Hatton v. Maury County, TN Board of Education Brief for Appellant

    Inttpfr States (Emtrt ai Appeals
F ob the SjpqiH Circuit

ncD 3 ^
Civil

In t h e

Miss F lorence E lla H atton,

—v.—
Appellant,

County B oard op E ducation of Maury County, 
T ennessee, et al.,

Appellees.

APPEAL FROM T H E  U N ITED  STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR T H E  

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TEN N ESSEE, COLUMBIA DIVISION

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT

Avon N. W illiams, J r.
Z. Alexander L ooby

327 Charlotte Avenue 
Nashville, Tennessee 37201

J ack Greenberg 
J ames M. Nabrit, III  
F ranklin E. W hite 
Conrad K. H arper 
W. H aywood B urns 

10 Columbus Circle 
Suite 2030
New York, New York 10019 

Attorneys for Appellant



I N D E X

PAGE

Issue Presented for Review .........................................  1

Statement of Facts ......................-..................-.............  2

Argument—

Appellant, a Qualified Tenure Teacher, Was 
Wrongfully Discharged Because of Race, in Vio­
lation of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, Section 601, et seq., When 
She Was Discharged From an All-Negro School 
Without Objective Comparison With Other Com­
parable School District Teachers, Because of the 
Loss of Enrollment Resulting From Desegrega­
tion and the Loss of Funds Under Title I of Pub­
lic Law 89-10 ........... - ............................................  6

Conclusion .................. ............. -........-................................. — 15

T able oe Authorities:
Cases:
Chambers v. Hendersonville City Board of Education,

364 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1966) ..............................-........ 12

Hill v. Franklin County Board of Education, 390 F.2d 
583 (6th Cir. 1968) ................ .......... ........... ..............  H

Kelly v. The Altheimer, Arkansas Public School Dis­
trict No. 22, 378 F.2d 483 (8th Cir. 1967) .... ............  12

North Carolina Teachers Association v. City of Ashe- 
boro Board of Education, 393 F.2d 736 (4th Cir. 
1968) ................... ...................... ............... .................. 12



ii

PAGE

Rolfe v. County Board of Education of Lincoln County, 
Tenn., 391 F.2d 77 (6th Cir. 1968) ..............6, 7,10,11,14

Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943) .... 14
Smith v. Board of Education of Morrilton School Dis­

trict No. 32, 365 F.2d 770 (8th Cir. 1966) ...................  12'

Wall v. Stanley County Board of Education, 378 F.2d 
275 (4th Cir. 1967) ..................................... ................  12

Authorities:
U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 

Office for Civil Rights, Policies on Elementary and 
Secondary School Compliance with T i t l e  VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (March 1968) ..................... 11



In t h e

States (Urntrl of Appals
F or the S ixth Circuit

No............
Civil

Miss F lorence E lla H atton,
Appellant,

County B oard of E ducation of Maury County, 
Tennessee, et al.,

Appellees.

APPEAL FROM T H E  U N ITED  STATES DISTRICT. COURT FOR T H E  

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF T EN N ESSEE, COLUMBIA DIVISION

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT

Issue Presented for Review

Can a qualified Negro teacher, having tenure, be dis­
charged consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment where 
she was not objectively compared with other comparable 
faculty members in the school district and where her dis­
charge resulted from loss of student enrollment and the 
consequent loss of Federal funds at the all Negro school 
in which she was teaching?



2

Statement o f Facts

This is an appeal from a judgment (59a) of the District 
Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, Columbia Divi­
sion, denying injunctive relief sought by plaintiff-appel­
lant, Miss Florence Ella Hatton, following her discharge 
as a teacher by the County Board of Education of Maury 
County, Tennessee.

Miss Hatton1 instituted an action on September 11, 1968, 
against the County Board of Education of Maury County, 
Tennessee, and against E. A. Cox, Superintendent of 
Schools of Maury County, seeking injunctive relief against 
the Board’s discriminatory discharges of teachers, includ­
ing Miss Hatton (7a). The complaint alleged that the 
Board discharged Miss Hatton solely because of race or 
color, in violation of her rights secured by the Due Process 
and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment to the Constitution of the United States and by the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Section 601, et seq. (18a).

The defendants filed an answer on September 30, 1968, 
denying that Miss Hatton or any other teacher has been 
discharged on account of race or color (38a-39a).

