote into two Congressional districts located in 
already Democratic-leaning areas. In direct contrast, locating one 
of the remedial districts in the Republican-leaning Piedmont 
Crescent would insure that its traditionally African-American vote, 
now a potential majority, would no longer be diffused (or 
"submerged," in Representative Balmer's characterization) in a 
Republican (hence, under present circumstances, white) majority 
voting population. Fitch testimony, Tr. pp. 675-78; Cohen 
testimony, Tr. pp. 330, 396.

Second, it would permit the creation of two remedial 
districts having the distinctive and different urban and rural 
characteristics and communities of interest which historical forces 
had shaped for the state's African-American population. This 
would accommodate suggestions of citizens at public hearings, and 
of legislators in floor debate, that the observance of distinctive 
urban and rural communities of interest should be a prime 
consideration in the general redistricting process. Stip. Ex. 200, pp. 
2, 3 (public notice inviting comments), 198 (Walker statement), 212 
(Mills statement), 245 (Tillman statement), 600 (Hunter statement), 
603 (Kimbrough statement), 820 (Sen. D. Winner), 1003 (Rep. 
Hasty). And it would accommodate an expressed desire of African- 
American legislators and citizens from the rural Coastal Plain area 
that the remedial district centered in that area should not include 
urban African-American populations in the easternmost Piedmont 
Crescent cities of Durham and Raleigh. These were thought not to



97a
share the predominantly rural, agricultural interests of the region, 
but likely to dominate such a district politically because of their 
much stronger political traditions. Fitch testimony, Tr. pp. 670-75.

For all these reasons, the Democratic leadership adopted the 
Merritt/Peeler Plan as its first base plan, "92 Congress I," for 
implementing its decision to enact a congressional redistricting plan 
with two majority-minority districts. Stip. Ex. 10, pp. 66-72. It 
was that plan which then evolved, preserving its basic design for the 
location of the two districts, into the enacted Plan now challenged. 
The process of its evolution involved different, but necessarily 
interrelated, sets of problems respecting the two districts. The 
working out of those problems determined the final shapes and 
locations of both. Because of the claimed centrality of their shapes 
and locations to the issues in this case, the process is best traced out 
separately as to each. Though vastly complicated in detail, its basic 
outlines are essentially undisputed and can be summarized.

To implement the basic decision to create a distinctively 
rural majority-minority district in the Coastal Plain region, the 
redistricting committees adopted the convention that at least 80% of 
its population must be located outside cities having populations 
greater than 20,000. This convention was observed by Cohen, 
using "places reports" detailing the exact location of persons within 
particular areas, to verify adherence. Cohen testimony, Tr. pp. 333, 
356-58. It had been assumed from the outset, starting with 
Representative Hardaway's plan, that the rural district should be 
centered, as was the single remedial district in the Chapter 601 plan, 
on the large, proportionately dense African-American population in 
the northern part of the Coastal Plain. Stip. Ex. 10, p. 62. But if 
the other, urban district was to include the African-American 
population of inner-city Durham, and the rural-urban distinction 
between the two districts was to be observed, the First District must 
be extended still further southward in the Coastal Plain to 
compensate for loss of the urban Durham population. Cohen 
testimony, Tr. pp. 355-56; Fitch testimony, Tr. pp. 676-78.

Extending it southward presented both difficulties and 
advantages for the overall design. Its difficulties lay in the need to 
avoid extensive destruction of the cores of the districts of incumbent



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Democratic Congressmen Valentine (Second), Lancaster (Third), 
and Rose (Seventh), all of which lay to the south. This difficulty 
already had been encountered in constructing Chapter 601's single 
remedial district. Even with that district's inclusion of the African- 
American population in Durham, southward extensions from its 
core into portions of the existing Second and Third Districts had 
required substantial realignment of those districts. Stip. Ex. 10, p. 
45 (Chapter 601 plan); Stip. Ex. 61 (1982 Congressional Districts). 
The need for still further extensions in that general direction posed 
the threat of still further realignments of those two districts and, 
depending upon its exact configuration, even of Congressman 
Rose's Seventh District in the southeastern comer of the Coastal 
Plain. Id. It was in part at least because of that threat of even 
further realignments of their districts if Chapter 601's plan were not 
precleared that these three Congressmen had urged the state to seeks 
its preclearance by litigation. Stip. Ex. 20. With that possibility 
now gone, these same Congressmen now sought by renewed 
consultations with the redistricting committee members and staff to 
protect their interests against unfavorable realignments in the 
drawing of the new Coastal Plain remedial district. Cohen 
testimony, Tr. pp. 358, 360, 388-92; D. Ex. 425, 426, 429, 430.

A compensating advantage of extending the First District 
even further southward was that by this means the Attorney 
General's objection that the African-American population in the 
south-central and southeastern portions of the state were not 
sufficiently taken into account in the Chapter 601 plan might be 
met. Cohen testimony, Tr. pp. 365-66; D. Ex. 441.

It was the interaction of these problems of protecting 
incumbents while meeting the equal population requirements, 
achieving effective African-American voting majorities, attending to 
the Attorney General's objections to the rejected plan, and observing 
the committees' contiguity criterion that produced the sprawling, 
peculiarly-shaped First District in the challenged Plan. Its overall 
sprawl — its sheer volume — resulted mainly from the need to 
include in it 552,386 persons out of a generally sparsely-populated 
rural region of the state, coupled with the decision to find at least 
80% of them outside cities with populations in excess of 20,000. 
Its sprawls in detail — and it has many — resulted from a variety of



99a
reasons: to include historic "black sections" in various of the towns 
and small cities -- including Fayetteville and Wilmington — 
scattered across the essentially rural, agricultural Coastal Plain; to 
preserve politically-critical core areas in the districts of three 
politically-affected incumbent Congressmen and to avoid pairing 
any of them in realigned districts; and in the process to maintain the 
territorial contiguity required by the committee criteria. Cohen 
testimony, Tr. pp. 329-400, passim.

Many oddities of shape resulted. A great number can be 
laid most directly to incumbent protection. Several examples 
suffice to illustrate.

Though the home precincts of both Congressman Valentine 
in Nash County in the existing Second District and of Congressman 
Lancaster in Goldsboro in the Third were heavily (45%) African- 
American and were geographically situated for ready inclusion in 
the First District, they were retained, as were their entire counties, 
in their existing districts. To compensate, the First District had to 
be extended much further southward to include rural portions of 
Columbus and Bladen Counties with comparable African-American 
populations. Cohen testimony, Tr. p. 364.

The highly irregular shape of the southeast portion of the 
district, with its two narrow extensions into historic "black sections" 
of Fayetteville and Wilmington, resulted directly from the effort to 
preserve the core of Congressman Rose's Seventh District. These 
extensions represent the minimum possible territorial intrusions into 
two key counties, Cumberland and New Hanover, which formerly 
had been entirely in his district, that were thought needed to achieve 
the requisite African-American population for the district.

Perhaps the most striking illustration of the effects of 
incumbent protection upon the final irregularity of the First 
District's shape was the use of a "double cross-over" -  a point of 
contiguity that allows two districts essentially to cross over each 
other -  to allow in this case the southern extension of the First 
District to cut across Congressman Lancaster's existing Third 
District in Duplin County without destroying the technical 
contiguity of either district. Stip. Ex. 42; P-I Ex. Map 1; D. Ex.



100a
419. Its purpose, as explained by Cohen, was to retain critical 
portions of Sampson County lying to the west of this cross-over in 
Lancaster's Third District, as part of a larger purpose to avoid 
pairing in the same district any of the incumbent Democratic 
Congressmen who could be affected by the First District's final 
configuration: Valentine (Second), Lancaster (Third), Rose
(Seventh), and Hefiier (Eighth). Cohen testimony, Tr. pp. 348-49. 
Other examples of irregularities of shape driven largely by concerns 
for incumbent protection abound in the record.

The evolution of the Twelfth District, from its earliest 
precursor in Representative Balmer's 1991 "Congress 8.1" plan, 
through Representative Hardaway's "Optimum Congressional II- 
Zero" plan and the "92 Congress I/Peeler" plan, into its final form in 
the challenged Plan, followed the same general pattern as did the 
First District's. The same combination of factors -- though with 
varying degrees of influence — determined this district's eventual 
location and shape. Again, though the process was complicated, its 
essentials for purposes of this case are largely undisputed and can 
be summarized.

Carrying through the idea of a predominantly urban district 
counterpart to the predominantly rural First District, the 
redistricting committees adopted a mirror-image convention to guide 
the Twelfth District's urban design: at least 80% of its total 
population must be drawn from cities with populations of 20,000 or 
more. Cohen testimony, Tr. pp. 333-35, 430-33, 536; D. Exs. 405, 
406, 407. In the course of the district's evolution, this convention 
dictated the removal from the "92 Congress I/Peeler" base plan of 
large portions of four basically rural counties -  Caswell, Person, 
Granville, and Vance -- along the Virginia border, and the addition 
of historic "black neighborhoods" in the inner cities of Gastonia and 
Winston-Salem, the only Piedmont Crescent cities meeting the 
20,000 criterion that were not included in the district in the original 
base plan. Cohen testimony, Tr. pp. 334, 341-42, 350-51. In the 
end, the design that resulted carried through a simple notion: to link 
the significant concentrations of African-Americans in the historic 
"black neighborhoods" of the various towns and cities closely strung 
along the Piedmont Crescent, achieving the required effective 
minority-race voting majorities by connecting these inner-city



101a
concentrations with narrow corridors designed to achieve the 
purpose of the predominantly urban convention. This produced a 
district which included portions of all the cities of this sub-region 
having populations in excess of 20,000, including four of the state's 
five largest. In its final form, the basic design therefore was that of 
a narrow, jagged band that stretched from inner-city Gastonia to 
inner-city Durham. Cohen testimony, Tr. pp. 331-35, 343, 350-52, 
356-58. And within this basic design there were further detailed 
oddities and irregularities of shape that have, of course, been 
extensively emphasized in descriptions of this district in various 
contexts. Most of these, just as those in the First District, can be 
traced in whole or part to concerns for incumbent protection, 
achieving required minority-race voting majorities, and maintaining 
technical contiguity both within the district and within other districts 
intersected by the Twelfth District's basically ordered long, narrow 
course through the Piedmont Crescent. Chief among these, and 
sufficient for our purposes to illustrate the point, are the several 
"point contiguities" and "double cross-overs" that exist in the 
district's design. The "point contiguities" occur in the narrow 
corridors used to link the "black neighborhoods" which provide the 
principal African-American population concentrations of the 
district. They occur when the political or census block boundaries 
that are being used to define the boundaries of such a corridor 
happen to touch only at a single "point." They serve no independent 
redistricting purpose and could be avoided by the simple but 
meaningless cosmetic device of "splitting" the connecting political 
or census block units just enough to continue the corridor on a front 
of any measurable width. Stip. Ex. 42; Cohen testimony Tr. pp. 
482-86. "Double cross-overs," however, are point contiguities with 
a purpose. Those in the Twelfth District serve the same general 
purpose as the one in the First District. Stip. Ex. 42, pp. 1-3; 
Cohen testimony, Tr. pp. 482-86. They permit the narrow remedial 
district to run completely across the existing district of an 
incumbent Congressman (here, Republican Congressman Coble's 
Sixth District) in a way that preserves the existing district's core 
portions while maintaining the technical contiguity of both.

The General Assembly enacted the challenged Plan, with its 
majority-minority districts in their final forms, as Chapter 7 of the 
1991 Extra Session Laws, on January 24, 1992. The vote was



102a
along partisan political lines. The overwhelming majority of 
Democratic legislators, including all the African-Americans, voted 
in favor of the Plan. Stips. 94-95; Stip. Ex. 36. Chapter 7 was 
precleared under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act on February 6, 1992. 
Stip. 98; Stip. Ex. 39.

The two remedial districts that resulted from this legislative 
process have several significant characteristics. First off, there is 
the obvious fact — in many ways the central fact of this litigation— 
that the shapes of both are highly irregular and geographically non­
compact. Laying aside the litigation-spawned pejoratives — 
bizarre," "grotesque," "ugly," etc. — they are highly irregular and 

geographically non-compact by any objective standard that can be 
conceived, including the shapes of all earlier North Carolina 
congressional districts running back to 1790, Stip. Ex. 53; the 
shapes of all other districts in the challenged Plan (even including 
those most directly affected by shared irregularities of boundary), 
D. Ex. 419; and virtually all mathematical measures of 
geographical compactness devised by social scientists, which reveal 
them to be among the least geographically compact of all recent 
congressional districts in the country. Hofeller testimony, Tr. pp. 
122. And, they are not the two most geographically compact 
remedial districts that could have been drawn — if no other interests 
were considered. Hofeller Testimony, Tr. pp. 123-125; P-I Ex. 301 
Tabs 1-3 ("Shaw II" and "Shaw III" plans).

But the districts also plainly possess the distinctively rural 
(First) and urban (Twelfth) characteristics intended, as 
contemporaneously asserted, by the legislature. Stip. Ex. 38 (§ 5 
submission of Chapter 7). This resulted primarily of course from 
their general locations, in the "rural" Coastal Plain and the "urban" 
Piedmont Crescent respectively, but it undoubtedly was heightened 
in degree by the planners adherence to the 20,000 population 
convention, one of the very factors that indisputably contributed to 
their irregular shapes.

That they are distinctively "rural" and distinctively "urban" 
in character is a fact so much within the common knowledge of 
intelligent inhabitants of the state that it probably is subject to 
judicial notice. McCormick on Evidence, (4th ed. 1992), at § 329.



But if it be needed, there is ample evidence to demonstrate the fact. 
We summarize its core.

The First District is wholly within a predominantly 
agricultural region. Of the state's four counties that have 
agriculture as their principal source of income, all are in the First 
District. The counties included in whole or in part within the 
District had 64% of the state's harvested cropland in 1992. Stuart 
Rpt. p. 23. Five of the top ten tobacco-producing counties in the 
state, seven of the top ten sweet potato-producing counties, all of 
the top ten peanut-producing counties, seven of the top ten in hog 
production, eight of the top ten in cotton production, eight of the top 
ten in farm cash receipts, and seven of the top ten in com for grain 
production are partly or wholly within the First District. Stip. 123. 
The district is without question predominantly rural in character.

Correspondingly, the Twelfth District is wholly within a 
predominantly urban, industrialized area of the state — the most 
heavily industrialized of its regions. Of its citizens, 86.3% reside in 
urban areas as defined by the Census Bureau. D. Ex. 401, p. 35, 
table 19. This measure of urbanness applies to African-American 
and white residents alike: at least two-thirds of the districts white 
residents and three-fourths of its African-American residents live in 
urban areas as so defined. Lichtman testimony, Tr. pp. 791-93; D. 
Ex. 440. The Twelfth District is without question predominantly 
urban in character.

Reflecting their distinctive rural and urban natures, the 
more important fact for our purposes is that the two districts, as 
mtended by the legislature, have correspondingly different and 
distinctive communities of interest. And, even more important, 
there are within each of the districts substantial, relatively high 
degrees of homogeneity of shared socio-economic -  hence political - 

interests and needs among its citizens. Belying any intuitive 
assumption that the very bi-racial make-up and the irregularity of 
shape and geographical non-compactness of these districts would 
reflect great diversity and conflicts of interest among their citizens, 
both anecdotal and expert opinion evidence demonstrates the 
contrary. Inhabitants of both districts, drawing on their specific life 
experiences in the areas, are able to bear witness to the homogeneity

103a



104a
of the material conditions and interests of the citizens of each; 
respected scholars of the regions concur. Stuart Rpt. pp. 23, 25, 29 
(First District); Goldfield Rpt. p. 2 (Twelfth District); Institute for 
Research in Social Science, Univ. of No, Car., Stip. Ex. 49, pp. 1, 2 
(Twelfth District); D-I Wit. Sts. Nos. 2 (Alvarez), at pp. 2-5; 3 
(Albright); 4 (Rash) at pp. 4-8; 9 (Davis), at pp. 4-5; 12 (Burts) at 
pp. 4-5; 25 (Emerson) at pp. 25-26 (Lambeth); 27 (McGovern).

These individual observations are validated on a larger 
scale by expert opinion concerning the homogeneity of basic 
interests in each of the districts. Based upon reliable analyses using 
accepted political-social science methodology, the two districts are 
among the most, rather than the least, homogeneous of the current 
twelve, in terms of the material conditions and political opinions of 
their citizens, whether only its white citizens, or only its African- 
American, or both together are considered. D. Ex. 401, pp. 11-25, 
Tables 3, 4, and 8.58

This distinctiveness of shared interests as between the two 
districts, and the homogeneity of those interests within each, are not 
accidental occurrences. They directly resulted from the legislature's 
contemporaneously-expressed purpose, in designing a plan to 
comply with the Voting Rights Act, to observe as a guiding 
districting principle the desirability of having districts with 
significant communities of interest as well as the necessary remedial 
racial compositions. Their deliberate location in different regions of

58 This analysis was performed and reported by Dr. Allan Lichtman, the state's 
expert witness who testified at trial. Plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenors objected 
to large portions of his testimony and the exhibits used to illustrate it, on the 
ground that his analysis of the distinctive homogeneities of the two districts was 
largely based on 1990 census data that was not available to the legislature during 
the redistricting process. For this reason, it was contended, this data, hence 
Lichtman's analysis in reliance upon it, was irrelevant to any issue of legislative 
intent in constructing these districts. We disagree. As with the objective 
evidence of the continued existence of the threshold Gingles conditions, see 
supra n.56, this evidence was relevant to validate the legislature's more intuitive 
and experiential perception — contemporaneously expressed — that the districts 
would indeed have just such high degrees of commonalities of interest — of 
homogeneity. Had there been contrary evidence — that they did not — its 
relevance to demonstrate the pretextual nature of the state's asserted purpose in 
constructing them so would have been obvious. There was none.



105a
the state having well and long-established historical integrities and 
distinctive cultures and economies insured that they would be such 
districts. Goldfield Rpt. pp. 1011, 15.

There is no convincing evidence in the record that the 
irregularities and lack of geographical compactness of these two 
districts have had or are having any significant adverse effect upon 
their citizens' interests in fair and effective representation — in 
matters either of voting or access to their elected representatives. 
Indeed, such evidence as there is on the matter preponderates in the 
other direction.

Plaintiffs point to evidence of extremely low (6%) name 
recognition of Twelfth District Representative Watt in a 
postelection sample survey of his constituents. O'Rourke testimony, 
Tr. p. 232. One of the plaintiffs, a Duke University Law Professor 
testified that though he was not confused as to his residence within 
the Twelfth District by its odd shape, a Duke History Professor 
neighbor of his reported being so. Shimm testimony, Tr. pp. 1086- 
87. A High Point businessman reported being surprised to find 
when he went to vote, that he was in the Twelfth District. Froelich 
Aff. p. 2. Beyond this, there was only opinion evidence that as a 
general proposition geographical non-compactness tends to make 
both campaigning, voting, and effective representation more 
difficult, O'Rourke testimony, Tr. pp. 209, 232, and some anecdotal 
evidence of instances of supposed inattentiveness of the two recently 
elected representatives to particular events or localities in their 
districts. E.g. Shimm testimony, Tr. pp. 1090-92.

On the other hand, voter participation in the 1992 
congressional elections in North Carolina -  with its quite recently 
created, peculiarly-shaped, non-compact districts ~  was higher than 
the national average that year. It was also higher than that in any 
neighboring state — all of which had relatively more compact 
congressional districts overall. And it was higher than that in the 
1988 congressional elections in North Carolina, when the state's 
districts overall were more geographically compact. Lichtman 
testimony, Tr. pp. 819-22; D. Ex. 440, pp. 61, 62, 64, Tables 40, 
41, 42. Nor did the irregularities resulting from the splitting of 
some counties between two or even three congressional districts



106a
have any demonstrable negative effect on voter participation in the 
1992 congressional elections. In fact, according to data assembled 
by plaintiff-intervenors' own expert, Dr. O'Rourke, of the ten 
counties in the state where voter "roll-off' between the 1992 
presidential and congressional elections was greatest, six were not 
divided, and of the ten where there was either no roll-off or even 
greater participation in the congressional elections, six were divided 
into two districts and one into three. O'Rourke testimony, Tr. pp. 
263-66.

Though the parties offered some evidence, largely 
anecdotal, about the extent to which the districts' configurations 
might affect the degree of accessibility to and responsiveness of the 
two districts' representatives,59 we think it too meager — given their 
short terms in office -- to support any fair finding of fact on the 
subject. The few physical facts of the districts' configurations in 
relation to transportation facilities, media markets, commuting 
patterns and volumes certainly do not support any finding that their 
irregularities of shape necessarily will make their representatives 
less accessible and responsive than those of other districts.60

59 A completely separate matter, unrelated to the effect of the remedial districts' 
shapes upon the accessibility and responsiveness of their representatives to all 
their constituents, is the question whether, without regard to their shapes, the 
very remedial purpose of the districts necessarily inhibits the ability of any 
African-American representatives elected from them to provide fair and effective 
representation to non-minority constituents. This obviously is an important 
political question for Congress concerning the remedial provisions of the Voting 
Rights Act, but it is irrelevant to any legal issue in this case turning on the 
peculiar shapes of these districts. We mention it only to indicate why we 
discount as legally irrelevant the opposing evidence on the subject offered by the 
parties: for the plaintiffs, Professor Shimm's opinion that the very remedial 
purpose of the districts necessarily prevented fair and effective representation by 
African-Americans of non-minority constituents such as he, Shimm testimony Tr. 
p. 1090; for the defendants, that in fact, the two current representatives had been 
called upon and had responded more frequently during their terms to requests for 
services and expressions of views by white than African-American constituents. 
Lichtman Report, p. 66, Table 43.

60 That objective evidence should reveal — perhaps counterintuitively — that the 
extreme "ugliness" of these districts has little if any effect of itself on fair and 
effective representation is unsurprising once a moment's honest reflection is put 
to it. Their perceived "ugliness" — their extreme irregularity of shape -  is 
entirely a function of an artificial perspective unrelated to the common goings



107a
Aside from their irregularities of shape and lack of 

geographical compactness, their urban and rural natures, and the 
resulting homogeneity of interests within them, the districts have 
two other characteristics of relevance to the legal issues.

First, they are generally located in areas of the state where 
violations of the Voting Rights Act have occurred. All or portions 
of 22 of the First District's 27 counties are covered by § 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act. Stip. 109. In the Gingles litigation in the mid- 
1980s, § 2 violations were found in 11 of these counties. Since 
Gingles, 21 counties and cities within the District have been subject 
to § 2 actions which resulted in changes from at-large local election 
systems. Keech Dep., Tables 8A and 8B. Two of the ten counties 
included in part in the Twelfth District, Gaston and Guilford, are 
covered by § 5. Stip. 110. In the Gingles litigation, § 2 violations 
were found in both of these counties. Since Gingles, a number of § 
2 actions have resulted in changes to local election systems in four 
of the Twelfth District's counties: Guilford, Forsyth, Davidson, and 
Iredell. Keech Dep., Tables 8A and 8B.

and comings of the citizen-voter. From the mapmakefs wholly imaginary 
vertical perspective at 1:25,000 or so range, a citizen may well find his district's 
one-dimensional, featureless shape aesthetically "bizarre," "grotesque," or 
ugly. But back down at ground or eye-level, viewing things from his normal 

closely-bounded horizontal perspective, the irregularity of outline or exact 
volume of the district in which he resides surely is not a matter of any great 
practical consequence to his conduct as citizen-voter. In the earth-bound, 
horizontal workaday world of his political and other lives, it surely never occurs 
to him — until aroused to dislike something else about his district or his 
representative — that the lines that include him with others in a particular 
electoral district wander irregularly rather than evenly to enclose them. What 
happens is that after every re-drawing of the lines of any of the various 
overlapping electoral districts in which he resides, he leams quickly enough (if 
interested enough), either by official notice or unofficially, that he is now in the 
same or a new district that is identified by a number. He has no idea where 
exactly on the earth's surface the lines of the district -  mostly invisible from this 
live perspective — run throughout their course. Nor does he need to know in 
order to conduct his political affairs effectively as a citizen of the district. In due 
course he leams that candidates A and B are contending for his vote, leams what 
he wants to about them, re-leams where his present voting location is, casts his 
vote, and thereafter has whatever contact he wants with his representative, 
completely unaffected either by where exactly his district boundaries lie, his lack 
of exact knowledge of their location, or by any "ugliness" that may from the 
mapmaker’s perspective result from their irregular shape.



108a
Second, the two districts have but narrow African- 

American voting majorities: in the First District, 50.5% of the 
registered voters; in the Twelfth District, 53.5% of the registered 
voters. Though African-American candidates were elected to 
represent both districts in the first elections held under the Plan, it is 
demonstrably the case in North Carolina that such narrow voting 
majorities do not assure election of minority candidates. Of the 
eight majority-minority House and Senate districts created to 
comply with § 2 of the Voting Rights Act pursuant to the judgment 
in Gingles, three are presently represented by whites elected to 
office despite the minority-race voting majorities in those districts.

C. Summary of Ultimate Facts Found

1. In enacting the challenged congressional redistricting plan, 
the General Assembly of North Carolina deliberately 
created two districts, the First and the Twelfth, that would 
have narrow, but effective voting majorities of African- 
American citizens, specifically intending thereby to give the 
African-American citizens of those districts a reasonable 
opportunity to elect representatives of their choice.

2. The General Assembly did this in order to comply with § § 
2 and 5 of the Voting rights Act, on the basis of the well- 
founded belief of a sufficient majority of its membership 
that failure to do so would, or might well, violate one or 
both of those provisions.

3. Though there was some sentiment in the General Assembly 
that doing so was warranted simply as remedy for the 
state's long and continuing history of race-discrimination in 
matters of voting, that sentiment was not sufficient in 
voting power to have caused the legislative action 
independent of the perceived compulsion of the Voting 
Rights Act.

4. The two districts are highly irregular in their shapes and 
extreme in their lack of geographical compactness as 
compared to other districts in the plan or to other districts 
nationally. They are not the two most geographically



109a
compact majority-minority districts that could have been 
created were no factors other than equal population 
requirements and effective minority-race voting majorities 
taken into account.

5. The exact locations and highly irregular shapes of the two
districts result from a combination of factors that 
influenced legislative choices: the equal-population
requirements in relation to the population dispersions in the 
areas of their locations; the need for effective African- 
American voting majorities; the legislative intention to 
create one predominantly rural (First) and one 
predominantly urban (Twelfth) district, and, concomitantly, 
two districts with distinctive and internally homogeneous 
commonalities of interest; incumbent protection; and the 
maintenance of technical territorial contiguity. After the 
equal population and majority-minority imperatives, the 
most important factor for the legislature was the creation of 
districts with distinctive and internally homogeneous 
communities of interest. In according primacy to these 
redistricting principles, the legislature necessarily had to 
subordinate geographical compactness and respect for the 
integrity of political subdivisions, and did so.

6. The irregularities of shape and lack of geographical 
compactness of the two districts have not demonstrably 
affected adversely the fair and effective representation of 
their citizens. The present representatives, both African- 
Americans, are able effectively to maintain their 
accessibility to constituents by the standard devices of the 
integrity of mailings, local offices, and personal visits to 
their districts.



Conclusions of Law

This three-judge district court has jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and 2284.

The substantive nature of the Equal Protection claim 
remanded to this court by the Supreme Court is as defined 
and discussed in Part II-A of this Opinion. See supra at 
14-20.

The plaintiffs and their supporting intervenors have 
standing to maintain the Equal Protection claim remanded 
to this court by the Supreme Court, because they have 
established that they are registered to vote in North 
Carolina's congressional elections and that the challenged 
redistricting plan assigns them to vote in particular electoral 
districts at least in part because of their race. See supra at 
20-30.

The state defendants' concession that, in designing the 
challenged congressional redistricting plan, the General 
Assembly of North Carolina deliberately drew two districts 
— the First and the Twelfth — so that African-American 
citizens had a voting majority in each, established prima 
facie that the Plan was a "racial gerrymander" that violated 
the Equal Protection Clause. See supra at 30-47. This had 
the effect of subjecting the Plan to judicial strict scrutiny to 
determine whether its use of race could yet be justified as a 
"narrowly tailored" means of furthering a "compelling state 
interest." Id.

In this strict scrutiny inquiry, the initial burden has been 
upon the state to come forward with evidence that the Plan's 
use of race was so justified. See supra at 51-54. But the 
burden of persuasion has remained throughout upon the 
plaintiffs to prove the Plan unconstitutional, and that 
burden extends to disproving any justification adequately 
advanced by the state. Id.



111a
6. As explained more fully in Conclusions of Law 7 and 8 

below, the state has produced sufficient evidence that the 
challenged Plan's use of race is narrowly tailored to further 
one or more compelling state interests to carry its burden of 
production under strict scrutiny analysis.

7. The state has adequately established that it had a 
"compelling interest" in enacting a race-based congressional 
redistricting plan, by demonstrating that it had a "strong 
basis in evidence" for concluding that such action was 
necessary to bring its existing congressional redistricting 
scheme into compliance with §§ 2 and 5 of the Voting 
Rights Act. See supra at 54-69.

The General Assembly had a "strong basis in evidence" for 
concluding that enactment of a race-based redistricting plan 
was necessary to avoid a violation of § 2 of the Act, 
because it was aware from a variety of sources -- including 
earlier legislative experience with § 2 challenges to 
redistricting plans, legal advice, and general personal 
knowledge — that African-American voters could very 
likely make out a prima facie § 2 challenge to its original 
Chapter 601 plan, or any other plan that did not contain 
two majority-minority districts, see supra at 119-24, and 
that the state could not defend a § 2 challenge to such a 
plan by arguing that it nonetheless provided African- 
Americans with equal political and electoral opportunity 
because it gave them a majority in a number of 
congressional districts that was roughly proportional to 
their share of the state's voting-age population as a whole.
See supra at 123. Compare DeGrandy,__  U.S. a t ___,
62 U.S.L.W. at 4760-62.

The General Assembly also had a "strong basis in 
evidence" for concluding that enactment of a race-based 
congressional redistricting plan was necessary to comply 
with § 5 of the Act, because the Justice Department had 
denied preclearance to its original Chapter 601 plan on the 
ground that it failed to satisfy the "purpose" prong of § 5, 
and the state reasonably concluded, after conducting its



112a
own independent reassessment of the Chapter 601 plan in 
light of the concerns identified by the Justice Department, 
that the Justice Department's conclusion was legally and 
factually supportable. See supra at 125. Compare Hays I, 
839 F. Supp. at 1196 & n. 21 (Justice Department had not 
denied § 5 preclearance to earlier version of same 
congressional redistricting plan).

That the General Assembly did not make specific 
legislative findings that the Chapter 601 plan would violate 
the Voting Rights Act is of no consequence, see Wygant, 
476 U.S. at 277-78 (plurality); id. at 289-91 (O'Connor, J., 
concurring), for it is clear from the record as a whole that 
the General Assembly was in fact "attempting to remedy its 
own unlawful conduct," rather than "to alleviate the wrongs 
suffered through general societal discrimination," id. at 
289, when it enacted Chapter 7, and that it "act[ed] on the 
basis of information which g[ave] [it] a sufficient basis for 
concluding that [such] remedial action [was] necessary." 
Id. at 291. Compare Croson, 488 U.S. at 498-506 
(majority) (state failed to demonstrate a compelling interest 
in engaging in race-based remedial action where it could not 
show that it was attempting to remedy identified instances 
of past or present discrimination within its own jurisdiction, 
but only general societal discrimination in the country as a 
whole). That the state initially took the position, when 
enacting the Chapter 601 plan and seeking its preclearance, 
that the plan would not violate the Voting Rights Act, does 
not mean that it did not have a "substantial basis" for 
concluding that the plan would violate the Voting Rights 
Act when it later decided to abandon that plan and enact the 
Chapter 7 plan in its stead, and that its assertions to that 
effect must be dismissed as nothing but "weak post-hoc 
rationalizations." Post, at 180. The record as a whole 
firmly establishes that while the state may have believed in 
good faith that the Chapter 601 plan would not violate the 
Voting Rights Act when it first enacted and sought 
preclearance for that plan, it later reassessed that belief in 
light of the objections raised by the Justice Department in 
its denial of preclearance, and concluded -  with



113a
considerable justification — that it may well have been 
erroneous.

8. The state has adequately established that the Plan creating 
the two remedial districts was "narrowly tailored" to serve 
the compelling interests discussed above. First, the state 
has demonstrated that the Plan does not create more 
majority-minority districts than is reasonably necessary to 
comply with the Voting Rights Act, and that the African- 
American voting majorities in each of those districts 
(50.5% and 53.5%, respectively) are no greater than is 
reasonably necessary to give African-Americans a 
reasonable opportunity to elect representatives of their 
choice in them. See supra at 74-76. Compare Hays I, 839 
F. Supp. at 1207-08 (race-based redistricting plan not 
"narrowly tailored" where it "packed" minority voters into 
majority-minority districts in percentages much greater than 
reasonably necessary to give them a fair opportunity to 
elect representatives of their choice in those districts). 
Second, the state has demonstrated that the Plan does not 
impose a rigid quota for African-American representation 
in North Carolina's Congressional delegation, but only a 
flexible goal, see supra at 76-78, and that that goal (2 out 
of 12 seats, or 16.7%) bears a reasonable relation to the 
percentage of African-American voters in the state's 
population as a whole (22%), see supra at 80-81. Third, 
the state has demonstrated that the Plan is a remedial 
measure of limited duration, which will automatically 
expire at the end of the ten-year redistricting cycle, and thus 
will last no longer than is reasonably necessary to eliminate 
the effects of the particular discrimination it is designed to 
redress. See supra at 78-80. Finally, the state has 
demonstrated that the Plan does not impose an undue 
burden on the rights of innocent third parties (such as 
plaintiffs in this case), because it complies with 
constitutional "one person, one vote" requirements, does not 
unconstitutionally dilute the voting strength of any 
identifiable group of voters, and creates districts which, 
though highly irregular in shape and relatively non-compact 
geographically, are nonetheless based on rational districting



114a
principles that ensure fair and effective representation to all 
citizens covered by them, since they are deliberately 
designed to be and are in fact highly homogeneous in terms 
of their citizens' material conditions and interests, and do 
not significantly inhibit access to and responsiveness of 
their elected representatives. See supra at 81-102.

9. The plaintiffs have not carried their burden of proving that 
the justification the state has advanced for the challenged 
Plan's use of race is untenable, either because the interest 
identified was not a "compelling" one or because the means 
used were not "narrowly tailored" to its achievement. Their 
only challenges to the two bases of justification advanced 
have been legal ones which are without merit, as is 
necessarily implied in our conclusions of law 7 and 8.

10. The challenged congressional redistricting plan does not 
violate any rights of the plaintiffs or their supporting 
intervenors under the Equal Protection Clause. Judgment 
accordingly will be entered for the state defendants 
dismissing this action on the merits.



115a
V.

Conclusion

The question in the end is whether a deliberately race-based 
districting plan enacted by an overwhelmingly white legislature in 
one of the former Confederate states in order to comply with its 
understanding of the commands of national law enacted to enforce 
the guarantees of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments shall be 
declared unconstitutional at the behest of five white voters whose 
voting rights have been in no legally cognizable way harmed by the 
plan. We have concluded that under controlling law and the 
material facts of this case, the legislation passes strict scrutiny as a 
sufficiently narrowly tailored effort by the state legislature to serve 
the state's compelling interest in complying with that national 
remedial law.

Pointing essentially to the odd shapes of the two districts 
resulting in part -- though by no means entirely -- from the 
legislature's racial design, the plaintiffs, through counsel, have 
characterized the plan as a "constitutional crime." We have 
concluded instead that, under controlling law, it is a justifiable 
invocation of a concededly drastic, historically conditioned remedy 
in order to continue the laborious struggle to break free of a legacy 
of official discrimination and racial bloc voting in North Carolina's 
electoral processes that has played a significant part in the ability of 
any African-American citizen of North Carolina, despite repeated 
responsible efforts, to be elected to Congress in a century. We 
decline in this case to put a halt to the effort by declaring the plan 
unconstitutional.



116a
VOORHEES, Chief District Judge, concurring in part, and 
dissenting in part:

I concur in the majority's findings here that the Plaintiffs 
have sufficient standing to bring suit under the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and further that Plaintiffs 
have successfully carried their burden of showing a racial 
gerrymander, for which the State of North Carolina must now offer 
compelling justification. I also concur in the majority's finding that 
Plaintiffs retain the ultimate burden of persuasion throughout these 
proceedings. However, I register my dissent as to the balance of the 
majority's opinion.

I .

Nature of the Constitutional Wrong

I agree that the evidence presented at trial wholly supports 
the finding here of a racial gerrymander, and that as such North 
Carolina's redistricting plan must survive strict scrutiny before it 
can be said to pass constitutional muster. Indeed, one glance at the 
map suffices to demonstrate to even the most casual observer the 
existence of at the very least a suspect intent on the part of the 
North Carolina General Assembly, a suspect intent that in itself 
demands explanation and justification.1 But I would go one step 
further than the majority in assessing the significance of the shapes 
of the districts currently before us, consistent with my reading of the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Shaw v. Reno.

The majority's opinion explicitly limits the relevance of the 
districts' odd shapes to circumstantial evidence of the State's alleged 
discriminatory intent. See ante at 38-40, 86. Where the legislature 
has conceded such an unlawful intent, as its witnesses have 
explicitly done here, the majority would dismiss any evidence of

1 Justice Souter remarks in his dissent in Shaw that "[t]he shape of the district 
at issue in this case is indeed so bizarre that few other examples are ever likely 
to carry the unequivocal implication of impermissible use of race that the Court
finds here." Shaw v. Reno, ___U .S .___ , ___, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2848 (1993)
(Souter, J., dissenting).



