Bakke v. Regents Brief Amicus Curiae for the Association of American Law Schools in Support of Petitioner
Public Court Documents
June 7, 1977
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Bakke v. Regents Brief Amicus Curiae for the Association of American Law Schools in Support of Petitioner, 1977. 4006c147-be9a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/1c386059-d92c-4fe3-9c98-e65188a54360/bakke-v-regents-brief-amicus-curiae-for-the-association-of-american-law-schools-in-support-of-petitioner. Accessed December 04, 2025.
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JAMES M. NA8R!T, III
ASSOCIATE-COU N S El
I n th e
Supreme Court of tfje Untteb States
October T er m , 1976
N o . 7 6 -8 1 1
T he Regents of the U niversity of Ca lifornia ,
Petitioner,
vs.
A llan Rakke ,
Respondent.
BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE
FOR THE ASSOCIATION OF
AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER
D avid E. F eller
Law Building
University of California
Berkeley, California 94720
E rnest Gellhorn
College of Law
Arizona State University
Tempe, Arizona 85281
T errance Sandalow
Legal Research Building
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48104
Of Counsel
A. K e n n e th P ye
Allen Building
Duke University
Durham, North Carolina 27707
F rancis A. A llen
Legal Research Building
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48104
Robert B. M cK ay
36 West 44th Street
New York, New York 10036
Attorneys for the Association
of American Law Schools
INDEX
Page
In terest of the Amicus ....................................................... 1
Sum m ary of A rgum ent ...................... .............................. 3
Introduction ......................................................................... 5
I. Without Minority Admission Programs Minority Stu
dents Would Be Excluded From American Law
Schools ............................................................................ 8
A. The Number of Qualified Applicants Exceeds The
Number of Openings in Law School ...................... 9
B. Numerical Predictors Indicate Which Applicants
Are Most Likely To Succeed In Law School ......... 12
C. The Admissions Process Is Designed To Identify
Which Of The Qualified Applicants Should Be Ad
mitted ..................................................................... 17
D. The Use of Race as a Factor In The Admissions Pro
cess Is Necessary If There Are To Be A Substantial
Number of Minority Students In Law School . . . . 21
1. The Special Admissions Programs ..................... 22
2. Minority Students Would Be Almost Eliminated
From Law School Without Special Admissions
Programs ............................................................. 27
3. No Reasonable Alternatives To Special Admis
sions Programs Have Been Proposed ............... 32
II. Special Minority Admissions Programs Serve Compel
ling Social Interests ...................................................... 39
A. The Need For More Minority Lawyers is Critical 42
1. The Public Role of the Legal Profession ............ 43
2. Serving the Legal Needs of Minority Com
munities ............................................................. 47
B. A Racially Diverse Student Body Is Important For A
Sound Legal Education ............................................. 49
C. Minority Group Lawyers Will Contribute To The
Social Mobility of Racial Minorities ......................... 53
11
D. Special Admissions Effectively Respond To The
Need For More Minority Lawyers .......................... 54
1. Success at School ................................................. 56
2. Success in Passing the Bar ................................ 59
3. The Argument on Stigmatization .................... 61
III. Special Admissions Programs Are Fully Consistent
With The Constitution .................................................... 63
Conclusion .............................................................................. 66
Ill
TABLES OF AUTHORITY
Table of Cases: Pages
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ....... 4, 39, 54
Califano v. Webster, 97 S.Ct. 1192 (1977) ............................ 65
Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 704 (1969) ......... 63
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 320 (1974) . . . .8, 10, 32, 47
Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 393 (1857) .......................... 39
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) .............................. 63
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) ................... 39
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402
U.S. 1, 16(1971) 52,64
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950) ........................ 50
United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh v. Carey, 97
S. Ct. 996 (1977) 64,65
Other Authority:
ABA, Law Schools and Bar Admission Requirements (1950)-
(1976) ................................................................................ 58
ABA, Law Schools and Bar Admission Requirements: A Re
view of Legal Education in the United States 42, 45
(1976) ................................................................................ 7
Altesek & Gomberg, Bachelor’s Degrees Awarded to Minority
Students 1973-1974, at 4 33
Angoff & Herring, Study of the Appropriateness of the Law
School Admission Test for Canadian and A merican Stu
dents, LSAC 71-1, in 2 Law School Admission Research
(1976) .......................................................................... . • • 13
Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series
P-60, No. 103. "Money Income and Poverty Status of
Families and Persons in the United States: 1975 and
1974 Revisions” (Advance Report 1976) ...................36, 37
Bureau of the Census, Detailed Characteristics of the Popula
tion, Table 223 (1970) ................................................ 40
Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United
States, Table 271, at 162 (1976) ............................... . 46
California Legislative Analysis of the 1976-77 Budget Bill,
Report of the Legislative Analyst to the Joint Legislative
Budget Committee 820 (1976) ......................................... 60
Carlson, Factor Analysis and Validity Study of the Law
School Admission Test Battery, LSAC 70-3, in 2 Law
School Admission Research 11 (1976) .......................... 14
IV
Carlson & Werts, Relationships Among Law School Pre
dictors, Law School Performance, and Bar Examination
Results, LSAC 76-1, at vii (1976) .................................. 60
CLEO, Annual Report of Executive Director (1976) 60
Columbia University Bulletin, School of Law, 96-97 (1976) . 18
A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 329-30 (Schocken
ed. 1961) 44
Employee Selection Guidelines. 41 Fed. Reg. 51733 (Nov. 23,
̂ 1976) .................................................................................. 34
EEOC Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29
C.F.R. 1607.1 (1976) ........................................................ 34
Evans, Applications and Admissions to ABA Accredited Law
Schools: An Analysis of National Data for the Class En
tering in the Fall 1976 (Law School Admission Council
1977) ................................................ 7, 28-34, 37, 38, 50, 55
Evans & Reilly, A Study of Speededness as a Source of Test
Bias, LSAC 71-2, in 2 Law School Admission Research
111 (1976) ........................................................................ 13
Evans & Reilly, The LSAT Speededness Study Revisited:
Final Report, LSAC 72-3, in 2 Law School Admission
Research 191 (1976) 13
Fleming & Poliak, The Black Quota at Yale Law School—An
Exchange of Letters, 19 The Public Interest 44, at 45
(Spring 1970) 55
Gellhorn, The Law Schools and the Negro, 1968 Duke L.J.
1069, 1073-74 ................................................................... 43
Hart & Evans, Major Research Efforts of the Law School A d
mission Council, in Law School Admission Research
(LSAC 1976) ..................................................................... 13
Hinds, Keynote Introduction: "The Minority Candidate and
the Bar Examination,” 5 Black L.J. 123, 124-36(1977) . 59
Hughes, McKay & Winograd, The Disadvantaged Student
and Preparation for Legal Education: The New York
University Experience, 1970 Tol. L. Rev. 701 ............... 56
In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) ....................................... 63
Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equality for the
Negro—The Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 361, 410 (1966) ........................................................ 38
Law School Admission Council, Reports of LSAC Sponsored
Research, vols. 1 & 2 (1976) 12
Linn & Winograd, New York University Admissions Inter
view Study, LSAC 69-2, in 1 Law School Admission 547
(1976) 16
LSAT Handbook 47 (1964) .................................................... 15
Nicholson, The Law Schools of the United States 26, 217
(1958) ............................................................................ 9, 10
V
1972-1973 Prelaw Handbook 153, 345 (1972) .................
1976-77Prelaw Handbook 153,375 (1976) ...................... 18,
Pitcher, Predicting Law School Grades for Female Law Stu
dents, LSAC 74-3, in 2 Law School Admission Research
555 (1976) ......................................................................
Rappaport, The Case for Law School Minority Programs, Los
Angeles Times, Opinions Section, p. 1 (Mar. 14, 1976)..
Redish, Preferential School Admissions and theEqualProtec-
tion Clause: An Analysis of the Competing Arguments, 22
UCLA L. Rev. 343 (1974) ..............................................
Reilly, Contributions of Selected Transcript Information to
Prediction of Law School Performance, LSAC 71-4 in 2
Law School Admission Research 133 (1976) .................
Reilly & Powers, Extended Study of the Relationship of
Selected Transcript Information to Law School Per
formance, LSAC 73-4, in 2 Law School Admission Re
search 405 (1976) ...........................................................
Report of Minority Groups Project in AALS Proceedings 172
(1965) .............................................................................. 7,
Report on Special Admissions at Boalt Hall After Bakke, 28 J.
Legal Ed. 363 (1977) ..............................................; • • 19,
Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education: Political
Responsibility and the Judicial Role, 42 U. Chi. L. Rev.
653,684(1975) .............................................. .................
Schrader & Pitcher, Adjusted Undergraduate Average.
Grades as Predictors of Law School Performance, LSAC
64-2, in 1 Law School Admission Research 291 (1976) . .
Schrader & Pitcher, Effect of Differences in College Grading
Standards on the Prediction of Law School Grades, LSAC
73-5, in 2 Law School Admission Research 451 (1976)..
Schrader, Pitcher & Winterbottom, The Interpretation of Law
School Admission Test Scores for Culturally Deprived
and Non-white Candidates, LSAC 66-3, in 1 Law School
Admission Research 375 (1976) .....................................
Schrader & Pitcher, The Interpretation of Law School Admis
sion Test Scores for Culturally Deprived Candidates: An
Extension of the 1966 Study Rased on Five Additional
Law Schools, LSAC 72-5, in 2 Law School Admission Re
search 227 (1976) ...........................................................
Schrader & Pitcher, Predicting Law School Grades for Black
American Law Students, LSAC 73-6, in 2 Law School
Admission Research 451 (1976) .....................................
55
55
13
60
63
14
14
22
, 27
52
14
14
13
13
13
VI
Schrader & Pitcher prediction of Law School Grades for Mex
ican American and Black American Students, LSAC
74-8,in2LawSchoolAdmissionResearch715(1976). . . 13
State Bar of California, Report of Commission to Study the
Bar Examination Process (1973) 60
Symposium, Disadvantaged Students and Legal E du
cation—Programs for Affirmative Action, 1970 Tol. L.
Rev. 277 ............................................................................. 22
University of Virginia Record 1976-77, School of Law, 55
(1976) ................................................................................ 19
Warren, Panel on "Factors Contributing to Bar Examination
Failure,” 5 Black L.J. 149-52 (1977) .............................. 60
White, Legal Education: A Time of Change, 66 A.B.A.J. 355,
356 (1976) ......................................................................... 11
I n t h e
S u p r e m e C o u r t of tfje U n tte b S t a t e s
October T er m , 1976
N o. 76-811
T he R egents of the U niversity of California ,
Petitioner,
vs.
A llan Bakke ,
Respondent.
BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE
FOR THE ASSOCIATION OF
AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER
This brief amicus curiae is filed by the Association of
American Law Schools w ith the consent of the parties, as
provided for in Rule 42 of the Rules of th is Court.
IN T E R E ST OF TH E AM IC U S
The Association of American Law Schools (AALS) has a
membership of 132 law schools, all of which are approved by
the American Bar Association. The purpose of the AALS is
"improvement of the legal profession through legal educa
tion.” It participates in developments affecting legal educa
tion, serves as a repository of inform ation about legal educa-
2
tion and assists in developing policy on national issues of
legal education.
The Association’s in terest in th is case derives from the
im pact th a t th is Court’s decision will have on legal educa
tion and the legal profession. Although the decision of the
court below arises from adm issions to a medical school, the
admissions processes of law schools are sufficiently sim ilar
to those of medical schools to be affected directly by any deci
sion in this case. Almost all m em ber schools of the AALS
have some form of special adm issions program designed to
in c rease th e n u m b e r of q u a lif ied m em bers of ra c ia l
m inorities who will en ter law school and become members of
the bar. The decision of the court below im perils these pro
gram s and therefore the progress made in the la st ten years
to include racial and ethnic m inorities1 in the legal profes
sion. Specifically, if th is Court were to hold th a t professional
schools including law schools could no longer take race into
account in the admissions process, the resu lt would be to ex
clude v irtually all m inorities from the legal profession. Be
cause of the ir im portance to the objective of achieving a m ul
tiracial bar, we are committed to these programs. We are
convinced th a t these carefully designed and thoughtfully
a d m in is te re d p ro g ram s re p re s e n t th e only re a lis t ic
possibility for increasing the very small num ber of m inority
group members in the legal profession and th a t they are
fully consistent w ith the Constitution.
1. Throughout this Brief, the terms "race,” "racial,” or "minorities,” are
based upon "standard race/ethnic categories” such as those defined by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for its various information
reports. See 41 Fed. Reg. 17601-02 (April 27, 1976). They are generally
limited to four groups: black, Hispanic (primarily Chicano and Puerto Ri
can), Asian (including Pacific Islanders) and American Indian (including
Alaskan Native). There is some variance among schools about which
groups are eligible for inclusion in their special admissions programs be
cause of differing emphasis reflecting the concerns of their geographical
service areas. It appears that all include blacks, either Chicanos or Puerto
Ricans or both, and American Indians.
3
SUM M ARY OF A R G U M EN T
The imposition of a requirem ent th a t professional schools
forego any consideration of race in m aking admissions deci
sions would resu lt in substantially all-white law schools. It
is for th is reason th a t almost all accredited American law
schools have adopted "special admissions program s” which
give preference in admissions to blacks and members of
other "discrete and in su la r” minorities. As a consequence, in
a little over a decade the law schools have increased the ir
enrollm ent of m inority students from 700 or 1.3% (in 1964)
to over 9,500 or 8.1% (in 1976). These special admissions
program s have thereby sought to increase the num ber of
lawyers from m inority groups, a num ber which is still inor
dinately sm all a t under 2% of the entire bar.
A fter over a decade of searching, it is clear to the law
schools th a t there is no alternative available to them , other
than the use of race as a factor in admissions, if m inority
student representation among American law students is to
rise above a negligible level. For the s ta rk and unalterable
fact is th a t under today’s conditions, if indicators of academic
potential were used by law schools as the sole basis for de
term ining admission, "few m inority students would be ad
m itted to law school.” Despite wishful th inking and facile
generalizations to the contrary concerning the means avail
able to professional schools to increase m inority enrollm ent
w ithout special admissions, no alternative with any prospect
of success has been proposed. Those alternatives which have
been suggested would be ineffective and undesirable: they
would not resu lt in a substantial enrollm ent of m inority s tu
dents in the nation’s law schools, but they would lead to an
abandonm ent of intellectual promise and academic qualifi
cation as the standard by which schools determ ine w hether
an applicant shall be adm itted.
