Thornton v. Davis Jurisdictional Statement
Public Court Documents
September 18, 1964
Cite this item
-
Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Thornton v. Davis Jurisdictional Statement, 1964. 6dfe1323-c69a-ee11-be37-00224827e97b. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/1efe23df-a021-4438-abac-81035f3cbe71/thornton-v-davis-jurisdictional-statement. Accessed November 23, 2025.
Copied!
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1965
No.
W il l ia m S. T h ornton , E dward L. S lade, Jr ., Jo h n M.
B rooks, W . F erguson R eid, F r a n k l in J. Gayles,
George A. P a n n ell , T in sley Spraggins, Jo h n T.
D rew , Sr., O th e l N. S parks, E lise F r a n k l in , E lsie
T. R obinson , Richmond Plaintiff-Intervenors,
Appellants,
v.
L evin N ock D avis , A lexander M. H arm on , Jr ., and
R obert C. B ayliss , Secretary and Members, State
Board o f Elections, et al.,
Appellees.
On Appeal From The United States District Court For The
Eastern District Of Virginia
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Sam u el W . T ucker
H enry L. M arsh , III
214 East Clay Street
Richmond, Virginia 23219
Attorneys for Appellants
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Jurisdictional Statem en t ........................................................................ 2
O pin io n Below .............................................................................................. 3
Jurisdiction ........................................................................ 3
T he Statutes I nvolved ............................................................................... 3
T he Q uestions P resented ........................................... 3
Statem en t of th e Case ............................................................................ 4
The Facts ................ - ......................................................................... *5
The Circumstances Surrounding the Adoption of the 1964
Reapportionment Statutes .............. 8
Equally Weighted Votes Was Not the Legislative Concern .... 14
T he Q uestions A re Su b s t a n t ia l ..................................................... 17
Conclusion ......... —................................................................................. —- 23
A ppendix A
Order on Petitions and Complaints of Intervenors from Hen
rico County, City of Richmond and Shenandoah County .... 1
Opinion ................................................................................................ 4
A ppendix B
Order on Mandate......................................................... -.................. 1
Opinion upon Order on M andate................................. ................ 5
A ppendix C
Chapter 1— Acts of the General Assembly of Virginia, Extra
Session 1964............................................ ................ ,.......-.......... 1
Chapter 2— Acts of the General Assembly of Virginia, Extra
Session 1964..................................................................................
A ppendix D
Public Documents Reflecting Virginia’s Official Reaction to
Brown v. Board of Education and Related Fourteenth
Amendment Rights .....................................................................
TABLE OF CITATIONS
Cases
Bradley v. School Board of the City of Richmond (4th Cir. 1963),
317 F. 2d 4 2 9 ......................................................................................
Davis v. Mann (1964), 377 U. S. 678, 12 L. ed. 2d 609, 84 S. Ct.
1441 ........ ...................................................................... 3, 4, 9, 10,
Fortson v. Dorsey (1965), 379 U. S. 433, 13 L. ed. 2d 401, 85 S.
Ct. 498 ..................................................................... 3, 17, 18, 19,
Gomillion v. Lightfoot (1960), 364 U. S. 339, 5 L. ed. 2d 110, 81
S. Ct. 1 2 5 ............................................................................................
Mann v. Davis (1962), 213 F. Supp. 571 .........................................
N AA C P v. Button (1963), 371 U. S. 415, 9 L. ed. 2d 405, 83 S.
Ct. 328 ................................................................................................
Reynolds v. Sims (1964), 377 U. S. 533, 12 L. ed. 2d 506, 84 S.
Ct. 1326 ................................................................................. 3, 18,
Wade v. City of Richmond (1868), 18 Gratt. (59 Va.) 583 .... 19,
Wright v. Rockefeller (1964), 376 U. S. 52, 11 L. ed. 2d 512, 84
S. Ct. 603, reh den 376 U. S. 959, 11 L. ed. 2d 977, 84 S. Ct.
964 ........................................................................................................
5
1
6
13
23
22
4
17
21
20
22
28 U. S. C.
Statutes
Page
§2101 (b ) ...................................................................... - ................ 3
§2281 .................................................................................................. 3
§2284 ................................................................................. -~......... - - 3
42 U. S. C.
§ 1983 ............................................................................... — .............. 3
§ 1988 .................................................................................- - - - - - ...... 3
Va. Const., 1902
§ 41 ....................................................................................................... 20
§ 42 ................................-..................................................................... 20
§ 43 .......................................................................... -................... ....... 20
§ 44 ..................................................................................... .............. 20, 21
Va. Code, 1950
§ 24-12 .............................................................................................. 3, S
§ 24-14 .............................................................................................. 3. 5
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1965
No.
W il liam S. T h ornton , E dward L. Slade, Jr ., Jo h n M. B rooks,
W . F erguson R eid, F r a n k l in J. Gayles, George A. P an n e ll ,
T insley Spraggins, Jo h n T. D rew , Sr ., O th el N. S parks, E lise
F r a n k l in , E lsie T. R obinson , Richmond Plaintiff-lntervenors,
Appellants,
v.
L evin N ock D avis, A lexander M. H arm on , Jr., and R obert C.
Bay liss , Secretary and Members, State Board of Elections;
T hom as R . M iller, Clerk, Hustings Court of the City of Richmond;
W ilm er L. O ’F lah erty , Sue D. B roun and R obert C. C h appell ,
Members, Electoral Board of the City of Richmond;
H elen D. Clevenger, Clerk, Circuit Court of Henrico County;
L inwood E. T oombs, E. R. B oisseau and C. K emper L orraine,
Secretary and Members, Electoral Board of Henrico County;
H arrison M a n n , K a th r y n Stone, Jo h n C. W ebb and Jo h n A. K.
D o navan , Original Plaintiffs;
H. B ruce Green , Clerk, Circuit Court of Arlington County;
D e n m a n T. R ucker, M aynard Carlisle and R alph K im ble ,
Members,, Electoral Board, Arlington County;
T hom as P. C h a p m a n , Jr ., Clerk, Circuit Court of Fairfax County;
P au l K incheloe, E bner L. D u n ca n , Jones Jasper, Members
Electoral Board, Fairfax County;
C harles L. Glanville , W illiam L. S hepheard , P aul, M. L ip k in
and Jack R. W il k in s , Norfolk Plaintiff-lntervenors;
2
W il liam L. P rieur, Jr., Clerk, Corporation Court of the City of
Norfolk; James M. W ilcott, Joseph T. F itzpatrick and James
E. B aylor, Members, Electoral Board, City of Norfolk;
Jesse D. F un kh ou ser , H enry L. H oller, W . H olmes F owle,
W il liam P. L ineburg , J. E ldred S w artz and Cletus R.
L indamood , Shenandoah Plaintiff-Intervenors;
M arvin G. S igler, Clerk, Circuit Court of Shenandoah County;
W arren B. F ren ch , Sr., P au l S hutters and F red H e ish m a n
Members, Electoral Board, Shenandoah County,
Appellees.
S im eon A. B urnette , B. E arl D u n n , E d w in H. R agsdale and
L. R ay S h adw ell , Jr .,
Co-Appellants.
On Appeal From The United States District Court For The
Eastern District O f Virginia
JURISDICTIONAL STATEM ENT
Appellants, William S. Thornton, et al., designated as
the Richmond Plaintiff-Intervenors, appeal from the judg
ment of the three-judge United States District Court for
the Eastern District o f Virginia, entered April 9, 1965,
dismissing the intervening petition and complaint filed by
appellants in the civil action therein pending under the
style, Harrison Mann, et al., v. Levin Nock Davis, et al., to
challenge the constitutionality o f the Virginia Reapportion
ment Acts o f 1964 and submit this statement to show that
the Supreme Court o f the United States has jurisdiction of
the appeal and that a substantial question is presented.
OPINION BELOW
The opinion o f the three-judge District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia is not yet reported. The opinion
and the order thereon are printed as Appendix A hereof.
3
JURISDICTION
This proceeding stems from the intervention by certain
citizens of the City o f Richmond in a suit styled Davis v.
Mann instituted on April 9, 1962, to test the validity of the
statutory apportionment of seats in both houses of the
General Assembly of Virginia. The original action and the
intervening petition and complaint of appellants were
brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (3 ) to assert rights pur
suant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988 and to obtain injunctions
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2284.
The judgment now sought to be reviewed is dated and was
entered on April 9, 1965. No rehearing was requested.
