Calhoun v. Latimer Memorandum of Facts Filed by Respondents Pursuant to Direction of the Court
Public Court Documents
April 8, 1964
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Calhoun v. Latimer Memorandum of Facts Filed by Respondents Pursuant to Direction of the Court, 1964. 85382288-ac9a-ee11-be37-00224827e97b. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/1c302e56-5715-41c8-8361-d3418114ff2e/calhoun-v-latimer-memorandum-of-facts-filed-by-respondents-pursuant-to-direction-of-the-court. Accessed November 23, 2025.
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Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1963
No. 623
In th e
Fred S. C alhoun , et ah,
Petitioners,
A. C. L atim er , et al.,
Respondents
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
MEMORANDUM OF FACTS
FILED BY RESPONDENTS
PURSUANT TO DIRECTION OF THE COURT
A. C. L atim er ,
Attorney for Atlanta
Board of Education
1205 Healey Building
Atlanta, Georgia
N ew ell Edenfield
Of Counsel
310 Fulton Federal Building
Atlanta, Georgia
Attorneys for Respondents
INDEX
Page
IN TRO DU CTION ______________________________ 1
QUESTIONS ANSWERED_______________ 3
Formal action of School Board on freedom of
choice and proximity as assignment and
transfer criteria. ......... 3
Notice to Negro community as to mechanics of
assignment and transfer.______________________ 4
A solution to overcrowding. ____________________ 5
Present administrative problems. _______________ 5
Start toward desegregation in 1961 rather than
in 1954______________ 6
Zone lines vel non. ________ 7
RESOLUTION OF TH E A T LA N TA BOARD
OF EDUCATION______________________________ 8
AFFIDAVIT OF THE ATLA N TA
SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS. _________ 12
I n the
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1963
No. 623
Fred S. C alhoun , et al.,
Petitioners,
A. C. L atim er , et al.,
Respondents.
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
MEMORANDUM OF FACTS
FILED BY RESPONDENTS
PURSUANT TO DIRECTION OF THE COURT
INTRODUCTION.
The confusion and apparent conflict between the
record and the oral argument in this case came about by
reason of the fact that the case was argued on a record
which was then two years old. In the intervening period
the actual situation in Atlanta, as respects both policies
and practices, had drastically changed, particularly as a
result of the decision of the Circuit Court and its im
plementation by the Atlanta School Board. These changes
which did not appear in the record then came out in
1
2
argument and in response to questions from the Court.
Hence the confusion. If this circumstance has incon
venienced the Court or embarrassed opposing counsel,
we respectfully ask the forgiveness of both. If we have
departed from the record, it was unavoidable. The rea
sons for this were pointed out in our brief in opposition.
There we said (p. 9) :
“ The most important changes in the plan, how
ever, are those that have taken place as a result of
the opinion of Judge Bell, or are planned for
September, 1964. These are not in the record, of
course. We are dealing with a record made in the
first days of desegregation, yet the Court is asked to
assess the degree of progress toward a goal made
over a period of time. We do not see how that can
fairly be done unless we, as attorneys and spokes
men for the school board, may make reference to
things that have occurred after the making of the
formal record.”
In short, what we were attempting to do was to argue
the case not on the basis of what the Atlanta situation
was but what it is, based on changes which we conceived
to be implicit in the lower court’s opinion.
For the convenience of the Court we have arranged
the material in this response in question and answer
form, the questions being intended in each case to sum
marize those asked by the Court. The answers in each
case show the record reference or the authority on which
they are based. In order that there be no question as to
the present policies of the Atlanta school authorities, we
also include a confirming resolution of the Atlanta Board
3
of Education and an affidavit from the Superintendent
of Schools.
QUESTIONS ANSWERED.
QUESTION (by Chief Justice Warren)
Where in the record or in the briefs does it appear
that the Atlanta Board of Education has by formal action
adopted a present policy of making initial assignments
or granting transfers on the basis of freedom of choice
or proximity?
ANSWER:
At the time of oral argument there had been no such
formal resolution. This was admitted in response to a
direct question by the Chief Justice. It had been publicly
stated, however, that under the decision of the Circuit
Court the only criteria left in the Atlanta plan were free
dom of choice, availability of facilities, proximity to
schools, and grade-a-year. (See Affidavit of Superin
tendent Letson, infra, p. I ! ) That such was the situa
tion was also indicated in the briefs. (See Brief for
Respondents, pp. 14-15; see Brief for State of Georgia
as Amicus Curiae, p. 9.) Availability of facilities as a
criterion was recited in the preamble to the original
Atlanta plan (R. 11). Availability of facilities is one of
the “other relevant matters” (R. 12) which per force
are a part of any school assignment and transfer plan.