Special admissions program s are an in tegral p a rt of the
4
law school admissions process which is designed to provide
the community w ith the lawyers i t needs. Admission to law
school is not a prize granted as a rew ard for the most deserv
ing. Law schools are created and supported by the sta te to
m eet its needs for lawyers and legal services. Thus the ques
tion which the law schools address in the ir admissions pro
cesses, in the best way they can, is which among the m any
applicants will best serve those needs of society. In th is con
text, where m any more qualified candidates apply than
there are places in the schools, th a t decision has generally
been to select those students who show the most potential to
succeed in law school subject to other lim itations which also
serve the community. Thus, in addition to past (under
graduate) grades and test scores, law schools consider an ap
plicant’s background as well as his residence in deciding
w hether to adm it him. Background is a factor in obtaining a
diverse student body so im portant to comprehensive educa
tion; residence is im portant to governing boards who seek
lawyers to m eet local needs.
Reliance on race is a sim ilar lim itation used as a factor in
the admissions process to serve the com m unity’s interests. It
is p a rt of the com mitment, made clear by this Court in 1954
in Brown v. Board of Education and by Congress a decade
la te r in the Civil R ights Act of 1964, tow ard racial equality
and the full participation of racial m inorities in American
life. T hat need is as pressing and pervasive today as i t has
ever been: (1) lawyers play a critical, indeed a crucial role in
our society and the inclusion of m inorities in the bar is re
quired to achieve the ir participation in the governance of our
society, public as well as private; (2) the existence of race as
an im portant social elem ent m eans th a t m inority lawyers
are needed to serve the legal needs of m inority communities
who will not otherwise be served as they prefer; (3) racial
diversity is v ita l in the classroom if legal education is to be
5
effective and not isolated from the individuals and in s titu
tions w ith which law interacts; and (4) the opportunity to be
a lawyer is part of a larger effort by the nation to improve
the conditions of life of its least advantaged citizens. The
special adm issions program s in the overwhelming m ajority
of A m erican law schools are a direct response to these and
sim ilar needs. Unless allowed to continue, these needs and
the nation’s need for m inority lawyers will go unm et.
The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend
m ent should not be construed to require th a t the law schools
of the country abandon special admissions program s so es
sential to achieving these compelling objectives. These pro
gram s are aimed w ith precision a t the ir objectives of racially
in teg rating law schools and substantially increasing the
num ber of m inority lawyers. They m eet the most exacting
constitutional standard and are necessary if law schools are
to serve these compelling sta te in terests. These programs
also support the concept of equality and give m eaning to the
opportunity which equal protection is designed to serve.
IN T R O D U C TIO N
The purpose of this B rief is to dem onstrate a single propo
sition: the practice of providing a degree of preference for
blacks and other m inorities in law school admissions is a
necessary, and indeed the only honest method, to achieve
ce rta in very im p o rtan t social objectives. S ta ted more
bluntly, a holding th a t the Constitution requires th a t the
schools abjure any consideration of race as a factor in m ak
ing adm issions decisions m ust, unless covertly circum
vented, resu lt in substantially all-white schools.
The case before the Court is a medical school case. We ven
tu re no conclusion as to w hether the m atters which we here
present are applicable to the same degree to medical schools.
6
But the holding of the court below, th a t none of the criteria
used in selecting among applicants for adm ission to medical
school "can be related to race,” may also be equally applica
ble to schools of law. Our assum ption, therefore, is th a t if the
judgm ent of the court below in th is case is affirmed, the pub
licly-supported law schools of this country will be obliged to
conform the ir admissions practices to the principle tha t, in
selecting among applicants, no consideration may be given
to race, either explicitly or by indirection.
The im position of such a requ irem en t would require
changes in the admissions practices used by the vast major
ity of the accredited A m erican law schools. Most of them
have, in one way or another, and under various nam es and
guises, adopted "special adm issions” programs: practices
which give preference in admissions to blacks and members
of other "discrete and in su la r” minorities. The resu lt is th a t
for each of those schools there can be found unsuccessful ap
plicants, such as the p la in tiff in th is case, who rank higher
on the num erical adm issions criteria used by th a t school
than other applicants who have been adm itted because they
are members of a racial m inority. The object ofth is Brief is to
dem onstrate th a t such a resu lt is the necessary consequence
of a program designed to m eet certain im perative social
needs directly related to the purposes for which the schools
exist and th a t there is no other reasonable method by which
those needs can be met.
The imposition of a requirem ent th a t the admission of law
school applicants be made w ithout consideration of race
would v irtually wipe out the progress th a t has been made
toward the goals of an in tegrated bar and society. In little
over a decade the law schools have increased the ir enroll
m ent of m inority students from 700 or 1.3% to over 9,500 or
8.1%.2 The regrettable but unalterable fact is th a t under to
day’s conditions, if indicators of academic potential w ithout
7
regard to race were used by law schools as the sole basis for
determ ining admission, "few m inority students would be
adm itted to law school.” T hat is the stark conclusion of an
exhaustive study of more than 76,000 applications to law
school for the 1975-76 admission year th a t was confirmed by
a separate survey of 80% of all accredited law schools. See F.
Ev ans, Applications and Adm issions to A B A Accredited Law
Schools: A n Analysis o f National Data for the Class Entering
in the Fall 1976 (Law School Admission Council 1977) (here
inafter Evans Report). The findings of the Evans Report are
crucial to an understanding of w hat is a t stake in th is case. A
detailed discussion of its findings appear a t pages 27-32, in
fra, following a description of the admissions process, which
also m ust be carefully considered if these findings are to be
fully understood. For now, we urge only a full awareness of
the major conclusions to emerge from the Evans Report, th a t
affirmance of the decision below would, under either exist
ing admissions standards or any realistic alternative, ex
clude all but a m inuscule num ber of m inority students from
the nation’s law schools.
The dem onstration of these conclusions comprises the fol
lowing parts. F irst, we exam ine the admissions systems used
by American law schools today, w ithout regard to the racial
question. This is im portant because those practices, and the
conditions which give rise to them , are quite different from
2. The specific figures for ABA-approved law schools are:
Total
Minority
Enrollment
Total
Enrollment
1964
1976
700 (approx.)
9,524
54,265
117,451
Source: Report of Minority Groups Project in AALS Proceedings 172
(1965); ABA Law Schools and Bar Admission Requirements: A Review of
Legal Education in the United States 42, 45 (1976).
8
those, fam iliar to most members of the bar, th a t existed only
a few years ago. Second, we describe the process by which the
practice of providing some preference to applicants of certain
m inority groups has developed in the context of these new
and different admissions standards. An understanding of
th is process dem onstrates th a t under current societal condi
tions, conditions th a t we believe will in tim e disappear,
there is no feasible alternative to the use of some form of
racial preference if the presence of a significant num ber of
m inority students is to be achieved. Third, we show th a t the
presence of a significant num ber of law students from these
m inority groups serves im portant social and educational
purposes th a t cannot be m et under today’s conditions in any
other way. Finally, and in conclusion, we add a few words as
to why we believe the Constitution does not require th a t the
law schools of the country abandon program s so essential to
achieving these compelling objectives.
I. WITHOUT MINORITY ADMISSION PROGRAMS
MINORITY STUDENTS WOULD BE EXCLUDED
FROM AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS
An adequate appreciation of the devastating im pact th a t
affirm ance of the decision below would have upon m inority
enrollm ent in law schools depends, initially , upon an under
standing of how admissions decisions are made, the facts
upon which they are based, and the purposes they serve. The
failure of such understanding can lead, as in the opinion
below and in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 320 (1974), to faulty
diagnoses of the problem th a t special admissions program s
address and to facile generalizations concerning the means
by which it can be solved. Both opinions assum e th a t means
exist by which law schools (or medical schools) can, by some
how altering the ir admissions criteria, m ain ta in substan tial
9
m inority enrollm ents w ithout consideration of race. An
understanding of the admissions process will dem onstrate
th a t this assum ption is based upon wishful th inking in ig
norance of the facts.
There is a second reason why it is im portant to understand
the selection process of law schools. A tendency exists to re
gard admission to law school as a prize to be awarded in ac
cordance w ith some principle of desert. But the goal th a t law
schools seek to serve in the admissions process is not th a t of
rew arding those applicants who are most deserving; adm is
sions are not simply handed out as aw ards for prior per
formance. R ather, law schools exist to provide the commu
nity w ith the lawyers it needs to serve its many purposes.
The question to which the schools therefore address them
selves, in the best way they can, is which of the m ultitude of
applicants to the school will best serve those needs.
A. The Number of Qualified Applicants Exceeds The
Number of Openings In Law School
The drastic change th a t has occurred in the admissions
processes of the law schools over the past few decades can
best be described by dividing its development into three
stages. The first stage was th a t era in which there was a
place in law school, v irtually any law school, for everyone
w ith m inim al credentials. Any applicant w ith a college de
gree from an accredited institu tion , and indeed many w ith
out, could find a place. Competence to perform as a law stu
dent was tested in the best possible way—by performance
itself. Those who dem onstrated the m inim um competence
required by the particu lar school were passed and those who
did not were washed out.3
3. The situation as it existed in 1948-49 is graphically described in L.
Nicholson, The Law Schools of the United States (1958), a report based on
136 questionnaires and inspections of 160 law schools prepared for the
10
Such a system is operable, however, only when there are
places available in law school sufficient to accommodate all
those possessing the m inim al educational qualifications.
When applications exceed the places available, some crite
rion of selection is required. The most n a tu ra l criterion, and
the one actually adopted by the law schools, was probable
success in completing the course of instruction. This is the
second stage in the development of the admissions process,
the stage a t which the Law School Admission Test (LSAT)
was developed as a tool for aiding predictions as to w hether
an applicant, if adm itted, would be able to m eet a school’s
m inim um level of performance. Since the dem and for adm is
sion as compared to the available places varies from school to
school, different schools reached th is stage and began using
the LSAT at different times.
W hen there are more com petent and qualified applicants
than there are available positions the question becomes
which applicants, of the m any who would be likely to suc
ceed, should be adm itted. At th is th ird stage, reached by dif
ferent schools a t different tim es, the demand by qualified
applicants for adm ission to law school far exceeds the
num ber of available positions. All or nearly all law schools
are now at this stage. Thus, in 1975, there were approxi-
ABA Survey of the Legal Profession. In 1948, 87% of the applicants to the
schools surveyed met the schools’ minimum requirements and 70% of the
applicants were accepted. Id. at 217. Descriptions taken from three inspec
tion reports typical of the "vast majority of schools,” were as follows:
"All qualified applicants have regularly been admitted to the law
school in recent years.”
"The school does not attempt to screen applicants over and above
the determination that they have complied with the minimum qual
itative and quantitative requirements.”
"In the year 1948-49,190 students entered upon the study of law in
this school; only 91 remained in school at the beginning of the follow
ing year. Forty of the 190 were flunked out, and 59 others quit volun
tarily, most of them persuaded so to do because of low grades.”
Id. at 26.
11
m ately 83,000 applicants for law school admission for the
39,038 first-year places opened for them in all ABA-approved
schools th a t year. There were, in short, a t least two appli
cants for each law school seat in the U nited S tates.4
Confronted w ith the necessity of choosing from among so
m any fully qualified applicants, alm ost all schools attem pt
to select, subject to the qualifications discussed below (pp.
18-20, infra), those applicants who are most likely to perform
best academically. The object, in other words, is no longer to
identify those students who can earn a C, but those who are
most likely to earn As and Bs.
In using th a t standard for admission, the schools are
guided by the assum ption th a t those who perform well in law
school are as a general rule likely to perform well in the pro
fession. We know, of course, th a t th is assumption is a t best
only a rough approxim ation. Law schools are concerned
prim arily w ith developing intellectual qualities-—analytic
skill, the m astery of legal concepts, and the ability to work
im aginatively w ith those concepts—th a t are im portant in
all the roles th a t lawyers may be called upon to perform. But
it is plain th a t there are additional qualities th a t are also
4. White, Legal Education: A Time of Change, 66 A.B.A.J. 355, 356
(1976) (based on LSD AS completions; the LSDAS column therein errone
ously reports for each year the following year’s data.)
Law School Data Assembly Service (LSDAS) completions understate
the number of college graduates applying to law school. In 1975, there
were 133,000 LSAT administrations, 50,000 more than the number of reg
istered applicants in LSDAS. Some of the difference is accounted for by
"repeaters,” students taking the test for the second time. Some of the dif
ference reflects potential applicants who were dissuaded from completing
the application process by low scores and some applicants were not re
quired by their law schools to register in LSDAS. This does not, however,
convey the full dimensions of the problem confronted by individual
schools, especially those perceived by applicants as most desirable. It is
not uncommon for law schools to receive as many as ten or fifteen applica
tions for each position in the first-year class, the largest number of which
are by applicants who would, it can be predicted with a high degree of
certainty, successfully complete the school’s academic program.
12
im portant, qualities th a t m ay well be different for the ju ry
lawyer, the appellate specialist, the counsellor and advisor,
the negotiator and the legislator.
In m aking adm issions decisions, however, law schools are
not able to address the full range of these qualities th a t go
into the m aking of a successful law yer because there are no
reliable guides, a t least yet,5 to the a ttribu tes of a "successful
lawyer.” Given the necessity of selection, a choice is the re
fore made in term s of a standard th a t the law schools can
m easure and apply, the expected performance of the appli
cant in school.
B. Numerical Predictors Indicate Which Applicants Are
Most Likely To Succeed In Law School
C entral to any understanding of the process by which law
schools ration the available spaces among qualified appli
cants is the role of the quan tita tive predictors.
We have already mentioned the LSAT. I t was first used in
1948. Since th a t tim e the test has been the subject of an
enormous volume of research under the sponsorship of the
Law School Admission Council (LSAC) which consists of a
representative from each school using the test (today identi
cal w ith the list of ABA-approved schools). This research,
now compiled in Law School Admission Council, Reports of
L SA C Sponsored Research , vols. 1 & 2 (1976), covering 72
separate research projects, has been dedicated not only to
scrutiny of the validity of the LSAT and its component parts
and to im provem ent in its content and structu re bu t also to
5. A major effort to study the relationships of predictors and success in
practice was begun in 1973 with the inauguration of the Competent
Lawyer Study, a joint project of the Association of American Law Schools,
Law School Admission Council, American Bar Foundation and National
Conference of Bar Examiners. The purpose of the study is to learn how to
identify, measure and predict the factors that go into performance as a
competent lawyer.
13
the search for other possible predictors of law school per
formance.6
Some of the resu lts of th a t research are worth noting. We
know, for example, th a t the test is not racially biased. Five
separate studies have indicated th a t the test does not under
predict the law school performance of blacks and Mexican-
A m ericans.7 We know th a t it is not sexually biased.8 We
know, even, th a t it predicts as well for Canadians as it does
for A m ericans.9 We know th a t questions designed to m ea
sure an applicant’s general background knowledge, which
6. For a summary of the result of this research, see Hart & Evans,
Major Research Efforts of the Law School Admission Council, in Law
School Admission Research (LSAC 1976).