Notice of appeal was filed by the instant appellants on June
7, 1965, in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District o f Virginia.
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to review this
decision by direct appeal is conferred by 28 U.S.C.§§ 1253,
2101 (b ).
The following decisions sustain the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court to review the judgment on direct appeal:
Fortson v. Dorsey (1965), 379 U.S. 433, 13 L. ed 2d 401,
85 S.Ct. 498; Davis v. Mann (1964), 377 U.S. 678, 12 L.
ed 2d 609, 84 S.Ct. 1441; Reynolds v. Sims (1964), 377
U.S. 533, 12 L. ed 2d 506, 84 S.Ct. 1362.
THE STATUTES INVOLVED
The state statutes, the validity of which is involved in
this appeal, are Sections 24-12 and 24-14 of the Code of
Virginia 1950, as amended by the 1964 Extra Session of
the General Assembly of Virginia. They are set out in
Appendix C hereof.
THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Do the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments pro
hibit a state from combining two multi-member legislative
4
districts into one multi-member legislative district in which
the voting strength of a minority racial element o f one of
the former districts will be minimized or canceled out; par
ticularly when no other suggested purpose for such change
is plausible ?
2. Do the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments pro
hibit a state from requiring that all of a city’s legislative
representatives be elected by the voters of the city at large,
when the purpose or effect o f such a requirement is to mini
mize or cancel out the voting strength of a racial minority ?
STATEM ENT OF CASE
This litigation was commenced on April 9, 1962, in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia by certain residents, taxpayers and qualified voters
of Arlington and Fairfax Counties, charging that they were
subjected to invidious discrimination in the apportionment
of seats in the General Assembly o f Virginia as provided by
the 1962 statutes. Residents of the City of Norfolk inter
vened to show that the statutes effected invidious discrimin
ation against that area as well. On November 28, 1962, the
three-judge District Court sustained the plaintiffs’ claims.
Mann v. Davis, 213 F. Supp. 577. On appeal by the state
officials, the judgment of the District Court was affirmed.
Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964).
By its September 18, 1964 order, on the mandate, the
District Court further stayed the enforcement of its Novem
ber 28, 1962 order to permit the General Assembly to enact
constitutionally valid reapportionment statutes for both
houses and provided that if such reapportionment legislation
as might be enacted failed to meet the requirements of the
Constitution, then the plaintiffs, the plaintiff-intervenors
and any party granted leave to intervene may apply to the
court for such further orders as may be required.
5
The General Assembly of Virginia, by acts approved
December 2, 1964, amended §§ 24-12 and 24-14 o f the
Code of Virginia. The effect o f the amendment o f § 24-12,
as far as is material to this appeal, was to allot eight dele
gates to the 36th House o f Delegates District consisting of
the City of Richmond and the County o f Henrico which,
prior to 1962, had been entirely separate districts.
The effect o f the amendment of § 24-14, as far as is
material to this appeal, was to allot two senators to the 30th
Senatorial District consisting of the entire City of Rich
mond.
Certain residents, taxpayers and voters o f the County
of Henrico (Simeon A. Burnett and others), designated as
Henrico Plaintiff-Intervenors, filed their intervening peti
tion asserting that, insofar as the amendment to § 24-12
combines the County of Henrico with the more populous
City of Richmond for representation in the House of Dele
gates, the statute effects an invidious discrimination against
voters of Henrico County who are entitled to be represented
by three delegates elected by the voters of the county at
large.
Certain residents, taxpaj^ers and voters o f the City of
Richmond all of whom are Negroes ( William S. Thornton
and others, sometimes referred to as Richmond Plaintiff-
Intervenors), filed their petition asserting that both sta
tutes as amended violate their rights under the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments inasmuch as the at-large elec
tion arrangements serve to dilute the effectiveness of those
Negro voters who, by reason of the segregated residential
pattern, inhabit certain sections o f Richmond in such num
bers that they would be in predominantly Negro districts
if Richmond were divided into single-member districts.
Further, the Richmond Plaintiff-Intervenors contend that
the purpose and effect of the combination of Richmond
6
and Henrico was and is to diminish and cancel out the rela
tive strength of the Negro vote in Richmond. The District
Court rejected the contentions o f both sets of intervenors.
THE FACTS
In 1934, approximately one-fourth of the Negroes in
the City of Richmond resided in “ East-End” and approxi
mately one-half o f Richmond’s Negroes resided in the
downtown or “ Central” area o f the city. The Master Plan
for the Physical Development of the City o f Richmond as
adopted by that city’s governing body in or subsequent to
1945 suggested that low rental housing be located in vacant
areas in sections of the city removed from the then existing
downtown slums; and that those slums could be replaced
by “ downtown apartments for white collar workers and
other income groups or for some industrial or public pur
pose” (R. pp. 74-75). Accordingly, the Council caused four
o f the five public housing projects now occupied by Negroes
to be located in Richmond’s “ East End” (R . p. 75).
The continued efforts o f the city’s school board to retain
racial segregation in the public schools accommodated and
contributed to the racially segregated residential pattern.
It is stipulated that until March of 1963, when it adopted
a “ Freedom of Choice” policy with respect to racial segre
gation in public education, the school board attempted to
meet the problem of overcrowding in Negro schools by
building new schools in Negro neighborhoods, making addi
tions to existing Negro schools and converting white schools
to Negro schools (R. p. 73). An illustrative occurrence is
related in Bradley v. School Board of the City of Richmond,
Virginia, 317 F. 2d 429 (4th Cir. 1963), viz: “ At a special
meeting held on September 15, 1958 (approximately two
weeks after the beginning of the school term), the School
Board voted to request the Pupil Placement Board to trans
7
fer the pupils then attending the Nathaniel Bacon School
(white) to the East End Junior High School (white), and
that a sufficient number o f pupils be transferred from the
George Mason (N egro) and Chimborazo (N egro) schools
to the Nathaniel Bacon building to utilize its capacity, thus
converting Nathaniel Bacon to a Negro School.”
Public authority accomplished its expressed purpose of
“ siphoning” Negroes from the older slum areas in the
central part of the city (R . p. 75) by developing a concen
tration of Negroes in Richmond’s East End. The 1960
Census shows that o f 92,331 non-white persons residing in
the City of Richmond, 41,899 or 45.4% lived in the East
End; 31,910 or 34.5% in Central; 10,062 or 10.9% in
Northside; 7,850 or 8.5% in Southside and 610 or 0.7% in
West End (Richmond Exhibit 10).
Substantial equality of population in these five major divi
sions of the city might be achieved by extending “ West
End” eastwardly into “ Central” and by extending “ North-
side” southwardly into “ Central” (Richmond, Exhibits 10,
15). These adjustments would leave “ East End” with a pop
ulation larger than either of the other four units— a fact
which does not detract from the force of the arguments here
advanced. So distributed, Negroes (comprising 42% of
Richmond’s total population) would constitute 88.6% of
East End’s total population of 47,275; 54.9% of Central’s
total population of 44,503; 40.8% of Northside’s total popu
lation of 44,350; 20.4% of Southside’s total population of
38,453; and 0.01% of West End’s total population, of 45,-
377 (Richmond Exhibit 15). It is impossible to divide
Richmond into five House of Delegates Districts o f sub
stantially equal population without creating one or more
districts in which Negroes will predominate (Gayles, Dep.
58). Any logical division of Richmond into two senatorial
districts o f substantially equal population is likely to create
8
one in which Negroes will predominate (Gayles, Dep. 43-
54). Only 5% of Henrico’s population of 117,339 is non
white.
As will be next seen, the General Assembly was aware of
the concentration o f Negroes in the City o f Richmond when
it convened in Extra Session to effect a legislative redistrict
ing in accordance with the directives of the Court.
The Circumstances Surrounding
The Adoption of the 1964 Reapportionment Statutes
The Committee on Privileges and Elections o f the House
of Delegates had conferred prior to the convening- o f the
General Assembly on November 30, 1964. Its report to the
House of Delegates recommended 2 delegates for Henrico
County separately and 6 Delegates for Richmond City and
Henrico County together (Henrico Exhibit 7, R. 441,
443). The Committee had before it the report, dated No
vember 15, 1961, of the Commission on Redistricting ap
pointed by the Governor in January o f 1961, which recom
mended 3 delegates for Henrico County and 6 delegates for
Richmond City (Henrico Exhibit 6, R. 415, 427). That
Commission had requested the Bureau o f Public Adminis
tration, University of Virginia, to analyze the problems and
make recommendations. Its report to the Commission of
July 17, 1961, presented Plan A which provided 3 delegates
for Henrico and 6 delegates for Richmond City (Henrico
Exhibit 5, R. 403, 406).
