Greenberg Statement on Dismissal of Suit to Reduce Congressional Representation of State Practicing Voter Discrimination

    MEMORANDUM 

To: Marianne Lado 

From: Garnethia Pettiford 

Date: June 18, 1991 

Re: Sheff v. O'Neill 
  

A. Introduction: 

This memorandum responds to the question of whether the courts 

in prior cases have addressed the educational needs of Latinos, 

Chicanos and other Hispanic groups in formulating desegregation 

remedies. The Hispanic population presents special challenges to 

the development of a desegregation plan, due to their cultural and 

language differences. The potentially harsh changes that confront 

a community facing a desegregation plan, such as transporting 

students from a familiar community setting to an environment that 

is unfamiliar, without support systems in place, can be traumatic 

and cause developmental delays. As a result, desegregation 

planners need to become sensitive to differences of the varied 

communities and address them appropriately. This memo will provide 

an historical overview. 

Section (I) of this memo will outline cases which use the term 

minority but do not particularize the educational needs of any 

single group. Section (II) of the memo will discuss how the courts 

have addressed the needs of the Mexican-American population. 

Section (III) will specifically address cases in which the courts’ 

1 

 



  

have in previous desegregation plans addressed the particular 

educational needs of the Hispanic population. A conclusion follows 

this section. 

I. Cases which use the term minority as all inclusive, and do not 

identify specific programs geared toward non-black minorities. 

Several desegregation cases involved diverse populations that 

included Latinos, Mexican-Americans or other Spanish-dominant 

groups. In these cases, however, the courts orders acknowledged no 

special needs and ordered no special treatment. 

In 1970-1971 the school district of Dallas County had an 8.4% 

hispanic enrollment. By 1981 it had ballooned to 82.2%. Tasby Vv. 
  

Wright 520 F.Supp 683 (N.D. Texas 1981), a desegregation case on 

remand from the Court of Appeals. Hart v. Community School Board 
  

of Brooklyn, New York School District #21, 383 F.Supp. 699 (E.D. 
  

New York 1974). Under the desegregation plan adopted by the court, 

Hispanics would be combined with blacks for purposes of defining a 

segregated school. In Norwalk v. Norwalk Board of Education, 298 
  

F.Supp. 213 (D. Conn. 1969), a class action by Black and Puerto 

Rican school children, Hispanic and African-America plaintiffs 

challenged the requirement that they travel to schools out side of 

their neighborhoods when there was no similar burden placed on the 

Anglos. Other Hispanic and African-Americans were opposed to 

 



  

plaintiffs action attempted to intervene and were denied. The 

complaint was dismissed. 

II. Desegregation and the Mexican-American Population. 

This section looks at how the courts have addressed the 

educational needs of the Mexican-American population, when this 

population has directly challenged segregation. Although the 

educational needs of Mexican-Americans may be different from other 

Hispanic groups, this section will provide some insight into the 

importance the court has put on their cultural, developmental and 

educational needs in contemplating a desegregation plan. 

In Alvarado v. El Paso Independent School District, Mexican- 
  

American parents on behalf of themselves, their children and other 

parents and children located in the district of El Paso, alleged 

that defendants operated and maintained dual and racially 

segregated school systems, 426 F.Supp. 575 (W.D. Texas 1976). 

Plaintiffs in the suit identified several disparities in 

treatment provided to Anglo-Americans as compared to the Mexican- 

Americans, such as air conditioning in the Anglo schools and no the 

Mexican-American schools. Moreover, actions were taken by the 

defendants that discriminated against Mexican-Americans. These 

actions included the gerrymandering of attendance zones, 

construction of a new high school and elementary school in the 

minority community to foster segregation, transportation of 

 



  

students on certain bus routes, and the districts' failure to hire 

and promote qualified Mexican-American teachers to predominately 

Anglo-American schools. The district court found that these 

factors established a prima facie case tending to show intentional 

discrimination. Id. at 591. 