7. Schrader, Pitcher & Winterbottom, The Interpretation of Law School
Admission T est Scores for Culturally Deprived and Non-white Candidates,
LSAC 66-3, in 1 Law School Admission Research 375 (1976); Flickinger,
Law School Admissions and the Culturally Deprived, printed with
Schrader & Pitcher, The Interpretation of Law School Admission Test
Scores for Culturally Deprived Candidates: An Extension of the 1966 Study
Based on Five Additional Law Schools, LSAC 72-5, in 2 Law School Ad
mission Research 227 (1976); Schrader & Pitcher, Predicting Law School
Grades for Black American Law Students, LSAC 73-6, in 2 Law School
Admission Research 451 (1976); Schrader & Pitcher, Prediction of Law
School Grades for Mexican American and Black American Students,
LSAC 74-8, in 2 Law School Admission Research 715 (1976).
Research has also been done as to whether there is any possible source of
bias in the "speededness” of the test, i.e., the question whether minority
candidates may not finish the test in as large a proportion as whites. The
first study indicated that, although speededness had a slight affect on
scores, there was no differential in that effect. Evans & Reilly, A Study of
Speededness as a Source of Test Bias, LSAC 71-2, in 2 Law School Admis
sion Research 111 (1976) and in 9 J. Educ. Measurement 123 (1972). A
second, extended study confirmed the absence of any differential effect.
Evans & Reilly, The LSA T Speededness Study Revisited: Final Report,
LSAC 72-3, in 2 Law School Admission Research 191 (1976).
8. Pitcher, Predicting Law School Grades for Female Law Students,
LSAC 74-3, in 2 Law School Admission Research 555 (1976).
9. Angoff & Herring, Study of the Appropriateness of the Law School
Admission Test for Canadian and American Students, LSAC 71-1, in 2
Law School Admission Research (1976).
14
were a t one tim e included in the test, bu t have since been
abandoned, add nothing to its predictive value.10 We know
th a t it is a useful and valid tool bu t th a t there is another
ind icato r of alm ost equal v a lid ity —the u n d erg rad u a te
grade-point average (GPA). And we know, finally, th a t these
two indicators combined constitute the best predictors of law
school performance th a t we have been able to devise.11
The validity of the LSAT, the GPA, and th e ir combination
as predictors is under constant scrutiny. Most schools which
use the LSAT subm it, usually once each year, the per
formance of each of the ir students in the first year as m ea
sured by grades. This record of performance is then m ea
sured against the LSAT and GPA of these students. A de
term ination is made as to the correlation of each of these
predictors, and of both combined, w ith performance; in addi
tion each school has a predicted index (or index number) pre-
10. Carlson, Factor Analysis and Validity Study of the Law School A d
mission Test Battery, LSAC 70-3, in 2 Law School Admission Research 11
(1976).
11. Efforts to find a consistent and systematic correlation with other
factors in order to improve the effectiveness of the combination of LSAT
and GPA have proved fruitless. Studies have been made, for example, of
the utility of factoring in the quality of the undergraduate schools as mea
sured by the average LSAT scores of their graduates. This has not proved
effective in increasing the predictive power of the LSAT and GPA com
bined. Schrader & Pitcher, Adjusted Undergraduate Average Grades as
Predictors of Law School Performance, LSAC 64-2, in 1 Law School Ad
mission Research 291 (1976); Schrader & Pitcher, Effect of Differences in
College Grading Standards on the Prediction of Law School Grades, LSAC
73-5, in 2 Law School Admission Research 451 (1976). Until recently a
separate weight was given to the score on the writing ability (WA) portion
of the LSAT but this was abandoned when it was found that it added little.
At one time it was thought that taking account of undergraduate major or
using the improvement in grades over the undergraduate career, rather
than simply the three-year average, would improve prediction. They did
not. Reilly, Contributions of Selected Transcript Information to Prediction
of Law School Performance, LSAC 71-4, in 2 Law School Admission Re
search 133 (1976); Reilly & Powers, Extended Study of the Relationship of
Selected Transcript Information to Law School Performance, LSAC 73-4,
in 2 Law School Admission Research 405 (1976).
15
pared for it in evaluating applicants in the succeeding year
based on the accuracy of the predictors in prior years.12
12. These studies not only validate the use of the composite of LSAT
and GPA by each school but, in addition, they also provide each school
annually with predictive formulas showing which combination of the two
(LSAT and GPA) have the highest validity based on performance at that
school in that year and in the three most recent years combined, as well as
one based on the experience of all law schools put together. The school can
choose whichever of these formulas it desires, or any other combination it
desires and, in the succeeding year ETS, through the Law School Data
Assembly Service (LSDAS), provides the school with an index, based on
the school’s specified formula, of each applicant’s predicted performance.
An illustration may be helpful. Assume that a study of the 1975 enter
ing class at a particular school reveals that the grades earned by the mem
bers of that class would have been best predicted by a formula that sums
the LSAT score and the product of 135 times the GPA. (Since LSAT is
scored on a 200-800 scale and GPA on a 4-point scale the assumed formula
involves a determination, today generally accurate, that the LSAT is a
somewhat better predictor than the GPA.) In the following year, i.e., for
applicants to the class of 1976, the LSDAS will, using that formula or any
other requested, provide an index number for each applicant. This can, if
requested, be given in terms of the particular school’s grading system.
This is the predicted first-year average (PFYA or PG A) referred to in the
brief filed by the deans of the four publicly-supported California law
schools in support of the petition for certiorari.
Such predictions are, however, only statements of probability and hence
are necessarily imperfect. The degree of probability is expressed in a corre
lation coefficient. A school whose index number has a correlation co
efficient of .45 and which admitted 100 students would normally expect to
find that at the end of their first year, 8 of the top 20 who had the highest
index numbers would be in the top 20 students. But the top 20 students
would also include 1 or 2 whose index numbers were in the bottom 20% of
those admitted. Conversely, 8 of the students with the lowest index num
bers, and 1 or 2 of those with the highest, would probably be represented in
the bottom 20% of the class. Finally, it is worth pointing out that a major
ity of both the highest ranking 20% and the lowest ranking 20% of admit
ted applicants are likely to end up in the middle 60% of the class. See
LSAT Handbook 47 (1964).
Over the past few years, the correlation between the index number em
ployed by most schools and the performance of their first-year students
has ranged between .3 and .5, with some as high as .7. The mean validity is
.45. Because a .45 correlation can be said to mean that the index accounts
for only 20% of the rank order of student performance, there are those who
have argued that the correlation of LSAT and GPA with law school per
formance is so low as to make the use of these predictors unnecessary or
undesirable. One answer to that argument is that, though far from perfect,
16
None of this is m eant to suggest th a t the law schools of this
country should, or do, rely entirely on the num erical indi
cators. While on average they are valid and reliable, they
state in essence only a probability of relative performance.
The probability th a t a selection based on these predictors
the combined LSAT-GPA index is the best predictor available. Extensive
efforts to use interviews or other subjective methods of evaluation of can
didates for law school have never proved valid when tested against actual
performance. See Linn & Winograd, New York University Admissions
Interview Study, LSAC 69-2, in 1 Law School Admission 547 (1976). This is
in accord with the available scientific evidence that predictors such as the
LSAT are in general likely to be more accurate than subjective evaluation.
The greater efficiency of the combination of LSAT and GPA is explained
by the fact that the latter may measure motivation and study habits, fac
tors not measured by the LSAT.
Moreover, the argument that a .45 correlation is too low to justify use of
the index fails to take account of the phenomenon technically known as
"range restriction” and thereby understates the utility of the index as a
predictor. "Range restriction” can be illustrated by a simple example. It is
a fact that there is a very strong relationship between the height and
weight of human beings. If a randomly selected sample were taken, the
correlation coefficient between these two quantities would be very high.
There are a few short but very heavy people and a few tall bean poles, but
on the average it is true that the taller a person is the more he weighs. But
it is also true that as the differences in height decrease the correlation
decreases: it is much less certain that a person 6'1" tall is heavier than one
who is just 6' than it is that a 6' person is heavier than a 5' person. A
correlation coefficient of height and weight among, let us say, professional
basketball players would therefore be much lower than one in which the
population as a whole were being measured.
Just so with law school admissions. Since almost all American law
schools tend to select those who have the higher scores, the correlation
coefficient is very much lower than it would be if all who applied were
admitted. The greater the weight given to the index in admissions the
lower the correlation coefficient. But the drop in the correlation coefficient
says nothing as to the efficiency and effectiveness of the index as a dis
criminator between those accepted and the vast majority who are
rejected—it measures only the efficient use of the index in predicting the
relative position of those accepted The "range restriction” phenomenon at
least partly explains the difference between the relatively high correla
tion coefficient of .67 for the University of California at Berkeley (Boalt
Hall) and the more typical .45. Although Boalt Hall accepts only a small
proportion of those who apply to it, including minorities, it does have a
larger "special admissions” program than most schools and therefore ex
hibits a somewhat smaller "range restriction” effect.
17
will in fact select the candidates who will perform best is
very high if the difference in the indices is large but it is low
when the indices are sim ilar. Given the large volume of ap
plications the u ltim ate decision may have to be made among
applicants who have very sim ilar index scores. It is for this
reason, among others, th a t the schools generally use those
predictors in combination with other inform ation th a t they
have about applicants. We now tu rn to the process by which
they do so.
C. The Adm issions Process Is Designed To Identify Which
Of The Qualified Applicants Should Be Admitted
A lthough the specific procedure varies from school to
school, the following describes in general term s the m ain
features of the regu lar admissions process a t most schools.
The first step is to reduce the num ber of files th a t can be
given detailed exam ination to a m anageable number. This is
done on the basis of the index num bers except where quick
exam ination of the file indicates tha t, for some reason, the
num bers are not indicative of probable performance. Those
having the highest indices are adm itted and a larger num ber
are denied, not because they are unqualified, although some
may be, bu t simply because the ir performance as predicted
by the index will probably be lower than th a t of the group to
be given detailed exam ination. After th is in itia l screening,
then each school, in its own way, attem pts to make the best
possible prediction as to the relative quality of the appli
cants. Everything th a t is known about them is taken into
consideration: the applicants’ personal statem ents, the ir
work histories, the na tu re of the subjects taken in under
g rad u a te college, differences in the k ind of education
provided by different colleges or differences in grading s tan
dards between colleges, the trend of an applicant’s under
graduate grades, the possible effect of a disadvantaged
18
background upon the validity of the predicted performance,
and every other factor th a t the particu lar school th inks can
possibly be utilized in m aking a judgm ent as to the relative
quality of the applicants.
The admissions process thus involves more than the use of
test scores and grades.13 All, or v irtually all schools use
w hatever inform ation they believe, in the best exercise of
the ir professional judgm ents, will indicate the relative abil
ity of the applicants to perform in law school. W hatever fac
tors a particu lar school considers, i t seeks to pick the most
promising candidates from among those who apply for ad
mission to it.
The last sta tem ent is subject to an im portant qualifica
tion. The effort of each school to identify and select those
applicants most likely to perform successfully is subject to
certain overrides. The first of these is the desire for diversity.
Faculties generally believe th a t a process th a t produces a
homogeneous student body, all of the members of which
share a common history, is unlikely to provide an atm o
sphere for effective education in the law. Thus, an adm is
sions committee is likely to give preference to diverse back
grounds and experiences, perhaps selecting an experienced
businessm an, a prison guard, a psychiatrist or a newspaper
reporter over a recently graduated college senior who would
be likely to perform better academically.14
13. Almost all schools admit students other than "on the numbers.”
This can be seen dramatically by inspecting the profiles of admissions at
almost any school as shown in the 1976-77 Prelaw Handbook. One
school, for example, rejected 15 of 94 applicants in 1976 who had LSAT
scores between 650 and 699 and also had undergraduate grade point aver
ages between 3.50 and 3.74. But it accepted 32 applicants who had LSAT’s
below 600 and undergraduate grade point averages below 3.49. These fig
ures exclude admissions under what that school calls its "special experi
mental” program. Id. at 237.
14. See, e . g Columbia University Bulletin, School of Law, 96-97 (1976).
The procedure used at the University of Virginia School of Law is typical:
19
A nother override typical of most state-supported schools is
a m andated preference for residents of the state, usually ex
pressed as a maxim um percentage of the students not regis
tered in the state who may be adm itted. Such a preference
serves a t least two purposes—increasing the opportunities
for professional education for those whose families support
the institu tions and increasing the likelihood th a t graduates
of the school will rem ain in the state to meet its needs for
legal services. The effect of the preference is, of course, th a t
the school will be required to reject some nonresidents who
would be likely to perform more successfully than some resi
dents who are adm itted.
The final override, and the one this case is about, is race.
The plain fact of the m atter is th a t were it not for this over
ride the admissions processes of the nation’s law schools,
tak ing into account all of the factors we have described,
would produce very few students who are members of racial
Even in dealing with the large application volume, encountered
during the last several years, the admissions committee believes that
absolute standards based on a combination of LSAT score and under
graduate grade-point average (GPA) are not the best way to select an
entering class. Consequently, the committee considers a broad array
of elements in addition to the essential factors of LSAT and GPA, with
a view toward assembling a diverse group while at the same time
arriving at a fair appraisal of the individual applicant.
Because of this approach it is difficult to predict what action may be
taken on an individual application. The LSAT score and under
graduate GPA constitute the bulk of the committee’s consideration;
usually about 80 percent total weighting is accorded these two factors.
However, there are other elements taken into account; the maturing
effect of an individual some years away from formal education; a ris
ing trend in academic performance versus solid but unexceptional
work; financial pressure requiring employment during the under
graduate years; significant personal achievement in extracurricular
work at college or in a work or military situation; unusual prior train
ing which promises a significant contribution to the law school com
munity. Other, similar factors are also considered.
University of Virginia Record 1976-77, School of Law, 55 (1976). A more
complete report of the factors used and the admissions process relied on at
another school appears at 28 J. Leg. Ed. 363, 378 (1977).
2 0
minorities. This has led to the creation of "special adm is
sions program s” designed to produce decisions different from
those th a t would be produced if the process were conducted
in a racially neu tra l way.
Each of the overrides has a purpose. Single-minded devo
tion to predictions of probable academic excellence undoubt
edly would increase the num ber of graduates who possess
the highest levels of the intellectual qualities im portant to
the practice of law, but th a t is not the only purpose for which
a law school, particu larly a state-supported law school,
exists. If a single standard of probable performance is used, a
defined group having lower levels of predicted performance
may be entirely excluded, even though many in th a t group
will perform as well or b e tte r than those adm itted. The only
solution, if this resu lt is to be avoided, is to apply a somewhat
lower standard for th a t group but one which will still assure
a high probability of success.
These overrides are not w ithout cost. F irst, since the best
predictors express only probabilities, a higher percentage of
those in the preferred group may encounter academic dif
ficulties (although it is impossible in advance to say which
ones). Second, the use of different standards for different
groups m eans th a t some w ell-qualified applicants who
would otherwise be adm itted will be rejected. But those costs
are balanced by the cost of the a lternative—nam ely, the de
nial of admission to well-qualified residents and m inority
applicants because the school has selected only those who
are most certain to succeed.
