Eaton v. Grubbs Brief and Appendix of Appellants
Public Court Documents
January 1, 1964
Cite this item
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Eaton v. Grubbs Brief and Appendix of Appellants, 1964. e4723d80-b09a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/1da5602a-c855-4e76-8a0b-0deea77e8c46/eaton-v-grubbs-brief-and-appendix-of-appellants. Accessed December 09, 2025.
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In the
In\t?b (Hmtrl ai Kppmla
F or the F ourth Circuit
No. 9058
H ubert A. E aton, et al.,
- v . -
Appellants,
E mory Grubbs and the B oard op M anagers op J ames
W alker Memorial H ospital, a Body Corporate,
Appellees.
on appeal prom the united states district court
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OP NORTH CAROLINA
BRIEF AND APPENDIX OF APPELLANTS
J ack Greenberg
Constance B aker Motley
Michael Meltsner
Suite 1790
10 Columbus Circle
New York 19, New York
R obert R. B ond
612 Red Cross Street
Wilmington, North Carolina
Conrad 0 . P earson
203% East Chapel Hill Street
Durham, North Carolina
Attorneys for Appellants
I N D E X
PAGE
Statement of the Case .................................................... 1
Questions Presented.......................................................... 5
Statement of Facts .......................................................... 6
A bgument — .............................................................................. 13
I. A Reversionary Interest in Land in Favor of
Government, Restricting Hospital Property to
Use “as a Hospital for the Benefit of the County
and City . . . And in Case of Disuse or Aban
donment to Revert to the Said County and City”
Subjects the Hospital to the Restraints of the
Constitution Against Racial Discrimination ..... 13
II. The Total Effect of the Hospital’s Contacts With
Government Is Sufficient to Place It Under the
Restraints of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend
ments Against Racial Discrimination .............. 18
Conclusion .................................................................................. 31
I ndex to A ppendix A
Relevant Docket Entries ................................................ la
Complaint ...........................................................-............... 2a
Motion to Dismiss ............................................................ 18a
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit A 19a
11
PAGE
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit B ........................................................ 21a
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit C ...................................................... 22a
Defendants’ Exhibit A .................................................... 58a
Opinion and Order............................................................ 61a
Notice of Appeal .............................................................. 69a
Designation of R ecord...................................................... 70a
I ndex to A ppendix B
Complaint in Prior A ction ............................................... 71a
T able oe Cases
Baldwin v. Morgan, 287 F. 2d 750 (5th Cir. 1961) ....... 26
Board of Managers of the James Walker Memorial
Hospital v. City of Wilmington, 237 N. C. 179, 74
S. E. 2d 749 (1953) ................................................... 27, 28
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497 ..................................... 20
Boman v. Birmingham Transit Co., 280 F. 2d 531 (5th
Cir. 1960) .................................................... 18, 20, 23, 26, 28
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 .................. 27
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U. S.
715 ........................................................ 2, 4,13,14,16,17,18,
19, 20, 22, 24, 29, 30
City of Charlotte v. Heath, 226 N. C. 750, 40 S. E. 2d
600 ................................................................................... 26
City of Greensboro v. Simkins, 246 F. 2d 425 (4th Cir.
1959) 16
I l l
City of St. Petersburg v. Alsup, 238 F. 2d 830 (5th Cir.
1956) ............................................................................. 14,17
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41 ....................................... 30
Coojjer v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1................. ...................17,18, 20
Eaton v. Board of Managers of James Walker Mem
orial Hospital, 261 F. 2d 521 (4tb Cir. 1958) cert.
denied 359 U. S. 984 ......................2, 3, 4, 5,13,16,18,19,
20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26
Hamjiton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F. 2d 320 (5th
Cir. 1962) .......................................................... 4,15,18,30
Johnson v. Virginia,------H. S . ------- , 10 L. ed. 2d 195,
83 S. Ct. — ................................. .......................... 27
Proctor v. State Highway and Public Works Comm.,
230 N. C. 687; 55 S. E. 2d 479......................................... 26
Public Utilities Commission v. Poliak, 343 U. S. 451 ....18, 22,
23, 24, 26, 28
Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.
Co., 240 N. C. 495; 82 S. E. 2d 771.............................. 26
Tate v. Department of Conservation and Development,
231 F. 2d 615 (4th Cir. 1956) ................................. 16,17
Table of Statutes and R egulations
Code of Federal Regulations:
Title 42, §§53-11, 53-12, 53-13 ................................. 23
Defense Public Works Act (Act of Oct. 14, 1940, as
amended June 28, 1941, 55 Stat. 361; 42 U. S. C.
§§1531 et seq.) ........................................................ 10,17,20
PAGE
IV
General Statutes of North Carolina:
§40-2 ............................................................................. 26
§§131-126 et seq........................................................11,22
Private Laws of North Carolina:
Chapter 12 (1901) .................................................... 7,8
Chapter 38 (1907) ..................................................... 9
Private-Local Laws of North Carolina:
Chapter 66 (1915) ................................................... 9
Public Laws of North Carolina:
Chapter 23 (1881) ..................................................... 7
Public-Local and Private Laws of North Carolina:
Chapter 8 (1937) ........................................................ 9
Chapter 470 (1939) ................................................... 9
United States Code:
Title 28, §1343(3)........................................................ 1
Title 42, §§291(a) (7), 291f(d) ............................ 11
Title 42, §291e (a) (b) (c) (d) ................................ 23
Title 42, §§1981, 1983 ................................................. 1
PAGE
I n t h e
luttTft Stairs CEnurt nf Appeals
F or the F ourth Circuit
No. 9058
H ubert A. E aton, et al.,
—v.-
Appellants,
E mory Grubbs and the B oard oe Managers of J ames
W alker Memorial H ospital, a Body Corporate,
Appellees.
on appeal from the united states district court
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OP NORTH CAROLINA
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
Statement of the Case
This appeal is from a final order entered April 9, 1963,
granting Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The
opinion below is reported, 216 F. Supp. 465, and appears
at 61a-68a.
Plaintiffs, three Negro physicians and two of their pa
tients, brought this class action to enjoin the James Walker
Memorial Hospital and its administrator from continuing
to deny admission to staff membership and treatment fa
cilities on a non-discriminatory and non-segregated basis
(17a).
The complaint asserted “ civil rights” jurisdiction under
28 U. S. C. §1343(3); 42 U. S. C. §§1981, 1983. Plaintiffs
2
claimed infringement of their rights under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United
States (2a, 3a).
The complaint was filed July 11, 1961 (2a-17a), and
the hospital moved to dismiss for want of jurisdiction on
July 28, 1961 (18a). The District Court granted the Mo
tion to Dismiss April 9, 1963 (61a-68a). No hearing was
held although plaintiffs filed three exhibits supporting the
allegations of the complaint (19a, 21a, 22a), and the hospital
filed the affidavit of its Director (58a). Notice of Appeal
was filed May 8,1963 (69a).
The Posture of This Appeal
The District Court granted the Motion to Dismiss on
the authority of Eaton v. Board of Managers of James
Walker Memorial Hospital, 261 F. 2d 521 (4th Cir. 1958),
cert, denied 359 U. S. 984 (three justices dissenting), on the
ground that “ a decision of the Court of Appeals should
be followed . . . in the absence of a material factual distinc
tion or a subsequent decision . . . requiring the District
Court to depart therefrom” (64a). The District Court
found no change of law “ justifying a change in results” and
no “ factual element, not before the Court in the prior case
which shows ‘State action’ on the part of the hospital when
considered within the totality of the relationships between
the State and the hospital” (64a-66a).
In the first Eaton case, decided prior to Burton v. Wil
mington Parking Authority, 365 U. S. 715, three physicians,
who are plaintiffs here, sought to enjoin the James Walker
Memorial Hospital from refusing to grant staff membership
to Negroes on the basis of race. Patients seeking non-
discriminatory treatment facilities and the right to treat
ment from physicians of their choice without regard to race
were not plaintiffs in that action. The District Court
3
granted Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, 164
F. Supp. 191 (E. D. N. C. 1958), and this Court affirmed,
holding the hospital was operated “by an independent board
free from State control,” 261 F, 2d at 525, and was not
an instrumentality of the State. The United States Su
preme Court denied petition for writ of certiorari, 359
U. S. 984 (three justices noting their dissent). Both the
District Court and this Court rested their decision on the
allegations of the complaint.1
The complaint here alleges facts not alleged in the com
plaint dismissed in the first suit. In addition, the complaint
alleges facts, in detail, which were but generally alleged
in the complaint in the first suit and which were not dis
cussed by this Court or the District Court.
Specifically, in the first suit this Court did not apparently
consider the effect of funds received from the United States
although there was such a general allegation (76a). Here,
amount, purpose, and origin of the funds are specified
(11a).
This Court did not apparently consider exercise of the
power of eminent domain, though there was a brief and
general allegation (76a). The complaint here reveals the
occasion, as well as State judicial conclusion that defen
dant herein “ is a public body, a body corporate and politic
.. . ” (11a, 12a).
In the first case, the complaint did not reveal the amount
or the purpose of “ certain financial support from the City
and County” prior to 1951 (261 F. 2d at 525). The com
plaint here shows the funds received by the hospital, for
operating expenses and capital improvement, from City,
County, State, and United States (8a, 9a, 11a).
1 The complaint in Eaton v. James Walker Memorial Hospital, 261 F. 2d
521 (4th Cir. 1958), appears, infra, pp. 71a-79a.
4
The District Court did not discuss these expanded alle
gations for the reason that “ the substance of the allegations
was fairly presented to and considered by the Court in the
prior case” (66a). The District Court did, however, ad
dress itself to the following facts “ urged for the first time”
and concluded that they “ did not justify” a change in result
(66a):
(1) The City as self-insurer has made certain pay
ments to the hospital for services rendered in treating
Workmen’s Compensation cases;
(2) Since July 1, 1947, the hospital has been required
to secure a license from the State through the North
Carolina Medical Care Commission and since that
time the hospital has complied with the licensing pro
cedure and standards prescribed by the Commission;
and
(3) James Walker Memorial Hospital is superior to
any hospital in the City and County, offering the
highest standard of medical care, and is the chosen
instrumentality of the City and County for furnishing
medical care to their white citizens and affording a
place to practice for qualified white physicians.
Subsequent to the first Eaton case, the United States
Supreme Court decided Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority, 365 U. S. 715, a case which the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit has concluded would decide the issues
raised here in favor of plaintiff physicians and patients,
Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F. 2d 320, 323 (5th
Cir. 1962). The District Court did not follow the Hampton
case, holding, “It is clear that Burton does not enunciate
a fundamental change in the law” (64a).
5
Questions Presented
1. Whether the Court below erred in failing to enjoin
a hospital policy of racial discrimination when the hospital
operated on property donated by City and County with the
following restriction on use: “ so long as the same shall
be used and maintained as a Hospital for the benefit of the
County and City aforesaid and in the case of disuse or
abandonment to revert to the said County and City.”
2. Whether a hospital—regulated and licensed by the
State—which has received large sums for capital construc
tion from the United States and local government; deter
mined a “ facility necessary for carrying on community life”
by the United States; operating on property donated by
government and required by a reverter clause to be used
only for hospital purposes; and having a long history of
significant governmental contacts, including use of eminent
domain and a call upon tax funds, may refuse staff mem
bership to Negro physicians and non-discriminatory treat
ment facilities to Negro patients.
3. Whether the Court below erred in dismissing the com
plaint on the authority of a prior case without permitting
full presentation of proof on the merits when the complaint
raised factual and legal issues not decided or considered
in that case and a decision of the United States Supreme
Court established principles which supersede the authority
of the decision relied upon.
6
Statement of Facts
Three plaintiffs are qualified physicians who reside and
practice in Wilmington, North Carolina.2 They sought and
were denied hospital staff membership, including the right
to place and treat patients, because of a hospital policy
excluding Negro physicians (4a, 5a, 13a, 14a, 15a). The
hospital bylaws state (14a):
The applicant for membership on the Medical Staff
shall be a white physician who has his office and prac
tice in New Hanover County and is a graduate of a
recognized medical school, legally licensed to practice
in the State of North Carolina, qualified for member
ship in the county medical society.
Two plaintiffs, patients of Doctor Roane and Doctor
Eaton, require treatment at the hospital and desire treat
ment from physicians of their choice without regard to race
(5a, 6a). The hospital is by far the largest and best in
the Wilmington area (12a, 13a, 15a, 16a), but Negro ad
mission is restricted (12a). Those few Negroes admitted
are segregated from other patients and placed in a separate
building (6a). “When the need arises for Negro patients
to undergo surgery, they are wheeled outdoors from the
building in which they are segregated” to the place where
surgery is performed (16a).
In addition to racial segregation, plaintiffs claim injury
by the policy of refusing Negro physicians staff membership
for the reason that Negro patients are forced to discharge
the physician of their choice (in this case Doctor Roane and
2 The physicians alleged that they are “ in all respects, except race, quali
fied to enjoy courtesy privileges at the James Walker Memorial Hospital”
(4a, 5a). Their professional qualifications are set forth in detail in the com
plaint (4a, 5a).
7
Doctor Eaton) if he is a Negro, and replace him with a
white physician in order to receive treatment at the hos
pital (16a).
In 1881, the City of Wilmington and the County of
New Hanover acquired land and constructed a City Hos
pital for the treatment of the “ sick or infirm poor persons”
of the City and County (9a, 10a).3 In 1900, James Walker,
a private citizen, furnished funds for construction of a
new hospital on the site then occupied by the City Hospital.
Accordingly, the old building was razed and a new hospital
building constructed on the same property (10a).
James Walker died in 1901 before completion of the new
building. Pursuant to his will, moneys necessary for com
pletion of the new hospital were paid to the City and County
and the completed building was turned over to the City and
County for use as a City Hospital, to be “used by them and
their successors as a hospital for the sick and afflicted”
(10a).
In 1901, the Board of Managers of the James Walker
Memorial Hospital was chartered as a corporation.4
The Act chartering the Board provided a majority of
the Board of Managers would be elected by the Board of
Commissioners of New Hanover County and the Board of
Aldermen of the City of Wilmington, vacancies occurring
thereafter to be filled by a vote of the Board members (7a).
The statute was enacted “ to provide for the government
of the ‘James Walker Memorial Hospital of the City of
Wilmington, North Carolina’ ” (7a) and its preamble de
clares as its purpose “ that suitable provisions should . . .
be made for the permanent maintenance of the hospital by
3 Chapter 23, Public Laws of North Carolina (1881).
4 Chapter 12, Private Laws of North Carolina (1901).
8
said City and Comity” (7a).5 The Act directed the County
to set apart annually the sum of Four Thousand Eight
Hundred Dollars and the City the sum of Three Thousand
Two Hundred Dollars “ for the purpose of providing the
proper means for sustaining the said hospital” (7a). Any
unexpended portion of this appropriation was to be invested
by the Board in bonds of the City, County or State (8a).
The Act required the Board to make reports annually to
both City and County, “which said reports shall contain a
full time and accurate account of the conduct and manage
ment of said hospital and dispensary, giving an itemized
account of their receipts and disbursements, together with
number, sex, race, age and disease of all occupants of said
for the preceding year” (8a).
In 1901, the City and County donated to the Board the
new hospital building and the land upon which it stood
with the following restriction:
To have and to hold in trust for the use of the Hospital
aforesaid, so long as the same shall be used and main
tained as a Hospital for the benefit of the County and
City aforesaid, and in case of disuse or abandonment
to revert to the said County and City as their interest
respectively appear (10a).
Throughout its history, the hospital has received funds
from government to meet costs of operation and capital
improvement.
In 1907, the North Carolina General Assembly provided
that annual appropriations in “ such sums as . . . may be
necessary” could be made from public funds in order that
5 Another purpose was removal of the management of the hospital “ from
the vicissitudes which generally result when such an institution is left entirely
in the control o f local municipal authorities,” Chapter 12, Private Laws of
North Carolina (1901) (emphasis supplied).
9
the hospital be run in an efficient manner (8a), and, in
1915, City and County were directed to share, in equal
proportions, the appropriations for the support of the
hospital which “ in any one year shall not be less than
fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000).” 6
In 1937, the Legislature provided for payments by City
and County of $25,000 a year, each, to the hospital for three
successive years (8a).7
In 1939, City and County were authorized to enter into
contracts with the hospital and empowered to appropriate
up to $25,000 a year, each, to the hospital. In addition,
City and County were authorized, if necessary, to lay addi
tional taxes. The appropriations and the tax levy were
enacted “ for the purpose of providing hospitalized medical
attention and maintenance of the indigent sick and afflicted
poor of the said municipalities” and “ such maintenance
and care is a necessary expense and that provision for the
poor and unfortunate is one of the first duties of govern
ment and that their proper maintenance and care is re
quired under the law and Constitution of the State of
North Carolina” (9a).8
During the period 1937-1939, City and County paid
$30,000 per year to the Hospital. They paid also $60,000,
of the total cost of $100,000, for addition of a North Wing
to the Hospital. The United States contributed the balance
of $40,000 (11a).
In 1944, another new wing, financed by the United States,
was placed in service. Construction of this wing, and pur
chase of the land on which it was built, was financed by a
6 Chapter 38, Private Laws o f North Carolina (1907); Chapter 66, Pri
vate-Local Laws of North Carolina (1915).
7 Chapter 8, Public-Local and Private Laws o f North Carolina (1937).
8 Chapter 470, Public-Local and Private Laws of North Carolina (1939).
10
grant of $508,000 from the United States under the provi
sions of the Defense Public Works Act (Act of October 14,
1940, as amended June 28, 1941, 55 Stat. 361; 42 U. S. C.
