Muntaqim v. Coombe Brief in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant and in Support of Reversal on Behalf of Amici Curiae

    01-7260
In  the

United States Court of Appeals
For the Second Circuit

Jalil Abdul Muntaqim, a/k/a Anthony Bottom, 
Plaintiff  —  Appellant,

—  v. —

Phillip Coombe, Anthony Annucci, Louis F. Mann, 
Defendants  —  Appellees.

On  A ppeal From  The U nited States D istrict Court 
For The N orthern D istrict Of N ew  Y ork

EN BANC BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT JALIL ABDUL 
MUNTAQIM, A/K/A/ ANTHONY BOTTOM, AND IN SUPPORT OF REVERSAL, ON 
BEHALF OF AMICI CURIAE NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE &  EDUCATIONAL FUND, 
INC., COMMUNITY SERVICE SOCIETY OF NEW YORK, AND CENTER FOR LAW 

AND SOCIAL JUSTICE AT MEDGAR EVERS COLLEGE

Theodore M. Shaw 
Director-Counsel

Norman J. Chachkin 
Janai S. Nelson 
Ryan P. Haygood 
Alaina C. Beverly
N aacp Legal Defense & Educational 

Fund , Inc .
99 Hudson Street, Suite 1600 
New'York, New York 10013-2897 
(212) 965-2200

Juan Cartagena 
Risa Kaufman
Community Service Society of New York 
105 E. 22nd Street 
New York, New York 10010 
(212) 260-6218

Joan P. Gibbs 
Esmeralda Simmons 
Center for Law and Social Justice 

at Medgar Evers College 
1150 Carroll Street 
Brooklyn, New York 11225 
(718)270-6296

Attorneys for Amici Curiae



CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Pursuant to Rule 26.1 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, the NAACP 

Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., Community Service Society of New York, 

and the Center for Law and Social Justice at Medgar Evers College, by and through 

the undersigned counsel, make the following disclosures:

Counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellants, all not-for-profit corporations of the State of 

New York, are neither subsidiaries nor affiliates of a publicly owned corporation.

Janai S. Nelson, Esq. 
NAACP Legal Defense & 

Educational Fund, Inc.
99 Hudson Street, Suite 1600 
New York, NY 10013 
(212) 965-2237 
jnelson@naacpldf.org

l

mailto:jnelson@naacpldf.org


TABLE OF CONTENTS

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEM ENT.......................................................... i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES...............................................................................  ^

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ................................................................................. j

BACKGROUND ...................................................................................  3

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF THE ARGUM ENT................................5

ARGUM ENT.....................................................................................  7

L Proof Required to Establish A Violation of Section 2
of the VRA (Court’s En Banc Question No. 3 ) .............................................  7

A. Disparate Impact of New York Election Law §5-106..........................8

B. Totality of the Circumstances T e s t ..................................................... 8

i. Evidence of Discrimination in the Criminal Justice System . . 11

a- Type of Evidence (Court’s En Banc
Question No. 3lait ............................................................ \ \

b- Quantum of Proof (Court’s En Banc
Question No. 3IbB ............................................................20

c- Relevance of Evidence of Discrimination in 
Federal and State Criminal Justice System 
(Court’s En Banc Question No. 3 tc ) ) ..............................22

II. Additional Senate Factors ........................................................  23

III. Evidence of Intentional Discrimination in the Enactment of
New York’s Felon Disfranchisement Law s.......................................................26

CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................  29

ii



TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Baker v. Pataki.
58 F.3d 814, 816 (2d Cir. 1995), vacated in part. 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 
13133 (2d Cir. 1996).................................................................................  12> 13

Baker v. Pataki.
85 F.3d 919 (2d Cir. 1996) ......................................................................  13

Burton v. City of Belle Glade.
178 F.3d 1175 (11th Cir. 1999).................................................................. g

Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. New York
719 N.Y.S.2d 475 (2002), rev'd , 245 A.D.2d 1,
744 N.Y. S.2d 130 (1st Dept. 2002) .............................................  24

Farrakhan v. Washington
338 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 1003), cert, denied. U S
125 S. Ct. 477 (2004)................................................... 777’ ............4 ,9 , 12

Farrakhan v, Washington
No. CS-96-76-RHW (E.D. Wash.) ........................................................3? 4

Goosby v. Town Board of the Town of Hempstead.
180 F.3d 476 (2d Cir. 1999) .................................................  jq

Hayden v. Pataki. 2004 WL 1335921 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 2004)
(order granting motion for judgment on the pleadings), appeal docketed 
No. 04-3886-PR................................................................ 7 ^ 7 7 “ ' 3

Johnson v. Bush
353 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2 0 0 3 )..............................................................  3> 4

Johnson v. DeGrandv
512 U.S. 997(1994)...............................................................................  9> 10

iii



McCleskev v. Kemp
481 U.S. 279(1987)...................................................................................  20

Muntaqim v. Coomhe.
366 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2004) ....................................................................  12

Rodriquez v. Pataki.
308 F. Supp. 2d 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), afFd, 125 S. Ct. 627 (2004) . . . .  3 

Thornburg v. Gingles
478 U.S. 30 (1986).............................................................. 9, 10, 20, 21, 22

U.S. v. Armstrong.
517 U.S. 456 (1996)...................................................................................  20

CONSTITUTIONS AND STATUTES

N.Y. Const. (1821), art. II, § 2 .................................................................................  27

N.Y. Const, art. II, § 2 (amended 1894) .....................................................  28

N.Y Elect. Law §5-106 ..................................................................................... ....

Section 2 of Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 .........................................paSsim

S. Rep. No. 97-417 (1982), reprinted m 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 179 .........passim

42 U.S.C. § 1973(a).................................................................................................. ...  .

U.S. Const, amend. XV ................................................................  28

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant In Banc ........................................................................ ...