117a
district shape as essentially duplicative.2 This approach, however, 
ignores the special breed of harms recently recognized by the 
Supreme Court in Shaw, a breed of harms "analytically distinct" 
from any associated with the mere intent to discriminate. Shaw, 
U.S. at , 113 S. Ct. at 2830 ("Nothing in [United Jewish 
Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977)] precludes white 
voters (or voters of any other race) from bringing the analytically 
distinct claim that a reapportionment plan rationally cannot be 
understood as anything other than an effort to segregate citizens into 
separate voting districts on the basis of race without sufficient 
justification"). The Court in Shaw characterized those harms 
explicitly as follows:

Put differently, we believe that reapportionment is 
one area in which appearances do matter. A 
reapportionment plan that includes in one district 
individuals who belong to the same race, but who 
are otherwise widely separated by geographical and 
political boundaries, and who may have little in 
common with one another but the color of their 
skin, bears an uncomfortable resemblance to 
political apartheid. It reinforces the perception that 
members of the same racial group -- regardless of 
their age, education, economic status, or the 
community in which they live -  think alike, share 
the same political interests, and will prefer the same 
candidates at the polls. We have rejected such 
perceptions elsewhere as impermissible racial 
stereotypes. By perpetuating such notions, a racial 
gerrymander may exacerbate the very patterns of 
racial bloc voting that majority-minority districting 
is sometimes said to counteract.

The message that such districting sends to 
elected representatives is equally pernicious. When 
a district obviously is created solely to effectuate

Likewise, Justice Stevens argues in dissent that "[ejvidence of the district's 
shape is therefore convincing, but it is also cumulative, and, for our purposes, 
irrelevant." Shaw,___U.S. a t___ , 113 S. Ct. at 2844 (Stevens, J., dissenting).



118a
the perceived common interests of one racial group, 
elected officials are more likely to believe that their 
primary obligation is to represent only the members 
of that group, rather than their constituency as a 
whole. This is altogether antithetical to our system 
of representative democracy.

*  *  *

Justice Souter apparently believes that 
racial gerrymandering is harmless unless it dilutes a 
racial group's voting strength. As we have 
explained, however, reapportionment legislation 
that cannot be understood as anything other than an 
effort to classify and separate voters by race 
injures voters in other ways. It reinforces racial 
stereotypes and threatens to undermine our system 
of representative democracy by signaling to elected 
officials that they represent a particular racial 
group rather than their constituency as a whole. 
Justice Souter does not adequately explain why 
these harms are not cognizable under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.

*  *  *

Racial classifications with respect to voting 
cany particular dangers. Racial gerrymandering, 
even for remedial purposes, may balkanize us into 
competing racial factions; it threatens to carry us 
further from the goal of a political system in which 
race no longer matters — a goal that the Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth Amendments embody, and to which 
the Nation continues to aspire.

Id. at ___, 113 S. Ct. at 2827-32 (citations omitted) (emphasis
added). In short, race-based districting creates racially conscious 
districts and foments racial polarization within them.



119a
As observed by Justice White in his dissent in Shaw, "[t]he 

logic of [the majority's] theory appears to be that race-conscious 
redistricting that 'segregates' by drawing odd-shaped lines is 
qualitatively different from race-conscious redistricting that affects
groups in some other way." Id. a t___, 113 S. Ct. at 2838 (White,
J., dissenting). Indeed, Justice White's observation is consistent 
with my reading of Shaw v. Reno as well. The majority here, 
however, fails even to acknowledge this significant distinction, 
instead implicitly subscribing to Justice White's argument that "[t]he 
consideration of race in 'segregation' cases is no different than in 
other race-conscious districting . . . .  A plan that 'segregates' being 
functionally indistinguishable from any of the other varieties of 
gerrymandering, we should be consistent in what we require from a
claimant: Proof of discriminatory purpose and effect." Id. at __ .
113 S. Ct. at 2840-41.3 Of course, this assumes first that a plan 
that "segregates" is, a priori, functionally indistinguishable from a 
more compact redistricting plan, an assumption that ignores the 
special breed of harms recognized by the Supreme Court, and 
second that the only cognizable "effects" under the Equal Protection 
Clause therefore are vote dilution and obstruction of voter access.
See id. a t ___, 113 S. Ct. at 2836 (White, J., dissenting) (equal
protection violation "only where the electoral system substantially 
disadvantages certain voters in their opportunity to influence the 
political process effectively"). That Shaw requires the State to 
justify not only its concededly discriminatory intent but also its 
scheme of implementation as a matter of constitutional relevance 
should not be surprising but expected in light of the divisive role 
that race has played in American society to date.4

3 Hence the majority's observation that the Equal Protection claim here "is, in 
effect, the same basic claim that the Court has recognized in other contexts in 
which race-based remedial measures, or 'affirmative action,' undertaken by state 
actors have been challenged, typically by members of the majority race claiming 
'reverse discrimination.'" See ante at 19. However, the majority disregards the 
fact that it was the shapes of North Carolina's congressional districts that 
prompted the instant litigation in the first place, and that it was likewise district 
shape, as a manifestation of legislative intent, that gave the Supreme Court 
considerable cause for concern on appeal. Nonetheless, the majority's opinion 
inexplicably renders district shape irrelevant altogether under the facts of this 
case. For the reasons discussed here, I would find that the Equal Protection 
claim recognized by the Court in Shaw is substantively distinguishable from 
more familiar "reverse discrimination" claims.



120a
Not long ago, in Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986), 

a plurality of the Supreme Court observed that "the valid or invalid 
configuration of the [politically gerrymandered] districts was an 
issue we did not need to consider," id. at 142, since the Court 
expressly determined that "aside from election results, none of the 
facts found by the district court were relevant to the question of 
discriminatory effects." Id. at 142 n. 20 (opinion by White, J.). 
Significantly, the Court in Shaw found that at least in the context of 
racial gerrymanders the configuration of districts is indeed relevant 
to the question of "discriminatory effects." In that regard, it seems 
clear from the cited language in Shaw, and from notions of logic and 
common sense, that a racially gerrymandered district of the tortuous 
nature presented here inflicts a harm qualitatively distinct from that 
imposed by an intentionally created majority-minority district whose 
contours are geographically compact and contiguous, a harm that 
the Supreme Court has found to be cognizable under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The constitutional injury here, then, derives not only 
from the nature of the State's ultimate objective — namely, to 
classify citizens on the basis of their race — but also from the means 
employed to achieve that objective — namely, voting districts so 
grossly misshapen as necessarily to divide and stigmatize their 
citizenry along racial lines. As the legislature must go to greater 
and greater lengths of disfigurement to achieve a racially 
preconceived result because of the dispersion of minority voters 
among the population, the districts at last become so bizarre in 
shape that they can only be perceived as racially designated 
districts.4 5 At this point, the harm has achieved a constitutional 
dimension and the shapes of the districts an unconstitutional one.6

4 The majority's reliance on discriminatory intent alone cannot be reconciled 
with the Supreme Court's express reservation of the question of whether the 
deliberate creation of majority-minority districts, without more, always triggers
strict scrutiny. See Shaw,___U.S. a t___ , 113 S. Ct. at 2828 ("we express no
view as to whether the intentional creation of majority-minority districts, 
without more,' always gives rise to an equal protection claim").

5 Indeed, the testimony of District 12's congressional representative, Mel Watt, 
speaks for itself. See, e.g., Tr. pp. 999-1001 ("representing a district that you are
consistent with in your philosophies allows you to be consistent in voting your 
conscience without buckling under or catering, as you said my statement said, to 
other interests that may not predominate in my district [such as the business or 
white community']") (emphasis added).



121a
In order to prevail the State should therefore be required to 

offer a compelling justification for the means employed as well as 
the ends served. The evidence adduced simply does not support a 
finding of such justification. Put another way, I would find the 
districts created here to be inherently defective, by characterization 
not sufficiently "narrowly tailored" to survive strict scrutiny. To 
dismiss the relevance of district shape from our inquiry otherwise is 
to ignore the Supreme Court's mandate in this particular case.7

II.

Lack of lustification

The primary justification proffered by the State for its 
redistricting plan, on which the majority here entirely relies, is its 
statutory duty to comply with the Voting Rights Act.8 The State

0 The majoritys opinion cites a host of legislative concerns, including 
incumbent protection, equal-population requirements, and district homogeneity, 
that affected the specific contours of the districts at issue here. See ante at 146- 
47. That such concerns played a role in the redistricting process is indisputable. 
Equally indisputable, however, is the fact that race, and race alone, was the sine 
qua non not only for the need for majority-minority districts generally, but also 
for the need to draw district lines of such peculiar shape, a fact of which the 
majority too easily loses sight.

7 Curiously enough, the majority's opinion seems to recognize the significance 
of "stigmatic" harm in its discussion on standing. See ante at 20-30 ("In other 
contexts, the Supreme Court has recognized that a state's use of racial 
classifications necessarily inflicts 'stigmatic' injury, which, though 'abstract' in 
the sense that it cannot easily be quantified, is sufficient 'injury in fact' to give 
any citizen who has been 'personally denied equal treatment' by such a 
classification standing to challenge it under the Equal Protection Clause") 
(citations omitted). Why the significance of such stigmatic harm is not 
recognized by the majority in the present context is puzzling, although not 
altogether surprising given the majority opinion's feverish concluding 
characterization of the case before us. See ante at 154 ("The question in the end 
is whether a deliberately race-based districting plan enacted by an 
overwhelmingly white legislature in one of the former Confederate states in 
order to comply with its understanding of the commands of national law enacted 
to enforce the guarantees of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments shall be 
declared unconstitutional at the behest of five white voters whose voting rights 
have been in no legally cognizable way harmed by the plan").

8 The majority contends that the redistricting plan enacted by North Carolina 
here is most closely analogous to a "voluntarily" adopted affirmative action plan



122a
argues that it had a duty to comply both with § 2 and with § 5 of 
the Act, thereby necessitating at least two majority-minority 
districts, if not these two majority-minority districts in particular. 
Keeping in mind the crucial distinction between compact and non­
compact majority-minority districts and the implications thereof as 
recognized in Shaw, I will address each of the State's arguments, 
and the majority's disposition thereof, in turn.

A. Compliance With Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act

The State first asserts that it had a compelling interest in 
complying with § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, and that failure to 
create the districts at issue might very well have resulted in liability 
thereunder. Essentially the State argues that it had a duty to 
anticipate a potential violation of the Voting Rights Act and to 
remedy such a violation in a timely fashion. As the Supreme Court 
has recognized, "[t]he States certainly have a very strong interest in 
complying with federal antidiscrimination laws that are 
constitutionally valid as interpreted and as applied." Shaw, _
U.S. at ___, 113 S. Ct. at 2830. In order to rely on such an
interest, however, the State must at the very least demonstrate that 
"it has convincing evidence that remedial action is warranted. That 
is, it must have sufficient evidence to justify the conclusion that 
there has been [some violation of the Voting Rights Act]." Wygant 
v. Jackson Bd. o f  Education, 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986)(plurality 
opinion) (regarding remedial action for prior discrimination). In 
other words, the trial court must make a factual determination that 
the State "had a strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that 
remedial action was necessary." Id.

for purposes of analysis under the Equal Protection clause, and as such may 
require less scrutiny than a "judicially-imposed" plan. See ante at 48 n. 21. If, 
as the majority maintains, the State alternatively faced liability under § 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act or denial of preclearance by the Department of Justice, I fail 
to see how its actions were "voluntary." The majority's opinion elsewhere 
characterizes the Voting Rights Act as an exercise of Congress' "constitutional 
mandate" pursuant to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Ante at 100. 
Accordingly, a state's obligation to comply with the Act would hardly seem 
elective. The distinction here between "voluntary" and "judicially-imposed" 
remedial plans on the facts of this case should therefore play no role in the legal 
analysis.



123a
The Supreme Court in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 

(1986), set out the threshold requirements for a vote dilution claim 
under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. First, a minority group must 
be able to demonstrate that it is "sufficiently large and 
geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member 
district." Id. at 50 (footnote omitted). Second, the minority group 
must be able to show that it is "politically cohesive." Id. at 51. 
Third, the minority must be able to demonstrate that "the white 
majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it ... to defeat the 
minority's preferred candidate." Id. (citation omitted). These being 
the threshold requirements for liability under § 2 for vote dilution, 
it follows that North Carolina must have had a "strong basis" in 
evidence for concluding that these three requirements had been met 
and that remedial action was therefore necessary.

It is significant to note as a preliminary matter that there is 
absolutely no evidence whatsoever in the legislative history of 
Chapter 7 regarding violations of the Voting Rights Act, or the 
necessity for any remedial action, other than as a response to the 
Attorney General's objections lodged against the State's initial 
redistricting proposal. Certainly no legislative findings were ever 
made during the redistricting process concerning the relevance of 
the factors set out in Gingles; on the contrary, in its submission to 
the Department of Justice in support of Chapter 601, its original 
redistricting plan, the State expressly disavowed the importance 
thereof altogether.9 The majority here makes only conclusory

9 In support of the State's first redistricting proposal (Chapter 601), and in reply 
to certain comments filed by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) 
arguing in favor of a second majority-minority district pursuant to Gingles, 
supra, Gerry Cohen, the Director of Legislative Drafting for the North Carolina 
General Assembly, submitted a memorandum dated October 14, 1991 
(hereinafter the "Memorandum"), to the Department of Justice on behalf of 
House Redistricting Committee co-Chairman Toby Fitch, Senate Redistricting 
Committee Chairman Dennis Winner, and House Speaker Daniel T. Blue. In 
rejecting the ACLUs contentions regarding a second district, the State's 
Memorandum first noted that the findings in Gingles concerning North 
Carolina's racial disparities were ten years old and based on statistics dating 
back to 1978. Stip. Ex. 25 at 16. It asserted that "the gains [in black voter 
registration] that the three-judge court had said had not occurred by the time of 
the 1983 trial have now occurred." Id. At various points in the Memorandum, 
moreover, the State proclaimed "an end to any discrimination in voter



124a

registration" and "an end to the kind of discriminatory history recited both [sic] 
in the Congressional history of the 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act." 
Id. at 16-17, 70.

As for racial appeals in political campaigns, another consideration 
under Gingles, the State asserted that "aside from the racial appeals attributed to 
Jesse Helms in 1990, the ACLU shows no evidence of them in the past decade 
since Gingles." Id. at 17. The State further disputed the ACLUs allegations 
concerning continued polarized voting in North Carolina, pointing to recent 
black electoral successes in "Wake, Durham, Cumberland, Guilford, Forsyth, 
Orange, etc." counties, leading to a "dramatic" increase in the number of black 
elected officials between 1980 and 1990. Id. at 17, 19,43, 65.

The State also rejected the contention that a second reasonably 
compact majority-minority district was feasible. In its Memorandum the State 
noted th a t"Gingles requires that a district be geographically compact in order to 
satisfy one of the prongs of the initial test." Id. at 34. Citing Dillard v. Baldwin 
County Bd. o f Educ., 686 F. Supp. 1459, 1466 (M.D. Ala. 1988), the State 
argued that a district is not compact if it is so spread out or convoluted that there 
is no sense of community, or that its representatives and members could not 
efficiently stay in touch with each other or easily tell who lived in the district. 
Id. The State further asserted that a district is likewise not compact if it is 
"materially stranger in shape than some of the districts contained in the enacted 
plan." Id. at 35 (quoting Jeffers v. Clinton, 730 F. Supp. 196, 207 (E.D. Ark. 
1989), affd, 498 U.S. 1019 (1991)).

The State therefore asserted that all of the ACLUs proposals for a 
second majority-minority district failed the "compactness tests” described in 
Gingles, Dillard, and Jeffers. Id. The State also claimed that the creation of an 
additional majority-minority district would require "stitch[ing] together dozens 
of disconnected black concentrations," and "snaking all over everywhere at the 
[census] block level." Id. at 33, 47. The State specifically criticized a second 
majority-minority district proposed by Republican House Member David Balmer 
as "meanderfing] over 200 miles"; "so sprawling that it was most often described 
as ludicrous' or 'absurd'"; and "too sprawling and uncompact to allow for 
effective campaigning and representation." Stip. Ex. 26. Further, the State 
claimed that in order to create such districts, it would be required to divide 
several more voting precincts, resulting in a "nightmare" of voter confusion and 
electoral complications. Stip. Ex. 25 at 31-32. The State's own observations 
now serve to describe North Carolina's current Chapter 7.

Given the State's efforts to disavow the continued relevance of Gingles 
and the nearly total absence of support in the legislative record, I disagree with 
the majority's conclusions that the General Assembly was "without doubt aware" 
or "necessarily aware" that "conditions in North Carolina were such that the 
African-American minority could likely prove many of the other factors that are 
relevant to establishing a § 2 violation," see ante at 119-22, and that there was a 
"generalperception by the legislature (or at least its leadership) that the African-



125a
observations about the General Assembly's "powerful, recent 
institutional and individual memories," see ante at 119, its "general 
perception" concerning potential liability under the Voting Rights 
Act, ante at 123, and the fact that it was "without doubt aware" or 
"necessarily aware" of the requisite circumstances thereunder. See 
ante at 119, 122. But the majority’s opinion fails to cite where in 
the legislative record the General Assembly specifically considered 
its duties under the Voting Rights Act and the implications thereof 
for a proposed redistricting plan.* 10 The State's contention that it 
was actually motivated by such concerns in light of the substantial 
evidence to the contrary has no support in the record whatsoever. 
Reversing its earlier contemporaneous position, the State now

American minority could make out a prima facie § 2 case with respect to any 
congressional redistricting plan that did not include two majority-minority 
districts . . . ." Ante at 123 (emphasis added). One could safely conclude that 
legislators were "without doubt aware" of the "need" for virtually any act of 
legislation.

10 Indeed, the portions of the legislative record cited in the majority's opinion 
support the conclusion that the Voting Rights Act was not the primary 
inspiration for Chapter 7:

Im not going to try to speak as a lawyer versed in 
congressional or any other kind of redistricting. Because I 
haven't even read the Gingles case and I don't know much 
about it.

And HI say this, also, that I want the black people of this 
State of have [sic] two congressmen in the United States 
Congress. I think they deserve it.

Stip. Ex. 200 at 924 (excerpt of Senate floor debates) (emphasis added).
Another Senator echoed this sentiment:

So, I just want to say I support this bill because I think so far 
as the blacks are concerned that yes, they deserve two black 
districts. After going through a 1990 race, they can see we 
still need to make some improvements in how our 
relationships are between our people. So I say to you, let's 
see how this works.

Id. at 932 (emphasis added).



126a
advances this argument as a matter of convenience to justify its 
unconstitutional behavior in enacting Chapter 7.

The majority holds that contemporaneous findings need not 
be made by a legislature prior to taking remedial action, see ante at 
59-61, 150-51, a proposition with which I generally agree. But in 
holding contemporaneous legislative findings of past discrimination 
unnecessary, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court contemplated 
rendering them irrelevant altogether. Such a result would 
necessarily prompt the same concerns, albeit to a lesser degree, 
expressed by Justice O'Connor regarding a state's voluntary efforts 
to eradicate the effects of past discrimination:

That Congress may identify and redress the effects 
of society-wide discrimination does not mean that, 
a fortiori, the States and their political subdivisions 
are free to decide that such remedies are 
appropriate. Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is an explicit constraint on state 
power, and the States must undertake any remedial 
efforts in accordance with that provision. To hold 
otherwise would be to cede control over the content 
of the Equal Protection Clause to the 50 state 
legislatures and their myriad political subdivisions.
The mere recitation of a benign or compensatory 
purpose for the use of a racial classification would 
essentially entitle the States to exercise the full 
pow'er of Congress under § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and insulate any racial classification 
from judicial scrutiny under § 1. We believe that 
such a result would be contrary to the intentions of 
the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, who 
desired to place clear limits on the States' use of 
race as a criterion for legislative action, and to have 
the federal courts enforce those limitations.

City o f  Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 490-91 (1989) 
(opinion by O'Connor, J.) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 
See also id. at 510 ("Absent such findings, there is a danger that a 
racial classification is merely the product of unthinking stereotypes



127a
or a form of racial politics"). While contemporaneous findings may 
not be required per se, certainly evidence to precisely the opposite 
effect would militate against a finding of compelling interest to 
justify the State's actions. At the very least such evidence raises 
serious concerns about the State's underlying motives here and the 
degree to which its interests can be genuinely characterized as 
"compelling," consequently casting doubt on the majority's 
conclusions in this regard.11

Of course, even assuming that the State's findings, such as 
they were, proved sufficient to warrant remedial action, and further 
assuming that the State has made sufficient showings of political 
cohesiveness and racial bloc voting under Gingles to support a 
finding of vote dilution under § 2 (showings not made here),12 the 
evidence presented arguably supports the State's original contention

11 The majority also notes the political sparring that took place between North 
Carolina Republicans and Democrats over the location of the majority-minority 
districts and the specific contours thereof. To the extent that such decisions 
were motivated by political expediency on either party's part, I would find the 
State’s interest in creating these particular districts that much less compelling. 
The fight here was about power. The Democratic majority party in the 
legislature, as the State admits by its answer, sought to protect its incumbents; 
the evidence also showed that it drew district lines to enhance its members 
within the State congressional delegation. The Republican Party legislators had 
like motives. This is simply not the stuff of which solemn rectifications of past 
racial wrongs are wrought.

12 Regarding the Gingles requirement of political cohesion, I cite Justice Thomas' 
recent observations in Holder v. Hall:

According to the rule adopted in Gingles, plaintiffs must 
show simply that members of a racial group tend to prefer 
the same candidates. There is no set standard defining how 
strong the correlation must be, and an inquiry into the cause 
for the correlation (to determine, for example, whether it 
might be the product of similar socioeconomic interests 
rather than some other factor related to race) is unnecessary .
. . .  As a result, Gingles' requirement of proof of political 
cohesiveness, as practically applied, has proved little 
different from a working assumption that racial groups can 
be conceived of largely as political interest groups.

____U .S .____ , ____, 62 U.S.L.W. 4728, 4737 (June 30, 1994) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (citations omitted).



128a
that the creation of a second "geographically compact" majority- 
minority district simply was not possible, given the "relatively 
dispersed" nature of the black population in North Carolina. See
Shew, ___U.S. a t ____, 113 S. Ct. at 2820 (noting that blacks
constitute a majority of the general population in only five of the 
State's 100 counties). Indeed, the impracticality of creating a 
second geographically compact district is perhaps best demonstrated 
by the existence of District 12 itself.13 Where there was no 
reasonable prospect of liability for vote dilution under § 2 given the 
dispersed nature of North Carolina's black population, therefore, 
and thus no "strong basis in evidence" supporting remedial action in 
connection therewith, the majority's finding in favor of a compelling 
interest in that regard is ill-taken.

Even if there were sufficient justification to create more 
than one majority-minority district generally in North Carolina, the 
very shape of District 12 demonstrates the absence of any 
compelling interest to create this particular gerrymandered district 
in order to avoid liability for vote dilution under Gingles, since the 
concept of geographical compactness was disregarded altogether. 
Put another way, had the district lines been drawn differently, would 
blacks living in various parts of what now constitutes District 12 
have had a legitimate cause of action under § 2 because their votes 
had been fragmented or split, thereby diluting their potential voting 
strength? Clearly not. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50. If  the purpose * 12

13 In Dillard, supra, the District Court stated that "a district is sufficiently 
geographically compact if it allows for effective representation." 686 F. Supp. at 
1466. Defendants cite this language in support of their contention that District
12 is in fact "geographically compact," common sense notwithstanding. But 
even Dillard recognized that "a district would not be sufficiently compact if  it 
was so spread out . . . or if it was so convoluted that there was no sense of 
community..  . ." Id. The term "geographic" at least connotes physical location, 
and the word "community" implies some sense of physical proximity as well. 
Indeed, Webster’s Dictionary defines "community" as most of us would, namely, 
"the people living in a particular place or region and usually linked by common 
interests." Webster’s 3d New Int'l Dictionary. The Court in Gingles elsewhere 
summarized its holding as follows: "Stated succinctly, a bloc voting majority 
must usually be able to defeat candidates supported by a politically cohesive, 
geographically insular minority group." Gingles, 478 U.S. at 48-49 (emphasis 
added) (citations omitted). It is safe to say that the minority population extracted 
from virtually all over the State to comprise both District 1 and District 12 has 
never been characterized as "geographically insular."



129a
behind the creation of Districts 1 and 12 was to empower a 
geographically compact, politically cohesive minority population, as 
the State maintains, then clearly the State failed miserably to attain 
that purpose, since neither district can be said to incorporate a 
geographically compact population of any race. To find otherwise 
would render the Court's vote dilution test in Gingles a nullity.

In this respect, the Supreme Court's distinction between 
"what the law permits, and what it requires" is particularly relevant.
Shaw,___U.S. a t___ , 113 S. Ct. at 2830. That the Voting Rights
Act permits race-conscious districting in the form of majority- 
minority districts is clear from the plurality decision in UJO. 
United Jewish Organizations, 430 U.S. at 156-61 (opinion by 
White, J.). To fmd that the Voting Rights Act requires the creation 
of districts as tortured as those in question here, such that 
compliance with the Act suffices as a compelling state interest 
under equal protection analysis, defies logic and reason. The 
necessary implication of the majority's holding in this regard, that 
majority-minority districts may and should be created wherever 
technologically possible regardless of the geographic consequences 
thereof, is to impose on states a de facto requirement of 
proportional representation,14 a result expressly prohibited by case

14 Indeed, the majority originally cited the recent Supreme Court case of
Johnson v. DeGrandy,___U .S.___ , ___, 62 U.S.L.W. 4755, 4760-62 (June 30,
1994), specifically for the proposition that the State here had an obligation to 
create majority-minority districts "in substantial proportion" to African- 
Americans' share of the State's voting-age population. See Opinion filed August 
1, 1994, at 144 (opinion by Phillips, J., joined by Britt, J.) ("The General 
Assembly had a 'strong basis in evidence' for concluding that enactment of a 
race-based congressional redistricting plan was necessary to avoid a violation of 
§ 2 of the Act, because its members were aware from a variety of sources. . . 
that the Chapter 601 plan did not create districts in which African-Americans 
were a voting majority in substantial proportion to their share of the State's 
voting age population"). However, I read DeGrandy only for the more limited 
proposition that if a state's existing plan already features majority-minority 
districts in substantial proportion to a given minoritys share of the states voting- 
age population, then the state generally has no further obligation to maximize the 
possible number of majority-minority districts located within its boundaries.
DeGrandy, ___ U.S. at ___, 62 U.S.L.W. at 4761 ("reading § 2 to define
dilution as any failure to maximize tends to obscure the very object of the statute 
and to run counter to its textually stated purpose . . . .  Failure to maximize



130a
law, see, e.g., Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 76 (1980) ("The 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not 
require proportional representation as an imperative of political
organization"); Freeman v. Pitts, ___U.S. ____, ___, 112 S. Ct.
1430, 1447 (1992) ("Racial balance is not to be achieved for its 
own sake. It is to be pursued when racial imbalance has been 
caused by a constitutional violation"), and by the statutory 
provisions of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act itself. See 42 U.S.C. § 
1973b ("Provided, that nothing in this section establishes a right to 
have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their 
proportion in the population"); see also Gingles, 478 U.S. at 97 
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Requiring that every 
minority group that could possibly constitute a majority in a single­
member district be assigned to such a district would approach a 
requirement of proportional representation as nearly as is possible 
within the framework of single-member districts. . . . This approach 
is inconsistent with the results test and with § 2's disclaimer of a 
right to proportional representation").* 15

Such a result is untenable and unconstitutional. Where a 
minority population is relatively dispersed geographically, as is the 
black population in most parts of North Carolina, and the only 
means therefore of achieving a majority-minority district is to 
disfigure the voting districts, the result amounts to a racial quota in 
pursuit of proportional representation.16 Consequently, as in

cannot be the measure of § 2"). The majority has since reconsidered its 
position. See ante at 149-50.

15 The majority's contention that majority-minority districts that guarantee only
the opportunity for minority electoral success do not violate § 2's rejection of 
proportional representation, see ante at 77-78, is wholly unpersuasive. As 
Justice Thomas notes in his concurrence in Holder, supra, "[i]t should be clear 
that a system that gives a minority group proportional control [accomplished 
even by a bare majority] effectively provides the 'right' to elect a proportionate 
number of minority candidates that the Act disclaims. Whether that right is 
utilized by minority voters to elect minority candidates is a matter of the voters' 
choice.’’ _  U.S. a t___, 62 U.S.L.W. at 4744 n.26.

16 On December 17, 1991, House Speaker Daniel T. Blue, Jr., Representative 
Toby Fitch, Senator Dennis Winner, Leslie Winner, and Gerry Cohen travelled 
to Washington, D.C., to meet with John Dunne, the Assistant Attorney General 
of the United States for Civil Rights. The meeting had been called by Mr. 
Dunne in connection with the rejection of North Carolina's original redistricting



131a
Wygant, supra, there is "no logical stopping point" to the majority's 
theory in this case. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 275 (plurality opinion) 
(finding that there was "no logical stopping point" to the District 
Court's role model theory, which allowed the Board of Education to 
engage in discriminatory hiring and layoff practices "long past the 
point required by any legitimate remedial purpose"); see also 
Croson, 488 U.S. at 498 (’"Relief for such an ill-defined wrong 
could extend until the percentage of public contracts awarded to 
MBE's [minority business enterprises] in Richmond mirrored the 
percentage of minorities in the population as a whole"); Davis, 478 
U.S. at 130-31 (plurality opinion) ("To draw district lines to 
maximize the representation of each major party would require 
creating as many safe seats for each party as the demographic and 
predicted political characteristics of the State would permit"). If 
North Carolina's District-12 were in fact required by the Voting 
Rights Act, as the majority seems to imply, then virtually any 
district, whatever shape or form, no matter how dispersed its

plan (Chapter 601). Senator Winner recounted the events of the meeting in his
deposition, waiving his legislative privilege:

That meeting — I could not figure out the purpose of that 
meeting once we got into it, because it was very obvious to 
me — that was the first time I met John Dunne, or whatever 
his name is. And it was very obvious to me that Mr. Dunne 
had already made his mind up, and why he dragged us to 
Washington I don’t know.

They talked about the Senate and the House plan — you 
know, out of an hour or two hour meeting maybe we spent 
five minutes on the legislative plans. Most of it had to do 
with the congressional plan. And Mr. Dunne did most of the 
talking-there was a little talking from the other staff, but he 
did most of the talking, and most of it got down to sort of 
that we ought to have a quota system with respect to minority 
seats. You had 22 percent blacks in this state. Therefore, 
you ought to have as close to that as you could have of 
congressional districts. That is really all I remember about it 
. . . .  I think his substance was really that you had -  if you 
had 22 percent blacks in North Carolina, then you ought to 
have 22 percent minority congressional seats. Whatever 
shape didn't matter.

Deposition of Senator Dennis Winner at 17-19.



132a
population, would be upheld. Furthermore, under the majority's 
theory here, every minority group that could make out the proper 
showings under Gingles would consequently be entitled to its own 
single member district, ultimately resulting in systematic political
apartheid. See Shaw,___U.S. a t___ , 113 S. Ct. at 2827. To the
extent that the Voting Rights Act by some stretch of the imagination 
does require such districts, therefore, I would find the Voting Rights 
Act to be unconstitutional, especially as applied in light of the 
distinct harms identified by the Court in Shaw.

In the alternative, even assuming that the State could have 
made a proper showing as to all of the relevant factors under 
Gingles, thereby supporting a finding of liability under § 2, and, 
further, that contemporaneous findings to that effect by the General 
Assembly are not required to support the State's burden herein (or, 
more precisely, that the State's actual beliefs to the contrary do not 
preclude a finding to that effect now), it only seems logical that 
whatever "remedy" the State imposes in anticipation thereof must be 
adequately tailored to the "wrong" to which it is addressed. See 
also City o f  Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 213 (1980) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("These precedents are carefully 
formulated around a historic tenet of the law that in order to invoke 
a remedy, there must be a wrong"). That is, even if compliance 
with § 2 constitutes a sufficient compelling interest for the creation 
of majority-minority districts generally, certainly the degree to 
which the State's proffered remedy — specifically the creation of 
Districts 1 and 12 — in fact addresses the anticipated violation here 
is at least relevant to whether the plan is "narrowly tailored." To 
hold otherwise would effectively read the "geographical 
compactness" requirement out of the Court's § 2 jurisprudence 
altogether, since a gerrymandered district conceivably could always 
be drawn to incorporate enough black voters to constitute a majority 
in a single-member district, no matter how dispersed they were 
throughout the State. Surely this was not the Court's intention in 
Gingles when it made compact geography at least legally relevant in 
vote dilution cases, if not required.17 The relevance of district

17 As a three-judge panel in Maryland recently noted, political scientists and 
voting law scholars have proved that any group of voters — regardless of where 
they live — can be fit into one contiguous district. Marylanders for Fair 
Representation, Inc. v. Schaefer, 849 F. Supp. 1022, 1052 n.38 (1994) ("If every



133a
shape to the issue of whether North Carolina's redistricting plan is 
narrowly tailored will be discussed more fully infra.

I would make one final general observation here before 
moving on with the analysis. By its plain language, the Voting 
Rights Act protects nothing more, and certainly nothing less, than 
the "opportunity" to participate in the political process and indeed 
specifically disavows any guarantee of proportional representation. 
Section 2(b) of the Act provides that:

A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based 
on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the 
political processes leading to nomination or election 
in the State or political subdivision are not equally 
open to participation by members of a class of 
citizens protected by subsection (a) in that its 
members have less opportunity than other members 
of the electorate to participate in the political 
process and to elect representatives of their choice.
The extent to which members of a protected class 
have been elected to office in the State or political 
subdivision is one circumstance which may be 
considered. . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1973b (emphasis added).

Since there are no allegations here that blacks in North 
Carolina are currently prevented from participating per se in the 
political process, from registering and exercising their right to vote, 
then the only salient evidence presented by the Defendants and 
Defendant-Intervenors here regarding a violation of § 2 would seem 
to be the extent to which members of the black population have

every name in the Manhattan phone book is randomly associated with one of ten 
districts, a map can be constructed that will place every voter in a literally 
contiguous district no matter which combination of names and districts are 
chosen. The resulting redistricting map would certainly look odd -  in places, 
districts might be stretched thin as telephone wires — but it can be done, 
regardless of where the voters live'"). The panel went on to conclude, rightly so, 
that "[o]n this view, Justice Brennan's requirement in Gingles that a minority 
group be compact enough to be placed in a contiguous remedial district would 
actually be no requirement at all." Id.



134a
been able to elect representatives of their choice or at least had the 
opportunity to do so. If we are to assume that the candidates of 
choice for blacks in North Carolina have always been black 
themselves, as Defendants imply, then we would have to find that 
the opportunity to elect such candidates has been denied them, given 
the congressional election results over the course of North 
Carolina's political history. See also Gingles, 478 U.S. at 93 
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) ("electoral success has 
now emerged, under the Court's standard, as the linchpin of vote 
dilution claims").

But in assessing vote dilution, it is not at all clear why the 
Court should not take into account political influence as well — 
after all, "the power to influence the political process is not limited 
to winning elections." Davis, 478 U.S. at 132 (plurality opinion); 
see also Gingles, 478 U.S. at 94-100 (O'Connor, J., concurring in 
the judgment) (otherwise "the Court's test for measuring voting 
strength and its test for vote dilution, operating in tandem, come 
closer to an absolute requirement of proportional representation 
than Congress intended when it codified the results test in § 2"). 
Moreover, § 2 expressly states that electoral success is only one 
circumstance which may be considered in vote dilution claims, 
leaving the door open to other kinds of evidence.18 Of course, there 
was no evidence presented to this Court regarding political influence 
per se, and the Court therefore has no basis on which to make a 
determination with respect thereto. But certainly such evidence, 
admitted for that limited purpose rather than as a testament to 
historical discrimination generally, would have been relevant to the 
question of the State's potential liability under § 2. For the courts 
to ignore such evidence, properly presented, is to limit unnecessarily 
the intended reach of the Voting Rights Act, thereby prompting 
legitimate concerns about proportional representation.

18 The Supreme Court has expressly left open the question of whether 
influence-dilution claims are themselves cognizable under § 2. Growe v.
Emison, ___U.S.___ , ___, 113 S. Ct. 1075, 1084 n.5 (1993); see also Gingles,
478 U.S. at 46-47 n. 12; Voinovich v. Ouilter, ___U.S. ___ , ___, 113 S. Ct.
1149, 1155 (1993).



135a
In sum, then, I dissent from the majority's finding here that, 

under the circumstances presented, North Carolina had a compelling 
interest in complying with § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The State 
lacked a sufficient basis in evidence reasonably to anticipate 
liability under § 2, and the remedial legislation allegedly enacted in 
response thereto, Chapter 7, was consequently unwarranted. 
Plaintiffs have therefore met their ultimate burden of persuasion. 
Moreover, the fact that the General Assembly failed to make 
explicit findings as to its remedial intent, and now brings before the 
Court only weak post-hoc rationalizations, precludes finding in 
favor of the Defendants on this issue. Finally, even if remedial 
action had been warranted, the threshold requirement in Gingles of 
geographical compactness must at least have implications for 
whether North Carolina's redistricting plan can ultimately be 
described as "narrowly tailored," an issue which I discuss in more 
detail infra.

B. Compliance With Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act

North Carolina's next argument in support of its 
redistricting plan derives from its statutory duty to comply with § 5 
of the Voting Rights Act. More specifically, the majority here finds 
that the State had a compelling interest to comply with the Attorney 
General's preclearance requirements under § 5 by demonstrating 
that its revised plan (Chapter 7) had neither the "purpose . . . [nor] 
the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of 
race or color. . . . "  42 U.S.C § 1973c; see also 28 C.F.R. § 
52.52.19 As the majority observes, there are two separate prongs to 
the § 5 standard, but I, like the majority, find the "effect" prong 
inapplicable in the case presently before us. As to the "purpose" 
prong of the § 5 standard, I agree that an analysis thereunder 
essentially duplicates the analysis under the constitutional vote 
dilution standard, namely requiring a showing that the proposed 
redistricting plan was not designed to dilute minority voting 
strength. See ante at 66 n. 31. This is essentially the identical 
argument offered by the State in connection with its alleged duty to

19 In fact, North Carolina's original plan (Chapter 601) was explicitly rejected 
by the Attorney General for failure to demonstrate as much. See ante at 115-16 
(quoting Stip. 72, Stip. Ex. 27).