§§1531, et seq.). This money was paid by the United States
to the State of North Carolina and in turn by the State to
the Hospital (11a). The hospital received the funds on
“ the basis of need and in determining need no discrimina
tion shall be made on account of race,” 42 U. S. C. §1533.
In order to receive the grant, the hospital was designated
a “ facility necessary for carrying on community life sub
stantially expanded by the national defense program,”
42 U. S. C. §1531.
In 1951, the Supreme Court of North Carolina found
unconstitutional the manner of providing for the continued
maintenance of the hospital which had been pursued by the
legislature since 1901, but the Court pointed out that there
were other methods of supporting the hospital. Thereafter,
the General Assembly of the State empowered City and
County to contract with the hospital in order to pay for
hospitalization of the sick and poor of the area and, sub
sequently, public funds were paid to the hospital pursuant
to contract. From 1952 to 1957, the hospital received ap
proximately $275,000 from City and County (261 F. 2d at
523). The hospital received $41,119.15 from the County
during fiscal year 1960-61 and $37,401.99 for the first eleven
months of fiscal 1961-62 (58a, 59a). In addition, the City
as self-insurer has made payments to the hospital for ser
vices rendered in treating Workmen’s Compensation cases
(11a).
The hospital is exempt from City and County taxes.
This exemption is worth approximately $50,000 a year to
the hospital (19a-21a).
The hospital has exercised the power of eminent domain.
Condemnation was employed to obtain the land for the new
11
wing financed by tlie United States. On two occasions, at
least, while taking property, the hospital held itself out as
a public body. In 1944, in connection with the wing con
structed with federal funds, the hospital recited in a con
demnation petition that it was “ a municipal corporation, a
public body and body corporate and politic” and the Su
perior Court of New Hanover County, found the hospital
“a public body, a body corporate and politic . . . ” (11a, 12a).
The State maintains control over the details of hospital
maintenance and operation by means of “Rules and Regu
lations for Hospital Licensure” (22a-57a) administered by
the North Carolina Medical Care Commission.9 Compli
ance with the standards adopted is required in order to
receive the license necessary to operate a hospital in North
Carolina, N. C. Gen. Stats. §§131-126.1 et seq.10
The hospital, by far the largest in the community, offers
“ the highest standard of medical care in the City of Wil
mington,” and is the “ chosen instrumentality” of the City
for providing medical care to its white citizens and a place
to practice for its white physicians. As such, it is “ in the
nature of a public utility carrying out functions for the
City” (13a).
9 For example, the rules provide among other things for medical staff
organization (23a) ; standards for facilities, organization and procedures in
surgical operating rooms (25a) ; equipment organization and procedures for
the obstetric department (27a) ; for separation of pediatric facilities from
those for adults and the newborn nursing service (32 a ); the circumstances
for administration o f anesthesia (32a) ; that hospitals have adequate diag
nostic X-ray and fluoroscopic examination facilities (34 a ); designated treat
ment facilities for emergency or outpatient service (34a) ; for isolation rooms
(35a) ; regulation of hospital pharmacies (35a) ; and records (3 6 a ); organi
zation of the nursing staff is described, including minimum numbers (38a) ;
and detailed provision for hospital food service is made (39a).
10 North Carolina enacted a “Hospital Licensing Act” in 1947 in order
to receive Federal aid under the Hill-Burton Act. The Act requires the states
to enact legislation providing for compliance with minimum standards of
maintenance and operation, 42 U. S. C. §§291(a) (7 ), 291f(d).
12
There are four hospitals serving the Wilmington area.
They admit approximately 16,600 persons per year; 11,000,
or approximately 66% are admitted to the James Walker
Memorial Hospital. As one hospital serves children only,
James Walker Memorial Hospital represents 75% of the
community’s hospital capacity for adults. The following
table reveals the manner in which the hospitals serve the
community (12a, 13a):
Hospital Status
No. Admissions
Per Year
Kaeial
Policy
James Walker Memorial Non-Profit 11,000 Most persons ad
mitted are white.
The few Negroes
admitted are seg
regated. No Negro
doctors on staff.
Community County Owned 2,000 Patients all Ne
gro. Negro physi
cians permitted on
staff. White phy
sicians on staff
also.
Babies Non-Profit 2,000 Negro and white
children admit
ted. No Negro
doctor on staff.
Cape Fear Memorial Non-Profit 1,600 No Negroes as pa
tients or on cour
tesy staff.
13
A R G U M E N T
I.
A Reversionary Interest in Land in Favor of Govern
ment, Restricting Hospital Property to Use “ as a Hospital
for the Benefit of the County and City . . . And in Case
of Disuse or Abandonment to Revert to the Said County
and City” Subjects the Hospital to the Restraints of the
Constitution Against Racial Discrimination.
In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U. S.
715, the Supreme Court held that when a state leases prop
erty to a private corporation so as to create a relationship
of mutual benefits, responsibilities and obligations the lessee
must comply with the proscriptions of the Fourteenth
Amendment as though they were binding covenants written
into the lease itself. The Burton case was decided April
17, 1961. This Court decided Eaton v. James Walker
Memorial Hospital, 261 F. 2d 521 (4th Cir. 1958), Novem
ber 28, 1958. Certiorari was denied, 359 U. S. 984, three
justices dissenting, May 4, 1959.
Appellants contend that the lease in Burton, 365 U. S.
at 719, for “ restaurant, dining room, banquet hall, cocktail
lounge and bar and for no other use and purpose” is iden
tical, as far as its legal consequences are concerned, to
provisions in the deed of July 19, 1901, by which the City
and County gave to the Board the hospital building and
the land upon which it stands “ to have and to hold in trust
for the use of the hospital aforesaid, as long as the same
shall be used and maintained as a hospital for the benefit
of the County and City aforesaid, and in case of disuse or
abandonment to revert to the said County and City as their
interest respectively appear” (10a).
14
By means of this retained property interest, the City and
County have dictated absolutely the use to which the hos
pital building and land is to be put. If the Board uses
the property for any purpose other than as a “hospital
for the benefit of the County and City,” or abandons the
property, building and land revert to City and County.
The retained property interest confers, therefore, complete
present control over the use of the property, for it assures
City and County that the land and building will always be
used as a “hospital for the benefit of the County and City.”
Freedom of choice in the use of property characteristic of
truly private institutions in our society is absent here.
The court below did not suggest any conceptual distinc
tion, insofar as state involvement is concerned, between
a long-term lease for a particular purpose with the right
of cancellation of the lease if that purpose is not carried
out, as in Burton, 365 U. S. at 719, and a conveyance sub
ject to the right of reversion if property does not continue
to be used for the purpose prescribed. In both cases the
obviously significant decision as to what use shall be made
of property is dictated and enforced by government. Nor
does it matter what label the law of real property attaches
to the property interest retained by City and County for
only the consequence of its retention is important in the
context of Fourteenth Amendment rights. See, e.g., City
of St. Petersburg v. Alsup, 238 F. 2d 830 (5th Cir. 1956)
(holding it irrelevant to Fourteenth Amendment rights
that a City operated parks and swimming facilities in a
proprietary capacity, as a business, rather than in a gov
ernmental capacity).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir
cuit has concluded that the holding as to the lease for a
particular purpose “ and no other” in Burton, supra, is indis
tinguishable from the situation created by the limitation
15
on use here. Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F. 2d
320, 322, 323 (5th Cir. 1962). In Hampton, golf courses were
sold by the City to private individuals who refused to
permit Negroes to play. The deeds of sale provided that
the properties were to be used as golf courses only or
would revert to the City. The presence of the reverter
clause was sufficient to invoke the restraints of the Con
stitution against racial discrimination. It should be noted
that in Hampton the condition limiting use of the properties
to that of golf courses was the only relationship between
the City and the vendees considered by the Court, 304
F. 2d at 323, whereas the condition and trust here limiting
use of the property to use as a hospital “ for the benefit of
the County and City” (10a) is but one of a number of
significant relationships between the hospital and govern
ment.
In Hampton, 304 F. 2d at 322, the Court found the prop
erty interest retained amounted to “ complete present con
trol” :
Conceptually, it is extremely difficult, if not impos
sible, to find any rational basis of distinguishing the
power or degree of control, so far as relates to the
state’s involvement, between a long term lease for a
particular purpose with the right of cancellation of
the lease if that purpose is not carried out on the one
hand, and an absolute conveyance of property, subject,
however to the right of reversion if the property does
not continue to be used for the purpose prescribed by
the state in its deed of sale. Appellees in this case
stress the fact that there is no “ immediate control” and
that there is no “present interest” in the City of Jack
sonville. These are empty phrases when considered in
connection with the absolute allegation on the part of
the present owners of the property that they imme
16
diately, presently, and always nse the leased property
for golf course purposes and no other. This is com
plete present control even though the daily operations
is, of course, not subject in other matters to the City’s
directions. (Emphasis in original.)
The court explicitly rejected the authority of Eaton v.
James Walker Memorial Hospital, 261 F. 2d 521 (4th Cir.
1958):
With reference to the Fourth Circuit case of Eaton
v. James Walker Memorial Hospital, supra, it appears
that it was decided before the Supreme Court an
nounced its decision in the Wilmington Parking case,
supra. Being unable, as we are, to find any valid dis
tinction between the effect of the lease in the Wilming
ton Parking Authority case and the sale with a rever
sionary interest in the Walker Hospital case, we doubt
whether the Fourth Circuit would have decided the
hospital case as it did had it followed the Supreme
Court decision. (304 F. 2d at 323.)
The City and County have retained not only a valuable
present interest in the hospital property and a severe limi
tation on the property rights of the Board, but also have
the practical assurance that the property will always be
used as City and County desire. As far as the Fourteenth
Amendment is concerned, retention by the City and County
of a present interest in property, which absolutely defines
the use to which it may be put, makes the hospital an in
strumentality of the State to the same extent as if title had
not passed and the transaction had been cast in the form
of a long-term lease. Cf. Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority, 365 U. S. 715; Tate v. Department of Conserva
tion and Development, 231 F. 2d 615 (4th Cir. 1956); City of
Greensboro v. Simkins, 246 F. 2d 425 (4th Cir. 1959). Cer
17
tainly, the form of the State’s property interest cannot
determine plaintiffs’ constitutional right, for “ state action”
extends to “ participation through any arrangement, man
agement, funds or property,” Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1,
4, 19; Burton, 365 U. S. at 722; Tate, supra; City of St.
Petersburg v. Alsup, 238 F. 2d 830 (5th Cir. 1956).
Under the Burton rule, if the hospital had leased the
property from the City and County, it would be forbidden
to follow its policy of racial discrimination. It is immate
rial that a reverter was used instead of a lease, for com
plete control of present use was retained.
Assurance that the property will be used for a hospital
or will revert to government ownership is highly significant
to the City and County. James Walker Memorial accounts
for 75% of Wilmington’s adult hospital capacity. The hos
pital is, as determined by the United States, a “ facility
necessary for carrying on community life,” 42 U. S. C.
§1531, which government would obviously have to replace
if it ceased to operate. In practice, the retained property
interest assures that change in use or abandonment is
unlikely to occur. Should it occur, however, City and County
would be able to take over the hospital operation at no
cost. As the replacement cost of the hospital increases—
as it has, significantly, since 1901—the value and signifi
cance of the retained property interest increases, for the
reverter is proof against the massive replacement cost
which City and County would otherwise have to bear in
the event of disuse or abandonment. Finally, the limitation
on use is retained in the form of a trust “ for the benefit
of the County and City” (10a). It is unlikely, therefore,
that the Board could even change the manner of hospital
operation from a non-profit to a private, profit-making,
institution.
18
Public Utilities Commission v. Poliak, 343 U. S. 451, is
authority for the rule of law urged here. In that case, the
court found a streetcar company subject to the Constitution
for the reason that it held a franchise to perform a service
for the benefit of the community and was regulated by
government. Boman v. Birmingham Transit Co., 280 F. 2d
531, 534, 535 (5th Cir. 1960) reached a similar conclusion.
So, here, the Board received a gift of a hospital from gov
ernment on the express condition that it be used as a hospi
tal and held in trust “ for the benefit of the County and
City” (10a). Cf. Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F. 2d
at 323. The hospital’s continued performance of this public
function, enforced by the retained property interest, makes
the hospital an agent of the State for the purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
II.
The Total Effect of the Hospital’s Contacts With Gov
ernment Is Sufficient to Place It Under the Restraints of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments Against Racial
Discrimination.
Burton, 365 U. S. at 722, 724, explicitly rejected single
factor tests of state responsibility under the Fourteenth
Amendment. In contrast to the absence of day-to-day con
trol, relied on in the first Eaton case, the Court in Burton,
365 U. S. at 725, found it sufficient that the State place “ its
power, property, and prestige” behind an institution which
discriminated. Despite a private board “ in full control”
(as relied upon in Eaton, 261 F. 2d at 525), the Court in
Burton found the State “a joint participant in the chal
lenged activity,” 365 U. S. at 725. Moreover, the Court
reasserted the test of Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1, 4, 19,
that responsibility under the Fourteenth Amendment ex
19
tends to “ State participation through any arrangement,
management, funds or property,” 365 U. S. 722 (emphasis
added). Under the rule of Burton, the total effect of the
relationship, including all benefits, obligations and assis
tance provided, is considered when determining whether the
Constitution applies to restrain racial discrimination.
This Court in the first Eaton case did not consider the
total effect of contacts between the hospital and govern
ment under the rule announced in Burton. Nor did this
Court actually have before it all of those contacts because
some were not alleged in the complaint in that case and
because others were alleged without precision or detail.
Financial Contributions for Capital Construction
In the first Eaton case the plaintiffs alleged only that
“defendants . . . have received large grants of money from
the Federal Government for expansion and maintenance
of the said Hospital” (76a). No mention of this allegation
of federal assistance was made in the opinion of the Dis
trict Court or this Court. Here, plaintiffs allege (11a):
The hospital has received money from the United
States under provisions of the Defense Public Works
Act (Act of October 14, 1940 as amended June 28,
1941, 55 Stat. 361) for the expansion and maintenance
of its facilities. In March, 1944 a new addition to
the hospital, financed by the United States, under
said Act to the extent of $508,000 was placed in service
at the hospital. This money was paid by the United
States to the State of North Carolina and in turn by
the State of North Carolina to the James Walker
Memorial Hospital.
The impact of a federal grant in excess of half a million
dollars to the hospital satisfies the rule of Burton that
20
state financial support of racial discrimination violates the
Fourteenth Amendment (and the Fifth Amendment, Bolling
v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497). Here, then, there is govern
mental participation through “ funds” as well as “property”
(the limitation on use) calling for application of constitu
tional principles against racial discrimination, Cooper v.
Aaron, 358 U. S. 1, 4, 19. It is significant that the grant
of $508,000 in federal funds was given to the hospital be
cause it was a “ facility necessary for carrying on com
munity life expanded by the National Defense Program,” 11
42 U. S. C. §1531, the funds being allocated “ on the basis
of need and in determining need no discrimination shall be
made on account of race.” 42 TJ. S. C. §1533. Such an in
stitution is certainly carrying on a “useful and necessary”
activity for the community, if not the nation, and, there
fore, subject to the Constitution, Boman v. Birmingham
Transit Co., 280 F. 2d 531, 535 (5th Cir. 1960); Burton,
365 TJ. S. at 723, 724.
In addition to the federal grant to construct a new hos
pital wing, City and County have joined with the United
States to construct another wing of the hospital. In the
first Eaton case, it was alleged that “ said City [and County]
has for many years prior to 1951 made direct annual con
tributions from its treasury for the support, maintenance
and operation of said hospital” (75a, 76a). While it is
true, of eourse, that capital contributions could be con
sidered under such an allegation, the opinion of this Court
shows that as far as the allegations as to City and County
funds for “ support, maintenance, and operation” are con
cerned, the Court did not interpret the allegation to apply
to appropriations for capital construction. See 261 F. 2d
11 Hospital expansion was financed by the United States in order to meet
an “ acute” national need of “ public works necessary to the health, safety or
welfare of persons engaged in national defense activities,” 42 U. S. C. §1532.
21
521, 524, 525. Here, the amount and purpose of City and
County contribution for capital construction are alleged
with specificity (11a):
Hospital costs for capital construction have been
paid for by the City and County. For example, from
fiscal 1937 to 1939, the City and County in addition to
their regular appropriations for $15,000 per annum,
paid $60,000 of the total cost of $100,000 for the addi
tion of a North Wing to the hospital. The balance of
$40,000 was contributed by the United States.
Two wings of the hospital, the main hospital building
and the real property on which the main building and a
wing of the hospital stand, are, therefore, the product of
funds and property donated by government. Without funds
and property received from government, it is doubtful
whether the Board would be able to operate an institution
in any way comparable to the present, over 300 bed, hos
pital.
Were these funds general appropriations expended for
hospital operation at a particular time in the past it might
be argued that their present effect on the hospital was not
crucial; while the hospital might once have been subject
to the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments it was not so sub
ject now. But these funds were not general appropriations
for hospital operation, hut grants for capital construction
and land acquisition. The consequences of their expenditure
are as great today as in 1939 and 1944. Capital construc
tion is by its very nature an investment for the future.
Government support of the hospital in the past has re
sulted in hospital buildings and land serving the com
munity today.