The cause came on for hearing on October 8, 9, and 
10, 1968 (72a). In an order filed on October 17, 1968, 
the District Court denied injunctive relief (59a). In its 
supporting opinion filed October 21, 1968, the Court held 
that the fact that Miss Hatton has not been re-employed 
is not due to the fact that she is Negro (64a).

On November 19, 1968, Miss Hatton filed notice of 
appeal from so much of the order of the District Court 
as denied injunctive relief requiring defendants to rein­

1 In addition, there were three other plaintiffs who filed notice 
of appeal—Mrs. Dorothy M. Johnson, Rev. James S. Harris, and 
Rev. James W. Caldwell (71a). This appeal is being proseeuted 
on behalf of Miss Hatton alone.



3

state Miss Hatton as a teacher in the Maury County School 
System and to award her back pay for the period from 
her dismissal until the date of reinstatement (71a).

Miss Hatton has a B. S. degree in elementary education 
and is certified in that area by the State of Tennessee 
(77a). She had been employed by the County Board of 
Education of Maury County for six years and was there­
fore a tenure teacher (77a, 81a). She acquired tenure at 
the conclusion of the 1965-66 school year when she taught 
at Hills Chapel, an all-Negro, two-teacher elementary school 
(81a). Hills Chapel was then closed, and Miss Hatton was 
instructed by the Superintendent of Schools’ office to speak 
with principals of various schools in the County concern­
ing her placement (82a).2

She was assigned to Macedonia Elementary School as 
part of an all-Negro faculty as the fourth-grade home­
room teacher, instructor of health and physical education 
and social studies, and part-time librarian (94a, 204a, 
365a). These positions were funded under a federal pro­
gram for the provision of educational opportunities to the 
educationally disadvantaged and economically deprived 
children known as Title One of Public Law 89-10 (105a, 
320a) .3 The District Court expressly found that Macedonia

2 Miss Hatton liad previously taught at Pisgah Elementary 
School, an all-Negro, one-teacher school, for three years. In 1965, 
she was notified that that school would be closed as a result of 
pupil transfers to formerly all-white schools, and that she was 
therefore dismissed (78a-79a, 316a). She was reinstated only after 
officials of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare con­
tacted the Superintendent of Schools and informed him that such 
dismissals of Negro teachers would jeopardize federal funds then 
received by Maury County (81a, 330a, 338a).

3 When a regular teacher is assigned to a Title One position, she 
is paid on the same salary schedule as any other teacher. The only 
difference is that the funds to pay her salary come from the fed­
eral rather than the state treasury (382a).



4

Elementary School has historically been an all-Negro 
school and remains overwhelmingly Negro (61a).

Miss Hatton taught at the Macedonia Elementary School 
during the school years 1966-67 and 1967-68 (82a). In 
April, 1968, when freedom-of-choice forms were received 
by the defendants, they knew that attendance at Mace­
donia School would drop substantially in 1968-69 because 
of the transfer of its Negro students to formerly all-white 
schools (173a-175a, 367a), and hence that fewer teachers 
would be needed there (413a-414a).4 Nonetheless, Miss 
Hatton was at that time re-elected to teach at Macedonia 
School for the 1968-69 school year (82a-83a). In addition, 
in April, 1968, the defendants assigned a white Title One 
teacher to Macedonia School upon her specific request for 
the 1968-69 school year—Miss Fannie Hogan (208a, 413a). 
In contrast to Miss Hatton, Miss Hogan was not thereafter 
dismissed and is presently teaching at Macedonia School 
under the Title One program (206a, 326a, 380a).

Early in August, 1968, the Superintendent of Schools, 
Mr. Cox, and the principal of Macedonia School, Anderson 
Hughes, knew definitely that the amount of Title One funds 
allocated to Macedonia School was to be curtailed, resulting 
in a reduction in the number of teaching positions at that 
school (176a, 199a, 324a). Superintendent Cox permitted 
Principal Hughes to submit a proposal for the reorgani­
zation of Macedonia School’s Title One program in light of 
the funds available (179a, 325a). Principal Hughes elected 
to retain three aides and a secretary who were paid from 
Title One funds and to eliminate Miss Hatton’s teaching 
position (180a, 325a). Although Principal Hughes had rec­
ommended Miss Hatton for reelection in April, 1968 (175a,

4 The enrollment projected for Macedonia School in April, 1968, 
differs from the actual enrollment at that school for the 1968-69 
school year by two pupils (378a-379a).



