Davis v. Alabama Brief for Appellants

    ■4fi.lL
I n  the

%niUb States GImtrt nt KppM z
F oe the F ifth Circuit 

No. 24265

John Davis and F ronzie H azzabd, et al.,
Appellants,

v.
State of A labama,

Appellee.

APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOE THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS

Oscar W . A dams, Jb.
1630 Fourth Avenue N.

Birmingham, Alabama 35203

Y eenon Z. Crawford 
578 Davis Avenue 
Mobile, Alabama 36603

Jack Greenberg 
Charles Stephen Ralston 
Charles H. Jones, Jr.
Norman C. A maker 
Melvyn H. Z aee

10 Columbus Circle
New York, New York 10019

Attorneys for Appellants

A nthony G. A msterdam 
3400 Chestnut St.
Philadelphia, Penna. 19104 

Of Counsel



TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

Statement of the Case ...................................................... 1
A. Fronzie Hazzard, et al. v. Alabama .................. - 1

B. John Davis v. State of Alabama ....................... 2

Specification of Error ...................................................... 3

Argument

28 TJ.S.C. §1443(1) Authorizes Federal Civil Rights 
Removal Jurisdiction of State Criminal Prosecu­
tions Brought Solely to Harass, Threaten or In­
timidate Negroes for Exercising Their Right to 
Vote or Aiding Others to Vote ..................-...........  4

A. The prosecutions in Hazzard v. Alabama are 
removable by virtue of the federal voting acts 4

B. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 gave federal
courts sole jurisdiction of offenses such as are 
charged in Hazzard ...... ...... ....................... -........  8

C. In Davis v. Alabama, the Federal Voting Rights
Acts similarly grant immunity from prosecu­
tion to those aiding others to register to vote .... 10

Conclusion .......................... ......................................... -....  13

Certificate of Service ....................... -............................. 14

Statutory Appendix .......................................................... la

ftfSvs t A fers-WoULj

QhTECVn* fto 6P

ji/i'T ft h , S u  pieptW'*fty



11

Table op Cases

page

City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966) ....4, 5,6,
10,11,12

Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 (1966) .......4,5,7,8,10,12

Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 
(1966) ..... .......................................................................... 7

In re Loney, 134 U.S. 372 (1890) ....................................  10

Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) ..........................  6

Sellers v. Trussed, 253 F.Supp. 915 (M.I). Ala. 1966) 9

United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960) ................... 7
United States v. Wood, 295 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1961), 

cert, den., 369 U.S. 850 (1962) ...................................... 7,11

Yick Wo v. Hopldns, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) ....................... 6

Federal Statutes:

28 U.S.C. §1443 ....................   1,3,4,11,12

42 U.S.C. §1971 (a ) (1) ....................................................  5

42 U.S.C. §1971(b) ...................................................5,7,8,11

42 U.S.C. §19731. ..............................................................  8-9

42 U.S.C. §1973d ... ........................................................   9

42 U.S.C. § 19731(h) ................  5,6,7,8,10,11,12

42 U.S.C. §1973!(c)(1 ) ....................................................  6

42 U.S.C. §2000a (1964) .................................................. 4, 5



Ill

PAGE

42 TJ.S.C. §2000a-2 (1964) ............................................. 4,5,8

Civil Rights Act of 1957, Act of September 9, 1957,
Pub. L. 85-315, 71 Stat. 637 ..........................................  6

Civil Rights Act of 1960, Act of May 6, 1960, Pub. L. 
86-449, 74 Stat. 90 .......................................................... 6

Civil Rights Act of 1964, Act of July 2, 1964, Pub. L. 
88-352, 78 Stat. 241..........................................................6,11

Voting Rights Act of 1965, Act of August 6, 1965, 
Pub. L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 ..........................1,2,4,6,8,11



In th e

Hmtm gtfata ©mtrt of
F ob the F ifth Circuit 

No. 24265

John Davis and F ronzie Hazzard, et al.,
Appellants,

v.

State of A labama,
Appellee.

a p p e a l s  f r o m  t h e  u n i t e d  s t a t e s  d is t r ic t  c o u r t

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS

Statement of the Case

This is an appeal from an order of the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of Alabama re­
manding in a single order and without a hearing two cases 
removed to the federal court under 28 U.S.C. §1443, the 
civil rights removal statute. The facts as alleged in the 
removal petitions and which, for the purpose of the pres­
ent appeal, must be taken as true, are as follows.