Nathaniel Carter, William Stone and Marcus Gould, Reports of the
Proceedings and Debates of the Convention of 1821 at 1QS ..................... 26

iv



Constitutional Convention of 1846, Debates of 1846. at 1033 ........................ 27, 28

Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows:
Terry, Race and Disorder in New York Citv. 28 Fordham Urb L J 457 
458-462 (2000) ............................................................................................ ’ 17

Jeffrey Fagan, Valerie West, and Jan Holland, Reciprocal Effects of
Crime and Incarceration in New York City N eighborhoods 30 Fordham 
Urb. L. J. 1551 (2 0 0 3 )...............................................................................  18> 19

The Franklin H. Williams Judicial Commission on Minorities, Equal Justice: A
Work in Progress, Five Year Report, 1991-1996 ......................................  34

Tushar Kansal, The Sentencing Project, Racial Disparity in Sentencing-
A Review of the Literature ......................................................................... 13

Mark Levitan, Community Service Society, A Crisis of Black Male 
Employment: Unemployment and Joblessness in New York 
City 2003. 2, 6 (2004) .....................................................................................  25

Manhattan Borough President’s Commission to Close the Health Divide,
Closing The Health Divide: What Government Can Do to Eliminate 
Health Disparities Among Communities of Color in New York City 
(October 2004).................................................................................  24

Mason Tillman Associates, Ltd., Report: City of New York 
Disparity Study (December 2004),
available at http://www.nvccouncil.info/pdf files/reports/citvnvrpt.pdf. . . 24

James Nelson, New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services,
Disparities in the Processing Felony Arrests in 
NYS. 1990-1992 U 995^

Cong. Globe, 41 st Cong. 2d Sess., at 1447-81 ........................................................ 28

14, 15

http://www.nvccouncil.info/pdf_files/reports/citvnvrpt.pdf


New York State Judicial Commission on Minorities, New York
State Judicial Commission on the Courts, Report of the New York State 
Judicial Commission on Minorities. Volume Two: The Public and the 
Courts. 139-177 (Apr. 1991)............................................................ j

Office of the Attorney General of the State of New York, Civil
Rights Bureau, The New York City Police Department’s “Stop & Frisk” 
Practices 0  9 9 9 ) .................................................  y

Cassia Spohn, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Thirty Years of Sentencing
Reform: The Quest for a Racially Neutral Sentencing Process 3 Crim J 
427,444-450,475 (2000) ...................................................  ’

vi



INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

Amici curiae are three non-profit, non-partisan legal organizations with lengthy 

histories in advocacy and litigation in the area of voting rights. Amici curiae are also 

the attorneys for the plaintiffs in Hayden v. Pataki. a class action brought on behalf 

of Black and Latino prisoners, parolees, and community members to challenge New 

York State s felon disfranchisement laws on the grounds that these laws 

impermissibly deny and dilute the nght to vote of plaintiffs in violation of, inter aha, 

the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Section 2 of

the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA). Havden is currently on appeal before this 

Court.1

The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. (LDF) was founded in 

1940 under the leadership of the late Associate Supreme Court Justice Thurgood 

Marshall. Its primary purpose is to provide legal assistance to poor African 

Americans. LDF has been involved in more cases before the United States Supreme 

Court than any other legal organization, except for the U.S. Department of Justice, 

including every seminal Supreme Court case on the issue of voting rights. In addition 

to serving as co-counsel in Havden. LDF is also co-counsel for the plaintiffs in

Hayden v. Pataki, 2004 WL 1335921 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 2004) (order granting 
motion for judgment on the pleadings), appeal docketed. No. 04-3886-PR (2d Cir 
July 13, 2004).

1



Farrakhan v. Washington, No. CS-96-76-RHW (E.D. Wash.), a case brought by 

Blacks, Latinos and Native Americans challenging Washington State’s felon 

disfranchisement laws. LDF is also a founding member of the Right to Vote 

Campaign, a national collaborative of eight organizations seeking to challenge state

felon disfranchisement laws through litigation, legislative action, and public 

education.

For more than 160 years, the Community Service Society of New York (CSS) 

has worked to improve the lives and enhance the political participation of the poor. 

CSS has challenged an array of barriers to and discrimination in voting in New York. 

Since 2002 CSS has directly challenged New York laws and policies that impede poor 

voters from participating in the political process because of felony convictions. In 

addition to serving as co-counsel in Hayden. CSS, along with other civil rights 

organizations, was instrumental in changing New York State policies for re­

integrating eligible persons with felony convictions to the voting rolls.

The Center for Law and Social Justice (CLSJ) is a unit in the School of 

Continuing Education and Community Programs at Medgar Evers College of the City 

University of New York. Founded in 1985, CLSJ’s mission is to be a resource for the 

liberation of people of African descent in order to achieve equitable distribution of 

wealth and resources, as well as cultural, economic, political, and social equity. CLSJ

2



seeks to achieve its mission through research, education, advocacy and litigation 

projects. CLSJ is widely recognized as one of the few community-based 

organizations in New York City that is actively committed to ensuring the voting 

rights of Black people, including incarcerated and formerly incarcerated persons. 

CLSJ s work has been pivotal in protecting the right to vote of communities of color 

and in determining the City Council, State Assembly and Senate, and U.S. 

Congressional districts in New York City. In addition to serving as co-counsel in 

Hayden, CLSJ was counsel to intervening Black voters residing in the three New York 

counties covered by Section 5 of the VRA in Rodnouez v. Pataki 308 F. Supp. 2d 346 

(S.D.N.Y. 2004), affd , 125 S. Ct. 627 (2004).

BACKGROUND

Whether Section 2 of the VRA, as amended, applies to felon disfranchisement 

laws is a question that will shape the modem civil rights struggle to ensure equal 

access to the franchise for all Americans. The Court’s resolution of this question not 

only has direct bearing upon this case, but will be germane to the resolution of at least 

three other felon disfranchisement cases currently before federal courts — Johnson

3



- - Bush, Farrakhan v. Washington.3 and Hayden4 — as well as to the development 

of Section 2 jurisprudence in general.