There is, in short, no free lunch. As long as the num ber of
qualified applicants exceeds the num ber of persons who can
be adm itted, some applicants m ust suffer the disappoint
m ent of being denied admission. U nder fair procedures th a t
determ ine which applicants do (and do not) meet the school’s
admissions criteria, the only issue of law is w hether the ad-
r
21
m issions c rite ria employed advance perm issible public
policies. The mere fact, regrettable as i t may be, th a t some
qualified applicants have been denied admission is not rele
v an t to th a t issue, for th a t resu lt is inevitable under any
criteria.
Our description of the admissions process has been offered
to underline the proposition tha t, subject to the overrides
specified, each law school decides w hether to adm it or reject
the thousands of applications received on its best estim ate of
the relative performance of the applicants to th a t school as
law students. The focus of the admissions decision is not on
which of the applicants is the most deserving but, if you will,
on the product: which of the applicants will best serve the
purpose for which the school was created, th a t of supplying
professionals needed by the community. Preferences based
on residence or on the desire for diversity in the student body
are clearly related to th a t purpose. Preferences for members
of certain m inority groups equally serve th a t purpose. This
brings us directly to the question of race.
D. The Use of Race as a Factor In The Admissions Process
Is N escessary If There Are To Be A Substantial Number
Of Minority Students In Law School
Our consideration of the use of race in law school adm is
sions is in three parts. We first set out in brief compass, and
in fairly general term s, the history and the natu re of special
admissions program s used by law schools to in tegrate the ir
student bodies. N ext we consider w hat the im pact would be
of a forced abandonm ent of these program s designed to in
crease m inority enrollm ent in law school. W hat, in other
words, would be the effect of a race-blind system of admission
upon the racial mix of applicants who would be adm itted to
the schools if they adhered to current admissions criteria of
probable academ ic success and d iversity (excluding of
22
course, racial diversity). F inally we explain why there are no
reasonable alternatives to reliance on the race-conscious
admissions procedures if m inority admissions are to be at
more than a token level and why the proposed racially neu
tra l solutions, including those suggested by the Supreme
Court of California, are not grounded in reality or logic—and
merely invite schools to adopt an approach we reject as u n
worthy and inappropriate, the institu tion of disingenuous
programs whereby race is taken into account covertly.
1. T he S p ec ia l A d m issio n s P rogram s
Responding to the moral pressures of the civil rights
movement, first led by this Court, which was sweeping the
country in the mid-1960s, the law schools began in a variety
of ways to take affirm ative steps to a tta in more than a token
enrollm ent of m inority students.15 There were, in 1964, only
700 black students in all the accredited law schools of the
c o u n try — 1.3% of th e to ta l e n ro llm e n t of m ore th a n
54,265—and 267 of them , more than a third, were enrolled in
w hat then were essentially segregated black schools.16 In all
of the other accredited schools in the country, then, fewer
than 200 were being adm itted each year. P lainly something
had to be done.
The first pa tte rn to emerge was an active program by the
law schools to recruit m inority, th a t is prim arily black, s tu
dents. Since the profession had historically been all bu t
closed to blacks, these students had first to be persuaded to
consider law as a career and then to enroll. Many methods of
recruiting were used. The Law School Admission Council
(LSAC) sponsored visits to black colleges and with black
15. The history given here can be traced in the voluminous reports pub
lished in Symposium, Disadvantaged Students and Legal Education—
Programs for Affirmative Action, 1970 Tol. L. Rev. 277.
16. Report of Minority Groups Project in AALS Proceedings 172(1965).
23
student groups; the LSAT was adm inistered to m inority s tu
dents w ithout charge; sum m er program s were held, first at
H arvard Law School in 1965, and then elsewhere, to give
college students an understanding of w hat law study m ight
involve; and scholarships were offered especially for m inor
ity applicants to overcome the financial hurdles th a t seemed
to dissuade so many.
Im plicit in these first program s to recru it and enroll
m inority students was the relaxation of admission standards
for them. For a t the same tim e th a t the law schools were
seeking to adm it increasing num bers of m inority students
they were also being deluged with increasing numbers of ap
plicants of all backgrounds. Law was becoming a more a t
tractive field to all sorts of students and, as previously de
scribed, the num ber of highly qualified, indeed exceptional
ly qualified, non-minority students was growing dispropor
tionately. Law schools, as a result, were seeking to increase
m inority student enrollm ent a t the same tim e th a t they
were first having to ration the ir available spaces by select
ing all students on an increasingly higher standard—and
unless something were done, it would he the m inority group
students once again who would be squeezed out.
A t most schools the solution was to return , in effect, to
w hat we have previously called the second stage in the de
velopment of the admissions process. (See p. 10, supra.) The
clock was, in effect, tu rned back for applicants from m inority
groups and all of those who were deemed to be qualified were
adm itted. T hat is to say, m inority students were adm itted
under these special admissions on the standards which had
been used by these very same schools in the late 1950s or
early 60s.
The schools accomplished th is in a variety of ways. In a
few, an explicit m inority admissions program was estab
lished. In others, it was disguised as a program for the disad-
24
vantaged. In still others, the action took place but no public
statem ent was made concerning the existence of differential
adm issions standards. In recent years, more and more
schools have identified the ir special admissions programs
publicly as they more fully understood the process and rea l
ized th a t no alternatives were available. Thus, by the mid
1970s, in v irtually all schools, in one way or another, a pref
erence in the application of admissions standards was in fact
afforded to applicants from m inority groups.
At the same tim e the law schools began adopting special
admissions program s, efforts were made to improve m inor
ity student preparation for law study, in sum m er studies be
fore law school and assistance program s while in school. The
preparatory program s had mixed results. H arvard’s pro
gram in 1965 and 1966 included a few college graduates, and
New York U niversity’s pre-law program in 1966 and 1967
sought to introduce students to the fundam entals of legal
study and to prepare them for the law school curriculum . At
the same tim e Emory Law School began a "pre-start” pro
gram whereby a dozen students from nearby black colleges
were recruited to take one regu lar law course in the sum m er
before the ir first year. If they passed, they were then adm it
ted to Emory as regu lar students except th a t they were on a
ligh ter course load during the ir first year. But programs
such as these were expensive. H arvard had to abandon its
program after being unable to obtain adequate funding in
1967 and New York U niversity concluded after two sum
mers th a t the results were so m eager as not to justify the
cost.
It was a t this point th a t the AALS, the LSAC and the na
tional bar associations, the Am erican B ar Association and
the N ational B ar Association, supported by the Office of
Economic Opportunity and the Ford Foundation, formed
w hat was called CLEO (the Council on Legal Education Op-
25
portunity) to provide sum m er tra in ing for disadvantaged
m inority pre-law students and to provide financial support
for these students once in law school. It began w ith four n a
tional institu tes in the sum m er of 1968 and has continued in
one form or another (now relying solely on congressionally
appropriated funds received through HEW) to the present
day.
Students adm itted are those who in general would not be
adm itted today to law school, even under special admissions
programs, w ithout an opportunity to pretest the ir ability to
do law school work in a sum m er institu te . T hat is, the ir nu
m erical credentials are such th a t under the elevated stan
dards forced by increased applicants, law schools generally
would tu rn down the applications of these m inority appli
cants because of low LSATs and GPAs. These sum m er in sti
tu tes are designed to be alternative predictors of success, and
the admission of these students into law school is generally
conditioned by the schools on the students’ successful com
pletion of a sum m er institu te . CLEO also has supported
these students during th e ir entire law school careers.
CLEO is only a partia l response, however. F irst it is costly
and could not be sustained w ithout governm ent support.
More im portant for this case is th a t it generally supports
students whose credentials are such th a t they could not be
adm itted in the schools in which they are enrolled even
using second-stage standards. Thus as a m atter of policy
CLEO does not support the most promising m inority s tu
dents on the theory th a t the law schools having special ad
missions programs will adm it these (more qualified) s tu
dents w ithout the aid of an expensive sum m er institu te’s ex
perience and th a t adequate financial assistance can be ob
tained for them from other funds. It is, in other words, a de
liberate federally-supported program to increase the pool of
m inority students attending law school beyond those who
would otherwise be adm itted in m inority admissions pro
grams.
At the in itia l stage these special admissions program s had
difficulties which we discuss la ter. Over time, however, the
fact th a t law was now open to m inorities th a t had heretofore
been alm ost totally excluded, plus the first effect of the im
provem ent in elem entary and secondary education resulting
from this Court’s decision inB row n, caused an im provem ent
in both the num ber and the quality of the applicants from
these groups. This has led to refinem ent of the programs.
Originally, the effort was to find and recru it m inim ally qual
ified m inority applicants. As the num ber and the qualifica
tions of m inority applicants increased, i t often became
necessary to put a ceiling on the num ber enrolled in them.
This "quota,” so called, is neither a lim it on the num ber of
m inority students to be adm itted nor, on the other hand, a
guarantee th a t a num ber equal to th is lim it will be adm itted
irrespective of qualification. I t is simply a lim it on the pro
portion of the school’s resources which will be devoted to the
program, sim ilar to the lim it which a school m ay put on the
num ber of nonresidents to be adm itted. The result, in either
case, is the existence of essentially two admissions processes,
each competitive w ithin itself and not competitive against
the other.
The premise of these special admissions programs is th a t,
in time, they will disappear. They are essentially a tra n
sitional device to correct a tim e lag. It would be naive to sup
pose th a t the cum ulative effects of centuries of deprivation
will be overcome in the space of a few years. But when the
need which brought the special admissions program s into
being disappears they will be term inated. It is to the schools’
in terest th a t this occur. Each is dedicated to atta in ing the
highest possible level of achievem ent in its student body.
Special admissions program s represent a compromise with
27
th a t goal, a compromise made necessary by the schools’ a l
most universal perception of a pressing societal need to
provide more m inority lawyers than can possibly be pro
duced w ithout them . But as the num ber of unrepresented
m inorities who can gain admission through the regu lar pro
cedures increases, the necessity for th a t compromise will
disappear.
An example, the only one we now know, is provided by the
elim ination of Japanese-A m ericans from the special adm is
sions program a t Boalt Hall, when th a t faculty found, after a
few years’ experience, th a t members of th a t group were gain
ing admission in substan tial num bers through the regular
procedure.17 The appropriate tim e for the eventual elim ina
tion of the program s, insofar as we can now determ ine it, is
still far in the fu ture for blacks and C-hicanos. The success of
the program s thus far, even w ith the ir m istakes, should not
obscure the fact th a t under today’s conditions the ir elim ina
tion would be a disaster. To th a t question we now turn.
2. M in ority S tu d en ts W ould B e A lm ost E lim in a ted
F rom L aw S ch o o l W ithout S p ec ia l A d m issio n s
P rogram s
The unpleasant bu t unalterab le reality is th a t affirmance
of the decision below would mean, for the law schools, a re
tu rn to the v irtually all-white student bodies th a t existed
prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and subsequent congres
sional enactm ents which, after so many years of default, fi
nally committed the nation to the goal of racial equality.
More specifically, as a resu lt of the programs described in the
preceding pages, 1700 black and 500 Chicano students were
adm itted to the Fall, 1976 enteri ng class of the nation’s law
17. Report onSpecial Admissions at BoaltHall After Bakke, 28 J. Legal
Ed. 363 (1977).
28
schools.18 They represented 4.9% and 1.3%, respectively, of
the total of 43,000 who were adm itted .19 If the schools had
not taken race into account in m aking th e ir adm ission deci
sions, bu t had otherwise adhered to the admission criteria
they employ, the num ber of black students would have been
reduced to no more than 700 and the num ber of Chicanos to
no more th an 300.20 It is v irtually certain , however, th a t the
reduction would have been much g reater and it is not a t all
unlikely th a t even th is reduced num ber would have again
been reduced by half or more. Thus, the nation’s two largest
racial m inorities, representing nearly 14% of the population,
would have had a t most a 2.3% represen tatation in the n a
tion’s law schools and, more likely, no more th an about 1%.
These conclusions are draw n from F. Evans, Applications
and Adm issions to A B A Accredited Law Schools: A n A naly
sis o f National Data for the Class Entering in the Fall 1976
(LSAC 1977) (the Evans Report) which studied characteris
tics of applicants for admission to the 1976 law school class.
The length and complexity of th a t study preclude any effort
to set out its findings and supporting data in detail. We shall,
however, set forth briefly the data underlying the conclu
sions stated in the preceding paragraph and sum m arize sev
eral additional findings th a t fu rther dem onstrate the devas
ta ting impact th a t race-blind admission standards would
have upon m inority enrollm ent in law schools.
The ineradicable fact is th a t, as a group, m inorities in the
18. The difference in the numbers of minority students covered by the
Evans Report and the number actually enrolled is explained primarily by
the absence of LSD AS status data from the four predominantly black law
schools. See Evans Report at 39.
19. The total admitted, as reported in the Evans Report, exceeds the
actual 1976 law school first-year enrollment of 39,000 because some of
those accepted into law school nevertheless did not matriculate. Thus of
the 43,000 students admitted to at least one law school, approximately
4,000 did not enroll.
20. Evans Report at 44.
29
pool of law school applicants achieve dram atically lower
LSAT scores and GPAs th an whites. Illustratively, 20% of
the w hite and unidentified applicants, bu t only 1% of blacks
and 4% of Chicanos receive both an LSAT score of 600 or
above and a GPA of 3.25 or higher. Similarly, if the combined
LSAT/GPA levels are set a t 500 and 2.75 respectively, 60% of
the w hite and unidentified candidates would be included but
only 11% of the blacks and 23% of the Chicanos.21 Such dis
parities exist a t all LSAT and GPA levels. Their effect, under
a race-blind system, m ust inevitably be to curtail sharply
the num ber of blacks and Chicanos adm itted to law school.
In 1976, there were more th an 80,000 applicants for ap
proxim ately 39,000 seats in the first-year class. As ex
plained above, pp. 14-16, supra, law schools commonly em
ploy an index num ber combining LSAT and GPA scores as
one m eans of p red ic tin g the probable law school p e r
formances of applicants. If all applicants for the 1976 class
were to be assigned an index num ber, computed under two
widely-used prediction formulas, the num ber of blacks in the
top 40,000 would have been 370, on one formula, and 410 on
the other. The equivalent figures for Chicanos are 225 and
250.22
Of course, as discussed above, law schools do not select
students solely by "the num bers.” A lthough an im portant
factor in determ ining who will be adm itted to law school,
they are not the only one. To determ ine the num ber of blacks
and Chicanos who would have been adm itted to law school
under a race-blind standard, it is necessary to estim ate how
they would have fared if non-quantitative predictors of suc
cess (letters of recommendation, experience, etc.) and other
21. Id. at 35.
22. Id. at 49-50.
30
non-racial criteria affecting admissions (e.g., the school’s
in terest in student diversity) were taken into account. Obvi
ously, th is cannot be done. I t seems reasonable to assume,
however, th a t if race were not a factor in the admission pro
cess, the applications of m inorities would be affected by such
factors in precisely the same way as those of whites.