After making a finding of discrimination, the district court 

ordered the following remedy: (1) a transportation system to 

facilitate desegregation. It would enable any Mexican-American 

students attending the newly created minority school to attend 

other schools. In addition any other non-minority student from the 

other high schools could voluntarily attend the new school; (2) 

restructuring of attendance zones to equalize the percentage of 

Mexican-American students attending each school; (3) increasing the 

number of air-conditioned schools to equal those of the Anglo- 

American; (4) the recruitment of sufficiently qualified bilingual- 

bicultural teachers and Hispanic administrative personnel to 

achieve a racial balance; (5) the assignment of additional teachers 

and administrative staff to predominately Mexican-American or 

Anglo-American schools; (6) affirmative promotion of minority 

staff. Id. at 613. Of the 4,800 students involved in the program in 

1975, 60% were of Spanish surname. On appeal, Alvarado v. El Paso 
  

Independent School District, 593 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1979), the   

court affirmed the lower court decision. Id. at 584. 

 



  

In U.S. v. Texas Education Agency, 532 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 
  

1976), Dedra Estell Overton a Mexican-American, intervened on the 

plaintiffs side, against the Austin Independent School District, 

defendants (AISD). The suit charged the district with operating a 

school system that discriminated against Blacks and Mexican- 

Americans. The first elementary school desegregation plan imposed 

by the court included meetings of students one week per month to 

participate in certain cultural activities as a move toward 

integration. U.S. v. Texas Education Agency, 467 F.2d 848, 875 (5th 
  

Cir. :1972). The Fifth Circuit court, however, reversed the 

district court's order, holding that part-time desegregation did 

not meet constitutional requirements. Id. at 875. On remand the 

district court adopted the ASID's new desegregation plan, which 

left untouched the students in grades K-5 and 7-12. U.S. v. Texas 
  

Education Agency, 532 F.2d 380, 393. For reasons similar to those 
  

that underlay the rejection of the first plan the court rejected 

the second plan. Id. at 393. 

The district court had adopted a sixth grade plan proposed by 

AISD. It essentially established six elementary schools in 

different geographic parts of the school district as sixth-grade 

centers. Of the six sixth grade centers, two would have had Anglo 

populations of over 80 percent, while the sixth grade population at 

the two junior high schools as part of the six grade plan would be 

97 percent minority. The plan required the busing of approximately 

1900 students, of which 62% would be Anglo. U.S. v. Texas Education 
  

 



  

Agency, 532 F.24 380, 393, To provide equal educational 

opportunities for all students, the school district began the 

development of a bilingual educational program and made several 

changes in the boundary lines elementary schools to produce a more 

balanced racial and ethnic composition. Id. at 393. 

The court held that the ASID's plan was insufficient and 

reversed and remanded this finding to the district court to provide 

a system that the Constitution requires. (see also U.S. v. Texas 
  

Education Agency, 579 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1978), petition filed and 
  

denied for rehearing of the decision). The Mexican-American 

intervenors submitted a desegregation plan prepared by Dr. Finger 

to the circuit court panel, which would have provided for an 

extensive restructuring and busing of students. U.S. v. Texas 
  

Education Agency, 532 F.2d 380, 395. The ASID objected. But, the 
  

objections were not found to be significant enough to invalidate 

the entire plan. Id. at 396. 

In U.S. v. State of Texas, 498 F.Supp, 1356 (E.D. Texas 1980), 
  

intervenor Gregory-Portland Independent School district sought to 

prevent the Texas Education Agency (TEA) from suspending, 

accrediting and funding pursuant to a previous court order entered 

in a statewide school desegregation case. Moreover, the school 

district sought declaratory judgment that it had not discriminated 

based on race. Id. at 1373. The district court in U.S. v. State of 
  

Texas, 498 F.Supp 1356, held that the state of Texas and its 

 



  

6 i» 

administrative agencies had persistently and intentionally 

segregated and discriminated against Mexican-American children in 

public schools. Id. at 1373. Therefore, the state was under an 

affirmative obligation to eliminate all vestiges of discrimination 

against this population. U.S. v. State of Texas, 498 F.Supp. at 
  

1373. 