136a
comply with § 2, discussed supra, the only material difference, of 
course, is that the State's interest here in complying with § 5 stems 
not from a desire to avoid future liability under the Voting Rights 
Act but from an administrative goal to secure preclearance from the 
Attorney General.20 Especially in light of the Attorney General's 
rejection of North Carolina's original plan, the. State argues that it 
consequently had a compelling interest to comply with its 
obligations under § 5 as interpreted and enforced by the Attorney 
General in connection with its submission of Chapter 7.

Blind deference to the administrative findings of the United 
States Attorney General cannot render the State's conduct here 
immune from constitutional scrutiny, however. Since the General 
Assembly had the option of subsequently seeking preclearance in 
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, see 42 
U.S.C. § 1973c, and expressly considered such a course of action, 
its choice not to do so but instead to capitulate to the Attorney 
General's recommendations effectively negates the argument that the 
creation of Chapter 7 in its present form was required per se under 
§ 5 .  In other words, reliance on the Attorney General's 
interpretation and application of the Voting Rights Act, without 
regard to the accuracy or constitutionality thereof, is insufficient in 
itself to constitute a compelling state interest. Instead, there should 
be some independent basis for the State's apprehension of vote * 68

20 The majority observes in a footnote that coverage under § 5 "is tantamount to 
a congressional finding that the jurisdiction in question has committed identified 
violations of the Fifteenth Amendment in the relatively recent past," see ante at
68 n.33, and that such a finding may be regarded as "sufficient, in and of itself, 
to give that jurisdiction a 'strong basis in evidence' for thinking that it must 
engage in race-based redistricting . . . ." Id. Given the restrictive nature of the 
Voting Rights Act's bailout provisions, however, such a rule, taken to its logical 
conclusion, could conceivably require a jurisdiction to employ increasingly 
extreme race-based remedial devices over a prolonged period of time without 
any real justification. This could not have been Congress' intent when it enacted 
the Voting Rights Act. Moreover, evidence was adduced at trial that some 
members of the legislatin' e believed that Justice Department officials were 
acting with partisan motives in requiring the State to create two majority- 
minority districts. This climate of opinion tends to contradict any contention that 
the legislature sincerely believed that "it must engage in race-based 
redistricting" in order to remedy voting rights violations.



137a
dilution sufficient to justify remedial action to correct it.21 22 
Otherwise the majority's holding in this respect would vest the 
Department of Justice with unbridled and unprecedented discretion, 
since under these circumstances at least the Department of Justice's 
findings would be deemed conclusive, and the Attorney General 
would further enjoy a de facto ability to determine the constitutional 
scope of federal legislation, heretofore a responsibility reserved for 
the courts."2 For obvious reasons this is an altogether wholly 
unacceptable result.

In my opinion, then, the analysis here is subsumed within 
the analysis described above for vote dilution under § 2. Therefore, 
I would find that, at least in the case as it comes before us, the State 
should demonstrate that it had some independent basis for its 
apprehension that its initial redistricting plan was designed to dilute 
minority voting strength in an unconstitutional manner, thereby

21 I agree with the majority here that a state is not required to "challenge a 
Justice Department denial of preclearance in the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia, and lose, before it may safely conclude that it has a 
compelling interest in adopting a new plan to address the concerns upon which 
the Department's denial of preclearance was based." See ante at 67. But to 
require a state to assert some independent basis for its apprehension of liability 
would neither manifest "disrespect for the judgment of the Attorney General" nor 
interfere with states' efforts "to comply voluntarily with their obligations under 
the federal civil rights laws." Id. at 67-68 (citations omitted). Indeed, such a 
requirement would only bolster a state's willingness to take remedial action, if 
warranted.

Here, of course, the State chose not to enact the particular district plan 
proposed by the Department of Justice, which included a majority-minority 
district in the south-central to southeastern part of the state. While the State 
obviously was not required to adopt the Department of Justice's proposal, its 
failure to do so or even to address the Department of Justice's concerns certainly 
casts some doubts on the merits of the Attorney General's objections and the 
compelling nature of the State's interest in complying therewith.

22 The majority notes that Congress expressly authorized the Department of 
Justice to act as a "surrogate" for the United States District Court for the District 
of Columbia in approving redistricting legislation. See ante at 68. Such 
approval of course does not render redistricting legislation immune from 
subsequent judicial scrutiny, including invalidation. Section 5 of the Voting 
Rights Act itself specifies that neither a declaratory judgment in the United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia nor a ruling by the Attorney 
General shall bar a subsequent action to enjoin enforcement of a proposed 
change in voting procedure. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.



138a
requiring it to take appropriate remedial measures in response 
thereto.23 The State may indeed have had an independently 
compelling reason to create a second majority-minority district, if in 
fact the failure to do so would have amounted to vote dilution. 
Whether the failure to create any majority-minority districts or these 
districts in particular would have amounted to vote dilution again 
depends upon the State's potential liability under § 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act, as discussed supra. For the reasons stated above, again 
I would find either that the State could not have had a reasonable 
apprehension of liability under § 2, given the dispersed nature of 
the black population in North Carolina, or that, in the alternative, if 
the black population was in fact geographically compact enough to 
support liability under § 2, that such compactness must at least 
have implications for the shapes of the districts consequently 
created to remedy the § 2 violation in order to be "narrowly 
tailored."

Finally, it is interesting to note that of North Carolina's 100 
counties, only 40 of those were subject to § 5's preclearance 
requirements at the time Chapter 7 was enacted. Any redistricting 
plan that affected all or a portion of these 40 counties would of 
course require preclearance, and such plans must by necessity be 
considered as a whole, not on a district-by-district basis. 
Obviously, if only one county in North Carolina were subject to the 
requirements of § 5, however, compliance therewith would not 
constitute a compelling interest for the creation of a gerrymandered 
district located elsewhere in the State. Here, of the 40 counties 
covered by § 5, none is entirely included within the Twelfth 
District, and only two such counties — Gaston and Guilford — are 
even partially included in District 12. Stip. Paras. 108-11.24 To

23 Otherwise, the case before us presents the perfect example of how, in Abigail 
Themstrom's view, § 5 has been improperly transformed from its original 
objective of "guarding against renewed disfranchisement, the use of the back 
door once the front was blocked," to an instrument to "promote the election of 
blacks to public office." See Abigail Themstrom, Whose Votes Count? 
Affirmative Action and Minority Voting Rights 20, 38 (1987).

24 Of the remaining 60 counties which are not covered by § 5, eight of those are 
included in part in District 12. In addition, eight of North Carolina's § 5 covered 
counties are entirely included within the First District, along with portions of 14



139a
argue that the State therefore had a compelling interest to create 
these particular gerrymandered districts in order to comply with § 
5's preclearance requirements defies common sense and would seem 
to defeat the purposes served by the Voting Rights Act. Insofar as 
the majority finds to the contrary, I dissent.

C. Remedy Past Discrimination

The final justification offered by the State for its racially 
gerrymandered districts is its interest in eradicating the effects of 
past racial discrimination. A state's voluntary efforts to remedy 
discrete and particular instances of discrimination is indeed a 
laudable endeavor and should not be discouraged. See Wygant, 476 
U.S. at 289-91 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment). Of course, a general showing of societal 
discrimination alone is not sufficient to justify a racial 
classification, see id. at 274-75 (opinion by Powell, J.), and the 
State must have had a "strong basis in evidence for its conclusion 
that remedial action was necessary." Id. at 277. I concur in the 
majority's finding here that the State has failed to demonstrate any 
basis in evidence for a conclusion that such remedial action was 
necessary', especially since the State has clearly demonstrated that it 
would not have enacted Chapter 7 but for  the Attorney General's 
rejection of Chapter 601.25

However, where Congress has sought to implement a 
legislative remedial scheme as decidedly broad and far-reaching as 
the Voting Rights Act, I question whether, as the majority here 
holds, a state can be found to maintain a compelling interest to 
exceed this federal mandate in efforts to achieve racial equality. See

other counties. Six of the remaining uncovered counties are included, in whole 
or in part, in the First District. Sixteen of North Carolina's 40 covered counties 
are not included, in whole or in part, in either of Chapter 7s majority-minority 
districts. Id.

25 The majority's finding in this regard is of interest, however, in light of its 
prior conclusion that the General Assembly found sufficient reason to remedy a 
suspected § 2 violation, since contemporaneous evidence of legislative findings 
as to either justification is unquestionably scarce.



140a
ante at 69-72. As the Court in Shaw clearly recognized, "only three 
Justices in UJO were prepared to say that States have a significant 
interest in minimizing the consequences of racial bloc voting apart
from the requirements of the Voting Act." Shaw,___U.S. at ___,
113 S. Ct. at 2832. Significantly, as the Court further observed, 
"those three Justices specifically concluded that race-based 
districting, as a response to racially polarized voting, is 
constitutionally permissible only when the State 'employfs] sound 
districting principles [such as compactness and population 
equality],' only when the affected racial group's 'residential patterns 
afford the opportunity of creating districts in which they will be in
the majority.'" Id. at ___, 113 S. Ct. at 2832 (quoting United
Jewish Organizations, 430 U.S. at 168 (opinion by White, J.)). 
Given North Carolina's total disregard for certain "sound districting 
principles," such as compactness and contiguity, I am compelled to 
find that the State's alleged efforts here to eradicate the effects of 
past discrimination transcend that which is expressly required by 
the Voting Rights Act.

The rationale behind the Court's apparent skepticism in 
Shaw in this regard should be obvious. It is by now a fundamental 
tenet in our equal protection jurisprudence that any effort by a state 
to remedy past discrimination must be carefully tailored, gauged to 
the specific past harm being alleviated. Croson, 488 U.S. at 507- 
OS (majority opinion); Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274 (plurality opinion). 
Where the past harm is as undefined as it is here, described in 
relatively abstract terms of vote "dilution" rather than outright 
"denial," however, there is the very real danger that the remedy 
imposed may actually become part of the problem, especially in 
light of the distinctive harms associated with racially gerrymandered
districts generally. See Shaw,___U.S. a t___ ,113 S. Ct. at 2827-
32; see also Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (opinion by O'Connor, J.) 
("Classifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm"); 
Regents o f  University o f  California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298 
(1978) (opinion by Powell, J.) ("preferential programs may only 
reinforce common stereotypes holding that certain groups are 
unable to achieve success without special protection based on a 
factor bearing no relationship to individual worth"). Accordingly, 
given the pitfalls necessarily inherent in any voluntary remedial 
undertaking concerning minority voting practices, I would find that



141a
the State has no compelling interest to address past discrimination 
in voting practices beyond that required by the Voting Rights Act, 
the federal remedy mandated by Congress.

III.

Not Narrowly Tailored

Assuming that the district lines employed by the State of 
North Carolina here are not inherently unconstitutional, and further 
assuming that the State had a compelling interest for its otherwise 
unconstitutional conduct, the next question is whether the 
redistricting plan at issue here is narrowly tailored to further that 
interest. I find that the districts here, while keenly tailored, are by 
no means "narrowly tailored" as that term is employed in Equal 
Protection law.

To what extent North Carolina's redistricting plan is 
narrowly tailored of course depends upon what compelling interest 
is advanced to justify the plan. After all, "[rjacial classifications 
are simply too pernicious to permit any but the most exact 
connection between justification and classification." Wygant, 476 
U.S. at 280 (plurality opinion) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 
U.S. 448, 537 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). The majority again 
inexplicably claims that district shape is irrelevant beyond its 
significance as an indication of discriminatory intent, thereby 
unwarrantedly delimiting the scope of the Court's opinion in Shaw. 
See ante at 86. But while such traditional districting principles as 
compactness and contiguity' may not be "constitutionally required"
per se, see Shaw ,___U.S. a t ___ , 113 S. Ct. at 2827, they are
plainly relevant at least in a relative sense in assessing whether there 
were less restrictive means available to the General Assembly 
during the redistricting process. See Bridgeport Coalition fo r Fair 
Representation v. City o f  Bridgeport, 1994 WL 247075 at *8 (2d 
Cir. 1994) ("A purported remedy for perceived violations of Section 
2 of the Voting Rights Act must include consideration of both racial 
fairness and traditional districting principles"); Marylanders for  
Fair Representation, 849 F. Supp. at 1053 ("although a State can 
— and at times must -- place great weight on race when redistricting, 
it may not do so to the exclusion of all traditional, nonracial



142a
districting principles, leaving a district that rationally can be 
understood only as 'an effort to classify and separate votes by 
race'") (citing Shaw,___U.S. a t___ , 113 S. Ct. at 2828).

North Carolina's alleged interests in complying with §§ 2 
and 5 of the Voting Rights Act are essentially based on the 
assumption that, but for the creation of these gerrymandered 
districts, the State would have been subject to a § 2 vote dilution 
claim or would not have been able to secure preclearance from the 
Attorney General under § 5. The first question the Court must ask, 
then, is to what extent the State's proposed "remedy" here, namely 
the enactment of Chapter 7, successfully addresses the anticipated 
underlying "injury," namely minority vote dilution. United States v. 
Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987) (opinion by Brennan, J.) 
(Court must consider "the necessity for the relief and the efficacy of 
alternative remedies"). The Court in Paradise undertook a similar 
endeavor in order to assess whether the remedy imposed in that case 
was narrowly tailored:

To evaluate the District Court's determination that 
it was necessary to order the promotion of eight 
whites and eight blacks to the rank of corporal at 
the time of the motion to enforce, we must examine 
the purposes the order was intended to serve.

Id. (emphasis in original). Likewise, we must evaluate the State's 
asserted purposes here in order to determine whether the districts at 
issue are necessary in connection therewith.

As discussed supra, one of the threshold requirements of a 
§ 2 vote dilution claim, and hence necessarily a factor in the 
Attorney General's § 5 preclearance considerations, is that the 
minority population at issue must be "geographically compact." See 
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50. The logical implication of the Court's 
opinion in Gingles, and of the Congressional mandate expressed in 
§ 2, is that if a politically cohesive and geographically compact 
minority population in fact exists, the State then has some 
obligation to incorporate said population in a majority-minority 
district in order to avoid liability under the Voting Rights Act. 
Growe,___U.S. a t___ , 113 S. Ct. at 1084. Assuming arguendo



143a
that there is a sufficiently "geographically compact" minority 
population in North Carolina to sustain a § 2 vote dilution claim, 
and thus a compelling reason for the State to take appropriate 
remedial measures in connection therewith in order to avoid liability 
and to secure preclearance under the Voting Rights Act, it would be 
difficult if not impossible to argue that the State here successfully 
incorporated compact minority populations within the boundaries of 
its two majority-minority districts. Indeed, one need only glance at 
the map to confirm that District 12 fails to accommodate a compact 
population of any race. In this context the precise shapes of the 
districts are relevant because they provide a gauge for the State's 
remedial success — and from the looks of Districts 1 and 12, the 
State failed miserably. When districts are as strung out as Districts 
1 and 12, lacking all inherent integrity, they cease being districts at 
all, instead merely patching together islands of voters with only a 
legislative intent to group predetermined numbers of voters by race. 
Creation of such districts was by no means "necessary" in order to 
comply with the Voting Rights Act.26

The State argues that Plaintiffs' submission at trial of an 
alternative district plan with more geographically compact districts 
in itself demonstrates the State's potential liability under § 2, since 
geographically compact majority-minority districts were clearly 
possible. In what can only be described as a legal leap of faith, 
however, the State, with the majority's blessing, see ante at 98-99 n. 
50, asserts that whatever districts it actually created to preempt 
liability under the Voting Rights Act need not reflect or incorporate

26 In assessing proposed gerrymandered districts far less egregious than those 
presently before us, a three-judge panel in Arkansas likewise found that bizarre 
district shape could very well betray the absence of any compact minority 
population sufficient to warrant § 2 liability under Gingles. Writing for the 
Court, Judge Arnold held that:

The peculiar shape of [plaintiffs proposed districts] . . .  is 
precisely due to the lack of the compact minority population 
required by Gingles . . . .  The bottom line is that the black 
population in this area is simply too widely dispersed for us 
to hold that the Board [of Apportionment] has violated § 2 
by refusing to draw the additional . . . districts which the 
plaintiffs have requested.

Jeffers, 847 F. Supp. at 662.



144a
the specific compact minority populations which would allegedly 
trigger the § 2 violation. This line of contention is devoid of both 
logic and common sense and hardly merits this Court's attention, 
much less its endorsement. I must conclude that the State "went 
beyond what was reasonably necessary to avoid [vote dilution]" and 
that North Carolina's reapportionment plan consequently is not
narrowly tailored to accomplish that goal. See Shaw,___U S at
___, 113 S. Ct. at 2831.

The majority here identifies five other factors relevant to 
determining whether the State's remedial scheme is sufficiently 
tailored to survive strict scrutiny. With respect to the first factor, I 
agree with the majority that a state that has a compelling interest in 
complying with the Voting Rights Act obviously has no completely 
race-neutral means of accomplishing that goal. Equally obvious, 
however, is the fact that the North Carolina General Assembly here 
failed to utilize more conventional district shapes that, if not 
inherently "race neutral," at least would have been more likely to 
have been perceived as such by the voters. After all, 
"reapportionment is one area in which appearances do matter." Id.
at ___, 113 S. Ct. at 2827. Again, where it is clear that a grossly
disfigured majority-minority district poses dangers qualitatively 
distinct from those posed by a compact majority-minority district, 
the extent to which a redistricting plan reflects the use of race 
should have a significant bearing on our analysis. The very purpose 
of narrow tailoring, of course, is to promote the accomplishment of 
the remedy at minimum expense to other important interests, 
including contiguity and compactness. Where, as here, the State 
completely disregards less offensive alternatives in favor of a 
redistricting plan as contorted as the one presently before us, I find 
it difficult to characterize such a plan as "narrowly tailored." See 
Croson, 488 U.S. at 507 ("there does not appear to have been any 
consideration of the use of race-neutral means to increase minority 
business participation in city contracting").

With respect to the second factor, the majority here finds 
North Carolina's redistricting plan more analogous to a "flexible 
goal" than a "strict quota." See ante at 76-78. While the 
"remedial" device employed by the State here is distinguishable 
from more traditional numerical quotas, Chapter 7 in many ways



145a
resembles the strict quota device struck down in Croson, supra. A 
redistricting plan that gerrymanders a given population in order to 
achieve a certain electoral result is closely analogous to hiring or 
promotion quotas designed to achieve a certain racial profile in the 
work force.27 Given the absence of any "logical stopping point" for 
the creation of majority-minority districts pursuant to the majority’s 
reading of the Voting Rights Act here, these districts "cannot be 
said to be narrowly tailored to any goal, except perhaps outright 
racial balancing." Croson, 488 U.S. at 507. As discussed supra, 
however, proportional representation is clearly not a legitimate 
objective, either for legislative pursuit or for judicial 
encouragement. Cf. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 178 (opinion by 
Brennan, J.) ("The one-for-one requirement evaporated at the ranks 
of corporal and sergeant upon implementation of promotion 
procedures without an adverse impact, demonstrating that it is not a 
disguised means to achieve racial balance") (emphasis added). And 
just as courts have struck down extreme quota devices that bear no 
rational relationship to any goal other than outright racial balancing, 
see, e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 507, so too should we strike down 
extreme gerrymanders that promote nothing short of proportional 
representation.

27 The majority here makes much of the fact that, given the bare majority of 
blacks in North Carolina's two majority-minority districts, these districts in no 
way "guarantee" the election of an African-American to Congress in the same 
way that traditional quotas "guarantee" the hiring or promotion of certain 
minorities. See ante at 77-78. Whether or not the election of blacks in these 
districts is certain, however, it is undisputed that these districts were intended by 
the General Assembly to achieve a certain result — guaranteeing blacks an 
opportunity to elect a representative of their own choice. This guaranty, of 
course, depends for its success on the legislative assumption that black voters 
will tend to vote in a bloc for black candidates. So while proportional 
representation may not always be the actual outcome of every election given the 
bare minority majorities in the districts at issue, it was nevertheless the intended 
outcome here, as the evidence strongly suggests.

In any event, the majority's argument that the Voting Rights Act 
requires even such "opportunity" districts arguably violates § 2’s repudiation of 
proportional representation where North Carolina's redistricting plan effectively 
provides the "right" to elect a proportionate number of minority candidates, even
if such right is not actually exercised by minority voters. See Holder,___U.S. at
___> 62 U.S.L.W. at 4744 n. 26 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); see
also supra at 174 n. 15.



146a
The majority's analysis of the final factor, the impact of the 

enacted districts on the rights of third parties, likewise gives cause 
for concern. See Paradise, 480 U.S. at 171 (opinion by Brennan, 
J ); Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 514 (Powell, J., concurring). Given the 
unique breed of harms caused by these racially gerrymandered 
districts as identified so forcefully in the Supreme Court's opinion in 
Shaw, harms suffered by racially gerrymandered district residents 
and non-gerrymandered district residents alike, I simply cannot 
subscribe to the view that such districts are "narrowly tailored" 
where in fact more compact alternative districts were feasible.

Here, the burden is not placed on innocent non-minorities 
(in terms of any denial of privileges, benefits, etc.) so much as it is 
placed on the very minorities that these districts were presumably 
created to empower. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 516-17 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); cf. Wygant, 476 
U.S. at 283-84 (plurality opinion). The stigma associated with such 
districts is real and tangible and cognizable under the Fourteenth
Amendment per the Court's opinion in Shaw,___U.S. a t___ , 113
S. Ct. at 2828, and even per the majority's opinion here. See ante at 
20-30. See also Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 545 and n. 17 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting); Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 ("Classifications based on 
race carry a danger of stigmatic harm"); id. at 516-17 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Bakke, 438 
U.S. at 298 (opinion by Powell, J.); cf. Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. 
F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547, 601 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring). Also, 
the stigmatic burden here is on all minorities, not just on certain 
nonminorities. Cf. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 596-97. 
Given the Supreme Court's obvious concern for district shape as 
expressed in Shaw, the burden of these district shapes cannot be 
dismissed as "relatively light" or "diffuse," as the majority's opinion 
here so easily does. Id. at 600 (citing Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 484 
(opinion by Burger, C.J.)). Rather, I would find that North 
Carolina's racially gerrymandered districts continue to "impose 
disproportionate harm on the interests, or unnecessarily trammel the 
rights, of innocent individuals directly and adversely affected by a 
plan's racial preference." Wygant, 476 U.S. at 287 (O'Connor, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). As evidenced 
by the alternative redistricting plans submitted by Plaintiffs at trial, 
there were "less intrusive" means available to the General



147a
Assembly. See id. at 283. To characterize the burden to third 
parties here as "marginal unfairness," as the majority does, see ante 
at 82, is to ignore the clear implications of the Supreme Court's 
opinion in Shaw2* Accordingly, this Court's decision should 
recognize the significance to third-party voters and citizens of the 
Supreme Court's observations that "[b]y perpetuating such notions 
[of racial stereotypes], a racial gerrymander may exacerbate the 
very patterns of racial bloc voting that majority-minority districting
is sometimes said to counteract," Shaw,___U.S. a t___ , 113 S. Ct.
at 2827, and that "elected officials are more likely to believe that 
their primary obligation is to represent only the members of that 
group, rather than their constituency as a whole. This is altogether
antithetical to our system of representative democracy." Id. a t ___,
113 S. Ct. at 2827.

Moreover, the majority's opinion, without justification, 
arbitrarily limits the criteria for evaluating North Carolina's 
redistricting plan to "constitutionally-mandated" redistricting 
principles, rendering all other considerations de minimis. See ante 
at 83-84. But it is not at all clear why redistricting principles which 
are not constitutionally-wanricrferi per se should not be at least 
relevant and even significant in assessing a plan's constitutionality, 
especially where the constitutional relevance of such redistricting 
principles as compactness and contiguity has so recently been 
declared by the Supreme Court.28 29 If we as a Court are to give any 
force at all to the mandate issued by the Supreme Court in this case, 
as I believe we must, then we must find in light of the cited 
language in Shaw that these districts are not "the most exact

28 That characterization also betrays the majority's belief that a legislature may, 
at its leisure, subordinate the constitutionally protected third-party interests 
identified in Shaw in favor of such a relatively transitory interest as incumbency 
protection, one of the admittedly primary goals of Chapter 7. See generally 
testimony of Gerry Cohen Tr. pp. 281-652.

29 Indeed, if consideration were reserved solely for constitutionally-mandated 
redistricting principles, there would be no need to engage in a strict scrutiny 
analysis in the first place. If a voting district violated the ''one person, one vote" 
standard or unduly diluted minority voting strength, such a district would be 
defective in its own right, inherently unconstitutional regardless of any 
compelling justification.



148a
connection between justification and classification" as required in 
Wygant, supra. More compact variations were possible, and the 
State's redistricting plan is not sufficiently "narrowly tailored" to 
survive strict scrutiny.30

The majority also makes three arguments as to why, for 
practical reasons, courts should not consider notions of 
compactness and contiguity in assessing the constitutionality of 
voting districts. First, the majority asserts that such traditional 
districting principles have "little inherent value" in the districting 
process since they are no longer necessary to ensure fair and 
effective representation. See ante at 89. The majority's conclusion 
in this regard, however, is misplaced. The evidence at trial amply 
demonstrated that the combination of modem computer technology 
and voter-specific census data, readily available today and used by 
the legislature in creating Chapter 7, permits the creation of districts 
of unreasonable length and complexity. See generally testimony of 
Gerry Cohen, Tr. pp. 281-652. Indeed, notwithstanding the 
potentially self-serving testimonies of those congresspersons elected 
to represent Districts 1 and 12, it cannot be gainsaid that 160 miles 
is long for such a lanky district as District 12; indeed, it is 
sufficiently long to be served by no less than three national airports 
and three television markets. District 1 is equally ungainly, spread- * 88

30 The majority observes that ''[n]either the UJO plurality nor the Shaw majority 
indicates that compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions are 
the only districting principles which can be considered 'sound1. . . . "  See ante at
88 n. 44 (emphasis in original) (citing United Jewish Organizations, 430 U.S. at 
167-68 (opinion by White, J.) ("we think it . . . permissible for a State, 
employing sound districting principles such as compactness and population 
equality, to attempt to prevent racial minorities from being repeatedly outvoted 
by creating districts that will afford fair representation to the members of those 
racial groups who are sufficiently numerous and whose residential patterns 
afford the opportunity of creating districts in which they will be in the majority." 
(emphasis added))). But I fail to see how this authorizes a state to completely 
disregard traditional redistricting principles such as compactness and contiguity 
without consequence. I would therefore vigorously disagree with the majority's 
conclusion that "[i]n according primacy to these redistricting principles 
[including distinctive and internally homogenous communities of interest], the 
legislature necessarily had to subordinate geographical compactness and respect 
for the integrity of political subdivisions . . . ." See ante at 147 (emphasis 
added). The legislature was not required to subordinate geographical 
compactness, and it should therefore be held accountable for its choice to do so.



149a
eagled over a vast portion of Eastern North Carolina, from Virginia 
to South Carolina. These facts make fair representation virtually 
impossible in Districts 1 and 12, a conclusion shared at one time by 
North Carolina's legislative representatives in marshalling support 
for Chapter 601. No less extreme would be a district that ran the 
length of the California coastline, some 800 miles in length — 
indeed, the configurations of voting districts would be limited only 
by politicians' imaginations.31 And while citizens of such districts 
would inevitably share certain concerns and interests, they would be 
denied the quality of representation inherent in a more 
geographically compact district, one that respected the established 
political, social, and economic communities already in existence.32 
So while it may be true, as the majority observes, that geography is 
no longer as important as it once was to the districting process 
because of improved transportation and communication, neither is it 
entirely irrelevant or insignificant.33

The majority's second and third arguments, regarding the 
absence of manageable judicial standards and the prospect of undue 
interference by the federal judiciary, respectively, are likewise 
unpersuasive.34 Even under the majority opinion's narrow

31 See also supra at 177 n. 17.

32 Of course, it is true that these values in isolation can be sacrificed by a 
legislature today with little fear of judicial intervention. But under Shaw, racial 
harmony is one value that may not be compromised free of strict (not scant) 
judicial scrutiny.

33 The majority in my opinion drastically underestimates the degree of voter 
confusion that can result from gerrymandered voting districts and the 
significance of such confusion to the political process, while overlooking the 
significance of citizens' perceptions of fair and effective representation as well. 
A citizenry's perceptions of its political process can be as critical in a democracy 
as the process itself, and factors that can adversely affect such perceptions 
should not be dismissed. Thus, the majority's conclusion that certain facts 
outside the normal, "earth-bound, horizontal workaday world" of the citizen- 
voter, such as the irregularity of the district in which he or she resides, are not a 
matter of any great practical consequence, see ante at 143^14 n. 60, seriously 
underestimates the intellectual grasp of those voters. These people serve on 
juries in intricate cases, and they know when race is energizing the affairs of 
state.



150a
interpretation of Shaw, determining whether or not a given district 
successfully incorporates a "geographically compact" minority 
population, and therefore sufficiently addresses any potential § 2 
violation, regardless of the aesthetics thereof, is a decision which is 
appropriately within the purview of the federal courts and which is 
subject to a "relatively simple and judicially manageable" standard. 
See Davis, 478 U.S. at 149 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the 
judgment). And while concepts like compactness and contiguity 
may not be scientifically ascertainable, even the majority here 
concedes that certain of the districts before us could never be 
characterized as "compact" by any definition of that word. Indeed, 
the obvious difficulty in distinguishing between permissible hiring 
or promotional goals and impermissible quotas in other affirmative 
action contexts has never prevented courts from striking down 
remedies as irrational as the one presently before us. Where it is 
clear that the State has in fact crossed that line, it is unnecessary for 
us to decide, for the purposes of this case, at what point the State 
crossed it. 34

34 Regarding the political nature of the court's role in vote dilution cases 
generally, I find Justice Thomas' concurrence in Holder, supra, to have 
considerable merit. Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, notes that:

by construing the [Voting Rights Act] to cover potentially 
dilutive electoral mechanisms, we have immersed the federal 
courts in a hopeless project of weighing questions of political 
theory.... [F]or it is only a resort to political theory that can 
enable a court to determine which electoral systems provide 
the "fairest" levels of representation or the most "effective" 
or "undiluted" votes to minorities.

___U.S. a t___ , 62 U.S.L.W. at 4733-34. Accordingly, "[t]he matters the Court
has set out to resolve in vote dilution cases are questions of political philosophy, 
not questions of law. As such, they are not readily subjected to any judicially 
manageable standards that can guide courts in attempting to select between
competing theories." Id. at ___, 62 U.S.L.W. at 4736 (footnote omitted).
Determining issues of district compactness and shape no more involves courts in 
standardless policy-making than does each and every judicial endeavor under the 
Voting Rights Act. Indeed, the majority opinion's pejorative assessment of the 
inherent value of geographically-based voting districts generally, see ante at 
8991, demonstrates the political nature of our endeavor here.



151a
Although assessing the merits of future gerrymandering 

cases may prove to be difficult at times, that is not sufficient reason 
in itself to abdicate our responsibility to do so here. An assessment 
of "geographical compactness" can be no more problematic or 
standardless here than under the vote dilution test articulated by the 
Supreme Court in Gingles, supra, and in fact courts have already 
embarked on such endeavors since the Supreme Court's decision in 
Shaw. See, e.g., Marylanders for Fair Representation, 849 F. 
Supp. at 1052-56 (finding that district at issue "is not only compact 
in its shape and appearance, but moreover reflects the reasonable 
balancing of numerous legitimate redistricting principles"). Indeed, 
the majority's opinion here successfully accounts for the stigmatic 
harms associated with gerrymandered districts in its analysis of 
standing, but it inexplicably fails to address such harms in weighing 
the ultimate constitutionality of Chapter 7. Thus, the majority 
would find that while residents of a racially gerrymandered voting 
district would always enjoy standing to bring suit, such standing 
would be of no avail so long as said district complied with certain 
"constitutionally-mandated" districting principles, regardless of its 
shape and the stigmatic harms associated therewith. The plain 
language of the Voting Rights Act and the Supreme Court's opinion 
in Shaw does not support such a reading.

I therefore reiterate my earlier observation in this case, 
Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461 (E.D.N.C. 1992), that it falls upon 
the courts to set forth constitutionally valid standards by which 
race-conscious redistricting may be implemented, and that it is not 
enough to leave these standards to the vicissitudes of "politics." Id. 
at 480-81 (Voorhees, C.J., dissenting). As the majority here 
recognizes, Congress has presumably balanced the need for 
"affirmative action" in the voting context against the potential harms 
thereof, resulting in the enactment and subsequent extension of the 
Voting Rights Act. But while it is true that every variety of 
"affirmative action" program necessarily relies on some offsetting 
form of the very discrimination such program is designed to combat, 
the remedial efforts undertaken here are particularly troublesome. 
See Paradise, 480 U.S. at 199 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("There is 
simply no justification for the use of racial preferences if the 
purpose of the [legislation] could be achieved without their use 
because '[r]acial classifications are simply too pernicious to permit



152a
any but the most exact connection between justification and 
classification'" (quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 537 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting))). As the Court in Shaw recognized, the essential thrust 
of the State's various arguments here is that "the deliberate creation 
of majority-minority districts is the most precise way -- indeed the 
only effective way — to overcome the effects of racially polarized
voting." Shaw ,___U.S. a t ___, 113 S. Ct. at 2832. But I find it
curious that the sole cure proposed for racially polarized voting and 
the effects thereof is a state-endorsed election system that is based 
on, and indeed whose success ultimately depends upon, racially 
polarized voting. See ante at 154 ("We have concluded instead that, 
under controlling law, [race-based districting] is a justifiable 
invocation of a concededly drastic, historically conditioned remedy 
in order to continue the laborious struggle to break free of a legacy 
of official discrimination and racial bloc voting").

It is often remarked that the vote is one of the most critical 
features of a representative democracy and therefore one of our 
most fundamental rights. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 
(1964) (describing the right to exercise the franchise in a free and 
unimpaired manner as "preservative of other basic civil and political 
rights"). It is also true that, by definition, a racially gerrymandered 
congressional district is a highly visible feature of the political 
landscape, visible to the American public in a way that many 
remedial programs are not. Indeed, it is just this kind of visibility 
that concerned the Court in Shaw in the first place. It is crucial to 
remember also that racial classifications are by their very nature 
presumptively invalid. City o f  Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 75- 
76 and n. 23 (1980); see also Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 523 (Stewart, 
J., dissenting) ("Under our Constitution, any official action that 
treats a person differently on account of his race or ethnic origin is 
inherently suspect and presumptively invalid"); Paradise, 480 U.S. 
at 193 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) ("In such cases [not 
involving any proven violations of law] the governmental 
decisionmaker who would make race-conscious decisions must 
overcome a strong presumption against them"). Therefore, I 
recount with emphasis the Supreme Court's observation in Shaw 
that three Justices in United Jewish Organizations "specifically 
concluded that race-based districting, as a response to racially 
polarized voting, is constitutionally permissible only when the State



153a
’employ[s] sound districting principles,' and only when the affected 
racial group's 'residential patterns afford the opportunity of creating
districts in which they will be in the majority.'" Shaw,___U.S. at

__, 113 S. Ct. at 2832 (quoting United Jewish Organizations, 430
U.S. at 168 (opinion by White, J.)) (emphasis added). Therefore, 
where the vote is concerned, and where the State's remedial efforts 
are as visibly pernicious as they are here, I finally must conclude 
that such efforts simply go beyond that which is permitted by the 
Constitution.

IV.
Conclusion

[E]ven in the pursuit of remedial objectives, an 
explicit policy of assignment by race may serve to 
stimulate our society's latent race consciousness, 
suggesting the utility and propriety of basing 
decisions on a factor that ideally bears no 
relationship to an individual's worth or needs. . . .

United Jewish Organizations, 430 U.S. at 173 (Brennan, J., 
concurring in part). That our society's race consciousness persists, 
latent or otherwise, is indeed a regrettable phenomenon. The 
question of whether the achievement of a "color-blind" society is 
imminent or remote at this stage in our collective history has been 
the subject of considerable debate. The power of this Court, 
however, is more limited in that regard than some might hope, and 
our task consequently more mundane: to insure that the law as 
applied affords equal protection to every citizen.

The evidence presented in this case overwhelmingly 
supports the conclusion that the controlling officials in the General 
Assembly adopted the admitted racial gerrymander to create two 
minority-majority congressional districts in satisfaction of a 
numerical quota consistent with an intent to maximize the 
incumbency of all congresspersons affiliated with the controlling 
political party. The efforts of the Defendants to justify their actions 
in that respect since this litigation began, with talk of homogenous 
communities of interest and a perceived (but not hitherto expressed) 
need to correct past inequities, are lame attempts to reconstruct that



154a
truth. Why, then, does the majority lend credence to the sparse 
evidence supporting the State's position?

Aside from the misreading of Shaw embodied in its 
apparent adherence to Justice White's dissenting opinion, see supra 
at 158-60, at times the majority seems influenced by the notion that 
this case is merely a rehash of Pope v Blue, where the instant 
gerrymander was held to reside in the political thicket, there to 
remain untouched by the judicial hand. That would explain the 
majority's indulgence towards the latest public position of a 
legislature which changes its assertions regarding the underlying 
facts as readily as it does its legal positions advanced in their 
support. But the Shaw decision requires that this Court address the 
underlying issues with greater seriousness of purpose than did the 
legislature. An admitted exercise in the nitty gritty of politics and 
power the majority opinion would elevate to heights of sensitivity 
and high purpose that the legislature simply never reached. The 
majority's findings of fact in these matters are decidedly contrary to 
the weight of the evidence, and it conclusions of law are accordingly 
misplaced.

I conclude with an acute observation by Justice Kennedy in 
a recent case involving distinct but analogous issues: "I regret that 
after a century of judicial opinions we interpret the Constitution to 
do no more than move us from 'separate but equal to 'unequal but 
benign.'" Metro Broadcasting 497 U.S. at 637-38 (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting). Under the majority opinion, one fears North 
Carolinians must live for an indefinite period of time with 
congressional districts in which the races are intentionally made 
"separate but equal" without sufficient justification. For all the 
foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.