The recommendation of the House Committee on Privi
leges and Elections was not unanimous. One of its members
who had been chairman of the Governor’s Commission on
Redistricting filed a written dissent in favor of the recom
mendations of his Commission (Henrico Exhibit 7, R.
458). In so doing he said:
9
“ In the extensive deliberations of the Committee, I
consistently observed and commented on the obvious
efforts o f a majority o f the Committee to shield and
protect numerous members of the House whose seats
were in jeopardy.”
The recommendation o f the House Committee on Privi
leges and Elections was embodied in House Bill No. 1
and presented to the House o f Delegates by its sponsors,
one o f whom was a Richmond City resident and member
of the joint delegation representing Richmond City and in
part Henrico County in the House o f Delegates under the
1962 apportionment statute declared unconstitutional by
this Court in Davis v. Mann, supra. House Bill No. 1
created a 36th District composed o f Henrico County alone,
having 2 delegates, and a 56th District composed o f Rich
mond City and Henrico County o f 6 delegates (Henrico
Exhibit 8, R. 461,462,463).
The General Assembly also had before it a resolution of
the Board of Supervisors of Henrico County, unanimously
adopted October 28, 1964 (Henrico Exhibit 9, R. 464;
Burnette Dep., R. 338) and a resolution o f the Council of
the City of Richmond, unanimously adopted November 30,
1964 (Henrico Exhibit 10, R. 466; Crowe Dep., R. 232),
both of which strongly urged separate representation for
the city and county. It was also advised that merger of
Richmond City and Henrico County had been defeated by
a Henrico County vote of 13,647 to 8,862 on December 12,
1961, while voters in Richmond City favored the merger
by 15,050 to 6,698 (Henrico Exhibit 20, R. 507).
The House Committee on Privileges and Elections held a
public hearing on House Bill No. 1 at which the Mayor
o f Richmond City, the Chairman of the Legislative Com
mittee of the Richmond City Council and the Chairman o f
10
the Board o f Supervisors of Henrico County each spoke
for separate and independent representation in the House of
Delegates and recognized necessary conflicts in the joint
representation of the two independent political subdivisions
(Crowe Dep., R. 232, 235; Wheat Dep., R. 331, 334;
Burnette Dep., R. 339-340).
Richmond City and Henrico County were represented in
the 1964 Extra Session of the General Assembly under the
1962 reapportionment statute declared unconstitutional by
this Court in Davis v. Mann, supra. Under that statute
Henrico County had one independent delegate and Rich
mond City and Henrico had eight delegates jointly (Henrico
Exhibit 36A, R. 638). O f those eight, five Democrats and
two Republicans lived in the City of Richmond, and one
Democrat resided in Henrico County (Pollard Dep., R. 228;
Sutton Dep., R. 116; Bradshaw Dep., R. 285; Herrink
Dep., R. 354-355; Andrews Dep., R. 94-97).
House Bill No. 1 was recommitted to the House Commit
tee on Privileges and Elections on November 30, 1964
(Henrico Exhibit 12, R. 470). On December 1, 1964, the
Committee reported the bill with amendments that elimi
nated altogether any independent delegate for Henrico and
consolidated Richmond City and Henrico County into a
single House district to be represented by eight delegates
elected at large (Henrico Exhibit 12, R. 472). The Com
mittee amendments were proposed by Delegate Andrews,
a resident of Richmond City, after consulting the other
members o f the Richmond-Henrico delegation who were
also residents o f Richmond, but without consulting those
residing in Henrico County (Andrews Dep., R. 80-82).
The Committee amendments were adopted and floor amend
ments offered by the two delegates residing in Henrico
County to restore separate representation were defeated.
The bill with the Committee amendments passed by a vote
11
of 74 to 22. The five Democratic delegates resident in Rich
mond City voted for the bill and the two Republican dele
gates from Richmond City and the two delegates resident in
Henrico County voted against it (Henrico Exhibits 12, R.
474; 13, R. 478).
All of the delegates representing Richmond City and
Henrico County were keenly aware o f the great upsurge
in voter registration during 1964, particularly in Richmond
City during October of 1964, and o f the increasing Negro
vote in Richmond City (Pollard Dep., R. 254; Dervishian
Dep., R. 189, 201). The growing Republican vote in Hen
rico and Chesterfield Counties had also been noted (Pollard
Dep., R. 254). Peculiar interest had been shown by the dele
gates in analyzing the trends indicated by the Congressional
elections o f 1962 and 1964 for the Third District, consisting
of Richmond City and Henrico County as well as Chester
field County and Colonial Heights.
The reasons expressed by some of the five Democratic
incumbents resident in Richmond City for insisting upon the
consolidation o f the two political subdivisions into one dis
trict were summarized as follows:
“ I think that the expressed opinions involved the re
tention in the members of the House of persons of
conservative political philosophy and also concern about
racial relations would be the principal reasons that
have been discussed.” (Sutton Dep., R. 130).
The same delegate testified further, as follows:
“ Q. Picking up right here, Mr. Sutton, getting a
little more specific about the concern for race relations,
was there not some discussion(s) as to whether a
Negro might be elected into the General Assembly
from the Richmond area?
12
“A. That has been discussed.
“ Q. Was it not pointed out in this discussion that
the combination of Richmond and Henrico would tend
to prevent or lessen the chance of a Negro being elected
to the General Assembly, in view of the growing vote
in Richmond?
“ A. That has been discussed.
“ Q. And this was discussed by members of the
present legislature from the Richmond area, the Dem
ocratic members?
“ A. That is correct.” (Sutton Dep., R. 131).
Such discussions were confirmed by other Delegates
(Dervishian Dep., R. 198-200; Herrink Dep., R. 189-191).
The Richmond City member of the Committee on Privileges
and Elections agreed that annexation was not the only
reason for the consolidation (Andrews Dep., R. 91-92).
Another delegate testified that annexation was the only
reason “ argued before the Committee or on the floor o f the
House” (Pollard Dep., R. 245).
The statutes which were enacted combined for the first
time in the history o f the Commonwealth two separate and
independent political subdivisions each of which was entitled
to more than one representative in the House of Delegates
according to the population ratio per delegate then prevailing
under the latest decennial census. It consolidated into a sin
gle multi-member district Richmond City, having a 1960
population o f 219,958 and 67,003 registered voters, and
Henrico County, having a 1960 population o f 117,339 and
34,220 registered voters (Henrico Exhibits 1, R. 375 ; 2, R.
380, 383; 21A, R. 511-513; 22A, R. 517). It awarded the
single district eight delegates to be elected at large by
the voters o f both Richmond City and Henrico County.
13
The excuse publicly assigned for this novel departure
from tradition was the pendency during the special session
o f an annexation proceeding brought by the City of Rich
mond against Henrico County in which the annexation
court had by its written opinion o f April 27, 1964 (Defend
ants’ Exhibit 4, R. 668), and its interlocutory order of
July 31, 1964 (Defendants’ Exhibit 3, R. 663), awarded the
city 17 square miles o f Henrico territory containing ap
proximately 45,000 residents. Only the financial adjust
ments remained for decision. That award was subsequently
refused (R . 698; Crowe Dep., R. 233-234; Wheat Dep., R.
334-335).
Annexation was not the basic motivating cause.1 The
Richmond City member of the Committee on Privileges
and Elections conceded that an allotment of two delegates
to Henrico County, five delegates to Richmond City and
one floater delegate for the county and city together would
have solved all o f the problems claimed to have been
presented by the pending annexation suit (Andrews Dep.,
R. 105-106). Such an amendment was offered in the Senate
and was defeated (Henrico Exhibit 14, R. 479, 480). This
Court has recognized that such was the traditional use in
Virginia o f the “ floterial district” . Davis v. Mann, supra,
footnote 2. (See also Bradshaw Dep., R. 295).
The real reason for combining the city and county into
a single House district was the grave concern of the
Democratic members o f the House o f Delegates resident in
Richmond City over the upsurge in voter registrations
during 1964 (particularly in Richmond City during Octo
ber, 1964), the growing Republican vote in Henrico County,
1 The District Court made no finding on this point, notwithstanding
the fact that the pendency of the annexation proceeding was the only
reason the state authorities suggested for the combination of the two
independent political subdivisions.