Prior to 1949, the Gregory Independent School District (GISD) 

and Portland Common School District (PCSD) in Texas each operated 

segregated elementary schools for Mexican-American students. Id. at 

1369. In 1949-50 these separate school systems were terminated. 

Id. at 1369. Nevertheless, the school district assigned Mexican- 

American school children in a manner that discriminated; each 

Mexican-American student was assigned to a particular grade in a 

segregated classroom. Furthermore, if Mexican-American children 

attempted to transfer from parochial schools, they were not given 

full credit for their education at the parochial school and were 

often penalized by being required to repeat a grade. Id. at 1372. 

The overall population for the district was 37% Mexican-American 

and 63% White. However in three of the four elementary schools, 

one race or the other separately accounted for over 85% of the 

student body. Id. at 1368. 

The district court sitting in Texas sought to remedy this 

situation with a plan proposed by the Texas Educational Agency. 

The plan required each elementary school to be made into one 

 



  

educational facility: that is, all children within the district in 

a particular grade were required to attend one school. Id. at 1374. 

One other plan that was proposed excluded the first and second 

grades from the remedial action and thus was rejected by the court. 

The court also rejected a plan proposed by an appointed expert 

explicitly because it placed a heavier transportation burden on 

Mexican-American students than on Anglo students. 

On appeal the question presented was under what circumstances 

did the Constitution require a transportation remedy to produce a 

racial balance. U.S. Vv. Greqory-Portland Independent School 
  

District, 654 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1981), The Fifth Circuit panel   

held where the segregated condition had not been caused by any 

governmental action whatsoever, the school board had no 

constitutional duty to integrate schools just because they happened 

to have different ethnic mixes in their populations. Thus its 

decisions to continue community schools did not violate the 

constitution. The Fifth Circuit court reasoned, where the 

"existence of an ethnically identifiable student body at one 

elementary school was the consequence of corresponding Mexican- 

American population concentration in a somewhat distinct and 

isolated part of the district, this imputed no obligation on the 

school board to desegregate." Id. at 1005. 

Summary: 

 



  

® » 

The desegregation of the Mexican-American population has 

mirrored that of the black population. The primary goal of 

plaintiffs had been to achieve racial balance in the schools. 

Remedies have centered on the integration of the various ethnic 

groups. In addition, courts have recognized a need for, and 

plaintiffs have sought to create bilingual classes to foster an 

environment conducive to learning for Mexican-American children and 

students. See Alvarado v. El Paso Independent School District, 426 
  

F.Supp. 575 (1976). Remedies ordered in these cases have focused 

on systemic changes, such as the transportation of students and 

rezoning of school districts to foster integration. 

III. Desegregation and the Puerto Rican and Chicano (Hispanic) 

population. 

This section will focus on cases which address the particular 

needs of the Hispanic population in formulating a desegregation 

plan. The leading case in this area is Keyes v. School District 
  

No. 1, Denver Colorado, 380 F.Supp. 673 (D.Colorade 1974); 
  

modified: 521 F.2d 465. This case involved a class action brought 

on behalf of Black and Hispanic school children to challenge 

segregation in the Denver school system. Id. at 674. The school 

district's plan adopted by the court had four sections: (1) racial 

and ethnic integration of the professional staff through 

reassignment and retraining; (2) integration of the student body 

through changes in the use of the facilities; (4) integration 

 



  

through programs, activities and related improvements. Id. at 675. 

The Plaintiffs' plan rejected by the court, included: (1) 

desegregation of students and faculty, administration, and staff; 

(2) integration of students, faculty, administration, and staff; 

(3) adequate educational explanations regarding the new educational 

system and education of the entire community; (4) installation of 

adequate and necessary curricula to improve the quality of the 

education; and (5) supportive services such as counseling, 

nutrition, health and discipline. Id. at 679. 

In addition, Plaintiffs endorsed a proposed educational plan, 

the Cardenas plan, submitted by intervenor, the Congress of 

Hispanic Educators. The Cardenas Plan, prepared by Dr. Jose 

Cardenas to address the problems that minority children, 

particularly Chicano children encounter in the typical American 

school system. The plaintiffs argued, minority students should not 

be required to reject their own culture, linguistic, economic and 

other characteristics in order to adapt to an educational program 

imposed upon them. Id. at 681. One educational element called for 

by the Cardenas plan was the utilization of bilingual training by 

students and staff. Id. at 695. The district court in Keyes agreed 

that the Cardenas plan should be implemented on a pilot basis with 

similar programs to be developed at various schools. Id. at 696. 

