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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Anderson v. Martin Jurisdictional Statement, 1962. 31c2f1c2-b79a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/9603ed5d-b91e-42e3-974f-74e28a051b51/anderson-v-martin-jurisdictional-statement. Accessed July 01, 2025.
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Is r t h e (Esmxt of % lu itxb BtaUs October T eem , 1962 No............... D xjpxjy H. A nderson and A cie J. B elton , Appellants, —v.— W ade 0 . M artin , J r., Appellee. ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT M ichael M eltsner N orman C. A maker Of Counsel J ack Greenberg J ames M. N abrit, III 10 Columbus Circle New York 19, New York J o h n n ie A. J ones 530 South 13th Street Baton Rouge 2, Louisiana M u rph y W. B ell B ruce A . B ell L eonard P. A very S amuel D ick ens W ilm on L. R ichardson Baton Rouge, Louisiana Attorneys for Appellants I N D E X PAGE Citation to Opinion Below.............................................. 1 Jurisdiction ................................................................... 2 Statute Involved ............................................................ 2 Question Presented......................................................... 3 Statement of the Case..................................................... 4 The Question Presented Is Substantial ..................... 6 Co n c l u s io n ........................................................................................ 12 A ppendix ............................................................................................. 13 Opinions Below.............................................................. 13 Judgment ....................................................................... 24 T able of Cases Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 .............. 10 Florida Lime and Avocado Growers v. Jacobsen, 362 U. S. 73 ....................................................................... 2 Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U. S. 157................................. 9 Hall v. St. Helena Parish School Board, 197 F. Supp. 649 (E. X). La. 1961), affd 368 U. S. 515................. 9 Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81 ................. 9 11 PAGE Kessler y. Department of Public Safety, 369 II. S. 153 2 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214................. 8 McDonald v. Key, 125 F. Supp. 775 (W. D. Olda., 1954)...................................................... ...................... 6, 7 McDonald v. Key, 224 F. 2d 608 (10th Cir. 1955), cert, denied 350 U. S. 895 ................................................. 6, 7, 8 N. A. A. C. P. v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449 ........................ 11 Nixon y. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536 ................................... 11 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 ................................ 10 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1 ......... 10 United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214............................ 11 S tatutes 28 United States Code, §1253 ................................ 2 28 United States Code, §§1331, 1343(3) ................. 2 28 United States Code, §§2281, 2284 ..................... 2 42 United States Code, §§1971a, 1981, 1983 .......... 2 La. R. S. 18:117.1 ..............................................2, 3, 6, 9 Is r t h e Bupnm? Glimrt of % HUmtvb Staten October T erm , 1962 No............... D u pu y H. A nderson and A cie J. B elton , Appellants, W ade O. M artin , J r., Appellee. ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT Appellants, Dupuy H. Anderson and Acie J. Belton, ap peal from the order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana entered on October 3, 1962 denying a permanent injunction against the en forcement of a statute of the State of Louisiana which requires the designation of the race of candidates for elec tive office on nominating papers and ballots. They submit this statement to show that the Supreme Court of the United States has jurisdiction of the appeal and that a substantial question is presented. Citation to Opinion Below The opinion of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana (R. 53) denying a prelimi nary injunction was rendered on June 29, 1962 and is re- 2 ported at 206 F. Supp. 700. The dissenting opinion of Circuit Judge Wisdom (R. 50) is reported at 206 F. Supp. 705. These opinions are reprinted in the appendix hereto at pp. 13 and 21, respectively. No further opinion was rendered with the final order, entered Oct. 3, 1962 (R. 70). Jurisdiction This suit was initiated in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana to enjoin the enforcement of La. R. S. §18:1174.1 (Act No. 538 of the 1960 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature). It was brought pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §§1331, 1343(3) and 42 U. S. C. §§1971a, 1981, 1983, and was heard by a three judge court convened under 28 U. S. C. §§2281 and 2284. The order of the District Court denying the prayer for issuance of a permanent injunction is dated September 28, 1962 and the time of its entry is October 3, 1962 (R. 70; see appendix infra, p. 24). Notice of Appeal to this Court was filed in the District Court on October 25, 1961 (R, 79). Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to review this decision by direct appeal is conferred by 28 U. S. C. §1253. The following cases sustain this Court’s jurisdiction on direct appeal: Florida Lime and Avocado Growers v. Jacob sen, 362 U. S. 73; Kessler v. Department of Public Safety, 369 U. S. 153. Statute Involved La. R. S. §18:1174.1 enacted as Act No. 538 of the 1960 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature. It is printed in volume 2 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes, 1960 Sup plement, p. 385. The statute provides as follows: 3 Designation of race of candidates on paper and bal lots—A. Every application for or notification or dec laration of candidacy, and every certificate of nomina tion and every nomination paper filed in any state or local primary, general or special election for any elec tive office in this state shall show for each candidate named therein whether such candidate is of the Cau casian race, the Negro race or other specified race. B. Chairman of party committees, party executive committees, presidents of boards of supervisors of election or any person or persons required by law to certify to the Secretary of State the names of candi dates to be placed on the ballots shall cause to be shown in such certification whether each candidate named therein is of the Caucasian race, Negro race or other specified race, which information shall be ob tained from the applications for or notifications or dec larations of candidacy or from the certificates of nomi nation or nomination papers, as the case may be. C. On the ballots to be used in any state or local primary, general or special election the Secretary of State shall cause to be printed within parentheses () beside the name of each candidate, the race of the candidate, whether Caucasian, Negro, or other specified race, which information shall be obtained from the documents described in Sub-section A or B of this Section. The racial designation on the ballots shall be in print of the same size as the print in the names of the candidates on the ballots. Question Presented Whether La. R. S. §18:1174.1 (Act No. 538 of the 1960 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature) which pro vides for the designation of the race of candidates for elec- 4 tive office on nomination papers and ballots in all primary, general or special elections violates the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Statement of the Case Appellants, Negro citizens of the United States and the State of Louisiana, and residents of the Parish of East Baton Rouge, Louisiana, were candidates for nomination to the office of School Board member of the Parish of East Baton Rouge in the Democratic Party primary election held on July 28, 1962. They filed a complaint in the Dis trict Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana on June 8,1962 to enjoin the enforcement of Act No. 538 of the 1960 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature, naming as defendant the Secretary of State of the State of Louisiana who, by the terms of the statute, was charged with its en forcement (R. 1). Asserting that the statute violated the First, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Con stitution of the United States, plaintiffs prayed for pre liminary and permanent injunctions and a temporary restraining order. They also asked that a three-judge court be convened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §§2281, 2284. On June 11, 1962 the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order was denied by District Judge West, and thereafter a three-judge court was convened (R. 13; 18). The cause was heard on June 26, 1962 before the three- judge court. At the hearing an Answer was filed admitting many facts alleged in the complaint (R. 31). Defendant also moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction (R. 28). The court recessed to consider its jurisdiction and having con cluded that the case was properly before it reconvened to hear the merits (R. 54). 5 In open court the parties stipulated that the defendant was a ministerial officer required to follow R. S. §18:1174.1 and that he caused the ballots to be printed in accordance with the provisions of the statute (R. 76-77). After argu ment, the motion for preliminary injunction was denied by the court on June 26, 1962 with Judge Wisdom dissenting (R. 25). Thereafter, on June 29, 1962 the majority and dissenting opinions were filed. On September 19,1962 District Judge West denied plain tiffs’ Motion for Leave to File a proposed Amended or Supplemental Complaint, which alleged that the aforemen tioned primary election was held on July 28, 1962 and that in accordance with the statute in issue the race of appellant was noted beside their names on the ballot (R. 66); that appellant Anderson was defeated in the primary and appel lant Belton was defeated in a subsequent run-off election held September 1, 1962 (R. 66); that appellants’ unsuc cessful candidacies were substantially influenced by the operation and enforcement of the statute (R. 66); that appellants “intend to be candidates in the next duly con stituted democratic primary election for nomination as members of the East Baton Rouge Parish School Board and further that they intend to seek other public office” in the parish and state in the future (R. 66). On September 28, 1962, the District Court signed, and on October 3,1962, entered a final order denying the prayer for permanent injunctive relief (R. 70). This order incor porated by reference the opinion of June 29,1962, and again Judge Wisdom noted his dissent. Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on Octo ber 25, 1962 (R. 79). 