14
that a Negro might be elected to the General Assembly from
the Richmond area in view of the increasing voting strength
of Negroes in concentrated areas of the City, and race
relations in general. Retention in the House o f Delegates
o f members from the Richmond area of conservative
political philosophy was the objective that the scheme to
consolidate Richmond City and Henrico County into a
single multi-member district was designed to accomplish.
Such a purpose the evidence plainly establishes.
Never before, so far as is known, in the history of the
Commonwealth have two separate and independent political
subdivisions, each entitled separately and independently
to more than one delegate in the House o f Delegates accord
ing to the population ratio per delegate then existing, been
combined and consolidated into a single district and awarded
delegates jointly to be elected at large by the voters of both
separate and independent political subdivisions. (See Hen
rico Exhibits 23A through 37D, R. 520-655). The chief
objection voiced by one Richmond City Councilman was
that “ it was the only city that would not have had any
individual representation, separate representation” (Wheat
D'ep., R. 334).
Equally Weighted Votes Was Not The Legislative Concern
The District Court considered as controlling the facts
next quoted from its opinion. “ Ideal representation in the
House of Delegates, when Virginia’s total population ac
cording to the 1960 census is distributed among its 100
delegates, is 39,669 persons for each member. * * * Rich
mond alone could justify 5 delegates with 21,613 towards
a sixth. T o have awarded only 5 delegates to Richmond
would have meant that each of its delegates represented
43,911, or 4,242 persons in excess of the norm.” (App. A.
15
p. 6.) However, o f Virginia’s 50 districts which are not
affected by floterial representation, 12 have populations in
excess o f 43,911 per delegate, v iz :
2nd Accomack, Northampton— 1 delegate—47,601 per dele
gate
6th Alleghany, Botetourt, Covington, Clifton Forge— 1
delegate— 45,173 per delegate
16th Russell, Dickenson— 1 delegate— 46,501 per delegate
24th Clarke, Frederick, Winchester— 1 delegate— 44,993
per delegate
26th Hampton— 2 delegates— 44,629 per delegate
28th Fauquier, Warren, Rappahannock— 1 delegate-—44,-
089 per delegate
32nd Carroll, Grayson, Galax— 1 delegate—-45,822 per dele
gate
38th Isle o f Wight, Southampton, Franklin— 1 delegate—
44,359 per delegate
47th Nansemond, Suffolk—-1 delegate—43,975 per delegate
61st Spotsylvania, Stafford, Fredericksburg— 1 delegate—
44,334 per delegate
62nd Tazewell— 1 delegate— 44,791 per delegate
50th-59th Page, Rockingham, Shenandoah, Harrisonburg
— 2 delegates— 44,899 per delegate
(Henrico Exh. 2).
It can hardly be supposed that the Legislature was so
much concerned for mathematical precision with respect
to the City of Richmond when it showed so little concern for
such precision in so many other places.
16
The General Assembly was aware o f the increasing
efforts o f Negroes in Richmond to make effective political
expression. On at least seven occasions between 1947 and
1961 some Negro citizen has sought the Democratic nomi
nation (tantamount to election) for one of Richmond’s seats
in the House of Delegates.2 In 1959, the Negro candidate,
bidding with eight others for one of the seven seats, re
ceived 10,975 votes; but the successful aspirants received
votes ranging from 12,723 to 14,000 (R . p. 71).
In 1964, there were approximately 18,355 Negroes quali
fied to vote in non-federal elections in Richmond City, ap
proximately 52,179 white persons qualified to vote in non-
federal elections in Richmond City (Henrico Exh. 21B),
and approximately 933 Negro and 40,660 white persons so
qualified in Henrico County (Henrico Exh. 22B).
Negroes in Richmond and elsewhere in Virginia have
the most compelling reasons for seeking a change from the
“ conservative” Democratic forces which control Virginia’s
government. The statutes of Virginia, past and present, are
replete with evidence of the age-old preoccupation o f the
General Assembly with establishing and preserving racial
segregation and discrimination as a cherished way of life.3
The dissatisfaction of Richmond’s Negroes with these facets
o f their environment was expressed on November 4, 1964,
when the city’s ten largest Negro precincts cast 14,111 votes
for President Johnson as against 115 for Senator Gold-
water, thus helping to put Richmond in the Democratic
column by a count of 35,662 over 27,196 (Richmond Exh.
2 In the July 13, 1965, Democratic Primary, two Negroes and ten
whites competed for the eight Richmond-Henrico seats. The high
est number of votes for any candidate was 22,610. The eighth highest
number was 14,588. In ninth place was Wm. Ferguson Reid, a Negro,
who received 14,556 votes. ( Richmond Nezvs-Leader, July 14, 1965,
p. 8.)
3 See Appendix D.
17
3). This Court, in N AACP v. Button (1963) 371 U.S.
415, 435 noted: “ W e cannot close our eyes to the fact that
the militant Negro civil rights movement has engendered
the intense resentment and opposition of the politically dom
inant white community of Virginia.”
Six o f the seven delegates and one of the two senators
who live in Richmond reside in “ West End” (Andrews,
Dep., 31, 33; Dervishian, Dep. 106-108) which is probably
the most affluent area in the city (Andrews, Dep. 29, 33).
The other delegate and the other senator live in “ Northside”
(Andrews, Dep. 31, 33). None of the incumbent legislators,
by reason of residence, economic interests or political out
look (especially with respect to race relations), can be said
to reflect the thinking of any considerable number o f resi
dents o f “ East End.”
THE QUESTIONS ARE SUBSTANTIAL
I.
The District Court, citing Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S.
433 (1965), held that the possibility (indeed the certainty)
that all of the delegates may be chosen from one part rather
than from all parts of a multi-member district “ exposes no
defect” in the apportionment scheme, even where the sub
stitution of single-member districts would necessarily
create some constituencies in which persons o f racial or
political minorities would predominate (App. A. pp. 7-9).
In Fortson, the Court made clear its reservation of opinion
whether under the circumstances of a particular case a
multi-member constituency scheme would unconstitutionally
operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength o f
racial or political elements of the voting population. That
question, unanswered in Fortson, is the exact question pre
sented by the facts in the instant case. Georgia’s 1962
18
Senatorial Reapportionment Act, reviewed in Fortson, re
quired that “ [e]ach Senator must be a resident of his own
Senatorial District” ; but it also provided that “ the Senators
from those Senatorial Districts consisting of less than one
county shall be elected by all o f the voters o f the county in
which such Senatorial District is located.” In considering
this latter proviso, the Court had no occasion to suggest that
all delegates o f a multi-member district might be validly
chosen from one part o f the district. I f such suggestion can
be found in the Fortson opinion, it lies in the quotation from
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), to which we now
turn.
II.
As the Court began Section V of its opinion in Reynolds,
it noted that it had said all that was necessary to its decision
of the issues then before it. However, to illustrate the propo
sitions that identity in the composition or complexion o f
the two bodies of a bicameral legislature need not follow
from the fact that one criterion controlled the apportionment
o f representation in both houses, the Court did suggest that
“ One body could be composed of single-member dis
tricts while the other could have at least some multi
member districts.” (377 U.S. at 577.)
But, in Section V I of the Reynolds opinion, the Court stated
a more pervasive guide which, for the instant case at least,
overshadows all else which has been written on the subject:
“ What is marginally permissible in one State may be
unsatisfactory in another, depending on the particular
circumstances o f the case.” (377 U.S. at 578.)
Our attention is thus deflected from consideration of the
abstract question whether all the delegates may be chosen
19
from one part of 'a multi-member district to the really per
tinent questions in this case, v iz :
May the Commonwealth of Virginia, where racial dis
crimination under color o f law yet prevails, arbitrarily com
bine two multi-member districts when such results in mini
mizing or cancelling out the voting effectiveness of Negroes
in the City of Richmond ?
May the Commonwealth of Virginia, where racial dis
crimination under color of law yet prevails, arbitrarily re
tain multi-member legislative districting for the City of
Richmond, when single-member districting would neces
sarily produce a predominantly Negro district?
III.