On th a t assum ption, the Evans Report calculated the ac
ceptance ra tes for whites for each LSAT-GPA com bination.23
These acceptance ra tes were then applied to black and
Chicano students who had the same combination of LSAT
scores and GPAs.24 On th is basis, 700 blacks and 300
Chicanos would have been adm itted, a num ber equal to 40%
of the blacks and 60% of the Chicanos actually adm itted.
These figures, 700 black and 300 Chicanos, sta te the out
side lim it th a t would have been adm itted under a race-blind
standard. It is v irtually certain , however, th a t they sub
stan tia lly overstate the num ber th a t would actually have
enrolled as first-year students. By employing aggregate na
tional acceptance rates, the study in effect trea ts all law
schools as a single school. As the report notes, the im plicit
assum ption of such a procedure is " th a t m inority candidates
23. Illustratively, of those whites who had an LSAT score between
600-649 and a GPA between 3.00—3.24, 83% received at least one offer of
admission from a school to which they had applied. Of those who had an
LSAT between 550-599 and a GPA between 2.75-2.99, 60% received such
an offer. These illustrations, and the full range of calculations set out in
the Evans Report, demonstrate that, as indicated in our discussion of the
admission process, the lower an applicant’s quantitative predictors, the
lower his or her chance of admission.
24. For example, since 60% of whites who had LSAT scores between
550-599 and GPAs between 2.75-2.99 were accepted by at least one school,
it was assumed that the same percentage of blacks with such credentials
would have received at least one offer of admission. Since there were 37
blacks in this group, the assumption is that 22 would have received an
offer. In fact, 30 of the 37 blacks in this group received at least one offer.
31
would apply to and be willing to attend” any school.25 Com
mon sense rebels against any such assumption. Geograph
ical considerations alone are bound to lim it a potential ap
plicant’s choice of schools. Moreover, the schools to which
these 700 blacks and 300 Chicano students would have been
adm itted are predom inantly the least selective law schools
in the country.26 Since those schools lack the financial aid
resources of the more selective institutions, a large portion of
the high percentage of m inority students who require finan
cial assistance would, for th a t reason alone, be unable to a t
tend the only schools to which they could gain admission.27
No one knows with any certainty how far these factors
would reduce the num ber of blacks and Chicanos attending
law school below the m axim um eligibility figures of 700 and
300, perhaps by 25%, perhaps by 50%, perhaps by more.
Since su b stan tia lly more th a n h a lf of both black and
Chicano applicants were from low-income families,28 how
ever, and in view of the lim itations imposed by geography, a
reduction of 50% seems not a t all im plausible. On th a t basis,
the num ber of black and Chicano students enrolled in the
first-year class in 1976 would have been approxim ately 1%
of the entering class, roughly the same as in 1964. The prog
ress of a decade would have been wiped out.
The drastic im pact of an affirmance is also dem onstrated
by th.eEvans Report’s findings th a t under a race-blind admis
sion standard 12 of the nation’s most selective law schools,
which during 1975 had to tal m inority enrollm ent of approx
im ately 1,250, nearly 15% of the national total, would have
25. Id. at 44.
26. Id. at 45
27. Id. at 57.
28. Id. at 29 & 59.
32
enrolled no "more than a handful of m inority students.”29
Yet, these are the schools from which, over the years, many
of the leaders of the bar and the nation have been drawn.
They are, moreover, the w ealthiest institu tions and, th e re
fore, those w ith the g reatest resources for the financial aids
so sorely needed by m any m inority students.
The im portance of th is case to the fu ture of m inority s tu
dent enrollm ent in the law schools of th is country cannot be
overstated. If the schools are prohibited from using race as a
factor in admissions, m inority enrollm ent will plum m et and
the hopes of a generation schooled in the traditions of equal
opportunity enunciated by Brown will be dashed. This be
comes even clearer when one exam ines the possible a lte rna
tives th a t have been suggested and realizes th a t in fact they
offer no realistic prospect of substan tial m inority enroll
ments.
3. N o R ea so n a b le A ltern a tiv es To S p ec ia l
A d m issio n s P ro g ra m s H a v e B een P ro p o se d
A rgum ents have been made from tim e to tim e, most nota
bly by the court below and by Justice Douglas dissenting in
DeFunis, th a t substan tial m inority enrollm ents in profes
sional schools can be m aintained w ithout using racial ad
mission criteria. If there are m eans by which th a t can be
done, they are not known to the law schools. We do know,
however, th a t none of those th a t have been suggested would
work. None would perm it the enrollm ent of m inority s tu
dents in num bers even close to those th a t now exist and some
would, in addition, have a destructive effect upon the quality
of legal education and of the profession, requiring law
schools to adm it students—white and black—who are less
qualified to study and practice law than students now being
adm itted.
29. Id.
33
The court below suggested th a t universities "m ight in
crease m inority enrollm ent by institu ting aggressive pro
gram s to identify, recruit, and provide rem edial schooling
for disadvantaged students of all races. . . . ” But as the
history recited a t pp. 22-55, supra, dem onstrates, law schools
have already directed precisely such efforts toward m inority
students. An expansion of these efforts to other groups would
not increase the num ber of m inority applicants, but it would
enlarge the num ber of w hites in competition with them .30
Recruitm ent efforts directed toward minorities have been
sufficiently successful so th a t for the past several years the
ratio of law school applicants to baccalaureate degrees
granted has been the sam e for blacks and Chicanos as for
w hites.31 There can be no doubt th a t this growth in the
num ber of m inority applicants is directly related to the exis
tence of the special admissions programs. For w ithout these
programs, it would have been pointless for most of the minor
ity applicants, including most of those adm itted, to have
applied to law school a t all.
A whole fam ily of o ther suggestions for m ain tain ing
m inority enrollm ents, while avoiding the use of race as an
admission factor, depend upon reducing the influence of the
quan tita tive predictors in the admissions process. These
range from Justice Douglas’ extrem e suggestion th a t the
LSAT be abandoned to more moderate proposals th a t would
have the schools place g reater reliance on personal inter-
30. Moreover, low income whites perform sufficiently well on the LSAT
and GPA to qualify for admission, in substantial numbers, at schools with
varying standards. Id. at 63.
31. These ratios are determined by a comparison of the percentage of
baccalaureate degrees awarded to minority students with the percentage
of law school applicants who are members of minority groups. Compare
Altesek & Gomberg, Bachelor’s Degrees Awarded to Minority Students
1973-1974, at 4 (1977) (baccalaureate degrees) with Evans Report at 29
(law school applicants).
34
views, recommendations, and the like as a way of predicting
academic performance and potential contribution to the so
ciety. Some of these suggestions rest upon the assum ption
th a t the LSAT is "culturally biased,” i.e., th a t it underpre
dicts the probable academic performance of m inority appli
cants. Five separate studies conducted over the past half
dozen years have found th a t assum ption is wrong.32 In the
light of these findings, to call for abolition of the LSAT
am ounts to a dem and th a t the m essenger who brings the
bad news be shot or, more accurately, th a t some other
m essenger who will bring be tte r tidings be substituted.
For both majority and m inority students, the combination
of LSAT and GPA, w ith all th e ir lim itations, is the best
available predictor of academic achievem ent, especially a t
the levels of difference which separate m ajority and m inor
ity applicants in nearly all law schools. If they are, for th a t
reason, to be given weight in the adm ission process, m inority
s tu d e n ts ’ n o n q u an tita tiv e p red ic to rs of academ ic p e r
formance (such as le tters of recommendation) would, on the
average, have to be a good deal more favorable th an those of
whites if the former are to compete successfully for adm is
sion. But there is not the slightest reason to suppose th a t
they are; indeed, there is no reason to suppose th a t such sub
jective factors are distributed on other than a random basis
among applicants of different races. There is, accordingly, no
reason to suppose th a t g reater em phasis upon "soft d a ta”
would lead to admission of any bu t a very small num ber of
m inority applicants.33
32. See note 7, supra.
33. Ironically, it is this very reliance on unverifiable "soft data” which
the equal employment regulations seek to limit. See Employee Selection
Guidelines, 41 Fed. Reg. 51733 (Nov. 23, 1976) (issued jointly by the De
partments of Justice and Labor and the Civil Service Commission); EEOC
Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R 1607.1 (1976). See
35
The same is true w ith respect to the suggestion th a t
schools should, in the in terest of "flexibility” place greater
em phasis on factors other th an predicted academic per
formance. W hatever may be the wisdom or unwisdom of such
a proposal, there is not a shred of evidence th a t reliance on
any of the non-academic factors suggested would, unless
used as a covert method of applying a racial preference,
greatly enlarge the num ber of m inority admissions. Some
greater num ber of m inority applicants m ight be adm itted
th an if purely academic predictors of success were to be em
ployed, bu t it is by no m eans obvious th a t th a t would be so. It
is entirely possible th a t an adm issions process employing
standards as flexible as those suggested by the court below
would disadvantage m inority students, favoring instead
those applicants who had le tters of recommendation from in
fluential persons, or who were most sim ilar to law school pro
fessors and admissions office professionals. And the cost of
g rea tly d im in ish ing th e ro le of th e best p red ic to rs of
academic competence would be so intolerable as inevitably
to cause abandonm ent of the endeavor.
We can put aside quickly the suggestion of the court below
th a t professional schools specifically rely more on "m atters
re la ting to the needs of the profession and society, such as an
applicant’s professional goals” as a method of increasing the
num ber of m inority lawyers. If "the needs of the profession
and society” are defined, as we believe they m ust be, to in
clude a need for more m inority lawyers, the alternative is no
alternative a t all but a restatem ent of precisely the adm is
sion program which the court declared unconstitutional.
Sim ilarly, if "professional goals” are defined to include an
intention specifically to serve m inority communities, their
use as an admissions criterion may be subject to the same
also Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348, 358 (5th Cir.
1972)(promotions).
36
attack as the use of the race of applicants in the adm issions
process. In any event, reliance on the stated goals of appli
cants for admission is pu rsu it of a chimera: applicants will
inevitably say th a t which they believe will secure adm it
tance and there is often—we th in k usually—little re la
tionship between even the sincerely expressed goals of an
applicant not yet in school and the professional career
eventually pursued.
We need not urge these considerations because there is a
far g reater difficulty. If the schools are to adm it students
upon the basis of the ir sta ted professional goals, they m ust
inevitably evaluate and ra te these goals comparatively. Is it
better, for example, to tra in a law yer who says he w ants to
attack corporations or one who seeks to defend them? Is a
practice in the field of securities regulation more or less
valuable to society th an the represention of labor unions?
Choices among applicants on any such basis would th ru st
the schools into an unw anted and unauthorized role of social
arbiter. They can properly assess the com m unity’s overall
need for lawyers; they should not be placed in the position of
evaluating those objectives.
Another, superficially more plausible, m eans th a t has
been suggested for m ain tain ing m inority enrollm ent is to
convert special admissions program s into program s for the
economically disadvantaged. The underlying theory seems
to be th a t a substan tial num ber of m inority group members
will gain admission to law schools under such a program be
cause m inorities are disproportionately included among the
economically disadvantaged. Here again, the theory de
pends upon ignoring the facts. A lthough racial m inorities
are disproportionately included among the economically
disadvantaged, approxim ately two-thirds of all disadvan
taged fam ilies are w hite.34 Even if we were to assum e th a t
34. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-60, No.
37
disadvantaged m inorities would apply for admission to law
school in proportion to the ir num bers, the size of special ad
missions program s would have to be trebled to m ain tain the
present representation of m inorities in law schools. A school
th a t now specially adm its 10% m inorities would be required
to extend its program to 30% of the class.35 But there is no
reason to believe th a t there would be anything like th a t pro
portion of m inority applicants presenting credentials equal
to those of w hite applicants w ith whom they would be in
competition.
The best data now available as to the probable composition
of any such disadvantaged special adm issions program
suggest tha t, among the present pool of applicants, over 90%
of those who would be adm itted under such a program would
be neither black nor Chicano.36 And even th is necessarily
understates the problem. However schools advertise their
special admissions programs, it is understood th a t these
program s are essentially lim ited to members of m inority
groups. But once it is learned th a t an applicant of any race
possessing academic credentials substantially lower than
those ordinarily required for admission can gain admission
if the applicant shows economic disadvantage, it can be pre
dicted w ith certain ty th a t two things will happen: (i) there
will be a substantial num ber of unverified and unverifiable
claims of childhood economic disadvantage and (ii) there will
be a large num ber of potential applicants who now do not
apply who will seek to take advantage of the program.
103, "Money Income and Poverty Status of Families and Persons in the
United States: 1975 and 1974 Revisions” (Advance Report 1976).
35. Even if the schools were willing to expand the programs to this ex
tent, their inability to provide financial assistance to so sharply increased
a number of disadvantaged students would necessarily lead to a very sub
stantial reduction in the number of minority students, if the programs
were to operate in a racially neutral manner.
36. Evans Report at 62.
38
Moreover, one effect of a racially neu tra l disadvantaged
program, as distinct from a m inority program , would be to
elim inate those blacks and other m inorities who now are
able to gain admission but who could not reasonably claim a
disadvantage other than race. Among m inorities, as among
whites, applicants who come from low-income families have,
in general, substantially lower LSAT scores and GPAs than
those who do not.37 Many of these la tte r applicants consti
tu te the most promising of those adm itted under the present
special admissions programs. Yet it is ju s t these applicants
who will be denied admission under a racially neu tra l pro
gram for the disadvantaged.
There is, regrettably, one final alternative still to be con
sidered. The suggestion th a t professional schools abandon
special m inority admissions program s in favor of programs
for the disadvantaged or th a t they seek to m ain tain m inority
enrollm ents by reducing reliance on quan tita tive predictors
of academic performance may rest upon the premise th a t
either of these alternatives would perm it race to be taken
into account sub rosa. We do not imply th a t the court below
m eant to invite such an in terpreta tion of those suggestions,
but there are others who have suggested th a t in the effort to
achieve racial equality "we cannot afford complete openness
and frankness on the part of the legislature, executive, or
judiciary.” K aplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World:
Equality for the Negro—The Problem o f Special Treatment,
61 Nw. U. L. Rev. 361, 410 (1966). It need hardly be said in
response th a t a constitu tional principle designed to be
flouted should not be imposed on schools dedicated to teach
ing the role of law in our society.
37. Id. at 61.
39
II. SPECIAL MINORITY ADMISSIONS PROGRAMS
SERVE COMPELLING SOCIAL INTERESTS
Section I of our B rief has dem onstrated th a t special adm is
sions program s are indispensable if more than a minuscule
num ber of m inority group members are to be represented
w ithin the student bodies of American law schools. The
widespread adoption of such program s reflects the consensus
of law faculties th a t it would be intolerable to have such m in
im al m inority representation in educational institu tions
th a t play so im portant a role in the life of the nation. In this
section of the Brief, we identify the reasons th a t have led to
th a t consensus, and we show th a t the means relied upon are
reasonable and effective.