A. Fronzie Hazzard, et al. v. Alabama

In the Hazzard case, petitioners alleged that prior to the 
passage of the Federal Voting Rights Act of 1965, they as 
Negro citizens had been denied their rights to register to 
vote and to vote. Subsequent to the passage of that act



2

and under its authority, numerous Negro citizens have 
registered in that county, including most of the named peti­
tioners (R. 17).

On February 23, 1966, with no prior warning, the twenty- 
four petitioners were notified by the sheriff of Clarke 
County that they were to appear in the Circuit Court on 
February 25th to answer to indictments for perjury. The 
ostensible basis for the perjury indictments was that the 
petitioners had made misstatements of fact under oath on 
their voter registration forms. These forms had been filled 
out under the authority and in exercise of the rights granted 
to petitioners under the Voting Rights Act of 1965.

Petitioners alleged further that there were no bases in 
fact for the perjury charges, but that the charges were 
brought against them for the purpose of harassing and in­
timidating them in the exercise of rights and privileges 
granted by the Constitution and laws of the United States 
with the intent and effect of discouraging themselves and 
other Negro citizens from exercising their right to register 
to vote and to vote (R. 17-18).

B. John Davis v. State of Alabama

In his petition, appellant Davis alleged that he is a Negro 
citizen of the State of New Jersey and the United States 
and is a voluntary worker with a civil rights organization 
in a project whose purpose was to “ eliminate discrimina­
tion with reference to registration and voting” in the State 
of Alabama (R. 3). At the time of his arrest, petitioner 
was at the Clarke County Courthouse assisting other per­
sons in their efforts in becoming registered to vote. The 
day of his arrest was the same day that the Federal Vot­
ing Rights Act was passed by the Congress of the United 
States.



3

A large number of persons were lined up at the regis­
trar’s office to try to register to vote but a sheriff’s deputy 
informed them, including the petitioner, that the voting 
period or the period allocated to become registered to vote 
had expired. When the petitioner sought clarification of 
this order, he was charged under state law with disorderly 
conduct and failure to obey the command of a law enforce­
ment officer. »

The petition alleged that the charge against petitioner 
had no basis in fact and the purpose and effect of the 
prosecution was to punish him for the exercise of rights, 
privileges, and immunities secured to him by the Federal 
Constitution and laws, and to deter others from exercising 
their right to register to vote in federal and state elec­
tions free of racial discrimination (R. 4-5).

The removal petition in Hazzard was filed March 21, 
1966, while the petition in Davis was filed on September 16, 
1965. Subsequently, on October 4, 1966, the District Court 
entered an order remanding both cases to the state courts 
(R. 8). Timely notices of appeal were filed in both cases 
(R. 9, 20). A  motion for a stay of the remand order pend­
ing appeal was filed in both cases but was denied by the 
District Court (R. 10-14). In neither case has a trial date 
been set as yet in the state courts.

Specification of Error

The Court below erred in holding that, given the allega­
tions of the petitions for removal, these prosecutions were 
not removable under 28 U.S.C. §1443 and in remanding 
them to the state courts for trial.



4

ARGUMENT

28 U.S.C. §1443(1 ) Authorizes Federal Civil Rights 
Removal Jurisdiction of State Criminal Prosecutions 
Brought Solely to Harass, Threaten or Intimidate 
Negroes for Exercising Their Right to Vote or Aiding 
Others to Vote.

The central issue in these cases is whether they come 
within the rule of Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 (1966) so 
that removal is proper, or within that of City of Green­
wood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966), which would defeat 
removal jurisdiction. Appellants contend that Rachel gov­
erns, in view both of the purpose and applicability of the 
voting rights statutes in general and of the effect of the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965 specifically.

A. The prosecutions in Hazsard v. Alabama are 
removable by virtue of the federal voting acts.

In Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 (1966), the Supreme 
Court of the United States sustained removal under 28 
U.S.C. §1443(1) of state criminal trespass prosecutions 
brought against Negroes for refusing to leave places of 
public accommodations in which they were given a right of 
service without racial discrimination by 42 U.S.C. §2000a 
(1964). 42 U.S.C. §2000a(a) (set forth in the statutory 
appendix, infra, pp. 2a-3a), was read as giving persons 
seeking restaurant service a right to insist upon such ser­
vice without discrimination, and 42 U.S.C. §2000a-2 (1964) 
(set forth, infra, p. 3a), was read as giving a con­
comitant right not to be prosecuted for that insistence.