5

201a), he testified that it was impossible to retain her on 
his regular teaching staff because of the substantial de­
crease in enrollment at Macedonia School (178a, 198a).

Miss Hatton had reported for and participated in the 
in-service training program from August 21, 1968, to Au­
gust 26, 1968, when Principal Hughes informed her two 
days before the opening of school that her position at 
Macedonia School had been eliminated (87a). At this time, 
Principal Hughes believed that Miss Hatton would be 
placed in another school in the system and he so in­
formed her (202a, 418a-419a).

On the same day, August 26, 1968, Miss Hatton spoke 
with Superintendent Cox, who informed her that the elimi­
nation of her position had been necessitated by the transfer 
of Macedonia’s Negro students to historically all-white 
schools and the decrease in Title One funds allocated to 
Macedonia School, and instructed her to complete her in- 
service training and await placement at another school 
(87a, 342a-343a, 418a-419a). Miss Hatton returned to see 
Superintendent Cox on August 28, 1968, the first day of 
school, and he informed her that he had not yet found a 
vacancy for which she qualified (87a).

At the hearing, Superintendent Cox admitted that the 
decrease in Title One funds was not the sole reason for 
Miss Hatton’s discharge, and then later testified that in 
fact Miss Hatton was discharged because of “incompetence” 
(352a, 372a). He also admitted that he could have placed 
Miss Hatton somewhere within the system if he had wanted 
to (352a), but that in August, 1968, when it became obvious 
that her teaching assignment would have to be changed, 
he compared her with all other teachers in the system on 
the basis of “subjective data” only (372a).

Miss Hatton has never been placed within the Maury 
County school system, although she remains prepared and



6

ready to perforin her teaching duties (94a). Because she 
was discharged by the defendants immediately prior to the 
beginning of the 1968-69 school year, she has been unable 
to secure employment elsewhere (95a, 418a).

ARGUMENT

Appellant, a Qualified Tenure Teacher, Was W rong­
fu lly  Discharged Because o f  Race, in Violation o f the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act o f  
1964 , Section 6 01 , et seq., When She Was Discharged 
From an All-Negro School W ithout Objective Compari­
son With Other Comparable School District Teachers, 
Because o f the Loss o f Enrollment Resulting From D e­
segregation and the Loss o f Funds Under Title I o f  
Public Law 89-10.

This case is controlled by this Court’s decision in Rolfe 
v. County Board of Education of Lincoln County, Tenn., 391 
F.2d 77 (6th Cir. 1968). In the instant case, the Maury 
County Board of Education, which is implementing a con­
stitutionally required plan of desegregation utilizing the 
freedom-of-choice approach, discharged a tenure Negro 
teacher at an all-Negro school, upon a substantial drop in 
enrollment at that school, without comparing her to other 
faculty members in the system in light of definite objec­
tive standards applied to all teachers alike without dis­
tinction as to race. In Rolfe, as in this case, Negro teachers 
were discharged in consequence of an enrollment loss at 
an all-Negro school, and the school board had no definite 
objective standards applicable to all teachers alike for 
comparison of all teachers within the system, Id. at 79. 
The discharged Negro teachers in Rolfe were compared 
with the other Negro teachers in their school, but this Court 
held that this comparison was so restrictive as to be dis­
criminatory, Ibid.



7

The District Court below held that the fact that Miss 
Hatton has not been re-employed by the Maury County 
Board of Education “ . . .  is not due to the fact that she 
is a member of the Negro race,” (64a), but the Court 
made no finding as to the reason for Miss Hatton’s dis­
charge. The Court’s opinion contains no discussion of 
the Bolfe rule or of the question whether Miss Hatton was 
compared to all other teachers in the school system.

The District Court’s conclusion that Miss Hatton was 
not dismissed because of her race is clearly erroneous, 
because it is not disputed that Miss Hatton was re-elected 
to teach at Macedonia School for the 1968-69 school year 
in April, 1968, and was discharged from the staff of 
Macedonia School in August, 1968, only because of the 
substantial enrollment loss at that school and the decrease 
in Title One funds allocated to that school. Mr. Hughes, 
the principal of Macedonia School, testified that he would 
have retained Miss Hatton on his faculty but for the 
facts (a) he elected to eliminate her Title One teaching 
position rather than lose a secretary and three aides,5 
and (b) the enrollment loss at Macedonia School made it 
impossible to retain her at the school on the regular 
teaching staff (178a, 180a, 198a, 325a). The curtailment 
in Title One funds for Macedonia School necessarily fol­
lowed the decline in enrollment, as Title One funds are 
allocated to schools on the basis of the number of eco­
nomically deprived children within each school (321a).