Virginia could have divided Richmond into single-member
districts for both houses of the legislature and thus afforded
every voter in each of such districts an opportunity (equal
to that enjoyed by voters in the forty-six single-member
House of Delegates Districts and the twenty-eight single
member Senatorial Districts) to cast his ballot for that one
o f his neighbors and acquaintances who, in the voter’s per
sonal opinion uninfluenced by city-wide political machina
tions, would best represent him. Such a course would have
comported with the Federal constitutional concept of Equal
Protection in the sense indicated by Mr. Justice Douglas,
dissenting in Fortson v. Dorsey, supra, v iz :
“ But to allow some candidates to be chosen by the elec
tors in their districts and others to be defeated by the
voters of foreign districts is in my view an ‘invidious
discrimination’— the test o f equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment” .
Such a course, and only such a course, would have complied
with the view of Virginia’s highest court in Wade v. City of
20
Richmond, 18 Gratt. (59 V a.) 583 (1868) that the appor
tionment of representation in the General Assembly among
the counties, cities and towns, which the Constitution of
1851 effected, was in all reality but a means of reflecting
representation o f “ persons and property comprised in these
local departments.” Such a course, and only such a course,
would have complied with the letter o f the Constitution of
Virginia (1902), as amended, viz [emphasis supplied]:
“ § 41. Number and election o f senators.— The
Senate shall consist o f not more than forty and not
less than thirty-three members, who shall be elected
quadrennially by the voters of the several senatorial
districts on the Tuesday succeeding the first Monday
in November.
“ § 42. Number and election of delegates.— The
House of Delegates shall consist o f not more than one
hundred and not less than ninety members, who shall
be elected biennially by the voters of the several house
districts, on the Tuesday succeeding the first Monday
in November.
“ § 43. Apportionment of Commonwealth into sena
torial and house districts.— The present apportionment
of the Commonwealth into senatorial and house dis
tricts shall continue; but a reapportionment shall be
made in the year nineteen hundred and thirty-two and
every ten years thereafter.
“ § 44. Qualifications of senators and delegates; who
ineligible; removal from district vacates office.— Any
person may be elected senator who, at the time o f elec
tion, is actually a resident of the senatorial district and
qualified to vote for members of the General Assembly;
and any person may be elected a member o f the House
of Delegates who, at the time of election, is actually a
resident of the house district and qualified to vote for
members o f the General Assembly. * * * The removal
21
of a senator or delegate from the district for which he
is elected shall vacate his office ”
The creation of multi-member districts for either house is
patently a legislative subversion of the above quoted pro
visions o f the State Constitution. In Reynolds v. Sims,
supra, the Court observed:
“ In those States where the alleged malapportionment
has resulted from noncompliance with state constitu
tional provisions which, if complied with, would result
in an apportionment valid under the Equal Protection
Clause, the judicial task of providing effective relief
would appear to be rather simple.” (377 U.S. at 584.)
By its mere failure to provide single-member districts for
the City of Richmond, the State made it reasonably certain
that the votes o f the citizens o f an identifiable predominantly
Negro constituency would be absorbed into the larger and
predominantly white community and thereby be rendered as
ineffective as if they had not been cast. The 10,975 votes cast
for the Negro candidate in the 1959 Democratic Primary
were simply submerged by the votes cas«£by the majority of
the city’s electorate for the slate o f candidates which had the
most influential endorsement. With single-member district
ing, some o f those 10,975 votes would have been effective.
Not only did the Legislature fail to adopt the course pre
scribed by the State’s Constitution which would have ren
dered meaningful and effective the elective franchise of
Richmond’s Negro citizens; the Legislature further widened
the gap between the text and the application of the Consti
tution by enlarging the district for the purpose o f further
diluting or submerging the votes of Richmond’s Negro cit
izens. What had, or would have been, a 42% potential vot
ing effectiveness of Richmond’s Negroes in electing five
22
delegates to the General Assembly was reduced to a 29.2%
potential voting effectiveness in electing eight delegates to
the General Assembly.
That such a merger, in Virginia, was an abridgment of
the right to vote because of race and color in violation o f the
Fifteenth Amendment appears to be clear. Just as Go-million
v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (I960), struck down Alabama’s
attempt to nullify Negroes’ political effectiveness by zoning
them out o f the City o f Tuskegee, so should fall Virginia’s
patent attempt to nullify the political effectiveness of Rich
mond’s Negro citizens by zoning them into a larger district
in which their number will be overwhelmed. As in Gomillion
is suggested, judicial approval o f this manuever “ would sanc
tion the achievement by a State o f any impairment o f voting
rights whatever so long as it was cloaked in the garb o f the
realignment of political subdivisions” or legislative appor
tionment (364 U.S. at 345).
“ ‘The [Fifteenth] Amendment nullifies sophisticated
as well as simple-minded modes of discrimination.’ ”
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, supra.
These appellants have not contended and do not contend
that any state is required to carve out legislative districts
so as to insure (or make possible) representation by persons
o f any particular race, religion or place of national origin.
W e are in agreement with so much of Mr. Justice Douglas’
dissent in Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 62, 66
(1964), as is quoted in the opinion of the Court below.
Specifically, we agree that “ government has no business
designing electoral districts along racial or religious lines.”
What is here contended is that government should not com
bine electoral districts to deny effective political expression
from those who are confined within racial or political lines.
23
As this Court has noted in Forison v. Dorsey, supra,
the precise questions here presented have not been settled.
Unquestionably, the resolution of these issues will have
far reaching effect upon the meaningfulness of the franchise
to Negro people in their quest for their rightful share of
the opportunities which are America’s promise to all. The
past and current efforts o f the legislative and executive arms
of our national government to enforce the Fifteenth Amend
ment will amount to naught if a state may meet and over
come the increasing political strength of Negroes in any
given area by expanding the political constituency from time
to time so as to submerge their votes in the votes of the
larger white community.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the questions here pre
sented are substantial and important and that they should be
considered and decided by this Court.
Richmond, Virginia
August 6, 1965
Sam u el W . T ucker
H enry L. M arsh , III
214 East Clay Street
Richmond, Virginia 23219
Attorneys for Appellants
APPENDIX A
1
U N ITED STA TE S D ISTR IC T COU RT FOR TH E
EA STE RN D ISTR IC T OF V IR G IN IA
At Alexandria
Civil Action No. 2604
Harrison Mann, et al.
v.
Levin Nock Davis, et al.
ORDER ON PETITIONS AND COMPLAINTS OF INTER-
VENORS FROM HENRICO COUNTY, CITY OF RICHMOND
AND SHENANDOAH COUNTY
Upon consideration of the intervening petition and com
plaint o f Simeon A. Burnette, et al., designated as the
Henrico County intervenors, the intervening petition and
complaint o f William S. Thornton, et al., designated as the
City of Richmond intervenors, and the intervening petition
and complaint o f Jesse D. Funkhouser, et al., designated as
the Shenandoah County intervenors, the answers thereto,
the evidence adduced thereon, as well as the arguments of
counsel, on brief and orally, the court for the reasons stated
in its opinion this day filed, which is adopted as its findings
o f fact and conclusions of law, orders as follows: 1
1. That the petitions and complaints o f the Henrico
County and the City of Richmond intervenors be, and they
are hereby, dismissed, the respondents thereto recovering
their costs o f the said intervenors;
2
2. That the petition and complaint o f the Shenandoah
County intervenors be, and they are hereby, sustained in
respect to the apportionment o f representation o f that
county in the House of Delegates;
3. That the State and local election officials who are de
fendants to the said intervening petition and complaint of
Shenandoah County be, and each of them is hereby, enjoined
and restrained from acting under and pursuant to so much
o f Chapter 2 o f the Acts o f the General Assembly o f V ir
ginia, Extra Session 1964, as declares the representation
in the House o f Delegates for the 50th and 59th districts;
that the court now reapportions the said districts so that
the counties o f Page, Rockingham and Shenandoah and
the City of Harrisonburg shall be represented jointly by two
delegates; that the reapportionment of the 50th and 59th
districts o f Virginia as aforesaid shall be effective for the
elections, both primary and general, o f members of the
House o f Delegates from the counties o f Page, Rocking
ham and Shenandoah and the City of Harrisonburg in the
year 1965 and thereafter until the General Assembly of
Virginia shall provide a Constitutionally valid apportion
ment of representation in the House o f Delegates for
Shenandoah County; and 4
4. That the court hereby approves the reapportionment
Acts o f the General Assembly of Virginia adopted at its
Extra Session in December 1964, insofar as such approval
may be required to remove any question or doubt o f the
3
validity of any legislation which has been, or may be, passed
by the General Assembly since the adoption of the said re
apportionment Acts.
Nothing further remaining to be done in this action, it
is ordered stricken from the docket, and this order is final.