In City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966), on 
the other hand, the Supreme Court disallowed removal of 
prosecutions against civil rights demonstrators based upon



5

their conduct in protesting the denial to Negroes of rights 
to register and vote given by 42 U.S.C. §1971(a)(l) (set 
forth, infra, p. la ). Section 1971(a)(1) was read as not 
extending to persons a specific statutory right to protest 
racial discrimination in voting registration, as distin­
guished from the right to register to vote without racial 
discrimination. Thus, in Peacock, the question was neither 
raised nor decided whether 42 U.S.C. §§1971 (b) and 
1973i(b) (set forth, infra, p. 2a), which protect those 
persons directly engaged in the exercise of voting rights 
in the same way as §2000a protects those engaged in sit-ins, 
resulted in a right to remove state prosecutions designed 
to intimidate and coerce persons for protected activities.

Appellants thus contend that the proper distinction be­
tween Rachel and Peacock is the presence in the former 
and absence in the latter of a federal statute with language 
granting the specific right exercised together with a protec­
tion against harassment, intimidation, coercion, etc., be­
cause of an exercise or attempted exercise of that right. 
The only other possible distinction between Rachel and 
Peacock—namely, that §2000a-2 includes the word “ punish” 
together with “ intimidate, threaten or coerce” within its 
prohibition, while §§1971 (b) and 1973i(b) do not—is so 
palpably insubstantial as to trivialize the significance of 
these important pieces of federal civil rights legislation 
and to reduce Rachel to trifling and rationally unsup- 
portable dimensions. Yet, only this second and wholly im­
permissible distinction will support the decision below re- 

. manding appellants’ cases to state court. Appellants in 
Hazzard, unlike the demonstrators in Peacock, were di­
rectly engaged in the process of being registered to vote 
and the conduct for which they are prosecuted comes di­
rectly within the language of §1973i(b), viz., “voting or at-



6

tempting to vote.” 1 Thus, one of the “ specific provisions 
of a federal pre-emptive civil rights law”— §1973i(b)— 
“ confers immunity from state prosecution” upon appel­
lants’ conduct (Peacock, supra, at 826, 827).

This Court must uphold federal civil rights removal ju­
risdiction here unless it decides that Congress has deter­
mined that voting rights are less worthy or needful of fed­
eral protection than the right to equal public accommoda­
tions, or unless it decides that Congress has failed to pro­
tect voting rights by similarly “ specific provisions of a 
federal pre-emptive civil rights law” (Peacock, supra, at 
826).

Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has relegated 
voting rights to such a subordinate position. In the Civil 
Rights Acts of 1957,2 I960,3 1964,4 and 1965,5 Congress has 
enacted a comprehensive scheme for the protection of 
voting rights, a legislative scheme certainly no less pro­
tective than Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Anal­
ysis of this scheme renders it highly unlikely that Congress 
intended to place voting rights on a lower plane of federal 
protection than the right to equal public accommodations. 
And the Supreme Court has long recognized that the right 
to vote is a fundamental right, “because preservative of 
all rights” (Yick Wo v. Ilopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)). 
In Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964), the Court 
said:

Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental 
matter in a free and democratic society. Especially

1 42 U.S.C. §19731 (c) (1) defines “vote”  or “voting” as including regis­
tering to vote.

2 Act of September 9, 1957, Pub. L. 85-315, 71 Stat. 637.
8 Act o f May 6, 1960, Pub. L. 86-449, 74 Stat. 90.
4 Act of July 2, 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241.
5 Act of August 6, 1965, Pub. L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437.



7

since the right to exercise the franchise in a free and 
unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil 
and political rights, any alleged infringement of the 
right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticu­
lously scrutinized.6

The language and intent of federal voting legislation en­
able appellants and others subjected to prosecutions which 
repress Negro voting activity to meet the test of removal 
announced in Rachel. Section 1971(b) provides an ample \  
declaration of Congressional intent to immunize from state 
prosecution a person against whom state criminal charges 
are brought with the sole purpose and effect of harassing 
and intimidating him and other Negroes and punishing 
them for, and deterring them from, exercising their right 
to vote. This Court has so. held, and its reasoning and j 
authority are persuasive./Cp”' United Siate~s~v. Wood, 29b 
F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1961), ttrt. den., 369 U.S. 850 (1962).