In April, 1968, the Maury County Board of Education 
and the Superintendent of Schools knew that there was 
going to be a considerable decrease in enrollment at Mace­
donia School and a consequent decrease in Title One funds 
for that school, because of transfers of Macedonia’s Negro

5 Macedonia’s Title One employees for the 1968-69 include one 
teacher, one aide, and one clerk (326a).



8

students to formerly all-white schools for the 1968-69 
school year (366a-368a). Yet Miss Hatton was re-elected 
in April, 1968, to teach the 1968-69 school year (82a-83a). 
When the loss of Title One funds for Macedonia School 
occurred in August, 1968, Miss Hatton was discharged 
two days prior to the beginning of the 1968-69 school year 
with no previous warning,6 and informed by Superin­
tendent Cox that this was a consequence of the loss of 
federal funds to support her Title One position at Mace­
donia School and that she would be placed on the preferred 
waiting list (342a-343a).

In their answer and in the District Court, the defendants 
asserted two grounds for Miss Hatton’s dismissal. First, 
they asserted that when they learned that her Title One 
position would have to be eliminated, it was too late to 
place Miss Hatton elsewhere within the system, as all 
other positions for which she qualified had been filled 
(40a, 343a). However, on cross examination Superintend­
ent Cox finally admitted that he could have placed Miss 
Hatton if he had wanted to7 (352a).

6 Although in March, 1966, Miss Hatton had received a letter of 
warning from Superintendent Cox (98a), no charges have ever 
been brought against her on the ground of incompetence or on any 
other ground (118a). The defendants had never communicated to 
Miss Hatton any complaints concerning her work at Macedonia 
School (94a, 418a-419a). Nor did Miss Hatton have any idea that 
a curtailment in Title One funds might jeopardize her employ­
ment, in view of the fact that she had acquired tenure (108a).

7 The evidence clearly establishes this fact in any case. Miss 
Hatton testified that on August 28, 1968, when she saw Superin­
tendent Cox, he informed her of two vacancies for which she was 
not qualified but did not inform her of several vacancies in ele­
mentary education which then existed (87a-88a). Since August 30, 
1968, the Maury County Board has employed 17 new teachers in­
cluding 5 white elementary teachers (399a-400a). In addition, 
Superintendent Cox admitted that any one of the 16 new elemen­
tary school teachers employed prior to August 26, 1968, for the 
1968-69 school year could have been discharged on August 26, as 
the School Board is not legally obligated to new teachers until 
after the beginning of the school year when contracts are signed



9

Second, the defendants asserted that Miss Hatton was 
dismissed on the basis of professional incompetence (40a, 
372a). Miss Hatton’s counsel objected to any evidence 
concerning her professional competence, in view of the 
fact that she was originally re-elected to teach for the 
1968-69 school year and was discharged only when the 
principal of Macedonia School was required to reorganize 
his Title One program (166a-167a). The District Court 
admitted evidence concerning Miss Hatton’s competence, 
and in its opinion found that the record shows that Miss 
Hatton is technically qualified to teach elementary school, 
but refused to rule on the question of her comparable com­
petence, stating:

I ’m not entirely sure that this court can consider 
the evidence of incompetency. I think I’m probably 
limited to a consideration of whether or not it was 
because of a denial of some constitutional right— 
that is, whether she was dismissed because of her race.

Be that as it may, I find first that she has not 
been re-employed by the County Board of Education 
to this date, hut that the fact that she had not been 
re-employed is not due to the fact that she is a mem­
ber of the Negro race.

I think it would probably be better if I made no 
finding as to the preponderance of the proof on the 
matter of incompetence because it is entirely possible 
that this matter may be further litigated under the 
provisions of the Tennessee statutes pertaining to dis­
missal in the event the Board elects to proceed in any 
such manner. (63a-64a).

(349a-351a), and further that 24 full-time and 6 part-time Title 
One teachers are employed for the 1968-69 school year (320a). Of 
the Title One teachers retained, 6 have less tenure than Miss Hatton 
had (348a).