We observe prelim inarily th a t the justification for special
admissions program s cannot be considered in isolation from
the historical and social conditions th a t have created the
need for them. The decisions of th is Court—from Bred Scott
v. Sanford, 19 How. 393 (1857) to Strauderv. West Virginia,
100 U.S. 303 (1880) to Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.
483 (1954) and beyond—amply record the efforts to exclude
cial m inorities from full participation in American life.
U ntil very recently, racial m inorities were almost entirely
foreclosed from a role in the nation’s public life, not only by
excluding them from elective and appointive office in na
tional, state, and local government but, in m any sections of
the country, by denying them the fundam ental rights and
obligations of citizenship, including the franchise and the
opportunity to serve on grand and petit juries. Their children
were required to attend segregated and generally inferior
schools. They often received lower levels of governmental
services th a n w hites and some services were a t tim es simply
w ithheld from them . In the private sector, m inorities fared
no better. By custom, and occasionally by law, they were re l
egated to the least desirable employment, to jobs th a t paid
40
substan tially less th an those open to w hites and th a t offered
neither an opportunity for advancem ent nor a chance to par
ticipate in the m any im portan t decisions made in the private
sector. The housing available to them displayed a sim ilar
pattern . Life in the ghetto and the barrio not only deprived
m inorities of contact w ith the dom inant society, it subjected
them to crowding, inadequate public services, and often to
housing th a t failed to m eet the m inim al standards of our so
ciety. The unp leasan t bu t inescapable tru th is th a t, the Con
s titu tio n no tw ith stand ing , th e re existed in the U nited
S tates a v irtual caste system.
The legacy of th a t history is the reality we now confront.
Despite the im portant beginnings th a t have been made since
enactm ent of the Civil R ights Act of 1964, racial m inorities
are not—and are not close to being—full participants in
American life. By every social indicator they continue to
constitute an underclass in our society. Their income, life
expectancies, and educational a tta inm en ts are lower than
those of whites. F inally, and of more im m ediate concern in
this case, racial m inorities constitute approxim ately 17% of
the total population but, as of the 1970 census, barely more
than 1.9% of the m em bership of the bar.38
The nation is now committed to elim inating th is legacy of
racism. We have undertaken to remove the vestiges of caste
from our society, not only by im proving the conditions of life
among historically disadvantaged m inorities, but also by
creating a racially in tegrated society. The question p resent
ed in th is case is w hether, now th a t we have made th a t com
m itm ent, the Constitution should be construed to forbid
m easures th a t are essential to its performance.
There are those who argue th a t special admissions pro
grams and other m easures designed to hasten the integra-
38. Bureau of the Census, Detailed Characteristics of the Population,
Table 223 (1970).
41
tion of our society are unw arranted precisely because the n a
tion’s com m itm ent to racial equality is so recent. Now th a t
the historic barriers to equality have been removed, they
m ain tain , the members of m inority groups may be expected
over tim e to share equally w ith other Americans in the full
range of opportunities th a t the nation offers to its citizens.
The effects of decades, even centuries, of exclusion cannot be
overcome in a few years. Thus, they assert, even though the
present generation of m inority students may not be able to
compete successfully for admission to professional schools,
there is no reason to suppose th a t subsequent generations,
having received a more nearly equal prim ary and secondary
education, will not be able to do so.
We share the hopes of these critics. Indeed, it is because we
believe th a t the com m itm ent to racial equality in all spheres
of Am erican life will eventually elim inate the need for spe
cial adm issions program s th a t, throughout th is Brief, we
stress th e ir tran sien t nature. But the fact th a t the programs
may some day be unnecessary does not m ean th a t they are
not necessary now. The U nited S tates faces no task more im
perative than fulfilling its promise of racial equality. If th a t
promise is to be m et, and if those to whom the promise has
been made are to accept th a t it has been made in good faith,
we m ust approach it w ith a degree of urgency greater than
th a t conveyed by the prediction th a t equality will come some
day.
Any effort to achieve racial equality must, if it is to suc
ceed, begin w ith an awareness th a t, in the United S tates to
day, race is a socially significant characteristic. Race, in
other words, is not m erely a superficial aspect of "deeper”
social problems such as poverty or inadequate education. It
is in tegral to those problems. Many Americans, but espe
cially those who are members of the groups th a t are the im
m ediate beneficiaries of special admissions programs, live in
42
communities and belong to organizations th a t are defined in
racial and ethnic term s. The direction of the ir loyalties and
the ir sym pathies are significantly determ ined by th e ir ra
cial and ethnic identifications. W hether, or to w hat extent,
th a t is desirable is currently the subject of much debate.
Such identification may, as some contend, lead only to
divisiveness. Or, as others m ain tain , i t may foster a sense of
belonging and a pride in cu ltural origins. But w hether i t is
good or bad, it is a reality w ith which law and the in s titu
tions of A m erican life m ust contend.
In these circum stances, th e question w hether rac ia l
m inorities are su b stan tia lly represen ted in law school
classes and a t the bar assum es crucial importance. Gross
underrepresentation of these groups has consequences quite
different from those th a t would resu lt from, say, gross
underrepresentation of persons with one blue and one green
eye. Individuals who share th a t characteristic have not h is
torically been segregated by our society, nor otherwise sub
jected to genera tions of invidious d iscrim ination . Gov
ernm ental decisions do not affect them differently th an they
affect other persons and, conversely, th e ir views on issues of
public policy are likely to be distributed in the same way as
in the general population. In each of these respects, in
dividuals who share only a socially irrelevan t characteristic
differ from the members of racial minorities. And, as we now
seek to dem onstrate, it is precisely because of these dif
ferences th a t gross underrepresentation of the la tte r in law
schools and a t the bar is a pressing social problem.
A. The Need For More Minority Lawyers is Critical
The most im portant reason for special admissions pro
gram s in the law schools is, quite simply, th a t there is a crit
ical need for more m inority lawyers. The 1970 census, as
noted above, reported th a t racial m inorities, which consti-
43
tu te approxim ately 17% of the population, represented
barely more th a n 1.9% of the bar. However dram atic, this
gross s ta tistic does not begin to convey the desperate short
age of m inority lawyers. A 1968 survey revealed th a t before
special admissions program s began to have an effect there
were, in th e en tire South, only 506 black law yers. In
M ississipp i, w here th e b lack p o p u la tio n w as n ea rly
1,000,000, there were 9 practicing black lawyers. In A la
bam a, w ith an even larger population of blacks, there were
bu t 20 and in Georgia only 34.39
In draw ing atten tion to th is data, we do not suggest th a t
any of the compelling reasons for increasing m inority repre
sentation a t the bar th a t are detailed below require repre
sentation proportional to the relative size of the minority.
Opponents of special adm issions program s have a t times
sought to characterize the program s as an a ttem pt to achieve
such representation among lawyers, an a ttem pt th a t would,
they then contend, necessarily imply m aximum quotas for
each racia l and ethnic group in the profession. S tated
bluntly, this objection is simply a "red herring .” The data set
forth in the preceding paragraph and elsewhere in this Brief
dem onstrate th a t neither now nor in the foreseeable future
can there be any question of proportional representation in
the bar. The serious question is w hether publicly-supported
schools can take steps to assure th a t the representation of
m inorities a t the bar is to be more than negligible. Reasons
of compelling social importance, to which we now tu rn , re
quire an affirm ative answ er to th a t question.
1. T h e P u b lic R ole o f th e L egal P r o fess io n
N early 150 years ago, de Tocqueville described the crucial
39. SeeGeHhorn,TheLawSchoolsandtheNegro, 1968DukeL.J. 1069,
1073-74.
44
role of the legal profession in the U nited States. Lawyers, he
wrote,
are natu ra lly called upon to occupy most of the pub
lic stations. They fill the legislative assemblies and
they conduct the adm inistration; they consequently
exercise a powerful influence upon the formation of
the law, and upon its execution. 1 A. de Tocqueville,
Democracy in Am erica 329-30 (Schocken ed. 1961).
Time has added prescience to the keenness of these observa
tions. Even more than in de Tocqueville’s tim e lawyers now
"form the highest political class” in the nation. No other pro
fessional group, no other single class of citizens, excercises or
comes close to exercising as pervasive an influence upon the
operations of government.
Of the nearly 400,000 lawyers in the U nited S tates today,
approxim ately 50,000 are employed by federal, state, and
local governments. They serve as legislators and as staff to
le g is la tu re s ; as policy m a k e rs , a d m in is tra to r s , and
litigators w ithin the executive departm ents; and as judges
and staff to the judicial system. Nor is the public role of
lawyers confined to the public offices they hold. Acting on
behalf of private in terests, they exert a powerful influence
on public policy, serving not only as interm ediaries between
citizens and the ir governm ents, but also as the architects of
law reform aimed a t m aking governm ent responsive to the
needs and in terests of the citizenry. No less im portant, if
often less fully appreciated, lawyers in terp re t the actions of
governm ent to the ir clients and th e ir communities, and
thereby serve a crucial role in achieving public understand
ing and acceptance of those actions.
The public influence of lawyers extends far beyond the ir
formal roles in governm ent or in representing clients in
the ir dealings with government. Despite the im portance of
governm ent in the modern world, the direction of our society
and the quality of our national life depend not only, and
45
perhaps not even most im portantly, upon the decisions of
governm ent, bu t also upon the m yriad decisions made in the
private sector. H ere too the influence of lawyers is pervasive.
Lawyers frequently serve as members of the governing
boards, as well as advisors to, private foundations, educa
tional and charitable institu tions and corporations. They
play an im portant role in the labor movement. They are
often in positions of leadership in the extraordinary variety
of community and other organizations th a t play so vital a
role in A m erican life. In all these varied roles, lawyers are
influential molders of public policy.
Because of the public im portance of the legal profession,
there is an im perative need th a t it include qualified repre
sentatives of the diverse groups th a t constitute our society.
Since pre-Revolutionary times, Americans have been com
m itted to the democratic ideal th a t government derives
legitim acy from the consent of the governed, an ideal th a t we
have historically understood to require the active and con
tinuous participation of the governed in the ir government,
either directly or by representation. For th is reason, the fre
quency w ith which lawyers are elected to public office alone
suggests the im portance of increasing m inority membership
in the bar. But as the preceding paragraphs dem onstrate,
representation does not depend solely upon elected represen
tatives.
In a society as complex as ours, representation throughout
the vast network of public and private institutions which
shape our national life is required to achieve the active and
continuous participation in the governance of society upon
which consent is founded. Decisions significantly affecting
the lives of m inority group members are made daily by zon
ing boards of appeal, transporta tion departm ents, regu
latory agencies—everywhere th a t decisions are made af
fecting the lives of Americans. At times, perhaps often,
46
these decisions will have a different im pact upon m inority
communities than upon the white community. A m inority
presence in the decision-m aking process increases the
likelihood th a t those differences will be recognized and
taken into account. Sim ilarly, a m inority presence in Wall
S treet law firms, corporate law departm ents, labor union
legal staffs, law faculties, and the boards of foundations
and community organizations—indeed, in all the in s titu
tions in which the influence of lawyers is felt—is likely to
a lte r the behavior of those institu tions in a host of subtle
and perhaps not so subtle ways, m aking them more re
sponsive to the varying needs of m inority communities. No
less significantly, the presence of m inorities in these in
stitutions provides evidence to the members of m inority
groups th a t these im portant centers of American life are
open to the ir members, evidence th a t may be expected to
have an im portant influence upon the ir acceptance of the
institu tional framework of Am erican society.
A single illustration may help to dem onstrate the urgency
of increasing m inority representation a t the bar. One of the
harshest indicators of the economic and social conditions of
A merica’s racial m inorities is the fact th a t the ir members
are disproportionately both the victims and the perpetrators
of reported crimes. Nationwide, 28% of all persons arrested
are members of a racial m inority.40 Unless the num ber of
m inority lawyers is raised beyond th a t which existed prior to
the commencement of special admissions program s and
which will continue in the absence of such programs, the
consequence m ust be a system of crim inal justice in which
many of the defendants are black or Chicano but in which
40. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States,
Table 271, at 162 (1976). This figure, of course, does not demonstrate the
criminal propensity of any ethnic group. It must also be viewed in light of
socio-economic conditions and the possibility of selective enforcement.
47
nearly all judges, prosecutors, and even defense counsel are
white. Given the history of racial injustice in the United
States, it is not to be expected th a t such a system can m ain
ta in the respect and confidence of the m inority communities
th a t is so essential to its mission. We do not, of course,
suggest th a t the fairness and credibility of the crim inal ju s
tice system depend upon m inorities or non-minorities being
prosecuted, defended, or judged by members of the ir own
groups. But we do m ain tain th a t the visible presence of
m inorities as prosecutors, defense counsel, and judges is es
sential to the appearance of justice, as well as to its reality.
The im portance of a visible, and therefore a substantial,
m inority presence is obviously not lim ited to the crim inal
justice system. I t exists wherever decisions are made th a t
affect minorities, and th a t, as we have suggested, means
th a t it exists wherever decisions are made affecting Ameri
cans. On the other hand, th is is not the objective of special
admissions since, of course, i t is neither possible nor neces
sary to have m inorities represented wherever decisions af
fecting m inorities are made. But substantially increased
num bers of m inority lawyers will inevitably have the effect
of rendering the decision-making processes of the system as
a whole more cognizant of th e d istinctive in te rests of
minorities.
2. S erv in g th e L egal N eed s o f M inority C om m unities
Increasing the num ber of m inority lawyers is necessary
also to serve adequately the legal needs of the members of
m inority communities. In sta ting the existence of this need,
we are mindful of the ideal eloquently expressed by Justice
Douglas in his DeFunis dissent, th a t "[t]he purpose of [a
sta te university] cannot be to produce Black lawyers for
Blacks, Polish lawyers for Poles, Jew ish lawyers for Jews,
Irish lawyers for the Irish. It should be to produce good
lawyers for Am ericans.” 416 U.S. a t 342. This is a compelling
48
social and political ideal. Constitutional law ought not, how
ever, in the single-minded pursu it of th a t ideal, ignore the
existence of other values or the reality of the society in which
we live. A lthough it would be absurd to suppose th a t only a
Jew ish lawyer can adequately represent a Jew or th a t only a
black lawyer can adequately represent a black, i t is true
nonetheless th a t m any Jew s and m any blacks (like many
persons of other backgrounds) would prefer to be represented
by lawyers w ith an ethnic and racial identity sim ilar to the ir
own. Nor should the existence of these preferences occasion
surprise. Beyond the na tu ra l affinity which m any persons
feel w ith persons of a common cultural background, the his
tory and in some m easure the present reality of our society
afford the members of some racial and ethnic m inorities
ample reason to perceive the dom inant society as alien and
to regard it w ith suspicion and even hostility. W hen the need
for legal assistance arises, often a t a tim e of anxiety or crisis,
they may feel the need to tu rn to a lawyer whom they tru s t to
understand and to em pathize w ith th e ir situation. Law
schools need not endorse these feelings to recognize the ir
existence and the im portance of providing some outlet for
them.