22
Regulation and Licensing
In addition to funds for capital construction and land
purchase, the conveyance of hospital and land in 1901,
and the restriction on use of hospital property, the total
relationship between government and the hospital includes
numerous other significant contacts.
A factor not considered by the Court in the first Eaton
case and clearly relevant under the broad test of Burton,
is the effect of the North Carolina Hospital Licensure Act,
§§131-126, et seq., of the General Statutes of North Caro
lina and the Rules and Regulations of the North Carolina
Medical Care Commission (22a-57a). While the Rules and
Regulations are not specifically alleged in the Complaint
they fairly come within its terms (13a) and they were con
sidered by the District Court (66a). The Rules and Regula
tions of the Commission are mandatory as a hospital can
not operate in North Carolina without a license issued
by the Commission, §131-126.3. General Statutes of North
Carolina. These Rules and Regulations (22a-57a) prescribe
specific standards which effectively control the full range
of day-to-day hospital administration and operation. They
set forth minimum standards for the physical plant, clinical
services, auxiliary services and food services of the hos
pital, which are enforced by an agency of the State. The
result of this regulation is comprehensive control of the
manner in which the hospital is operated sufficient, in it
self, to invoke the Constitution. Public Utilities Commis
sion v. Poliak, 343 U. S. 451, 462. Plaintiffs do not contend,
however, that every institution the state regulates becomes
an instrumentality of the state for the purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment, but that state control of operating
standards is another factor to be considered in evaluating
the total relationship between hospital and government.
As such, they provide evidence of day-to-day control, the
absence of which was relied upon in the first Eaton case,
supra, at 261 F. 2d at 525.
The license itself is, of course, a grant of government
power which the Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit
have held sufficient, when the licensee operates in an area
of high public importance, to invoke the Fifth and Four
teenth Amendments. Public Utilities Commission v. Poliak,
343 U. S. 451; Bornan v. Birmingham Transit Co., 280
F. 2d 531 (5th Cir. 1960). While it is true that the state
licenses a variety of persons and institutions, it is an
easily verifiable fact that some licenses grant more power
than others. The state would be hardpressed to justify
denial of a driver’s license or a doctor’s license on the
ground that there already existed drivers or doctors in the
community. But the public interest would not be the same
if a license were denied to those who would construct a
hospital in a place where there was already sufficient hos
pital care available. North Carolina has accepted this prop
osition by submitting a State Plan under the Hill-Burton
Act which controls the number of hospitals which may be
built in given areas throughout the State, 42 C. F. E.
§§53-11, 53-12, 53-13; 42 U. S. C. §291e (a) (b) (c) (d).
So here the grant of a hospital license, after inspection to
insure conformance with multiple standards of operation,
confers far greater State power than many other licenses.
The United States, for example, is not in the habit of
giving large sums of money to automobile drivers, but it
did grant over half a million dollars to this hospital.
Such a comprehensive scheme of governmental regula
tion was sufficient to require decision of a Fifth Amendment
due process claim where the principal government involve
ment was a decision by a regulatory body to do nothing
about private activity. Public Utilities Commission v.
Poliak, 343 U. S. 451, 462. And this case, of course, has
24
elements that the Poliak case did not, e.g., financial sup
port and restrictions on the use of real property among
others.
Tax Exemption
In the first Eaton case, the complaint alleged as one
facet of state participation exemption from City and County
taxes. This factor was not mentioned in the District Court
or this Court’s opinion. Secondly, no estimate of the value
of tax exemption was before the Court in Eaton, supra. But
in Burton, 365 U. S. at 724, the Court, when denoting the
factors which led to its conclusion that the restaurant was
subject to the Fourteenth Amendment, considered that
“ should any improvements effected in the leasehold . . .
become part of the realty, there is no possibility of in
creased taxes being passed on to it since the fee is held
by a tax exempt government agency.” The value of tax
exemption to the hospital is, therefore, a factor which now
must be considered in evaluating the relationship of gov
ernment and this hospital.
The tax rate of New Hanover County was $1.30 per
$100.00 valuation in 1961 and the tax rate of the City of
Wilmington was $2.15 per $100.00 valuation (21a). Tax
assessment is at 50 percent of actual value (21a). The
James Walker Memorial Hospital has been appraised (19a,
20a) by a realtor, familiar with the Wilmington area, at
a value of approximately $3,000,000. Therefore, tax exemp
tion from City and County subsidizes the hospital to the
extent of approximately $50,000 per year. This is further
evidence of substantial support from government which
was not before the Court in the first Eaton case.
25
Em inent Domain
In Eaton, supra, the complaint alleged only “ that from
time to time the said defendants . . . have exercised the
right of eminent domain” (76a). The allegation was not
discussed by this Court or the District Court. The present
complaint alleges (11a):
4. The hospital has exercised the power of eminent
domain in aid of the expansion of its facilities. De
fendant Board of Managers of said hospital, on April
28, 1942, filed a petition . . . to condemn land for use
by the hospital in connection with the addition to the
hospital facilities completion in 1944. The condemna
tion petitions in which the defendant alleged that it
was “a municipal corporation, a public body and body
corporate and politic” was granted in the Superior
Court of New Hanover County, State of North Caro
lina on December 5, 1944, which recited that the defen
dant herein “ is a public body, a body corporate and
politic. . . . ”
5. On another occasion in which the hospital sought
a declaratory judgment in the State Courts of North
Carolina adjudging its right to support from the City
and County, it alleged that it was a public body. . . .
Not only did the hospital receive large amounts of City,
County and Federal funds to expand its facilities, but it was
granted the power of eminent domain to obtain the prop
erty on which to build. Not only was the money to purchase
the land and the right to acquire the property supplied by
government, but the hospital alleged that it was at the
time a public or municipal corporation and was adjudi
cated such. As the hospital has used public power for a
public purpose it cannot discriminate.
26
In North Carolina hospitals exercise eminent domain for
“works, which are authorized by law and which involve a
public use or benefit,” §40-2, General Statutes of North
Carolina, and the hospital must be “wholly or partly de
pendent upon the State for maintenance” and “ in need of
land for its location.” Ibid. Significantly, eminent domain
is granted hospitals along with other public service insti
tutions such as railroads, power producers, streetcar com
panies and motor carriers. Ibid. Cf. Public Utilities Com
mission v. Poliak, 343 U. S. 451, 461-63; Boman v. Birming
ham Transit Co., 280 F. 2d 531, 535 (5th Cir. 1960); Baldwin
v. Morgan, 287 F. 2d 750, 755 (5th Cir. 1961). Moreover,
in order to exercise eminent domain, these institutions must
furnish the public with “ some necessity or convenience
which cannot readily be furnished without the aid of gov
ernmental power, and which is required by the public as
such,” City of Charlotte v. Heath, 226 N. C. 750, 40 S. E. 2d
600, 604, 605; cf. Boman v. Birmingham Transit Co., supra.
And the use which justifies a taking by eminent domain is
use by or for government or the general public, and, con
sequently, only government or quasi public agencies are
authorized to exercise the power. Proctor v. State Highway
and Public Works Comm., 230 N. C. 687; 55 S. E. 2d 479;
City of Charlotte v. Heath, 226 N. C. 750; 40 S. E. 2d 600;
Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.,
240 N. C. 495; 82 S. E. 2d 771, 784.
Financial Contribution for Hospital Operation
“ The record before” the Court in the first Eaton ease
did “not reveal” the amount of “ certain financial support
from the City and County” received by the hospital, 261
F. 2d at 525. The complaint there only alleged “ that said
City [and County] has for many years prior to 1951 made
direct annual contributions from its treasury for the sup
port, maintenance and operation of said Hospital” (75a).
27
It is clear, however, from the present complaint that both
City and County undertook, up to 1951, to carry out their
responsibility under the statute chartering the Board to
provide “ for the permanent maintenance of the hospital”
(7a). City and County expended large sums to support the
hospital (7a-9a) and were authorized to lay taxes in order
to obtain such funds (9a).
The Supreme Court of North Carolina declared uncon
stitutional the method by which City and County supported
the Hospital in Board of Managers of the James Walker
Memorial Hospital of Wilmington v. City of Wilmington,
237 N. C. 179, 74 S. E. 2d 749 (1953), but City and County
have nonetheless paid public funds to the hospital pursuant
to contract. In other circumstances, payment of public
funds by contract to a hospital might not result in “ state
action.” But such payments are merely a continuation,
by a different means, of the City and County policy, going
back to 1901, of supporting the operations of the hospital.
Secondly, this history of financial support—when consid
ered along with the limitation on use of hospital property,
contribution of capital funds and property, grant of emi
nent domain and the other contacts shown by the complaint
—demonstrates again that the hospital is the chosen instru
ment of City and County, akin to a public utility, for pro
viding medical care to their white citizens.
The complaint reveals that only James Walker Memorial
Hospital is capable of meeting the medical needs of the
community’s population (12a, 13a). Had not the City and
County continuously conferred the benefit of governmental
action upon the hospital, a public hospital would have been
built long ago to meet the needs of the community and, of
course, such a hospital could not racially discriminate,
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483; Johnson v.
Virginia,------U. S . ------- , 10 L. ed. 2d 195, 83 S. Ct. ------.
As much as streetcar companies in Public Utilities Com
mission v. Poliak, 343 U. S. 451 and Boman v. Birmingham
Transit Co., 280 F. 2d 531, 535 (5th Cir. 1960), the hospital
“ is about the public’s business. It is doing something the
state deems useful for the public necessity and convenience.
This is what differentiates the public utility which holds a
special franchise from an ordinary business corporation
which in common with all others is granted the privileges of
operating in corporate form but does not have that special
franchise of using state property for private gain to per
form a public function” (emphasis added).
Board of Managers of the James Walker Memorial Hos
pital of Wilmington, North Carolina v. The City of Wil
mington, 237 N. C. 179, 74 S. E. 2d 749, held the method of
supporting the hospital unconstitutional, under state law,
as unauthorized local legislation pertaining to health. The
Court emphasized, however, that only the manner of sup
porting the hospital was invalid and that the end could be
accomplished easily through other means. 237 N. C. at 196,
197. Subsequent to this decision, the contractual device
suggested by the Court was adopted by City and County
(9a). Although the Court denied the hospital’s right to
annual appropriations from City and County, it did not
thereby—nor could it—erase the consequences of such sup
port for Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment purposes. And,
of course, nothing decided in that case in any way changes
the consequences of the continuous use by the hospital of
other government power and property.
Summary
The hospital is by far the largest and best hospital in
Wilmington. If it had not received government funds and
property, government would have had to take direct action
to meet the medical needs of the community. It holds a
valuable license and is closely regulated by the State.
29
Throughout its history, indigent sick have been plaeed in
the hospital by local government. Government appointees
sat on the hospital Board for many years. The United
States determined it a facility “necessary for carrying on
community life.” The hospital has exercised the “ public”
power of eminent domain for the benefit of the general
public and at that time held itself out as a “public corpo
ration.” The hospital has been granted and presently uses
large amounts of “ state” and federal property. Two wings
of the hospital in service today are the product of construc
tion financed by government. The hospital building, also in
service today, and the land on which it and a hospital wing
stand are the gift of government. The Board owns hospital
property “ for the benefit of the County and City” (10a).
Bestrictions imposed by government on that property as
sure the continued operation of the hospital either for com
munity benefit or, in case of disuse or abandonment, under
government ownership. Public funds have been appropri
ated for the operation of the hospital for over fifty years.
Tax exemption subsidizes the hospital to the extent of
$50,000 annually.
But for the “ power” and “property” of government and
the “benefits mutually conferred” (Burton, 365 U. S. at 724,
725) the hospital would be a far different institution than
it is now, poor in physical resources, and certainly not a
facility “necessary for carrying on community life,” 42
U. S. C. §1531. Support of the hospital enabled City and
County to create an institution able to serve the medical
needs of its citizens while enabling the hospital to fulfill its
chartered purpose. This is as much a relationship of “bene
fits mutually conferred” as found in the Burton case be
tween a municipal parking authority and a coffee shop. It
would be to divorce this hospital from its history to hold it
may discriminate on the basis of race. For “ state action,”
taking many forms, has always supported the hospital, and
30
the fruits of government support—still clearly in evidence
to any patient or physician—have played a crucial role in
providing the hospital with the resources with which it
presently serves the community.
Right to Hearing
The complaint alleges contacts between the hospital and
government in detail, but that is no substitute for a full
record. “ Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances
can the non-obvious involvement of the state in private con
duct be attributed its true significance.” Burton, 365 II. S.
at 722. The District Court, by refusing the opportunity
to submit detailed proof of the allegations of the complaint,
has necessitated resolution of the constitutional status of
the hospital without the concrete and revealing surround
ings of a complete record.12 But it is “ the accepted rule” that
a complaint “ should not be dismissed for failure to state
a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff
can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S.
41, 45-47. Considering the Fifth Circuit decision in Hamp
ton, 304 F. 2d 320 (5th Cir. 1962), which supports granting
plaintiffs relief because of the limitation on use alone, and
the numerous other consequential relationships between
government and the hospital present here, it is far from
“beyond doubt that plaintiffs can prove no set of facts in
support of [their] claim which would entitle [them] to
relief.” Conley v. Gibson, supra. Plaintiffs are entitled to
a hearing in order to prove, in detail, those allegations of
the complaint which establish they are entitled to relief.
12 For example, the hospital building and land, conveyed in 1901, plus
two wings of the hospital, were gifts from government. Evidence may be
extremely useful in gauging the significance of this property in terms of the
total hospital operation. Similarly, evidence may be of great assistance in
evaluating the other contacts between the hospital and government.
31
CONCLUSION
W herefore, for the foregoing reasons, appellants pray
that the judgment o f the court below be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
Jack Greenberg
Constance B aker Motley
Michael Meltsneb
Suite 1790
10 Columbus Circle
New York 19, New York
R obert R. B ond
612 Red Cross Street
Wilmington, North Carolina
Conrad 0 . P earson
2031/2 East Chapel Hill Street
Durham, North Carolina
Attorneys for Appellants
APPENDIX
A P P E N D I X A
E mory
7-11-61
7-28-61
3- 8-62
5-14-62
9-12-62
9-15-62
9-28-62
10- 4-62
3- 9-63
4- 9-63
5- 8-63
Relevant Docket Entries
H ubert A. E aton, et al.,
Grubbs and T he B oard of Managers of J ames
W alker H ospital, a body corporate.
Filed Complaint and Cost Bond
Filed defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Filed plaintiffs’ Motion for Hearing
Filed plaintiffs’ Motion for Hearing
Filed plaintiffs’ Exhibit A
Filed plaintiffs’ Exhibit B
Filed affidavit of Robert R. Martin, defendants
Exhibit A
Filed plaintiffs’ Exhibit C
Filed plaintiffs’ Motion for Judgment
Filed Opinion and Order Granting Motion to
Dismiss
Filed Notice of Appeal to United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
2a
Complaint
(Filed: July 11, 1961)
IlST THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
F ob the E astern D istrict op North Carolina
W ilmington D ivision
H ubert A. E aton, D aniel C. R oane, Samuel James Gray,
V ernetta E. H ussey and L eland M. Newsome, on be
half of themselves and others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
— v .—
E mory Grubbs and T he B oard op Managers op J ames
W alker Memorial H ospital, a body corporate,
Defendants.
I
A. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to
Title 28 United States Code §1343(3). This is an action
authorized by Title 42 United States Code §1983 which
authorizes any citizen of the United States or other per
son within the jurisdiction thereof to commence a suit in
the district courts of the United States to redress the
deprivation, under color of any state law, statute, ordi
nance, regulation, custom, or usage of any right, privilege,
or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United
States or any Act of Congress providing for equal rights
of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States.
3a
B. Plaintiffs are Negro citizens of the United States
and of the State of North Carolina who seek redress for
the deprivations of rights, privileges, and immunities se
cured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States, §1, and also secured by Title 42
United States Code §1981 providing that Negro citizens
shall have the same benefits under law as are enjoyed by
white citizens. Plaintiffs also assert rights under the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States.
Complaint
I I
This is a class action brought by plaintiffs on behalf of
themselves and on behalf of other Negroes similarly situ
ated, pursuant to Rule 23(a)(3) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs herein are of the class of per
sons who because of their race have been denied access to
the facilities of defendant hospital on the same basis and in
the same manner as white persons similarly situated in the
City of Wilmington, North Carolina. Plaintiffs, Hubert
Eaton, Daniel C. Roane and Samuel James Gray are physi
cians who are duly licensed by the State of North Carolina
to practice the profession of medicine within the state.
Plaintiffs Yernetta E. Hussey and Leland M. Newsome
are Negro citizens residing in the City of Wilmington who
seek admission to defendant hospital for the purpose of the
diagnosis and treatment of illness without racial discrim
ination and by a physician of their choice who without
regard to his race is qualified to practice in said hospital.
Common questions of law and fact are involved, plaintiffs
assert common grievances which arise out of common
wrongs, and they seek common relief for themselves and
for the members of the class they represent.
4a
III
This suit seeks an injunction on behalf of plaintiffs and
those similarly situated prohibiting defendants from re
fusing to grant courtesy staff privileges to plaintiff-physi
cians including the right to treat their own patients when
admitted to the hospital, and requiring defendants to
grant to plaintiff-patients access to the facilities of defen
dant hospital without distinction based upon race or color.
IV
A. Plaintiff, Hubert A. Eaton a Negro and citizen of the
United States and the State of North Carolina, is and has
been a resident of the City of Wilmington, where he has
been practicing medicine for the past seventeen years.