The district court, however, found both the Plaintiffs!" and 

10 

 



  

Defendants' plans otherwise unacceptable. Id. at 683. The court 

gave the parties its thinking and guidelines and commenced an 

independent study for the purpose of developing a workable plan or 

program. The district court in Keyes, found that Denver's minority 

schools had provided students with an inferior education. It 

determined that a remedy was necessary. 

The Tenth Circuit Court stated that the district court had 

limited remedial power. Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver 
  

Colorado, 521 F.2d 465. Intervenor Congress of Hispanic Education   

(CHE) submitted to the district court the Cardenas plan for the 

bicultural-bilingual education of minority children in Denver. 

The Cardenas plan was premised on the theory that the poor 

performance of minority children in public schools results from 

incompatibilities between the cultural and developmental 

characteristics of minority children on the one hand and the 

methods and expectations of teachers on the other hand. Id. at 480. 

Conflicts between minorities and the Anglo system were pervasive. 

The plan required an overhaul of the system's entire approach to 

education of minorities. The proposal extended to matters of 

educational philosophy, governance, instructional scope and 

sequence, curriculum, student evaluation, staffing, non- 

instructional service and community involvement. The plan also 

  

'. See 380 F.Supp 673. In its April 1974 final judgment the 
district court ordered the school authorities to implement the plan 
on a pilot basis. 

11 

 



  

proposed a mechanism for comprehensive monitoring of the program's 

status. Id. at 481. 

Plaintiffs and CHE contended that inclusion of the plan in the 

court's order was justified on either of two grounds. First, it 

was necessary to effectuate meaningful desegregation in the 

schools. The plan would force school authorities to establish a 

receptive scholastic environment for minority students in order to 

eradicate the problem of isolation of minorities. Second, the plan 

corrected the School Board's failure to provide an equal 

educational opportunity for minority children. The Keyes case is 

important to the question of whether the court in prior cases have 

addressed the needs of the Latino and other Hispanic groups in 

formulating a desegregation plan. Keyes established a standard for 

addressing the needs of the Hispanic population in formulating a 

desegregation remedy. As such, this case has lead to further 

litigation. 

In Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 521 F.2d 
  

465, the appellate court reviewed the district courts order. 

Parents of African-American and other minority students challenged 

the alleged segregation in the school system.” The Tenth Circuit 

panel considered two plans: The Finger plan adopted by the district 

  

2 On remand from the Supreme Court, 412 U.S. 189, Denver 
Colorado, 1973, the U. 8S. district court for the district of 
Colorado, 368 F. Supp. 207, Denver Colorado, 1973, held the school 
system to be a dual system. The district court subsequently 
adopted a desegregation plan, 380 F.Supp 673. 

12 

 



  

= 

court and the Plaintiffs plan. The Finger plan required first that 

24 schools to rezoned. Second, 23 other schools would be rezoned 

and would receive students from satellite attendance areas. Third, 

approximately 37 schools would be organized in pairs or clusters 

for purposes of the part-time assignment of students on a classroom 

basis. Id. at 475. 

Plaintiffs challenged the requirement that 1,000 minority 

students be transported to seven schools in the extreme southern 

portions of the city. Id. at 479. The circuit court acknowledged 

that these students would bear a heavy burden under Denver's 

desegregation plan. As such, special provisions to ease the 

hardships of long distance travel should be a part of the plan. 

The court further stated that based on projections made by Dr. 

Finger, who was in charge of developing the plan, the court 

opinioned that the overall transportation plan did not over burden 

the minority students. Although Plaintiffs' plan would have 

allocated the burdens of transportation more evenly between 

minority and Anglo children, the plaintiffs' plan required 

substantially more transportation overall and was not required by 

the constitution. Id. at 479. 