155a
APPENDIX D

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

RALEIGH DIVISION

No. 92-202-CIV-5-BR 
ORDER

[FILED 
SEP 1 1994

DAVID W. DANIEL, CLERK 
U.S. DISTRICT COURT 

E. DIST. NO. CAR ]

RUTH SHAW, ET A L .,

Plaintiffs,

v.

JAMES B. HUNT, ET AL.,

Defendants,

This matter is before the court on motion of plaintiffs, filed 
on 15 August 1994, to amend and add findings pursuant to Rule 2 
(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The motion contains two requests for specific amendments 
to the court's findings: (1) that set out on page 1 of the motion 
concerning a finding on page 117 of the court's original opinion 
filed on 1 August 1994; and (2) that set out on page 2 of the motion 
concerning language in footnote 3 of that original opinion.

Both of these have been mooted by revisions to the findings 
of feet in the court's amended opinion filed on 22 August 1994.



156a

The remainder of the motion requests the addition of 
findings to those of the court. Among these are a number based 
upon stipulations of fact by the parties. The court observes of these 
particular requests that, for all purposes apparent to us, they are 
essentially redundant. The facts so stipulated, the stipulations not 
having been judicially rejected, remain facts of record 
notwithstanding their non-inclusion as findings by the court because 
not considered material to its decision.

Except as mooted, and subject to the court's observation 
respecting the status of stipulated facts of record, the motion is 
DENIED, by vote of a majority of the court consisting of Judges 
Phillips and Britt.

This September 1, 1994.

For The Court:

(-s-1 W, Earl Britt
W. EARL BRITT 

United States District Judge

CHIEF JUDGE VOORHEES, dissenting: Recognizing that a
dissenting judge must always find it awkward to comment on a 
motion addressed to a majority of the court, I feel bound to set 
forth my view concerning the merits of plaintiffs' Rule 52(b) 
motion. I agree that stipulations of fact remain facts of record 
notwithstanding the majority's decision not to include them in its 
opinion as formal findings of fact. However, I would grant 
plaintiffs' motion in predominant part because, in my opinion, most 
of the stipulations and findings of fact proposed by plaintiffs are 
material to a sound resolution of this case and, in feet, did have a 
bearing on my dissenting opinions filed with the majority opinions. 
For this reason, I respectfully decline to join in the majority's denial 
of the motion.



No. 92-202-CIV-5-BR

THREE-JUDGE COURT

[CAPTION OMITTED IN PRINTING]

[FILED 
AUG 29 1994

DAVID W. DANIEL, CLERK 
U.S. DISTRICT COURT 

E. DIST. NO. CAR ]

157a
APPENDIX E

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

RALEIGH DIVISION

NOTICE OF APPEAL TO THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

NOW COME THE Plaintiffs Ruth 0 . Shaw, Melvin G. 
Shimm, Robinson O. Everett, Janies M. Everett, and Dorothy G. 
Bullock through counsel and, pursuant to Rule 18 of the Supreme 
Court Rules, hereby give Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court of 
the United States from the Final Judgment of the three-Judge 
District Court entered on August 1, 1994 dismissing the Complaint 
in this action, as well as from the Opinion entered on August 11, 
1994, from the Amended Opinion issued on August 22, 1994, and 
from all rulings and Orders entered by the three-Judge District 
Court in support of, or in connection with, the Final Judgment.

This appeal is taken pursuant to section 1253 of Title 28 of 
the United States Code.

This the 29th day of August, 1994.

(-s') Robinson 0 . Everett 
Robinson 0 . Everett



N.C. State Bar #1385
Pro se and as Attorney for the other Plaintiffs 
Suite 300
301 West Main Street 
Durham, North Carolina 27707

Tel. (919) 682-1591
Of Counsel:

Cliff Dougherty, Esquire 
Bean, Kinney & Korman, P.C.
2000 North Fourteenth Street 
Suite 100
Arlington, VA 22201

158a

[Certificate of Service]



159a

NO. 92-202- CIV-5-BR

THREE-JUDGE COURT

[FILED 
SEP 15, 1994

DAVID W. DANIEL, CLERK 
U S. DISTRICT COURT 

E. DIST. NO. CAR.]

[CAPTION OMITTED IN PRINTING]

SUPPLEMENTAL NOTICE OF APPEAL TO THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

NOW COME THE Plaintiffs Ruth O. Shaw, Melvin G. 
Shimm, Robinson 0. Everett, James M. Everett, and Dorothy G. 
Bullock through counsel and, pursuant to Rule 18 of the Supreme 
Court Rules, hereby give Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court of 
the United States from the Final Judgment of the three-Judge 
District Court entered on August 1, 1994 dismissing the Complaint 
in this action, as well as from the Opinion entered on August 11, 
1994, from the Amended Opinion issued on August 22, 1994, and 
from all rulings and Orders entered by the three-Judge District 
Court in support of, or in connection with, the Final Judgment, 
including an Order dated September 1, 1994 denying Plaintiffs 
Motion to Amend and Add Findings pursuant to Federal Rule 52(b) 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

This appeal is taken pursuant to section 1253 of Title 28 of 
the United States Code.

This is the 15th day of September, 1994.

f-sl Robinson 0. Everett

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

RALEIGH DIVISION



160a

Of Counsel:

Robinson O. Everett 
N.C. State Bar #1385
Pro se and as Attorney for the other Plaintiffs 
Suite 300
301 West Main Street 
Durham, North Carolina 27707

Tel. (919) 682-1591

Cliff Dougherty, Esquire 
Bean, Kinney & Korman, P.C.
2000 North Fourteenth Street 
Suite 100
Arlington, VA 22201

[Certificate of Service]



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA 

RALEIGH DIVISION 
NO. 92-202- CIV-5-BR

THREE-JUDGE COURT

161a
APPENDIX F

[FILED 
AUG 18 1994

DAVID W. DANIEL, CLERK 
U.S. DISTRICT COURT 

E. DIST. NO. CAR.]

[CAPTION OMITTED IN PRINTING]

NOTICE OF APPEAL TO THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Notice is hereby given that plaintiff-intervenors James Arthur "Art" 
Pope, Betty S. Justice, Doris Lail, Joyce Lawing, Nat Swanson, 
Rick Woodruff, J. Ralph Hixon, Audrey McBane, Sim A. Delapp, 
Jr. and Jack Hawke hereby appeal to the Supreme Court of the 
United States from the Order and Judgment of the three judge 
district court entered on 1 August 1994, dismissing the Complaint 
in this action.

This appeal is taken pursuant to section 1253 of Title 28 of the 
United States Code.

Date: 18 th August. 1994.

MAUPIN TAYLOR ELLIS & ADAMS, P.A.

BY:
(-S -)  Thomas A. Farr 
Thomas F. Ellis 
N.C. State Bar No. 1336



162a
Thomas A. Farr 
N.C. State Bar No. 10871 
Sean C. Callinicos 
N.C. State Bar No. 16580 
Craig D. Mills 
N.C. State Bar No. 18729 
3200 Beechleaf Court, Suite 500 
Post Office Drawer 19764 
Raleigh, North Carolina 

27619-9764
Telephone: (919) 981-4000 

BY:
(-s-) Michael A, Hess 
Michael A. Hess 
310 First Street, S.E. 
Washington, D.C. 20003

Counsel for Plaintiff-Intervenors

[Certificate of Service]



163a

NO. 92-202-CIV-5-BR

THREE-JUDGE COURT

[FILED 
SEP 16 1994 

U S. DISTRICT COURT 
E. DIST. NO. CAR.]

[CAPTION OMITTED IN PRINTING]

NOTICE OF APPEAL TO THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Notice is hereby given that plaintiff-intervenors James 
Arthur "Art" Pope, Betty S. Justice, Doris Lail, Joyce Lawing, Nat 
Swanson, Rick Woodruff, J. Ralph Hixon, Audrey McBane, Sim A. 
Delapp, Jr. and Jack Hawke hereby appeal to the Supreme Court of 
the United States from the Amended Opinion of the three-judge 
district court entered on 22 August 1994, amending the Order and 
Judgment entered on 1 August 1994, dismissing the Complaint in 
this action.

This appeal is taken pursuant to section 1253 of Title 28 of 
the United States Code.

Date: 13th September. 1994

MAUPIN TAYLOR ELLIS & ADAMS, P.A.
BY:
( - S - )  Thomas A, Farr 
Thomas F. Ellis 
N.C. State Bar No. 1336 
Thomas A. Farr 
N.C. State Bar No. 10871 
Sean C. Callinicos

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

RALEIGH DIVISION



164a
N.C. State Bar No. 16580 
Craig D. Mills 
N.C. State Bar No. 18729 
3200 Beechleaf Court, Suite 500 
Post Office Drawer 19764 
Raleigh, North Carolina 

27619-9764
Telephone: (919) 981-4000 

BY:
(-s-~) Michael A. Hess 
Michael A. Hess 
310 First Street, S.E. 
Washington, D.C. 20003

Counsel for Plaintiff-Intervenors

[Certificate of Service]



165a
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
RALEIGH DIVISION 

NO. 92-202- CIV-5-BR

THREE-JUDGE COURT

[FILED 
SEP 21 1994

DAVID W. DANIEL, CLERK 
U.S. DISTRICT COURT 

E. DIST. NO. CAR.]

[CAPTION OMITTED IN PRINTING]

SUPPLEMENTAL NOTICE OF APPEAL TO THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

NOW COME the Plaintiff-Intervenors James Arthur “Art” Pope, 
Betty S. Justice, Doris Lail, Joyce Lawing, Nat Swanson, Rick 
Woodruff, J. Ralph Hixon, Audrey McBane, Sim A. Delapp, Jr. 
and Jack Hawke, through counsel, and pursuant to Rule 18 of the 
Supreme Court Rules, hereby give Notice of Appeal to the Supreme 
Court of the United States from the Final Judgment of the three- 
Judge District Court entered on August 1, 1994 dismissing the 
Complaint in this action, as well as from the Opinion entered on 
August 11, 1994; from the Amended Opinion issued on August 22, 
1994; and from all rulings and Orders entered by the three-Judge 
District Court in support of, or in connection with, the Final 
Judgment, including an Order dated September 1, 1994 denying 
Plaintiffs’ Motion To Amend and Add Findings pursuant to Federal 
Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appeal is taken pursuant to section 1253 of Title 28 of 
the United States Code.

This the 21st of September, 1994.

MAUPIN TAYLOR ELLIS & ADAMS, P.A. 
BY:



166a
(-s-) Thomas A. Farr 
Thomas F. Ellis 
N.C. State Bar No. 1336 
Thomas A. Farr 
N.C. State Bar No. 10871 
Sean C. Callinicos 
N.C. State Bar No. 16580 
Craig D. Mills 
N.C. State Bar No. 18729 
3200 Beechleaf Court, Suite 500 
Post Office Drawer 19764 
Raleigh, North Carolina 

27619-9764
Telephone: (919) 981-4000 

BY:
(-s-) Michael A. Hess 
Michael A. Hess 
310 First Street, S.E. 
Washington, D.C. 20003

Counsel for PlaintifF-Intervenors

[Certificate of Service]



167a
APPENDIX G

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. A-252

James Arthur Pope, et al., 

v.
appellants

James B. Hunt, Jr., Governor of North Carolina, et al.

ORDER

UPON CONSIDERATION of the application of counsel 
for the appellants,

IT IS ORDERED that the time for filing a jurisdictional 
statement in the above-entitled case, be and the same is hereby, 
extended to and including November 21. 1994.

C-s-) William H. Rehnauist 
Associate [sic] Justice of the Supreme 
Court of the United States

Dated this 13th 
day of October, 1994



SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. A-253 

Ruth 0 . Shaw, et al.,
Appellants

v.

James B. Hunt, Jr., Governor of North Carolina, et al.

ORDER

UPON CONSIDERATION of the application of counsel 
for the appellants,

IT IS ORDERED that the time for filing a jurisdictional 
statement in the above-entitled case, be and the same is hereby, 
extended to and including November 21. 1994.

168a

( - S - )  William H. Rehnquist 
Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court of the United States

Dated this 13th
day of October, 1994



169a
APPENDIX H

GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA 
EXTRA SESSION 1991 

RATIFIED BILL
CHAPTER 7 

HOUSE BILL 3
AN ACT TO DIVIDE NORTH CAROLINA INTO TWELVE
CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS.

The General Assembly of North Carolina enacts:
Section 1. G.S. 163-201 reads as rewritten:

“ § 163-201. Congressional districts specified.
(a) For the purpose of nominating and electing members 

of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the 
United States in ■j&g2 1992 and every two years there­
after, the State of North Carolina shall be divided into ■tr­
ig  districts as follows:

FIRST■'DIgTBICT> ■ Boa'Ui'»K'--5c'Krjc-,- Ctanoon ■'Coraoro^ 
CSwvroii, Crovon, Uarritiaek- Boro,' Gocoo-.-GpooDOr Bom
iw d , Hyde, LLiiuL,"',Mai'tiii, Xui iLb~j,iptoii, Pamlico,.Poe
qaotQnli, .-P itt) Tyrrolh ond Wnohington
€ euatiea.

SECOND DISTRICT; CaaweD; -Dunham—■Bdgooombe? 
GhuuiuIIg, Halifea, NaA,"Pe?ron,'Tapoo,- Vgft?geBr <uid Wj- 
eaa—Countioe;-ond tho -Q--Noek>- -¥ownohip in- -Johnston 
S canty.—

B IH) DirmiCT: Blades, Duplin, ■gmraott, Jonoc- Loo, 
-Qnoiow, Pondo?, " "Sompoop- and Woyoo ■Gountiooi tho- f-ej- 
■lowing townohipo of ■Johnston County; Bonnorj-Bontanr 
wSer  BoiaSo h ;-goon. E31, Clairton,1 Cleveland, Elevation, 
i ngHima, Meadow;' Micno, Pine Level, Pleasant Crave; 
.Snlnxt,-SB!ithfiold,"'WBdogo, and Whoon Mfllo;-and ■ ike fol- 
lowing iownahipa af Moerc Ccun»;.v 1 (Cai'iaage), 4 (Rar 
fewo); 5-{Docp Rivoi1), C (Greenwood}, and 10 (Little Rive?1).



170a

gQUIlTn DIGTIUCT; Chatham, '"Ffanldin, Ojongc, Has 
dolph, and WqiIiqi Countiopi

gil'Tll BIETIHCl! Aloxandoi*- Moghany, Aoho,^ero3~frh) 
Rocliiggham, Giakca, Sui'i'synnd Willtoo CountioGi

g'lLvI'il DICTIIICT; .\lameaaeo- "E>oTi'idoon, and -GoSiemi 
Gouutioc.......

SETTBiTII. DI£¥niCT: Brunowiok;1 Columbui], Cumbor' 
h>nd, Nom~" Hanoyaiy' cmd Rebocon4]ounfeioD. ■—

■EIGHTH DICUIICT;1 .ino»i>- Cabeuima, Davie, 
■Montgomery, Riohmond, Rowan;1 Scotland, Staihy-r -anel 
Unieg. Counties; and the foh owing. tow-nohipo of ■'M oopg 
■6'eimtyi 3-fS eB9alen), 0 (Ohcsaaldi),1 7 (MlXhIILs), '0 (Qro r  
Hill), mu-O1 Qlimi. ggl Springs); ana- thc following townohipo 
of -Yadkin- County;- Boonville;1East Bond;1 Fall-Crook, ?o? 
bash, Knobo, and Liberty.-

f̂DTTII DICTTUCT; IrcdeB;.■LiaeoiBr anch'Moolilonbuxg
Corniticar -affid tl "fonoviTis^ownDhipEHÔ -̂ dk i& '^ouiity? 
S uck Shoal and Deep Greek.

:¥ ^ r r H DICTTUCT! Burko-,4 j)aidwel]-' Catawba, Clovoland) 
G'Qoton." and Watauga Counties; 'and the- following—'town 
ahipa uJ A il.,  i Gaunty; Deemo*'Elk. ~Bonnh Mnvmfnin 
Cmiborry-' Lhmlkv-'Qnd WIIoono''Grook-

DICTIlICTi Dunoombo, Chorolioo-ClnV} Gr-a. 
bom; Haywood, Hondoroon, Jaoiioon, MoDowoII,—Maoon, 
Madison—-Mitchell, Folk, 'Rutherford, STrain, Tran&ylranioi 
and Yaneov Countiocj and-uho following frownohipo of -Avi 
<?;' Coumy; Aitaraont, Roaring Crook, and T oo Rivor»

District 1: Beaufort County: Chocowinitv township. Rich­
land township. Washington township: Tract 9903. Tract 
9904: Bertie County. Bladen County: Abbotts township: 
Tract 9504: Block Group 5: Block 546A: Tract 9506: Block 
Group 5: Block 508A: Block Group 7: Block 701. Block 
702A, Block 703A. Block 703B. Block 705. Block 706. Block 
707. Block 708, Block 709. Block 710. Block 711. Block



171a

712, Block 713. Block 714. Block 715. Block 716. Block 
717. Block 718. Block 719A, Block 720A. Block 720B, Block 
721, Block 722. Block 723A. Block 724A, Block 725. Block 
726. Block 727, Block 728A. Block 729, Block 730, Block
731. Block 732, Block 733. Block 734. Block 735. Block
736. Block 737, Block 738, Block 739, Block 740, Block
741, Block 742. Block 743, Block 744. Block 745. Block
746, Block 747A. Block 748. Block 749, Block 750. Block 
751A. Block 752A. Block 753A. Block 754A. Block 759A. 
Block 760. Block 783. Block 784. Block 785. Block 786A: 
Brown Marsh township. Carvers Creek township. Central 
township. Elizabethtown township. Frenchs Creek town­
ship. Lake Creek township. TnmbuU township. White Oak 
township. Whites Creek township: Chowan Countv. Colum­
bus County: Bolton township. Chadbonm township: Tract 
9905: Block Group 4: Block 415A. Block 416A, Block 417A. 
Block 424A. Block 425A  Block 426. Block 427. Block 
428A. Block 429, Block 430, Block 431. Block 432: Tract 
9907: Block Group 1: Block 103A. Block 105A. Block 106A. 
Block 107A. Block 108A. Block 109. Block 110A, Block 
HOB. Block 111, Block 112, Block 113. Block 114, Block
115. Block 119. Block 120A. Block 121, Block 122. Block 
123: Block Group 2: Block 210A, Block 210B. Block 211-
Block 212, Block 213. Block 214. Block 215, Block 216.
Block 217, Block 218. Block 230. Block 232. Block 233-
Block 234, Block 235. Block 236. Block 237, Block 238-
Block 239: Block Group 4: Block 410A. Block 410B. Block 
411A. Block 411B. Block 412. Block 413. Block 414. Block 
415, Block 416A. Block 416B. Block 417: Block Group 5: 
Block 501A. Block 502A. Block 503A. Block 508B, Block 
508C. Block 509. Block 510. Block 511. Block 512, Block 
513. Block 514. Block 515. Block 516B. Block 517B. Block 
520: Tract 9909: Block Group 6: Block 606A. Block 607A. 
Block 608. Block 612. Block 613. Block 614. Block 615A: 
Ransom township. Welch Creek township. Western Prong 
township. Whiteville township: Tract 9907: Block Group 1: 
Block 120B: Tract 9908: Block Group 1: Block 118. Block



172a

121; Block Group 2: Block 206A. Block 206B. Block 210; 
Block Group 3: Block 302, Block 303. Block 307. Block
308. Block 309. Block 310. Block 311A. Block 311B. Block
312. Block 313A. Block 313B. Block 313C. Block 314. Block 
315A. Block 315B, Block 316. Block 317. Block 318, Block 
319, Block 320. Block 321, Block 322, Block 323. Block
324. Block 325, Block 326. Block 327. Block 328. Block
329, Block 330; Block Group 4: Block 401. Block 402. Block
403. Block 404A. Block 404B. Block 404C. Block 407. Block 
408, Block 409A. Block 409B. Block 410. Block 411, Block
412, Block 413. Block 414, Block 415, Block 416. Block
417; Tract 9909: Block Group 1; Block 101A. Block 101B. 
Block 102A. Block 102B. Block 102C. Block 102D, Block 
103, Block 107, Block 121A. Block 121B. Block 121C. Block 
122; Block Group 3: Block 301A, Block 301B. Block 302. 
Block 303, Block 304. Block 305. Block 306, Block 309.
Block 310. Block 311, Block 312. Block 313. Block 314-
Block 315, Block 316, Block 317, Block 318. Block 319.
Block 320, Block 321. Block 322, Block 323. Block 324-
Block 325. Block 326. Block 327, Block 328, Block 329.
Block 330. Block 331. Block 332, Block 333. Block 334-
Block 335. Block 336. Block 337. Block 338, Block 339,
Block 340. Block 341. Block 342. Block 346, Block 347
Block 348, Block 349, Block 350. Block 351. Block 352A. 
Block 352B. Block 353. Block 354. Block 355. Block 356: 
Block Group 4: Block 401. Block 402, Block 403. Block
404. Block 405. Block 406. Block 407, Block 408A. Block 
408B. Block 409, Block 410, Block 411. Block 412, Block
413. Block 414. Block 415. Block 416. Block 417. Block
418. Block 419. Block 420A, Block 420B, Block 421A. Block 
421B. Block 422, Block 423B. Block 427. Block 428. Block 
429; Block Group 5: Block 501, Block 502. Block 503. Block 
504, Block 505, Block 506. Block 507A. Block 507B. Block 
507C. Block 508. Block 509, Block 510. Block 511, Block
512. Block 513. Block 514, Block 515. Block 516. Block
517. Block 518. Block 519. Block 520, Block 521. Block
522. Block 525. Block 526: Block Group 6: Block 601A.



173a

Block 601B. Block 602, Block 603. Block 604. Block 605, 
Block 606B, Block 607B. Block 615B. Block 616. Block 
619, Block 620B: Tract 9910: Block Group 1: Block 101A. 
Block 101B, Block 101D, Block 102, Block 103, Block 104. 
Block 105. Block 106, Block 107, Block 108A. Block 108B. 
Block 108C, Block 108D, Block 109. Block 110A, Block 
HOB, Block HOC. Block HOD, Block 111. Block 112. Block 
113A, Block 113B, Block 113C, Block 114, Block 115A. 
Block 115B. Block 116A. Block 116B, Block 117. Block 
118A, Block 118B, Block 118C. Block 119A. Block 119B. 
Block 120, Block 121A, Block 121B. Block 122A. Block 
122B. Block 123A, Block 123B. Block 123C. Block 124- 
Block 125A. Block 125B, Block 126A. Block 126B. Block 
127. Block 128. Block 129. Block 130. Block 131, Block 
132A: Craven Countv: Cove City *. Dover *, Fort Barnwell 
*. Harlowe *. Croatan *: Tract 9610: Block Group 7: Block 
711. Block 712. Block 714. Block 715. Block 716, Block 
717. Block 718, Block 719, Block 720, Block 721, Block 
722. Block 723. Block 724. Block 725, Block 726. Block 
727. Block 728. Block 729. Block 730. Block 731. Block 
732, Block 733. Block 734. Block 735, Block 736. Block 
737. Block 738. Block 739. Block 740. Block 741, Block 
742, Block 743. Block 744, Block 745. Block 746. Block 
747. Block 748. Block 749. Block 750, Block 751. Block 
752, Block 753. Block 754, Block 755: Tract 9611: Block 
Group 1: Block 116: Block Group 2: Block 202, Block 203. 
Block 204, Block 206, Block 207, Block 208, Block 209, 
Block 210. Block 211, Block 212, Block 213. Block 214, 
Block 223, Block 236, Block 237, Block 238. Block 239, 
Block 240. Block 241. Block 242. Block 243. Block 244- 
Block 245. Block 246. Block 247. Block 248. Block 289- 
Block 290: Havelock *: Tract 9611: Block Group 2: Block
249. Block 250. Block 283. Block 284. Block 285. Block
286, Block 287, Block 288. Block 291. Block 292, Block
293. Block 294, Block 295. Block 296. Block 297; Tract
9613: Block Group 2: Block 219A. Block 219B. Block 222. 
Block 223: Block Group 3: Block 323B. Block 324, Block



174a

325, Block 326, Block 327. Block 328. Block 329: Block 
Group 5: Block 503G. Block 525B: First Ward *, Second 
Ward *, Third Ward *, Fourth Ward *, Fifth Ward *. 
Clarks *. Rhems *: Tract 9604: Block Group 5: Block 516. 
Block 517. Block 518. Block 521D. Block 530B, Block 531C. 
Block 533. Block 534. Block 535. Block 536. Block 537. 
Block 538. Block 539, Block 540. Block 541, Block 542. 
Block 543. Block 544, Block 545. Block 546, Block 547A. 
Block 547B, Block 548. Block 549. Block 550, Block 556, 
Block 558, Block 559, Block 560. Block 561, Block 562B. 
Block 563. Block 564, Block 565, Block 566, Block 567.
Block 568. Block 569, Block 570, Block 571. Block 572:
Block Group 7: Block 701, Block 702, Block 711B, Block 
712B. Block 738B, Block 739, Block 740. Block 741, Block
742. Block 743: Jasper *: Cumberland Countv: Beaver Dam 

^ c t  0029: Block Group 1: Block 116: Block Group 2: 
Block 222A, Block 224A. Block 225A. Block 226A. Block 
227A, Block 22SA, Block 229. Block 230, Block 231. Block 
232. Block 233A. Block 234A. Block 235. Block 236, Block 
237, Block 238A. Block 239A. Block 250, Block 25IA. 
Block 252A. Block 253. Block 254. Block 255. Block 256. 
Block 257. Block 258. Block 259. Block 260. Block 261
Block 262. Block 263, Block 264. Block 265. Block 266:
Block Group 3: Block 311. Block 336: Cedar Creek *. Cross 
Creek #1 . Cross Creek #3 *. Cross Creek #5 *. Cross 
Creek #9 *; Tract 0012: Block Group 2: Block 203: Tract 
0024: Block Group 9: Block 901A. Block 902. Block 903 
Block 904. Block 905. Block 908. Block 909. Block 910 
Block 911, Block 912. Block 913. Block 914: Tract 0025.01: 
Block Group 9: Block 911. Block 931. Block 933: Cross 
Creek #10 », Cross Creek #13 *. Cross Creek #15 »: Tract 
0004: Block Group 2: Block 231, Block 232: Tract 0006: 
Block Group 1: Block 133: Block Group 3: Block 301. Block 
302, Block 304, Block 307. Block 308: Block Group 4: Block 
401, Block 402. Block 403, Block 404. Block 405. Block
406. Block 407. Block 408. Block 409, Block 413, Block
414. Block 415: Cross Creek #16 ». Cross Creek #17 »:



175a

Tract 0010: Block Group 1. Block Group 3: Block 313, 
Block 314. Block 315. Block 316: Block Group 9: Tract
0011: Block Group 1: Block 102. Block 103, Block 104,
Block 108. Block 109. Block 112. Block 113. Block 115.
Block 117, Block 118. Block 119. Block 120. Block 121.
Block 122. Block 123. Block 124: Block Group 3: Block
301. Block 302. Block 303. Block 304. Block 308, Block 
309A, Block 309B. Block 310. Block 311. Block 312. Block
313. Block 314, Block 315, Block 316: Tract 0024: Block 
Grout) 1: Block 101B. Block 101C. Block 104, Block 105A. 
Block 105B. Block 106B. Block 107A, Block 107B. Block 
108. Block 109, Block 110, Block 111. Block 115. Block
116. Block 117. Block 118. Block 138: Block Group 2: Block 
201A. Block 201B, Block 202. Block 203. Block 204. Block
205. Block 206: Block Group 4: Block 406A: Block Grout) 
5: Cross Creek #19 *. Sherwood *, Pearces Mill #3 *: 
Duplin County: Glisson *: Tract 9901: Block Group 2: Block
201. Block 202. Block 208. Block 209. Block 210, Block
211. Block 225. Block 227, Block 234, Block 235. Block 
237. Block 257A. Block 257B: Charity *. Kenansville *. 
Magnolia *, Rockfish *. Warsaw *; Edgecombe County: 
Precinct 1-1 *. Precinct 1-2 *: Tract 0209: Block Group 
2: Block 201. Block 202. Block 203. Block 204A. Block 
204B. Block 205. Block 206. Block 207A. Block 207B. Block 
208A. Block 208B. Block 211. Block 212. Block 213, Block
214. Block 215. Block 219, Block 224, Block 228. Block 
229: Precinct 3-1 *, Precinct 4-1 *. Precinct 5-1 *. Precinct 
6-1 *. Precinct 7-1 *. Precinct 12-1 *, Precinct 12-2 *, 
Precinct 12-3 *: Tract 0202: Block Group 5: Block 513B: 
Block Group 6: Block 614. Block 625: Tract 0204: Block 
Group 7: Block 702, Block 703B. Block 704B. Block 705, 
Block 706. Block 707. Block 708C. Block 709B. Block 710. 
Block 712, Block 713. Block 714. Block 721B, Block 722B: 
Precinct 12-4 *. Precinct 12-5 *: Gates Countv. Greene 
County, Halifax County: Hollister *: Tract 9906:0 Block 
Group 3: Block 301A. Block 302A. Block 303B, Block 325A. 
Block 325B. Block 326A, Block 326B: Tract 9908: Block



176a

Group 1: Block 113A, Block 113B. Block 127, Block 128 
Block 134A. Block 1S4B. Block 135A, Block 138A. Block 
138B. Block 139: Block Group 3: Block 322. Block 32.7 
Block 324. Block 325. Block 326, Block 327. Block 328 
Block 329. Block 330: Block Group 4: Block 401. Block
402. Block 403. Block 417. Block 422. Block 423, Block
424, Block 425. Block 426, Block 427, Block 428. Block
429, Block 430. Block 431, Block 432, Block 433. Block
434. Block 435, Block 436. Block 437. Block 438. Block
439. Block 440. Block 441. Block 442. Block 443, Block
444. Block 445, Block 446. Block 447. Block 448, Block
449. Block 450, Block 451: Ring-wood *. Butterwood *. 
Tract 9907: Block Group 4: Block 411A, Block 412. Block 
446A, Block 448. Block 449: Conoconnara *. Enfield #1 *. 
Enfield #2 *, Enfield #3 *. Faucett *: Tract 9905: Block 
Group 7: Block 707A. Block 715. Block 716: Tract 9906: 
Block Group 2: Block 201. Block 202. Block 203. Block
204. Block 205. Block 206. Block 207. Block 208. Block
209. Block 210, Block 211. Block 212. Block 213, Block
214, Block 215, Block 216. Block 217, Block 218. Block
219, Block 226. Block 227. Block 228. Block 236, Block
237, Block 240,. Block 241. Block 247, Block 248: Block
Group 3: Block 310. Block 314. Block 317. Block 318. Block 
319, Block 320. Block 321. Block 322, Block 323. Block
324. Block 325C. Block 326C. Block 326D. Block 327, Block 
328, Block 329. Block 330, Block 331. Block 332. Block 
333; Tract 9908: Block Group 2: Block 201C: Tract 9909: 
Block Group 1: Block 101B. Block 101C, Block 102C. Block 
102D, Block 103B, Block 103C. Block 104A. Block 104B: 
Tract 9910: Block Group 1; Block 110. Block 111, Block 
112, Block 113, Block 114: Halifax *. Littleton #1 *: Tract 
9907: Block Group 2: Block 240. Block 241. Block 242. 
Block 256, Block 257. Block 258. Block 259. Block 26p' 
Block 261, Block 262, Block 263. Block 264. Block 266 
Block 266. Block 269. Block 270. Block 271: Block Grom  
3: Block 308, Block 309, Block 310, Block 311, Block 312. 
Block 313A. Block 313B. Block 314. Block 315. Block 316A.



177a

Block 316B, Block 318. Block 320. Block 333. Block 334. 
Block 335. Block 336. Block 337, Block 338. Block 339. 
Block 344. Block 345. Block 346. Block 347. Block 348A. 
Block 348B. Block 349. Block 350. Block 351: Block Group 
4: Block 401. Block 402. Block 403. Block 404. Block 407, 
Block 41IB. Block 414. Block 415, Block 416, Block 417. 
Block 418. Block 419. Block 420, Block 421, Block 422. 
Block 423, Block 424. Block 425A. Block 425B. Block 426A. 
Block 426B, Block 427. Block 428. Block 429A. Block 429B.
Block 430. Block 431. Block 432. Block 433. Block 434-
Block 435. Block 436, Block 437. Block 438. Block 439.
Block 440. Block 441. Block 442. Block 443. Block 444.
Block 445. Block 446B. Block 447: Tract 9908: Block Group 
1: Block 108: Hobgood *. Palmyra *, Roanoke Rapids #7 
*. Roanoke Rapids #9 *: Tract 9905: Block Group 5: Block 
509. Block 510. Block 511A. Block 511B. Block 512A. Block 
512B, Block 513. Block 514, Block 515. Block 516, Block 
517A. Block 519. Block 52QA. Block 520B. Block 521A. 
Block 521B: Block Group 6: Block 601A. Block 601B. Block 
602A. Block 602B. Block 602C. Block 603. Block 604A. 
Block 604B. Block 605. Block 606, Block 607A. Block 607B. 
Block 608. Block 609. Block 610A. Block 613. Block 614. 
Block 615. Block 616. Block 617. Block 618.. Block 619. 
Block 620. Block 621, Block 622: Roseneath *. Scotland 
Neck #1 *. Scotland Neck #2 *. Weldon #1 *. Weldon #2 
*. Weldon #3 *; Hertford County. Jones County: Pollocks- 
ville *, Trenton *: Lenoir County: Contentnea *. Kinston 

*. Kinston #2 *. Kinston #6 *. Kinston #7 *. Kinston 
#8 Moselev Hall *. Trent #2 *: Tract 0112: Block Group 
4: Block 406. Block 407. Block 410. Block 411. Block 412. 
Block 422. Block 423. Block 424. Block 425, Block 445- 
Block 449, Block 450: Vance *: Martin County: Goose Nest. 
Hassell. Hamilton. Poplar Point. Robersonville # 1. Rob- 
ersonville # 2. WTiHamston # 1- Williamston # 2. VTD’s 
not defined: Nash County: Griffins *: Tract 0108: Block 
Group 1: Block 166A. Block 167; Tract 0109: Block Group 
1: Block 101. Block 102. Block 103. Block 110. Block 111.



178a

Block 112. Block 113. Block 114. Block 115. Block 116-
Block 117. Block 118. Block 119. Block 120. Block 121.
Block 122. Block 123. Block 124. Block 125. Block 126.
Block 127. Block 128. Block 129. Block 130, Block 131-
Block 132. Block 133. Block 134. Block 135. Block 136.
Block 137. Block 138. Block 139. Block 140. Block 141.
Block 142. Block 143. Block 144, Block 145, Block 146.
Block 147. Block 148. Block 149. Block 150, Block 151.
Block 152, Block 153A. Block 153B, Block 156B. Block 
156C. Block 157: Block Group 2: Block 206E. Block 206F. 
Block 207D: Block Group 3: Block 301. Block 302. Block 
303A. Block 304: Block Group 4: Block 401. Block 402. 
Block 403. Block 404. Block 405, Block 406. Block 407.
Block 408. Block 409. Block 410. Block 411, Block 412.
Block 413. Block 414, Block 415. Block 416. Block 417.
Block 418. Block 419. Block 420, Block 421. Block 422,
Block 423. Block 424, Block 425. Block 426, Block 427.
Block 430. Block 431. Block 432, Block 433. Block 434.
Block 435. Block 436. Block 437. Block 438A. Block 438B. 
Block 439. Block 440A. Block 441. Block 445. Block 446- 
Block 447. Block 448. Block 449. Block 450. Block 451. 
Block 453. Block 454: No. Whitakers #1 *, No. Whitakers 
#2 *. Rockv Mount #3 *. Rocky Mount #4 *. Battleboro 
»; New Hanover County: Cape Fear #1 *: Tract 0115: 
Block Group 1: Block 141. Block 142. Block 143: Block 
Group 2: Block 209: Block Group 4: Block 401: Block Group 
5: Block 501. Block 502. Block 503. Block 504, Block 505. 
Block 506. Block 507. Block 508. Block 509. Block 510-
Block 511. Block 512. Block 513. Block 514. Block 515.
Block 516, Block 517, Block 518. Block 519. Block 520,
Block 521. Block 522, Block 523. Block 524. Block 525.
Block 526. Block 527. Block 528. Block 529. Block 530.
Block 531. Block 532. Block 533. Block 534. Block 535.
Block 536. Block 537. Block 538. Block 539. Block 540.
Block 541, Block 542. Block 543. Block 544. Block 545.
Block 546, Block 547, Block 548. Block 549. Block 550.
Block 551. Block 552. Block 553. Block 554. Block 555.