He has been a surgeon in said city for the past fifteen years
on the active surgical staff of the Community Hospital.
He holds a B. S. degree from Johnson C. Smith University,
Charlotte, North Carolina, and M. S. and M. D. degrees
from the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
He served one year of internship at the Iv. B. Reynolds
Hospital in Winston-Salem, North Carolina prior to be
ginning practice in Wilmington, North Carolina. He is in
all respects, except race, qualified to enjoy courtesy privi
leges at the James Walker Memorial Hospital.
B. Plaintiff, Daniel C. Roane a Negro and citizen of the
United States and the State of North Carolina, is and has
been a resident of the City of Wilmington, where he has
been practicing medicine for the past twenty-three years.
He holds B. S. and M. D. degrees from Howard University,
Washington, D. C. He served one year of internship and
a residency in internal medicine at Kansas City General
Hospital, Kansas City, Missouri. He also served a resi
Complaint
5a
dency in 1938 at Community Hospital, Wilmington, North.
Carolina. Since then he has been engaged in the general
practice of medicine and surgery in New Hanover County.
Dr. Eoane is presently chief of staff and acting head of
the Department of Obstetrics, Community Hospital, Wil
mington, a member of the Old North State Medical Society,
John Andrew Surgical Society of the Carolinas, the Wil
mington Academy of Medicine and the National Medical
Association. He is in all respects except race, qualified to
enjoy courtesy privileges at the James Walker Memorial
Hospital.
C. Plaintiff, Samuel James Gray a Negro and citizen of
the United States and the State of North Carolina is and
has been a resident of the City of Wilmington, where he
has been practicing medicine for the past twenty-two years.
He holds B.S. and M.D. degrees from Howard University,
Washington, D. C. He served one year (1937-1938) as an
interne at Lincoln Hospital, Durham, North Carolina, and
eighteen months residency at Community Hospital, Wil
mington. Dr. Gray is a member of the surgical and medical
staff of Community Hospital, Wilmington. He is in all
respects, except race, qualified to enjoy courtesy privileges
at the James Walker Memorial Hospital.
V
A. Plaintiff, Vernetta E. Hussey is a Negro and citizen
of the United States and the State of North Carolina and
has resided in Wilmington, North Carolina for the past 34
years. She suffers from low back pains and a feeling of
pelvic organs falling, especially while in motion. She also
suffers from low abdominal pains and interference with
digestive processes. She is a patient of Dr. Daniel C.
Complaint
6a
Eoane and desires to remain his patient but cannot obtain
treatment or diagnosis by him at James Walker Memorial
Hospital because of its racial policy. She desires to secure
treatment and diagnosis at James Walker Memorial Hos
pital and is in all respects eligible to enter James Walker
Memorial Hospital but has not because she is unable to
retain the physician of her choice there. Moreover, she
desires, when admitted to said hospital not to be segregated
solely because of her race, which racial segregation is the
policy of said hospital.
The plaintiff, Leland M. Newsome is a Negro and citizen
of the United States and the State of North Carolina and
has resided in New Hanover County for the past 11 years.
The policy of the company for which he works requires that
employees in his capacity take a thorough physical exam
ination once each year using the best services and medical
equipment available. He is a patient of Dr. Hubert A.
Eaton and wishes to take these yearly physical examina
tions as Dr. Eaton’s patient. He desires to enter James
Walker Memorial Hospital where the best medical equip
ment in this locality is available. He cannot enter James
Walker Memorial Hospital and retain Dr. Eaton as his
physician because of the racial policy at the hospital. He
is in all respects eligible to enter James Walker Memorial
Hospital for these yearly physical examinations but has not
because he is unable to retain the physician of his choice.
Moreover, he desires, when admitted to said hospital not to
be segregated solely because of his race, which racial seg
regation is the policy of said hospital.
V I
A. The defendant, Emory Grubbs is the Secretary of
the Board of Managers of the James Walker Memorial
Complaint
7a
Hospital. He has overall control and management of the
James Walker Memorial Hospital, is its chief administra
tive officer, and is sued in his official and individual capaci
ties.
B. Defendant, Board of Managers of the James Walker
Memorial Hospital, is a body corporate under and by
virtue of the laws of the State of North Carolina (Private
Laws of North Carolina—1901, Chapter 12, ratified Janu
ary 23, 1901). The aforesaid statute was enacted “ to pro
vide for the Government of the ‘James Walker Memorial
Hospital of the City of Wilmington, North Carolina.’ ”
1. The preamble to said statute declares as its purpose
“ that suitable provisions should . . . be made for the per
manent maintenance of the hospital by said City and
County.”
2. Provisions were made in said act for a majority of
the Board of Managers, corporate defendant herein, to be
elected by the Board of Commissioners of New Hanover
County and the Board of Aldermen of the City of Wilming
ton, vacancies occurring thereafter to be filled by a vote of
the Board Members.
3. Provisions were made in said act for the Board of
Commissioners of New Hanover County to set apart an
nually the sum of four thousand eight hundred dollars and
for the Board of Aldermen of the City of Wilmington to
set apart annually the sum of three thousand two hundred
dollars to “be placed in the hands of the said Board of
Managers”—“for the purpose of providing the proper
means for sustaining the said hospital.”
4. The act declares that it shall be the duty of the Board
of Managers to invest any unexpended portion of the an-
Complaint
8a
nual appropriations by the County of New Hanover and
City of Wilmington in bonds of the City of Wilmington or
County of New Hanover, or State of North Carolina.
5. The act requires that the Board of Managers shall
make two separate reports annually, one to the Board of
County Commissioners of New Hanover County, the other
to the Board of Aldermen of the City of Wilmington “which
said reports shall contain a full time and accurate account
of the conduct and management of said hospital and dis
pensary, giving an itemized account of their receipts and
disbursements, together with the number, sex, race, age
and disease of all occupants of said for the preceding year.”
6. Subsequent enactments of the North Carolina General
Assembly provided for appropriations from public funds
for the maintenance of defendant hospital:
a. The Private Act of 1907, Chapter 30 of the North
Carolina General Assembly, provided that annual appro
priations could be made from public funds of the City of
Wilmington and the County of New Hanover in order that
the hospital be run in an efficient manner.
b. The Private-Local Act of 1915, Chapter 66, provided
that the appropriation for the support of the James Walker
Memorial Hospital should be contributed and paid in equal
proportions by the above-mentioned City and County.
c. The Public-Local and Private Act of 1937, Chapter 8,
provided for the payment from the public treasury of
twenty-five thousand dollars each for three successive years
by each of the respective municipalities, the County of
New Hanover and the City of Wilmington.
d. The Public-Local and Private Laws of 1939, Chapter
470, authorized the City and County to enter into contracts
Complaint
9a
with the defendant hospital and empowered each of them
to appropriate to the defendant hospital, a snm not to ex
ceed twenty-five thousand dollars annually and authorized,
if necessary, an additional tax levy. In terms of this act,
this authorized appropriation and tax levy was “ for the
purpose of providing hospitalized medical attention and
maintenance of the indigent sick and afflicted poor of the
said municipalities and that such maintenance and care is
a necessary expense and that provision for the poor and
unfortunate is one of the first duties of government and
that their proper maintenance and care is required under
the law and the Constitution of the State of North Carolina.”
e. The Session Laws of 1951, Chapter 906, provided for
contributions of the City and County to be on a per diem
basis for purposes of providing for the indigent sick and
afflicted poor of said City and County. The enactment re
peated the expression of public purpose set out immediately
above.
7. Since 1951, when by judicial decision of the highest
court of the State of North Carolina, the legislatively pur
sued manner of making provisions for the continued main
tenance of defendant hospital was declared unconstitu
tional, public funds of the City of Wilmington and County
of New Hanover have nevertheless been continually paid
to defendant hospital pursuant to contract.
VII
A. Pursuant to the Public Laws of North Carolina,
Chapter 23 (1881), the City of Wilmington and County of
New Hanover acquired the tract of land known as Block
227 in the City of Wilmington and caused to be built there
on the City Hospital of Wilmington, as a public institution
Complaint
10a
administering to the infirmities of the sick and afflicted of
said City and County.
B. In 1900, James Walker furnished funds for the erec
tion of a new hospital on the site then occupied by the City
Hospital of Wilmington. Accordingly, the old building used
by the City Hospital was razed and a new hospital building
was completed in 1901.
C. In 1901, James Walker died. His will instructed his
executors to turn the recently completed building over to
the City and County for use by them as a City hospital for
treatment of the indigent “ sick and afflicted.”
D. Pursuant to the legislative act of 1901, above-men
tioned, the City of Wilmington and County of Hanover,
chartered the defendant Board of Managers as a corpora
tion and conveyed to them the tract of land upon which the
hospital stood “to have and to hold in trust for the use of
the Hospital aforesaid, so long as the same shall be used
and maintained as a Hospital for the benefit of the County
and City aforesaid, and in case of disuse or abandonment
to revert to the said County and City as their interest re
spectively appear.”
E. The City of Wilmington has provided financial sup
port for the hospital by granting the hospital exemption
from the payment of City taxes.
1. The County of New Hanover, has provided financial
support for the Hospital by granting the Hospital exemp
tion from the payment of County taxes.
F. Other indicia of the continuing control and influence
exercised by the City and County over the affairs and oper
ation of the James Walker Memorial Hospital and of its
essentially public character are the following:
Complaint
11a
1. The City as self-insurer has made certain payments
to the hospital for services rendered in treating Workmen’s
Compensation cases.
2. Hospital costs for capital construction have been paid
for by the City and County. For example, from fiscal year
1937 to 1939, the City and County, in addition to their reg
ular appropriations for $15,000 per annum, paid $60,000
of the total cost of $100,000 for the addition of a North
wing to the hospital. The balance of $40,000 was contributed
by the United States.
3. The hospital has received money from the United
States under provisions of the Defense Public Works Act
(Act of October 14, 1940 as amended June 28, 1941, 55 Stat.
361) for the expansion and maintenance of its facilities.
In March 1944 a new addition to the hospital, financed by
the United States, under said Act to the extent of $508,000
was placed in service at the hospital. This money was paid
by the United States to the State of North Carolina and
in turn by the State of North Carolina to the James Walker
Memorial Hospital.
4. The hospital has exercised the power of eminent do
main in aid of the expansion of its facilities. Defendant,
Board of Managers of said hospital, on April 28, 1942,
filed a petition for the condemnation of land owned by
Kirby C. Sidbury and wife, to condemn such land for use by
the hospital in connection with the addition to the hospital
facilities completed in 1944. The condemnation petition in
which the defendant alleged that it was “ a municipal cor
poration, a public body and body corporate and politic”
was granted by final judgment in the Superior Court of
New Hanover County, State of North Carolina on Decern-
Complaint
12a
ber 5, 1944 which recited that the defendant herein “ is a
public body, a body corporate and politic . . . ”
5. On another occasion in which the hospital sought a
declaratory judgment in the State Courts of North Carolina
adjudging its right to support from the City and County,
it alleged that it was a public body. Board of Managers of
the James Walker Memorial Hospital of Wilmington v.
City of Wilmington and New Hanover County, 237 N. C.
179, 74 S. E. 2d 749.
VIII
A. In Wilmington, North Carolina, there are the fol
lowing hospitals:
1. James Walker Memorial Hospital which has 250 beds
and approximately 11,000 admissions per year. This hos
pital is the instrumentality of the City of Wilmington for
affording hospital care to its white residents. By far the
greatest number of its admissions are of white persons
although some Negroes are admitted to it on a racially
segregated basis. It is far superior to any other hospital
in Wilmington, North Carolina.
2. Also in Wilmington, North Carolina, is the Com
munity Hospital. This hospital is owned by the City of
Wilmington and the County of Hanover. This is the in
strumentality of the City of Wilmington by which it affords
hospital care to its Negro residents. Patients at this hos
pital are all colored and Negro physicians are admitted to
practice in Community Hospital. White physicians are
permitted to practice there also. The Community Hospital
has somewhat in excess of 2,000 admissions per year.
3. Another hospital facility in the City of Wilmington
is the Babies Hospital. This hospital furnishes care for
Complaint
13a
white children only. It is a private hospital with somewhat
in excess of 2,000 admissions per year.
4. The only other hospital in Wilmington is the Cape
Fear Memorial Hospital. This, too, is a white hospital with
somewhat in excess of 1,600 admissions per year.
B. The James Walker Memorial Hospital as the chosen
instrumentality of the City of Wilmington for furnishing
medical care to its white citizens and affording a place to
practice for qualified white physicians, as such and as the
institution which offers the highest standard of medical
care in the City of Wilmington, is in the nature of a public
utility carrying out functions for the City of Wilmington,
North Carolina and is, therefore, performing state action
subject to the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States.
Complaint
IX
A. In compliance and conformity with the procedure,
rules, and regulations set out and adopted by defendant
hospital governing the granting of “ courtesy staff privi
leges” in the James Walker Memorial Hospital, each of
the plaintiff-physicians herein on or before the 19th day
of March 1955, timely and properly presented applications
to defendant hospital for admission to the use of courtesy
staff privileges, particularly the privilege of treating their
own patients when they are admitted to the hospital. These
plaintiffs presented with their applications, their records
of past academic achievements, references as to character,
and such other materials as were required. These plaintiffs
were ready and willing to abide by all lawful regulations
of defendant hospital.
14a
B. Despite these plaintiffs’ possession of all of the neces
sary qualifications, defendant hospital denied and refused
to grant to them courtesy staff privileges at the hospital.
Such denial and refusal was solely because of the race and
color of these plaintiffs, pursuant to a bylaw of said hos
pital which provides:
“ The applicant for membership on the Medical Staff
shall be a white physician who has his office and prac
tice in New Hanover County and is a graduate of a
recognized medical school, legally licensed to practice
in the state of North Carolina, qualified for member
ship in the county medical society.”
N
Following this refusal plaintiff-physicians filed suit in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of North Carolina, sub nom. Eaton v. Board of Managers
of the James Walker Memorial Hospital, Civ. No. 700, al
leging, inter alia, that said exclusion denied to them rights
secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Said court held that “ for the lack of juris
diction the complaint must be dismissed, and it is so or
dered.” 164 F. Supp. 191, 198. Said judgment was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 261 F. 2d
521, cert, denied 358 U. S. 948.
X I
A. During the month of April, 1960, each of the plaintiff-
physicians by letter addressed to defendant, Superintendent
Grubbs, renewed their requests for permission to use the
“ courtesy staff privileges” of defendant Hospital. Each
Complaint
15a
letter referred to the jjrevious request made in 1955 and its
refusal. Each letter stressed the dissatisfaction among the
Negro population of the community with the conditions of
racial exclusion at defendant hospital. Plaintiffs expressed
the hope that the traditional policy of defendant by which
Negro physicians have been denied use of the hospital’s
facilities would be changed in light of the fact that since
the earlier requests, conditions and circumstances had
changed sufficiently for defendant’s policy to be reconsidered
in the light of present circumstances. In addition, plain
tiffs stated their inability to give the best medical care
possible to their patients because they were barred from
the facilities of the defendant hospital. Plaintiffs also com
plained that due to the exclusionary policies of the hospital,
their patients if desirous of using these facilities, could no
longer continue to employ them as their physicians. Each
of the named plaintiffs again stated his medical background
and qualifications.
B. By letter under date of April 26, 1960, defendant
Grubbs sent to each of the named defendants, an applica
tion blank for them to fill in and return to the hospital. The
letter stated that upon receipt of the form properly filled
in, it would be “handled in the usual manner.” Plaintiffs
completed said blanks and returned them to the hospital.
C. Thereafter, by letter under date of September 7,1960,
signed by the defendant Emory Grubbs, plaintiffs were in
formed simply that their applications were not approved.
In fact, these applications were denied because of plaintiffs’
race and color pursuant to the bylaw set forth above.
D. Defendants have by the aforesaid acts denied to
plaintiff-physicians the equal protection of the laws secured
Complaint
16a
by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States and by the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
XII
A. Plaintiffs, Vernetta E. Hussey and Leland M. New-
some are patients of Drs. D. C. Eoane and Hubert A.
Eaton respectively. They desire to be admitted to defen
dant hopsital and to be treated and examined by Drs.
Eoane and Eaton when so admitted. Plaintiffs desire to
be admitted to defendant hospital because the facilities
there are the best in the locality and as residents of the
locality they desire to have the same right as is accorded
to white residents to take advantage of these facilities.
Plaintiffs, moreover, desire to continue to be treated by
Drs. Eoane and Eaton who are the physicians of their
choice but because of the discriminatory practices of de
fendant hospital, their right to the continuation of the
medical services they have thus far received from Drs.
Eoane and Eaton have been and will be denied should they
be admitted to defendant hospital and such denial is clearly
to their detriment and will occasion them serious injury.
B. Defendant hospital when it admits Negro patients,
segregates them from other patients in a separate build
ing; when the need arises for said Negro patients to under
go surgery, they are wheeled outdoors from the building
in which they are segregated, a practice hazardous and
inconsiderate of their health and safety, to the building
in which the surgical operation is to be performed. Fol
lowing surgery they must be wheeled back again. This
practice is not followed with respect to white patients.
Complaint
17a
C. Defendants have by the aforesaid acts denied to
plaintiff patients the equal protection of the laws secured
by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States and by the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
XIII
Plaintiffs and those similarly situated suffer and are
threatened with irreparable injury by the acts herein com
plained of. Both classes of plaintiffs have no plain, ade
quate or complete remedy to redress these wrongs other
than this suit for injunction. The pursuit of any other
remedy would be unavailing and occasion to these plain
tiffs and to others similarly situated, great hardship, in
convenience and vexation and would not afford them sub
stantial relief.