Section 1971(b), as a matter of language, is broad enough 
to cover the case of official intimidation through abuse of 
the state criminal process; and its legislative history can­
vassed in Wood, 295 F.2d at 781-82, compels the conclu­
sion “that Congress contemplated just such activity as is 
here alleged—where the state criminal processes are used 
as instruments for the deprivation of constitutional rights” 
(295 F.2d 781).

Section 1973i(b) is of particular significance here for 
two reasons. First, it has signified Congressional accept­
ance of the Wood construction of §1971 (b) in that there 
is now specifically proscribed any “ attempt to intimidate, 
threaten or coerce any person for voting or attempting to 
vote.” Second, it has retained the “ intimidate, threaten or

6 § 0e also, Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667-68 
(1966); United States v. Baines, 362 U.S. 17, 27 (1960).



8

coerce” formula of §1971 (b), apparently deeming it suffi­
cient to cover the case of official intimidation through 
harassment prosecutions— a case undoubtedly recognized 
by the 89th Congress as an important means of repression 
of persons aiding other persons to register to vote. Thus 
it can be seen that there is no magic to the language “ pun­
ish or attempt to punish” of §2000a-2 which qualifies it 
alone to combat harassment prosecutions violative of im­
portant federal rights.

To recapitulate, appellants contend that: (1) when they 
registered to vote they exercised rights specifically granted 
under federal statutes that provide for equal civil rights;
(2) the statutes, 42 U.S.C. §§1971 and 1973i, further pro­
vide that they could not be intimidated or threatened be­
cause they exercised those rights; and (3) therefore, just 
as in Rachel, removal of their prosecutions to federal dis­
trict court is essential to give the full protection afforded
by the statutes. O'

« 'W to
B. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 gave federal courts . .

sole jurisdiction of offenses such as are charged in 
Haszard.

f  6 W* Appellants further argue that the overall statutory 
Cyyf}*4*  scheme of the Voting-Rights Act of 1965 establishes the 

jurisdiction of the 'Tederal-'Courts over the offenses 
» charged. The operation of the Act and its effect on the 

. present prosecutions can be best understood by outlining
./> chronologically the events relevant to this action.

^  (M Prior to August, 1965, the registrars in Clarke County, 
j .  Alabama, operated under state lâ v. That is, they enforced

state statutory provisions relating to the registering of 
voters and imposed state qualifications upon prospective 

\ registrants. On August 6, 1965, the Voting Rights Act of
1965 was signed by the President. In Section 4 (42 U.S.C.



9

§1973b) of the Act, the Attorney General of the United 
States was given the power to determine, according to a 
formula, that tests or devices had been used in a state to 
restrict the right of persons to vote because of race. Upon 
his making such a determination, the use of any test (in­
cluding a literacy test or other requirements such as had 
been in force in the State of Alabama) in the state or po­
litical subdivision was no longer permissible.

On August 7, 1965, the Attorney General made the re­
quired determination with regard to the entire State of 
Alabama, including Clarke County.7 Under the statute, he 
had two options. He could request the Civil Service Com­
mission to appoint federal examiners to go into some or 
all counties in the state and to themselves register voters 
for both federal and state elections (42 U.S.C. §1973d). In 
the alternative, he could decide that within a particular 
subdivision state registrars were making bona fide efforts 
to register voters free of racial discrimination. In the case 
of Alabama, federal examiners were sent into certain se­
lected counties; in most counties, including Clarke County, 
reliance was placed on existing state registrars. In either 
case, however, the result was the same: prior requirements 
of Alabama law were no longer in effect; literacy tests, 
voucher requirements, etc., no longer were applicable; 
rather, only such standards as were permitted under fed­
eral law were imposed. In other words, the state registrars 
were acting in the capacity of quasi-federal officers, doing 
the same thing federal examiners would be doing, i.e., en­
forcing provisions of federal law.

Thus, to permit removal in the present case in no manner 
enlarges federal at the expense of state trial jurisdiction. 
Just as the state courts would clearly lack jurisdiction over

7 See, Sellers v. Truss ell, 253 F. Supp. 915, 917 (M.D. Ala. 1966).



10

the offense charged against appellants-petitioners if they 
had registered with federal examiners, so they lack juris­
diction when the alleged offense is charged to have taken 
place before state officials enforcing federal law. See, In re 
Loney, 134 U.S. 372 (1890). In Loney, the Supreme Court 
held that to allow the state to prosecute a person for per­
jury because of testimony given before a state notary pub­
lic for use in a trial in federal court could effectively 
hamper the administration of an important federal opera­
tion. Similarly, the state may not be allowed to interfere 
with the enforcement of federal voting rights and the reg­
istration of voters under federal statutory standards by a 
criminal prosecution merely because the official acting pur­
suant to federal law holds a state rather than a federal 
position.