In Johnson, a challenge to Florida’s permanent disfranchisement of individuals 

with felony convictions who have completed their sentences, the Eleventh Circuit 

vacated for reconsideration en banc a panel decision reversing a lower court decision 

holding that Section 2 applies to felon disfranchisement laws. In Farrakhan. the Ninth 

Circuit upheld the application of Section 2 to felon disfranchisement laws. Farrakhan

w Washington, 338 F.3d 1009, 1019-20 (9th Cir. 1003), cert denied. ___U .S .___ ,

125 S. Ct. 477 (2004). The Supreme Court denied a petition for certiorari and 

remanded the case for further proceedings.

Finally, Hayden, a challenge to New York State’s felon disfranchisement laws 

on behalf of Blacks and Latinos who are incarcerated or on parole for a felony 

conviction, is pending on appeal before this Court from a dismissal on the pleadings. 

The Hayden pleadings describe the pervasive history of discrimination that motivated 

the enactment of New York’s felon disfranchisement laws. Moreover, the Havden 

pleadings set forth the disparate impact of felon disfranchisement laws on New York

4

353 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2003).

No. CS-96-76-RHW (E.D. Wash.). 

See supra n . l .

4



State’s Black and Latino communities. Consideration of the Havden plaintiffs’ vote 

denial and vote dilution claims under Section 2 was explicitly reserved on appeal, 

pending the outcome of the instant case.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 

The resolution of the issues raised in this appeal will reflect this country’s 

commitment to democracy and the eradication of racially discriminatory practices in 

the electoral process. This Court will decide whether voting eligibility requirements 

namely felon disfranchisement laws — that disparately impact racial minorities 

may be challenged under legislation specifically enacted to rid this country of 

discrimination in the electoral arena.5 As a threshold matter, Amici submit that the 

VRA unequivocally applies to felon disfranchisement laws such as N.Y Elect. Law 

§5-106 (hereinafter “§5-106”). Moreover, Amici assert that Congress’ power to 

legislate against such practices where they yield racially disparate results is firmly 

grounded in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States 

Constitution. For purposes of this brief, however, we focus upon the specific

According to a 2005 report by the Sentencing Project, 4.7 million, or one in 
forty-three adults, have currently or permanently lost their voting rights because of 
felony convictions. Of that number, 1.4 million or 13 percent are Black men, a rate 
seven times the national average. Given current rates of incarceration, three in ten of 
the next generation of Black men can expect to be disfranchised at some point in their 
lifetime an eventuality that, if allowed to occur, places Black people’s right to vote 
and to elect representatives of their choice on a path to extinction.

5



questions posed by this Court in its order granting rehearing en banc regarding the 

nature and quantum of proof required to support a challenge to felon disfranchisement 

laws under Section 2 of the VRA (Court’s En Banc Question No. 3).

Like other Section 2 challenges, claims regarding the racially disparate impact 

of felon disfranchisement laws — whether in the context of vote dilution or vote 

denial are governed by the totality of the circumstances test articulated in Section 

2 jurisprudence since the 1982 amendments to the VRA. Once the disparate impact 

of a voting practice, procedure or qualification is established, the totality of the 

circumstances test requires courts to consider various external and contextual factors 

that interact with the electoral mechanism at issue. The most salient of these factors 

in a felon disfranchisement challenge is the extent to which racial bias in the criminal 

justice system interacts with the disfranchisement law to create the racially disparate 

impact. Like any other factor considered within the totality of the circumstances, bias 

in the criminal justice system is not measured through a qualitative or quantitative 

formula, but rather involves a probing assessment of the nature, magnitude, and extent 

of the bias, along with consideration of other relevant factors.

As demonstrated below, there are several objective measures of bias within the 

criminal justice system in New York State, some of which have been analyzed in 

governmental reports and data. Plaintiff should be allowed an opportunity to marshal

6



such evidence and have it weighed by the district court as part of the totality of the 

circumstances analysis prescribed by the law of this Circuit and Section 2 

jurisprudence generally. We, therefore, urge the Court not only to affirm the breadth 

of the protections afforded by Section 2, but to establish a flexible standard by which 

to guide future felon disfranchisement jurisprudence.

ARGUMENT

I. Proof Required to Establish A Violation of Section 2 of the VRA (Court’s 
En Banc Question No. 3)

In its order granting rehearing en banc, this Court posed specific questions 

about the proof required to support a felon disfranchisement challenge under Section 

2 of the VRA. While these questions are framed in the context of vote dilution, they 

are equally relevant to an evaluation of Plaintiff s vote denial claim, which is the only 

claim being pursued in his en banc appeal.6 Indeed, the totality of the circumstances

Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant jn Banc at 3. As described above. Amici represent 
plaintiffs in Hayden, a felon disfranchisement challenge currently on appeal before 
this Court, which raises, inter aha, a vote dilution claim under the VRA. The vote 
dilution claim, which specifically challenges the erosive effects of §5-106 on the 
voting strength of Black and Latino communities, is brought on behalf of Black and 
Latino registered voters in those communities. These individuals undeniably have 
standing to pursue a vote dilution claim under Section 2 of the VRA given their 
allegation that §5-106 denies them an equal opportunity to participate in the political 
process in New York State because of the disproportionate disfranchisement of Blacks 
and Latinos under the statute.

Because the vote dilution claim is no longer before the Court in the instant 
matter, Amici respectfully submit that any decision rendered by this Court should

7



analysis required under Section 2 applies to both vote denial and vote dilution claims, 

although, as discussed below, the factors most relevant to the inquiry will depend on 

the electoral procedure at issue, the specific facts of the case, and the nature of the 

violation.

A. Disparate Impact of N.Y. Elect. Law §5-106

As an initial matter, Section 2 s application is triggered upon sufficient 

allegations of disparate impact, and relief under the statute is appropriate upon a 

showing that the electoral mechanism at issue is either intentionally discriminatory or 

has a discriminatory result on account of race. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a). In the instant 

case, Plaintiff has alleged facts and statistical evidence of the racially disparate impact 

of §5-106 sufficient to trigger application of the “results” test of Section 2.