W herefore, plaintiffs respectfully pray this Court to
advance this cause on the docket and order a speedy hear
ing of this action and upon such hearing to :
a. forever enjoin defendants herein from denying to
these plaintiffs and all others similarly situated the use
of the facilities of the James Walker Memorial Hospital
because of race and color, to wit: the right of plaintiff-
physicians to enjoy courtesy staff privileges and of plain
tiff patients to be admitted for treatment on a nonsegre-
gated and nondiscriminatory basis;
b. allow plaintiffs their costs herein and such further,
other or additional relief as may appear to the Court to be
equitable and just.
Complaint
18a
Motion to Dismiss
(Filed: July 28, 1961)
[ s a m e t i t l e ]
Now comes the Defendants, Emory Grubbs and the
Board of Managers of James Walker Memorial Hospital,
a North Carolina corporation, and move to dismiss the
above entitled action under Rule 12 of the Federal Rule
for Civil Procedure for that the Court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of this action, said motion being
based upon the following matters and things:
For that it appears from the face of the Complaint that
the said action is by Plaintiffs as individuals, against the
Defendants as individuals, and that the Defendants are
not performing state action subject to the provisions of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution
of the United States; and that the action complained of by
the Plaintiffs is not such action that redress may be had in
the Federal District Court under 28 U. S. C. A. 1343 (3).
W h e r e f o r e , your Defendants, Board of Managers of
James Walker Memorial Hospital, a North Carolina cor
poration, and Emory Grubbs respectfully pray that the
action be dismissed and that these Defendants recover
their costs to be taxed by the Clerk.
C. D. H ogue, J r.
Attorney for Defendants
P. 0. Box 1268
309 Carolina Power & Light Bldg.
Wilmington, North Carolina
19a
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit A
(Filed: September 12, 1962)
State of North Carolina
County of New H anover
A ffidavit
R. F. L ee, being duly sworn deposes and says:
That he is a Real Estate Broker in Wilmington, North
Carolina; that the attached “Appraisal of James Walker
Memorial Hospital, Wilmington, North Carolina,” was pre
pared by the said R. F. Lee and represents his appraisal
of all the physical assets of the said James Walker Memo
rial Hospital.
Further this deponent says not.
R. F. L ee
Affiant
Subscribed and sworn before me,
this 10 day of September, 1962.
Clemmon L. Jacobs
Notary Public
My commission expires: Feb. 27, 1963
[Notarial Seal]
20a
A ppraisal of J ames W alker Memorial H ospital
W ilmington, N. C.
September 8,1962
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit A
Total Evaluation ................................................... 3,009,120
— Breakdown —
Nurses Home ........................................................ 200,000
All other buildings ................................................. 2,559,120
127,956 sq. ft.
@ $20.00/sq. ft.
Land ........................................................................ 50,000
All furniture and equipment................................ 200,000
3,009,120
The above appraisal is based on information contained
in the 1957 Jacque Norman (Hospital Consultant) Hospi
tal Survey and on my general knowledge of real estate
values in this area.
Signed,
/ s / E. F. L ee
E. F. Lee, Eealtor
/ s / H elen F redlaw
Witness
21a
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit B
(Filed: September 15, 1962)
State op North Carolina
County op New H anover
A ffidavit
T. D. L ove, being first duly sworn deposes and says:
That he is the duly elected Auditor of New Hanover
County, North Carolina; that he knows the tax rate of
New Hanover County, North Carolina, to be $1.30 per
$100.00; valuation and the tax rate of the City of Wilming
ton, North Carolina, to be $2.15 per $100.00; valuation and
that the tax assessment of both said properties is 50 per
cent of the actual value.
These are the tax rates for 1961.
Further this deponent says not.
T. D. L ove
Subscribed and sworn before me,
this ....... day of .................. , 1962.
Notary Public
My commission expires:
22a
R ules and R egulations foe H ospital L icensure
in North Carolina
(Filed: October 4, 1962)
R evised September 16,1960
SECTION I—ADMINISTRATION
A. GOVERNING BOARD
The governing board, or owner, or the person or persons
designated by the owner as the governing authority shall
be responsible for seeing that the objectives specified in the
charter (or resolution if publicly-owned) are attained.
This shall include the selection and appointment of a com
petent administrator and a medical staff and the formula
tion or approval of such bylaws as may be desirable for the
proper operation of the hospital. The governing board
shall be the supreme authority in the hospital to which the
administrator, the medical staff, the personnel, and all
auxiliary organizations are directly or indirectly respon
sible.
B. ADMINISTRATOR
There shall be a competent, well-trained executive officer
or administrator with authority and responsibility for the
operation of the hospital in all its administrative and pro
fessional functions, subject only to the policies enacted by
the governing board and to such orders as it may issue.
The administrator shall be the direct representative of the
governing authority in the management of the hospital and
shall be responsible to said board alone for the proper
performance of his duties.
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit C
23a
C. ACCOUNTING
The financial and statistical records of the hospital shall
be available for inspection at all times within business
hours by the Commission through its duly authorized offi
cers, agents or employees.
D. TELEPHONES
There shall be a telephone in the building and additional
telephones or extensions as required to summon help
promptly in case of fire or other emergency.
E. PERSONNEL
All professional and non-professional personnel shall be
given a preemployment examination consisting of a general
physical examination including a chest x-ray, and stool
cultures if a history of typhoid is elicited.
The physical examination including the chest x-ray is to
be repeated annually on all personnel. Any person who
shows signs of upper respiratory infections, skin lesions,
diarrhea, or other communicable disease shall be excluded
from work if, in the judgment of a physician, it is necessary
to do so for the protection of patients and others.
SECTION II— CLINICAL SERVICES
A. MEDICAL STAFF
1. Organisation and Qualifications
In any hospital used by two or more physicians for the
treatment of injury or disease, the physicians and surgeons
privileged to practice in the hospital shall be organized as
a definite medical staff which shall initiate and, with the
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit C
24a
approval of the governing authority of the hospital, adopt
rules, regulations, and policies which specifically provide:
a. For eligibility for membership on the staff;
b. That the medical staff meetings be held at least
once a month;
c. That the medical staff review and analyze at regu
lar intervals their clinical experience in the various
departments of the hospital; the medical records of
the patients, free and pay, to be the basis for such
review and analysis.
Every person admitted to practice in the hospital shall
qualify for membership on the medical staff by submitting
a signed application in writing which shall contain the fol
lowing data: age, year, and school of graduation, date of
licensure, statement of postgraduate or special training
and experience, statement of the type of medicine the ap
plicant desires to practice, a pledge that if appointed the
applicant will comply with the rule and regulations of the
hospital so far as they affect him and his membership on
the medical staff, and include a statement of his own special
qualifications and a resolution against division of fees in
accordance with the requirements of the American College
of Surgeons.
All rules and regulations and policies adopted by the
medical staff and a roster of medical staff members shall
be available to the Commission upon request.
In hospitals with twenty-five beds or more, the organized
medical staff shall annually elect a staff member to be
chief-of-staff, and it shall elect a member to be the respon
sible head or chief of each of the departments or services
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit C
25a
in the hospital, such as obstetrics, pediatrics, surgery, med
icine, etc. In hospitals of less than twenty-five beds, the
medical staff shall annually elect one of its members to
be chief-of-staff.
2. Supervision of Patient Care
All persons admitted to any institution covered by these
standards must be under the care of a physician or surgeon
who has (a) a degree of Doctor of Medicine, is in good
standing, and legally licensed to practice in North Carolina;
(b) competent in his field; and (c) worthy in character and
in matters of professional ethics; and does not practice
fee-splitting under any guise whatsoever. A diagnosis shall
be entered in the admission records.
3. Orders for Medication and Treatment
No medications or treatments shall be given in institu
tions covered by these standards except on the order of a
physician.
4. Availability for Emergencies
All hospitals shall have one or more duly licensed physi
cians available on call for emergencies at all times.
B. SURGERY
1. Facilities
Every hospital in which surgical operations are per
formed shall have an operating room; scrubbing and toilet
facilities; sterilizing apparatus; and other equipment and
instruments in keeping with the requirements of modern
surgery.
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit C
26a
This room shall be provided for exclusive use as an
operating room and shall be located as not to be used as
a passage between other parts of the hospital and shall not
be subject to contamination from other parts of the hospital.
Hospitals with less than 20 beds— (see OBSTETRICS—
1.—c. Delivery Room).
2. Organisation
The operating room shall be under the supervision of
registered nurses. Surgical operations shall be done only
by physicians designated by the hospital as qualified to do
surgery.
An accurate and complete description of the technique of
operation and the findings and a statement of organs or
tissues removed together with the post-operative diagnosis
shall be entered by the surgeon in the patient’s record im
mediately following the operation. It shall be the policy of
all hospitals providing services for surgical care to have
available facilities for the pathological examination of tis
sue specimens, except tonsils and adenoids, either on the
premises or by arrangement through affiliation, or other
means, with a competent pathological laboratory.
3. Procedures
An acceptable aseptic technique shall be observed in all
major or minor operative procedures. Proper care shall be
taken to prevent contamination of the surgical field, sterile
tables or operating team by visitors. After an operation on
a septic case, the operating room shall be thoroughly
cleansed in a manner adequate for the type of contamina
tion existing.
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit C
27a
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit C
C. OBSTETRICS
1. Facilities
a. Maternity
Obstetrics and newborn services shall be located and
arranged as to provide for complete protection of mothers
and newborn infants from infection and from cross-infec
tion from patients in other services in the hospital.
There shall be written provisions and policies in regard
to the care of patients with an infectious, contagious or
communicable disease which will insure the protection of
other maternity or newborn infants and other patients.
The hospital shall have adequate facilities for steriliza
tion of equipment, supplies and instruments.
b. Labor Boom
There must be satisfactory provision for the care of
patients in labor either in the patient’s room or in a desig
nated special labor room.
Rooms used for this purpose should afford desirable
privacy, be conveniently located with reference to the de
livery room, and should be so located as to minimize the
possibility of sound reaching other patients’ rooms.
If analgesia is used, beds shall be equipped with guard
rails.
There must be facilities for examination and prepara
tion of patients as required by the attending physician.
c. Delivery Room
Hospitals with less than twenty beds: a delivery room
used for no other purpose is recommended. If one room is
used for both surgery and delivery room, the admission of
28a
infected cases to the surgery will be discouraged. However,
if the surgery is used for an infected case, it will receive
a thorough scrubbing of all floors and walls, there will be a
thorough cleaning and sterilization of all equipment after
such use, before being used as a delivery room.
Hospitals with twenty beds or more: the delivery room
shall be used for no other purpose, and it should be used
only for the delivery of non-infected patients.
Delivery rooms shall include the following:
(1) Sphygmomanometer and stethoscope.
(2) Adequate facilities for anesthesis shall be provided.
A small table conveniently placed shall contain arti
cles needed by the anesthetist.
(3) There shall be several sterile syringes, with suitable
needles for osytocics and emergency medications.
(4) A sterile package of instruments and gauze for
uterine packing shall be at hand.
(5) Instruments for repair of lacerations and handling
other occasional delivery accidents shall be provided
in sterile packages if they are not supplied routinely
in the delivery set.
(6) Facilities for intravenous therapy shall be available.
In addition to flasks of sterile glucose and saline solu
tion, all hospitals accepting maternity patients shall
have, on the premises, a standard preparation of
blood plasma or serum.
(7) A properly-heated bassinet shall be available for
each delivery. There shall be no hazardous electrical
equipment on the bassinet.
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit C
29a
(8) A table or tray shall be provided containing articles
needed for treating cord, and silver nitrate or pen
icillin or other accepted chemotherapeutic agent for
treating the eyes of the infant.
(9) There shall be available facilities for suction, such
or tracheal catheter, and equipment for administer
ing oxygen to the infant.
(10) An acceptable means of identifying each infant shall
be available in every delivery room ,
d. Nursery
A nursery, not to be used for any other purpose, must
be provided for the newborn with adequate space, light
and ventilation.
There shall be provisions for a suspect nursery for in
fants suspected of a contagious, infectious or communicable
disease; and there shall be provisions for the complete
isolation of infants with a known infectious, contagious or
communicable disease. Newborn and older infants admitted
from the outside shall not be cared for in the newborn
nursery.
Suction apparatus and oxygen should be easily and
quickly available in the nursery.
The premature should be cared for in a separate nursery
or should be segregated in the newborn nursery.
A large plainly legible wall thermometer shall be pro
vided for the nursery.
An accurate scale for weighing newborn shall be pro
vided.
Running hot and cold water and suitable receptacles
for the disposal of waste and soiled linens shall be provided
in or adjacent to each nursery.
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit G
30a
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit C
2. Organization
a. Maternity
Every birth occurring in a hospital shall be attended by
a medical doctor who shall possess the qualifications pre
scribed in Section II, A above. Nothing in this paragraph
is intended to prevent members of the hospital resident
staff, when acting under the authority and supervision of
the attending medical doctor, from attending at births.
A graduate registered nurse when available shall be
responsible at all times for the nursing care of maternity
patients and newborn infants.
The needs of the individual hospital will determine the
number of nurses to be employed. It is desirable that nurses
caring for maternity patients shall not care for other pa
tients.
b. Nursery
Nurses assigned to infected infants shall not care for
other infants at the same time.
3. Procedures
a. Maternity
Routine nursing procedures for care of obstetric patients
and newborn infants shall be prepared in written form.
Accurate and complete medical records must be provided
for all maternity patients, and separate records for infants.
The standard forms approved by the American College of
Surgeons are recommended.
Any indication of infection must be reported immediately
to the attending physician in charge of the patient.
31a
Immediate segregation and isolation of all mothers with
infection, fever or other condition inimical to the safety and
welfare of others must be provided in a separate room.
A mother shall be considered infected i f :
(1) She has a communicable disease or is suspected of
such, or if she is a carrier.
(2) She nurses an infected infant.
(3) She is delivered outside the maternity unit of the
hospital in which she is afterwards cared for.
(4) She has an unexplained fever during the puerperium.
For the protection of mothers and newborn infants, the
Commission requests every institution receiving maternity
patients to observe the following rules and regulations.
(1) The number of visitors to a maternity patient should
not exceed two, exclusive of the husband, at any time.
(2) Visitors known to have an existing or recent com
municable infection, as well as those having contact
with such infection, shall be excluded.
(3) Visitors must not sit on beds or place articles of
clothing on the beds of maternity patients.
(4) Children under 12 years of age are not permitted to
visit in the maternity department of a hospital.
(5) Visitors may not enter the nursery or have direct
contact with infants.
(6) Whenever babies are shown to visitors, there must
be a complete separation, by a glass window, of
babies from visitors. No visitors should be allowed
in the mother’s room during nursing hours.
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit C
32a
b. Labor and Delivery Room
The physician shall be notified when the patient is ad
mitted and immediately upon onset of labor.
D. PEDIATRICS
1. Facilities
Hospitals providing pediatrics care shall have proper
facilities for the caring of children apart from the services
for adult patients, apart from the newborn nursing service
and there shall be proper facilities and procedures for the
isolation of children with infectious, contagious or com
municable conditions.
E. ANESTHESIA
1. Facilities
In the surgical department or division of any hospital,
there shall be facilities and equipment for the administra
tion of anesthesia, commensurate with the needs of the
hospital.
2. Procedures
Operations under a general anesthetic (inhalation, spinal,
intravenous or rectal) shall not be performed nor a general
anesthetic given until the patient has had a physical ex
amination including examination of the chest for respira
tory infection or cardiac disease and including a urinalysis
with tests for albumin and sugar. In ease of an emergency
the operation may be done without the physical examination
and tests, but a note shall be made in the patient’s record
stating the reason for the operation and be signed by the
attending surgeon and another member of the staff qualified
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit C
33a
to use the operating room for surgery. The results of these
examinations, together with the pre-operative diagnosis,
shall be entered on the patient’s record. After the adminis
tration of a general or spinal anesthetic, patients shall be
constantly attended by a nurse until they have regained
consciousness, or until the effects of the anesthetic have
worn off. After any major operation, adequate nursing
services shall be provided so that patients are closely
watched and given all necessary care.
F. CLINICAL PATHOLOGICAL LABORATORY
1. Facilities
Hospitals of 49 beds and under shall provide facilities
for performing routine chemical and microscopic examina
tions of the urine and complete blood counts.
Hospitals of 50 beds or over shall have a laboratory
capable of making the standard hematological, bacterio
logical, pathological and chemical examinations, or have
regular arrangements for obtaining all such services from
an approved laboratory.
2. Organisation
The laboratory shall be under the actual supervision of
a physician, preferably a trained clinical pathologist or one
who has had special training in clinical laboratory diagno
sis, whose judgment should be accepted in doubtful finds.
3. Records
All requests for laboratory service shall be presented
in writing; results from all laboratory tests should be writ
ten indelibly on the patient’s record.
Plaintiffs' Exhibit C
34a
4. Required Tests
All patients above 16 years of age, except maternity
patients who have had a blood test during their current
pregnancy, shall have a recognized standard blood test
for syphilis, within 3 days after admission. If examina
tions of blood for syphilis are performed in the hospital
laboratory, the requirements as defined by the State De
partment of Health for pre-marital or pre-natal serology
test must be met.
G. RADIOLOGY
1. Facilities
All hospitals shall have adequate space and equipment
for diagnostic x-ray and fluoroscopic examinations.