6 The Question Presented Is Substantial La. E. S. §18:1174.1 requires all candidates for elective office in every election in Louisiana to state on every ap plication for or notification or declaration of candidacy whether they are “of the Caucasian race, the Negro race, or other specified race.” It requires the Secretary of State to print the racial description so obtained in parentheses beside the name of every candidate on the ballots used “in any state or local, primary, general or special election.” Plaintiffs, both candidates for office in a primary election as well as being qualified voters, sued to enjoin the Secre tary of State from enforcing this law by making the re quired racial designation on the ballot. The majority of the court below, District Judges West and Ellis, held the statute valid and enforceable as not repugnant to the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. The majority opinion by Judge West undertakes to distinguish the Louisi ana statute in suit from a similar Oklahoma law which was held unconstitutional in McDonald v. Key, 224 F. 2d 608 (10th Cir. 1955), cert, denied 350 U. S. 895.1 The opinion below held that while the Oklahoma law required that the race of candidates be designated on bal lots only if they were “other than of the white race” and thus treated Negroes differently from other candidates, the Louisiana statute was sufficiently different to be valid since it required that candidates of all races be so desig nated on the ballot. The majority also held that a candi date has no right not to have his race disclosed and that the court was “not disposed to create a shield against the 1 This opinion reversed a District Court opinion upholding the Oklahoma statute at 125 F. Supp. 775 (W. D. Okla. 1954). 7 brightest light of public examination of candidates for pub lic office” (R, 57). Circuit Judge Wisdom adopted a contrary view and agreed with appellants’ contention that McDonald v. Key, supra, could not be distinguished in principle. As he ob served, and as petitioners submit is altogether obvious, “the omission of any racial designation on . . . [an Okla homa] ballot amounted to the candidate identifying him self as a white man just as surely as a Negro candidate would identify himself by the word ‘Negro’ after his name. The result was essentially the same result intended to be accomplished by the Louisiana statute” (R. 51).2 Indeed, the trial court in McDonald v. Key, 125 F. Supp. 775, 777 (W. D. Okla. 1954), relied on this asserted equality in treatment in upholding the Oklahoma statute using rea soning very similar to that of the court below in the pres ent case. The Oklahoma District Court said that placing the word “Negro” on the ballot was “merely descriptive and properly serves to inform the electors of the fact that the candidate is of African descent,” and added that it “likewise serves to inform the voters that the other candi dates are members of the ‘white race’ ” (Id. at 777). While the Tenth Circuit’s decision in McDonald v. Key found a denial in equal treatment with respect to Negroes who run for office in that their race was placed on the ballot while the race of other candidates was not (224 F. 2d at 610), it is submitted that the opinion below conflicts in principle with the decision in McDonald v. Key, supra, and that this conflict between a Court of Appeals and a statutory three-judge District Court demonstrates that the question involved here is substantial. 2 Under the Oklahoma Constitution the “white race” included all persons except Negroes. See McDonald v. Key, 224 F. 2d 608, 609 (10th Cir. 1955). 8 It is submitted that Judge Wisdom’s dissent in this case effectively states the appropriate constitutional principles which should decide the issue and demonstrates that the result reached in McDonald v. Key, supra, is the correct one. The Louisiana law’s requirement that a candidate state his race in order to gain a place on the ballot and that the Secretary of State print each candidate’s race in paren theses beside his name on the ballot infringes the liberty of citizens and introduces a racial classification into the electoral process while serving no legitimate end of the State. Neither the State nor the court below has asserted any legitimate governmental purpose to be served by the required disclosure and designation. To be sure, it is said that this designation informs the electorate, but no one has said what state objective this accomplishes. A state might rationally require that a candidate disclose and that the voters be told of his qualifications for office, or indeed, perhaps, even of his views on issues relating to the office sought. But, racial designations have no rational relation ship to candidates’ qualifications and the State has no business placing its power and prestige behind a system of racial identification of citizens. Electors may often cast their ballots on the basis of the candidate’s race, religion, national origin, or other factors not related to his qualifica tions for office, but it is no legitimate object of the state to feed or stimulate such prejudices in the elections it conducts. Indeed, racial classifications so rarely have any rational connection with any legitimate objects of government as to be “immediately suspect” necessitating “the most rigid scrutiny.” Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214, 216. “Distinctions between citizens solely because of their an cestry are by their very nature odious to a free people 9 whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equal ity.” Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 100. Beyond the absence of any valid state purpose in compel ling candidates to declare their race and in putting a racial stamp on them, thus requiring them to run for office as Negroes or as whites, this statute must be viewed in the context of Louisiana’s well-known policy of racial discrimi nation against Negroes. This Court’s attention has been repeatedly drawn to various manifestations of Louisiana’s officially declared policy of racial separation all designed to brand Negroes as inferiors to be set apart from whites by the State.3 Having legally branded Negroes as an inferior race by a host of laws and practices applied throughout com munity life, Louisiana now, by R. S. §18:1174.1 insures that the public will identify as such any individual member of the state-designated “inferior race” who seeks public office. In the context of this state policy, it is plainly no answer to say that Caucasians are also required to make similar self-identifications and to be racially designated on the ballots. To be labelled as a member of the dominant majority racial group is quite a different thing than to be labelled as a member of a legally disadvantaged minority race. As Judge Wisdom wrote in Hall v. St. Helena Parish School Board, 197 F. Supp. 649, 655 (E. D. La. 1961), aff’d 368 U. S. 515: To speak of this law as operating equally is to equate equal protection with the equality Anatole France spoke of: “The law in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread.” 3 See the discussion of Louisiana’s policy in Mr. Justice Douglas’s concurring opinion in Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U. S. 157, 181. 10 This Court rejected a parallel argument saying that “equal protection of the laws is not achieved through indiscrimi nate imposition of inequalities.” Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, 22. The majority of the Court that decided Plessy v. Fergu son, 163 U. S. 537, 551, subscribed to the view that segre gation laws, such as the Louisiana railroad segregation laws and the similar laws that remain in that State, did not stamp Negroes as inferior, but rather, that it was Ne groes themselves who placed that construction upon them. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, rejected this notion holding that segregation laws did, indeed, have their intended result, namely, to disadvantage Negroes, the racial minority set apart by the State. The Brown case vindicated the first Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy, supra at 554, where he wrote: In respect of civil rights, common to all citizens, the Constitution of the United States does not, I think, permit any public authority to know the race of those entitled to be protected in the enjoyment of such rights . . . But I deny that any legislative body or ju dicial tribunal may have regard to the race of citizens when the civil rights of those citizens are involved. Mr. Justice Harlan further expounded his view that the post-Civil War amendments to the Constitution “removed the race line from our governmental systems” (Id. at 555), stating in often quoted language that: But in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our Consti tution is color-blind and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law. The humblest is the peer of the most powerful. The law regards man as 11 man, and takes no account of his surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are involved (at 559). As Judge Wisdom’s opinion indicated, racial classifica tions are particularly inappropriate in the electoral process. “If there is one area above all others where the Constitu tion is color-blind, it is the area of state action with respect to the ballot and the voting booth” (206 F. Supp. at 705). Cf. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536, 541. The purpose of the Fifteenth Amendment to “forbid all discriminations between white citizens and citizens of color in respect to their right to vote” (United States v. Reese, 92 IT. S. 214, 226) and to proscribe denials or abridgements of the right on the basis of race is patent. Although this particular Louisiana law does not operate directly to disfranchise Negroes or affect their entitlement to vote and participate in the system of self-government, it does affect their votes by injecting racism into the electoral process in a manner calculated to stimulate the same racial animosities otherwise encouraged by Louisiana’s segrega tion laws. Louisiana thus encourages racial discrimination by voters. Such an indirect effort to limit Negro participa tion in government accomplishes the same objective as an abridgement or denial of the franchise on the basis of race. That this result will flow from the racially motivated choices of voters does not make it any less repugnant to the Constitution since governmental action under R. S. 18:1174.1 initiates the chain of events resulting in the dis crimination, and this interplay of governmental and pri vate action makes it more likely to occur. Cf. N. A. A. C. P. v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449, 463. Finafiy, the fact that this statute might operate to ben efit a Negro candidate and against a white candidate in a community, unlike East Baton Rouge where plaintiffs re- 12 side, which had a Negro electoral majority, is not relevant. For, it is submitted that the State has a duty under the Fifteenth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment to be “color-blind” and not to