The racially disparate impact of §5-106 is starkly demonstrated by the fact that 

a staggering 80 ̂  or more of the persons denied the right to vote under the statute are 

Black or Latino. Blacks comprise over 50% of the disfranchised population in New 

York State and Latinos comprise approximately 30% of the same, despite the fact that, 

collectively, Blacks and Latinos comprise only 31% of the state population. These 

numerical truths demonstrate beyond cavil the disparate impact of §5-106.

B. Totality of the Circumstances Test

reserve for further inquiry whether a vote dilution claim may be pursued under the

8



Section 2 of the VRA prohibits the use of any “voting qualification or 

prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure . . .  which results in a denial 

or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of 

race or color.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a). The statute expressly requires courts to assess 

the “totality of the circumstances,” 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b), to determine whether “a 

certain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social and historical 

conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white 

voters to elect their preferred representatives.” Thornburg v. Gjngles 478 U.S. 30, 

47 (1986); see also Johnson v. DeGrandv 512 U.S. 997, 1010 n.9 (1994). This 

totality of circumstances analysis applies to both vote denial and dilution claims. 42 

U.S.C. § 1973; S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 30 (1982), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.A.N.N. 177, 

179 (hereinafter “S. Rep.”) (“Section 2 remains the major statutory prohibition of all 

voting rights discrimination”); Gingles, 478 U.S. at 42-46; Burton v. City o f R P11P 

Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1197-98 ( 11th Cir. 1999); Farrakhan. 338 F.3d at 1015 n.l 1.

The Senate Judiciary Committee report (hereinafter “Senate Report”) lays out 

a broad, non-exclusive list of factors that “typically may be relevant to a §2 claim” in 

assessing whether a VRA violation has occurred (hereinafter “Senate factors”). Id  

at 44; see S. Rep. at 28-29 (listing factors). However, the Supreme Court has 

recognized that while the Senate factors provide guidance for a totality of

9



circumstances analysis, they are “neither comprehensive nor exhaustive.” Gingles. 

478 U.S. at 45. Indeed, no particular or specific number of factors must be proven to 

establish a Section 2 violation, id ; S. Rep. at 29, and courts are free to evaluate other 

factors to determine whether a challenged electoral procedure violates Section 2. S. 

Rep. at 207. The factors most relevant to the court’s analysis will depend on the 

electoral procedure at issue, the nature of the claim, and the specific facts of the case. 

See id  at 206; see also Goosby v. Town Bd. of the Town ofHempsteaH 180 F.3d 476, 

492 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[T]he ultimate conclusions about equality or inequality of 

opportunity were intended by Congress to be judgments resting on comprehensive, 

not limited, canvassing of relevant facts.”) (quoting Johnson. 512 U.S. at 1011).

Having put forth evidence of the significant disparate impact of §5-106, 

Plaintiff may proffer additional evidence relevant to whether New York State’s felon 

disfranchisement laws result in discrimination on account of race. One clearly 

pertinent factor in this inquiry is evidence of racial disparities and bias in New York’s 

criminal justice system. In addition, Plaintiff may show other evidence of official 

discrimination that touches on the right of Blacks and Latinos who are incarcerated 

or on parole for a felony conviction to participate in New York’s political process, 

including, inter aha, evidence of intentional discrimination in the enactment of New 

York’s felon disfranchisement statute; evidence of the effects of discrimination in the

10



areas of education, employment, health, and housing; and evidence of the tenuousness 

of the felon disfranchisement statute to any legitimate State policy. Consistent with 

the flexible approach mandated by Section 2, however, none of these factors is singly

dispositive, and the weight given to each is measured by its relevance to Plaintiffs 

claim.7

i. Evidence of Discrimination in the Criminal Justice System

a- l ype of Evidence (Court’s En Banc Question No 3(a))

Proof of racially disparate outcomes in the underlying criminal justice system 

is indispensable to the totality of circumstances analysis and a successful felon 

disfranchisement challenge under the VRA. However, no court has yet explicitly 

addressed the types and quantum of evidence necessary to establish that racial bias in 

a criminal justice system operates to deny an equal opportunity to vote in Section 2 

challenges to felon disfranchisement laws.

Evidence of racial disparities in New York’s criminal justice system that 

contribute to §5-106’s racially disparate impact fits squarely within the analysis of 

the Senate factors. For example, the Senate Report expressly notes the relevance of

While the totality of circumstances test applies equally to vote denial and vote 
dilution claims, the factors relevant to the court’s analysis may vary depending on 
which type of claim is at issue and the specific facts involved. Amici thus propose a 
standard for a vote denial challenge to felon disfranchisement laws consistent with 
Section 2 jurisprudence.

11



the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political 

subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment 

and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political 

process.” S. Rep. at 29. This factor clearly contemplates proof of discrimination in 

a variety of areas to the extent that such discrimination limits equal opportunity to 

participate in the political process. See Farrakhan. 338 F.3d at 1020.

Indeed, in Farrakhan, the Ninth Circuit held that the totality of circumstances 

test “requires the court to consider the way in which the disfranchisement law interacts 

with racial bias in Washington’s criminal justice system to deny minorities an equal 

opportunity to participate in the state’s political process.” 338 F.3d at 1014 (emphasis 

added). The court held that “a causal connection may be shown where the 

discriminatory impact of a challenged voting practice is attributable to racial 

discrimination in the surrounding social and historical circumstances.” Id  at 1019. 

The racially discriminatory evidence that the lower court in Farrakhan found 

“compelling,” id  at 1020, consisted of statistical evidence regarding disparities in

arrest, bail and pre-trial release rates, charging decisions, and sentencing outcomes. 