A lbert V. B ryan
United States Circuit Judge
W alter E. H offm an
United States District Judge
O ren R. L ew is
United States District Judge
April 9th, 1965.
4
U N ITE D STA TE S D ISTR IC T COU RT FO R T H E
E A STE R N D ISTR IC T OF V IR G IN IA
At Alexandria
Civil Action No. 2604
Harrison Mann, et al.
v.
Levin Nock Davis, et al.
(Argued March 10, 1965 Decided April 9, 1965)
Before B ryan , Circuit Judge, and L ew is and H offm an ,
District Judges.
OPINION
A lbert V. B r ya n , Circuit Judge:
Virginia’s 1964 reapportionment of the State into dis
tricts for the election of delegates and senators in her
General Assembly, following our invalidation of the 1962
5
redistricting,1 is here attacked as denying Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection of the laws. The assault is made
in three separate intervening petitions in the original action,
each dealing with a local problem, by certain citizens of
Henrico County, the City of Richmond and Shenandoah
County. W e think only Shenandoah can prevail.
Henrico County
The grievance asserted by these intervenors is that
Henrico County and Richmond were placed in a single dis
trict, No. 36, for representation in the House of Delegates,
rather than each made an independent district. Combined,
these two political subdivisions were given 8 delegates, but
Henrico pleads for 3 delegates o f its own, leaving the re
maining 5 to Richmond. The injury from the consolidation,
according to the county, is that as Richmond has a voting
power greater than Henrico, the city will be able to elect
all 8 delegates and Henrico will have no representation by
its own citizens.
This result, says Henrico, is due to a general disregard by
the General Assembly of the guide lines and ground rules
thus far enunciated for legislative apportionment by the
Supreme Court. E.g. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) ;
1 Mann v. Davis, 213 F.Supp 577 (1962), affirmed sub. nom. Davis v. Mann,
377 U.S. 678 (1964). By order entered September 18, 1964 this court restored
its injunction which had been suspended during the appeal. Thereupon the
Legislature adopted a new apportionment in December 1964. The statute re
lating to the State Senate appears as Chapter 1, and the enactment relating to
the House of Delegates as Chapter 2, of the Acts of Assembly, Extra Ses
sion 1964.
6
Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963 ); Westberry v.
Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964 ); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533 (1964 ); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633
(1964); Maryland Committee v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656
(1964 ); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964) ; Roman v.
Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964) ; Lucas v. Colorado General
Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964 ); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379
U.S. 433 (1965). Our examination o f the record discloses
no such trespasses or fouls. To demonstrate the correctness
o f this conclusion, we review the 1964 reapportionment (the
A ct), touching particularly upon the features on which
Henrico found its accusations.
Ideal representation in the House of Delegates, when
Virginia’s total population according to the 1960 census is
distributed among its 100 delegates, is 39,669 persons for
each member. Richmond had a population of 219,958,
Henrico 117,339. Applying these figures, it appears that
Henrico would be entitled to 2 delegates and wanting but
3,668 residents for a third. Richmond alone could justify 5
delegates, with 21,613 towards a sixth. To have awarded
only 5 delegates to Richmond would have meant that each
o f its delegates represented 43,911, or 4,242 persons in ex
cess of the norm. With Henrico* not quite earning 3 dele
gates, but Richmond due more than 5, the solution of the
Virginia Assembly was to give the two areas 8 delegates
jointly. There would then be 42,164 persons per delegate,
a representation fairly nearing the par of 39,669.
A multi-member district, though linking more than one
political subdivision, is not Constitutionally impermissible.
7
Fortson v. Dorsey, supra, 379 U.S. 433 (1965). A multi
county or a county-city district is also legal. Id. But the
possibility that a delegate or delegates may be chosen from
one part o f a district— whether a multi-county or a county-
city district— rather than from another exposes no defect
in the allotment. Id. In passing, it is at least noteworthy
that Henrico made no objection in 1962 when the reappor
tionment act gave Henrico 1 delegate and then assigned 8
delegates jointly to Richmond and Henrico. While this dis
tribution was in effect in 1963, we are told that a number
o f the 8 winning candidates, although resident in Richmond,
received more votes in Henrico than did the candidates
from that county. This would seem to refute somewhat
Henrico’s insistence that its citizens prefer to have their
delegates come from Henrico.
The multi-member policy here does not have the “ un
desirable features” mooted in Lucas v. Colorado General
Assembly, supra, 377 U.S. 713, 731 with footnote 21
(1964). The unification does not constitute so spacious or
“ populous” a territory as to demand the establishment of
“ identifiable constituencies.” Indeed, Henrico now pledges
its willingness to have 3 delegates elected at large from
among its whole population of 117,339 and without a smaller
constituency than its entire area.
The effect o f the Act has not been to obliterate the tradi
tional integrity in Virginia o f city and county lines. The
custom was sanctioned in Davis v. Mann, supra, 377 U.S.
678, 686 (1964). The individuality of Henrico and Rich
mond is observed by the design o f a separate senatorial
district for each. W e see no inconsistency in allocating
senators on a different basis from delegates. Such a varia
tion has been authoritatively approved, when, as presently,
8
it may tend to “ balance off minor inequities.” Reynolds v.
Sims, supra, 377 U.S. 533, 577, 579 (1964).
Physical factors could reliably have directed the judg
ment o f the General Assembly in determining upon the
union of Richmond and Henrico. They form a compact and
contiguous territory. I f they may not agree politically, con-
cededly their interests are interknit and common in many
aspects. The county is the residence of hundreds of business,
professional and otherwise occupied persons plying their
callings in the city. In fact, while the two are distinct
governmental units, the courthouse of the county is situate
well within the city’s corporate limits. At all events, the
Act does not in any degree devalue the vote in either Rich
mond or Henrico below the Constitutional standard of
weight and fineness, “ one person, one vote.”
City of Richmond
Certain Richmond Negro residents question the fusion of
the city and Henrico County for the election o f delegates
on the ground that it deprives Negro citizens o f a chance
to elect one o f their race to the General Assembly. They
point out that the population o f Richmond consists of 92,331
non-white and 127,627 white persons; that in Henrico the
non-white residents number 6,070, the white 111,269; and
that the potential vote of Negroes in Richmond is, by the
coadunation, reduced from 42% (the percentage of non
white in Richmond) to 29% (the percentage of non-whites
in the aggregate population o f the city and Henrico.)
Further, they suggest that the Negro communities in
Richmond are so located that any division of the city into
9
S fairly equal segments, each embracing a sufficient number
o f inhabitants for a delegate, would create 1 or more dis
tricts in which Negroes would be the majority. Additionally,
they say that if the city were divided into 2 substantially
equal districts with the allotment o f 1 o f Richmond’s 2
senators to each district, the colored population in at least 1
might elect a senator.
Consequently, these intervenors suggest that Richmond
be assigned 5 delegates apart from Henrico, and that the 5
be distributed, 1 to a district, among 5 substantially equal
districts. Likewise, they ask that the city be fairly split into
2 senatorial districts. These contentions are underbraced by
advertence to the Virginia constitutional injunction that
legislators be elected by the voters of the several senatorial
and house districts, and that apportionment of the “State”
into such districts be made every ten years.§§ 41, 42 and 43.
From this they conclude that these clauses command legis
lative allocation, both within and without city and county
marches, by population and not according to existing
governmental units. Omission of such delineations inside
the city and State-wide, the intervenors aver, violates the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, as a deprivation of
equal protection o f the election laws and abridgement of
the right to vote. W e disagree.
To begin with, we reaffirm our earlier declaration of the
validity o f conjoining Richmond and Henrico. Moreover, as
we have also shown, adherence to municipal boundaries in
establishing legislative districts has been declared to be
altogether free of legal infirmity. Furthermore, the racial
exclusion decried in Gotnillion v. Lic/Jitfoot, 364 U.S. 399
(1960) and universally forbidden is not evident. Neither
10
Richmond, nor any other city or county in Virginia has
in her history ever been sub-districted. Even councilmen
for the local government of Richmond are elected at large,
and this without question by either race.
The concept of “ one person, one vote” we understand,
neither connotes nor envisages representation according to
color. Certainly it does not demand an alignment of districts
to assure success at the polls o f any race. No line may be
drawn to prefer by race or color.
As Justice Douglas, though in dissent but obviously
undeniably, tartly put it in Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S.