act so as to encourage racial discrimination in the electoral process against any racial group. CONCLUSION It is respectfully prayed that the Court should review the judgment of the District Court and enter a judgment reversing the decision below. Respectfully submitted, M ichael M eltsner N orman C. A maker Of Counsel J ack Greenberg J ames M. N abrit, III 10 Columbus Circle New York 19, New York J o h n n ie A. J ones 530 South 13th Street Baton Rouge 2, Louisiana M u rph y W. B ell B ruce A. B ell L eonard P. A very S amuel D ickens W ilm on L. R ichardson Baton Rouge, Louisiana Attorneys for Appellants APPENDIX APPENDIX U nited S tates D istrict Court D istrict of L ouisiana Civ. A. No. 2623 June 29, 1962 D upuy H. A nderson and A cie J. B elton , v. Complainants, W ade 0 . M artin , J r., Defendant. Opinion Before W isdom, Circuit Judge, and W est and E llis , District Judges. W est, District Judge. In 1960 the Louisiana Legislature enacted legislation requiring the Secretary of State to place a racial designa tion over the name of every candidate on the ballot in the primary or general election.1 Under the statute the 1 LSA-R.S. Sec. 18:1174.1, Act 538 of 1960. “Sec. 1174.1 Designation of race of candidates on paper and ballots—A. Every application for or notification or dec laration of candidacy, and every certificate of nomination and every nomination paper filed in any state or local primary, general or special election for any elective office in this state shall show for each candidate named therein whether such candidate is of the Caucasian race, the Negro race or other specified race. “B. Chairmen of party committees, party executive com mittees, presidents of boards of supervisors of election or any 14 candidate must place his name and racial designation on his certificate of candidacy and the Secretary of State uses that information in preparing the ballot. The designation applies to all candidates. The Statute requires that the designation of “Caucasian”, “Negro”, or “other specified race” be placed on the ballot after the name of each can didate. Plaintiffs are two Negro candidates for the school board in East Baton Rouge Parish, State of Louisiana. They challenge the constitutionality of this statute under the First, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and request injunctive relief against the Secretary of State prior to the July 28, 1962, Demo cratic primary. The District Judge denied a temporary restraining order and thereafter a three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. A. § 2284. Defendant filed his answer together with a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction in court on the day of the hearing. The court recessed to consider its jurisdiction and having concluded that it had jurisdiction,2 the court reconvened to hear the merits. The parties person or persons required by law to certify to the Secretary of State the names of candidates to be placed on the ballots shall cause to be shown in such certification whether each candidate named therein is of the Caucasian race, Negro race or other specified race, which information shall be obtained from the applications for or notifications or declarations of candidacy or from the certificates of nomination or nomination papers, as the case may be. “C. On the ballots to be used in any state or local primary, general or special election the Secretary of State shall cause to be printed within parentheses () beside the name of each candidate, the race of the candidate, whether Caucasian, Negro, or other specified race, which information shall be obtained from the documents described in Subsection A or B of this Section. The racial designation on the ballots shall be in print of the same size as the print in the names of the candidates on the ballots.” 2 Jurisdiction is properly invoked under 28 U. S. C. A. §§ 1331, 1343(3), and 42 U. S. C. A. §§ 1971(a), 1981, 1983. 15 stipulated that the facts were as stated in plaintiffs’ com plaint ; the case proceeded to argument, and was submitted. At the outset it is important to grasp the fundamental relationships of the parties. Plaintiffs are candidates for office and the rights they advance arise out of that status. Secondly, the statute in question is a state statute and applies to all. While it requires the Negro to have his race disclosed on the ballot, it requires the same of the Cau casian, Mongolian, and so on. The garden variety dis crimination between white and Negro is not involved. Moreover, the state adopts no “sophisticated” method of discrimination that might give us pause.3 The sole question is whether the constitutional rights of a Negro candidate are abridged when his race, like that of all other candidates, is disclosed on the ballot pursuant to state statute. Precisely which constitutional rights plaintiffs advance is somewhat difficult to determine. Certainly the Fifteenth Amendment gives plaintiffs no comfort. While the Four teenth Amendment apparently protects rights broader than those originally conceived by its drafters due to the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses,4 the Fifteenth Amend ment is direct in its protection.5 It is exclusively the right to vote, and nothing more, which, in terms, is protected. Surely the statute must be interpreted in such a way as to protect the fundamental power of the franchise in whatever context a State bent on discrimination seeks to cast it.6 But 3 See Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268, 59 S. Ct. 872, 83 L. Ed. 1281. 