Id  at 1013.8

8
In the instant case, the Court’s prior panel decision recognized that racial 

disparities m sentencing in New York were at the heart of Plaintiff s allegations that 
§5-106 discriminated against Blacks and Latinos. Muntaqim v. Coomhe 366 F.3d 
102, 105 n.3 (2d Cir. 2004). Moreover, in the second appeal of Baker v. Pataki this

12



To this end, the extent to which race, ethnicity and sentencing are correlated is 

a relevant consideration. In 2000 the U.S. Department of Justice sponsored a major 

national review of the research addressing race and sentencing that included 32 studies 

of sentencing decisions in state courts and 8 studies at the federal court level using 

data from the 1980s and 1990s. These studies revealed that race and ethnicity are 

strong determinants in sentencing.9

While Plaintiff should have the benefit of full discovery on remand, a number 

of prominent and well-known studies have analyzed the racial bias prevalent in New 

York’s criminal justice system with respect to some of these factors. For example, the 

1991 report of the New York State Judicial Commission on Minorities10 cited a report

Court was prepared to remand the case for further factual development on the strength 
of allegations regarding, inter aha, the racial composition of the prison population and 
racially discriminatory sentencing in the courts. 58 F.3d 814 816 (2d Cir 1995) 
vacated in part, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 13133 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Baker v Pataki’ 
85 F.3d 919, 934-35 (2d Cir. 1996) (Feinberg, J.).

Cassia Spohn, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Thirty Years of Sentencing Reform- The 
Quest for a Racially Neutral Sentencing Process. 3 Crim. J. 427,444-450,475 (2000), 
^ d a b l e  at http://www.ncjrs.org/cnminaljustice2000/vol_3/03i.pdf (hereinafter
Spohn Review”). Three of the studies reviewed investigated sentencing decisions 

by New York State courts. \ j l  at 444-450; accord Tushar Kansal, The Sentencing 
ProJect’ Eacial Dispantv in Sentencing: A Review of the Literaturr fr available at 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/dispanty.pdf (Jan. 2005) (“The most recent 
generation of evidence suggests that while racial dynamics have changed over time, 
race still exerts an undeniable presence in the sentencing process.”).

New York State Judicial Commission on the Courts, Repon of the New York 
State Judicial Commission on Minorities. Volume Two: The Public and the CrmrtQ

13

http://www.ncjrs.org/cnminaljustice2000/vol_3/03i.pdf
http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/dispanty.pdf


on bail disparities, which concluded that “race was found to affect both the decision 

to release the defendant on bail and the amount of bail offered.”11 The Commission 

also cited the New York State Committee on Sentencing Guidelines’s report 

documenting significant differences in sentencing that turned on race.12 Each of these 

reports firmly suggests that there is evidence of racial bias in many areas of the 

criminal justice system that adversely impacts Blacks and Latinos.

Moreover, in 1995 the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services 

issued an empirical study of nearly 300,000 adult felony arrests addressing a number 

of factors that resulted in the disproportionate representation of Blacks and Latinos 

in New York State prison.13 Specifically, this report found: (1) statistically significant 

differentials in detention rates for minorities and whites;14 (2) that minorities were 

sentenced to prison more often than comparably situated whites;15 * and (3) that whites

139-177 (Apr. 1991).

14 at 142 (citing Nagel, The Legal/Extra-Leeal Controversy: Judicial Derisions
in Pretrial Release. 17 Law & Soc’y Rev. 481 (1983)).

14 at 164 (citing New York State Committee on Sentencing Guidelines, New 
York State Sentencing Patterns: An Analysis of Disparity (1985)).

James Nelson, New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, 
Disparities in the Processing Felony Arrests in NYS. 1990-1997 MQQM (hereinafter 
“Nelson Report”).

14 14 at vi.

13 14 at viii.

14



were sentenced to probation more than comparably situated minorities.16 Indeed, 

statewide, for certain categories of defendants, one in five minority defendants 

sentenced to prison would have been sentenced to a different sanction if they were 

sentenced comparably to whites.17 Additionally, among certain probation-eligible 

minority defendants, one in seven sentenced to prison in New York City and one in 

three sentenced to pnson in the rest of the state would have been sentenced to a 

different sanction if processed as similarly situated Whites.18 Relying on the Nelson 

Report, the Franklin Williams Judicial Commission observed that “rampant racism 

still infects our criminal justice system.”19

In 1999 the New York State Attorney General issued an historic report on stop 

and frisk practices by the New York City police force which included a quantitative 

analysis of nearly 175,000 “stops” in the City.20 * The data analyzed by the Attorney 

General demonstrate that the decisions regarding stops in the City are marked by 

racial disparities: Even when controlling for population and crime, the differences in

w Id  at 27.

18 Id  at 43.

The Franklin H. Williams Judicial Commission on Minorities, Equal Justice:
A Work in Progress, Five Year Report, 1991-1996 34 (1997).

Office of the Attorney General of the State of New York, Civil Rights Bureau, 
The New York City Police Department’s “Stop & Frisk” Practices (1999)

15



stop rates for Blacks versus Whites and Latinos versus Whites remain statistically 

significant. Blacks, who constitute only 25.6% of the City’s population, comprise 

of all persons stopped” by the New York Police Department’s Street Crime

Unit.22

Indeed, even when it controlled for racial demographics, the Attorney General’s 

report concluded that Blacks and Latinos are specifically targeted by the police in 

areas where they comprise the smallest proportion of the population. In those 

precincts, Blacks were stopped at a rate ten times greater than their percentage of the 

overall population, and Latinos at a rate more than three times greater. Whites, by 

contrast, were stopped at only half the rate of their population.23 Higher crime rates 

in minority communities, as measured by race-specific arrest counts, also did not 

explain why Blacks and Latinos are stopped at higher rates than Whites: “[A]fter 

accounting for the effect of differing crime rates, Hispanics were ‘stopped’ 39% more 

often than whites across crime categories. . . . [Bjlacks were ‘stopped’ 23% more 

often than whites, across all crime categories.”24

Id  at 121. 

Id. at viii.

23 Id  at 106.

Id. at ix-x.

16



Moreover, the breadth and depth of these empirical studies dwarf the sample 

sizes in most national literature.25 Professor Jeffrey Fagan, Professor of Law and 

Public Health at Columbia University, has used these data to study issues of mass 

incarceration, policing, crime and health in New York City neighborhoods. In one 

study,26 he examines “whether, after controlling for disorder, the city’s stop and frisk 

policy is, in fact, a form of policing that disproportionately targets racial minorities”27 28 

and found “little evidence to support claims that policing targeted places and signs of 

physical disorder. Instead, “stops of citizens were more often concentrated in 

minority neighborhoods characterized by poverty and social disadvantage.”29 As 

Fagan notes, consistent with the findings of the Attorney General, when objective 

measures of social disorder were analyzed, such as physical characteristics of 

neighborhoods, stops had less to do with order-maintenance policing and more to do 

with race and ethnicity.30 Accordingly, there is ample data that could be presented on

25 See Spohn Review, supra, at 444-452.

26 Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Tprrv Rare 
and Disorder in New York Citv. 28 Fordham Urb. L. J. 457, 458-462 (2000).