There shall be space for safe film storage, view boxes,
and a dark room.
2. Organization
X-ray department shall be in charge of properly qualified
physicians.
3. Records
A written report on each x-ray film taken shall be made
and properly recorded as a part of the patient’s record.
H. OUT-PATIENT DEPARTMENT
Any hospital concerned with emergency or out-patient
shall provide space and facilities for emergency treatment,
including the administration of blood or blood plasma and
intravenous medication, facilities for the control of bleed
ing, and the emergency splinting of fractures, and it shall
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit C
35a
provide for facilities for the administration of oxygen and
anesthesia. Competent personnel shall be at all times avail
able on call for the care of emergencies.
I. ISOLATION
There shall be available a room or rooms which shall be
used for isolation of a patient or patients with communi
cable disease. These rooms can be planned at the end of
a corridor or off a sub-corridor, and there must be observ
ance of accepted measures of aseptic technique in care of
such cases.
SECTION III—AUXILIARY SERVICES
A. PHARMACY
1. Facilities
Hospitals operating and maintaining a pharmacy shall
have adquate space for storage and compounding and
dispensing drugs. The compounding of prescriptions shall
be done by a pharmacist licensed to practice pharmacy in
North Carolina.
There shall be adequate refrigeration for biologicals and
such drug jjroducts as require refrigeration.
2. Storage of Medicine
All medicines, poisons, and stimulants kept in a nursing
service division shall be plainly labeled and stored in a
specially designed medicine cabinet, closet or storeroom,
and made accessible only to authorized personnel.
The cabinet for drugs shall be well illuminated.
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit C
36a
3. Narcotics and Special Prescriptions
When orders have been discontinued or the patient dis
missed, all medication shall be discarded, or returned to
the pharmacy, or taken out with the patient according to
the doctor’s orders and the suitability of the medication
for re-issue for the use of other patients.
Narcotics must be securely locked at all times and ac
cessible only to persons in charge.
B. MEDICAL RECORDS AND REPORTS
1. Facilities
Provisions shall be made for safe storage of all medical
records.
2. Organization
The responsibility for supervision, filing, and indexing
of medical records shall be delegated to a trained medical
records librarian or to a responsible employee of the hos
pital.
In hospitals of 25 beds or more, medical records shall be
indexed fo r : the patient, the disease, the medical or surgical
procedure involved, the physician, the results and any
other pertinent information deemed necessary by the med
ical staff. A member or committee of members appointed
by the medical staff should be appointed to ascertain
whether or not the medical records are adequate and
up-to-date; and to formulate rules and regulations and
assist in their enforcement.
Records of patients are the property of the hospital and
must not be taken from the hospital property except under
subpoena. When taken from the hospital property under
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit C
37a
subpoena, they must be returned to the hospital at the end
of the hearing for which they were directed to be procured.
The administrative officer shall be responsible for the en
forcement of this rule.
3. Content
Adequate and complete medical records shall be written
for all patients admitted to the hospital. These records
shall be filed in an orderly and accessible manner in the
hospital. A minimum medical record shall include the fol
lowing information:
Identification data (name, address, age, sex, marital
status)
Date of admission
Date of discharge
Personal and family history
Complaint
History of present illness
Physical examination
Special examination, if any, such as: consultations,
clinical, laboratory, x-ray
Provisional diagnoses
Medical treatment
Complete surgical record, if any
Progress and nurse notes
Temperature chart including pulse and respiration,
medications
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit C
38a
Final diagnoses
Condition on discharge
In case of death—autopsy findings, if any
All orders of physicians for medication and other ser
vices shall be written in ink and signed by the prescribing
physician or undersigned by him within 24 hours.
If narcotics are administered from a stock secured by
the hospital under a Federal permit, each dose shall be
recorded on a permanent narcotic record, wherein shall
be recorded the date, hour, name of patient, kind of nar
cotic, dose and by whom administered. If administered
by prescription only, it shall be sufficient to record each
dose on the clinical record of the patient.
SECTION IV—NURSING SERVICE
A. ORGANIZATION
The department of nursing and all nursing personnel
shall be organized to provide complete and efficient care
to each patient, and the authority, responsibility and func
tion of each nurse and all nursing personnel shall be clearly
defined, by establishing definite personnel policies.
There shall be regular meetings of the professional nurs
ing staff to review and analyze the nursing service and
to determine the quality of the nursing care rendered to
patients and to increase the efficiency of the nursing care.
Applications for employment as to registered nurse shall
be submitted, in writing, to the person responsible for nurs
ing personnel, and each application shall contain accurate
information as to the education, training, experience and
personal background of each applicant. All professional
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit C
39a
nursing personnel shall be registered in the State of North
Carolina.
B. PROFESSIONAL PERSONNEL
There shall be at least one professional registered nurse
on duty at all times.
In hospitals of 50 beds or more, there shall be a pro
fessional registered nurse on duty or on call for each
specific service or department in the hospital.
The superintendent or director of nursing service shall
be a competent and well-trained person with administrative
and executive ability and she shall be a graduate nurse and
registered in the State of North Carolina.
Nursing care shall be that amount of professional and
non-professional care essential to provide proper treatment
for the well-being and the recovery of the patient.
C. NON-PROFESSIONAL PERSONNEL
Practical nurses, subsidiary workers, orderlies and at
tendants, both male and female, who are employed by
hospitals, shall be assigned only those duties for which they
are trained. They shall be under the supervision of a
graduate nurse staff. All practical nurses shall be regis
tered in the State of North Carolina.
SECTION Y—FOOD SERVICE
A. SUPERVISION
The dietary department shall be under the supervision
of a trained dietitian or a person skilled in the handling,
preparation and serving of foods and the supervision and
management of food handlers.
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit C
40a
The dietitian or person in charge of the department shall,
with the approval of the administrator of the hospital,
initiate policies and procedures with which each employee
shall be familiar and these shall provide for the adminis
trative and technical guidance of all personnel handling
food.
B. PHYSICAL APPLIANCE AND EQUIPMENT
The floors of kitchens, diet kitchens, dining rooms, and
pantries, and the floors of all rooms in which food is stored,
prepared, or served, or in which utensils are washed, shall
be of such construction as to be easily cleaned, shall be
smooth, and shall be kept in good repair. The walls and
ceilings of such rooms shall have a smooth washable sur
face, and shall be kept clean and in good repair. In con
struction done after the adoption of these regulations and
where practical to change in existing structures, all walls
and ceilings shall be finished in light color. All such rooms
shall be so constructed as to prevent the entrance of rats
and mice.
All rooms in which food is stored, prepared, or served,
and in which utensils are washed, shall be well lighted and
provided with adequate ventilation.
Where flies are prevalent, all doors and windows, or
other openings into the outer air, shall be effectively
screened, and the doors shall be self-closing, unless other
effective means are provided to prevent the entrance of
flies.
Storerooms and cupboards, including shelves and racks,
shall be constructed of easily cleanable, smooth material,
and shall be kept clean and orderly. The contents of such
rooms and storage places shall be neatly stored at least 15
inches above the floor, and unnecessary and obsolete items
shall not be permitted to accumulate therein.
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit C
41a
All eating, drinking, and cooking utensils, and all tables,
shelves, refrigeration equipment, sinks, and other equip
ment or utensils used in connection with the hospital
kitchen, shall be so constructed as to be easily cleaned, and
shall be kept in good repair.
All equipment, including shelves, tables, counters, re
frigerators, stoves, hoods, sinks, meat blocks, potato peel
ers, grinders, slicing machines, saws, and mixers shall be
kept clean and free from dust, dirt, insects, and other con
taminating material. All cloths and rags used by chefs
and other employees in the kitchen shall be clean. Single
service containers shall be used only once.
C. DISHWASHING
All dishes, knives, forks, drinking glasses, cups, and
other eating and drinking utensils shall be thoroughly
washed, rinsed, and subjected to an approved bactericidal
treatment after each usage. All multi-use utensils, such as
mixing bowls, cream dispensers, stock pots, baking pans,
and other utensils used in the storage, preparation, cook
ing, or serving of food and drink shall be thoroughly
cleaned and rinsed immediately after the day’s operation,
or upon completion of each meal, if necessary.
The minimum dishwashing facilities shall consist of a
heavy gauge three compartment sink of adequate size and
depth, with hot and cold running water service for each
vat, splash back protection, continuous with the sink and
an integral part of the sink, and drain boards on each end
of ample size to accommodate the number of eating and
drinking utensils involved. Separate facilities shall be re
quired when necessary for the washing of glasses, and,
when needed, separate facilities shall be required for the
washing of pots, pans, and vegetables. The facilities for
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit C
42a
the heating of water shall be adequate and effective, and
the storage capacity shall be ample. When dishwashing
machines are used, the machines shall be approved, and
shall be fitted with drain boards of ample capacity on each
side, and include a counter-sunk sink or other approved
means for pre-cleaning or pre-soaking of the utensils in
the dirty dish lane. Thermometers indicating the tempera
ture of the wash and rinse water shall be required.
Where it is deemed necessary, mechanical glass and dish
washing equipment shall be required.
After cleaning (i.e., cleaning to sight and touch), and
thorough rinsing, all such utensils are effectively subjected
to one or more of the following, or other equivalent bac
tericidal processes:
1. Immersion for at least two minutes in clean hot water
at a temperature of at least 170° F. An approved ther
mometer shall he availably convenient to the vat. The
pouring of scalding water over washed utensils shall
not be accepted as satisfactory compliance. Where hot
water is used for bactericidal treatment, there shall he
provided a hot water heater (preferably controlled by
a thermostat) capable of maintaining water temperature
of at least 170° F. in the vat at all times when the dishes
are being washed. The heating device may be integral
with the immersion vat. In any case, the supply of
hot wTater must be ample to last through the period of
greatest demand.
2. Immersion for at least two minutes in a chlorine rinse
containing at least 50 p.p.m. of available chlorine, if hy
pochlorites are used, or concentration of equal bacterici
dal strength if chloramines are used. WThere chlorine
treatment is used, a three-compartment vat shall be re-
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit G
43a
quired, the first compartment to be used for washing, the
second for rinsing, and the third for chlorine immersion.
The first basket of utensils will remain in the chlorine
rinse for at least two minutes while the second basket
is in the plain rinse, and the third basket is being
washed. If hot water is maintained in the chlorine rinse,
the dishes will dry quickly after the basket is removed
from the third vat. Silver and silver-plated tableware
should not be treated with chlorine, as silver chlorides
are formed which blacken the silver.
3. Exposure in a steam cabinet, equipped with an indicated
thermometer, located in the coldest zone to at least
170° F. for at least 15 minutes or to at least 200° F.
for at least 5 minutes.
4. A sufficient supply of glasses, dishes, cups, goblets,
tableware, etc. is provided so that enough time is al
lowed for proper washing, rinsing, and bactericidal
treatment of those that are being used.
5. In washing machines, where strong alkalies and higher
wash water temperatures may be used for cleansing, a
shorter exposure period for the final treatment may be
employed. In such cases, the above standards for bac
tericidal treatment will not apply.
After bactericidal treatment, no utensils shall be stored
except in a clean, dry place protected from flies, dust, and
other contamination, and no utensils shall be handled ex
cept in such a manner as to prevent contamination so far
as practical. Single service utensils shall be purchased only
in sanitary containers and shall be stored therein in a
clean, dry place until used. Adequate space should be pro
vided in the diet kitchen for the storage of an ample supply
of clean glasses.
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit C
44a
D. STORAGE AND HANDLING OF FOOD
All food shall be stored, handled, and served as to be
protected from dust, flies, rats, vermin, handling, droplet
infection, overhead leakage, and other contamination. No
animals, or fowls shall be kept or allowed in any room
in which food is prepared or stored. All means neces
sary for the elimination of flies and roaches shall be
used. All readily perishable food or drink shall be kept
at or below 50° F., except when being prepared or served.
All fresh meats, except in small portions for immediate
use, shall be stored at or below 40° F. Where available,
grade “A ” milk products shall be used. These products
shall be served in the original containers in which they are
received from the distributor, so that the name and grade
of the contents, and the name of the producer or distribu
tor, may be readily observed by the patient. This require
ment shall not apply to buttermilk which is used strictly for
cooking purposes only. Milk products shall be stored in a
sanitary manner and shall be kept refrigerated except when
being served. Bottles shall not be completely submerged
in water. All foods shall be wholesome and free from
spoilage. Food that is spoiled or unfit for human consump
tion shall not be kept on the premises. Portions of food
once served to patients, or employees, shall not be served
again.
E. EMPLOYEES
All employees shall be free of communicable and infec
tious diseases, such as tuberculosis, syphilis, and gonorrhea,
communicable skin diseases, and are not carriers of typhoid.
It shall be the responsibility of the management to require
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit C
45a
such, inspections and tests as often as are necessary to
safeguard the health of the patients and other employees.
All employees shall wear clean outer garments, and shall
keep their hands clean at all times when handling food,
drink, utensils, or equipment. Kitchen employees shall not
smoke while engaged in food handling operations. All
precautions necessary shall be observed by the nurses and
others having contact with patients known to have a com
municable disease, and no such persons shall administer
to other patients or employees without first eliminating all
chances for transmitting disease by observing standard
hospital isolation technique.
SECTION VI—PHYSICAL PLANT
A. CONSTRUCTION
Each institution must be so planned, organized, equipped,
manned, and administered so as to furnish adequate care
for each class of persons wlhich it receives for care or treat
ment.
The design and construction shall be in accordance with
the construction standards of the North Carolina Medical
Care Commission, the North Carolina Building Code, and
local municipal codes.
1. Submission of Plans
Before construction, assisted with Federal and State
funds, is begun, plans and specifications covering the con
struction of new buildings, alterations, or additions, to
existing buildings, and plants, or any change in facilities,
may be submitted to the Commission for approval. There
upon, the Commission will investigate the plans so contem-
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit C
46a
plated and will notify the licensee that said buildings, alter
ations, additions, or changes are approved or disapproved
with such recommendations as the Commission will care
to make.
In order to avoid unnecessary expense in changing final
plans, it is suggested that as a preliminary step, proposed
plans in sketch form be reviewed with the Commission.
The preliminary plans shall include a plot plan showing
the size and shape of the entire site and the location of all
existing or proposed facilities.
2. Location
The site for new construction or expansion, assisted with
Federal and State funds, must have the approval of the
Commission.
Hospitals should be so located that they are free from
undue noise from railroads, freight yards, main traffic
arteries, schools and children’s play grounds. The site
should not be exposed to smoke, foul odors, or dust from
nearby industrial plants.
The area of the site should be sufficient to permit future
expansion and to provide adequate parking facilities.
The site should be easily accessible to patients, doctors,
and employees. Available paved roads, adequate water,
sewerage, and power lines should be taken into considera
tion in selecting the site.
3. Fire Protection
Facilities and construction shall be in accordance with
rules and regulations of the State Fire Marshal.
Plaintiff s ’ Exhibit C
47a
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit C
a. Anesthetics
In addition to all the other requirements pertaining to
fire safety, as set forth in these regulations, surgeries, de
livery room, minor surgeries, and similar places shall be
made to comply with the following general requirements.
All electrical lighting fixtures and convenience outlets
located below a level of seven feet from the surgery floor
shall be of the vapor proof type as approved by the Under
writers Laboratory for use in hazardous locations.
Open gas flames, electrical heating elements, portable
electrical heaters, similar devices not of the type approved
for the use in hazardous locations shall not be used in
rooms subjected to combustible anesthetic gases. Gas fired
sterilizers, hot water heaters, similar equipment located in
rooms directly adjacent to the surgery, having doors lead
ing thereto, shall be located at a distance of at least ten
feet from the door leading into the surgery room. Excep
tion to this may be made at the discretion of the Commis
sion if adequate mechanical ventilation which will eliminate
the possible explosion hazards is provided in this room.
Heating in surgeries and similar rooms shall be by
steam radiator, hot water or some other device which would
not contribute to the ignition of combustible gases.
Special precaution shall be taken at all times toward the
elimination of static electricity which might provide the
ignition of combustible anesthetic gases within this type of
occupancy. This may be accomplished by the use of the
Horton intercoupler, the electro-static grounding intercoup
ler, or a method of applying a conductive rubber floor cover
ing properly grounded, or some other recognized means of
adequately eliminating the possibility of static electricity.
Recognition is also given to the maintenance of a humidity
48a
within the surgery room which will greatly reduce the static
hazard.
Every effort should be made to prevent the use of open
lights of any description, radio knives, high frequency
electrical apparatus, live cauteries, or any other source of
ignition in the vicinity of combustible anesthetic gases.
Smoking is prohibited in surgeries or in similar hazard
ous areas, or within ten feet of the doorway of any room
in which combustible anesthetic gases are being used.
B. ACCOMMODATIONS FOB PATIENTS
1. Rooms
Each patient’s room shall have an outside exposure.
Booms extending below ground level shall not be used for
patients unless they are dry, well ventilated, have the
required window space and are otherwise suitable for occu
pancy. New Construction: No patient’s room shall be al
lowed below ground level.
No room shall be used for bed care of patients which can
only be reached by passing through another patient’s room.
a. Floor Area
Beds must be spaced so as to provide adequate room
for nursing procedures and to prevent the transmission of
infection. Beds must be placed at least three feet apart.
New Construction: Private rooms shall have a minimum of
100 square feet floor area. Semi-private rooms or wards
shall have a minimum of 80 square feet per bed with at least
3 feet between beds.
b. Window Area
Window area shall not be less than one-eighth of the
floor area.