4 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 II. S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686, 98 L. Ed. 873; Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497, 74 S. Ct. 693, 98 L. Ed. 884. 5 U. S. Constitution Amend., XV. “Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” 6 Terry v. Adams, 345 U. S. 461, 73 S. Ct. 809, 97 L. Ed. 1152; United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299, 61 S. Ct. 1031, 85 L. Ed. 1368. 16 at no time has the Supreme Court expanded the protection of the amendment beyond the franchise. Even with the recognition that the Fifteenth Amendment created affirma tive rights,7 the court has not gone beyond the protection of the voter per se. Likewise, McDonald v. Key,s which is urged on us as controlling, recognized that the right to vote is not involved in a statute requiring racial designa tions on the ballot. Moreover the facts of the case do not suggest a restriction on voting rights. The unfathomable vagaries of the voter operate just as freely with this statute as without it. This statute merely contributes to a more informed electorate. In any event, plaintiffs do not validly assert a right under the Fifteenth Amendment. [1] There is a creeping tendency, when dealing with problems in the area of the First and Fourteenth Amend ments,9 to outlaw State statutes on the grounds of their lack of rightness or wisdom, while under the misapprehen sion that only their constitutionality is being tested. This the Supreme Court has told us, more than once, we may not do.10 With due respect for our federalism, the court must examine the Constitution and the various lines of 7 Ex parte Yarborough, 110 U. S. 651, 4 S. Ct. 152, 28 L. Ed. 274; Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347, 35 S. Ct. 926, 59 L. Ed. 1340. 8 224 P. 2d 608 (10 Cir. 1955). 9 So that the matter may not confuse the issue let it be noted that the First Amendment is wholly inapplicable to this ease deal ing as it does with the powers of Congress. It is the rights enumerated in the First Amendment which are included within the Fourteenth Amendment upon which plaintiff relies. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 45 S. Ct. 625, 69 L. Ed. 1138. 10 Carpenters and Joiners Union, etc. v. Bitter’s Cafe, 315 U. S. 722, 62 S. Ct. 807, 86 L. Ed. 1143; Giboney v. Empire Storage <& Ice Co., 336 U. S. 490, 69 S. Ct. 684, 93 L. Ed. 834; International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc., Union v. Hanke, 339 U. S. 470, 70 S. Ct. 773, 94 L. Ed. 995; Building Service Employees, etc. v. Gazzam, 339 U. S. 532, 70 S. Ct. 784, 94 L. Ed. 1045. 17 Supreme Court decisions and determine if the State action contravenes the Constitution. The examination must be liberal so as not to exalt form over substance; it must be circumspect so as to accord the states their just powers.11 [2] Plaintiffs’ reliance on the Fourteenth Amendment suggests two lines of Supreme Court cases which might control this action. The first of these is the right to ano nymity defined in N. A. A. C. P. v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449, 78 S. Ct. 1163, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1488. This case, plus Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516, 80 S. Ct. 412, 4 L. Ed. 2d 480, and Talley v. California, 362 TJ. S. 60, 80 S. Ct. 536, 4 L. Ed. 2d 559, expounded the proposition that a person exercis ing freedom of speech or association had a right to ano nymity if disclosure entailed “the likelihood of a substantial restraint upon the exercise * # * of their right to freedom of association.” 12 Justice Black in Talley v. California, supra at 65, 80 S. Ct. at 539, explained that “the reason for these holdings was that identification and fear of reprisal might deter perfectly peaceful discussions of public matters of importance.” It may be assumed, for present purposes, that plaintiffs have a constitutional right to seek office.13 However, no matter what the length and breadth of that right, there is no basis for saying that a candidate for office has a right to anonymity. The Court in N. A. A. C. P. v. Alabama, was of the opinion that the injury to a right subsequent to 11 “To maintain the balance of our federal system, insofar as it is committed to our care, demands at once zealous regard for the guarantees of the Bill of Rights and due recognition of the powers belonging to the states. Such an adjustment requires austere judg ment, and a precise summary of the result may help to avoid misconstruction.” Milk Wagon Drivers, etc. v. Meadowmoor, 312 U. S. 287, 297, 61 S. Ct. 552, 85 L. Ed. 836. 12 N. A. A. C. P. v. Alabama, supra, 357 U. S. at 462, 78 S. Ct. at 1172. 13 See McDonald v. Key, 10 Cir., 224 F. 2d 608. 