27 Id  at 463.

28 Id

29 Id  at 463-464.

30 Id  at 489.

17



remand demonstrating that police practices in New York — the entry point to 

prosecution in the criminal justice system — are racially biased.

The pattern of prosecution and incarceration in the City’s neighborhoods is 

another relevant area of inquiry. Analyzing incarceration data in New York City in 

five waves from 1985 to 1996, Fagan and his colleagues geocoded data on prison 

admissions by the residential address of the incarcerated to show the spatial 

concentration of incarceration.31 The study found that arrests and incarceration have 

long been concentrated in only a few of the poorest neighborhoods, accounting for a 

majority of New York’s prisoners and suggests that this concentration reflects a 

correlation between race and policing.32 Moreover, the spatial concentration of 

incarceration was independent of crime rates, including during a period from 1990 to 

1996 when felony crimes declined by almost half across the City.33

These specific community impacts are so pervasive in minority neighborhoods 

that Fagan characterizes them as endogenous or “grown from within, seeping into and

Jeffrey Fagan, Valerie West, and Jan Holland, Reciprocal F.ffects of Crime anH 
Incarceration in New York City Neighborhoods. 30 Fordham Urb. L. J. 1551 (2003). 
The sample in this study included 25% of all prison admissions and 5% of all jail 
admissions in five waves, yielding annual samples of two to four thousand in the 
former and three to four thousand in the latter. Id  at 1567.

32 14
33 Id  at 1569.

18



permanently staining the social and psychological fabric of neighborhood life in poor 

communities in New York. 34 In the same vein, felon disfranchisement has an 

identifiable community impact because of the excessive concentration of incarcerated 

persons from predominantly Black and Latino neighborhoods who are ensnared by a 

racially-flawed criminal justice system.

Thus, there is a significant body of research already available that provides a 

substantial foundation for an analysis of Plaintiffs allegations concerning 

discrimination in New York’s criminal justice system and its relation to §5-106’s 

disparate impact on Blacks and Latinos. It is important to note that the studies that 

have focused on sentencing outcomes (the Nelson Report and the research review by 

Prof. Spohn, above) all control in some way for the seriousness of the offense and the 

defendant s prior criminal history in order to assess how significantly race and 

ethnicity factor into sentencing outcomes. The variables included in the important 

work on policing practices (the Attorney General’s report and the report of Fagan, et 

al., on stop and frisk practices) all control, at a minimum, for population and incidence

of crime to assess the significance of race and ethnicity in these discretionary 

decisions by the police.

Id  at 1589.

19



b- Quantum of Proof (Court’s En Banc Question No 3(b)) 

The appropriate quantum of proof of bias in the criminal justice system 

sufficient to prevail under Section 2 in a felon disfranchisement challenge must be 

grounded in the seminal case of Thornburg v. Gingles. and its progeny. These cases 

have interpreted the amended Section 2 to create a results test that requires a searching 

analysis of all relevant evidence concerning whether minority voters’ opportunity to 

participate in the political process is effectively limited on the basis of race or 

ethnicity.35

Although felon disfranchisement implicates issues related to criminal justice, 

it is important to distinguish this civil challenge from the standards of proof required 

in criminal proceedings and appeals. A vote denial plaintiff in a felon 

disfranchisement challenge need not offer proof of discrimination in the criminal 

justice system sufficient to overturn her criminal conviction or a sentencing decision. 

To be sure, were Plaintiff challenging his conviction or sentence, he would have to 

meet such standards and show ultimately that these decisions were made in 

furtherance of a discriminatory purpose.36 This Section 2 challenge, however, is

35 Gingles. 478 U.S. at 62-63.

See McCleskey—v.—Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (requiring proof of 
discriminatory intent in an Equal Protection challenge to a death sentence); see also 
U.S. v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (summarizing case law requiring that 
for selective prosecution claim, defendant must “demonstrate that the federal

20



simply not that case. Instead, Plaintiff asks this Court to examine the application of 

a statute that unquestionably has a disparate impact to determine whether his right to 

vote has been unlawfully denied. Success or failure on this claim will have no effect 

on his conviction, the length of his sentence, or his chances for parole.

Section 2 jurisprudence also cautions against requiring the heightened 

evidentiary standard of discriminatory intent used in criminal cases that focus on the 

racial bias of the criminal justice apparatus. For example, under Gingles. evidence of 

racially polarized voting is now a threshold evidentiary showing in all vote dilution 

challenges to at-large electoral schemes. However, the plurality opinion in Gingles 

rejected the proposition that racially polarized voting is present only when voting 

behavior is caused by race, that is, when the race of Black voters is the determining 

cause in their voting behavior and, conversely, when voting behavior by Whites is 

explained primarily by their racial hostility to candidates preferred by Blacks.37 

Instead, racially polarized voting is a function of patterns that are merely correlated 

with the race of the voter:

[T]he reason why black and white voters vote differently is irrelevant to the
central inquiry of Section 2. . . .  It is the difference between the choices made

prosecutorial policy . . was motivated by a discriminatory purpose’”).

37 Id  at 63, 71-72.

21



by blacks and whites — not the reasons for that difference — that results in 
blacks having less opportunity than whites to elect their preferred 
representatives.38

The plurality in Gingles noted that requiring that racial intent or racial hostility be the 

cause of racially polarized voting asks the wrong question under Section 2 and

converts the result standard Congress created into an intent standard that it sought to 

undo.39

Similarly, Amici submit that the quantum of proof required in felon

disfranchisement challenges is a showing that race is significantly correlated to the

outcomes produced by the criminal justice system. For these reasons, this Court

should remand this case for further discovery with instructions to the district court to

re-open discovery and apply the totality of circumstances test to all of the evidence of

discrimination in the criminal justice system that may be marshaled by the Plaintiff,

in accordance with the mandates of Section 2.

c- Relevance of Evidence of Discrimination in Federal and 
State Criminal Justice System (Court s En Banc Question 
No. 3(c))

This Court’s query about whether to distinguish between the state and federal 

criminal justice systems in weighing statistical and other evidence of racial

Id. at 63 (emphasis in original).