179a

Block 556, Block 557, Block 558, Block 559: Wilmington 
#1 *. Wilmington #2 *. Wilmington #3 *. Wilmington #6 
* .Wilmington #7 *, Wilmington #8 *: Tract QUO: Block 
Group 1: Block 102. Block 124. Block 129: Block Group 
2: Block 201. Block 207. Block 208. Block 209. Block 210. 
Block 211. Block 213, Block 223: Block Group 3: Block
312. Block 313. Block 314. Block 318. Block 319. Block
322. Block 323: Wilmington #9 *: Tract 0103: Block Group 
2: Block 208. Block 209. Block 210: Tract 0116.02: Block 
Group 4: Block 420A: Wilmington #10 *. Wilmington #15 
*, Northampton County, Pasquotank Countv: Newland. 
Nixonton. Elizabeth City 1-A. Elizabeth City 3-A. Elizabeth 
City 3-B. Elizabeth City 4-A. Elizabeth City 4-B: Pender 
County: Canetuck *. Caswell *. Columbia * Grady *: Tract 
9805: Block Group 1: Block 182B. Block 183B. Block 184B, 
Block 185. Block 186. Block 187. Block 188: Block Group 
4: Block 401. Block 402. Block 403. Block 404. Block 405. 
Block 406, Block 408. Block 410. Block 411. Block 412.
Block 413, Block 414. Block 415, Block 416. Block 417,
Block 419. Block 425. Block 426, Block 427. Block 428.
Block 457. Block 468. Block 469. Block 470. Block 472-
Block 484. Block 486. Block 487. Block 488. Block 489,
Block 490, Block 491. Block 492. Block 495: Upper Holly 
*. Upper Union *: Perquimans County. Pitt County: Ar­
thur *. Avden East *. Belvoir *. Bethel *. Carolina *. 
Falkland ». Farmville West *. Fannyflle East m. Fountain 
*. Grifton *. Grimesland *. Pactolus *. Greenyille #1 *. 
Greenville #2, Greenville #3 *. Greenville #4 *. Greenville 
#5 *. Greenville #6 *. Greenville #13 *. Greenvffle #2 Non­
contiguous: Vanpp County: Middleburg. Townsville. ^WS- 
liamsboro. East Henderson I. East Henderson II. North 
Henderson I, North Henderson II. South Henderson I: 
Warren County. Washington Countv. Wayne County: 
White Hall *: Tract 0006: Block Group 6: Block 650. Block 
651. Block 659. Block 660. Block 661: Block Group 7: Block
743. Block 744. Block 746. Block 747: Wilson County: 
Gar oners *, Saratoga *. Stantonsbursr *: Tract 0010. Block



180a

Group 1: Block 101A. Block 101B. Block 112, Block 116A. 
Block 117A. Block 117B, Block 117C. Block 118A. Block 
118B. Block 119. Block 120A. Block 120B. Block 121. Block 
122, Block 123. Block 124. Block 125, Block 126, Block
127. Block 128, Block 129. Block 130. Block 131. Block
132, Block 133. Block 134. Block 135. Block 136. Block
137. Block 138. Block 139A. Block 139B. Block 140. Block
141A. Block 141B, Block 142, Block 143. Block 144A. Block 
144B. Block 145. Block 146A. Block 146B, Block 147A. 
Block 147B, Block 148. Block 149, Block 150. Block 151- 
Block 152, Block 153. Block 154. Block 155. Block 156,
Block 158. Block 159. Block 160, Block 161. Block 162.
Block 163. Block 164: Tract 0011: Block Group 2: Block 
230B: Toisuot *: Tract 0013: Block Group 1: Block 101A. 
Block 101B. Block 102, Block 103. Block 104. Block 105. 
Block 106. Block 107, Block 108. Block 109. Block 110.
Block 111. Block 112. Block 113. Block 114, Block 124-
Block 125. Block 134. Block 135. Block 136, Block 137-
Block 138. Block 143. Block 144. Block 145, Block 146:
Block Group 2: Block 201, Block 202, Block 203. Block
205. Block 213. Block 214: Block Group 3: Block 301. Block 
302A. Block 302B. Block 302C. Block 303A. Block 303B. 
Block 304. Block 305. Block 306. Block 307, Block 308. 
Block 309. Block 310. Block 311A. Block 311B. Block 311G. 
Block 312A, Block 312B; Block 313. Block 314. Block 315, 
Block 316. Block 317. Block 318. Block 319, Block 320. 
Block 321. Block 322. Block 323. Block 324. Block 325A. 
Block 326A. Block 327. Block 329. Block 336. Block 337- 
Block 338. Block 339: Block Group 4: Block 401. Block 
402, Block 403, Block 404. Block 405. Block 406, Block 
407A. Block 408. Block 409. Block 410. Block 411. Block 
412A: Block Group 5: Block 508. Block 509. Block 512. 
Block 513. Block 514, Block 521. Block 522. Block 523A. 
Block 523B. Block 524A, Block 524B. Block 525A. Block 
526, Block 527. Block 528. Block 529A. Block 529B, Block 
529C, Block 530A, Block 530B. Block 531A. Block 532, 
Block 533. Block 534. Block 535. Block 536. Block 537.



181a

Block 538. Block 539. Block 540. Block 541A. Block 541B. 
Block 542. Block 543. Block 544, Block 545, Block 546.
Block 547. Block 548: Wilson A *. Wilson B *, Wilson C
*■ Wilson E *: Tract 0001: Block Group 1: Block 101.
Block 102. Block 103. Block 104. Block 105. Block 106-
Block 107, Block 108. Block 109. Block 114. Block 115,
Block 116, Block 117, Block 122. Block 123: Block Group 
2: Block 201. Block 202. Block 203. Block 204. Block 213. 
Block 214. Block 215. Block 217. Block 218, Block 219: 
Tract 0006: Block Group 2: Block 206. Block 210. Block
213. Block 214. Block 216. Block 217: Block Group 5: Block 
518B; Tract 0013: Block Group 4: Block 416: Wilson F *, 
Wison G *, Wilson H *. Wilson I *: Tract 0003: Block 
Group 1: Block 119. Block 120. Block 121. Block 122. Block 
123, Block 124, Block 125. Block 127, Block 128, Block 
129: Block Group 2: Block 207. Block 208. Block 213. Block
214. Block 223: Wilson N *. Wilson O *.

District 2: Durham County: Neal Junior H.S. *, Brogden 
Junior H.S. *. Club Blvd. School *. Edison Johnson Com­
munity Center *. E.K. Powe School *. Fire Station #6 *. 
Hillandale School *. Holv Infant Catholic Church *, Hope 
Valiev School *. Multi-Purpose Building/Duke *, NC School 
of Science & Math *. Rogers-Herr Junior H.S. *. St. Ste- 
phens/Parish Hall *: Tract 0020.07: Block Group 4: Block
406. Block 410: Tract 0020.08: Block Group 1. Block Group 
2. Block Group 3: Block 301A. Block 301B. Block 302A. 
Block 302B. Block 303. Block 304. Block 305, Block 306. 
Block 307. Block 308. Block 309. Block 310, Block 311. 
Block 312. Block 313. Block 314. Block 315: Block Group 
4: Cole Mill Church of Christ *, Eno Valiev School *. 
Bethesda Ruritan Club *. Oak Grove School *. Durham 
Academy Gvm *. Five Oaks Seventh Day Adventist Church 
*, Jordan H.S. *, Nelson Community Center *. Parkwood 
School *: Edgecombe Countv: Precinct 1-2 *: Tract 0209: 
Block Group 2: Block 209, Block 210. Block 216A, Block 
216B. Block 217A. Block 217B, Block 217C. Block 217D. 
Block 218, Block 225. Block 226, Block 227: Tract 0210:



182a

Block Group 5: Block 506. Block 507. Block 516. Block 
517. Block 518. Block 530, Block 531. Block 532: Block 
Group 9; Tract 0212: Block Group 2. Block Group 5: Tract 
0213: Block Group 2: Block 248A, Block 248B, Block 250: 
Block Group 3: Block 301A, Block 301B. Block 302. Block 
303, Block 304A. Block 304B. Block 305. Block 306A. Block 
306B, Block 307. Block 308, Block 318A: Precinct 1-3 *. 
Precinct 1-4 *. Precinct 2-1 ». Tract 0209: Block Group 
2: Block 220, Block 221. Block 222. Block 223: Precinct 
8-1 *. Tract 0213: Block Group 3: Block 301C. Block 306C. 
Block 309. Block 310, Block 311. Block 312. Block 313. 
Block 314, Block 315. Block 316. Block 317, Block 318B. 
Block 319. Block 320, Block 321. Block 322. Block 323. 
Block 324, Block 325, Block 326: Precinct 9-1 *. Precinct 
10-1 *. Precinct 11-1 *, Tract 0213: Block Group 1: Block 
102, Block 122, Block 123. Block 124: Precinct 12-3 *: 
Tract 0202: Block Group 1: Block 151B. Block 151C, Block 
153: Block Group 4: Block 411B. Block 416B. Block 417B. 
Block 424C. Block 424D. Block 425: Block Group 5: Block 
506B. Block 513C. Block 516, Block 520C: Block Group 6: 
Block 601, Block 602. Block 603. Block 604. Block 605.
Block 606, Block 607, Block 608. Block 609. Block 610,
Block 611. Block 612, Block 613. Block 615. Block 616-
Block 617, Block 618. Block 619. Block 620. Block 621,
Block 622. Block 623, Block 624. Block 626. Block 627.
Block 628. Block 632. Block 633: Tract 0203: Block Group 
5: Block 50IB: Block Group 6: Block 618, Block 619: Block 
Group 7: Block 701. Block 702. Block 703. Block 704, Block 
705. Block 706B. Block 707B. Block 708B. Block 709B. 
Block 710, Block 711. Block 712. Block 713. Block 714. 
Block 715C. Block 716B. Block 717B. Block 718B. Block 
<29B. Block 730B. Block 735B: Tract 0204: Block Group 
7: Block 701. Block 711: Tract 0213: Block Group 1: Block
101. Block 103. Block 104, Block 105, Block 106. Block
107, Block 108. Block 109. Block 110, Block 111. Block
112. Block 113. Block 114. Block 115. Block 116, Block
117. Block 118. Block 119. Block 120. Block 121. Block



183a

125. Block 126. Block 127. Block 128, Block 129, Block 
130. Block 131. Block 132. Block 133. Block 134, Block 
135; Block Group 2: Block 211. Block 212. Block 213. Block 
214. Block 215. Block 216. Block 217B. Block 218B: Tract 
0214: Block Group 1: Block 101. Block 104. Block 105; 
Precinct 13-1 *, Precinct 14-1 *; Franklin County. Gran­
ville Countv: Brassfield *. Butner *, Creedmoor *, Antioch 
*. Corinth *, Credle *, East Oxford *. South Oxford *. 
Salem *. Tally Ho *; Halifax County: Hollister *; Tract 
9906: Block Group 3: Block 301B. Block 302B. Block 302C. 
Block 303A. Block 303C; Tract 9908: Block Group 1: Block 
117A. Block 117B. Block 124A, Block 124B. Block 124C. 
Block 125A. Block 126, Block 129. Block 130. Block 131 A. 
Block 131B. Block 131C. Block 132, Block 133, Block 140. 
Block 141. Block 142, Block 143. Block 144. Block 145- 
Block 146: Block Group 2: Block 205, Block 206: Block 
Group 3: Block 301. Block 302. Block 303. Block 304. Block 
305. Block 306. Block 307. Block 308. Block 309, Block
310. Block 311. Block 312. Block 313. Block 314. Block
315. Block 316. Block 317. Block 318. Block 319. Block
320. Block 321. Block 331. Block 332: Block Group 4: Block 
404. Block 405. Block 406, Block 407, Block 408, Block
409. Block 410. Block 411. Block 412. Block 413. Block
414. Block 415. Block 416. Block 418. Block 419. Block
420, Block 421: Faucett *: Tract 9906: Block Group 2: 
Block 220. Block 221C. Block 223B. Block 225B. Block
229. Block 230. Block 231B. Block 232. Block 233. Block 
234. Block 235. Block 242. Block 243. Block 244, Block
245. Block 246. Block 249. Block 250. Block 251. Block
252. Block 253, Block 254. Block 255. Block 256. Block
257. Block 258. Block 259. Block 260. Block 261. Block
262. Block 263. Block 264: Block Group 3: Block 301C.
Block 301D. Block 302D. Block 304. Block 305. Block 306, 
Block 307, Block 308. Block 309, Block 311. Block 312, 
Block 313, Block 315. Block 316: Tract 9907: Block Group 
4: Block 408A: Littleton #1 *: Tract 9907: Block Group 
4: Block 405. Block 406. Block 408B, Block 409. Block



184a

410, Block 413: Littleton #2 *, Roanoke Rapids #1 * Roan­
oke Rapids #2 *, Roanoke Rapids #3 *, Roanoke Rapids 
#4 *, Roanoke Rapids #5 *, Roanoke Rapids #6 *. Roanoke 
Rapids #8 *, Roanoke Rapids #9 *: Tract 9905: Block 
Group 2: Block 216, Block 218, Block 219: Block Group 
5: Block 517B, Block 518: Block Group 6: Block 610B, 
Block 611. Block 612; Block Group 7: Block 701, Block 
702, Block 703, Block 704, Block 705, Block 706, Block 
707B, Block 708, Block 709, Block 710, Block 711, Block 
712, Block 713, Block 714, Block 717, Block 718: Roanoke 
Rapids #10 *. Roanoke Rapids #11 *; Harnett County, 
Johnston County, Lee County, Moore Coustv: Township 
4, Ritters: Tract 9501: Block Group 2: Block 202A, Block 
203A, Block 210, Block 211A, Block 212, Block 213. Block 
214. Block 215, Block 231, Block 242: Township 5, Deep 
River, Tract 9501: Block Group 1: Block 101. Block 102, 
Block 103. Block 104: Block 105. Block 106, Block 107- 
Block 108. Block 109C. Block HOB. Block 142B, Block 
142C. Block 142D, Block 142E. Block 142F, Block 145G. 
Block 146B, Block 156. Block 157. Block 158. Block 159. 
Block 160, Block 161. Block 162. Block 163. Block 164- 
Block 165, Block 166, Block 167, Block 168. Block 169- 
Block 170, Block 171. Block 172. Block 173. Block 179B. 
Block 179C: Township 6. Greenwood. Township 7. McNeill. 
Township 8, Sand HU], Township 9. Mineral Springs. 
Township 10, Little River, Nash County: Bailev * Castalia 
*■ Coopers *, Drvwells *. Ferrells *. Griffins »; Tract 0109: 
Block Group 1: Block 104. Block 105, Block 106, Block 
107. Block 108. Block 109: Block Group 4: Block 452: 
Jacksons *, Mannings #1 *, Mannings #2 *, Nashville *, 
Oak Level. Oak Level Noncontiguous. Red Oak *, Rockv 
Mount #1 *, Rockv Mount #2 *, Rocky Mount #5 *, Rockv 
Mount #6 *, Rockv Mount #7 *, Stonv Creek #1. Stonv 
Creek Noncontiguous A, Stonv Creek Noncontiguous B; 
Vance County: Dabnev. Hilltop. Kittrell, Sandv Creek. 
Watkins. South Henderson II, West Henderson I. West 
Henderson DA. West Henderson llB: Wake County: New



185a

Light #1 *; Wilson County: Black Creek *. Cross Rnsrk 
*, Old Fields *. Sprint Hill *, Stantonsburg *: Tract 
0008.02: Block Group 2: Block 238. Block 239, Block 240. 
Block 245. Block Block 246. Block 247. Block 248. Block 
249. Block 250: Block Group 3: Block 319A, Block 320. 
Block 321A. Block 322. Block 323: Tract 0009: Block Group 
3: Block 30IB: Tract 0010: Block Group 1: Block 101C. 
Block 102, Block 103, Block 104. Block 105. Block 106. 
Block 107, Block 108. Block 109. Block 110. Block 111. 

■Block 113. Block 114. Block 115, Block 116B: Tavlors *. 
Toisnot *: Tract 0012: Block Group 1: Block 104. Block 
105, Block 106. Block 107. Block 108, Block 109. Block
110. Block 111, Block 114. Block 118. Block 119, Block 
120, Block 121: Tract 0013: Block Group 1: Block 115. 
Block 116; Block 117. Block 118. Block 119, Block 120. 
Block 121. Block 122. Block 123. Block 126. Block 127, 
Block 128. Block 129. Block 130. Block 131. Block 132. 
Block 133. Block 139. Block 140, Block 141. Block 142: 
Block Group 2: Block 204. Block 206. Block 207. Block 
208, Block 209. Block 210. Block 211. Block 212. Block
215. Block 216, Block 217, Block 218. Block 219, Block
220. Block 221, Block 222. Block 223. Block 224. Block 
225. Block 226. Block 227. Block 228. Block 229. Block
230. Block 231. Block 232. Block 233. Block 234. Block 
235, Block 236. Block 237. Block 238. Block 239. Block 
240. Block 241. Block 242, Block 243. Block 244. Block 
245. Block 246. Block 247. Block 251: Block Group 3: Block 
325B. Block 328: Block Group 4: Block 407B, Block 412B, 
Block 413. Block 414: Block Group 5: Block 501. Block 
502. Block 503. Block 504. Block 505. Block 506. Block 
507, Block 510. Block 511. Block 515. Block 516A. Block 
516B, Block 517. Block 518. Block 519, Block 520. Block 
525B. Block 53IB. Block 549: Wilson D *. Wilson E *: 
Tract 0006: Block Group 2: Block 201. Block 202. Block 
205. Block 207. Block 208. Block 209. Block 211. Block
212. Block 215: Block Group 3. Block Group 5: Block 517. 
Block 518A: Tract 0013: Block Group 4: Block 415. Block



186a

417. Block 418: Wilson I *: Tract 0003: Block Group 1:
Block 101. Block 102, Block 103. Block 104. Block 105.
Block 106. Block 107. Block 108, Block 109, Block 11Q.
Block 111. Block 112. Block 113. Block 114. Block 115.
Block 116. Block 11 1 . Block 118. Block 126: Block Group 
2: Block 209, Block 210. Block 211. Block 212: Tract 0004: 
Block Group 5: Block 520B. Block 520X. Block 520Y. Block 
520Z. Block 521. Block 522. Block 523. Block 524A. Block 
524B. Block 525. Block 526. Block 527A. Block 527B. Block 
528A. Block- 528B. Block 529A. Block 529B. Block 529C 
Block 531A. Block 531B. Block 532A, Block 532B. Block 
535: Tract 0008.02: Block Group 2: Block 207. Block 208. 
Block 209. Block 210. Block 211A. Block 211B. Block 211C. 
Block 212. Block 213. Block 214. Block 234A. Block 234B. 
Block 235. Block 251A. Block 251B. Block 252. Block 253A. 
Block 253B. Block 254. Block 255. Block 256 Block 257: 
Tract 0009: Block Group 1: Block 108. Block 109: Wilson 
J *. Wilson K », Wilson L *. Wilson M *. Wilson P *.

District 3: Beaufort County: Bath township, Long Acts 
township, Pantego township. Washington township: Tract 
9902: Block Group 1: Block 129B. Block 130B, Block 131- 
Block 132, Block 133. Block 134. Block 135. Block 136
Block 137, Block 138. Block 139. Block 140. Block 141
Block 142, Block 143, Block 144. Block 145. Block 146.
Block 147. Block 148. Block 149. Block 150. Block 151
Block 152, Block 153. Block 154. Block 155. Block 156
Block 157B. Block 158B. Block 159B, Block 160B. Block 
175B. Block 176B. Block 185B, Block 186B. Block 187B. 
Block 189, Block 190. Block 191. Block 197: Block Group 
2; Tract 9905: Block Group 5: Block 522A. Block 528A: 
Camden County. Carteret County; Craven Countv: Emn3 
*- Epworth *, Vanceboro *. Bridgeton *. Truitt *. Croatan 
*: Tract 9611: Block Group 1: Block 106. Block 107, Block
108. Block 109. Block 110. Block 111. Block 112, Block
113. Block 114. Block 115, Block 117, Block 118A. Block 
USB. Block 119. Block 120. Block 121. Block 122, Block
123. Block 124. Block 125. Block 126. Block 127: Block



187a

Group 2: Block 201, Block 205. Block 215, Block 216 RlnrV 
217, Block 218. Block 219. Block 220. Block 221 RW V 
222. Block 224. Block 225; Havelock *: Tract 9611- Block 
Group 1: Block 128A. Block 128B. Block 129, Block 180 
Block 131. Block 132, Block 133. Block 134: Block Gmnn 
2: Block 226, Block 227, Block 228, Block 229. Block 230 
Block 231, Block 232. Block 233. Block 234. Block 235 
Block 251. Block 252. Block 253. Block 254A. Block 254B. 
Block 255A. Block 255B. Block 256. Block 257. Block 258. 
Block 259A, Block 259B. Block 260. Block 261. Block 262A. 
Block 262B. Block 262C. Block 263, Block 264. Block 265- 
Block 266. Block 267. Block 268. Block 269. Block 270 
Block 271, Block 272, Block 273. Block 274. Block 275 
Block 276. Block 277, Block 278. Block 279. Block 280A. 
Block 280B. Block 280C. Block 281. Block 282: Block Group 
3; Tract 9612. Tract 9613: Block Group 1, Block Group 2: 
Block 201. Block 202, Block 203. Block 204. Block 205. 
Block 206. Block 207, Block 208. Block 209. Block 210A. 
Block 21QB. Block 210C. Block 211A. Block 211B. Block 
211C. Block 212. Block 213 Block 214. Block 215. Block 
216, Block 217A. Block 217B. Block 217C. Block 218A. 
Block 218B, Block 218C, Block 220. Block 221, Block 224. 
Block 225; Block Group 3: Block 301. Block 302. Block 
303, Block 304. Block 305. Block 306A, Block 306B. Block 
307, Block 308. Block 309. Block 310. Block 311. Block 
312, Block 313. Block 314. Block 315. Block 316A, Block 
316B, Block 317A Block 317B. Block 318. Block 319, Block 
320, Block 321. Block 322. Block 323A. Block 323C: Block 
Group 4, Block Group 5: Block 503A Block 503B, Block 
503C, Block 503D. Block 503E. Block 505A. Block 505B, 
Block 506A. Block 506B. Block 507A. Block 507B. Block 
508A. Block 508B. Block 509, Block 510, Block 511, Block 
512. Block 513. Block 514. Block 515. Block 516, Block
517. Block 518. Block 519, Block 520, Block 521. Block
522. Block 523, Block 524, Block 525A, Block 526. Block 
527, Block 528, Block 529, Block 530, Block 531. Block
532, Block 533. Block 534. Block 535. Block 536. Block



188a

537, Block 540B; Block Group 6: Block 642, Block 643 
Block 644A, Block 644B, Block 645; Grantham *, Sixth 
Ward *, Country Club *, Rhems *: Tract 9604: Block 
Group 7: Block 704: River Bend *, Tract 9604: Block Group 
5: Block 562A; Block Group 7: Block 703, Block 705, Block 
706, Block 707, Block 708. Block 709, Block 710, Block 
711A, Block 712A, Block 713, Block 714, Block 715, Block 
716, Block 717, Block 718, Block 719, Block 720, Block
721, Block 722, Block 723, Block 624, Block 725, Block
726, Block 727, Block 728. Block 729, Block 730. Block
731. Block 732, Block 733, Block 734, Block 735. Block
736, Block 737, Block 738A: Trent Woods *, Woodrow *: 
Currituck Countv: Dare County: Duplin County: Albertson 
*. Chinquapin *. Cypress Creek *, Calypso *, Faison *. 
Glisson *: Tract 9901: Block Group 2: Block 203, Block 
204, Block 205, Block 206, Block 207, Block 212. Block
213, Block 214, Block 215, Block 216, Block 217, Block
218, Block 219, Block 220, Block 221. Block 2??. Block
223. Block 224, Block 226. Block 238, Block 239. Block
240. Block 241. Block 242. Block 243, Block 244. Block
245, Block 246. Block 247, Block 248. Block 249. Block
250, Block 251. Block 252, Block 253, Block 254, Block
255, Block 256: Wallace *, Beulaville *, Cedar Fork *, 
Rose Hill *, Smith/Cabin *, Wolfscrape *, Hvde County; 
Jones County: Beaver Creek *. Chinquapin *, Cypress 
Creek *, Tuckahoe *. White Oak *: Lenoir Conntv- Falling- 
Creek *, Institute *, Kinston #3 *. Kinston #4 * Tti-ncrh-m 
#5 *, Kinston #9 *, Neuse *. Pink Hill #1 *, Pink Hill #9. 
*• Tract 0112: Block Group 3: Block 339A, Block 341: 
Sandhill *, Southwest *, Trent #1 *, Trent #2 *: Tract 
0112: Block Group 3: Block 301: Block Group 4: Block 
401, Block 402, Block 403, Block 404, Block 405. Block
408. Block 409. Block 413, Block 414. Block 415. Block
416, Block 417. Block 418, Block 419, Block 420, Block
421, Block 426, Block 427, Block 428, Block 429. Block
430. Block 431. Block 432, Block 433, Block 434. Block
435. Block 436. Block 437. Block 438. Block 439. Block



189a

440. Block 441. Block 442. Block 443, Block 444. Block 
446, Block 447. Block 448: Woodlington *. Martin County: 
Bear Grass. Cross Roads. Griffins, Jamesville Williams- 
Onslow County: East Northwoods *. West Northwoods *. 
Half Moon *: Tract 0012: Block Group 1: Block 101B, 
Block 102B. Block 108B, Block 109B. Block 110, Block
111. Block 112. Block 113, Block 114. Block 115, Block
116. Block 117. Block 118. Block 128, Block 129. Block
132. Block 136. Block 137: Block Group 2: Block 201. Block 
203. Block 204. Block 205. Block 206. Block 207. Block 
208. Block 209. Block 210. Block 211. Block 212A. Block 
212B, Block 213. Block 214. Block 215. Block 216: Block 
Group 3: Block 306B. Block 307A: Jacksonville. New Rjyer 
*. Catherine Lake *. Haw,Branch *. Gum Branch *, Rich- 
lands *, Haris Creek *. Haws Run *. Tract 0004: Block 
Group 4: Block 408: Holly Ridge *: Tract 0004: Block 
Group 4: Block 406. Block 407. Block 409. Block 410, Block 
414, Block 415. Block 416. Block 417. Block 418. Block
426: Swansboro *. Mills *. Tract 0001: Block Group 1:
Block 101. Block 102, Block 103. Block 104B, Block 105. 
Block 106, Block 107. Block 108. Block 109. Block 110.
Block 111. Block 112. Block 114, Block 115, Block 119,
Block 120. Block 125B. Block 129B. Block 133. Block 134B. 
Block 135B, Block 136, Block 137B: Mortons *. Northeast 
*, VTD ZZZZ: Tract 0001: Block Group 1: Block 104A. 
Block 125A, Block 126, Block 127, Block 128. Block 129A. 
Block 130. Block 131. Block 132. Block 134A. Block 135A. 
Block 137A. Block 138. Block 139A, Block 140. Block 141. 
Block 142. Block 143. Block 144A. Block 144B. Block 144C. 
Block 145. Block 146. Block 147. Block 148. Block 149.
Block 150. Block 151. Block 152. Block 153, Block 154.
Block 155. Block 156, Block 157, Block 158. Block 159-
Block 160. Block 161, Block 162, Block 163. Block 164-
Block 165, Block 166, Block 167. Block 168. Block 169A. 
Block 170. Block 171A. Block 172. Block 173, Block 174. 
Block 175. Block 176. Block 177A. Block 177B, Block 178, 
Block 179. Block 185. Block 186, Block 196A. Block 196B,



190a

Block 197A. Block 197B: Tract 0002: Block Group 6: Block 
627A. Block 628. Block 629A. Block 629B. Block 630A. 
Block 631. Block 632, Block 633. Block 634A. Block 635A. 
Block 648A. Block 649A: Tract 0012: Block Group 1: Block 
101A. Block 102A. Block 103, Block 104. Block 105. Block 
106. Block 107A. Block 108A. Block 109A: Tract 0013: 
Block Group 1: Block 107: Pamlico Countv: Pamlico 
County: Pasquotank County: Mount Hermon. Providence. 
Salem. Elizabeth City 1-B. Elizabeth City 2-A. Elizabeth 
City 2-B: Pender County: North Burgaw *. South Burraw 
*. Grady *: Tract 9805: Block Group 4: Block 407. Block 
409, Block 418. Block 420, Block 421. Block 49.9 BWk
423. Block 424. Block 429, Block 430. Block 431, Block
432. Block 433, Block 434, Block 435, Block 436. Block
437. Block 438. Block 439. Block 440, Block 441. Block
442. Block 443, Block 444. Block 445. Block 446. Block
447, Block 448, Block 449. Block 450. Block 451. Block
452. Block 453. Block 454, Block 455. Block 456. Block
458. Block 459. Block 460, Block 461. Block 462, Block
463, Block 464. Block 465. Block 466, Block 467. Block
471, Block 473. Block 474. Block 475. Block 476. Block
477. Block 478. Block 479. Block 480. Block 481. Block
482. Block 483, Block 485. Block 493, Block 494. Block
496; Tract 9806: Block Group 3: Block 339: Middle Hollv 
*• Long Creek *. Penderlea *, Lower Union *. Roekv Point 
*• Topsail *; Pitt County; Avden West ». Chicod
*, Simpson *. Swift Creek.*. Winterville West *, Win- 
terville East *, Greenville #7 *. Greenville #8 *. Greenville 
#9 *, Greenville #10 *, Greenville #11 *, Greenville #12 »: 
Sampson County. TvtJcell Countv. Wavno Conntv: Brogden 
x. Mt. Olive *. Buck Swamp ». Fork *. Grantham ». Great 
Swamp *. Goldsboro #1 *. Goldsboro #2 *. Goldsboro #3 
*. Goldsboro #4 *. Goldsboro #5 *, Indian Springs *. White 
Hall *: Tract 0006: Block Group 6: Block 605, Block 624
Block 625. Block 626, Block 627, Block 628. Block 629.
Block 630, Block 631. Block 632, Block 633. Block 634
Block 635. Block 636. Block 644. Block 645. Block 646



191a

Block 647, Block 652, Block 653. Block 654. Block 655. 
Block 656. Block 657. Block 658: Block Group 7: Block 
701. Block 702. Block 703. Block 704A. Block 704B. Block 
705. Block 706. Block 707. Block 708. Block 709. Block 
710, Block 711. Block 712, Block 713. Block 714A, Block 
714B. Block 715. Block 716A. Block 716B. Block 717. Block 
718. Block 719. Block 720. Block 721, Block 722. Block 
723. Block 724. Block 725, Block 726. Block 727, Block 
728A. Block 728B, Block 729A. Block 729B. Block 730. 
Block 731. Block. 732. Block 733. Block 734. Block 735, 
Block 736. Block 737, Block 738. Block 739. Block 740. 
Block 741. Block 742. Block 745, Block 748: Eureka * 
Fremont *, New Hope *. Pikeville *. Saulston *. Pinewood 
*. Stonev Creek *.

District 4: Chatham County, Orange County- Orange 
Grove *. White Cross *. Carr *: Tract 0108: Block Group 
1: Block 130. Block 131. Block 132. Block 154. Block 185. 
Block 186. Block 187: Block Group 4: Block 401. Block 
402. Block 403. Block 404, Block 405, Block 406. Block
407. Block 408. Block 409, Block 410. Block 411. Block
412. Block 413. Block 414. Block 415. Block 416, Block
417. Block 418. Block 419. Block 420. Block 421, Block
422, Block 423. Block 424. Block 425. Block 426. Block
427. Block 428. Block 429, Block 430. Block 431. Block
432. Block 433. Block 434. Block 435. Block 436, Block
437. Block 438. Block 439. Block 440. Block 441. Block
442, Block 443. Block 444. Block 445, Block 446. Block
447, Block 448. Block 449. Block 450. Block 451. Block
452, Block 453. Block 454. Block 472. Block 475, Block
476A, Block 477. Block 478, Block 479A Block 480, Block 
481, Block 482. Block 483A. Block 484A. Block 485A: 
Tract 0111: Block Group 2: Block 206A Block 207. Block 
209. Block 210, Block 211A, Block 212A Block 213. Block 
214A  Block 215A: Cedar Grove *: Tract 0108: Block Group 
1: Block 145, Block 147. Block 149, Block 150. Block 151- 
Block 152. Block 153. Block 158, Block 159. Block 160-
Block 161. Block 162. Block 163. Block 164. Block 165.



192a

Block 166, Block 167, Block 168. Block 169, Block 170,
Block 171. Block 172. Block 173. Block 174. Block 175.
Block 176. Block 177, Block 178. Block 179. Block 180.
Block 181. Block 182. Block 183. Block 184. Block 188.
Block 189, Block 190: Block Group 4: Block 455, Block
456, Block 457. Block 458. Block 459. Block 460. Block 
461. Block 462, Block 463A. Block 464. Block 465. Block 
466A. Block 467A. Block 468. Block 469A. Block 470A. 
Block 471A. Block 473, Block 474: Tolars *: Tract 0108: 
Block Group.2: Block 271, Block 272. Block 273. Block 
274. Block 278, Block 279, Block 280. Block 281, Block 
282, Block 283, Block 284A: Block Group 3: Block 307A. 
Block 308. Block 309, Block 310. Block 311. Block 312-
Block 313, Block 314. Block 315. Block 316, Block 317,
Block 318. Block 319A. Block 342A. Block 342B. Block 
343. Block 344, Block 345. Block 346A. Block 347, Block 
348, Block 349. Block 350. Block 351. Block 354A. Block 
355A, Block 356A. Block 357. Block 358A. Block 359, 
Block 360A, Block 361A. Block 361B, Block 381. Block 
382: Tract 0109: Block Group 2: Block 213A: Battle Park 
*, Coker Hills *, Coles Store *. Colonial Heights *. Coun­
try Club ». Dogwood Acres *. East Franklin *, Eastside 

. Estes Hills *, Foxcroft *. Glenwood *. Greenwood *, 
Kings Mill *, Lincoln *, Lions Club ». Masnn Farm 
NortbCarrfaoro *. Norside *, Owasa *. Patterson *, Ridge­
field *, St. John *, Town Hall *, Weaver Dairy *. Westood 
*• Cheeks *. Efland *. St. Marvs *. Cameron Park ». 
Grady Brown *, Hillsborough *. West Hillsborough *, Cald­
well »: Tract 0108: Block Group 3: Block 338. Block 339. 
Block 340. Block 346B, Block 352. Block 353. Block 354B. 
Block 355C. Block 356B. Block 361E. Block 362B, Block 
363. Block 364. Block 365. Block 366. Block 367. Block 
368, Block 369. Block 376. Block 377. Block 378. Block 
379, Block 380B: Wake County: Raleigh 01-01 *. Raleigh 
01-02 *, Raleigh 01-03 », Raleigfa 01-04 ». Raleigh 01-05 
*• Raleigh 01-06 «. Raleigh 01-07 «, Raleigh 01-09 *. Ra­
leigh 01-10 », Raleigh 01-11 ». Raleigh 01-12 «. Raleigh



193a

01-13 *. Raleigh 01-14 *. Raleigh 01-15 *. Raleigh 01-16 
*, Raleigh 01-17 *. Raleigh 01-18 *, Raleigh 01-19 *. Ra­
leigh 01-20 *. Raleigh 01-21 *. Raleigh 01-22 *. Raleigh 
01-23 *. Raleigh 01-26 *. Raleigh 01-27 *. Raleigh 01-28 
*. Raleigh 01-29 *, Raleigh 01-30 Raleigh 01-31 *, Ra­
leigh 01-32 *, Raleigh 01-33 *. Raleigh 01-34 *. Raleigh 
01-35 *. Raleigh 01-36 *. Raleigh 01-37 ». Raleigh 01-38 
*. Raleigh 01-39 *. Raleigh 01-40 *. Raleigh 01-41 *. Ra­
leigh 01-42 *. Raleigh 01-43 *. Raleigh 01-44 *. Raleigh 
01-45 *. Raleigh 01-46 *. Bartons Creek #1 *. Bartons 
Creek #2 *. Buckhorn *. Carv #1 *. Cary #2 *. Carv #3 
*. Carv #4 *. Carv #5 *. Cary #6 *. Carv #7 *. Carv #8 
*. Carv #9 ». Carv #10 ", Cedar Fork ». Hollv Springs 
*. House Creek #1 *. House Creek #2 *. House Creek #3 
*. House Creek #4 V  House Creek #5 *. House Creek #6 
*. Leesville #1 *. Leesville #2 *. Leesville #3 *. Little 
River #1 *. Little River #2 *, Marks Creek #1 *, Marks 
Creek #2 *. Meredith *. Middle Creek #1 *. Middle Creek 
#2 m. Raleigh 01-27 Part. Neuse #1 *. Neuse #2 *. New 

- Light #2 *. Panther Branch *. St. Marvs #1 *. St. Marvs 
#2 *, St. Marvs #3 *. St. Marvs #4 *. St. Marvs #5 *. St. 
Marvs #6 *. St. Marvs #7. St. Matthews #1 *. St. Matthews 
#2 *. St. Matthews #3 *. St. Matthews #4 *. Swift Creek 
#1 *. Swift Creek #2 *. Swift Creek #3 *. Swift Creek #4 
*. Wake Forest #1 *. Wake Forest #2 *. White Oak #1 
*. White Oak #2 *.

District 5: Alleghany County: Ashe County: Burke 
County: Drexel #1 *. Drexel #2 *. LinviHe #2 *. Lower 
Creek *. Morganton #1 *. Morganton #3 *. Morganton #4 
*. Morganton #5 *. Morganton #6 *. Morganton #7 *. 
Morganton #8 *. Morganton #9 *. Morganton #10 *. Quaker 
Meadow #1 *. Quaker Meadow #2 *. Silver Creek #1 *. 
Silver Creek #3 *. Silver Creek #4 *. Smokv Creek *; 
Caldwell County: Kings Creek *. Lenoir #1 *. Lenoir #2 
*. Lenoir #3 *. Lenoir #4 *, Lower Creek #1 *. Lower 
Creek #4 *. Yadkin Valiev *; Caswell Countv. Forsvth 
Countv: Abbotts Creek #3 *. Belews Creek *. Bethania #1



194a

*. Bethama #3 *, Kemersville #1 *. Kemersville #2 *. 
Kemersville #3 *. Kemersville #4 *, Middlefork #2 *, Mid- 
dlefork #3 *. Old Town #2 *. Salem Chapel #1 *. Salem 
Chapel #2 *. Ardmore Baptist Church *, Bethabara Mo­
ravian Church *. Bible Wesleyan Church *. Bishop Mc- 
Guiimess *, Bolton Swimming Center *, Brown/Douglas 
Recreation *, Brunson Elementary School *. Christ Mo­
ravian Church *, Country Club Fire St. *. Covenant Pres­
byterian Church . Easton Elementary School *, First 
Christian Church *, Forest Hill Fire Station *. Forsvth 
Tech W. Camp. *. Greek Orthodox Church *. Hanes Com­
munity Center *, Hill Middle School *. Latham Rlpmpntarv 
School *. Memorial Coliseum *. Miller Park Recreation 
Center ", Mineral Springs F. St. *. Mt. Tabor High School 
*• New Hope United Methodist Church *. Old Town Pres­
byterian Church *, Parkland High School *. Parkway 
United Church *. Philo Middle School *. Polo Park Rec­
reation Center *. Reynolds Hid: School Gvm *. South 
Fork Eiem School *. St. Anne’s Episcopal Church *. Sum­
mit School *. Trinity Moravian Church ». Trinity United 
Methodist Church *. Whitaker Elementary School *; Gran­
ville County: Oak Hill *. West Oxford Elementary *. Sas­
safras Fork ». Walnut Grove »: Guilford Countv: North 
Madison *, Stokesdale *: Tract 0158: Block Group 1: Block 
105A. Block 107A. Block 108A: Tract 0159: Block Group 
1: Block 105A. Block 114A. Block 115A. Block 116. Block 
117A. Block USA. Block 118B. Block 125. Block 126, Block 
127, Block 128A. Block 129A: Block Group 2: Block 203. 
Block 204. Block 205. Block 206. Block 207. Block 208.
Block 209, Block 210. Block 211. Block 212. Block 213.
Block 214. Block 215. Block 216. Block 217. Block 218.
Block 219, Block 220. Block 221. Block 292 Block 223-
Block 224. Block 225. Block 226. Block 227. Block 228-
Block 229. Block 230. Block 231. Block 232B. Block 233. 
Block 234. Block 235. Block 236. Block 237. Block 238. 
Block 239A. Block 240. Block 241. Block 242. Block 243A 
Block 244. Block 245. Block 246. Block 247. Block 248.