Moreover, the Keyes court on appeal struggled with whether the 

district court properly left certain predominately Hispanic Schools 

segregated. Under the district court's order, five schools were 

left with a high percentages of minority students. Keyes v. School 
  

13 

 



  

District No. 1. Denver, Colorado, 380 F.Supp. at 692, 717. The 
  

district court justified the continued segregation of the students 

on the grounds that the schools were inaccessible and the 

institution or continuation of bilingual-bicultural required 

specific programming. Keyes Vv. School District No. 1, Denver, 
  

  
Colorado, 521 F.2d at 465, 480. The circuit court rejected this. 

The circuit court panel stated that such action could only be 

justified on the grounds that practical or other legitimate 

considerations rendered desegregation unwise or on the basis of 

proof that the racial compositions of these schools is the result 

of past discriminatory actions. 

The circuit court found that bilingual education was not a 

substitute for desegregation. Although it may be required to 

prevent the isolation of minority students in a predominately Anglo 

school system, such instruction must be subordinated to a plan of 

school desegregation. Id. at 480. The Tenth Circuit court 

determined that the district court's adoption of the plan 

overstepped the limits of its remedial powers. It reasoned that 

courts have the power to effectuate their remedial orders by 

removing all obstacles to meaningful desegregation, however, the 

court was limited to the boundaries of the proven constitutional 

violation and its relationship to the ordered relief. Id. 481. 

14 

 



  

omer 

On remand, from the Supreme Court’, the Circuit court 

determined that since many elementary school Chicano children are 

expected to acquire normal basic learning skills that are taught 

through the medium of an unfamiliar language, a meaningful 

desegregation plan must provide for the transition of Spanish- 

speaking children to the English language. Id. at 482. 

Nonetheless, the Tenth Circuit panel still found the Cardenas plan 

to go beyond helping Hispanic school children reach the proficiency 

in English necessary to learn other basic subjects. The circuit 

court asserted that the district's court's order would 

unnecessarily impose upon school authorities a pervasive and 

detailed system for the education of minority children. Id. at 482. 

The circuit court further stated that educational policy is an 

area where the court lacks specialized knowledge and experience. 

The policy of the state of Colorado is to encourage local school 

districts to develop bilingual skills and to assist in the 

transition of non-English speaking students to English. The court 

here found that the plan would unjustifiably interfere with such 

state and local attempts to deal with the myriad economic, social 

and philosophical problems connected with the education of minority 

students. Id. at 482. 

  

See Keyes v. School District No. 1. Denver Colorado, 413 
U.8. 189. (1973). 

35 

 



  

® ® 

The circuit court characterized both the plaintiffs’ and 

intervenors plans as requesting a right to the differential 

treatment of minority children in the educational process. 

According to the Tenth Circuit panel, plaintiffs' argued that the 

Fourteenth Amendment entitled minority students to an educational 

experience tailored to their unique cultural and developmental 

needs. The circuit court refused to affirm the district court's 

adoption of the Cardenas plan. This was based on the grounds for 

supporting the plan that the school's alleged failure to adapt to 

the cultural and economic needs of minority students amounts to a 

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 480. 

In Garcia v. Board of Education District No. 1, Denver, 
  

Colorado and Dr. Iouis J. Kishunas, Hispanic residents of the 
  

Denver community sought relief from the desegregation plan 

articulated in Keyes. 573 F.2d. 676 (10th Cir.1978). Plaintiffs 

were Hispanic school children and their parents all of whom reside 

in a predominately Hispanic community in Denver. Plaintiffs wanted 

to stop desegregation of their neighborhood school. The district 

court granted the school board's motion to dismiss® and plaintiffs 

appealed. Prior to the implementation of the desegregation plan, 

all of the children attended their neighborhood school, Swansea 

Elementary. Under the desegregation plan that was adopted, under 

Keyes, one-half of the children attending the school were bused to 

  

Keves v. School District No. 1, D. Colo., 313 F.Supp. 61 
(1970). 

16 

 



  

a school in another section of the city. It is this transfer to 

which the plaintiffs objected, of which they sought to enjoin the 

operation. 