52, 62, 66 (1964):
“ The fact that Negro political leaders find advantage
in this nearly solid Negro and Puerto Rican district is
irrelevant to our problem. Rotton boroughs were long a
curse o f democratic processes. Racial boroughs are also
at war with democratic standards.”
Page 66:
“ . . . The principle o f equality is at war with the notion
that District A must be represented by a Negro, as it
is with the notion that District B must be represented
by a Caucasian, District C by a Jew, District D by a
Catholic, and so on. . . . O f course race, like religion,
plays an important role in the choices which individual
voters make from among various candidates. But
government has no business designing electoral districts
along racial or religious lines. . . . ”
11
Previously Justice Douglas had said for the Court in
Gray v. Sanders, supra, 372 U.S. 368, 380 (1963) :
. . The concept o f political equality in the voting
booth contained in the Fifteenth Amendment extends to
all phases o f state elections, . . . and, as previously
noted, there is no indication in the Constitution that
homesite or occupation affords a permissible basis for
distinguishing between qualified voters within the
State.”
Shenandoah County
Certain citizens of Shenandoah County protest they have
been deprived of Constitutional rights by the 1964 assign
ment of delegates in the 50th and 59th districts. The
former, which has been assigned 1 delegate, comprises Page,
Rockingham, Shenandoah Counties and the City o f Har
risonburg. The 59th district encompasses only Rockingham
County and Harrisonburg but it is also given 1 delegate.
Harrisonburg is geographically within Rockingham County.
Over-representation o f Shenandoah County under the 1962
reapportionment was noted in Davis v, Mann, supra, 377
U.S. 678, 688; it had “ one seat in the Virginia House”
although its population was 21,825 as compared to the
“ ideal ratio o f one delegate for each 39,669 persons.”
In 1964 Shenandoah’s 21,825 people were leagued with
Rockingham’s 39,559, Page County’s 15,572, and Harrison
burg’s 12,842, increased to 13,804 by an annexation in
1962.* Obviously this readjustment erects a district of
* These figures are taken from the face of the complaint of the Shenandoah
Intervenors. The U.S. Bureau of Census’ U.S. Census o f Population : 1960
General Population Characteristics, Virginia. Final R ep ort P C (1 )-4 8 B , reveals
Rockingham’s population as 40,485 and Harrisonburg’s as 11,916 rather than
12,842 prior to annexation.
12
90,760, far above criterion of 39,669. Rockingham and
Harrisonburg are saved from injustice by their additional
delegate, but Shenandoah with Pag'e suffers from a clear
under-representation.
Invidious discrimination has thus been visited upon
Shenandoah. With primary elections for the General
Assembly scheduled for July of this year, and candidates’
filing times therefor expiring in April, correction of this
injury to Shenandoah County cannot await the convening
o f the General Assembly in 1966. Consequently, we are
required to act to prevent the watering down of the Shenan
doah votes. Until the General Assembly can rectify the
inequity, we must set aside the 1964 apportionment o f the
50th and 59th districts. In lieu of the present provision for
them, the court will order that the counties o f Page, Rock
ingham and Shenandoah and the City o f Harrisonburg be
assigned 2 delegates to represent all four of these political
subdivisions jointly. This adjustment will effectuate a rep
resentation o f 45,380 persons per delegate. While this is
above the proper ratio, we do not deem it an unfair approach
in the circumstances.
Recapitulation
The record does not authorize attribution to the General
Assembly or caprice or an unacceptable motive in the
Henrico and Richmond reapportionment. To the contrary,
a firm foundation may be seen for it. For Shenandoah
County, however, the imbalance in representation is obvious
and fatal.
13
An order will be entered dismissing the intervening com
plaints o f Henrico and Richmond, but sustaining the claim
of the Shenandoah intervenors, with the relief we have
prescribed. The order will also express our approval o f the
Act insofar as such approval is required to remove any
question or doubt o f the validity of any legislation which
has been, or may be, passed by the General Assembly since
the adoption o f the Act, our order of September 18, 1964
having required the General Assembly acting thereafter to
make a Constitutionally valid reapportionment o f the State
before undertaking any other legislation.
APPENDIX B
1
IN T H E U N ITE D STA TE S D ISTR IC T COURT
FO R T H E EA STE R N D ISTR IC T OF V IR G IN IA
At Alexandria
Civil Action No. 2604
H ARR ISO N M AN N , et al.,
v.
LE V IN NOCK D A V IS, et al.,
ORDER ON MANDATE
This action came on to be heard upon the mandate of
the Supreme Court of the United States affirming the judg
ment order of this Court entered November 28, 1962, upon
the motions of the plaintiffs and intervening plaintiffs for
an order on said mandate and the argument o f counsel;
upon a consideration of all of which it is
2
D eclared, A djudged and O rdered :
1. That the Governor o f Virginia and the Attorney Gen
eral be dismissed as parties defendant to this action;
2. That the motion o f the defendants to dismiss the com
plaint and intervening petition be denied;
3. That the acts o f the General Assembly of Virginia,
approved April 7, 1962, appearing as Chapter 635, page
1266, and Chapter 638, page 1269 of the 1962 Acts o f the
Assembly of Virginia, deny the plaintiffs and plaintiff-in
terveners and those persons similarly situated the equal
protection of the laws in contravention of the Fourteenth
Amendment o f the Constitution of the United States, and
that the said acts for that reason are void and of no effect;
4. That the order entered by this court on November 28,
1962 be in all respects reaffirmed but the enforcement o f said
order be further stayed until December 15, 1964 inso
far as necessary to afford ample time for the General As
sembly of Virginia to be called and convened in special ses
sion, if the Governor or the requisite number o f members
o f the General Assembly are so advised, for the purpose of
enacting constitutionally valid reapportionment statutes for
both houses of the General Assembly, and enact statutes
to effectuate said reapportionment by providing for the
election of members o f both houses of the General Assembly
from the districts of the State as reapportioned;
3
5. That, for the reasons set forth in the opinion filed
this day, the terms of the present members o f the House of
Delegates shall not be terminated by force of the said order
before, but shall terminate upon, the expiration o f the
terms for which they were elected in November, 1963 or
in any special election thereafter, that is on the day before
the second Wednesday of January, 1966;
6. That, for the reasons set forth in said opinion, the
terms o f the present members of the Senate, who were
elected in November 1963 or in any special election there
after, shall not be terminated by force of the said order
before, but shall terminate upon, the expiration o f the
terms o f the members o f the House of Delegates elected in
November, 1963 or thereafter -as aforesaid, that is the day
before the second Wednesday in January, 1966;
7. That the motion o f the plaintiffs and plaintiff-inter
veners that the present General Assembly be enjoined at this
time from enacting any legislation other than the said re
apportionment statutes be denied; but by way o f a declara
tory judgment the court now states that after the enact
ment of a constitutionally valid reapportionment statute
the present General Assembly may until the 2nd Wednesday
in January 1966 consider and pass such legislation as it
deems necessary or proper in the public interest, unless
before that date through special elections a General As
sembly is chosen in conformity with the new reapportion
ment statute.
8. That the motion o f the defendants for a continuance
is also denied, in view of the stay herein granted of the
effectiveness o f the order issued by this Court on November
28, 1962.
4
9. That the plaintiffs and plaintiff-interveners recover
o f the defendants their statutory costs, assessed or assess
able in the Supreme Court and in this court, and that the
motion of the plaintiff-inteveners for an allowance of counsel
fees as a part o f said costs is denied; and
10. That if the steps stated in paragraph 4 hereof for
reapportionment be not taken before December 15, 1964,
or if taken they do not meet the requirements of a constitu
tionally valid reapportionment, then the plaintiffs, the plain-
tiff-interveners and any part ( sic) hereafter granted leave to
intervene, may apply to the court for such further orders
as may be required; and jurisdiction of this action is hereby
retained for entry o f such other orders as may be necessary
or proper.
United States Circuit Judge
United States District Judge
-United States District Judge
September 18, 1964.
5
IN T H E U N ITED STA TE S D ISTR IC T COURT
FO R T H E EA STE RN D ISTR IC T OF V IR G IN IA
A t Alexandria
Civil Action No. 2604
H A R R ISO N M AN N et al„
v.
LE V IN N OCK D A V IS et at,
(Argued September 10, 1964 Decided 1965)
Before B r ya n , Circuit Judge, and H offm an and L ew is,
District Judges.