195a

01-13 *, Raleigh 01-14 *, Raleigh 01-15 *. Raleigh 01-16 
*, Raleigh 01-17 *, Raleigh 01-18 *, Raleigh 01-19 *. Ra­
leigh 01-20 *. Raleigh 01-21 ». Raleigh 01-22 *. Raleigh 
01-23 *, Raleigh 01-26 *. Raleigh 01-27 *. Raleigh 01-28 
*■ Raleigh 01-29 *, Raleigh 01-30 *. Raleigh 01-31 *. Ra­
leigh 01-32 *, Raleigh 01-33 *. Raleigh 01-34 », Raleigh 
01-35 *. Raleigh 01-36 *. Raleigh 01-37 ». Raleigh 01-38 
*■ Raleigh 01-39 *. Raleigh 01-40 *. Raleigh 01-41 *. Ra­
leigh 01-42 *. Raleigh 01-43 *. Raleigh 01-44 *. Raleigh 
01-45 *, Raleigh 01-46 *. Bartons Creek #1 *. Bartons 
Creek #2 *. Buckhom *. Carv #1 *. Carv #2 *. Cary #3 
*. Cary #4 *, Carr #5 *. Cary #8 *. Carv #7 *. Carv #8 
*. Carv #9 *. Carv #10 *. Cedar Fork *. HoUv Springs 
*. House Creek #1 *, House Creek #2 *. House Creek #3 
*. House Creek #4 *. House Creek #5 *. House Creek #6 
*. Leesville #1 *. Leesville #2 *. Leesville #3 *, Little 
River #1 *. Little River #2 *. Marks Creek #1 *. Marks 
Creek #2 *. Meredith *. Middle Creek #1 *. Middle Creek 
#2 *. Raleigh 01-27 Part. Neuse #1 *. Neuse #2 *. New 

• Light #2 *. Panther Branch *. St. Marvs #1 *, St. Marvs 
#2 *. St. Marys #3 *. St. Marys #4 *. St. Marys #5 *. St. 
Marvs #6 *. St. Marvs #7, St. Matthews #1 *, St. Matthews 
#2 *, St. Matthews #3 *. St. Matthews #4 *. Swift Creek 
#1 *, Swift Creek #2 *. Swift Creek #3 *. Swift Creek #4 

■ *. Wake Forest #1 *. Wake Forest #2 *. White Oak #1 
*. White Oak #2 *.

District 5: Alleghany County: Ashe County: Burke 
County: Drexel #1 *. Drexei #2 *. Linville #2 *. Lower 
Creek *. Morganton #1 *. Morganton #3 *. Morganton #4 
*. Morganton #5 *. Morganton #6 *, Morganton #7 *. 
Morganton #8 *. Morganton #9 *. Morganton #10 *. Quaker 
Meadow #1 *. Quaker Meadow #2 *. Silver Creek #1 *. 
Silver Creek #3 *. Silver Creek #4 *. Smokv Creek *: 
Caldwell County: Kings Creek *. Lenoir #1 *. Lenoir #2 
*. Lenoir #3 *. Lenoir #4 *. Lower Creek #1 *, Lower 
Creek #4 * Yadkin Valiev *; Caswell County. Forsvth 
Countv: Abbotts Creek #3 *. Belews Creek *. Bethania #1



196a

Block 249. Block 250, Block 251A. Block 252. Block 253: 
Block Group 3: Block 306A. Block 314A. Block 315A. Block 
320, Block 321B. Block 322B. Block 323A. Block 323B- 
Person County, Rockingham County, Stokes County: Surry 
County, Watauga County; Wilkes County: Beaver Creek 
*, Boomer V Elk No. 2 ", Moravian Falls *. No. Wilkes- 
boro-1 *. No. WiIkesboro-3 *, Wilkesboro No. 1 *.

District 6: Alamance County: Albright *. Central Boone 
*. North Boone *, South Boone *, West Boone *. Boone 
#5 *, East Burlington *, North Burlington *: Tract 0201.01: 
Block Group 1: Block 102. Block 103. Block 104, Block
105. Block 106. Block 107, Block 108. Block 109, Block
110. Block 111. Block 112, Block 117, Block 118: Block
Group 2: Block 201, Block 209. Block 224: Tract 0202:
Block Group 1: Block 104. Block 112. Block 114. Block
115. Block 116. Block 117, Block 118, Block 119. Block
120. Block 121. Block 122, Block 123: Tract 0203: Block 
Group 1: Block 102, Block 103. Block 106. Block 111A. 
Block 111B. Block 112, Block 113A. Block 113B. Block 
113C: Block Group 2: Block 203. Block 204. Block 205. 
Block 206. Block 207, Block 209. Block 210: Block Group 
3: Tract 0204: Block Group 3: Block 301. Block 302, Block 
303. Block 305, Block 348. Block 349: Tract 0205: Block 
Group 8: Block 807, Block 823: South Burlington *. West 
Burlington », Burlington #5 ». Burlington #6 *. Burlington 
#8 *. Burlington #9 », Coble *. East Graham * North 
Graham *, South Graham *, Graham #3 *. North Melville 
*, South Melville », Melville #3 ». North Newlin ». South 
Newlin ». Patterson *. North Thompson ». South Thomn- 
son »; Davidson County: Abbotts Creek *: Tract 0601: 
Block Group 1: Block 101. Block 102. Block 103. Block
104. Block 105. Block 106, Block 107. Block 108, Block
109, Block 110, Block 111. Block 112. Block 113, Block
114, Block 120. Block 121. Block 122. Block 123. Block
124, Block 125, Block 126. Block 127, Block 128. Block
129. Block 130, Block 131: Block Group 2: Block 201. Block
202. Block 203. Block 204. Block 205. Block



197a

206. Block 207. Block 208. Block 209, Block 211. Block 
212. Block 213. Block 214, Block 218. Block 219, Block 
220, Block 221. Block 222. Block 223. Block 224, Block 
225. Block 226, Block 227. Block 228. Block 230. Block 
231, Block 232. Block 233. Block 234. Block 235, Block 
236, Block 238, Block 239. Block 240. Block 241, Block 
242. Block 243. Block 248. Block 250: Block Group 3. Block 
Group 9: Block 901A. Block 901B. Block 902. Block 903. 
Block 904. Block 905, Block 906, Block 907, Block 908. 
Block 909, Block 910. Block 911. Block 912, Block 915- 
Block 916A. Block 916B, Block 917, Block 918. Block 920. 
Block 921. Block 922: Alleghany *. Arcadia *, Boone *. 
Central *. Hollv Grove *, Liberty *. Cotton *: Tract 0615: 
Block Group 4: Block 443: Tract 0618.01: Block Group 2: 
Block 204B, Block 207A. Block 207B, Block 208A. Block 
208B. Block 227, Block 235C. Block 236, Block 237C, Block 
238: Block Group 3: Block 301. Block 309. Block 310, Block
311. Block 312. Block 313. Block 314. Block 315. Block
316, Block 317, Block 318. Block 319. Block 320. Block
321. Block 322. Block 323: Block Group 4: Block 401, Block 
402. Block 403. Block 404. Block 405. Block 406. Block
407. Block 414. Block 415, Block 416. Block 417. Block
418, Block 419, Block 420. Block 421, Block 422, Block
423. Block 424. Block 425. Block 426. Block 427. Block
428. Block 429: Block Group 5: Block 541, Block 542. Block 
543, Block 544. Block 545: Block Group 6: Block 601. Block 
602. Block 603, Block 604, Block 605. Block 606. Block 
607. Block 622. Block 623. Block 624: Block Group 7: Block 
701. Block 702, Block 703. Block 704. Block 705. Block
706, Block 707, Block 708, Block 709. Block 710. Block
711. Block 714. Block 715. Block 716. Block 745: Soutb- 
mont-*. Denton *, Emmons *, Silver Valiev *. Hampton 
*. Healing Springs *. Jackson HOI *, Lexington No. 1 *: 
Tract 0604: Block Group 2: Block 206, Block 213. Block 
226: Tract 0612: Block Group 3: Block 301. Block 302. 
Block 303, Block 304. Block 305, Block 307. Block 309. 
Block 310. Block 311. Block 312, Block 314, Block



198a

315., Block 316. Block 317B, Block 318. Block 319. Block 
320? Block 321, Block 322, Block 324B. Block 325B Block 
326B, Block 327B. Block 348B. Block 349C. Block 350r 
Block 350D, Block 370E. Block 371B. Block 372. BlnA  
g7^B? Block 374. Block 375. Block 382: Lexington No. 2 
-■ Lexington No. 3 *. Lexington No. 4 *, Ward No. 2 *- 
Tract 0613: Block Group 2: Block 220. Block 221. BW V
222. Block 223. Block 237: Block Group 3: Block 340 Block
341: Block 342: Tract 0614: Block O otid 2: Block 210 
Block 211: Tract 0615: Block Group 1: Block 106. Block-
M ,  Block 109. Block 110. Block 111, Block 112. Block
1_13. Block 120. Block 121: Block Group 4: Block 401, Block 
402. Block 403. Block 404. Block 407. Block 408' Block
409, Block 410, Block 411, Block 412. Block 449. Block
^50. Block 451. Block 452. Block 453A: Tract 0616: Block 
Group 1: Block 101. Block 102. Block 103. Block 105. Block 
106- Block 107, Block 108. Block 109. Rfock 113. Block
m .  Block 115. Block 116. Block 117. Block 118, BlnHr
119. Block 120, Block 121. Block 122. Block 123. Block
124: Block 125, Block 126. Block 127, Block 128. BW V
12^ Block 130. Block 131: Block Group 2. Block Group
3LBlock 301A. Block 302A. Block 314A. Block 315A. Block 
319A. Block 320. Block 321. Block 322: Tract 0618 0V 
Block Group 2: Block 211; Ward No. 3~«, Ward
^ p c t  0614: Block Group 3: Block 340: Block O™™ a- 
gjock 413B. Block 413C. Block 414. Block 415. Block 41 fi- 
gract 0615: Block Group 1: Block 131. Block 122: BWV 
Group 2: Block 204. Block 205. Block 206 Block 207 Bind? 
208. Block 209, Block 210. Block 211, Block 212.’ Block
g l3 ; Block 214. Block 215. Block 216, Block 217. Block
218. Block 219. Block 220. Block 221. BWk 999 tti/v i
223. Block 224. Block 225. Block 226. Block 227. Block
228r Block 229, Block 230, Block 231. Block 282' Block
ggL Block 234, Block 235. Block 236. Block'
238? Block 239, Block 240. Block 241, Block 242: Block
g p up 3: Block 301C, Block 301D, Block 302B. Block 808 
Block 304. Block 305. Block 306. Block 307. BW k 308.



199a

Block 309. Block 310. Block 311. Block 312, Block 313A. 
Block 313B. Block 314. Block 315. Block 316. Block 317A. 
Block 317B. Block 368A. Block 368B. Block 369. Block 
370. Block 371: Tract 0618.02: Block Group 2: Block 201. 
Block 202. Block 203. Block 204A. Block 205. Block 206A. 
Block 206B, Block 228. Block 229. Block 230. Block 231. 
Block 232, Block 233. Block 234A. Block 234B. Block 235A. 
Block 235B. Block 237A. Block 237B: Tract 0618.02: Block 
Group 1: Block 101a. Block 135: Welcome *. Midway *. 
Reeds *. Tyro *. Reedv Creek *. Silver Hill Thomasville 
No. 4 *: Tract 0609: Block Group 1. Block Group 2, Block 
Group 3: Block 301. Block 302, Block 303. Block 304, Block 
305. Block 306. Block 307. Block 308A, Block 310. Block 
313A. Block 315A. Block 316. Block 317A. Block 317B, 
Block 318, Block 319, Block 320, Block 321. Block 322A. 
Block 322B. Block 324A. Block 324B. Block 324C. Block
325. Block 326A. Block 327. Block 328A: Block Group 4. 
Block Group 5: Block 501. Block 502. Block 503. Block 
504. Block 505, Block 506. Block 507, Block 508. Block 
09, Block 510, Block 511. Block 512. Block 513. Block 514- 
Block 515, Block 518. Block 519. Block 520. Block 521. 
Block 522: Block Group 9: Block 901A. Block 903A. Block 
91LA Block 911B: Tract 0611: Block Group 1: Block 101. 
Block 102. Block 103A: Thomasville No. 5 *. Thomasville 
No. 7 *: Tract 0605: Block Group 1: Block 107. Block 108 
Block 109, Block 112. Block 113. Block 114. Block 115.
Block 116, Block 117. Block 119. Block 126. Block 127:
Block Group 9: Block 903. Block 904. Block 905. Block 
906, Block 907. Block 908. Block 915. Block 917: Thom- 
asYille No. 8 *: Tract 0605: Block Group 1: Block 101. 
Block 102. Block 103. Block 104. Block 105. Block 106.
Block 110. Block 111: Block Group 9: Block 901. Block
902. Block 909, Block 910. Block 911. Block 912: Tract 
0606: Block Group 1: Block 101, Block 102, Block 103. 
Block 104. Block 105. Block 106. Block 107. Block 108. 
Block 109. Block 110. Block 111. Block 112B. Block 113B, 
Block 114. Block 115. Block 116. Block 117. Block 118B.



200a

Block 119B, Block 120B. Block 121B. Block t tw v
123. Block 124; Block Group 4: Block 401A. Block 401B 
Block 401C, Block 402A. Block 402B, Block 403 Rlork 
404. Block 405A, Block 405B. Block 405C. Block 40nD 
Block 405E, Block 406A. Block 406B. Block 407.
413., Block 414: Block Group 9: Block 901, Block 902 Block 
905. Block 906B, Block 907. Block 908, Block 909 BWV 
910. Block 930B, Block 934, Block 935B, Block 95fi. BWV 
959B: Tract 0607: Block Group 1: Block 101B. Block 102B: 
Block Group 3: Block 324B. Block 325, Block 326B: Tract - 
0608: Block Group 1: Block 101, Block 102B. Block 104B: 
pomasviUe No. 9 ». Thomasvffle No. 10 » Yariks College 
*; Davie Countv: Fulton township, Jerusalem township 
Mocksville township, Shadv Grove township; GrnHfnrri 
County: GB-10 *, GB-11 *. GB-12 *. GB-13 » G B - 1 ~  
GB-15 *: Tract 0116.01: Block Group 1: Block 105. Block 
—8- BI°ck 109. Block 110. Block l l .  Block 112. Block n a  
Block 114: Block Group 2: Block 201: Block Group 4: Block
410. Block 411. Block 412, Block 415. Block 417: GB-16 
*. GB-17 *. GB-18 *. GB-20 *. GB-21 *, GB-22 *, GB-27A 
*-• GB-28 * GB-31 *. GB-32 *. GB-34A *, GB-35A *, GB- 
37A *. GB-38 * GB-39 *. GB-40A *. GB-41A * GB-43 * 
HP-01 * HP-02 1  HP-04 *. HP-08 *. HP-OQ - TTP.in »' 
HP-13 *■ HP-14 *, HP-16 ». HP-18 *. HP-19 » TTP-9n »' 
^ 2 1  ». BP-23 ». HP-24 ». Bruce *. North C e^ jT g^  
_^_South Center Grove *. Clav «. Deep River », Fentrass- 
1— Fentress-2 *. Friendship-1 *. Friendship  *. Whitsett 
l _ Greene *. Jamestown-1 *: Tract 0164.01: Block Grmm 

Block 221Y, Block 221Z. Block 223A: Tract 0614.02- 
Block Group 4: Block 401W, Block 401Z. Block 402. Block 
403C, Block 403D. Block 403E. Block 403F. Block 403G 
Bjock 405. Block 406, Block 407, Block 408. Block 409 
l lock 410, Block 412. Block 424. Block 425. Block 426 
Block 434. Block 435. Block 443X. Block 443Y. Block 4437 
glock 444, Block 445. Block 446, Block 447Y. Block 447Z: 
Blgck Group 9: Block 901A: Tract 0165.02: Block Gmnn 
3: Block 315X. Block 315Y. Block 3152. Block 317: James-



201a

town-2 *: Tract 0164.01: Block Group 2: Block 20IF. Block 
201G. Block 211B. Block 212B. Block 213. Block 214. Block
215. Block 216. Block 217. Block 218. Block 219. Block 
220, Block 221C. Block 221D, Block 222, Block 223B; Tract 
0164.02: Block Group 4: Block 401C: Tract 0165.01: Block 
Group 2: Block 201D. Block 20IE, Block 202. Block 211B. 
Block 211C: Tract 0165.02: Block Group 1: Block 103D. 
Block 103E. Block 104, Block 108B. Block 109C. Block 
HOB. Block 111B. Block 112, Block 113: Block Group 2: 
Block 201, Block 202. Block 203. Block 204. Block 205-
Block 211. Block 224: Block Group 3: Block 303. Block
304. Block 305. Block 306. Block 307, Block 308. Block
309. Block 310, Block 311. Block 315B. Block 316. Block
318. Block 319, Block 320, Block 321. Block 322: Block
Group 4: Block 407A. Block 415A, Block 415B. Block 418A: 
Tract 0166: Block Group 9: Block 904. Block 905. Block 
906. Block 907. Block 930A, Block 952, Block 953: Tract 
0167: Block Group 1: Block 105A. Block 106A. Block 106B. 
Block 110A. Block 111A. Block 112. Block 113. Block 114. 
Block 115. Block 116, Block 117, Block 118A. Block 119A,a 
Block 120. Block 121. Block 122. Block 123. Block 124. 
Block 125: Block Group 5: Block 501A. Block 502. Block 
503, Block 504. Block 505. Block 506A. Block 507A, Block 
508A. Block 510A. Block 511: Jamestown-3 *. North Jef­
ferson *: Tract 0127.07: Block Group 2: Block 201C. Block 
201D: Tract 0128.03: Block Group 2: Block 208. Block 209. 
Block 210. Block 211, Block 212. Block 215. Block 216. 
Block 218. Block 219. Block 220. Block 221. Block 222. 
Block 223, Block 225. Block 226, Block 227B. Block 232- 
Block 233, Block 234C: Tract 0153: Block Group 1: Block 
101A. Block 102A. Block 103. Block 104A. Block 105A. 
Block 106A. Block 112A. Block 113. Block 114A. Block
133. Block 134: Block Group 2. Block Group 3: Block 302A. 
Block 304. Block 305, Block 306. Block 307, Block 308. 
Block 313. Block 314, Block 315. Block 316: Tract 0154: 
Block Group 5: Block 511A. Block 520A. Block 521. Block 
522A. Block 523. Block 524A. Block 525A. Block 526A.



202a

Block 527, Block 528A: Block Group 6: Block 601, Block 
602A. Block 603, Block 604, Block 605B. Block 606. Block 
607. Block 608. Block 609. Block 610. Block 611: South 
Jefferson *, South Madison *, North Monroe *, South 
Monroe *. Oak Ridge *. Stokesdale *: Tract 0159: Block 
Group 2: Block 201A, Block 201B. Block 202, Block 232A- 
Block Group 3: Block 303A, Block 307A. Block 308A. Block 
309A. Block 310, Block 311. Block 312. Block 313. Block 
316. Block 321A. Block 322A:- South Sumner *. North 
Washington *. South Washington *: Tract 0151: Block 
Groun 1: Block 149: Tract 0152: Block Group 1: Block 101. 
Block 102, Block 103. Block 104. Block 105. Block 106:
Block Group 4: Block 401, Block 402. Block 403. Block
404, Block 405. Block 406. Block 407, Block 408. Block
409. Block 410. Block 411. Block 412. Block 413. Block
414, Block 415B. Block 416B: Tract 0153: Block Group 1: 
Block 101B. Block 102C. Block 104C: Tract 0154: Block 
Group 4: Block 401C. Block 404B: Block Group 5: Block 
501. Block 502. Block 506B: GB-27B *, GB-34B *. GB- 
35B *, GB-37B *, GB-40B ». GB-41B *. GB-24C GB- 
27C *. Randolph County, Rowan Countv: Franklin Tract 
0505: Block Group 2: Block 201B. Block 202B. Block 202C: 
Block Group 3: Block 301B: Tract 0513.01: Block Group 
2: Block 201, Block 202. Block 203, Block 204B. Block 
205C. Block 205D. Block 206B. Block 207: Block Group 
3: Block 301, Block 303. Block 304. Block 305. Block 306 
Block 307. Block 308. Block 309C. Block 310, Block 311 
Block 313, Block 314: Tract 0513.02: Block Group 1: Block 
101. Block 102. Block 103B, Block 103C. Block 104B. Block 
1Q5B. Block 106, Block 107. Block 108B, Block 114B. Block 
119B; Block Group 2. Block Group 3: Block 302. Block 
303, Block 304. Block 305. Block 306. Block 319. Block 
320: Tract 0519: Block Group 2: Block 224A: Block Groun 
3: Block 301A: Bamhardt Mill *. Rockwell * Bnstian 
Crossroads *. Faith. Sumner *: Tract 0502: Block Group 
4: Block 411A. Block 411D. Block 411E. Block 416B. Block 
417: Tract 0511: Block Group 1: Block 101. Block 102:



203a

Block Group 2: Block 202. Block 203, Block 204. Block
206. Block 208. Block 209, Block 210. Block 211. Block 
212. Block 213. Block 214A. Block 214B. Block 215. Block
216. Block 217, Block 218. Block 219, Block 220. Block
221. Block 222. Block 223. Block 224. Block 225: Tract 
0512.01: Block Group 1: Block 102C. Block 102D. Block 
108C. Block 122B. Block 123B. Block 123C: Block Grom 
2: Block 205. Block 207. Block 208. Block 209. Block 210. 
Block 211: Block Group 3: Block 312A. Block 312B. Block 
312C, Block 312D. Block 313. Block 314. Block 318. Block 
319: Block Group 4: Block 401. Block 402A. Block 402B. 
Block 403, Block 411, Block 412A. Block 412B Block 413 
Block 414, Block 415. Block 416. Block 417. Block 418. 
Block 419, Block 420. Block 421, Block 422. Block 423: 
Tract 0517: Block Group 1: Block 102B. Block 103B: Mor­
gan I *. Morgan II *, Gold Knob *. Granite Quarry *, 
Hatters Shop *. West Innes *: Tract 0505: Block Group 
2: Block 202A: Block Group 3: Block 301A. Block 301C. 
Block 302, Block 303. Block 304, Block 305. Block 306. 
Block 307, Block 308. Block 309. Block 310, Block 312, 
Block 313. Block 314: Tract 0513.02: Block Group 1: Block 
103A, Block 104A. Block 105A. Block 108A. Block 109.
Block 110. Block 111. Block 112. Block 113. Block 114A.
Block 115. Block 116, Block 117. Block 118. Block 119A.
Block 120. Block 121. Block 122. Block 123: Block Group
3: Block 321B: North Ward II *: Tract 0505: Block Group 
1: Block 101A. Block 102, Block 103. Block 105. Block 
106. Block 108, Block 109. Block 111. Block 112. Block 
113. Block 114. Block 115.' Block 116. Block 117, Block
118. Block 119. Block 120. Block 121. Block 123. Block 
124. Block 126. Block 128. Block 129, Block 130. Block 
131. Block 132: Block Group 2: Block 201A. Block 203. 
Block 204, Block 205. Block 206, Block 207. Block 208. 
Block 209. Block 210: Tract 0506: Block Group 1: Block 
134, Block 135.

District 7: Bladen County: Abbotts township: Tract 9505: 
Block Group 2: Block 213A. Block 214A. Block 224A. Block



204a

226A. Block 227A, Block 229: Block Group 4: Block 418B. 
Block 419B, Block 451A: Block Group 5: Block 501, Block 
502. Block 503. Block 504. Block 505. Block 506A. Block 
508A, Block 509. Block 510. Block 511. Block 512. Block 
513, Block 514, Block 515, Block 516, Block 517. Block
518, Block 519. Block 520, Block 521, Block 522. Block
523. Block 524. Block 525. Block 526A, Block 527A. Block 
527B, Block 534A. Block 539. Block 540. Block 541. Block 
542. Block 543. Block 544. Block 545. Block 546. Block
547, Block 548. Block 549, Block 550, Block 551, Block
552A. Block 554. Block 555. Block 556. Block 557. Block 
558. Block 559, Block 560, Block 561. Block 562, Block 
563. Block 564. Block 565. Block 566: Bethel township. 
Bladenboro township. Collv township. Cypress Creek town­
ship. Hollow township: Brunswick County: B m n sw k  
County: Columbus County: Bogue township. Bhp- PTill town­
ship. Cerro Gordo township. Chadbourn township: Tract 
9906: Block Group 4: Block 401A. Block 403B. Block 404B: 
Tract 9907: Block Group 1: Block 101A. Block 116. Block 
117A. Block 118. Block 124A; Block Group 2: Block 201A. 
Block 201B. Block 202A, Block 202B, Block 203A, Block 
203B. Block 204A. Block 204B, Block 205A. Block 205B 
Block 206. Block 207, Block 208A. Block 208B. Block 209A. 
Block 209B. Block 219. Block 220. Block 223 BWV 999 
Block 223. Block 224. Block 225. Block 226, Block 227, 
Block 228. Block 229. Block 231. Block 240: Block Group 
3, Block Group 4: Block 401, Block 402. Block 403. Block 
404. Block 405. Block 406A. Block 406B. Block 407, Block
408. Block 409. Block 418. Block 419. Block 420, Block
421, Block 422. Block 423, Block 424. Block 425. Block
426, Block 427. Block 428, Block 429. Block 430, Block
431, Block 432. Block 433. Block 434. Block 435: Block
Group 5: Block 521B. Block 522. Block 523, Block 524.
Block 525B. Block 526, Block 527. Block 528, Block 529. 
Block 530B. Block 531B. Block 532: Tract 9909: Block 
Group 6: Block 609, Block 610. Block 611. Block 618A. 
Block 620A. Block 621. Block 622. Block 623. Block 624.



205a

Block 625, Block 626A. Block 627A. Block 628. Block 629: 
Tract 9910: Block Group 2: Block 210A. Block 210B. Block 
211A. Block 212. Block 213. Block 214. Block 215, Block
216, Block 217, Block 218. Block 219. Block 220A. Block
228. Block 229: Block Group 3: Block 302A. Block 303.
Block 304. Block 305. Block 306. Block 327, Block 328.
Block 329. Block 330. Block 331, Block 332, Block 333.
Block 334. Block 335. Block 336. Block 337. Block 338-
Block 339: Tract 9911: Block Group 1: Block 101. Block 
1Q2A: Fair Bluff township. Lees township. South William* 
township. Tatums township. Waecamaw township, White- 
ville township: Tract 9905: Block Group 4: Block 401, Block 
402. Block 403, Block 404B: Tract 9907: Block Group 1: 
Block 101C. Block 102. Block 117B. Block 124B. Block 
125, Block 126: Tract 9908: Block Group 1: Block 101. 
Block 102. Block 103. Block 104. Block 105. Block 106- 
Block 107. Block 108. Block 109, Block 110, Block 111. 
Block 112. Block 113. Block 114, Block 115. Block 116- 
Block 117. Block 119. Block 120B. Block 122, Block 123- 
Block 124, Block 125. Block 126: Block Group 2: Block 
201. Block 202, Block 203. Block 204, Block 205. Block
207. Block 208A. Block 208B. Block 209, Block 211, Block 
212. Block 213. Block 214. Block 215. Block 216. Block
217, Block 218. Block 219. Block 220, Block 221, Block
222. Block 223. Block 224. Block 225, Block 226: Block 
Group 3: Block 301. Block 304, Block 305. Block 306: Block 
Group 4: Block 405, Block 406: Tract 9909: Block Group 
1: Block 104. Block 105. Block 106. Block 108. Block 109- 
Block 110. Block 111, Block 112, Block 113, Block 114, 
Block 115. Block 116. Block 117, Block 118. Block 119. 
Block 120: Block Group 2. Block Group 3: Block 307. Block 
308. Block 343. Block 344. Block 345: Block Group 4: Block 
423A. Block 424. Block 425, Block 426. Block 430: Block 
Group 5: Block 523. Block 524: Block Group 6: Block 617. 
Block 618B, Block 626B. Block 626C. Block 627B: Tract 
9910: Block Group 1: Block 126C, Block 132C: Block Group 
2: Block 201A, Block 201B. Block 201C. Block 202, Block



206a

203. Block 204, Block 205. Block 206A. Block 206B. Block 
207, Block 208. Block 209, Block 210C, Block 211B. Block 
220B, Block 221, Block 222, Block 223. Block 224. Block 
225, Block 226. Block 227: Block Group 3: Block 301B 
Block 302B, Block 309B: Williams township; Curoberiand 
Comity: Beaver Dam *: Tract 0029: Block Group 1: Block 
108A. Block 109A. Block 110, Block 111A. Block 112A. 
Block 112B. Block 115A. Block 117A. Block 118. Block 
119, Block 120, Block 121. Block 122. Block 123. Block
124. Block 125, Block 126. Block 127. Block 128. Block
129, Block 130: Block Group 3: Block 301. Block 302, Block 
303, Block 304. Block 305. Block 306. Block 307. Block
308. Block 309, Block 310. Block 312. Block 313. Block
314. Block 315. Block 316. Block 317. Block 318. Block
319. Block 320. Block 321, Block 322. Block 323, Block
324. Block 325. Block 326. Block 327. Block 328. Block
329, Block 330, Block 331, Block 332. Block 333. Block
334. Block 335: Black River * Linden *, Long- TTffl * 
Westarea *. Judson *. Stedman *. Cross Creek #4 *. Cross 
Creek #6 ». Cross Creek #7 ». Cross Creek #8 *, Cross 
Creek #9 *: Tract 0012: Block Group 2: Block 201. Block 
202, Block 227. Block 229. Block 230. Block 231. Block 
232; Tract 0025.01: Block Group 9: Block 901A. Block 
901B, Block 902A, Block 906A. Block 908A. Block 909A. 
Block 910, Block 912A. Block 913A, Block 914. Block 915. 
Block 917. Block 919, Block 920. Block 921. Block 922-
Block 923. Block 924. Block 925. Block 926. Block 927.
Block 928. Block 929, Block 930, Block 932, Block 934C. 
Block 934D, Block 934H. Block 934J. Block 935, Block 
936; Cross Creek #11 », Cross Creek #12 *. Cross Creek 
#14 *, Cross Creek #15 *: Tract 0006: Block Group 1: 
Block 101. Block 102. Block 103. Block 134. Block 135. 
Block 136. Block 143: Block Group 2. Block Group 3: Block 
303. Block 305. Block 306. Block 309: Block Group 4: Block 
410, Block 411. Block 412: Tract 0018: Block Grout? 1: 
Block 101. Block 102. Block 107. Block 111. Block 123- 
Block 124A. Block 129. Block 130. Block 131: Block Grout?



207a

2: Block 203A, Block 204A. Block 205A: Tract 0019,07- 
Block Group 1: Block 101A: Tract 0020: Block Group 6: 
Block 619A: Cross Creek #17 »: Tract 0023: Block Group 
2: Block 201. Block 208. Block 209. Block 210. Block 215 
Block 216B. Block 217. Block 218. Block 219. Block 29.1 
Block 222. Block 223. Block 224. Block 225. Block 226 
Block 227, Block 240. Block 251: Block Group 9: Block 
90IB. Block 903B. Block 906, Block 907B. Block 907C. 
Block 907D. Block 907E, Block 910: Tract 0024: Block 
Group 1: Block 103A: Block Group 3: Block 304A, Blook 
307A. Block 308A: Cross Creek #18 ", Cross Creek #20 

Cross Creek #21. Cross Creek #22 *, Cross Creek #23 
*. Cross Creek #24 *. Cross Creek #2 *. Eastover *. Van- 
der *. Wade *. Alderman *. Spring Lake *: Tract 0035: 
Block Group 1: Block 110A. Block 119. Block 123: Pearces 
Mill #2 *. Pearces Mill #4 ». Cumberland #1 *. Cumberland 
#2 *. Hope Mills #1 *. Hope Mills #2 *. Beaver T.alrg *. 
Montclair *. Seventy First #2 *. Seventy First #3 *. New 
Hanover County: Cape Fear #1 *: Tract 0115: Block Group 
1: Block 144. Block 148: Block Group 2: Block 202. Block 
205. Block 206. Block 207, Block 208. Block 210. Block 
211. Block 212. Block 213. Block 214. Block 215. Block 
216: Block Group 3. Block Group 4: Block 402. Block 403. 
Block 404. Block 405. Block 406. Block 407: Cape Fear 
#2 *. Cape Fear #3 ». Federal Point #1 ». Federal Point. 
#2 *. Federal Point #3 *. Wrightsville Beach *. Harnett 
#2 V Harnett #3 *. Harnett #4 *. Harnett #6 * TTarrwtt 
#6 *, Harnett #7 ». Masonboro #2 *. Masonboro #3 ", 
Masonboro #4 *. Masonboro #5 *, Wilmington #4 *, Wil­
mington #5 *. Wilmington #8 *: Tract 0107: Block Group 
1: Block 101. Block 102. Block 103. Block 104, Block 105. 
Block 106. Block 107. Block 108. Block 109, Block 110, 
Block 111. Block 112. Block 113. Block 115. Block 127. 
Block 131. Block 133. Block 134: Tract QUO: Block Group 
1: Block 101. Block 103. Block 107. Block 110, Block 115. 
Block 116. Block 118. Block 123, Block 125. Block 126- 
Block 127: Block Group 2: Block 203. Block 205. Block



208a

206, Block 212, Block 214. Block 215, Block 219, Block 
220, Block 222, Block 224, Block 225, Block 226: Wil­
mington #9 *: Tract 0102: Block Group 1: Block 102. Blw-V 
105, Block 106, Block 107, Block 108, Block 109, Block 
110, Block 111, Block 112. Block 126: Tract 0103: Block 
Group 3, Block Group 4, Block Group 5: Block 508, Block 
509: Wilmington #11 *, Wilmington #12 *. WilTmWnw #13 
1  Wilmington #14 *, Wilmington #16 », WilTnincrfnT, #17 
*, Wilmington #18 *: Onslow County: Cross Roads * Half 

. Moon »: Tract 0012: Block Group 1: Block 130. Block 131: 
Block Group 3: Block 301, Block 302, Block 30S. B1or-k 
304, Block 305, Block 306A, Block 307B: Block Group 4: 
Tar Landing *, Brvnn Marr *, Folkstone *, Verona * 
Bear Creek *, Hubert *, Camp Leieune Military Base 1. 
Camp Leieune Military Base 2 , Camp Leieune Military 
Base 3, Camp Leieune Military Base 4. Camp Leieune 
Military Base 5, Camp Leieune Military Base 6 , Camp 

- Leieune Military Base 7, Camp Leieune Military Base 8. 
Camp Leieune Military Base 9. Camp Leietme Military 
Base 10, Camp Leieune Military Base 11, Camp Leieune 
Military Base 12, Camp Leieune Military Base 13, Camp 
Leieune Military Base 14: Pender County: Lower Topsail 
", Scott's Hill *, Surf City *; Robeson Countv: Alfordsrille 
* Back Swamp *, Britts *, Burnt Swamp *. Fairmont. #1 
, Fairmont #2 *, Gaddys *, East Howellsyille *, West 

gowellsville *, Lumberton #1 *. Lumberton #2 *, Lum- 
berton #3 », Lumberton #4 *. Lumberton #5 *. T.nmhpn^ 
#6 ». Lumberton #7 *. Lumberton #8 *, Orrum », North 
Pembroke *, South Pembroke *. Philadelphus *, Raft 
Swamp *. Rowland *, Saddletree *, Smiths *, Smyrna *. 
Sterlings *, Thompson *, Union *, Whitehouse *, Wishart

8: Anson County, Cabarrus County, Cumberland 
County: Manchester *, Spring Lake *: Tract 0034.85: Block 
to)up 1: Block 101. Block 103A: Tract 0035: Block Group 
1: JBlock 101A, Block 102, Block 103. Block 104. Block 
10.5. Block 106. Block 107. Block 108. Block 109. Block



209a

112. Block 113. Block 114. Block 115. Block 116. Block m  
Block 118. Block 120, Block 121. Block 122. Block m  
Block 125. Block 126: Block Group 2: Block 201A. Block 
202A. Block 203B, Block 204. Block 205A. Block 206A 
Block 207. Block 208A. Block 208C. Block 208W. Block 
208X, Block 208Y. Block 208Z. Block 209Y. Block 209Z 
glock 210. Block 211. Block 212. Block 213. Block 214 
Block 215. Block 216. Block 217. Block 218. Block 219: 
Block Group 3. Block Group 4. Block Group 5: Tract 
0036.85: Block Group 2: Block 203B: Block Group 3: Block 
324A. Block 326A: Block Group 4: Block 401C. Block 403A 
Block 404A. Block 404B. Block 404C. Block 405. Block 406~ 
glock 407A. Block 407B. Block 407C. Block 408. Block 409 
Block 410. Block 411. Block 412. Block 413. Block 414 
Block 415. Block 416A. Block 416B. Block 417: Block Group 
5? Block Group 6: Block 606A. Block 608A. Block 60SB 
glock 609A: Brentwood *. Cottonade *. Morganton Road 
#1 *. Morganton Road #2 *, Seventy First #1 *; Hoke 
County. Iredell County: Barringer *: Tract 0613: Block 
Group 2: Block 216. Block 217A. Block 218. Block 225. 
glock 226. Block 227: Block Group 4: Block 402A. Block 
404A. Block 406A. Block 409. Block 410, Block 411. Block 
412. Block 413. Block 414. Block 415. Block 416. Block 417- 
glock 418. Block 419. Block 420. Block 421. Block 422. 
glock 423: Block Group 5: Block 501. Block 502, Block 503. 
Block 504A. Block 505. Block 506D, Block 507. Block 508A. 
glock 509, Block 510, Block 514A. Block 517, Block 518. 
glock 519A. Block 524A. Block 525. Block 526A. Block 
527A: Chamhersburg *: Tract 0607: Block Group 6: Block 
610. Block 611. Block 613. Block 614. Block 615. Block 616. 
glock 617, Block 618. Block 619. Block 620, Block 621- 
Block 622. Block 623. Block 624: Tract 0613: Block Group 
2: Block 201B: Block Group 3: Block 301. Block 302. Block 
303, Block 304. Block 305. Block 306. Block 307. Block 308. 
glock 309B. Block 314B. Block 315B. Block 316B, Block 
318, Block 319, Block 320. Block 321. Block 324, Block 325. 
Block 326: Block Group 4: Block 401. Block



210a

402B, Block 403, Block 404B. Block 405. Block 406B: Cod­
dle Creek #1 *. Coddle Creek #3 *. Mecklenburg County: 
COR *: Tract 0064: Block Group 2: Block 217F. Block 
2175: Block Group 4: Block 401C: CQ2 *: Tract 0056.01: 
Block Group 3: Block 323: Block Group 4: Block 401. Block 
402. Block 403. Block 404. Block 407. Block 408. Block
409. Block 410, Block 411. Block 412. Block 413. Block
414, Block 415. Block 416. Block 417, Block 418. Block
424. Block 425, Block 426: Tract 0056.02: Block Group 1:
Block 101. Block 102, Block 103. Block 104: Block 110.
Block 111. Block 113. Block 114: DAY *: Tract 0064: Block 
Group 2: Block 207. Block 208. Block 209. Block 210, Block 
211, Block 212, Block 213. Block 214, Block 215. Block 
216. Block 217G, Block 217K. Block 217M. Block 218. 
Block 219, Block 220. Block 222. Block 223. Block 224. 
Block 225. Block 226, Block 227. Block 231A. Block 232A. 
Block 233B: Block Group 3: Block 301. Block 304. Block 
305A, Block 305B. Block 306, Block 307, Block 308 Block 
309. Block 310. Block 316. Block 317: Block Group 4: Block 
40IB. Block 40IE, Block 401G: Block Group 6: Block 603B: 
Montgomery Countv: Moore County: Township i .  Car­
thage. Township 2. Bensalem. Township 3. Sberfields. 
Township 4. Ritters: Tract 9501: Block Group 1: Block 
1Q9A, Block 109B. Block 110A. Block 111. Block 112. Block
113. Block 114. Block 115. Block 116, Block 117, Block
118, Block 119. Block 120. Block 121, Block 199 BWV
123. Block 124. Block 125. Block 126B. Block 126C. Block 
130B, Block 130C. Block 131B. Block 131C. Block 132 
Block 133. Block 134, Block 135. Block 136. Block 137. 
Block 138. Block 139. Block 140. Block 141. Block 142A. 
Block 143. Block 144. Block 145A. Block 145B. Block 145C. 
Block 145D. Block 145E. Block 145F, Block 146A. Block 
147. Block 148. Block 149. Block 150. Block 151. Block
152, Block 153. Block 154, Block 155. Block 174, Block
175. Block 176. Block 177. Block 178. Block 179A: Block 
Group 2: Block 229. Block 230B. Block 232. Block 233. 
Block 234. Block 235. Block 236. Block 237. Block 238.