For these reasons, just as in Loney, the federal courts 
have full power here to intervene, whether by removal or 
otherwise, and exercise their proper jurisdiction over the 
alleged offenses.

C. In Davis v. Alabama, the Federal Voting Rights Acts 
similarly grant immunity from prosecution to those 
aiding others to register to vote.

It has been argued above that the appellants in Haszard 
are entitled to the removal of their prosecutions under the 
rule of Georgia v. Rachel, since their conduct is specifically 
protected by a federal statute providing for equal civil 
rights. Their case was contrasted with that of the respon­
dents in City of Greenwood v. Peacock, since no statute 
grants the right to demonstrate in support of equal voting 
rights. Just as the appellants in Haszard are protected for 
the act of registering to vote, so appellant Davis is pro­
tected in the act of directly aiding persons to vote or at­
tempting to vote by 42 U.S.C. §19731 (b ).



11

The importance to adequate federal protection of voting 
rights of protection and insulation of persons aiding others 
to register was recognized by this Court in United States 
v. Wood, 295 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1961). In Wood, the court 
ordered a federal injunction against the state prosecution 
of John Hardy, a Negro voter registration worker in 
Walthall County, Mississippi, for peacefully attempting to 
aid and encourage Negro citizens to attempt to register to 
vote. Hardy had been arrested, without cause, for breach 
of the peace. The court held that the prosecution of Hardy, 
regardless of its outcome, would effectively intimidate Ne­
groes in the exercise of their right to vote in violation of 
§1971(b). 42 U.S.C. §1973i(b) thus in effect accepted and 
codified the holding of Wood by prohibiting any “attempt 
to intimidate, threaten or coerce any person for urging or 
aiding any person to vote or attempt to vote.” Thus the 
section sets to rest whatever doubt §1971 (b) may have left 
that appellant Davis merits the protection of federal vot­
ing legislation in aiding others to register to vote.

Again, the distinction between this case and Peacock lies 
in the fact that appellant was directly involved in the vot­
ing registration process, whereas the demonstrators in the 
latter case were only tangentially involved. The Supreme 
Court in Peacock made it clear that it construed a “law 
providing for . . . equal civil rights” within the meaning of 
28 U.S.C. §1443, as excluding the First Amendment rights 
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. On the other hand, the phrase does include 
the Equal Protection Clause, the Fifteenth Amendment, 
42 U.S.C. §1971, the Civil Eights Act of 1964, and the Vot- 

—... ing Rights Act of 1965.

C'  ̂ .... -"In Peacock, the only claim available to the demonstrators
IfdffbD ! was the claim mot that they were being prosecuted for pro­

tected acts, but that their prosecutions were harassing de-

® I * * > h i j  //iV  a



12

vices indirectly aimed at Negro voting activity. Therefore, 
the Supreme Court held, there was no establishment of a 
denial of the equal rights of the demonstrators themselves 
by their prosecution in the state courts.

Appellant Davis, on the other hand, as in the case of 
the appellants in Ilazzard, is being prosecuted for conduct 
which is itself directly protected by the “ aiding” provision 
of the voting rights statutes, and the “aiding” provision is 
part of a section prohibiting all forms of intimidation, 42 
U.S.C. §1973i(b). Where prosecution is based on conduct 
thus directly protected by such a federal law protecting 
equal rights, the prosecution necessarily denies the defend­
ant his equal federal rights within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 
§1443(1), as the Supreme Court held in Georgia v. Rachel.

In conclusion, to permit appellants to prove in a federal 
evidentiary hearing that the state prosecutions against 
them are nothing more than an attempt to stifle the exer­
cise of the right to vote by Negroes in Clarke County, 
Alabama will not “work a wholesale dislocation of the his­
toric relationship between the state and federal courts in 
the administration of the criminal law” (Peacock, supra, 
at 831). Rather, it will vindicate respect for that law by 
assuring that it will not be used to interfere with specific 
rights declared by Congress to be essential for the 
achievement of equal civil rights.