In a society in which racial and ethnic identities play an
im portant role in everyday life, moreover, a law yer’s racial
or ethnic background may have an im portant bearing on his
ability to serve his client. Many of the tasks th a t lawyers
perform for th e ir clients require an understanding of the so
cial context in which the client’s problem arises. A brillian t
and effective tax specialist is, for th a t reason, unlikely to be
an effective representative in a labor negotiation. The rea
son is not simply th a t he is unfam iliar with the law of labor
relations, it is also and perhaps prim arily th a t he lacks an
understanding of the practical problems of labor relations, of
the customs th a t have developed in dealing w ith those prob-
49
lems, and of the style and m anners of collective bargaining.
To the extent th a t racial and ethnic groups form distinctive
subcultures w ithin our society, the representation of some of
the ir members in connection with some of the ir legal needs
m ay involve sim ilar difficulties for the "outsider.” The abil
ity to "speak the language” of the client, to understand his
perception of his problem, and to deal w ith others in the
community on his behalf are qualities essential to being a
"good law yer.” These qualifications are more likely to be
found among lawyers who share the client’s racial or ethnic
identity, a t least to the ex ten t th a t the client’s life is bound
up in a community defined in these term s.
B. A R a c ia lly D iv erse S tu d en t B o d y Is Im p ortan t For A
S o u n d L eg a l E d u ca tio n
At least since the tim e of Plato it has been understood th a t
those who govern require an understanding of the governed.
The need is common to all forms of governm ent, but in a de
mocracy it is critical. In the U nited States, as we have previ
ously observed, lawyers play a crucial role in the governance
of the nation. Successful performance of th a t role requires an
understanding of the diverse elem ents th a t comprise our
p luralistic society. The need for such an understanding is
hard ly less im portan t to successful perform ance of the
law yer’s role in the representation of private interests.
F or these reasons, a major objective of legal education is to
assist students in acquiring an understanding of the social
environm ent w ithin which legal decisions are made. I t is in
evitable th a t th is understanding, so far as it can be gained in
an academic setting, will be acquired largely from books. To
a substan tial degree, however, i t is also acquired by in terac
tion among students, through exposure to differing points of
view in class discussion and in less formal settings. The im
portance of these interactions to the education of lawyers
50
was recognized by th is Court more than a quarte r century
ago in Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950): " [A l
though the law is a highly learned profession,” Mr. Chief
Justice Vinson wrote for the Court,
we are well aw are th a t it is an intensely practical
one. The law school, the proving ground for legal
learning and practice, cannot be effective in isola
tion from the individuals and institu tions with
which the law interacts. Few students and no one
who has practiced law would choose to study in an
academic vacuum, removed from the in terplay of
ideas and the exchange of views with which the law
is concerned.
The Court’s concern in Sw eatt was, of course, the need of
black law students to in teract with th e ir w hite counterparts.
But there is no less need for whites to in teract w ith blacks.
The im portance th a t the law faculties a ttach to achieving
diversity w ithin th e ir student bodies is revealed in the ad
mission practices described earlier. Of course, with respect
to m any of the characteristics th a t are socially significant in
our p luralistic society, substan tial heterogeneity is achieved
w ithout deviating from admission criteria concerned only
with predicting the level of an applicant’s academic per
formance. Thus, even though on the average w hite appli
cants from low income families have lower LSAT scores and
GPAs than those from more affluent families, substantial
num bers do qualify for admission, w ithout special consid
eration, a t schools which have varying admissions s tan
dards.41 To the extent th a t diversity is not achieved in this
way, the schools commonly rely upon non-academic factors
to achieve it, always subject to the requirem ent th a t an ap
plicant’s predicted level of performance exceeds a school’s
m inim um standards. Thus, some schools give preference to
students from geographical areas th a t otherwise would not
41. Evans Report at 63.
51
be represented in the ir student bodies. Many, perhaps most,
are likely to prefer a student who has an uncommon back
ground—e.g., substan tial experience in business or law en
forcement or, perhaps advanced train ing in economics or
psychology—to others who have scored higher on predictors
of academic success. The admission decision in all such cases
rests upon the judgm ent of schools th a t the existence of this
diversity will contribute to the education of other students in
the class.
In view of the im portance of race in American life and the
im portance th a t it is certain to have for the indefinite future,
it would be s tartling if faculties had not concluded th a t the
absence of racial m inorities in law schools, or the ir presence
only in very small num bers, would significantly detract from
the educational experience of the student body. As a conse
quence of our history, race accounts for some of the most im
portan t differences in our society. Precisely because race is
so significant, prospective lawyers need knowledge of the
backgrounds, views, a ttitudes, aspirations, and m aners of
the members of racial minorities. It is true, or course, th a t
the members of a m inority group often differ with respect to
these characteristics, and th a t w ith respect to some or all of
them some members of m inority groups are indistinguisha
ble from m any whites. Encountering these diversities and
sim ilarities is, however, an im portant part of the educa
tional process. Well intentioned whites, no less than bigots,
need to learn th a t there is not a common "black experience”
and to appreciate the oversimplification of such statem ents
as "blacks w ant (believe, need, etc.). . . .” Moreover, the dis
tribution of attitudes among blacks, or among the members
of other racial minorities, undoubtedly is not the same as it is
among whites. And th a t too is worth knowing. If the dis
tribution of perceptions and views about politics or crime or
family is different among the several m inority groups than
52
among whites, th a t in and of itse lf may exert a shaping in
fluence upon law and public policy, an influence to which law
students m ust become sensitive if they are adequately to
serve th e ir fu ture clients and perform successfully th e ir fu
tu re roles as community leaders.
The educational objectives of a m inority presence in law
school, finally, encompass more th an increased understand
ing of m inority groups. There is also a need to increase effec
tive communication across racial lines. The difficulties th a t
stand in the way of achieving such communication are not
always obvious. Thus, an experienced law teacher has re
cently w ritten:42
I cannot im agine th a t any law teacher whose sub
ject m a tte r requires discussion of racially sensitive
issues can have failed to observe the inability of
some W hite students to exam ine critically a rgu
m ents by a Black, or the difficulty experienced by
others in expressing th e ir d isagreem ents w ith
Blacks on such issues. Yet, these skills are not only
a professional necessity, they are indispensable to
the long-term well-being of our society.
We have developed the educational objectives of special
admissions program s a t some length because of th e ir im
portance and because they are m atters about which law
teachers may claim to speak w ith special competence. The
im portance of those objectives has already and only recently
been recognized by this Court, albeit in a somewhat different
context. Thus in Sw ann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education, 402 U.S. 1, 16(1971), the Court acknowledged
th a t it was w ithin the authority of school officials to assign
pupils by race "in order to prepare students to live in a
p luralistic society.” Most law faculties, w ith the approval of
the governing bodies of the ir institu tions, have sim ilarly
42. Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education: Political Re
sponsibility and the Judicial Role, 42 U. Chi. L. Rev. 653, 684 (1975).
53
concluded th a t the educational environm ent necessary to
assure a sound legal education requires a racially in tegrated
student body.
C. Minority Group Lawyers Will Contribute To The Social
Mobility of Racial Minorities
The special adm issions program s th a t have been under
taken by the law schools m ust be seen as part of a larger
effort by the nation to improve the conditions of life of some
of its most disadvantaged citizens. In p a rt th a t effort in
volves an a ttem pt to accelerate the growth of a "middle
class” w ithin those racial and ethnic m inority groups th a t
historically have been denied the opportunity to participate
fully in the richness of Am erican life. The justification for
m inority preferences w ithin th a t overall strategy is not dif
ficult to discern: because of the continuing im portance of ra
cial and ethnic identifications and loyalties, there is reason
to anticipate th a t the strengthening of the black, Chicano, or
Puerto Rican middle class th rough such preferences will
have a catalytic effect. Increased num bers of black and His
panic lawyers and other professionals should encourage the
aspirations of black and Hispanic children. The organiza
tional ta len t and financial resources of a m inority middle
class, experience suggests, will to some extent be put a t the
service of less advantaged members of m inority groups. The
hope, in short, is to set in motion a chain reaction leading to
the break down of a complex of conditions th a t today con
demn large num bers to lives of poverty and desperation.
But if th is chain reaction is to occur it m ust begin. Profes
sional education is the last step in a long educational pro
cess. The abilities of an applicant to compete successfully for
law school admission is the product not only of 16 years of
previous schooling but also of the applicant’s cultural back
ground, a background in tim ately related to the educational
54
attainm ents of the applicant’s parents and of other adults
who have influenced his or her development. Even if there
were now to be im m ediate and effective compliance w ith the
command of Brown v. Board o f Education, and equal educa
tional opportunity in prim ary and secondary schools were
suddenly to become a reality , considerable tim e would have
to elapse before the effect of these changes could signifi
cantly affect the num ber and quality of m inority applicants
to law school. The command of Brown is not completely
obeyed, however, even after nearly a quarte r century. And
equal educational opportunity does not exist.
To deny professional schools the power to employ race-con
scious adm issions s tandards is, thus, to w ithhold from
m inorities, for a generation and perhaps longer, an impor
ta n t avenue of social mobility. The costs of w ithholding
realistic opportunities for professional education from the
curren t generation of m inority students will not be borne
only by them . It will be borne also by other members of
m inority groups who will be denied the service th a t would
have otherwise been provided to th e ir communities. It will
be borne by the next generation of m inority children who,
like those of previous generations, will lack a visible demon
stration of the potential rew ards of aspirations and effort.
And, not least, it will be borne by w hite Americans who, once
again, will have failed to m eet th e ir com m itm ent to achieve
racial equality.
D. Special Adm issions Effectively Respond To The Need
For More Minority Lawyers
M easured simply by the num ber of students in school,
there can be no question th a t the special admissions pro
gram s are a success: The num ber of m inority law students
has grown from 1.3% of the law student population in 1964 to
8.1% today. While th is is less than half of the 17% m inority
population in the country, the law schools have never pro-
55
posed stric t proportionality nor assumed th a t they could
singlehandedly overcome the continuing obstacles created
by the disadvantage suffered by m inority groups throughout
our society and particu larly in prim ary and secondary edu
cation.
Success cannot be m easured, however, by adm ission
statistics alone. If it could, the schools could simply set
quotas and adm it the designated num ber of m inority s tu
dents w ithout regard to th e ir qualifications. They have not
done so. Only 39% of the blacks who applied to law school in
1975 were adm itted; th is contrasts w ith the adm ittance rate
of 59% for the whites.43 W hat the law schools have done is
to accept m inority applicants who, considering all of the fac
tors deemed relevant, are believed to be qualified to succeed,
while in some cases pu tting an upper lim it on the num ber
who will be adm itted on th a t showing.44
The question, nevertheless, rem ains as to w hether the
special admissions program s can be said to be successful in
term s of actual performance in school and, after graduation,
in passing the bar exam ination. And there is a fu rther ques
tion: To w hat extent, if any, does the existence of special ad
missions programs have the effect of stigm atizing m inority
43. Evans Report at 37.
44. Probable success at a particular school may, of course, be quite dif
ferent from probable success at another. Thus one eastern school with very
high admissions standards, as shown by its profile, has a minority admis
sions program limited to approximately 10% of the entering class. See
Fleming & Poliak, The Black Quota at Yale Law School—An Exchange of
Letters, 19 The Public Interest 44, at 45 (Spring 1970). In this school the
special admissions policy resulted in 1976 in no admission of any student
with an LSAT below 550 and, below an LSAT of600, none with less than a
3.5 undergraduate grade point average. 1976-77 Prelaw Handbook 375
(1976). In 1972, the last year for which these figures are at hand, the me
dian LSAT for that school’s class as a whole, including minorities, was
723, for minorities, 648.1972-1973 Prelaw Handbook 345 (1972). To pick a
random example at the other end of the country, the median LSAT at one-
school in that same year was 585, id. at 153, and, excluding special admis
sions, was 620 in 1976.1976-1977 Prelaw Handbook 153 (1976).
56
students as separate and unequal and thus im peding ra th e r
than accelerating the goal of an in tegrated society which
these program s are designed to serve?
None of these considerations, as we show below, goes to the
constitutional issue in th is case. But they are im portant to
the law schools and to the society which the schools serve,
and we therefore address them. In so doing, we are frank to
adm it th a t the record is not perfect. The conduct of the edu
cational enterprise involves judgm ent and, a t tim es, exper
im ents which are not always successful. M istakes have been
made. The appropriate corrective for these m istakes, how
ever, is the schools’ own in terest in the success of th e ir effort,
ra th e r than a constitutional bar which prevents them from
m aking the effort. And the record is clear th a t the m istakes
have, indeed, been largely corrected.
1. S u c c e ss a t S ch oo l
The m istakes here have been of two varieties. The first
was the notion th a t the absence of a strong educational
background could be largely ignored. Some schools enrolled
students who, it could reasonably be predicted, would have
grave difficulty in m eeting m inim um standards of qualifica
tion but coupled the ir admission with intensive tra in ing and
tu to ria l work during the sum m er before school began.45 The
notion th a t a lifetime of deprivation could be compensated
for by a few m onths of intensive preparation proved to be
naive and rom antic, and it was quickly abandoned. The
statistics given above (see p. 55, supra) as to the ratio of
m inority applicants to adm ittances dem onstrate th a t the
day has long since passed, if it ever existed except in a few
cases, when the desire to enroll m inorities m eant th a t any
45. Hughes, McKay & Winograd, The Disadvantaged Student and
Preparation for Legal Education: The New York University Experience,
1970 Tol. L. Rev. 701.
57
m em ber of a m inority group who applied was adm itted.
A second, and related, error was the failure in some
schools to give effect to the increased a ttrition ra te necessar
ily im plicit in the institu tion of special admissions pro
grams. Even the best indicators of law school performance
are predictions subject to error. Given the escalated s tan
dards which some schools were using for regular admissions
in the th ird stage, the m argin for error was so large th a t it
became custom ary to expect th a t alm ost none who were ad
m itted would fail. When these schools began to adm it m inor
ity students whose predicted performance, while above the
passing level, was below th a t of the regular admissions pro
cess, it should have been anticipated th a t the attrition rate
would rise and would be concentrated predom inantly among
those specially adm itted. Some schools failed to recognize
this and regarded any substan tial num ber of failures among
adm itted m inority students as symptoms of failure of the
program ra th e r than as a necessary concomitant of success.
Refusal by a school to adm it applicants who have an 80%
chance of success would resu lt in denial of admission to 8 out
of 10 who will succeed and to the 1 or 2 of th a t num ber who
will succeed superbly. But the price of this 80% chance of
success is a failure rate of 20%, unless something else is
done, a fact not im m ediately recognized by some.