211a

Block 239. Block 240. Block 241. Block 243. Block 244 
Block 250B: Block Group 3: Block 301. Block 302. Block 
303. Block 304. Block 305. Block 306. Block 307, Block
308. Block 309. Block 310. Block 311. Block 312. Block
313. Block 314. Block 315, Block 316. Block 317. Block
318, Block 319, Block 320. Block 321. Block 322. Block
323. Block 324, Block 325. Block 326. Block 327. Block
328. Block 329B. Block 330, Block 331C. Block 333B. Block 
334B. Block 335B. Block 340C. Block 341C. Block 342B. 
Block 346, Block 347. Block 348: Tract 9502: Block Group 
1: Block 134B. Block 134C. Block 149B. Block 149C: Block 
Group 4: Block 401B. Block 401C. Block 402B. Block 402C. 
Block 403B, Block 403C. Block 414E. Block 415C. Block 
415F. Block 415G. Block 416. Block 417D. Block 417E. 
Block 417G. Block 417H. Block 418. Block 419. Block 420C. 
Block 420D: Block Group 5: Block 501. Block 502B. Block 
502C. Block 502E. Block 5Q2F, Block 533C. Block 533D. 
Block 534C, Block 534D. Block 535B. Block 536B, Block 
537B. Block 541C. Block 541D: Richmond County. Robeson 
County: Lumber Bridge *. Maxton *. Parkton *. Red 
Springs #1 *. Red Springs #2 *. Rennert », Shannon » 
North St. Pauls ». South St. Pauls *: Rowan County: 
Bradshaw *. Enochville *. Blackwelder Park *. Bostian 
School *. N. China Grove *. S. China Grove *. East Kan­
napolis *, West Kannapolis *. East Landis V West Landis 
*. Cleveland *, Faith Noncontiguous. Locke *, Sumner *: 
Tract 0502: Block Group 4: Block 402A. Block 402C. Block 
403B. Block 409B. Block 410B. Block 410C. Block 411B. 
Block 411C. Block 411F. Block 412A. Block 412C. Block 
413B. Block 413C. Block 415A. Block 415B. Block 416C: 
Tract 0511: Block Group 2: Block 201C. Block 205: Tract 
0512.01: Block Group 2: Block 206: Mt. Ulla *. East Ward 
I *. West Ward I *. West Ward II *. Steele *. Tract 
0519: Block Group 3: Block 334B. Block 335: Scotland 
County, Stanlv County: Union County-

District 9: Cleveland County: Boiling Springs *, Pearl 
*, East Kings Mountain *, West Kings Mountain *. Grover



212a

*, Bethware *, Waco *. Shanghai *, Falston * Mulls * 
Casar *; Gaston County: Cherrwille #1 *. Cherrwille #2 

Cherryvffle #3 *. Landers Chapel *. Trvon *. Bessemer 
City #1 *, Bessemer City #2 *: Tract 0316: Block Group 
2. Block Group 3, Block Group 4: Block 401A. Block 401B. 
Block 402. Block 403A, Block 403B. Block 403C. Block 
404. Block 405. Block 406, Block 407. Block 408. Block 
409. Block 410. Block 411A. Block 411B. Block 412. Block 
413, Block 414B. Block 417A. Block 417C: Tract 0317.02: 
Block Group 1: Block 101. Block 102. Block 103. Block 
104, Block 105, Block 106, Block 107, Block 108. Block
109. Block 110, Block 111. Block 112. Block 113. Block
114. Block 115. Block 116, Block 117, Block 120. Block
121. Block 122. Block 123, Block 124. Block 125. Block
126. Block 127. Block 128. Block 129: Block Group 2: Block 
202: Block Group 3: Block 301. Block 302: Tract 0318: 
Block Group 1: Block 101C. Block 102. Block 103. Block
104, Block 105. Block 106, Block 107. Block 108: Tract 
0331: Block Group 1: Block 103D. Block 105A: Crowders 
Mtn. *. Alexis *. Dallas #1 » Dallas #2 * Fio-h Shoals *. 
Armstrong *. Ashbrook *. Firestone *: Tract 0329: Block 
Group 1: Block 101. Block 102. Block 103. Block 104. Block
105. Block 109. Block 110. Block 111, Block 112. Block 
113, Block 114. Block 115: Block Group 2: Block 207: Block 
Group 3: Block 306, Block 307. Block 317: Block Group 
4: Block 404. Block 405. Block 406: Tract 0330: Block 
Group 1: Block 118. Block 119. Block 120, Block 126. Block
127, Block 128, Block 129. Block 131. Block 133. Block
134. Block 135. Block 136. Block 137. Block 157. Block 
158. Block 159. Block 160. Block 161: Flint Groves *: Tract 
0313.02: Block Group 2: Block 205A. Block 217A. Block 
219; Tract 0314: Block Group 2. Block Group 4: Block 401.
Block 402. Block 403, Block 404. Block 405. Block 406.
Block 407, Block 408. Block 409. Block 410. Block 411.
Block 412, Block 413, Block 414. Block 415. Block 416.
Block 418. Block 419: Block Group 5: Block 501A. Block 
50IB. Block 502. Block 503A. Block 503B. Block 504. Block



213a

505A. Block 505B, Block 506A. Block 506B. Block 507, 
Block 508, Block 509. Block 510, Block 511. Block .312A 
Block 513. Block 514. Block 515. Block 516, Block 517. 
Block 518, Block 519. Block 520, Block 521A- Block 599 A- 
Block Group 6: Tract 0321: Block Group 3: Block 301.
Block 302. Block 303. Block 304. Block 306, Block 307.
Block 308. Block 309. Block 310. Block 311. Block 312,
Block 313, Block 314. Block 315. Block 316. Block 317.
Block 320. Block 325. Block 326. Block 327: Forest Heights 
*. Gardner Park *. Gaston Day *. Grier *, Health Center 
*: Tract 0308: Block Group 7: Block 701, Block 705A. 
Block 705B. Block 713. Block 714. Block 715. Block 716. 
Block 717: Tract 0315: Block Group 1: Block 103A. Block 
103B. Block 104. Block 106A. Block 106B. Block 107A. 
Block 107B. Block 108. Block 109. Block 110. Block 111. 
Block 112. Block 113. Block 114. Block 115A. Block 115B. 
Block 116A. Block 116B. Block 117. Block 118. Block 119A. 
Block 119B,- Block 120. Block 122. Block 123. Block 124- 
Block I25A. Block 125B. Block 126A. Block 126B. Block 
127. Block 128A. Block 128B. Block 129A. Block 129B. 
Block 130, Block 131. Block 132, Block 133, Block 134. 
Block 135. Block 136: Block Group 3, Block Group 4. Block 
Group 5. Block Group 6: Block 602. Block 603. Block 604. 
Block 605. Block 610. Block 614: Memorial Hall *. Mvrtle 
*: Tract 0316: Block Group 4: Block 414A. Block 414C. 
Block 415, Block 416. Block 417B. Block 417D. Block 418- 
Block 419: Tract 0318: Block Group 5: Block 501. Block
502. Block 503. Block 504, Block 505. Block 506. Block
507, Block 508. Block 509. Block 510. Block 511. Block
512. Block 513. Block 514. Block 515. Block 516. Block
517. Block 523, Block 524. Block 525: Rank? *: Tract 0303: 
Block Group 5: Block 502B. Block 505D: Tract 0310.01: 
Block Group 1: Block 101A. Block 102A, Block 103; Tract 
0313.01: Block Group 1. Block Group 2: Block 201A, Block 
201B. Block 202. Block 203. Block 204A. Block 204B. Block 
205A. Block 205B. Block 205C. Block 206, Block 207. Block 
208A. Block 208B. Block 209B. Block 209C. Block 210.



214a

Block 211B, Block 212. Block 213. Block 214. Block 21 s  
Block 216. Block 217, Block 218. Block 219: Tract 0313 02- 
Block Group 1: Block 104B. Block 105A. Block 105B. B lock 
106B. Block 107B, Block HOB: Block Group 2: Block 20TR 
Block 202, Block 203. Block 204. Block 205B. Block 20fi~ 
Block 207. Block 208, Block 209. Block 210 Block g n '
Block 212. Block 213. Block 214. Block 215. Block 21 fi'
Block 217B. Block 217C. Block 220B: Tract 0314: B lock 
Group 5: Block 512B. Block 521B. Block 522B: Rohmsrm 

Sherwood *. South Gastonia *. Woorimll *• Tract 0314- 
Block Group 1: Block 101. Block 109. Block 110 B lock
111. Block 112, Block 113. Block 114. Block 115. Block 
116. Block 117. Block 118, Block 119: Tract 0320: Block 
Group 1: Block 120: Block Group 3: Block 301. Block 303 
Block 304, Block 305. Block 306. Block 307 Block a m ’
Block 311. Block 312. Block 313. Block 314, Block Sin'
Block 316, Block 326. Block 327, Block 328. Block 329
Block 330. Block 331. Block 332. Block 333 Block 334
Block 335. Block 336. Block 337, Block 338, Block M9
Block 350. Block 351. Block 352. Block 353, Block 354-
Victory *. Lucia *, Mt. Holly #1 ». Mt. Holly #2 * SfemW  
#-l *• Stanley #2 *. Belmont #1 ». Belmont #2 *: Tm et 
0323.01: Block Group 1: Block 102, Block 103. Block 104 
Block 106. Block 107A. Block 113. Block H4A. Block 114ft' 
Block 114C. Block 114D. Block 115. Block 116, Block 117 
Block 118. Block 119, Block 120C. Block 122, Block 123 
Block 124. Block 125. Block 126. Block 127. Block 12SA 
Block 128B. Block 129. Block 130A. Block 130B. Block 
130C. Block 131, Block 132, Block 133. Block 13 4 . Block
135. Block 136: Block Group 2: Block 201A. Block 2Q1D 
Block 202B. Block 208. Block 209. Block 210, Block 212 
Block 213. Block 214. Block 215. Block 216. Block 217, 
Block 218: Block Group 3: Tract 0323.02: Block Grono i- 
Block 10IB. Block 102. Block 105. Block 106. Block 107. 
Block 108 Block 109. Block 110A. Block 110B. Block HOC. 
Block 111A. Block 111B. Block 112A. Block 112B B lnok 
113. Block 114. Block 115. Block 116A. Block 116B. Block



215a

116C, Block 116D. Block 117A. Block 117B. Block 11S 
Block 119A. Block 119B, Block 12QA. Block 12QR BW V 
121, Block 122, Block 123. Block 124. Block 125: BWV 
Group 2. Block Group 3: Block 301A, Block 301B. Block 
301C, Block 302A, Block 302B. Block 303. Block 3Q4A. 
Block 304B, Block 305, Block 306, Block 307, Block 308~ 
Block 309, Block 310, Block 311. Block 312, Block 313A 
Block 313B. Block 314, Block 315. Block 316A. Block 316B 
Block 317A, Block 317B, Block 318A, Block 318B, Block 
318C; Belmont #3 *: Tract 0310.01: Block Group 3: Block 
305, Block 306, Block 307, Block 308. Block 309. Block 
310, Block 312A, Block 312B. Block 312C. Block 3i9n  
Block 313A, Block 313B: Tract 0310,02: Block Groim 3- 
Block 313B, Block 314. Block 315: Block Group 4: Tract 
0312: Block Group 1: Block 101A. Block 101B, Block 101C. 
Block 101D, Block 102A, Block 102B, Block 102C. Block 
103, Block 104, Block 105, Block 106A, Block 106B. Block 
106C. Block 107, Block 108, Block 109. Block 110, Block 
HIA. Block 111B, Block'112A. Block 112B. Block 112C. 
Block 113, Block 114, Block 115. Block 116A. Block 116B. 
Block 117, Block 118, Block 119A. Block 119B. Block 120. 
Block 121: Block Group 2: Block 202A, Block 202B, Block 
202C, Block 203. Block 204. Block 205: Block Group 3: 
Block 301, Block 303: Catawba Heights *, Cramerton *. 
Lowell *: Tract 0313,01: Block Group 2: Block 209A, Block 
211A: Tract 0313.02: Block Group 1: Block 101A, Block 
103, Block 104A, Block 106A. Block 107A. Block 108. 
Block 109, Block 110A, Block 111, Block 112. Block 113. 
Block 114, Block 115. Block 116. Block 117, Block 118. 
Block 119. Block 120. Block 121A. Block 122. Block 123. 
Block 124. Block 125A. Block 128A. Block 129A: Block 
Group 2: Block 201A. Block 220A. Block 221. Block 222. 
Block 223. Block 224: Block Group 3: Block 301A. Block 
301B, Block 302A, Block 303, Block 304. Block 305. Block 
306. Block 307. Block 308, Block 309. Block 310, Block 
311, Block 312. Block 313. Block 314. Block 315. Block 
316. Block 317. Block 318. Block 319. Block 320. Block



216a

321. Block 322, Block 323. Block 324, Block 325. Block
326. Block 327, Block 328. Block 329. Block 330A. Block 
331A. Block 333. Block 334, Block 335, Block 336. Block 
337. Block 338. Block 339. Block 340, Block 341. Block
342. Block 343, Block 344. Block 345. Block 346. Block
347. Block 348. Block 349. Block 350, Block 351. Block
352: Block Group 4: Block 401, Block 402. Block 403, Block
404. Block 405, Block 406. Block 407, Block 408. Block
409. Block 410. Block 412A. Block 415C. Block 416. Block
419. Block 420. Block 421, Block 422. Block 423. Block 
424. Block 425. Block 426: Tract 0322: Block Group 1: 
Block 105A. Block 107A. Block 112. Block 115, Block 
116A: Block Group 2: Block 209B. Block 213. Block 214. 
Block 215A. Block 216A. Block 217B. Block 221B. Block 
223: McAdenville *: Tract 0310.01: Block Group 1: Block 
101C. Block 105B, Block 106B. Block 107: Block Group 
2: Block 201. Block 202. Block 203. Block 204. Block 205. 
Block 206, Block 207. Block 208. Block 209. Block 210.
Block 211, Block 212. Block 213. Block 214. Block 215~
Block 216. Block 217. Block 218: Block Group 3: Block
301. Block 302. Block 303. Block 304, Block 311: Tract
0313.02: Block Group 1: Block 101B. Block 102. Block 
121B. Block 125B, Block 126. Block 127. Block 128B. Block 
129B. Block 130. Block 131A. Block 131B. Block 132A. 
Block 132B: Block Group 3: Block 301C. Block 302B. Block 
330B: Tract 0322: Block Group 1: Block 101, Block 102A. 
Block 102B. Block 103, Block 104B, Block 105B. Block 
105C, Block 106. Block 107B, Block 110. Block 111. Block 
113. Block 114. Block 116B. Block 116C. Block 117. Block 
118, Block 119A. Block 119B. Block 120, Block 121B. Block 
122; Block Group 2: Block 201A. Block 201B. Block 201C. 
Block 202. Block 203. Block 204. Block 205. Block 206. 
Block 207. Block 208. Block 209C. Block 210. Block 218 
Block 225. Block 226: Tract 0323.01: Block Group 1: Block 
108A, Block 111. Block 112A, Block 120B. Block 121A: 
Tract 0325.01: Block Group 5: Block 501: New Hope *. 
Southpoint *. Union *: Mecklenburg Count?: CWlnrt-P Pr-t



217a

1  Charlotte Pet. 4. Charlotte Pet. 5 *. Charlotte P t̂ 
g !: Charlotte Pet. 7 ». Charlotte Pet. 8 *. Charlotte Pot 
^— --Tract 0003: Block Group 1: Block 103. Block 104 
Block 105. Block 107. Block 109. Block 110; Tract 00fU  ̂
Block Group 5: Block 514: Tract 0027: Block Cronr 3 : 
Block 304: Tract 0035: Block Group 1: Block 101 Block
102. Block 103. Block 107. Block 108. Block 109:' BWk 
Group 2. Block Group 3: Block 301. Block 302. Block 305 
Block 306. Block 307. Block 308. Block 309 Blook~3Tn  ̂
Block 311. Block 312. Block 313. Block 314. Block 31 s 
Block 316: Block Group 4: Block 4-01. Block 402. Block
403. Block 404. Block 405. Block 406. Block 407. Block
408. Block 409, Block 410. Block 411. Block 412. Block
414; Charlotte Pet. 10 *. Charlotte Pet. 15 *: Tract 0010- 
Block Group 1; Block 101. Block 103. Block 105, Block 
107, Block 108. Block 109, Block 112. Block 113. Block
114. Block 115. Block 116. Block 117, Block 118. Block
119: Block Group 2: Block 201. Block 206. Block 207 RWk
208. Block 214, Block 218: Block Group 3: Block 307 Block 
308, Block 309, Block 313, Block 314. Block 315. Block 
317; Tract 0011: Block Group 1: Block 103. Block 105. 
Block 106. Block 107. Block 108. Block 109. Block 110 
Block 114. Block 117. Block 120: Block Group 4: Block 
408: Tract 0012: Block Group 3: Block 305, Block 306. 
Block 308Y, Block 308Z: Charlotte Pet. 18 ». Charlotte 
Pet. 19 *, Charlotte Pet. 20 *. Charlotte Pet. 21 *. Char­
lotte Pet. 29 ». Charlotte Pet. 32 ». Charlotte Pet. 33 * 
Charlotte Pet. 34 *. Charlotte Pet. 35 *, Charlotte Pet. 
36 *. Charlotte Pet. 37 *. Charlotte Pet. 38 ». Charlotte 
Pet. 44 *, Charlotte Pet. 45 ». Charlotte Pet. 47 », Char­
lotte Pet. 48 ». Charlotte Pet. 49 ». Charlotte Pet. 50 *. 
Charlotte Pet. 51 *. Charlotte Pet. 57 ». Charlotte Pet. 
58 m. Charlotte Pet. 59 *. Charlotte .Pet. 61 *. Charlotte 
Pet. 62 *. Charlotte Pet. 63 », Charlotte Pet. 64 *. Char­
lotte Pet. 65 *. Charlotte Pet. 66 * Charlotte Pet. 67 *. 
Charlotte Pet. 68 *. Charlotte Pet. 69 ». Charlotte Pet. 
70 *■ Charlotte Pet. 71 *. Charlotte Pet. 72 ». Charlotte



218a

Pet. 73 *, Charlotte Pet. 74 *. Charlotte Pet. 75 *. Char- 
lotte Pet. 76 *, Charlotte Pet. 77 *: Tract 0058.06- Block 
Group 1: Block 113; Tract 0059.03: Block Group 3: PI nek 
340A. Block 340B, Block 341A. Block 341B. Block 342. 
Block 344A. Block 344B, Block 345. Block 346. Block 347’ 
Block 348. Block 349. Block 350. Block 351, Block 352 
Block 353. Block 354. Block 355. Block 356. Block 357 
Block 361: Charlotte Pet. 79 *. Charlotte Pet. 80 * Char­
lotte Pet. 81 *, Charlotte Pet. 83 *, Charlotte Pet, fu * 
Charlotte -Pet. 85 ». Charlotte Pet. 86 *. Charlotte Pet. 
87 *. Charlotte Pet. 88 *. Charlotte Pet. 89 *. Charlotte 
Pet. 90 ». Charlotte Pet. 91. Charlotte Pet. 92 * PW lntto  
Pet. 93 111. Charlotte Pet. 94 ", Charlotte Pet. 95 * Char­
lotte Pet. 96 *, Charlotte Pet. 97 *: Tract 0031.04: Block 
Group 2: Block 204. Block 205, Block 216. Block 217 Block
218. Block 219: BER *: Tract 0059.01: Block Group 3- 
Block 301A. Block 301B, Block 302A. Block 302B, Block 
303. Block 304, Block 305. Block 306. Block 307. RWk
308. Block 309, Block 310, Block 311. Block 315. RWV
316. Block 317. Block 318. Block 319. Block 320. Block
321. Block 322. Block 323. Block 324, Block 325. Block
326. Block 327. Block 328. Block 329, Block 330. Block
331. Block 332A, Block 332B. Block 333. Block 334 Block 
335. Block 336A. Block 336B. Block 337. Block 338. Block 
339. Block 340. Block 341. Block 342: Block Group A: CC.Y 
*. COR *: Tract 0063: Block Group 1: Block 101. Block
102. Block 103. Block 104. Block 105. Block 106. Block
107. Block 108B. Block 109. Block 110: Block Group 2- 
Block 201. Block 202. Block 203. Block 204. Block 205~ 
Block 208. Block 209. Block 212: Tract 0064: Block Group 
2: Block 217A, Block 217B. Block 217C. Block 217D. Block 
217E. Block 217J, Block 217L. Block 228 Block 229A 
Block 229B. Block 229C. Block 230. Block 231B. Bind- 
232B. Block 233A. Block 233C, Block 234. Block 235: Block 
Group 3: Block 311. Block 312, Block 313. Block 314. Block 
315, Block 318, Block 319. Block 320, Block 321. Block
o22. Block 323. Block 324: Block Group 4: Block 401A.



219a

Block 401D, Block 401F, Block 402A. Block 402B. Block 
403. Block 404, Block 405, Block 406. Block 407, Block 
408, Block 409. Block 410: Block Group 5: Block 501D. 
Block 504A. Block 504B. Block 505, Block 506, Block 507. 
Block 508. Block 509. Block 510, Block 511. Block 512. 
Block 513A. Block 513B. Block 514A, Block 514B. Block
514C. Block 514D. Block 515A. Block 515B. Block 516A.
Block 516B. Block 517. Block 518A, Block 518B. Block
519. Block 520A. Block 52QB. Block 520C. Block 521B.
Block 524A: Block Grouo 6: Block 603A. Block 606. Block 
610, Block 611. Block 612, Block 613, Block 614. Block
615. Block 616. Block 617, Block 618. Block 619. Block
620, Block 621. Block 622: COl *. C02 *: Tract 0015.01: 
Block Group 1: Block HOB: Block Group 2: Block 201: 
Tract: 0056.01: Block Group 1: Block 101. Block 102. Block
103. Block 104. Block 105. Block 106, Block 107, Block 
108, Block 109. Block 110: Block Group 2: Block 201. Block 
202: Block Group 3: Block 301. Block 302. Block 303. Block 
304. Block 305. Block 306. Block 307. Block 308, Block
309. Block 310. Block 311. Block 312. Block 313. Block
314. Block 315, Block 316. Block 317. Block 318. Block
319. Block 320. Block 321. Block 322, Block 324. Block
325. Block 326. Block 327. Block 328. Block 329. Block
330. Block 331. Block 332. Block 333: Block Group 4: Block
405. Block 406. Block 419, Block 420. Block 421, Block 
422B. Block 423: Tract 0056.02: Block Group 1: Block 105, 
Block 106: HUN *: Tract 0063: Block Group 1: Block 108A. 
Block 111. Block 112. Block 113. Block 114A. Block 114B, 
Block 117. Block 118. Block 119: Block Group 2: Block
206. Block 207. Block 210, Block 211. Block 213. Block
214A. Block 214B, Block 214C. Block 215A. Block 215B. 
Block 216. Block 217: Block Group 3: Block 301. Block 
302, Block 303. Block 304. Block 305B. Block 308. Block 
309. Block 310. Block 311. Block 315A. Block 315C. Block 
316, Block 317. Block 323. Block 324, Block 325. Block
326. Block 327. Block 328. Block 329. Block 330. Block
331: Block Group 4: Block 401. Block 402A. Block 402B.



220a

Block 402C. Block 404A. Block 404B, Block 405. Blor-k 
406, Block 407, Block 408, Block 409, Block 410, Block
411. Block 412. Block 413. Block 414A. Block 414B. Block
415. Block 416. Block 417. Block 418. Block 419. Block
420. Block 421. Block 422. Block 423. Block 424. Block
425. Block 426, Block 427. Block 428. Block 429. Block
430. Block 431. Block 432. Block 433. Block 434. Block
435. Block 436, Block 437. Block 438, Block 439. Block
440, Block 441. Block 442. Block 443. Block 444, Block
445. Block 446: Tract 0064: Block Group 5: Block 521A:
LEM ». LC1 - North. LC2: Tract 0061: Block f i r m  1- 
Block 108B: Block Group 5, Block Group 9: LC1 - South: 
Tract 0061: Block Group 4: Block 409, Block 410, Block 
411, Block 420, Block 421. Block 422. Block 432 Block 
471; MCI. MC2: Tract 0051.01: Block Group 1: Block 101: 
Tract 0054.01: Block Group 3: Block 308. Block 309, Block
310. Block 311, Block 312. Block 316. Block 318. Block
320. Block 325, Block 326: Tract 0054,02: Block Grmm 1- 
Block 101A. Block 101B. Block 101C. Block 102A. Block 
102B. Block 102C. Block 102D. Block 102E. Block 103. 
Block 104. Block 105, Block 106B. Block 107A. Block 107B 
Block 108, Block 109. Block 110, Block 111. Block 112. 
jBIock 113. Block 114A. Block 114B. Block 114C. Block 
114D, Block 114E. Block 114F. Block 114G. Block 115- 
Block 116. Block 117. Block 123. Block'19A. Block 129D. 
glock 129F, Block 134. Block 135. Block 136: Tract 
0055.01: Block Group 1: Block 101. Block 102. Block 108- 
Block 109. Block 110. Block 111. Block 112. Block 113.
Block 114, Block 115, Block 116. Block 117. Block 118.
Block 119. Block 120. Block 122. Block 123. Block 124
Block 125. Block 126. Block 127. Block 128. Block 129
Block 130, Block 131. Block 132. Block 133. Block 134
Block 135. Block 136. Block 137, Block 138, Block 139.
Block 140, Block 141. Block 142. Block 143. Block 144.
Block 145A. Block 145B. Block 146. Block 147. Block 148. 
Block 149, Block 150. Block 151. Block 152. Block 153-
Block Group 2: Block 213. Block 214. Block 216. Block



221a

217B, Block 218. Block 219: Block Group 3: Block 301. 
Block 312B: Tract 0061: Block Group 1: Block 101. Block 
102. Block 103. Block 130, Block 131B, Block 132B: Block 
Group 4: Block 401. Block 402. Block 413. Block 414. Block 
415, Block 416, Block 417. Block 478. Block 479. Block 
480, Block 481: MAI *. MA2 ». MA3 *. MA4 ", Charlotte 
Pet. 102. MH1 *. MH2 *. MH3 *, OAK. PCI *. PC2 *, PVL 
*. PR1. PR2. PR3. Charlotte Pet. 93 Part, SCI. SC2. Char­
lotte Pet. 100 *. Charlotte Pet. 105.

District 10: Alexander Countv: Averv County: Buncombe 
Countv: Broad River *. Fairview *. Limestone #2 *: Burke 
County: Drexel #3 *. Ieard #1 *. Icard #2 *. Icard #3 *. 
Icard #4 *. Icard #5 *. Jonas Ridge *. Linville #1 *. Lov- 
eladv #1 *. Loveladv #2 *. Loveladv #3 *. Loveladv #4 *. 
Lower Fork *, Silver Creek #2 *. Upper Creek *. Upper 
Fork *: Caldwell Countv: Globe *. Hudson #1 *. Hudson 
#2 *. Johns River *. Gamewell #1 *, Gamewell #2 *. Littrle 
River *. Loveladv-Rhodhiss *, Loveladv #2 *, Sawmills *. 
Lower Creek #2 *. Lower Creek #3 *. Mulberry *. North 
Catawba *. Patterson *. Wilson Creek *: Catawba Countv. 
Davie Countv: Calahaln township. Clarksville township. 
Farmington township: Forsyth County. Bethania #2 * 
Clemmonsville #1 *. Qemmonsville #2 *. Clemmonsville #3 
*. Lewisville #1 *. Lewisville #2 *. Lewisville #3 *. Old 
Richmond *. Old Town #3 *. South Fork #2 *. South Fork 
#3 *, 'Vienna #1 *. Vienna #2 *. Vienna #3 *. Calvary 
Baptist Church *. Jefferson Elementary School *, Messiah 
Moravian Church *. Sherwood Forest Elementary School 
*: Henderson Countv: Fletcher *. Hoopers Creek *. Park 
Ridge *: Iredell County: Bethany *, Chambersburg *: Tract 
0606: Block Group 1: Block 101. Block 102. Block 103. 
Block 104. Block 105, Block 106A. Block 107. Block 108. 
Block 109, Block 110. Block 111. Block 112. Block 113. 
Block 114. Block 115. Block 116. Block 117, Block 118A, 
Block 118B. Block 122. Block 145, Block 146. Block 147, 
Block 148: Block Group 2. Block Group 3: Block 301A. 
Block 302, Block 303A: Tract 0607: Block Group 2: Block



222a

223E, Block 224A, Block 225A. Block 226A: Block Grmrn 
3: Block 327A. Block 330A: Block Group 4: Block d99/^ 
Block 423A, Block 425A. Block 426. Block 429A. Block 
430A? Block 431A, Block 434A. Block 436. Block 437: 
Block Group 5: Coddle Creek #4 *: Tract 0614: Block 
Group 8: Block §23. Block 824. Block 825. Block 826. Block 
827A. Block 829, Block 830. Block 831. Block 832, Block 
833A. Block 836A. Block 837A. Block 838. Block 840 
Block 841, Block 842: Tract 0616: Block Group 3: Block
312. Block 313. Block 314: Block Group 4: Block 402. Block 
403A. Block 403B. Block 403C. Block 403D. Block 404A. 
Block 4Q4B. Block 404C. Block 405, Block 406. Block 407-
Block 408. Block 409. Block 410. Block 411. Block 412-
Block 413. Block 414. Block 415. Block 416. Block 417.
Block 418. Block 419, Block 420. Block 421. BW k d99
Block 423. Block 424. Block 425. Block 426A. Block 426B: 
Block Group 5: Block 501A. Block 501B. Block 502A. Block 
502B, Block 503A. Block 503B. Block 504. Block 505, Block 
506A. Block 508. Block 509, Block 510. Block o il;  Block 
Group 6: Block 601, Block 602. Block 603. Block 604. Block 
605. Block 606. Block 607A. Block 607B. Block 607C. Block 
607D, Block 607E, Block 608. Block 609A. Block fl09r, 
Block 609D, Block 610A. Block 611A. Block 611B. Block 
612A. Block 612B. Block 613. Block 614. Block 615. Block 
616. Block 617. Block 618. Block 619. Block 620, Block
621. Block 622. Block 623, Block 624. Block 625. Block
626, Block 627, Block 628A: Concord *, Davidson *, Eagle 
Mills ». Fallstowp », New Hope », Oim ». Sharpesbnnr * 
Shiloh », Statesville #1 *, Tract 0610: Block Group 4: Block 
401A. Block 402A, Block 429A. Block 430. Block 431- 
Block 432, Block 433A  Block 434: Statesville #2 ». States­
ville #4 *. Statesville #5 *: Tract 0603: Block Group 1: 
Block 105: Tract 0604: Block Group 1: Block 101. Block 
102. Block 103, Block 104. Block 105. Block 106, Block
1-07, Block 108. Block 109. Block 110. Block 111. Block
112. Block 113. Block 114. Block 115. Block 116. Block
117, Block 121. Block 122. Block 126. Block 127. Block



223a

128. Block 132. Block 133. Block 134: Block Group 2: Block 
201. Block 202. Block 203, Block 204. Block 207. Block
208. Block 209. Block 210. Block 216. Block 217. Block
218. Block 219. Block 220. Block 222. Block 223. Block
225; Block Group 3: Block 304. Block 305, Block 306A.
Block 307A. Block 309A, Block 317A: Block Group 4: Block 
401. Block 402. Block 403. Block 404, Block 405. Block
406. Block 407. Block 408A. Block 408B, Block 409A, Block 
409B. Block 410A. Block 410B, Block 411. Block 4.19. A  

Block 412B. Block 413A. Block 413B,- Block 414A. Block 
414C. Block 414D. Block 414E. Block 415B. Block 416, 
Block 417, Block 418. Block 419. Block 420. Block 421- 
Block 422. Block 423. Block 424. Block 425. Block 426B. 
Block 427B, Block 429B, Block 430B. Block 431A. Block 
431B. Block 432. Block 433. Block 434. Block 435, Block 
436A. Block 436B; Tract 0605; Block Group 2: Block 201. 
Block 202B. Block 203. Block 211, Block 212. Block 213, 
Block 214. Block 215, Block 216. Block 217, Block 218- 
Block 219. Block 220, Block 221; Block Group 3: Block 
325. Block 326; Tract 0610: Block Group 4: Block 409A. 
Block 435B, Block 437A. Block 443. Block 444. Block 445. 
Block 446: Tract 0611; Block Group 3: Block 321A. Block 
322B, Block 323A. Block 323D. Block 324, Block 325. Block 
326A. Block 326C: Tumersburg *. Union Grove *: Lincoln 
County. McDowell County: Brackett township. Crooked 
Creek township. Glenwood township. Higgins township. 
Montford Cove township: Mitchell County. Polk County: 
Cooper Gap township: Rutherford County: Camp Creek 
township: Tract 9601: Block Group 1: Block 102A. Block 
103, Block 104. Block 105, Block 106. Block 107, Block
108, Block 109. Block 112. Block 113.' Block 114. Block
115. Block 116. Block 117. Block 118. Block 119. Block
120. Block 121, Block 122, Block 123. Block 124. Block
125. Block 126. Block 127. Block 128. Block 129. Block
130. Block 131. Block 138. Block 139. Block 141. Block
142. Block 144: Tract 9602: Block Group 1: Block 101A.
Block 119. Block 120. Block 121. Block 122, Block 123.