14 at 73. The Supreme Court has never disapproved the plurality’s approach.

22



discrimination should be answered in the negative. First, the factors contributing to 

the discrimination in each system — including the existence of joint state and federal 

policing task forces — are sufficiently commingled as to make any distinction 

between the two systems irrelevant for purposes of Section 2’s totality of the 

circumstances analysis. Moreover, it is clear that Section 2, as the “major statutory 

prohibition of all voting rights discrimination,” 42 U.S.C. § 1973; S. Rep. at 30, was 

enacted to stamp out racial discrimination in voting without regard to where it is 

found.

II. Additional Senate Factors

In addition to evidence of discrimination in the criminal justice system, the 

district court may consider other Senate factors in a Section 2 totality of the 

circumstances analysis of felon disfranchisement laws. For example, the Senate factor 

No. 5 is particularly relevant in this regard, as it considers the extent to which 

members of the minority group in the state or political subdivision bear the effects of 

discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health, which hinder their 

ability to participate effectively in the political process.

A substantial body of evidence shows that Blacks and Latinos in New York 

State and in New York City, in particular, bear the effects of discrimination in 

education, health, housing and employment which hinder their ability to participate

23



in the political process. For example, Blacks and Latinos in New York City have been 

found to be disadvantaged with respect to public education funding and, consequently, 

denied a minimally adequate education.40

Government sponsored and scholarly reports have also found that Blacks and 

Latinos in New York, especially in New York City, continue to suffer significant 

disadvantages in housing, health, and public and private employment. See, e.g.. 

Manhattan Borough President’s Commission to Close the Health Divide, Closing The 

Health Divide: What Government Can Do to Eliminate Health Disparities Am ong  

Communities of Color in New York City (October 2004). In addition, a recent New 

York City “disparity study” conducted under the supervision of Amicus CLSJ and the 

DuBois-Bunche Center for Public Policy at Medgar Evers College for the New York 

City Council identified statistically significant disparities between minority and white- 

owned businesses in the City s award of prime contracts for construction, architecture 

and engineering, professional services, standard services, and goods. See Mason 

Tillman Associates, Ltd., Report: City of New York Disparity Study (December

See, Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. New York 7 1 Q N V S  9H47S (2002), 
rev_d , 245 A.D.2d 1, 744 N.Y. S.2d 130 (1st Dept. 2002), a ff  d in part and modified 
mjiart, 100 N.Y.2d 893, 801 N.E.2d 326, 769 N.Y.S.2d 106 (2003) (holding that New 
York State violated the state constitutional mandate to make available a “sound basic 
education to all the children of the state by establishing an education financing 
system that failed to afford New York City’s public school students, 84% of whom 
are “racial minorities,” the opportunity for a meaningful high school education).

24



2004), available at http://www.nyccouncil.info/pdf_files/reports/citynyrpt.pdf. 

Further, in 2003, according to a study undertaken by Amicus CSS, the citywide 

unemployment rate for Blacks and Latinos was respectively 12.9 percent and 9.6 

percent, as compared to 6.2 percent for Whites. Indeed, 50% of all Black males in that 

year were unemployed. Mark Levitan, Community Service Society, A Crisis of Black 

Male Employment: Unemployment and Joblessness in New York City 2003 2, 6 

(2004). These disparities in educational and employment opportunities undoubtedly 

contribute to the concentration of minority citizens in impoverished neighborhoods 

which, as suggested above, become the focus of racially skewed police practices 

leading to the dramatic impact of New York’s felon disfranchisement statute.

Moreover, Senate factor No. 9 concerns “[wjhether the policy underlying the 

state or political subdivision’s use of such voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, 

or standard, practice or procedure is tenuous.” Under the totality of circumstances 

analysis, this Senate factor No. 9 would require a court to consider, among other 

things, the extent to which felon disfranchisement serves an effective rehabilitative, 

retributive, deterrent, and/or punitive function.

The above factors represent a relevant but not exhaustive list of factors for the 

district court to consider in assessing whether felon disfranchisement results in 

discrimination based on race.

25

http://www.nyccouncil.info/pdf_files/reports/citynyrpt.pdf


III. Evidence of Intentional Discrimination in the Enactment of New York’s
Felon Disfranchisement Laws

There is also considerable evidence that §5-106 was specifically enacted with 

the intent to discriminate against Blacks. If presented below, that evidence should

also be considered under the totality of circumstances analysis by the court below on 

remand.

As alleged in Hayden, the historical origins of New York’s felon

disfranchisement provisions are rooted in the Constitutional Convention of 1821__

a convention dominated by an express, racist purpose to deprive Blacks of the right 

to vote. At that convention, the question of Black suffrage sparked heated debates, 

during which delegates expressed their conviction that Blacks, as a “degraded” people, 

and by virtue of their natural inferiority, were unequipped and unfit to participate in 

the democratic process. Nathaniel Carter, William Stone and Marcus Gould, Reports 

of the Proceedings and Debates of the Convention of 1821. at 198 (Albany: E. & E. 

Hosford, 1821) (hereinafter “Debates of 1 8 2 1 One delegate to the 1821 convention 

instructed his colleagues to “[ljook to your jails and penitentiaries. By whom are they 

filled? By the very race, whom it is now proposed to cloth with power of deciding 

upon your political rights.” Id  at 191. Another delegate urged the other delegates to 

[sjurvey your prisons your alms houses — your bridewells and your penitentiaries

and what a darkening host meets your eye! More than one-third of the convicts and

26



felons which those walls enclose, are of your sable population.” kb at 199.