Defendant school board moved to dismiss the complaint on the 

one ground that plaintiffs were bound by the results in Keyes In 

Keyes, the district court's certification identified the plaintiff 

class as Negro and Hispanic children who were attending schools 

that were predominately minority in their racial and ethnic pupil 

population. It also included Anglo children attending 

predominately Anglo schools. In addition to the school board as 

defendants in Garcia, there were intervening children and parents 

who opposed any remedy that would require leaving their 

neighborhood schools and generally opposed any relief beyond a 

voluntary plan to insure quality education for all Denver school 

children. 

Plaintiffs in Garcia made the following argument: (1) their 

community was not involved in Keyes until the final decree in 

March, 1976, thus they were not bound by the decision. The Tenth 

Circuit panel asserted, however, that the record negated this 

contention. Id. at 678. The Hispanic community was mentioned in 

the 1973 Keyes decision.’ On remand to the district court the 

  

> Supreme Court decision, 413 U.S. 189, 192 n.4. (1973). 

17 

 



  

Swansea school’ was specifically considered and was not included 

in the desegregation plan because of the institution of a 

bilingual-bicultural program. The decision not to include the 

school was deemed erroneous on appeal and the case was remanded for 

further consideration of the disposition of the Swansea school and 

other Hispanic schools.’ It was after the appellate court's 

decision to reconsider the Cardenas plan that the school board 

passed the resolution at issue in the case that included the 

Swansea community school and the district court approved it. Id. at 

679. 

The Tenth Circuit Garcia panel stated that the parties in 

Keyes represented broad views on the desegregation controversy. 

Plaintiffs in Garcia argued that they were not parties to the 

litigation. Plaintiffs reasoned that because their community was 

predominately Hispanic and because they did not wish to take part 

in any segregation remedy, their interests were neither the same as 

nor adequately represented by the plaintiff class. Garcia v. Board 
  

of Education District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 313 F. Supp 679. 
  

Defendants contended that the intervening defendants in Keyes, 

parents and children who objected to any move that would remove 

children from their neighborhood schools and the Congress of 

Hispanic Educators, which sought adjustments in the desegregation 

  

® Reyes v. School District No. 1, 380 F.Supp 673, 678, 672, 
  

717%. 

? Keyes v. School District No. 1, 521 F.2d. 465, 479-80. 
  

18 

 



  

plan to allow for the special needs of the Hispanic students, 

represented substantially identical claims and interests to those 

asserted in Garcia. Id. at 679. 
  

The Tenth Circuit panel concluded, to the extent plaintiffs’ 

interests were not represented by the Keyes plaintiffs, they were 

clearly represented and pursued by the intervenors. Id. at 679. 

Having drawn these conclusions, the court affirmed the district 

court's application of res judicata and affirmed the dismissal. 

In Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F.Supp. 410 (D. Mass. 1974), black 
  

parents and their children who attended Boston public schools 

brought suit against the Boston school committee, its individual 

members, the superintendent of the Boston public schools, the Board 

of Education and commissioner of education seeking declaratory and 

injunctive relief against the acts that allegedly violated the 

constitutional rights of the plaintiff class. The district court 

certified the named plaintiffs as the proper representatives of the 

class. Id. at 415. At trial the parties did not frame any issue 

particular to discrimination against other minority students, who 

comprise approximately 7% of Boston's public school population. 

However, at future hearings concerning equitable remedies required 

to convert the Boston schools, the Keyes holding would be observed 

by the district court and consideration given to the treatment of 

19 

 



  

other minorities.? see Also Morgan v. Kerrigan 509 F.2d 580, (5th 
  

Cir. 1974), affirming this decision (regarding the hearing). 

The following year, in January 1975, El Comite de Padres 

was permitted to intervene as a party on behalf of the Hispanic 

school children and their parents. At the time of the court's June 

21, 1974 liability holding, other minority ’ students compromised 

approximately 7% of the Boston public school population. Many of 

the exhibits used to assess the racial and ethnic composition of 

the Boston schools referred to Hispanics or other minorities.’ 