224a

Block 124, Block 125, Block 126. Block 127. Block 128.
Block 129, Block 130. Block 131. Block 132. Block 133.
Block 134. Block 135, Block 136. Block 137. Block 138-
Block 139. Block 140. Block 141. Block 142. Block 143.
Block 144, Block 150A. Block 151. Block 180. Block 186. 
Block 191: Chimney Rock township. Tract 9602: Block 
Group 1: Block 107A. Block 108. Block 193. Block 194 
Block 195. Block 196. Block 197: Golden Valiev township 
Green Hill township. Logan Store township. Morgan town­
ship. Wilkes Countv: Antioch *. Brushy Mountain *. Ed­
wards No. 1 *. Edwards No. 2 *. Edwards No. 3 ». Elk 
No. 1 *. Jobs Cabin *, Lewis Fork *. Lovelace *, Mulberry 
No- 1 *■ Mulberry No. 2 *, New Castle ». No. Wilkesboro- 
2 », Reddies River-1 ». Reddies River-2 *. Rock Creek *. 
Somers *. Stanton *. Traphill No. 1 *. Trsnhil] \To 9 » 
Union *, Walnut Grove *. Wilkesboro No. 2 *• YaHkî ' 
County-

District 11: Buncombe County: Asheville #1 * Ashpvillp 
#2 U Asheville #3 *, Asheville #4 * Asheville #5 * Ashp- 
ville #6 ». Asheville #7 *, Asheville #8 *. Asheville #9 *. 
Asheville #10 *. Asheville #11 *. Asheville #12 *. Asheville 
#13 *. Asheville #14 *. Asheville #15 ». Asheville #16 * 
Asheville #17 ». Asheville #18 *, Asheville #19 *. Asheville 
#20 *. Asheville #21 », Beaverda-m *. Biltmore «. Haw 
Creek *, Hazel #1 ». Hazel #2 *. Reynolds s . Woodfin » 
Avervs Creek *. Black Mountain #1 *, Black Mountain #2 
*■ Black Mountain #3 *. Black Mountain #4 », Flat Creek 
*• French Broad *, Lower Hominy #1 *. Lower TTnminv 
#2 ». Lower Hominv #3 ». Upper Hominy ». Upper 
Hominy #2 *, Ivy #1 », Iw  #2 ». Leicester *. W est Bun­
combe *. Limestone #1 *. Riceville * Swarma-npa #1 V 
Swannanoa #2 *, Reems Creek *. Weaverville #1 *, Weav- 
erville #2 *. Sandy Mush *: Cherokee Countv: Clay Countv: 
Cleveland County: Hollv Springs *. Mrb-Yo *, Shelbv #1 
*= Shelbv #2 *, Shelbv #3 *. Shelbv #4 *, Shelby #5 *. 
Shelby #6 *. Shelby #7 *. Lattimore *, Polkville *. Lawn­
dale *: Graham County: Haywood Countv: Henderson



225a

County: North Blue Ridge *, South Blue Ridge *. Clear 
Creek *. Bowmans Bluff *. Crab Creek *. Bat Cave *, 
Ednewille *. Green River *. Raven Rock *, Armory *. 
Flat Rock *. Grimesdale *. Hendersonville #1 *. Hender­
sonville #2 *. Hendersonville #3 *. Horse Shoe *. Laurel 
Park *. Long John Mountain *, Moores Grove *. Northeast 
*. Northwest *. Pisgah View *, Rugfav *, Southeast *. 
Southwest *. Valiev Hill *. Northwest Non-contiguous *. 
Brickton. Brickton Noncontiguous. Etowah *. North Milk 
River *. South Mills River *: Jackson Countv: McDowell 
Countv: Dvsartsville township. Marion township. Nebo 
township. North Cove township. Old Fort township; Mar>nn 
Countv: Madison Countv: Polk Countv: Columbus town­
ship. Greens Creek township. Saluda township. Trvon 
township. White Oak township: Rutherford Countv: Camp 
Creek township: Tract 9601: Block Group 1: Block 140A. 
Block 143: Block Group 2: Block 201A. Block 202. Block 
203A. Block 207A: Tract 9602: Block Group 1: Block 145. 
Block 146. Block 147, Block 148. Block 149. Block 177, 
Block 178. Block 179A, Block 181. Block 182. Block 183A. 
Block 184A. Block 1S5. Block 187. Block 188, Block 189, 
Block 190. Block 192: Block Group 3: Block 301. Block 
302A, Block 305A. Block 306A: Colfax township. Cool 
Spring township. Duncans Creek township. Gilkev town­
ship. High Shoals township. Rutherfordton township. Sul­
phur Springs township. Union township; Swain County. 
Transylvania County: Yancey Countv.

District 12: Alamance County: North Burlington *: Tract 
0201.01: Block Group 1: Block 101: Tract 0202: Block 
Group 1: Block 101. Block 102. Block 103. Block 105, Block
106. Block 107, Block 108. Block 109. Block 110. Block
111. Block 113: Tract 0203: Block Group 1: Block 107.
Block 108. Block 109. Block 110: Block Group 2: Block
201. Block 202. Block 208: Tract 0204: Block Group 3:
Block 304A, Block 304B. Block 306A. Block 306B. Block 
307A. Block 307B. Block 308. Block 309, Block 310. Block
311. Block 312. Block 313. Block 314, Block 315. Block



226a

316A. Block 316B, Block 317B. Block 318. Block 319. Block 
337, Block 338, Block 339, Block 340: Block Group 4. Block 
Group 6; Tract 0205: Block Group 8: Block 804. Block 816. 
Block 817. Block 819: Burlington #7 * Faueette * Haw 
River », Morton *, Pleasant Grove »; Davidson Countv: 
Abbotts Creek *: Tract 0601: Block Group 1: Block 115. 
Block 116. Block 117, Block 118. Block 119: Block Group 
2: Block 210. Block 215, Block 216. Block 217. Block 229. 

. Block 237, Block 244. Block 245. Block 246. Block 247.
Block 249, Block 251: Block Group 9: Block 913. Block
914; Cotton *: Tract 0615: Block Group 4: Block 435B. 
Block 439C. Block 441B. Block 442B. Block 444B, Block 
445B. Block 446B. Block 447. Block 448. Block 454. Block 
455. Block 456; Tract 0618.01; Block Group 2: Block 209A. 
Block 209B. Block 210. Block 212A. Block 9 1 Block 
226; Block Group 3: Block 302, Block 303. Block 304. Block 
305, Block 306, Block 307, Block 308. Block 324. Block
325, Block 326. Block 327, Block 328. Block 329, Block
330A, Block 330B; Block Group 4: Block 408. Block 409. 
Block 410. Block 411. Block 412. Block 413: Block Group 
5: Block 537, Block 53S. Block 539. Block 540, Block 546. 
Block 556. Block 557. Block 558: Lexington No. 1 *; Tract 
0612: Block Group 3: Block 306. Block 308. Block 323 
Block 376. Block 377, Block 378. Block 379, Block 380. 
Block 381C: Tract 0614: Block Group 1; Block 101B. Block 
107C; Block Group 2: Block 227B. Block 228B: Block Group 
3: Block 301B. Block 302. Block 305. Block 306B: Block 
Group 4: Block 401B, Block 401C. Block 401D. Block 402D. 
Block 402E. Block 403. Block 404. Block 405B. Block 410B. 
Block 411D. Block 412B; Ward No. 1 *. Ward No. 2 *: 
Tract 0615: Block Group 1; Block 114. Block 115. Block
116. Block 117. Block 118. Block 141. Block 142, Block 
143. Block 144. Block 155. Block 156; Block Group 4: Block 
405, Block 406, Block 413, Block 414. Block 415. Block 
416, Block 417, Block 421. Block 422; Tract 0616: Block 
Group 1; Block 104. Block 110. Block 111. Block 112: Ward 
No. 4 *. Ward No. 5 *. Ward No. 6 *: Tract 0614: Block



227a

Group 3: Block 311. Block 312. Block 313. Block 314. Block 
315, Block 316, Block 317. Block 318, Block 321. Block
322, Block 337, Block 338, Block 339, Block 341: Tract
0615: Block Group 1: Block 119. Block 129, Block 130, 
Block 133, Block 134, Block 135, Block 136, Block 137,
Block 138, Block 139, Block 140, Block 145, Block 146,
Block 147, Block 148, Block 149, Block 150, Block 151,
Block 152, Block 153, Block 154: Block Group 2: Block
201, Block 202, Block 203: Thomasville No. 1 *, Thom­
asville No, 2 *, Thomasville No, 3 *, Thomasville No. 4 
*: Tract 0608: Block Group 2: Block 202: Block Group 3: 
Block 303. Block 304. Block 305. Block 307. Block 308. 
Block 309. Block 310. Block 311A. Block 339A. Block 
342A. Block 342B, Block 343. Block 344A. Block 345A: 
Tract 0609: Block Group 5: Block 516. Block 517: Block 
Group 9: Block 906A; Thomasville No. 7 *: Tract 0605:
Block Group 1: Block 118. Block 120. Block 121. Block
122. Block 123. Block 124. Block 129: Block Group 9: Block 
913. Block 914. Block 916. Block 918. Block 919. Block 
920. Block 921. Block 922: Tract 0608: Block Group 3: 
Block 306B, Block 306C, Block 306D. Block 311B. Block
312. Block 313. Block 314B. Block 322. Block 323B. Block
324, Block 325. Block 326. Block 327. Block 328. Block
329, Block 330. Block 331. Block 332. Block 333, Block
334. Block 335, Block 336. Block 337, Block 338. Block
339B. Block 340, Block 34IB. Block 344B, Block 345B. 
Block 346. Block 347. Block 348: Thomasville No. 8 *: 
Tract 0606: Block Group 4: Block 408. Block 409, Block
410. Block 411. Block 412. Block 415. Block 416. Block 
417: Block Group 9: Block 903. Block 904B. Block 958B: 
Durham County. Bragtown School *, Burton School *. C.C. 
Spaulding School *. Durham Co. Main Library *. Durham 
High School *, Forest Hills Club House *. Holloway Street 
School *, Holton Junior High School *. Lakewood School 
*. Moose Lodge *. Morehead School *. North Durham 
School Building *, Pearson School *. Pearsontown School 
*. R-N. Harris *, Shephard Junior H.S. *. St. Stephens/



228a

Parish Hall *: Tract 0020.07: Block Group 4: Block 401. 
Block 402. Block 403. Block 404. Block 405. Block 407. 
Block 408, Block 409: Watts Street School *, Weaver 
Street Community Center *, W hite Rock Baptist Church 
*, Y.E. Smith School *, Campus Precinct *. Homestead 
Heights Baptist *, Carrington Junior H.S. *, Northern 
H.S. *. DNOE VALLEY SCHOOL NONCONTIGUOUS *. 
Mangum School *. Rougemont United Mpthonist *. Gor­
man Ruritan Club *: Forsyth County: Abbotts Creek #1 
*. Abbotts Creek #2 *. Broadbav #1 *. Broadbav #2 *, 
Ashlev Middle School *. Carver High School *. East Win­
ston Library *, Forest Pk. Elementary School *. 14th 
Street Recreation Center *. Happy Hill Recreation Center 
*• Kennedy Middle School *. Lowranee Middle School *. 
M. L. King Recreation Center *. Mt. Sinai Church *. St. 
Andrews United Methodist *. Winst.n-n T ,ake Family YMCA 
*: Gaston County. Bessemer City #2 *: Tract 0318: Block 
Group 1: Block 101A: Firestone *: Tract 0329: Block Group 
1: Block 106. Block 107. Block 108: Block Group 2: Block 
201, Block 202, Block 203. Block 204. Block 205. Block
206. Block 208. Block 209, Block 210. Block 211. Block
212, Block 213. Block 214, Block 215. Block 216, Block
217. Block 218: Tract 0330: Block Group 1: Block 121-
Block 122. Block 123. Block 124. Block 125. Block 130.
Block 132: Flint Groves »; Tract 0313.02: Block Group 2: 
Block 218A: Tract 0314: Block Group 1: Block 120: Block 
Group 4: Block 417: Tract 0321: Block Group 3: Block 305. 
Block 318. Block 319, Block 321. Block 322. Block 323. 
Block 324. Block 334: Health Center »: Tract 0315: Block 
Group 6: Block 601. Block 606, Block 607. Block 608. Block 
609, Block 611. Block 612. Block 613: Tract 0319: Block 
Group 2: Block 214. Block 215. Block 221. Block 25>2; Block 
Group 3: Highland *, Mvrtle *: Tract 0318: Block Group 
1: Block 101B. Block 101D. Block 101E. Block 109, Block 
110; Block Group 2. Block Group 3, Block Group 4. Block 
Group 5: Block 518. Block 519. Block 520. Block 521. Block 
522. Block 526. Block 527. Block 528. Block 529. Block



229a

530; Tract 0331: Block Group 1: Block 104. Block 105B: 
Ranlo *: Tract 0313.02; Block Group 2: Block 218B. Block 
218C: Block Group 4: Block 413D. Block 414B: Tract 0321: 
Block Group 3: Block 338D; Woorihill *• Tract 0321: Block 
Group 1: Block 101, Block 102. Block 103. Block 104. Block 
105. Block 108. Block 109. Block 111, Block 112. Block
113. Block 114. Block 115, Block 121. Block 122. Block 
123; Belmont #2 *: Tract 0323.01: Block Group 1; Block 
101, Block 105. Block 107B. Block 108B. Block 109, Block 
110A. .Block HOB, Block 121B: Tract 0323.02: Block Group 
1; Block 101A, Block 103. Block 104; Block Group 3: Block 
319; Belmont #3 *: Tract 0312: Block Group 1; Block 116C: 
Lowell *; Tract 0313.02: Block Group 3: Block 353A. Block 
354. Block 355. Block 356. Block 357; Block Group 4: Block 
411, Block 413B, Block 417 Block 418; Tract 0322: Block 
Group 1: Block 104A. Block 108, Block 109; McAdenville 
*: Tract 0310.01; Block Group 2: Block 219A. Block 219B. 
Block 220A. Block 220B; Tract 0313.02: Block Group 3: 
Block 331B. Block 331C. Block 332, Block 353B; Tract 
0323.01; Block Group 1; Block 112B; Guilford County: GB- 
01 *. GB-02 *, GB-03 *. GB-04 *. GB-05 *, GB-06 *, GB- 
07 «. GB-08 *. GB-09 ». GB-15 »: Tract 0115: Block Group 
1: Block 103. Block 104. Block 105. Block 111. Block 112. 
Block 113; Block Group 2: Block 201, Block 202. Block 
203Y. Block 203Z. Block 206, Block 207. Block 208, Block 
211. Block 212. Block 213, Block 214. Block 215, Block 
216. Block 217. Block 218; Block Group 3, Block Group 
4. Block Group 5; Tract 0116.01: Block Group 1: Block 
101. Block 102. Block 103, Block 104. Block 107; Block 
Group 2; Block 202. Block 203. Block 204. Block 205. Block
214. Block 218. Block 221; Tract 0126.04: Block Group 3: 
Block 303. Block 304; GB-19 *. Tract 0154: Block Group 
6: Block 605A; GB-23 *. GB-24A *. GB-25 », GB-26A *. 
GB-29 *. GB-30 *. GB-33 *. GB-36 ». GB-42 ». GB-44 *. 
GB-45 *. Tract 0128.03: Block Group 2: Block 217A. Block 
227A. Block 228. Block 229. Block 230Y, Block 230Z, Block
231. Block 234A; HP-03 ». HP-05 ». HP-06 *. 5P-07 »,



230a

HP-11 *, HP-12 *, 5P-15 *, HP-17 *. HP-22 ", Gibsonvffle 
*■ Jamestown-1 *: Tract 0164.02: Block Group 4: Block 
401Y. Block 403B. Block 404. Block 411Y. Block 411Z. 
Block 413, Block 414. Block 415. Block 416, Block 417,
Block 418, Block 419, Block 420, Block 42] Block a.9.9
Block 423. Block 427, Block 428. Block 429. Block 430.
Block 431. Block 432, Block 433. Block 436. Block 437,
Block 438B. Block 439B, Block 440. Block 441. Block 442: 
Tract 0165.01: Block Group 2: Block 212C, Block 213A: 
Jamestown-2 *: Tract 0126.09: Block Group 4: Block 414C: 
Tract 0165.01: Block Group 2: Block 212D. Block 213B: 
Tract 0165.02: Block Group 2: Block 206. Block 207, Block 
208, Block 209, Block 210, Block 212, Block 213, Block 
214, Block 215. Block 216. Block 217A. Block 218. Block
219. Block 220. Block 221. Block 222. Block 223. Block 
225, Block 226, Block 227: Block Group 3: Block 301, Block
302. Block 312. Block 313. Block 314: Block Group 4: Block 
407B: North Jefferson *: Tract 0111.02: Block Group 4: 
Block 422B; Tract 0127.06: Block Group 2: Block 20IB: 
Tract 0128.03: Block Group 1: Block 107B: Block Group 
2: Block 201C. Block 202C, Block 205B. Block 206. Block
207. Block 213. Block 214. Block 217B. Block 224. Block 
234B, Block 235: Block Group 3: Block 301. Block 303. 
Block 306: Block Group 9: Block 901. Block 902B. Block 
904. Block 905B, Block 906: Tract 0153: Block Group 1: 
Block Block 115A, Block 117. Block 118A. Block 120A. 
Block 121, Block 122, Block 123. Block 124. Block 125. 
Block 126, Block 127. Block 128. Block 129, Block 130, 
Block 131. Block 132: Block Grom 3: Block 303A. Block 
309. Block 310. Block 311. Block 312. Block 317. Block 
318, Block 319. Block 320, Block 321. Block 322. Block
323. Block 324: North Smrmer *. South Washington *: 
Tract 0152: Block Group 1: Block 110. Block 111. Block 
115, Block 122. Block 123, Block 124. Block 131. Block 
132B. Block 133B. Block 134B, Block 136B: GB-24B *. GB- 
26B *. GB-35C *: Iredell County: Barringer *: Tract 0612: 
Block Group 3: Block 317A. Block 317C. Block 321A. Block



231a

322A. Block 323A: Block Group 4: Block 401; Block 402A. 
Block 402B. Block 402F, Block 41QA. Block 410C. Block 
411A. Block 412A. Block 412C. Block 412D. Block 413. 
Block 414. Block 415. Block 416. Block 417. Block 418. 
Block 419. Block 420, Block 421. Block 422A. Block 422B. 
Block 423A. Block 423B. Block 424. Block 425: Block 
Group 5: Block 501C. Block 507A. Block 508. Block 509. 
Block 510. Block 511: Block Group 9: Block 901A. Block 
902A. Block 904A: Tract 0613: Block Group 1: Block 101A: 
Block Group 2: Block 201A. Block 202. Block 203. Block
204. Block 205. Block 206. Block 207, Block 208. Block 
209, Block 210, Block 211. Block 212. Block 213. Block 
214. Block 215. Block 219. Block 220A. Block 221A. Block 
222. Block 223. Block 224A: Block Group 3: Block 309A. 
Block 310A. Block 312A, Block 313. Block 314A, Block 
315A. Block 316A, Block 322. Block 323: Block Group 4: 
Block 407A. Block 408: Chambersburg *: Tract 0606: Block 
Group 3: Block 323D. Block 324A, Block 325A. Block 327. 
Block 328. Block 329. Block 330A. Block 331. Block 332: 
Block Group 4: Block 401. Block 402. Block 403. Block
404. Block 405. Block 406. Block 407, Block 408B. Block 
416A. Block 416C. Block 417. Block 418. Block 419, Block 
420. Block 421. Block 422, Block 423, Block 424. Block 
425, Block 42S, Block 427: Block Group 5: Block 501. Block 
502. Block 503. Block 504. Block 505. Block 506A. Block 
506B. Block 507A. Block 507C. Block 517A, Block 518. 
Block 519. Block 520: Tract 0607: Block Group 6: Block 
601. Block 602. Block 603. Block 604. Block 605. Block 
606. Block 607. Block 608. Block 609, Block 612: Tract 
0613: Block Group 3: Block 310B. Block 311A. Block 312B. 
Block 317: Block Group 4: Block 407B: Coddle Creek #2 
*■ Coddle Creek #4 *: Tract 0614: Block Group 8: Block 
820. Block 821, Block 822, Block 843. Block 844. Block 
845. Block 846. Block 847. Block 852: Tract 0616: Block 
Group 2: Block 214: Block Group 3: Block 306. Block 307, 
Block 308, Block 309. Block 310. Block 311. Block 315. 
Block 316: Block Group 4: Block 401A. Block 401B, Block



232a

401C. Block 401D. Block 401E: Block Group 5: Block 512 
Block 513A. Block 513B. Block 513C. Block 513D. Block 
513E. Block 514: Block Group 7: Block 714, Block 718- 
Block 719; Cool Springs *. Statesville #3 *. Statesville #5 
*: Tract 0604: Block Group 1: Block 118, Block 119. Block 
120. Block 123. Block 124, Block 125. Block 129. Blorir 
130. Block 131. Block 135. Block 136. Block 137. Block 
138: Block Group 2: Block 205. Block 206. Block 214, Block
215. Block 221, Block 224: Block Group 3: Block 301: 
Statesville #6 *: Mecklenburg County: Charlotte Pet. 2 * 
Charlotte Pet. 3. Charlotte Pet. 9 *: TTaet 0003: Block 
Group 1: Block 101. Block 102, Block 106. Block 108: BloHc 
Group 2: Tract 0004: Block Group 5: Block 508. Block 513, 
Block 518. Block 519. Block 520. Block 521: Tract 0035- 
Block Group 3: Block 303. Block 304: Block Group 4: Block 
413: Charlotte Pet. 11 *. Charlotte Pet. 12 *. Charlotte 
Pet. 13 *. Charlotte Pet. 14 *. Charlotte Pet. 15 *: Tract 
0010: Block Group 1: Block 104. Block 106: Block Group 
2: Block 209. Block 210, Block 211. Block 217. Block 219- 
Block 220: Block Group 3: Block 301. Block 302. Block
303. Block 304. Block 305, Block 310. Block 318. BWk
319: Tract 0011: Block Group 1: Block 111. Block 118.
Block 119: Block Group 4: Block 405. Block 406. Block
407. Block 409, Block 411. Block 412: Charlotte Pet, ifl 
*• Charlotte Pet. 17 *. Charlotte Pet. 22 *. Charlotte Pet. 
23 *. Charlotte Pet. 24 *, Charlotte Pet. 25 ». Charlotte 
Pet. 26 *. Charlotte Pet. 27 », Charlotte Pet. 28 ». Char­
lotte Pet. 30 *, Charlotte Pet. 31 *. Charlotte Pet. 39 * 
Charlotte Pet. 40 ». Charlotte Pet. 41 *. Charlotte Pet- 
42 *. Charlotte Pet. 43 *, Charlotte Pet. 46 *. Charlotte 
Pet. 52 *. Charlotte Pet. 53 *. Charlotte Pet. 54 *. Char­
lotte Pet. 55 *. Charlotte Pet. 56 *. Charlotte Pet 60 
Charlotte Pet. 77 »: Tract 0038.04: Block Group 2: Tract. 
0058.06: Block Group 1: Block 101. Block 102. Block 103- 
Block 104. Block 105. Block 106A. Block 107. Block 108A 
Block 109. Block 110. Block 111A. Block 124A. Block 125- 
Block 126. Block 127. Block 128A. Block 128B. Block 129.



233a

Block 130: Tract 0059.03: Block Group 3: Block 301. Block 
302, Block 303, Block 304. Block 343. Block 386, Block 
387; Charlotte Pet. 78 *. Charlotte Pet. 82 *, Charlotte 
Pet. 97 *; Tract 0058.07: Block Group 1. Block Group 2: 
Block 201A, Block 201B. Block 202B: Charlotte Pet. 98 
*. BER *: Tract 0059.01: Block Group 2: Block 208. Block 
209, Block 221B, Block 225. Block 226. Block 227, Block 
228, Block 229: Block Group 3: Block 312, Block 313, Block 
314: COR *: Tract 0062.02: Block Group 2: Block 201A. 
Block 201B. Block 202A. Block 202B. Block-204A. Block 
204B. Block 204C. Block 205A. Block 205B. Block 208, 
Block 209. Block 217. Block 218. Block 219. Block 220. 
Block 221: Tract 0064: Block Group 5: Block 501A. Block 
50IB. Block 501C. Block 501E. Block 501F. Block 502, 
Block 503. Block 522. Block 523A. Block 523 B. Block 
524B. Block 525: Block Group 6: Block 601A. Block 601B. 
Block 601C. Block 601E. Block 601G. Block 604. Block 
605. Block 607. Block 608. Block 609: DAV »: Tract 
0062.01: Block Group 4: Block 401A. Block 402C: Tract 
0064: Block Group 1. Block Group 2: Block 201. Block 
202. Block 203A. Block 203B. Block 203C. Block 204A. 
Block 204B. Block 205. Block 206. Block 221: Block Group 
3: Block 302, Block 303: Block Group 6: Block 601D, Block 
60IF. Block 602: HUN *: Tract 0062.02: Block Group 2: 
Block 225, Block 226. Block 227. Block 228. Block 248,
Block 249. Block 250. Block 251. Block 252, Block 294.
Block 295A. Block 295B. Block 295C. Block 295D. Block 
296. Block 297: Block Group 3: Block 301. Block 302A. 
Block 302B, Block 303A. Block 303B. Block 334. Block 
335A. Block 335B, Block 336. Block 337. Block 338. Block 
339. Block 340. Block 341. Block 342. Block 348. Block
349. Block 350. Block 351: Tract 0063: Block Group 1:
Block 115. Block 116: Block Group 3: Block 3Q5A. Block 
305C. Block 306, Block 307. Block 312. Block 313. Block 
314. Block 315B. Block 318A. Block 318B. Block 319. Block
320. Block 321. Block 322: Block Group 4: Block 403A. 
Block 403B. Block 403C. Block 403D. Block 447, Block



234a

448; LC2: Tract 0054.01: Block Group 3: Block 304. Block 
305, Block 306, Block 313. Block 321. Block 322. RlnrV 
323, Block 324. Block 330; Block Group 4: Block 401; Tract 
0061: Block Group 1; Block 104A. Block 104B. Block 105 
Block 106. Block 107, Block 108A. Block 109. Block 11OA 
Block HOB. Block 111. Block 112. Block 113. Block 314 
Block 115, Block 116, Block 117. Block 118. Block 119
Block 120. Block 121. Block 122. Block 123, Block 124.
Block 125. Block 126. Block 127A. Block 127B. Block 127C 
Block 128A. Block 128B. Block 128C. Block 129A. Block 
129B. Block 133. Block 134. Block 135: LCl - South: Tract 
0061: Block Group 4: Block 403. Block 404. Block 405.
Block 406. Block 407. Block 408. Block 412. Block 418-
Block 419: Tract 0062.02: Block Group 3: Block 331. Block 
332, Block 343. Block 344. Block 347. Block 352: MC2: 
Tract 0054.01: Block Group 3: Block 301. Block 302, Block 
303, Block 307. Block 314. Block 317. Block 319. Block 
328: Tract 0054.02: Block Group 1: Block 106A. Block 
129B. Block 129C, Block 129E. Block 130: Tract 0055 01- 
Block Group 2: Block 217A: Block Group 3: Block 312 A 
Block 313. Block 314. Block 315. Block 316: Tract 0061: 
Block Group 1: Block 131A. Block 132A: Charlotte Pet. 
16 Part. MCI part, XMC2 Noncontiguous: Charlotte Pet- 
104: Orange County: Carr *: Tract 0108: Block Group 1: 
Block 110. Block 111. Block 112. Block 113. Block 114
Block 115. Block 116. Block 117. Block 118, Block 119
Block 120. Block 121. Block 122. Block 123. Block 124
Block 125. Block 126. Block 127. Block 128. Block 129
Block 155. Block 156. Block 157. Block 194. Block 195
Block 196. Block 197: Cedar Grove *: Tract 0108: Block 
Group 1: Block 101. Block 102. Block 103. Block 104, Block 
105. Block 106. Block 107. Block 108. Block 109. Block
133. Block 134. Block 135. Block 136. Block 137. Block
138. Block 139. Block 140. Block 141. Block 142. Block
143. Block 144. Block 146. Block 148. Block 191. Block
192. Block 193: Block Group 2: Block 216. Block 217. Block 
218: Tolars *: Tract 0108: Block Group 2: Block 211A.



235a

Block 212, Block 213. Block 214. Block 215. Block 219. 
Block 220, Block 221. Block 222. Block 223A. Block 224A. 
Block 254A. Block 255. Block 256. Block 257, Block 258. 
Block 259A. Block 260A. Block 261A. Block 262. Block 
263. Block 264. Block 265. Block 266, Block 267. Block 
268. Block 269, Block 270, Block 275. Block 276. Block 
277A. Block 285A: Caldwell *: Tract 0108: Block Group 
2: Block 201. Block 202, Block 203, Block 204. Block 205- 
Block 206, Block 207, Block 208, Block 209. Block 210. 
Block 211B, Block 223B. Block 224B, Block 225, Block 
226, Block 227, Block 228. Block 229. Block 230. Block 
231. Block 232, Block 233. Block 234, Block 235. Block 
236. Block 237, Block 238. Block 239A. Block 239B. Block 
240, Block 241, Block 242, Block 243. Block 244. Block 
245, Block 246. Block 247. Block 248. Block 249. Block 
250, Block 251. Block 252. Block 253. Block 254B, Block 
259B, Block 260B. Block 261B. Block 277B. Block 284B. 
Block 285B, Block 286. Block 287. Block 288. Block 289- 
Block 290. Block 291, Block 292, Block 293, Block 294- 
Block 295, Block 296A. Block 296B. Block 297A. Block 
297B: Block Group 3: Block 301. Block 302. Block 303- 
Block 304. Block 305. Block 306, Block 307B. Block 319B. 
Block 320. Block 321. Block 322. Block 323. Block 324, 
Block 325, Block 326, Block 327, Block 328. Block 329. 
Block 330. Block 331. Block 332, Block 333. Block 334. 
Block 335. Block 336. Block 337. Block 341, Block 370. 
Block 371. Block 372, Block 373, Block 374B: Tract 0109: 
Block Group 2: Block 201B, Block 201C. Block 201D. Block 
201E. Block 202. Block 203. Block 204B: Rowan County: 
Franklin *: Tract 0505: Block Group 1: Block 101E: Tract 
0513.01: Block Group 2: Block 208B: Block Group 3: Block 
302: Tract 0513.02: Block Group 3: Block 301. Block 307, 
Block 308, Block 309, Block 310. Block 311, Block 312, 
Block 313. Block 314. Block 315, Block 316. Block 317, 
Block 318, Block 321C. Block 321D, Block 322. Block 323. 
Block 324, Block 325. Block 326. Block 327. Block 328- 
Block 329. Block 330, Block 331. Block 332, Block 333.



236a

Block 334; Tract 0519: Block Group 2: Block 225A. Block 
248A. Block 249. Block 250: East Spender *, Milford Hilk 
*• Spencer *, Trading Ford. W est Innes *: Tract 0505: 
Block Group 2: Block 211. Block 212. Block 213: Block 
Group 3: Block 311. Block 315. Block 316, Block 317. Block 
318. Block 319. Block 320. Block 321. Block 322. Block
323. Block 324. Block 325. Block 326. Block 237, Block
238. Block 329, Block 330. Block 331. Block 332. Block
333. Block 334. Block 335: Tract 0513.02: Block Group 3: 
Block 321A: East Ward H *. North Ward I *. North Ward 
II *: Tract 0505: Block Group 1: Block 101B, Block 101C. 
Block 104, Block 107A. Block 110: Tract 0506: Block Group 
1: Block 104A, Block 105. Block 106. Block 107. Block 
112. Block 113, Block 114. Block 115, Block 116. Block
119, Block 120, Block 121. Block 122, Block 123. Block
132: W est Ward m  *. Trading Ford Noncontiguous A. 
Scotch Irish *. Unity *.

(b) The name and boundaries of townships specified in 
this section are as they were legally defined and in effect 
as of January 1, 1980, and recognized in the 1980 United 
States Census.

(b) The names and boundaries of townships, p r e s e ts  
(voting tabulation districts), tracts, block groups, and 
blocks, specified in this section are as they were legally 
defined and recognized in the 1990 U.S. Census, except 
as provided in subsection (cl of this section. Boundaries 
are as shown on the IVTD Version of the United States 
Bureau of the Census 1990 TIGER Files, with such mod­
ifications as made bv the Legislative Services Office and 
shown on its computer database as of May l. 1991. to 
reflect census blocks divided bv prior district boundary  
and precincts added or modified as outlined in subsection
(c) of this section.

(c) For Guilford County, precinct boundaries for High 
Point Precincts 20. 23. and 24 are as modified bv the



237a

Guilford County Board of Elections and shown on the Leg­
islative Service Office computer database as of May. 1991.

For Mecklenburg County, precinct boundaries are as al­
tered by the Mecklenburg County Board of Elections as 
reported to the Legislative Services Office and shown on 
the Legislative Services Office computer database as of 
Mav 1. 1991.

For'Wake County:

(1) St.'M arys Precinct #7 is a created bv the Wake 
County Board of Elections out of St. Marys Pre­
cinct #4:

(2) Raleigh 01-27 Part is an area reported by the 
Bureau of the Census as part of Raleigh 01-23 but 
has been put by the Wake County Board of Elec­
tions in Raleigh 01-27: and

(3) VTD ZZZZ has been assigned to the appropriate 
parts of Wake Forest #1 and Wake Forest #2.

all as shown on the Legislative Services Office computer 
database as of May 1. 1991.

For Anson. Bertie. Camden. Caswell. Franklin. Gates. 
Greene, Hertford. Hoke. Lee. Lincoln. Martin. Mitchell, 
Northampton. Pasquotank. Perquimans. Person. Tyrrell. 
Vance. Warren, and Yadkin Counties, precincts are as 
shown on mans on file with the Legislative Service Office 
as of Mav 1. 1991. except that

(1) In Anson County, Lanesboro #1 and Lanesboro #2 
are listed together as Lanesboro #1 and #2:

(2) In Vance County, where West Henderson II is not 
contiguous, the northerly part is listed as West 
Henderson HA and the southerly part as West 
Henderson KB:

(3) In P e r q u im a n s  Countv. computer VTD Code 0005 
(Track 9801, Block 550A) is actually part of Bel- 
videre Precinct and is districted with it notwith­
standing any description above:



238a

{4} In Greene County, Snow Hill Town Satellite is 
Tract 9503. Block 301A which is a part of Snow 

. Hill town Precinct entirely surrounded by Sugp- 
Precinct and is districted with Sugg Precinct not­
withstanding any description above

(51 In Greene Countv. Snow Effll town Sat B is Tract. 
9503. Block 224B which is a part of Snow Hill 
Town Precinct entirely surrounded bv Snow Hill 
Rural Precinct and is districted with Snow HOI 
Rural Precinct notwithstanding anv description 
above:
Ip  Mecklenburg Countv. Precinct TMC9 
tiguous is Tract 55.01. Block 303C. and is dk- 
tricted with Precinct MCI notwithstanding- any 
description above:

(7} In Martin County, any listing of VTDs not defined 
consists of Tract 9705, Block 413 (which is in Po­
plar Point Precinct), Tract 9704, Block 202 (which 
is in Goose N est Precinct), and Tract 9706, Block 
168A (which is in Robersonville #2 Precinct), and 
those blocks are districted with those respective 
precincts regardless of any listing above;

(8} In New Hanover County. Tract 123.98. Blocks 
307B. 308A. 309. 310A. 311A. and 312A. listed 
by the Census Bureau as part of VTD 7777. are 
districted bv this section as part of Wilmington

s ..apy precinct or township boundaries are cfrano-ori
guch changes shall not change the boundaries of the 
Congressional Districts, which shall remain th o  « n ,a

In the case where any individual blocks are listed above. 
the district allocation of unlisted water blocks shall be as 
found on maps and statistical reports of the districts on 
file with the Secretary of State.

(cl) In this section:



239a

(D Wake County Tract 0510, Block 301 is shown on 
the computer database as part of Raleigh 01-23 * 
when it is in fact correctly shown on the Board 
of Elections map as part of Raleigh 01-27:

£2} Vance County Tract 9606 blocks 248 and 227A 
are shown on the computer database as part of 
Hilltop, when they are in fact correctly shown on 
the Board of Elections map as part of North Hen­
derson II and East Henderson I, respectively.:

(3) Lincoln County Tract 0706.98 Block. 307 is shown 
on the computer database as part of North Brook 
I/H when it is in fact correctly shown on the Board 
of Ejections map as part of North Brook HI:

(4) Mecklenburg County Tract 0044 Block 906F is 
shown on the computer database as part of OAK 
when it is fact correctly shown on the Board of 
Elections map as part of Charlotte Pet. 16:

(5) Granville County Tract 9703. Block 33QB is dis­
tricted with Corinth * Precinct notwithstanding 
anv description above.

(c2) If any precinct or township is listed in a district in 
this section, with a comma after the name of the precinct 
or township, followed by a listing of census geography 
within that- precinct, and other parts of that precinct or 
township are not listed in another district, that precinct 
or township is in fact whole within the district with which 
it is listed.

(d) If this section does not specifically assign anv area 
within North Carolina to a district, and the area is

(1) Entirely surrounded bv a single district, the area 
shall be deemed to have been assigned to that 
district;

(2) Contiguous to two or more districts, the area shall 
be deemed to have been assigned to that district 
which contains the least population according to 
the 1990 United States Census: or



240a

(3) Contiguous to only one district and to another 
state or the Atlantic Ocean, the area shall hp 
deemed to have been assigned to that district.” 

Sec. 2. Chapter 601, Session Laws of 1991, is re­
pealed.
Sec. 3. This act is effective upon ratification.
In the General Assembly read three times and ratified 
this the 24th day of January, 1992.

JAMES C- GARDNER_______________
James C. Gardner 
President of the Senate

DANIEL BLUE. JR.____________________
Daniel Blue, Jr.
Speaker of the House of Representatives