Against this backdrop of racial hostility, the delegates to the 1821 convention 

adopted a provision that permitted the legislature to exclude from the franchise those 

“who have been, or may be, convicted of infamous crimes.” N. Y. Const. (1821), art. 

II, § 2. As is made manifest by their own language, the delegates to the 1821 

convention not only understood that enacting the felon disfranchisement provision 

would result in the disproportionate disfranchisement of the “sable” or Black 

population, but actively sought to preserve the franchise for Whites only: “[A]ll who 

are not white ought to be excluded from political rights.” Debates of 1821. at 183. 

Another delegate summed up the goals of the 1821 Constitutional Convention — to 

exclude Blacks from “any footing of equality in the right of voting.” frL at 180.

Delegates to subsequent conventions continued to advocate for the denial of 

equal suffrage rights to Blacks, including the 1846 Constitutional Convention, at 

which one delegate pronounced that “[Blacks] were an inferior race to whites, and 

would always remain so.” Constitutional Convention of 1846, Debates of 1846. at 

1033 (hereinafter Debates of 1846 ). Moreover, the delegates were well aware of 

and sought the same success as other slaveholding states in excluding Blacks from the 

ballot. As one delegate suggested to the convention, “in nearly all the western and 

southern states . . .  the [Bjlacks are excluded . . . would it not be well to listen to the

27



decisive weight of precedents furnished in this case also?” Id  at 181.

New York’s explicitly racially discriminatory suffrage requirements were 

firmly in place until the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment, which sought to finally 

bring equal manhood suffrage to New York. See U.S. Const, amend. XV. However, 

two years after the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment, which New York attempted 

to withdraw its ratification of, Cong. Globe, 41st Cong. 2d Sess., at 1447-81, an 

unprecedented committee convened to amend the New York State Constitution’s 

disfranchisement provision to require the State Legislature, at its following session, 

to enact iaws excluding persons convicted of infamous crimes from the franchise. See

N Y- Const, art. II, § 2 (amended 1894). Until that point, enactment of such laws had 

been permissive.

The corrosive effects of New York’s purposefully discriminatory felon 

disfranchisement law still reverberate today in the incontrovertible disparate impact 

of New York State Election Law § 5-106 on Blacks and Latinos. The pervasive 

pattern of historical intentional discrimination against Blacks in voting in New York, 

including repeated explicit statements by legislators about Blacks’ biological unfitness 

for suffrage and, their perceived criminality, as well as the codification of mandatory 

disfranchisement during an unprecedented special session at a time when overt denial 

of the franchise to Blacks was newly outlawed by the Fifteenth Amendment provide

28



additional evidentiary support for a conclusion that Section 5-106 violates Section 2 

of the VRA.

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should hold that Section 2 of the VRA can 

constitutionally be applied to New York’s felon disfranchisement statute that results 

m the denial of the nght to vote on account of race, and should reverse the district 

court s grant of summary judgment with instructions to reopen discovery and evaluate 

Plaintiff s claims within the totality of circumstances.

CONCLUSION

Respectfully submitted,

Theodore M. Shaw Juan Cartagena 
Risa Kaufman
Community Service Society of N ew 
York

105 E. 22nd Street
New York, New York 10010
(212) 260-6218

Director-Counsel 
Norman J. Chachkin 
Janai S. Nelson 
Ryan P. Haygood 
Alaina C. Beverly
N aacp Legal D efense & Educational

Fu n d , In c .
99 Hudson Street, Suite 1600 
New York, New York 10013-2897 
(212) 965-2200

Joan P. Gibbs
Esmeralda Simmons
Center for Law  and  Social Justice

at Medgar Evers College 
1150 Carroll Street 
Brooklyn, New York 11225 
(718)270-6296

Attorneys for Amici Curiae

29



RULE 29(d) CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

The undersigned hereby certifies that this brief complies with the type-volume 

limitations of Rule 32(a)(7)(B) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Relying 

on the word count of the word processing system used to prepare this brief, I hereby 

represent that the brief of the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., 

Community Service Society of New York, and the Center for Law and Social Justice 

at Medgar Evers College for Plaintiff-Appellant contains 6,772 words, not including 

the corporate disclosure statement, table of contents, table of authorities, and

certificates of counsel, and is, therefore, within the 7,000 word limit set forth under 

Fed. R. App. P. 29(d).

Janai S. Nelson, Esq. 
NAACP Legal Defense & 

Educational Fund, Inc.
99 Hudson Street, Suite 1600 
New York, NY 10013 
(212) 965-2237 
jnelson@naacpldf.org

Dated: February 4, 2005

mailto:jnelson@naacpldf.org


CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify under penalty of peijury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 that, on 

February 4, 2005,1 caused two true and correct copies of the foregoing En Banc 

Brief in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant Jalil Abdul Muntaqim, a/k/a Anthony 

Bottom, in Support of Reversal, on Behalf of Amici Curiae NAACP Legal Defense 

& Educational Fund, Inc., Community Service Society of New York, and Center 

for Law and Social Justice at Medgar Evers College, to be served via United States 

Postal Service priority mail, postage prepaid, to the following attorneys:

Jonathan W. Rauchway Elliot Spitzer

1550 Seventeenth Street, Suite 500 New York, New York 10271-0332 
Denver, Colorado 80202

William A. Bianco 
Gale T. Miller
Davis, Graham & Stubbs, LLP

York
120 Broadway -  24th Floor

Attorney General fo r the State o f  New

J. Peter Coll, Jr.
Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, 
LLP
666 5th Avenue
New York, New York 10013-0001 General

Appeals and Opinions Bureau 
The Capitol
Albany, New York 12224

Julie M. Sheridan 
Assistant Solicitor General 

Daniel Smirlock 
Deputy' Solicitor General 

New Y ork State Office of the Attorney

Attorneys fo r  Plaintiff-Appellant

Counsel for Defendants-Appellees

NAACP Legal Defense & 
Educational Fund, Inc.

99 Hudson Street, Suite 1600
New York, NY 10013 
jnelson@naacpldf.org

mailto:jnelson@naacpldf.org