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit C
49a
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit C
c. Doors
Doors to patients rooms should be sufficiently wide to
permit easy removal of the occupied bed with at least a
4-inch overall clearance. Vision panels should be placed in
all double acting doors.
d. Storage Space
There shall be satisfactory safe storage space for cloth
ing, toilet articles, valuables, and other personal belongings
of the patients.
2. Room Furnishings
A separate bed shall be provided for each patient with
separate mattresses, pillow and bedding.
Gatch beds or equivalent shall be provided unless other
wise indicated by the type or medical condition of the
patient.
There shall be a chair and bedside table for each patient.
a. Signals
Means of signaling nurses must be provided within easy
reach of the patient confined to bed.
b. Patients’ Screens
Screens shall be provided in wards or multi-bedrooms in
order to secure privacy for each patient.
New Construction: All wards or multi-bedrooms shall be
provided with cubicle curtains, or equivalent equipment
which shall completely shield the patient.
3. Bedside Equipment
Individual bedpans, wash basins and mouth wash cups
shall be provided for each patient. This equipment shall
50a
be plainly marked for each patient, stored so that it cannot
be inter-changed and shall be sterilized when the patient
is discharged.
Thermometers must be sterilized before each use.
Hot water bags must be covered before being placed in
bed and carefully checked for temperature and leakage.
Electrical heating pads shall be checked at least annually
by an electrician.
Restraints may be applied only when they are necessary
to prevent injury to the patient or to others, and shall be
used only when alternative measures are not sufficient to
accomplish these purposes. In applying restraints, careful
consideration shall be given to the method by which they
may be speedily removed in case of fire or other emergency.
Oxygen apparatus either for nasal oxygen or oxygen
tents, shall be provided in adequate amounts.
4. Central Supply and Sterilizing
In hospitals of 100 or more beds, there shall be a central
supply room with adequate facilities for sterilization of
supplies and equipment to be used in the hospital.
In hospitals of 100 or more beds, separate sterilizer rooms
shall be required for obstetrical units and surgical units.
Sterilizer space shall be required in a central supply room.
Adequate cabinets, cupboards or other suitable enclosed
spaces shall be provided for keeping sterile equipment and
supplies in a clean, convenient and orderly manner. All
sterilization of supplies and equipment in a hospital shall
be under the direct supervision of a registered nurse.
5. Service Room
Utility rooms shall have adequate lighting and ventila
tion. They shall be conveniently located for efficient conduct
of work.
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit C
51a
A bedpan hopper shall be provided in each utility room
and/or bedpan cleansing room. The bathtub, lavatory, or
laundry tray shall not be used for cleaning the bedpan.
C. HEATING
1. Temperature
Heating plans shall be adequate to maintain a cold
weather temperature of 70° F. in all rooms used by patients.
D. LIGHTING
1. Artificial
Each patient’s room must have artificial lighting adequate
for reading and other uses needed.
Every room, including storage rooms, hallways, and
others shall have sufficient artificial light to make all parts
clearly visible and to permit efficient performance of all
necessary work.
All hallways, stairways, inclines, ramps, and entrances
shall be well lighted.
2. Emergency
Safe emergency lighting facilities shall be provided and
distributed so as to be readily available to personnel on
duty at all times.
E. VENTILATION
Each patient’s room will have at least one window, open
ing to the outside to permit ventilation and source of nat
ural light.
Kitchens, bathrooms, and service rooms shall be located
and ventilated by window or mechanical devices to prevent
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit C
52a
offensive odors from entering patient’s room and public
balls.
F. STAIRWAYS & ELEVATORS
Stairways should be of a width and design which will
easily accommodate removal of a patient by stretcher.
Elevators and machinery shall be so constructed and
maintained as to comply with the regulations of the North
Carolina Insurance Commission.
G. MAINTENANCE
The hospital structure and component parts and facilities
shall be kept in good repair and maintained with considera
tion for the safety and comfort of the patient.
H. SANITATION
1. Water Supply
The water shall be obtained from a municipal water sup
ply or a private supply system, the location, construction,
and operation of which will comply with the standards
approved by the North Carolina State Board of Health.
The water shall be distributed to conveniently located
taps and fixtures in the building.
There shall be an ample supply of hot water available
at all times for general use.
All ice shall be washed, stored, handled, and served in a
sanitary manner. Ice storage boxes, buckets and containers
shall be maintained in good repair and kept clean. Buckets,
containers, etc. shall be stored so as not to be subject to
contamination. Ice boxes shall be covered.
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit C
53a
2. Sewage Disposal
Sewage shall be discharged into a municipal sewerage
system where such a system is available; otherwise, the
sewage shall be collected, treated, and disposed of in an
independent sewerage system which complies with the
standards approved by the State Department of Health.
3. Plumbing
a. Codes
All plumbing installed must be in accordance with the
North Carolina Building Code.
b. Cross Connections and Bach Siphonage
All plumbing facilities, whether for sterilization of uten
sils, instruments or supplies, general water supply or waste
disposals, shall be installed in such a manner as to com
pletely prevent possibility of cross connections between
safe and unsafe supplies or back siphonage.
c. Facilities
Toilet facilities shall be provided in reasonable ratio to
the number and kind of patients cared for in the institution,
and in reasonable ratio to the number of employees.
4. Garbage Disposal
All garbage and trash shall be kept in suitable receptacles
in such manner as not to become a nuisance. Garbage shall
be removed daily and all garbage cans shall be washed at
least daily and kept clean.
A space for the refrigeration of garbage should be pro
vided. There should be an adjacent cement floor area pro
vided with a drain for washing and sterilizing the garbage
Plaintiffs' Exhibit C
54a
cans by means of hot water and steam jets. This depart
ment should obviously be accessible to the outside so that
garbage can be readily removed.
5. Incineration
Incineration facilities shall be provided for disposal of
infected dressings, surgical, and obstetrical waste and other
similar material.
6. Screens
All outside doors, windows and other outside openings
shall be screened against mosquitoes, flies, and other in
sects. All screen doors shall open outward and be equipped
with self-closing devices.
7. Handwashing
There shall be adequate handwashing facilities in the
institution, within or conveniently located with regard to
every patient’s room or patient earing service. Hand scrub
bing sinks shall be provided in operating, delivery, and
labor rooms, nurseries, examining and treatment rooms,
and in rooms used in the isolation of patients. Handwash
ing facilities must be provided for foodhandlers and other
hospital employees.
I. HOUSEKEEPING
Housekeeping facilities and service are required to be
such that comfortable and sanitary living conditions for
patients and employees are maintained constantly. Ac
cumulated waste material must be removed daily.
There must be a frequent cleaning of the floors, walls,
woodwork, and windows.
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit C
55a
The premises must be kept free from rodents and insect
infestation.
Bath and toilet facilities must be maintained in a clean
and sanitary condition at all times.
.J. LINEN
A supply of towels, washcloths, bath blankets, and all
other linen which comes directly in contact with the patient
shall be provided as needed for each individual patient.
No such linen should be interchangeable from one patient
to another before being properly cleaned or laundered.
Bedpan covers should not be used interchangeably.
K. LAUNDRY
The institution shall make provision for proper cleaning
of linen and other washable goods with special provision
for handling contaminated linen.
Where linen is sent to an outside laundry, it is advisable
for the superintendent, or a responsible member of the
staff, to visit such laundry and note facilities and methods
for handling the hospital linen.
General Criteria Applying to Classification of
Medical Facilities Subject to Licensure by the
Medical Care Commission
The classification “Hospital” shall be restricted to facili
ties that provide as their primary functions diagnostic
services and intensive medical and nursing care in the
treatment of acute stages of illness. On the basis of the
specialized facilities and services available, each such hos
pital will be licensed as to the following medical types:
(1) general; (2) mental; (3) tuberculosis; (4) rehabilita-
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit C
56a
tion, including orthopedics; (5) maternity; (6) pediatric;
(7) eye, ear, nose and throat; and (8) physician’s clinic-
hospital. Extenuating circumstances will be considered in
continuing the classification of a facility licensed as a hos
pital prior to September 1, 1960.
All other medical facilities accepting patients requiring
skilled nursing care that are not operated as a unit of a
hospital within the above meaning shall be classified as a
“ Nursing Home.”
Each facility applying for licensure will be classified in
accordance with the determination of the Medical Care
Commission.
SECTION VIII—TYPES OF LICENSES FOR
HOSPITALS
A. CLASSIFICATION OF LICENSES
Each hospital license issued shall indicate thereon
whether it is a Class I license or a Class II license or a
Temporary Conditional Hospital License in accordance
with the provisions set out below:
1. Hospital License, Class I, will be issued to new and
existing hospitals that comply with the requirements
of (a) the construction standards established in the
State Building Code, (b) the Sanitary Regulations
of the State Board of Health, and (c) the Rules and
Regulations of the Medical Care Commission.
2. Hospital License, Class II, will be issued to existing
hospitals that do not comply with the construction
standards established in the State Building Code
but have completed measures recommended by the
State Insurance Department to provide to occupants
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit C
57a
a maximum of safety which can be afforded by com
pliance with such recommendations, and otherwise
have met the requirements of the Medical Care Com
mission.
3. Temporary Conditional Hospital License will be is
sued to hospitals that do not fully meet the require
ments of (a) the construction standards established
in the State Building Code and have not completed
measures recommended by the State Insurance De
partment to provide a minimum of safety, or (b)
the State Board of Health, or (c) the Medical Care
Commission, but which agree to correct the specific
deficiencies in question within a prescribed period
of time.
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit C
58a
(Filed: September 28, 1962)
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT R. MARTIN,
DIRECTOR, JAMES WALKER MEMORIAL
HOSPITAL
R obert R. M artin being duly sworn deposes and says
that he is the Director of James Walker Memorial Hospital
and as such has available to him all of the books and
records of the Hospital and is familiar with the operation
of the Hospital; that he has examined the records of the
Hospital and is familiar with these records, and that he
knows to his own knowledge that there has been no change
in the ownership or operation of the Hospital with relation
to payments or receipts to the Hospital from the City of
Wilmington, North Carolina, or the County of New
Hanover since the decision was rendered in the case of
Eaton et al. v. James Walker Memorial Hospital on the
29th day of November, 1958, other than a change in the
per diem charge to the County for treatment of patients
which is renegotiated each year.
Further with regard to the present operation of the
Hospital affiant doth state:
(a) That the total receipts of the Hospital for the fiscal
year commencing October 1, 1960 and ending September 30,
1961 were $1,978,224.43. That the total receipts of the
Hospital for the eleven month period of the 1961-1962
fiscal year, through August 31, 1962, were $1,929,989.89.
(b) That for the 1960-1961 fiscal year referred to above
the total amount paid to the Hospital by the County of
New Hanover under contract for the treatment of welfare
patients was $41,119.15, and that for the eleven month
Defendants’ Exhibit A
59a
period which has passed in the 1961-1962 fiscal year, the
total payment for treatment for welfare patients by the
County was $37,401.99.
(c) That the payments by the County of New Hanover
are based on a per diem payment for each welfare patient
which is treated; that the charge to NewT Hanover County
for the 1960-1961 year was $17.50 per diem per patient.
For the fiscal year 1961-1962 which has not yet ended, the
charge per diem per welfare patient is $19.00. That the
amount paid by New Hanover County is renegotiated at
the beginning of each fiscal year in relation to the past
per diem cost of patient care for the previous fiscal year.
(d) That the Hospital has no contract for the treatment
of any employees of the City of Wilmington, North Caro
lina in Workmen’s Compensation cases. That the charges
made to the City for the treatment of these employees
are based on the usual charges of the Hospital; however
in the case of Workmen’s Compensation patients, all
charges of the Hospital are subject to review and regula
tion by the North Carolina Workmen’s Compensation Com
mission. The total amount paid by the City for this
treatment was $1599.21 since October 1, 1961.
(e) That the only contractual relationship between New
Hanover County and the Hospital is on the per diem rate
of $19.00 for certified charity in-patients; a rate of 50 ̂
per visit is charged to the County for certified out-patients
who are treated in the clinics of the Hospital, and a charge
of $2.50 is made for certified welfare patients for emer
gency room treatment. In the event the patient treated
in the emergency room becomes an in-patient the charge
for the emergency room is waived, the emergency room
Defendants’ Exhibit A
60a
treatment being included in the per diem charge made with
regard to the patient.
This the 26th day of September, 1962.
/ s / R obert R. Martin
Robert R. Martin
Sworn to and subscribed before me
this 26th day of September, 1962.
/ s / Charlotte S imon
Notary Public
My commission expires: 9-15-64.
( S e a l )
Defendants’ Exhibit A
61a
Opinion and Order
(Filed: April 9, 1963)
[ s a m e t i t l e ]
This is a class action for injunctive relief brought by
three Negro physicians and certain of their Negro patients,
on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, to
prohibit defendants from denying plaintiff-physicians
courtesy staff privileges1 at James Walker Memorial Hos
pital in Wilmington, North Carolina, solely on account of
their race or color, and requiring defendants to admit
plaintiff-patients to said hospital for treatment on a non-
segregated and nondiscriminatory basis.
Federal jurisdiction is invoked on the theory that the
Board of Managers of the hospital, a corporation created
by an act of the General Assembly of North Carolina, is
an instrumentality of the State, which is prohibited by
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States from denying to any person within its juris
diction the equal protection of the laws. Jurisdiction is
also based on asserted rights under the due process clause
of the Fifth Amendment, and on 28 U. S. C. A. §1343(3),
which gives district courts original jurisdiction of pro
ceedings to redress the deprivation of civil rights under
color of any State statute or usage.2
The defendants moved to dismiss under Buie 12, Fed.
Buies Civ. Proc., 28 U. S. C. A., for lack of federal juris-
1 The sole privilege of the members o f the “ courtesy staff” is the use of
private rooms and pay wards for their patients.
2 See, 42 U. S. C. A. §1983.
62a
diction for the reason that the hospital is a private cor
poration not performing “ State action” within the prohibi
tion of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, nor within
the purview of 28 U. S. C. A. §1343(3).
The question presented by the motion is whether, from
the facts set forth in the complaint and in the affidavits
filed by the parties, the hospital is an instrumentality of
the State. If, from the totality of the relationships between
the State and the hospital, the hospital is performing State
action, this Court has jurisdiction and the motion should
be denied. If, despite the admitted relationships, the hos
pital is not an agency of the State, but acts independently
as a private corporation, this Court is without jurisdiction
and the motion to dismiss should be granted.
“ It is clear, as it always has been since the Civil Rights
Cases, supra [109 U. S. 3, 3 S. Ct. 18, 27 L. Ed. 835],
that ‘individual invasion of individual rights is not the
subject-matter of the amendment’ * * * and that private
conduct abridging individual rights does no violence to
the Equal Protection Clause unless to some significant
extent the State in any of its manifestations has been
found to have become involved in it.” Burton v. Wilming
ton Parking Authority, 1961, 365 U. S. 715, 722, 81 S. Ct.
856, 860, 6 L. Ed. 2d 45; Shelley v. Kraemer, 1948, 334
U. S. 1, 68 S. Ct. 836, 92 L. Ed. 1161.
Whether James Walker Memorial Hospital is an in
strumentality of the State is not presented here for the
first time. In Eaton v. Board of Managers of James Walker
Memorial Hospital, 4 Cir., 261 F. 2d 521, affirming 164
F. Supp. 191 (E. D. N. C. 1958), cert. den. 359 IJ. S. 984,
3 L. Ed. 2d 934, 79 S. Ct. 941, the identical physicians who
are plaintiffs here sought admission, in a class action,
to courtesy staff privileges at James Walker Memorial
Opinion and Order
63a
Hospital. Relief was denied on motion of the defendants
for lack of jurisdiction in that the hospital was not per
forming State action. Judge Soper, speaking for the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, said: “ * * * (T)he
facts clearly show that when the present suit was brought,
and for years before, the hospital was not an instru
mentality of the State but a corporation managed and
operated by an independent board free from State con
trol.” Id., 261 F. 2d 521, 525.
Plaintiffs contend that they have alleged facts and cir
cumstances not considered or adjudicated in Eaton; that
the decision in Eaton is based on a single factor test of
day-to-day control and that the United States Supreme
Court in the subsequent case of Burton v. Wilmington
Barking Authority, supra, has announced a new standard
for determining State action based on a consideration of
the totality of the relationships between the hospital and
the State.3
Defendants contend that all material facts before the
Court in this case relating to State action were presented
to and considered by the Court in the prior Eaton case,
and that the decision in Eaton is determinative of the
issues here presented, and binding upon this Court.
It is a recognized principle of law that a previous opinion
deciding contentions identical in fact, law, and application
with those in a subsequent case should be followed under
the doctrine of stare decisis. Grand Rapids & I. R. Co. v.
Blanchard, 6 Cir., 38 F. 2d 470; United States v. Egelak,
D. C. Alaska, 173 F. Supp. 206; 21 C. J. S. Courts §186.
Opinion and Order
3 In Hampton v. City o f Jacksonville, 304 F. 2d 320, 323 (5 Cir. 1962),
the Court said: “ * * * (W )e doubt whether the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit would have decided the Hospital case (Eaton) as it did had it
followed the Supreme Court decision (Burton).”