Choice was one of the criteria contained in the original
plan (R. 13). All transfers heretofore granted under the
Atlanta plan were based upon choice. (Affidavit of Su
perintendent Letson, infra, p. If-.) Choice was not one
of the criteria which were abandoned. (Brief in Opposi
tion, pp. 8-9.) Proximity was not one of the criteria ex
pressly mentioned in the original plan but was recognized
4
by the District Court, by the respondents, and by peti
tioners to be a relevant consideration in the assignment
and transfer of pupils (R. 212). Atlanta has now adopted
a formal policy of applying these criteria in connection
with assignments and transfers. (See Resolution of the
Atlanta Board of Education, infra, pp. §-J|.)
QUESTION (by Chief Justice Warren) :
Has the Negro community been apprised of the me
chanics to be followed in applying for initial assignments
to the eighth grade and for transfers in the higher grades?
ANSWER:
This question was asked in a context which leads us
to believe that what the Chief Justice wanted to know
was whether or not the Negro community had been ad
vised as to the plans of the school board relating to as
signments and transfers in September, 1964. In response
we can only say that there had been a public announce
ment following the decision of the Circuit Court as to
what was left of the Atlanta plan. (See affidavit of Su
perintendent Letson, infra, p. IS.) The decision of the
Circuit Court was widely publicized and was construed
by the school board as eliminating all criteria except
freedom of choice, availability of facilities, and proximity
of schools. (See Affidavit of Superintendent Letson, infra,
p. 13.) These were the same criteria urged before the
Court on oral argument. For each of the previous years
the Negro community had been apprised of how to take
advantage of the transfer privilege (R. 63-65, 71) . The
procedure was printed and made available to the public.
(R. 64) . In previous years the official action of the Board
of Education was made public (R. 64), it was discussed
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between the Superintendent and school principals (R.
64-65, 71), and teachers (R. 65), and was discussed over
the educational television system (R. 65). It was given
wide publicity by newspapers, radio and television (R.
64). It was discussed at Parent-Teacher Association
meetings (R. 71). The Superintendent was of the opinion
that there was no lack of understanding as to how to
apply for transfers (R. 63-64, 71).
QUESTION (by Chief Justice Warren) :
When and how will Atlanta solve the present situation
with respect to overcrowding whereby some schools are
crowded to several times their capacity while others are
only half full?
ANSWER:
The respondents freely admit the existence of this
situation and concede that the Negro school population
suffers more as a result than do the whites, although there
is overcrowding with respect to both (R. 105). Over
crowding, however, is not so much a racial problem as
a population problem. The enrollment in Atlanta
schools has been constantly increasing (R. 101) . This
increase has consisted almost entirely of Negro children
(R. 101, 105) . No plan of desegregation, however com
prehensive or however fairly administered, can com
pletely solve the problem of overcrowding. Admittedly,
desegregation will help and is helping this situation, but
the ultimate solution can lie only in additional con
struction. JJ-
QUESTION (by Mr. Justice Stewart) :
Does Atlanta presently have any administrative prob
6
lems which would militate against a more speedy transi
tion toward complete desegregation?
ANSWER.
Since this question is addressed to the situation pres
ently existing, it of course can only be answered by going
outside the record. The administrative problems which
lead to a staggered plan of desegregation were recited in
the preamble to the original plan (R. 10-12) . Since the
existence of these problems was not controverted, the
District Court took them as true (R. 19). With respect
to the present situation, we can only say that the same
problems, including the size of the school system, rapid
growth of the community, and shifting populations, con
tinue to exist.
QUESTION (by Mr. Justice Goldberg) :
Why did Atlanta not voluntarily start toward desegre
gation in 1954, and should it be rewarded because it
waited to make a start until after a court order which be
came effective in 1961?
ANSWER:
The answer to these questions must necessarily be
more practical than legal. The resistance of the Georgia
Legislature, which threatened to cut off funds, the danger
of schools being closed, and the successful efforts of the
Atlanta community to overcome these obstacles have
been stated and reiterated both in the record and in the
briefs. (See: Order of District Court of December 30,
1959, R. 29; Order of the District Court of March 9,
1960, R. 43-46; Order of the District Court of September
8, 1960, R. 48-53; Order of the District Court of June
7
16, 1959, R: 165; Brief in Opposition to Petition for
Certiorari, pp. 4, 6; Brief for Respondents, pp. 2, 3;
Brief for the State of Georgia as Amicus Curiae, pp. 2,
3.)