18 disclosure of identity precludes the right to identification. A political candidate does not lose his right to run for office by disclosure of his race. Further, it is safe to say that his race, like his name and political affiliation which also appear on the ballot,14 will come out in the campaign. This court is not disposed to create a shield against the brightest light of public examination of candidates for public office. The Court in Bates, N. A. A. C. P. v. Alabama, and Talley, recognized that the right to anonymity could be abridged in certain instances. However, in those instances, the State bore the burden of showing an overriding interest in the public sufficient to justify the partial abridgement of the right.15 In the case before us the right of anonymity on the ballot does not exist so far as this court can determine. Thus this court is not put to any balancing since no per sonal interests are placed in the scale opposite the State interest, whatever it may be. We conclude that the Louisiana statute does not violate the Fourteenth Amend ment on that score. The second line of cases which appears applicable are the “state action” cases having their matrix in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, 68 S. Ct. 836, 92 L. Ed. 1161, and Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249, 73 S. Ct. 1031, 97 L. Ed. 1586. It is insufficient to state that these cases are dis tinguishable because state action is clear in this case. These cases must be read for their meaning as well as their facts. The first case is, of course, McDonald v. Key, supra. While it does not fall precisely within the “state action” concept, it is the case closest on its facts and involves the 14 LSA-R. S. 18:671. 16 See also International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc., Union v. Hanke, 339 U. S. 470, 474, 70 S. Ct. 773, 94 L. Ed. 995; Inter national Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc. v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U. S. 284, 77 S. Ct. 1166, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1347. 19 equal protection clause. There the Tenth Circuit found that the requirement that only Negroes have their race desig nated on the ballot violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs attempt to make more of this case than is in it. The Tenth Circuit did not require any intricate theory of constithtional deprivation to strike down the Oklahoma Statute. Negro candidates were treated different from all other candidates without good reason being shown. Given those facts the Court need not have gone further, and it did not. This is not the case before us. Here all candidates must state their race and have it printed on the ballot. Plaintiffs must look further to find unconstitutionality. Plaintiffs would have us find in Shelley v. Kraemer and its progeny some principle which would deter a state from placing racial classifications on the ballot. A brief synopsis of the principle of these cases is in order. The Supreme Court, in the first instance, recognized that discrimination by private individuals was beyond the scope of the Four teenth Amendment under the Civil Rights Cases.16 To this was added the undeniable proposition that discrimination by the states was improper under the Fourteenth Amend ment. Further the Court held that ostensibly private dis crimination which was in fact enforced by the state was discriminatory “state action” under the Fourteenth Amend ment.17 The crucial fact in all these cases, insofar as the instant case is concerned, is that there existed a prior act of actually proven discrimination to which the state was privy. Either the private individual was seeking to exclude Negroes from a neighborhood,18 or denying Negroes the 16109 U. S. 3, 3 S. Ct. 18, 27 L. Ed. 835. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, 13, 68 S. Ct. 836, 92 L. Ed. 1161. 17 Shelley v. Kraemer, supra; Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249, 73 S. Ct. 1031, 97 L. Ed. 1586; Terry v. Adams, 345 U. S. 461, 73 S. Ct. 809, 97 L. Ed. 1152; Burton v. Wilmington Parking Author ity, 365 U. S. 715, 81 S. Ct. 856, 6 L. Ed. 2d 45. 18 Shelley v. Kraemer, supra; Barrows v. Jackson, supra. 20 right to vote,19 or segregating buses,20 train terminals,21 restaurants,22 or golf courses.23 In those cases the state sought either to enforce the discrimination24 or permit it within the public domain.23 Since the Louisiana statute does not discriminate on its face, the Court must ask where the proven discrimination lies. Plaintiffs offer no proof of actual discrimination against them.26 They ask the court to take notice that discrimination among the electorate will somehow occur as a result of this statute.27 Precisely how this discrimination against plaintiffs can be discovered is not made clear, much less how the state controls the dis crimination through this statute. Nothing that we can find in the state action cases suggest that a court may take a state statute, and gaze into the future, seeking some gos samer possibility of discrimination in a group of individuals wholly beyond the control of the state. The discrimination is Terry v. Adams, supra. 20 Boman v. Birmingham Transit Company, 5 Cir., 280 F. 2d 531. 21 Baldwin v. Morgan, 5 Cir., 287 F. 2d 750. 22 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, supra. 23 Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 5 Cir., 304 F. 2d 320. 24 Shelley v. Kraemer, supra; Boman v. Birmingham Transit Co., supra. 25 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, supra. 26 A classification in a statute having some reasonable basis does not offend against the equal protection clause of the Constitution even though in practice results in some inequality. One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary. Morey v. Bond, 354 U. S. 457, 77 S. Ct. 1344, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1485. 27 Plaintiff’s reliance on Hall v. St. Helena Parish School Board, E. D. La., 197 F. Supp. 649, is unavailing since in that case the court was able to determine purpose from concrete results, or at the very least easily predictable consequences. Plaintiffs do not refer this court to any resulting discrimination and do not even hint at predictable results. 