64a
It is fundamental that a decision of the Court of Appeals
should be followed in a subsequent case in a District Court
of that circuit in the absence of a material factual distinc
tion or a subsequent decision of the Court of Appeals or
of the United States Supreme Court requiring the District
Court to depart therefrom. Williams v. Carolina Coach
Co., I l l F. Supp. 329, affirmed 4 Cir., 207 F. 2d 408;
Adkins v. School Board, 148 F. Supp. 430, affirmed 4 Cir.,
246 F. 2d 325; 21 C. J. S. Courts §198.
Therefore, the decision of the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals in the prior Eaton case is binding on this Court
in the absence of (1) a change in the law since the previous
decision justifying a change in results, or (2) a factual
element, not before the Court in the prior case, which
shows “ State action” on the part of the hospital when
considered within the totality of the relationships between
the State and the hospital.
It is clear that Burton does not enunciate a fundamental
change in the law. The same general principles were
recognized, applied and limited to the particular facts in
the Eaton and Burton cases. Each case must rest on its
peculiar facts and no universal principle or criteria for
determining State action has yet been established.4
Opinion and Order
4 “ Because readily applicable formulae may not be fashioned, the conclu
sions drawn from the facts and circumstances of this record are by no means
declared as universal truths * * * Owing to the very ‘largeness’ of government,
a multitude of relationships might appear to some to fall within the Amend
ment’s embrace, but that, it must be remembered, can be determined only in
the framework of the peculiar facts or circumstances present. * * * Specifically
defining the limits of our inquiry, what we hold today is that when a State
leases public property in the manner and for the purpose shown to have been
the case here, the proscriptions of the Fourteenth Amendment must be com
plied with by the lessee as certainly as though they were binding covenants
written into the agreement itself.” Burton v. Wilmington ParJcing Authority,
365 TJ. S. 715, 725.
65a
Therefore, unless there are one or more additional facts
in this case not previously before the Court, which, viewed
as a component part of all existing relationships between
the hospital and the State, show that the State is involved
in the conduct of the hospital to a significant extent, the
decision in the prior Eaton case is controlling.
The allegations of the complaint in the prior case re
lating to State action were as follows:
(1) That certain of the land upon which the hospital
stands was conveyed in 1901 by deed from the City of
Wilmington and the County of New Hanover to the Board
of Managers of the hospital “ so long as the same shall
be used and maintained as a hospital for the benefit of
the City and County aforesaid, and in case of disuse or
abandonment to revert to the said City and County as their
interest respectively appear” ;
(2) That the City and County provide financial support
for the hospital by granting the hospital exemption from
City and County taxes;
(3) That prior to 1951 the City and County made direct
contributions for the support, maintenance, and operation
of the hospital;
(4) That since the year 1951 per diem contributions to
the hospital were made by the City and County for ser
vices rendered certain residents of each;
(5) That the hospital exercised the power of eminent
domain; and
(6) That the hospital received large grants of money
from the federal government for expansion and main
tenance.
Opinion and Order
66a
These facts are alleged in more detail in the present
complaint. The substance of the allegations was fairly
presented to and considered by the Court in the prior case.
The following facts are urged for the first time as show
ing the relationship of the hospital to the State:
(1) The City as self-insurer has made certain payments
to the hospital for services rendered in treating Workmen’s
Compensation cases;
(2) Since July 1, 1947, the hospital has been required
to secure a license from the State through the North Caro
lina Medical Care Commission and since that time the
hospital has complied with the licensing procedure and
standards prescribed by the Commission; and
(3) James Walker Memorial Hospital is superior to any
hospital in the City and County, offering the highest
standard of medical care, and is the chosen instrumentality
of the City and County for furnishing medical care to
their white citizens and affording a place to practice for
qualified white physicians.
These additional facts do not justify a different result
here. The payments for services rendered in Workmen’s
Compensation cases by the City is not unlike the per diem
payments for services to indigent patients by the County
discussed at length in the prior opinions. It appears by
affidavit filed by the Director of the hospital, that there
is no contract between the hospital and the City for such
services and that since October 1, 1961, the total amount
paid by the City is $1599.21 or one-tenth of one per cent
of the gross income of the hospital since that date.
Opinion and Order
67a
Under the North Carolina Hospital Licensing Act, both
private and public hospitals in North Carolina are re
quired to be licensed. The purpose of the statute is “ to
provide for the development, establishment and enforce
ment of basic standards: (1) For the care and treatment
of individuals in hospitals and (2) For the construction,
maintenance and operation of such hospitals, which, * * *
will insure safe and adequate treatment of such individuals
in hospitals * * * ” 5 The statute is designed to protect the
public health and does not constitute the licensee an
instrumentality of the State. To hold otherwise would
change the character of every private hospital by the
mere act of licensing. Williams v. Howard Johnson, 4 Cir.,
268 F. 2d 845; Slack v. Atlantic White Tower System, Inc.,
181 F. Supp. 124, affirmed, 4 Cir., 284 F. 2d 747.
Whether the hospital is superior or inferior to others in
the immediate area is not a significant fact of State
manifestation in the conduct of the hospital. Here the
hospital is chartered by the State as an ordinary private
corporation—there is no “ special franchise” as in Boman
v. Birmingham Transit Co., 5 Cir., 280 F. 2d 531.
The plaintiff-patients in this case, who seek admission
to defendant hospital on a nondiscriminatory basis, were
not parties to the prior Eaton case. This fact does not
affect the basic question whether the hospital is performing
State action.
It follows, therefore, that the relationships between the
State and the hospital, viewed singly and collectively, do
not constitute the hospital an instrumentality of the State,
Opinion and Order
5 N. C. General Statutes §131-126.2.
68a
and upon the authority of the prior Eaton case, the motion
to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is allowed.
It is so Ordered.
This the 5th day of April, 1963.
A lgernon L. B utler
Chief Judge, U. S. District Court
Opinion and Order
69a
Notice of Appeal
(Filed: May 8,1963)
[ same title}
Notice of A ppeal to the United States Court of A ppeals
for the F ourth Circuit
Notice is hereby given that the plaintiffs in this cause
hereby appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit from the Order of the District Court
dismissing the action filed by the District Court on April
9,1963.
Dated: 1963
M ichael Meltsner
J ack Greenberg
J ames M. Nabrit, III
10 Columbus Circle
New York 19, New York
Robert R. B ond
612 Red Cross Street
Wilmington, North Carolina
Conrad 0 . P earson
P. 0. Box 1428
203% E. Chapel Hill Street
Durham, North Carolina
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
70a
Designation of Parts of Record Appellants
Propose to Print
In the United States Court of A ppeals
F or the F ourth Circuit
No. 9058
[ s a m e t i t l e ]
T o : C. D. Hogue, Jr., Esq.
309 Carolina Power & Light Building
Wilmington, North Carolina
P lease take notice that pursuant to Rule 10 of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, appellants
hereby notify you that they plan to print the following as
an appendix to their brief in the above entitled case:
1. Clerk’s Docket Entries.
2. Complaint.
3. Motion to Dismiss.
4. Plaintiffs’ Exhibit A.
5. Plaintiffs’ Exhibit B.
6. Plaintiffs’ Exhibit C.
7. Affidavit of Robert R. Martin.
8. Opinion.
9. Notice of Appeal.
10. This Designation.
71a
A P P E N D I X B
Complaint in Prior Action
United States District Court
Eastern District of North Carolina
Wilmington Division
Hubert A. Eaton, Daniel C. Eoane, and
Samuel James Gray,
PLAINTIFFS
vs.
Board of Managers of the James Walker Memorial Hos
pital, a body corporate, H. B. Hamilton, Secretary of the
Board of Managers of the James Walker Memorial Hos
pital, the City of Wilmington, North Carolina, and the
County of New Hanover, North Carolina,
DEFENDANTS
1.
(a) The jurisdiction of the Court is invoked under Title
28, United States Code, Section 1331, this being a suit
which arises under the Constitution and laws of the United
States, viz: The Fourteenth Amendment to said Consti
tution and sections 1981 and 1983 of Title 42 of the United
States Code, wherein the matter in controversy exceeds,
exclusive of interest and the costs, the sum of $3,000.00.
(b) The jurisdiction of this Court is also invoked under
Title 28, United States Code, Section 1343 (3), this being
72a
a suit authorized by law to be brought to redress the depri
vation under color of law, statute, regulation, custom, and
usage of the State, of rights, privileges, and immunities
secured by the laws of the United States providing for
equal rights of citizens of the United States and all other
persons within the jurisdiction of the United States, viz,
section 1981 of Title 42 of the United States Code.
2.
The plaintiffs further show that this is a proceeding for
a Declaratory Judgment and Injunction under Title 28,
United States Code, sections 2201 and 2202 for the pur
pose of determining questions in actual controversy by the
parties to wit:
(a) The question of whether the custom and practice
of the defendants in denying, on account of race and color
to plaintiffs and other qualified Negro physicians similarly
situated the right to courtesy staff privileges, including the
right to treat their patients when they are admitted to
defendants hospital, the James Walker Memorial Hospital,
Wilmington, North Carolina, is unconstitutional and void
as being a violation to the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States.
3.
All parties to this action are residents and citizens of
North Carolina and of the United States.
4.
This is a class action authorized under Rule 23, of the
rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the
United States. The rights herein involved are of common
Complaint in P rior Action
73a
and general interest to the members of the class repre
sented by the plaintiffs, namely Negro physicians of Wil
mington, North Carolina and New Hanover County, North
Carolina.
5.
The plaintiff, Hubert A. Eaton is a Negro and a citizen
of the United States and the State of North Carolina, and
is now and has been a practicing physician in Wilmington,
North Carolina for the past twelve (12) years, and has
been a surgeon in said City for the past ten (10) years;
that said plaintiff holds the following degrees: B.S. from
Johnson C. Smith University, Charlotte, North Carolina;
M.S. and M.I). from the University of Michigan, Ann
Arbor, Michigan; that said plaintiff served one (1) year
of internship at the K. B. Reynolds Hospital prior to be
ginning practice in Wilmington, North Carolina. Said
plaintiff is presently a member of the surgical and medical
staff of the Community Hospital of Wilmington, North
Carolina.
6.
The plaintiff, Daniel C. Roane is a Negro and citizen
of the United States and the State of North Carolina and
is now and has been a practicing physician in Wilmington,
North Carolina for the past eighteen (18) years. The said
plaintiff holds the following degrees: B.S. and M.D. from
Howard University, Washington, D. C.; said plaintiff
served one (1) year of internship and one (1) year resi
dency in internal medicine at Kansas City General Hos
pital, Kansas City, Missouri. He also served residency in
1938 at the Community Hospital, Wilmington, North Caro
lina, New Hanover County, since that time he has been
Complaint in P rior Action
74a
engaged in general practices of medicine and surgery in
New Hanover County. Said plaintiff is presently chief of
the Department of Obstetrics at the Community Hospital,
Wilmington, North Carolina.
Complaint in P rior Action
7.
The plaintiff, Samuel James Gray, is a Negro and a
citizen of the United States and the State of North Caro
lina and is now and has been a practicing physician and
surgeon in Wilmington, North Carolina for the past six
teen (16) years; that said plaintiff holds the following
degrees: B.S. and M.D. from Howard University, Wash
ington, D. C.; the said plaintiff served one (1) year in
ternship (1937-1938) Lincoln Hospital, Durham, North
Carolina and eighteen (18) months residency at the Com
munity Hospital, Wilmington, North Carolina. Said plain
tiff is presently a member of the surgical and medical staff
of Community Hospital, Wilmington, North Carolina.
8.
The defendant, the Board of Managers of the James
Walker Memorial Hospital, is a body Corporate under and
by virtue of the laws of the State of North Carolina and
in act of the General Assembly ratified on the 23rd day of
January, 1901, charged with the management and super
vision of said hospital but is in fact subsidiary to an in
strumentality of said City of Wilmington and County of
New Hanover and is sued in its official capacity.
9.
H. E. Hamilton is the Secretary of the Board of Man
agers of the James Walker Memorial Hospital, that he
75a
has overall control and management of the James Walker
Memorial Hospital and is its chief administrative officer,
and is sued in his official capacity.
10.
The defendant, City of Wilmington, North Carolina is
a Municipal Corporation, located in New Hanover County,
North Carolina, and it is engaged in the usual duties and
activities pertaining to Municipal Corporations, and it has
provided financial support for the said James Walker
Memorial Hospital by granting said Hospital exemption
from the payment of City taxes; that said City has for
many years prior to 1951 made direct annual contributions
from its treasury for the support, maintenance and opera
tion of said Hospital and that since the year 1951, the said
City has made per diem contribution to said Hospital in
payment of services rendered certain residents of the City
of Wilmington, North Carolina.
11.
The defendant, New Hanover County, is a body politic
and corporate of the State of North Carolina and it is en
gaged in the usual duties and activities pertaining to such
bodies, and it has provided financial support for the James
Walker Memorial Hospital by granting said Hospital ex
emption from the payment of County taxes; that said
County has for many years prior to 1951, made direct
annual contributions from its treasury for the support,
maintenance and operation of the said hospital; and that
since the year 1951, the said County has made per diem
contributions to said hospital in payment of services ren
dered certain residents of the County of New Hanover.
Complaint in P rior Action
76a
Complaint in Prior Action
12.
That from time to time the said defendants, including
defendant Hospital, have exercised the right of eminent
domain and have received large grants of money from the
Federal Government for expansion and maintenance of the
said Hospital. That under the Will of the said James
Walker, deceased, the said hospital originally was erected
and built by him to be held and used by the defendants,
City and County and their successors as a hospital for the
treatment of the “ sick and afflicted.”
13.
The defendants, New Hanover County and City of Wil
mington purchased the original tract of land in the year
1881, being all of Block 227 in the City of Wilmington
upon which the late James Walker built or caused to be
built, the original “ James Walker Memorial Hospital,” see
copy of said deed hereto attached and marked Exhibit No. 1
and it is prayed that said deed be made a part of the com
plaint as if fully set out herein.
14.
That on or about the 19th day of July, 1901, the de
fendants, City of Wilmington and the County of Hanover,
after having been authorized through the Board of Aider-
men of the City of Wilmington and the County Commis
sioners of the County of New Hanover, did by deed trans
fer the land upon which was situated the James Walker
Memorial Hospital to the Board of Managers of the James
Walker Memorial Hospital in trust for the benefit of the
said County and City aforesaid. A copy of the said in
denture is hereto attached and marked Plaintiff’s Exhibit
77a
No. 2, and it is prayed that said deed be made a part of
this complaint as if fully set out herein.
15.
That now and at the time complained of, the City of
Wilmington and the County of Hanover were and are the
owners in fact of the James Walker Memorial Hospital.
16.
In compliance and conformity with the procedure, rules
and regulations set out and adopted by these defendants
governing the granting of “ courtesy staff privileges” in
the James Walker Memorial Hospital, the plaintiffs and
each of them on or before the 19th day of March, 1955,
timely and properly presented applications to these de
fendants for “ courtesy staff privileges” in the James Walker
Memorial Hospital with such records of past academic
achievements, character and other materials as required;
that plaintiffs are ready and willing to abide by all lawful
regulations of defendants; that despite plaintiffs admitted-
possession of all the necessary qualifications, these de
fendants have denied and refused to grant the plaintiffs
and each of them “ courtesy staff privileges,” including the
right to treat their patients when they are admitted to
defendant hospital because of their race and color. While
at the same time, granting “ courtesy staff privileges” in
the James Walker Memorial Hospital to white applicants
with the same qualifications as those possessed by the
plaintiffs.
17.
(a) That on or about the 30th day of January, 1956
the plaintiffs appealed to the Board of County Commis-
Complaint in P rior Action
78a
sioners of New Hanover County requesting the County
Board of Commissioners to direct the James Walker Memo
rial Hospital to cease discriminating against them on ac
count of color. The said County Board of Commissioners
by letter dated March 3, 1956, a copy of which is hereto
attached and asked to be made a part of this Complaint
as if fully set out herein, refused to intervene.
(b) That on or about the 30th day of January, 1956
the plaintiffs appealed to the Wilmington City Council re
questing it to direct the James Walker Memorial Hospital
to cease discriminating against them on account of color.
The said Wilmington City Council by letter dated Febru
ary 28, 1956, a copy of which is hereto attached and asked
to be made a part of this complaint as if fully set out
herein, refused to intervene.
By virtue of such wrongful action and illegal customs
and usages on the part of the defendants and each of them,
the plaintiffs are damaged and have no adequate remedy
at law.
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs respectfully pray the court:
(1) That the court adjudge and decree and declare the
rights and legal relations of the parties to the subject mat
ter herein controverted in order that such declaration shall
have the force and effect of the final judgment and decree.
(2) That this court should order a judgment or decree
declaring that the policy, and usage of the defendants in
refusing to grant “ courtesy staff privileges” to the plain
tiffs and other qualified Negroes to the James Walker
Memorial Hospital solely on account of their race and
color is unconstitutional and violative of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Complaint in P rior Action
79a
(3) That this court issue a permanent injunction forever
restraining and enforcing the defendants and each of them
in denying to the plaintiffs possessing the qualifications of
“ courtesy staff privileges” in the James Walker Memorial
Hospital solely because of color.
(4) That this court will allow the plaintiffs their costs
herein and such further and other additional or alternative
relief as may appear to the court to be just and equitable
in the premises.
Complaint in P rior Action
[Attorneys Names Omitted]
* # #
Hubert A. Eaton, Daniel C. Eoane, and Samuel James
Gray, who being duly sworn depose and say: That they
are the plaintiffs in the foregoing action, that they have
read the complaint herein; that the same is true of their
own knowledge, except those matters and things stated
upon information and belief, and as to those they believe
it to be true.
* # #
[Notary & Names Omitted]