Moreover the October 1974 order set fourth the following 

guidelines: other minorities will be provided with the operation of 

bilingual education on a desegregated basis. Morgan v. McDonough 
  

511 F.Supp 408 (D. Mass. 1981). 

The amended motion on behalf of the Hispanic students was 

stated that intervention was necessary to protect the interests of 

Hispanic children, particularly with regard to bilingual education 

programs, and to provide technical assistance in working out a plan 

that would meet the needs of spanish-speaking students. McDonough 
  

511 F.Supp at 411. 

  

®. other minorities has been defined as primarily Hispanic. 

°. see above n.8. Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F.Supp 410 at 415. 
  

0. Id. at 424, 426, 428-229, 437-439, 443-45 and 467. 

20 

 



  

The remedial plan adopted by the court on June 5, 1975 

addressed the concerns of bilingual and other minority groups, 

adopting several of the recommendations set forth by El Comite. 

The remedy ordered by the court included the provision of bilingual 

schooling of Hispanic students and the assignment of bilingual 

students to particular schools before the assignment of others. 

This priority in student assignment was presented as a way of 

preventing excessive dispersal of spanish speaking students. 

Therefore the clustering of bilingual classes would be possible and 

Boston's schools would be able to fulfill the state's promised 

exemplary bilingual education law as well as meet the Federal Civil 

Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 411. 

El Comite continued to represent the rights of bilingual, 

Hispanic and other minority groups throughout the remedial phase of 

the case. Due to El Comite's continued activities, other services 

were expanded: advanced classes for bilingual children; a program 

for parent involvement for minority students; the creation of 

extended day bilingual kindergarten classes; the provision of 

support services to Hispanic children at examination schools; and 

bilingual classes that contained proper clusters of classes. In 

addition, staff desegregation orders and voluntary agreements 

reflected the need to recruit minority administrators and 

faculty. 

  

". The district court ultimately held El Comite's 
participation had not added significantly to the remedial measures 
and the fee award should be reduced accordingly. See Morgan V. 

  

21 

 



  

The Courts in a number of cases have ordered the same or 

similar remedial changes and programs for Hispanic students: See 

United States v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago, 588 F.Supp. 132 
  

(N. D. Illinois, E. D. 1984), in which the Hispanic school 

population was 18.4%, during the years 1980-1981. Id. at 140. It 

increased to about 21% as of 1982. Id. at 152. The Chicago court 

ordered a bilingual program in the plan to enable students to be 

instructed in their own language until they can make the transition 

to regular classrooms. See Also Diaz v. San Jose Unified School 
  

  

District, 633 F.Supp. 808 (N.D.Cal. 1985); aff'd, 861 F.2d. 591. 
  

The remedial phase of this case, which was initiated by Hispanic 

plaintiffs, proceeds on a finding by the Ninth Circuit panel that 

San Jose segregated its schools in violation of the Fourteenth 

Amendment. The plan adopted by the court explicitly required the 

continuation of the Board of Education's then present bilingual and 

multi-cultural programs. However, the program would be modified to 

accomplish two goals: (1) to help students acquire English language 

proficiency; and (2) to foster academic skills such as math, 

reading and science. Id. at 827. 

Summary: 

  

McDonough and Morgan v. Nucci. In Morgan v. McDonough, 689 F.2d 
265 (1982) the court affirmed the challenged desegregation orders 
of the district Court entered in 1980. In Morgan v. Nucci 831 F.2d 
313 (1987) a related case, the court looked at the absent 
attainment of maximum desegregation in faculty and staff hiring 
practices to secure staff consisting of 25% black and 10% other 
minority. The court affirmed its prior decision allowing the 
percentages to stay as noted above. 

  
  

  

22 

 



  

Desegregation remedies have primarily focused on the 

restructuring of attendances pattern and the overall educational 

services to children. In general, plans have sought to integrate 

minorities and whites. Often this has been done through rezoning 

or busing of children to obtain a balance of the various ethnic 

groups within each school in a district. However, the Hispanic 

groups have presented added challenge to desegregation. Because of 

their cultural makeup. As a result, some courts have found it 

necessary to create specific programs for this group. 