21 must be real and the state must effect it. On this record we find a nondiseriminatory statute and nothing more. Judicial notice of a state policy of segregation avails us nothing unless actual discrimination is proven as a result of that policy through the medium of this statute. We have previously found that the state treats all candidates alike. For the foregoing reasons we conclude that the statute is not in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the re quest for preliminary injunction is denied. W isdom, Circuit Judge (dissenting). In the eyes of the Constitution, a man is a man. He is not a white man. He is not an Indian. He is not a Negro. If private persons identify a candidate for public office as a Negro, they have a right to do so. But it is no part of the business of the State to put a racial stamp on the ballot. It is too close to a religious stamp. It has no reasonable relation to the electoral processes. When courts have struck down statutes and ordinances requiring separate seating arrangements in buses, separate restrooms, and separate restaurants in state-owned or operated airports and bus terminals, it was not because the evidence showed that negroes were restricted to uncom fortable seats in buses, dirty restrooms, and poor food. It was because they sat in buses behind a sign marked “col ored”, entered restrooms under the sign “colored”, and could be served food only in restaurants for “colored”. It is the stamp of classification by race that makes the clas sification invidious. On principle, the case before us cannot be distinguished from McDonald v. Key, 10 Cir., 1955, 224 F. 2d 608, cert, den’d, 350 U. S. 895, 76 S. Ct. 153, 100 L. Ed. 787. In that case the court had before it an Oklahoma statute requiring that any “candidate who is other than of the White race, shall have his race designated upon the ballots in paren- 22 thesis after Ms name.” Under the Oklahoma constitution, the phrase “white race” includes not only members of that race, but members of all other races except the Negro race. The court held that this resulted in a denial of equality of treatment with respect to Negroes who run for office. As a practical matter, in Oklahoma the omission of any racial designation on the ballot amounted to the candidate iden tifying himself as a white man just as surely as a negro candidate would identify himself by the word “negro” after his name. The result was essentially the same result in tended to be accomplished by the Louisiana statute. Act 538 of 1960 is somewhat more sophisticated in that there is superficial appearance of equality of treatment. The effect is the same in that candidates are classified by race, and the State is using the elective processes to furnish in formation and stimulus for racial discrimination in the voting booth. The State’s imprimatur on racial distinctions on the ballot is no more valid than the State’s imprimatur on separate voting booths. In Anderson v. Courson, 1962, 203 F. Supp. 806, 813, the District Court for the Middle District of Georgia held that maintenance of racially segregated voting places deprived Negroes of equal protection of the law “in the matter of the exercise of the elective franchise, a function and prerogative of utmost importance in the process of government, and so intrinsically characteristic of the dignity of citizenship”. Considering the extent of media of information today, it is highly unlikely that any voters will be confused by lack of racial identification of candidates on the ballot. Con sidering the number of parishes having a large Negro pop ulation, it is entirely likely that a racial stamp will help as much as it will hinder Negro candidates for public office in Louisiana. The vice in the law is not dependent on in jury to Negroes. The vice in the law is the State’s placing 23 its power and prestige behind a policy of racial classifica tion inconsistent with the elective processes. Justice Harlan put his finger on it many years ago when he said that the “Constitution is color-blind”. If there is one area above all others where the Constitution is color-blind, it is the area of state action with respect to the ballot and the voting booth. I respectfully dissent. 24 U nited S tates D istrict Court F or t h e E astern D istrict oe L ouisiana B aton R ouge D ivision Filed October 3, 1962 Civil Action No. 2623 D u pu y H. A nderson and A cie J. B elton , Complainants, v. W ade 0 . M artin , J r ., Defendant. Order Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file amended or supple mental complaint has been denied. The Court heretofore having fully heard the arguments of counsel and having fully considered the evidence in cluding stipulations of counsel, rendered judgment on June 26, 1962 denying plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary writ of injunction. Its opinion in support of that judgment was rendered on June 29, 1962 and is incorporated herein by reference. The Court being of the opinion that for the rea sons stated in its opinion, plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief sought. I t is ordered t h a t p l a i n t i f f s ’ p r a y e r f o r th e i s s u a n c e o f a p e r m a n e n t i n ju n c t io n b e a n d th e s a m e i s h e r e b y d e n ie d . Dated: Sept. 28,1962. 25 (Signed) E. Gordon W est E. Gordon West United States District Judge (Signed) F rank B. E llis Frank B. Ellis United States District Judge (Signed) J ohn M inor W isdom John Minor Wisdom United States Circuit Judge Dissenting Clerk’s Office A True Copy Oct 5 1962 (Signed) M ary A n n S anford Deputy Clerk, United States District Court Eastern District of Louisiana Baton Rouge, La.