Tutorial program s were generally institu ted in an effort to
alleviate the a ttrition problem but here too a lack of experi
ence sometimes resulted in ineffective programs. One com
mon m istake was to assume th a t success of the programs
would be enhanced if the num ber of those adm itted were
small. The effect, in many cases, turned out to be precisely
the opposite. The introduction of a very small num ber of
m inority students into a previously all-white environm ent
intensified pressures leading to poor performance which
m ight not have existed if there were substantial representa-
58
tion from the m inority groups.46 In tim e and with experi
ence, most of these difficulties have been resolved. U nfortu
nately, we have no statistics showing a ttrition rates by race
for entering classes prior to 1971 and by th a t tim e the correc
tion had been made by m any schools. (The available figures
are set forth in the Table and C hart below.) The figures for
1971 correspond to w hat one would expect. The a ttrition ra te
of all students had fallen from 38.4% in 1950 to 13% as law
schools began moving from w hat we have called the second
to the th ird stage of the admissions process and became in
creasingly selective in adm itting students. But the a ttrition
ra te for m inority students who first enrolled in 1971 was a l
most 23%, a ra te comparable to the 26% ra te for all students
in 1965.
W ith the increase in the quality and quantity of m inority
applicants in the succeeding years the m inority attrition
rate has now fallen to approxim ately 17%. The trend is en
couraging and indicates th a t the special admissions pro
gram s are in general working as they were designed to.
46. Id. at 711-712.
T ab le 1
ENROLLMENT AND ATTRITION
Y ea r E ntered F irs t Y ear E n ro llm en t A d ju sted S econd Y ear A ttr itio n R a te
E nro llm en t
All Students Minority All Students Minority All Students Minority
1950 ■ 16,411 10,111 38.4%
1955 14,460 9,888 32.5
1960 15,607 10,958 29.8
1965 24,167 17,559 26.6
1970 34,289 30,073 12.7
1971 36,171 2,567 31,077 1,988 13.0 22.6%
1972 35,131 2,934 30,980 2,287 11.8 22.1
1973 37,018 3,114 33,489 2,602 9.5 16.4
1974 38,074 3,308 34,227 2,639 10.1 20.2
1975 39,083 3,413 35,189 2,846 10.0 16.6
Source: ABA, Lain S c h o o ls a n d B a r A d m is s io n R e q u ir e m e n ts (1950M1976). This table was derived from enrollment
data presented in each annual report of law school statistics. Second-year enrollments used in calculating attrition
rate6 were adjusted by subtracting the number of second-year students in new schools approved after the count of
first-year students for that entering class. Thus the first-year enrollments show all first-year students in ABA-
approved law schools and the second-year enrollments show all second-year students enrolled the following year in
those same schools.
59
2. Success in Passing the Bar
The early errors, both in admission and in dealing with
those adm itted under special admissions programs, were
also reflected in some cases in high failure rates of m inority
graduates in the bar exam ination.
Here again the evidence is th a t the mistakes have been
corrected and th a t th e p ic tu re is im proving. N ational
statistics on bar exam ination passage rates are not available
by race or ethnic group.47 However, a study was made in one
state, California, as part of an effort to determ ine w hether
there was any racial or ethnic bias in the bar exam ination of
th a t state. The study covered in full only the graduates of the
law schools of California in the years 1970-73. It showed the
expected increase in the num ber of m inority graduates, from
59 in 1970 to 283 in 1973. I t also showed th a t the percentage
47. For an admittedly incomplete tabulation focusing primarily on
blacks taking the bar examination, see Hinds, Keynote Introduction: "The
Minority Candidate and the Bar Examination,” 5 Black L.J. 123, 124-36
(1977). However, individual schools are often notified of the results of
their graduates, from which some data has been gathered, and special
programs such as CLEO seek to survey their participants to determine bar
examination results.
Year
60
of those passing the bar exam ination on the first attem pt
dropped from 51.9% in 1970, to 40.9% in 1971, and to 35.3%
in 1972. In 1973, however, the percentage passing on the
first tim e showed a slight increase, to 37.3%.48
We have no la ter figures for the state as a whole, but we do
have figures from one of the larger schools which contributed
to the 1970-1973 decline, the U niversity of California a t Los
Angeles. These show th a t in the period between 1970 and
1973 the pass ra te of m inority graduates tak ing the bar ex
am ination for the first tim e was less than 21%. These were
the students, it will be remembered, who were adm itted a t
the very early stages of the special adm issions program in
1967-1969. In 1973 the first-tim e passage ra te rose to 23%
and in the three years since th a t tim e the first-tim e passage
ra te has ranged between 39 and 50% ,49 S tatistics from other
states and program s such as CLEO could be exam ined to
show a sim ilar pa tte rn .50
Failures on the bar exam ination reflect in part m istakes
made in the early stages of development of special adm is
sions program s and in part the risks th a t the law schools
have w illingly taken in estab lish ing those program s.51
These failures have, concededly, created tensions. But those
tensions are the unavoidable price which m ust be paid for
the achievem ent of a tru ly in tegrated bar.
48. These figures are derived from Tables 1 through 4 of Appendix A to
State Bar of California, Report of Commission to Study the Bar Examina
tion Process (1973). They are summarized at California Legislative Anal
ysis of the 1976-77 Budget Bill, Report of the Legislative Analyst to the
Joint Legislative Budget Committee 820 (1976).
49. See Rappaport, The Case for Law School Minority Programs, Los
Angeles Times, Opinions Section, p. 1 (Mar. 14, 1976).
50. See CLEO, Annual Report of Executive Director (1976).
51. For a further explanation of these developments, see Warren, Panel
on "Factors Contributing to Bar Examination Failure,” 5 Black L. J. 149-52
(1977). See also Carlson & Werts, Relationships Among Law School Pre
dictors, Law School Performance, and Bar Examination Results, LSAC
76-1, at vii (1976) ("The LSAT has a stronger relationship with bar exam
ination performance than with law school grades.”).
61
3. The Argument on Stigmatization
W hat has gone before raises the one serious question
which m any in educational circles and elsew here have
raised as to the desirability of special admissions programs.
There is, concededly, a danger th a t th e consequence of these
program s m ay be to reinforce adverse stereotypes regarding
in tellectual capability and thus re tard continued develop
m ent tow ard the goal of equality. On balance, however, the
law schools of th is country have concluded th a t th is danger is
far sm aller th an the danger th a t these misconceptions will
persist as the resu lt of exclusion of m inorities from the pro
fession.
The argum ent has several th reads. The first goes to
w hether in fact there is stigm a attached to admission under
a special admissions program as compared to the stigm a of
denial. A lthough it is true th a t m inority students adm itted
under special adm issions program s are somewhat lower on
the predictors of law school performance, it is not true th a t
unqualified applicants are being adm itted. And although it
is true th a t, on average, of those adm itted by special adm is
sions some will perform a t a lower level than others, it is also
true th a t some will perform far better. Finally, so far as we
now know, the relative place on the scale of indicators and
in law school grades is only very loosely related to relative
competence in the practice of law. There are simply too many
individuals—black and w hite—who have contributed sub
stan tia lly to the legal profession, though the ir law school
careers were undistinguished, to tre a t relative grades let
alone the predictors of those grades as constituting a m ark of
inferiority. On the other hand, the presence of substantial
num bers of members of m inority groups heretofore largely
excluded from the profession m eans the addition of lawyers
who, precisely because of the ir racial and ethnic characteris
tics, will be in a unique position to contribute to the in tegra
tion of American life.
62
Secondly, the argum ent th a t special adm issions program s
should be abandoned because they stigm atize the preferred
groups has a patronizing and paternalistic ring when u t
tered by those who complain th a t they are denied admission
because others are given a preference. If the professional
schools had imposed these program s upon a re luc tan t m inor
ity th e a rg u m en t m igh t, n ev e rth e less , be en title d to
credence. But the fact is th a t once the law schools of th is
country let it be known in the m inority com munities th a t
admission to the schools was possible under special adm is
sions programs, the dem and for th e ir continuance and, in
deed, enlargem ent, has been overwhelming. The outrage
expressed by v irtually every segm ent of the m inority com
m unity a t the decision of the court below bears testim ony to
the conclusion th a t a prohibition of special adm issions pro
gram s on constitutional grounds will hardly be accepted as a
benefit because it avoids stigm atization. We are confident
th a t the briefs filed in th is Court on behalf of those who
would be excluded if the decision of the court below is af
firmed will amply confirm th a t testimony.
Finally, the argum ent th a t the program s should be discon
tinued because of the ir stigm atizing effect, if it has a place, is
properly made not in th is case but in the educational and
political forum. The com plaint in th is case is not th a t special
ad m issions p rog ram s are u n fa ir to b lacks and o th e r
m inorities and, hence, are unconstitutional. To the contrary,
the complaint is th a t the program s are unconstitutional be
cause they add a small num ber to the very large num ber of
qualified white applicants who perforce m ust be denied ad
mission to medical (and law) schools. There is, in th is case,
we assert, no place for the argum ent th a t the p lain tiff should
prevail on his constitutional claim because it will, in the end,
be good for those who are the real defendants in interest.
63
III. SPECIAL ADMISSIONS PROGRAMS ARE FULLY
CONSISTENT WITH THE CONSTITUTION
Since the parties, and no doubt other amici, will fully brief
the Court on the constitutional issues raised by special ad
missions program s, we have thought we m ight render the
greatest assistance by inform ing the Court of the im perative
need for such program s in the law schools. We recognize, of
course, th a t however compelling the need the programs can
not be justified if they transgress constitutional lim itations.
It may be appropriate, therefore, th a t we state briefly the
reasons for our belief th a t the programs are fully consistent
with the Constituion.
Students of constitutional law have expressed varying
views about w hether special admission programs should be
subjected to "strict judicial scrutiny” or w hether the ir valid
ity should be judged under a more relaxed standard of re
view. Redish,Preferential School Adm issions and the Equal
Protection Clause: A n Analysis o f the Competing Arguments,
22 UCLA L. Rev. 343 (1974). We do n o ten ter this dispute, for
its is abundantly clear th a t the program s survive the most
exacting scrutiny.
To m eet the test of such scrutiny, the Court has held, a
governm ental program m ust be "necessary to promote a
compelling sta te in terest.” Cipriano v. City o f Houma, 395
U.S. 701, 704 (1969); D unn v. B lum stein, 405 U.S. 330
(1972); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973). Section I of this
B rief dem onstrates, beyond any possibility of doubt, the
necessity for the programs. W ithout them , only a negligible
num ber of m inority students would be enrolled in the na
tion’s law schools. The program s are, moreover, aimed with
precision a t the ir objectives, racially in tegrating law schools
and su b s ta n tia lly in c reasin g th e num ber of m inority
lawyers. Nor is there any realistic prospect th a t those objec
tives can be met in any other way. Every alternative th a t has
64
been suggested would fail to produce any but a negligible
num ber of m inority students. Most would, in addition, have
disastrous collateral effects upon the schools and the bar.
The only serious question, therefore, is w hether the pro
gram s serve "a compelling state in terest.” Our reasons for
believing th a t they do are set forth in detail a t pp. 39-54,
supra. We can conceive of no governm ental in terests more
compelling th an in tegrating the nation’s law schools, in
creasing the num ber of m inorities a t the bar, and achieving
equality for m inority groups whose members have histori
cally been denied opportunities th a t were the ir righ t as
Americans.
The Court has not, of course, yet had an opportunity to
speak directly to the issues in th is case. Several of its recent
decisions, however, strongly support our conclusion th a t the
Constitution perm its consideration of race in the service of
goals such as those we have identified. We have already di
rected atten tion to Sw ann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board
of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971) where the Court recog
nized the propriety of race-conscious school assignm ents de
signed "to prepare students to live in a pluralistic soci
ety . . . .” The propriety of race-conscious program s aimed
a t in tegrating other governm ental institu tions was im plicit
also in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), where in
rejecting the claim th a t W ashington’s selection criteria for
police officers discrim inated against blacks, the Court relied
in p art on "the affirm ative efforts of the M etropolitan Police
D epartm ent to recruit black officers. . . .”
Several cases decided during the past Term have recog
nized, even more directly, the propriety of governm ental ac
tion aimed a t redressing historic injustices w ithin our soci
ety. Thus, in United Jewish Organizations ofW illiam sburgh
v. Carey, 97 S. Ct. 996 (1977), the Court sustained a race
conscious reapportionm ent plan designed "to protect the op-
65
portunities for non-whites to be elected to public office” and
thereby to assure fair representation of m inorities in the
legislature. In th a t case, as in the present one, there was no
finding of past discrim ination. But the Court held, "[t]he
perm issible use of racial criteria is not confined to elim inat
ing the effects of past discrim inatory districting or appor
tionm ent.” The governm ental action was "broadly rem edial”
and, for th a t reason, fully consistent w ith the equal protec
tion clause.
Sim ilarly, in Califano v. Webster, 97 S.Ct. 1192 (1977), the
Court sustained a formula calculating social security bene
fits th a t was more favorable to women than to men. To w ith
s ta n d c o n s t i tu t io n a l s c ru tin y , th e C o u rt observ ed ,
" 'c lass ifica tio n by gender m ust serve im p o rtan t gov
ernm ental objectives . . . . ’ ” T hat test was met because
"[Reduction of the disparity of economic conditions between
men and women caused by the long history of discrim ination
against women has been recognized as such an im portant
governm ental objective.” The challenged classification did
not, the Court stressed, rest upon "archaic and overbroad
generalizations,” bu t upon a careful judgm ent of the need for
preferential trea tm en t if the effects of the historic discrim i
nation against women were to be redressed.
Webster and W illiamsburgh are controlling in the present
case. Here, as in those cases, the purpose of the challenged
governm ental action is "broadly rem edial,” to overcome the
effects of the historic discrim ination against minorities.
Moreover, special m inority admissions program s do not rest
upon "archaic and overbroad generalizations,” bu t upon a
solid foundation of inform ation concerning the need for them
if the compelling social objectives th a t they serve are to be
met. Efforts will no doubt be made to distinguish Webster
and W illiamsburgh on the ground th a t neither involved the
denial of a governm ental benefit to an identifiable in-
66
dividual. But the fact th a t some students who m ight other
wise be adm itted to law school are denied admission because
of special admissions program s is not constitutionally rele
vant. Since the num ber of qualified applicants exceeds the
places available, any selection criteria m ust exclude some
one. The sole issue is w hether the criteria employed are con
stitu tionally permissible. In view of the compelling social
needs th a t they serve, needs th a t could not be m et in any
other way, we believe th a t the admissions criteria employed
in special admissions program s clearly m eet th a t test.
CO NC LU SIO N
The judgm ent below should be reversed.
Respectfully subm itted,
A. K enneth Pye
Francis A. Allen
Robert B. McKay
Attorneys for the Association
of Am erican Law Schools
June 7, 1977
David E. Feller
E rnest Gellhorn
Terrance Sandalow
Of Counsel