13

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the order of the District 
Court remanding appellants’ cases should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

Oscar W. A dams, Jr.
1630 Fourth Avenue N. 
Birmingham, Alabama 35203

V ernon Z. Crawford 
578 Davis Avenue 
Mobile, Alabama 36603

Jack Greenberg 
Charles Stephen Ralston 
Charles H. Jones, Jr.
Norman C. A maker 
Melvyn H. Zarr

10 Columbus Circle
New York, New York 10019

Attorneys for Appellants

A nthony G. A msterdam 
3400 Chestnut St. 
Philadelphia, Penna. 19104 

Of Counsel



14

Certificate of Service

I hereby certify that I have served copies of appellants’ 
Brief on appellee by sending copies to Hon. Lee B. W il­
liams, County Solicitor of Clarke County, Clarke County 
Courthouse, Grove Hill, Alabama, and Hon. J. Massey 
Edgar, District Attorney, Butler, Alabama, by United 
States mail, postage prepaid.

Done this 17th day of February, 1967.

Attorney for Appellants



Statutory Appendix

1. 28 U. S. C. §1443(1) (1964):

§1443. Civil rights cases
Any of the following civil actions or criminal prosecu­

tions, commenced in a State Court may be removed 
by the defendant to the district court of the United 
States for the district and division embracing the place 
wherein it is pending:

(1) Against any person who is denied or cannot 
enforce in the courts of such State a right under any 
law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens 
of the United States, or of all persons within the juris­
diction thereof; . . .

2. 42 U. S. C. §1971(a) (1) (1964) (R. S. §2004 (1875) : 
§1971 . . .

(a) (1) All citizens of the United States who are 
otherwise qualified by law to vote at any election by 
the people in any State, Territory, district, county, 
city, parish, township, school district, municipality, or 
other territorial subdivision, shall be entitled and al­
lowed to vote at all such elections, without distinction of 
race, color, or previous condition of servitude; any 
constitution, law, custom, usage, or regulation of any 
State or Territory, or by or under its authority, to the 
contrary notwithstanding.

3. 42 U. S. C. §1971 (b) (1964) (Sec. 131 of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1957, 71 Stat. 637):

§1971 . . . (b) Intimidation, threats, or coercion

No person, whether acting under color of law or 
otherwise, shall intimidate, threaten, coerce, or at-



2a

tempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any other per­
son for the purpose of interfering with the right of 
such other person to vote or to vote as he may choose, 
or of causing such other person to vote for, or not to 
vote for, any candidate for the office of President, Vice 
President, presidential elector, Member of the Senate, 
or Member of the House of Representatives, Delegates 
or Commissioners from the Territories or possessions, 
at any general, special or primary election held solely 
or in part for the purpose of selecting or electing any 
such candidate.

4. 42 U. S. C. §1973 i (b) (Supp. I, 1965) (Sec. 11(b) of 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 443):

§1973 i . .. (b) Intimidation, threats, or coercion

No person, whether acting under color of law or 
otherwise, shall intimidate, threaten, or coerce, or at­
tempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any person 
for voting or attempting to vote, or intimidate, 
threaten, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, 
or coerce any person for urging or aiding anv person 
to vote or attempt to vote, or intimidate, threaten, or 
coerce any person for exercising any powers or duties 
under section 1973a(a), 1973d, 1973f, 1973g, 1973h, or 
1973j(e) of this title.

5. 42 U. S. C. §2000a (a) (1964) (Sec. 201(a) of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 243):

§2000a. Prohibition against discrimination or segrega­
tion in places of public accommodation—Equal 
access

(a) All persons shall be entitled to the full and 
equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, 
privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any



3a

place of public accommodation, as defined in this sec­
tion, without discrimination or segregation on the 
ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.

6. 42 U. S. C. §2000a-2 (1964) (Sec. 203 of the Civil 
Bights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 244):

§2000a-2. Prohibition against deprivation of, inter­
ference with, and punishment for exercising 
rights and privileges secured by section 
2000a or 2000a-l of this title

No person shall (a) withhold, deny, or attempt to 
withhold or deny, or deprive or attempt to deprive, any 
person of any right or privilege secured by section 
2000a or 2000a-l of this title, or (b) intimidate, threaten, 
or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce 
any person with the purpose of interfering with any 
right or privilege secured by section 2000a or 2000a-l 
of this title, or (c) punish or attempt to punish any 
person for exercising or attempting to exercise any 
right or privilege secured by section 2000a or 2000a-l 
of this title.



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