10

The evidence concerning Miss Hatton’s competence is 
conflicting. A fellow teacher of Miss Hatton’s at Mace­
donia School with 32 years of teaching experience af­
firmed Miss Hatton’s teaching competence (144a-145a). Mr. 
Hughes, her principal at Macedonia School, testified that 
Miss Hatton was the least competent teacher in his school 
(172a-173a), but added that as fas as he is concerned, 
she would in all probability be teaching in his school to­
day but for the decline in pupil enrollment and loss of 
Title One funds (198a).

The Elementary Supervisor for 1967-68 testified that, in 
her opinion, Miss Hatton is not a competent teacher (219a). 
However, this Supervisor never communicated her evalua­
tion of Miss Hatton to Superintendent Cox and was not 
consulted by him when the decision to discharge Miss 
Hatton was made (215a, 374a). There was testimony that 
Miss Hatton was incompetent to maintain her attendance 
register (230a). Superintendent Cox admitted that he had 
never observed Miss Hatton’s teaching personally (315a), 
and that his opinion of her competence was based on com­
munications from other staff members, primarily Mr. 
Hughes (331a, 372a, 374a-375a).

But whatever the defendants’ reason or reasons for fail­
ing to place Miss Hatton elsewhere in the school system, 
the controlling fact is that Miss Hatton was assigned to 
the all-Negro Macedonia School as part of a Negro faculty, 
was re-elected to teach in that school for the school year 
1968-69, and is not teaching' in  that school today only be­
cause of the enrollment loss and consequent decrease in 
Title One funds resulting from the transfer of its Negro 
students to formerly all-white schools under the defen­
dants’ freedom-of-choice plan. The District Court erred 
in finding that Miss Hatton was not dismissed because of 
her race, and thus erred in failing to consider whether the 
Maury County Board of Education complied with the Rolfe 
rule in its dismissal of Miss Hatton.



11

Under the Rolfe rule, the Maury County Board of Edu­
cation was constitutionally required to compare Miss Ha- 
ton—a Negro teacher assigned to an all-Negro school on 
the basis of race who was thereafter dismissed from that 
school in consequence of enrollment losses resulting from 
the implementation of the Board’s desegregation plan—to 
all other teachers in the system in light of definite objec­
tive standards applied to all teachers alike without distinc­
tion as to race. Rolfe v. County Board of Education of 
Lincoln County, Tenn., swpra; Hill v. Franklin County 
Board of Education, 390 F.2d 583 (6th Cir. 1968). The 
failure of the Maury County Board of Education to evalu­
ate teachers on the basis of objective standards when there 
is to be a reduction of its total professional staff is also 
violative of Subpart B, paragraph 10, of the Policies on 
Elementary and Secondary School Compliance with Title 
V I of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 published by the Office 
for Civil Rights of the U.S. Department of Health, Edu­
cation, and Welfare, March, 1968, which provides in perti­
nent part:

If, as a result of a program for complying with 
Title VI, there is to be a reduction in the total pro­
fessional staff of a school system, or professional staff 
members are to receive assignments of lower status 
or pay, the staff members to be released or demoted 
must be selected from all the school system’s profes­
sional staff members without regard to race, color, 
or national origin and on the basis of objective and 
reasonable standards. In addition, in such a situation, 
no staff vacancy may he filled through recruitment 
from outside the system unless school officials first 
determine that none of the displaced staff members 
is qualified to fill the vacancy.



12

See also, North Carolina Teachers Ass’n v. Asheboro City 
Bd. of Ed., 393 F.2d 736 (4th Cir. 1968); Wall v. Stanley 
County Board of Education, 378 F.2d 275 (4th Cir. 1967); 
Kelly v. Altheimer, Arkansas Public School Dist. No. 22, 
378 F.2d 483 (8th Cir. 1967); Smith v. Board of Educa­
tion of Morrilton Sch. Dist. No. 32, 365 F.2d 770 (8th Cir. 
1966); Chambers v. Hendersonville City Board of Educa­
tion, 364 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1966).