QUESTION:
Does Atlanta now have or has it ever had inflexible
attendance zones for each school? (This question was
raised by several Justices but was perhaps put in best
perspective by Mr. Justice White, who asked the precise
question whether the District Court made any finding
as to the use of attendance lines.)
ANSWER:
The District Court found as follows (R. 158) :
“ Neither does the evidence show that defendants
are maintaining a ‘dual system of school attendance
area lines.’ Proximity to the schools in question is
a factor considered by the defendant Board. It is
not shown that defendants are acting arbitrarily in
connection with the assignment of pupils in rela
tion to their distance from the school. It does ap
pear that area lines (where such exist) are some
times changed for the sole purpose of relieving
overcrowded conditions in the schools.”
On the question of lines the Court of Appeals also
found (R. 234) that:
“ He [the School Superintendent] testified that
there were no attendance areas or zone lines es
tablished by the board, but that lines are sometimes
drawn administratively between schools in an at
tempt to equalize class loads. There was no evidence
8
before the court that they were based on race. The
Atlanta system is divided into five sub-areas with an
assistant superintendent in charge of each area. One
sub-area has only Negro schools in it, but there is
no evidence of white children living in it, or that
it resulted from gerrymandering.”
In his dissenting opinion Judge Rives challenges these
statements (R. 250, Footnote 4) . With all deference to
Judge Rives and to the District Court, the statement
made in the majority opinion in the Circuit Court more
correctly states the facts.1 For administrative purposes,
as distinguished from attendance, the school board has
divided the City of Atlanta into five administrative areas,
each under an area superintendent (R. 234) . Atlanta
has no “ official attendance lines. There are administra
tive lines drawn by individual schools on occasion to
equalize the load in various schools.” (R. 61.) “ There
are no official lines in this city.” (R. 98, 99.) (See also
R. 104-105.)
RESOLUTION OF THE ATLANTA BOARD OF
EDUCATION.
A regularly called meeting of the Atlanta Board of
Education was held at the administrative offices of the
Board on April 8, 1964. All members of the Board were
present.
A report was received from Mr. A. C. Latimer, Mr.
Newell Edenfield, and Mr. J. Lee Perry, the attorneys
1 A reading of the testimony quoted in footnote 4 of Judge Rives’
dissent (R. 250) will reveal that the line of inquiry was with
respect to elementary schools which, of course, have not been
reached by the plan at this date. (R. 61-62).
who appeared for the Board in the case of Calhoun v.
Latimer before the Supreme Court of the United States.
It was reported by the attorneys that at the time of
argument the Court was somewhat confused as to exactly
what issues were presented for decision, inasmuch as
the record in the case was originally made during the
1961-62 school year, and particularly because neither in
the record nor elsewhere did it appear what, policy was
to be followed by the Board in making assignments and
granting transfers under the plan of desegregation for
the school year 1964-65.
By reason of the foregoing and in the light of certain
questions asked by the Justices during argument, the at
torneys were requested by the Court to furnish to the
Court such documents, minutes or resolutions, or other
actions of the Board as would indicate the exact position
of the Board on these questions. The attorneys there
upon requested the Board to adopt such a resolution
for the benefit of the Court stating unequivocally the
present policy of the Board and the factors to be con
sidered by it in making initial assignment of pupils and
in permitting transfers for the school year 1964-65.
U pon motion made and seconded, the following resolu
tion was adopted by a unanimous vote:
“ BE IT RESOLVED: That for the school year
beginning August 24, 1964, all pupils entering the
eighth grade from elementary schools be assigned
among the various high schools without regard to
race, after consideration of the following factors:
1. Choice of the pupil or his parents;
2. Availability of facilities; and
10
3. Proximity of the school to place of residence.
“ BE IT FURTH ER RESOLVED: That among
those seeking to attend a particular school, where
facilities are not available for all, priority shall be
based on proximity, except that for justifiable edu
cational reasons and in hardship cases other factors
not related to race may be applied. Administrative
assignments or reassignments may be made in cases
of overcrowding, in hardship cases, and for disci
plinary reasons. When such administrative assign
ments are made they shall be based on relative
proximity and available facilities, giving considera
tion to pupil choice where possible.
“ BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED: That in
those grades already reached by the Atlanta plan of
desegregation (ninth, tenth, eleventh and twelfth
grades) , transfers be freely granted according to the
criteria hereinbefore provided, without formal ap
plication, other than the usual pre-registration re
quired of all students.
“ BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED: That where
a student has exercised his choice of schools, either
by initial assignment to the eighth grade or by
transfer, as herein provided, further and additional
transfers will be permitted only in hardship cases
or for valid educational reasons unrelated to race.
“ BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED: That a
certified copy of this resolution be furnished to the
attorneys for transmission to the Supreme Court of
the United States in accordance with its direction.”
11
CERTIFICATE
I, Louise Simpson, Secretary of the Atlanta Board of
Education, do certify that the within and foregoing con
stitutes a true and correct transcript of a resolution
adopted by the Atlanta Board of Education in regular
called session held on the 8th day of April, 1964.
L ouise Simpson ,
Secretary.
(SEAL)
12
AFFIDAVIT OF THE ATLANTA
SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS,
GEORGIA,
FULTON COUNTY
Personally before the undersigned officer authorized
to administer oaths appeared JOHN W. LETSON, who,
being duly sworn, deposes and says that he is Superin
tendent of Schools in the City of Atlanta, Georgia, and
that he makes this affidavit to be furnished to the Su
preme Court of the United States for the purpose of
clarifying and eliminating any uncertainty as to what are
the present policies of the Atlanta School Board with
respect to the assignment and transfer of pupils pursuant
to the plan of desegregation originally adopted pursuant
to court order in 1959.
Affiant deposes and says that in the opinion of the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (on petition for
rehearing), the Court held:
“ The corrective action necessary in light of the
deficiencies will entail the application of the plan
in an even handed manner without regard to race
to all assignments of pupils new to a school for ad
mission in a desegregated grade in that school; and
to all transfers whether formal, informal or other
wise. Personality interviews to determine probable
success or failure in the schools to which transfer
and assignment is sought may not be utilized where
such a practice relates only to Negro pupils as was
the case. No standard requiring that a transferee
score a grade on scholastic ability and achievement
tests equal to the average of the class in the school
to which transfer is sought may be utilized, nor may
13
any scholastic requirement whatever be used where
applied only to Negro students seeking transfer and
assignment as was the case in Atlanta in the ad
ministration of the plan approved by the District
Court. The opinion is modified to make it clear
that this corrective action must apply to transfers
and assignments for the 1963-64 school term to the
extent, if any, that the practices giving rise to the
deficiencies may have been continued in use.”
Affiant further says that upon the rendition of the
judgment quoted, it was publicly stated by him, on be
half of the Atlanta Board of Education, that under the
decision initial assignments could be made and transfers
determined only on the basis of freedom of choice,
available facilities, proximity, or other valid educational
reasons, not related to race.
Affiant shows that pursuant to the conclusions stated,
and in what they conceived to be compliance therewith,
the Board caused all previous applications for transfer
to be reconsidered and further caused each of said trans
fers which had been denied to be granted, provided only
that the school to which transfer was sought was nearer
to the place of residence of the student than the school
then attended.
Affiant shows that the foregoing conclusions of neces
sity would not appear on the record in the Supreme
Court of the United States because they represented
policies which were and could only have been adopted
subsequent to the decision of the Circuit Court on
August 16, 1963.
Affiant says further that said policies were publicly re
ported at the time of the reconsideration of transfer ap
14
plications following receipt of the Circuit Court opinion.
Administrative regulations were not formulated and
distributed because it has always been the policy of the
Board since the adoption of the original plan to announce
administrative regulations for the assignment and trans
fer of pupils by a regulation promulgated in the spring
of each school year to be effective during the following
school year.
With respect to “ freedom of choice” as distinguished
from “ proximity” in making assignments and transfers,
affiant shows that such a factor was among those con
tained in the original plan, that all transfers heretofore
granted pursuant to the plan were initiated pursuant to
choice, and that for administrative reasons wholly un
related to race, Atlanta prefers to continue to give rec
ognition to choice, as well as proximity, in making as
signments and transfers in the future.
John W. L etson
Sworn to and subscribed before me this 10th day of
April, 1964.
Fannie R. K night
Notary Public
Notary Public, Georgia, State at Large.
(SEAL). My Commission Expires Jan. 26, 1966.
Respectfully submitted,
A. C. L atim er , Attorney for
Atlanta Board of Education
N ew ell Edenfield,
Of Counsel
V':/