Some school districts have sought to leave certain Hispanic 

schools in their own schools because of the need for special 

bilingual-bicultural programs. Other plans have focused on the 

entire overhaul of the methods of educating minorities, including 

Hispanics to address the inferior prior education. Keyes 380 F.Supp 

692, 717. Although the appellate court in Keyes found that the 

district court over stepping its bounds, the court maintained that 

local school districts have power to develop remedies to address 

the needs of the Hispanic population. 

Moreover, the need for other services for the Hispanic 

population have been articulated by El Comite de Padres. These 

include support services, parent involvement, advance bilingual 

services and other programs geared to the particular developmental 

and adjustment needs of this population. Overall, in an attempt to 

desegregate the school system the courts have on occasion 

23 

 



  

considered the needs of this population, particularly if they have 

intervened or have been the original plaintiffs. 

IV. Conclusion: General Findings: 

Hispanic groups have appeared in desegregation cases in 

multiple capacities. Hispanics have been intervenors plaintiffs, 

in favor of desegregation, and intervenors-defendants, opposed to 

desegregation. The common thread, among their appearances in 

court, however, has been their support for ensuring the continuity 

in the educational development of their children. In a number of 

cases, although Hispanics constituted a sizable percentage of the 

population at issue, the court acknowledged and accorded no special 

treatment. 

In a few cases particular issues were raised by the Hispanic 

community and were acknowledged by the courts: (1) In Keyes, a 

general desegregation action, the district court ordered the 

Cardenas plan to provide minorities with the services they needed 

to ameliorate incompatibilities; (2) the circuit court panel, in 

Keyes, subsequently reversed, on the issue of segregation being 

continued in some communities, because of the special bilingual 

needs of the Hispanic children, The circuit court ordered 

desegregation and continued bilingual services; and (3) in Morgan 

V. McDonough, intervenor E1 Comite de Padres, representing 
  

Hispanic children, sought specific services for the children 

including: bilingual programs, advance work for bilingual children, 

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parent involvement and other services. These remedies proposed 

were specifically geared toward the Hispanic population and were 

concerned both the potential effect on the children and how to 

minimize the negative impact of disruption to their communities. 

V. Recommendations. 

In formulating a desegregation plan for the Hispanic 

population, it will be necessary to consider the close nature of 

the community. Courts have recognized that it is not enough to 

only transport students in order to integrate them. Any plan must 

minimize disruption in the educational process. Although bilingual 

services will be an essential part to any plan involving this 

population, exposing Hispanic students to a new more integrated 

system must also include, parent involvement and counseling 

services. The overall goal should be the development of a 

comprehensive desegregation plan, accounting for the individual 

needs of the various ethnic groups. 

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BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Alvarado v. El Paso Independent School District, 426 F. Supp. 575 
(W. D. Texas 1976), 593 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1979). 
  

Diaz v. San Jose Unified School District, 633 F.Supp. 808 (N.D.Cal. 
1985) . 
  

Garcia v. Board of Education District No. 1, Denver, Colorado and 

Pr. louis J. Rishunas, 313 F. Supp. 61. 
  

  

Hart wv. Community School Board of Brooklyn, New York School 

District #21, 383 F. Supp. 699 (E. D. New York 1974). 
  

  

Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver Colorado, 380 F.Supp. 673 
{(D. Colorado 1975), 521 F.2d 465, (10th Cir. 1975). 
  

Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F.Supp. 410 (D. Mass. 1974), Aff'd 509 F.2d 
580. 
  

Morgan v. McDonough, 511 F. Supp. 408 (D. Mass. 1981). 
  

Morgan v. Nucci, 831 F.2d 313 (D. Mass. 1978) 
  

Norwalk v. Norwalk Board of Education, 298 F. Supp. 213 (D. Conn. 
1969). 
  

Tasby v. Wright, 520 F. Supp. 683 (N. D. Texas 1981). 
  

United States v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 588 
F.Supp. 132 (1984). 
  

U.S. v. Gregory-Portland Independent School District, 654 F.2d 989 
(5th Cir. 1981), 
  

U.S. v. State of Texas, 495 F. Supp. 1356 (E. D. Texas 1980) 
  

U.S. v. Texas Education Agency, 532 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 197s). 
  

U.S. v. Texas Education Agency, 467 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1978). 
  

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