During the hearing in the District Court, the defendants 
stipulated that the Maury County Board of Education has 
published no rules, regulations or standards concerning the 
discharge of teachers resulting from enrollment losses 
(269a). There is no evidence that Principal Hughes made 
any comparison of Miss Hatton’s qualifications with those 
of any other teacher in A ugust, 1.968. Principal Hughes 
simply testified that in comparison with the other teachers 
at Macedonia School, he is of the opinion that Miss Hat­
ton is the least qualified and the least competent (172a- 
173a). He admitted that he has no knowledge of the quali­
fications of other teachers in the school system (204a), 
and that he never had any opportunity to compare the 
qualifications of Miss Hatton with those of Miss Fannie 
Hogan, who is a Title One teacher presently teaching 2nd 
and 3rd grade classes at Macedonia School (380a).8 In the 
school year 1967-68, Miss Hatton was the only Title One 
teacher at Macedonia School (381a). In April, 1968, when 
Miss Hatton was re-elected, Miss Hogan, a white teacher 
with limited tenure and no college degree, who was near­
ing retirement, was also assigned to Macedonia School in 
accord with her specific request as a Title One teacher for 
the 1968-69 school year (368a-369a). Clearly Mr. Hughes 
could not have determined to retain Miss Hogan in prefer­

8 Superintendent Cox testified that although Miss Hogan is paid 
out of Title One funds, she is performing the duties which any 
regular teacher performs (381a).



13

ence to Miss Hatton on the basis of any comparison of 
their respective teaching abilities.

The defendants were instructed by the Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare to double the degree of 
faculty desegregation for the 1968-69 school year (410a- 
411a). Superintendent Cox testified that it is his practice 
to “spread” white teachers among all the formerly all- 
Negro schools (411a). Significantly, in the 1967-68 school 
year, Macedonia School had one white teacher ; as a re­
sult of the assignment of Miss Hogan, Macedonia has 
two white teachers on its staff for the 1968-69 school year 
(327a).

It is clear from Superintendent Cox’s testimony that he 
did not determine to dismiss Miss Hatton as the result 
of a comparison of her with every other teacher in the 
system in light of definitive objective standards applicable 
to all teachers alike. First, he is unaware of any com­
pletely valid objective standards.9 Second, he testified that

9 On cross examination, Mr. Cox testified as follows:
Q. Now, then, what rales or standards did you have for 

determining in ease of such loss of enrollment which teacher 
would be dismissed or let go? A. Bach teacher that was 
dismissed would have to be handled on the merits of the 
individual situation. (362a)

# * *
Q. And with regard to the HEW, I take it you are referring 

to the—what are you referring to? A. In essence it says 
that any teacher who is dismissed in the system must be the 
individual who is least prepared to teach. And, therefore, 
judgment decision would have to be made.

Q. Must be the individual least prepared? A. Least pre­
pared in my judgment.

Q. Well, now, wait a minute. Now, what—what objective 
criteria did you use in applying that rule? A. Question of 
objectives criteria, Mr. Williams, is a much debated one in 
education. I ’m not aware of any completely valid objective 
evaluation of teachers.

Q. Well, what do you mean by prepared? What is meant 
by least prepared? A. You asked me for document or rules



14

in August, 1968, when it became obvious that her teaching 
assignment would have to be changed, he mentally com­
pared her with the other 432 teachers in the school system 
(328a, 373a) and concluded that she was the least pre­
pared teacher (373a-374a). But he admitted that he did 
not review a list of teachers in the system (374a), or a 
list of their educational qualifications (374a).

Under these circumstances, it is not credible that Super­
intendent Cox made the decision to dismiss Miss Hatton 
on the basis of the comparison required by Rolfe and the 
guidelines of the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare. In view of the Fourteenth Amendment strictures 
on school board actions, a remand is unnecessary and this 
Court can and should reverse the district court outright, 
see Schneider man v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 129-131, 
165 (1943).

and standards. I ’m not aware of any absolute objective data.
Q. So that there actually—actually there were no objective 

standards established, were there? A. The only objective 
standard I’ve heard referred to is the National Teachers Ex­
amination and it’s discussed pro and eon as to whether or 
not it is a valid objective standard. (363a)

# * #
Q. Now, at the time that she was terminated, tell me what 

teachers she was compared against? A. All teachers in the 
system.

Q. How? A. Subjective data I am sure because I know of 
no objective view to use. (372a)



15

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, appellants submit that the 
judgment of the District Court should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

Avon N. Williams, J r.
Z. Alexander L ooby

327 Charlotte Avenue 
Nashville, Tennessee 37201

J ack Greenberg 
J ames M. Nabrit, I I I  
F ranklin E. W hite 
Conrad K. H arper 
W. H aywood B urns 

10 Columbus Circle 
Suite 2030
New York, New York 10019 

Attorneys for Appellant



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