OPINION UPON ORDER ON MANDATE
A lbert V. B ryan , Circuit Judge:
A foremost concern in framing the order on the mandate
o f the Supreme Court affirming our original decree is the
question of the maximum period in which the present,
1963, General Assembly elected under the condemned
statute may still function and with what powers. In our
opinion it must expire as to both houses not later than the
2nd Wednesday in January 1966.
6
W e think the 1963 Assembly necessarily is empowered
to enact the requisite reapportionment laws. There is no
other body to do so, and unless its jurisdiction is recognized
for this purpose the State would be helpless to accomplish
the reapportionment. The Supreme Court has tacitly ap
proved this accordance o f provisional vitality to the existing
legislature. Maryland Committee v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656,
675 (1964 ); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 585 (1964)
adopting the view expressed by Justice Douglas concurring
in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 250 footnote 5.
W e think, also, that after the 1963 Assembly has enacted
a constitutionally valid reapportionment statute— but not
before then— and during the interval between its adoption
and the commencement of the terms of the Senators and
Delegates chosen in the 1965 elections, vide post, the A s
sembly should not be restrained from considering and pass
ing such legislation as it considers necessary or proper in
the public interest. I f the present legislature could not act
in this interim, a potentially dangerous interregnum could
result, for there would be no legislature available in an
emergency. Moreover, if this authority were not conceded,
special elections for the creation of a new General Assembly
would have to be called immediately after the passage of the
reapportionment statute. This would mean an election of
Delegates to serve for a matter of months, when a primary
election o f Delegates is probable in July and a regular
general election is set for November, 1965. That would
be an undue burden upon the State elective processes. In
these exigencies general principles o f equity, as noted by the
Supreme Court in the decisions just cited, sustain an order
permitting such a temporary continuance o f the powers of
the current legislature.
7
In the effort to minimize disruption of the State’s elective
processes as far as possible, but still consistently with our
first order, it is well to recall those processes and consider
their application here. When our finding of invalidity in the
legislative apportionment was made in November 1962,
both houses o f the General Assembly were to stand for elec
tion the following year, 1963. During the temporary stay
of enforcement of this finding, the 1963 election proceeded
upon the unconstitutional apportionment. Delegates were
then chosen for 2-year terms expiring on the 2nd Wednes
day in January 1966, and the Senators were selected for
4 years each, that is until the 2nd Wednesday in January
1968.
Orderly procedure would, therefore, suggest that the
1963 House of Delegates should continue in being until the
expiration o f their terms in January 1966. Cf. Reynolds v.
Sims, supra, 377 U.S. 533, 585 (June 15, 1964). In the
November 1965 general election a House of Delegates will,
under the Virginia law, be elected to assume their duties on
the 2nd Wednesday in January 1966. O f course, the 1965
House would be serving under the new apportionment.
As noted, however, the 1963 Senate would not normally
leave office until January 1968. Elected on a void pattern
of representation, there is no warrantable foundation for its
accreditation beyond January 1966. Further, if it should be
allowed to survive until 1968, the General Assembly— from
January 1966 to January 1968— would be composed of a
House of Delegates elected on one (a valid) scheme of ap
portionment with a Senate elected upon another (in
8
validated) plan. This too, would be constitutionally un
justifiable. Together the two houses in a bicameral system
form a unitary and entire Legislature. For equality of
popular reprsentation they are mutually complementary,
and constitutional validity is not fulfilled if one house is
deliberately permitted to lag behind the other in seeking
fairness o f representation. Cf. Maryland Committee v.
Tarwes, supra, 377 U.S. 656, 673.
Incidentally, practical difficulties might develop if the
life o f the 1963 Senate lasted until 1968. In the event of
vacancies in the Senate, as an illustration, they could not be
filled because no elections may be conducted under the nulli
fied apportionment statutes. Reynolds v. Sims, supra,
377 U.S. 533, 585. Probably none could be held under the
new act because o f the subsequent rearrangement o f the
district. While such eventualities might occur in the House
of Delegates also, the opportunity there for such con
tingencies is for one year only— 1965.
For these reasons we hold that the terms of the 1963
elected Senators as well as Delegates must come to an end
not later than January 1966. Unavoidably, this will mean a
special election of Senators to serve from January 1966 to
January 1968. However, to repeat, we have stated only the
maximum limits o f the life o f the present legislature. W e
do not mean to say that special elections may not be called
9
earlier than November 1965, if the legislature desires,
so that a General Assembly under the new reapportionment
statute might be constituted before January 1966.
United States Circuit Judge
September 18, 1964.
W e concur:
United States District Judge
United States District Judge
APPENDIX C
1
Henrico Plain tiff-Intervenars’ Exhibit 37D
C H A P TE R 1
An Act to amend and reenact § 24-14, as amended, of the
Code of Virginia, relating to State senatorial districts.
[S 1]
Approved Dec. 2, 1964
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Virginia:
1. That § 24-14, as amended, o f the Code o f Virginia, be
amended and reenacted as follows:
§ 24-14. The State is hereby divided into * thirty-three
districts entitled to senators as follows:
First.— The counties o f Accomack, Northampton, *
Mathews, Gloucester and York, one.
Second.— Norfolk city, * three.
Third.— * The cities of Chesapeake, Portsmouth and Vir
ginia Beach, three.
Fourth.— The counties of Halifax, Charlotte, * Prince
Edward, Lunenburg and Nottoway and the city of South
Boston, one.
Fifth.— The counties o f Isle o f Wight, Nansemond,
Southampton, and the cities o f Suffolk and Franklin, one.
2
Sixth.'— The counties o f Greensville, Janies City, Prince
George, Surry and Sussex, and the * cities o f Hopewell and
Williamsburg, one.
Seventh.— The counties o f Brunswick, * Dimmddie and
Mecklenburg, and the city of Petersburg, one.
Eighth.— The counties o f * Arlington and Fairfax, and
the cities of Fairfax and Falls Church, one.
Ninth.— Arlington county, one.
* Tenth.— The counties o f Appomattox, Buckingham. *
Amherst, Nelson and * Campbell, one.
* Eleventh.— * Bedford County and city o f Lynchburg,
one.
^Twelfth.— The counties o f Henry, Patrick and Pittsyl
vania, and the cities of Danville and Martinsville, two.
* Thirteenth.— The counties o f * Carroll, Floyd, * Frank
lin and Montgomery, and the * cities of Galax and Radford,
one.
* Fourteenth.— The counties of Washington, Lee and
Scott and the city o f Bristol, one.
* Fifteenth.— The counties o f Dickenson, Russell and
Wise and the city of Norton, one.
* Sixteenth,— The counties o f Buchanan, * Smyth and
Tazewell, one.
* Seventeenth.— The counties o f Bland, Giles, Pulaski,
Craig, Grayson and Wythe, one.
3
* Eighteenth.— The counties o f Alleghany, * Bath) Bote
tourt, * and * Roanoke, and the cities o f * Clifton Forge and
Covington, one.
* Nineteenth.— The counties: o f Augusta, * Rockbridge
and Highland, and the cities of Buena Vista, Staunton and
Waynesboro, one.
* Twentieth.— The counties o f Page, Rappahannock,
Rockingham and Warren, and the city of Harrisonburg,
one.
* Twenty-first.— The counties of Clarke, Frederick,
Shenandoah and Loudoun and the city of Winchester, one.
* Twenty-second.— The counties o f Albemarle, Fluvanna,
Green, Cumberland, Powhatan and Madison, and the city
of Charlottesville, one.
* Twenty-third.— The counties o f Goochland, Louisa,
Orange, * Spotsylvania, Culpeper, Caroline, King George.
and the city of Fredericksburg, one.
* Twenty-fourth.— The counties o f Fairfax and the cities
of Fairfax and Falls Church, two.
* Twenty-fifth-—The counties o f * Prince William, *
Stafford, and Fauquier, one.
* Twenty-sixth.— The counties o f * Hanover, King W il
liam, Essex, King and Queen, Middlesex, Westmoreland,
Nor thumb er land, Richmond and Lancaster, one.
* Twenty-seventh.— City o f Newport News *, one.
4
* Twenty-eighth.— City of Hampton, one.
* Twenty-ninth.— The counties o f Charles City, Chester
field, * Amelia and New Kent and the * city o f Colonial
Heights *, one.
* Thirtieth.— Richmond city, two.
* Thirty-first.— County of Henrico, one.
* Thirty-second.— City of Roanoke, one.
* Thirty-third.— City o f Alexandria, one.
Dec. 10, 1964.
A TR U E COPY, T E S T E :
George R. R ich
Clerk of the House of Delegates and
Keeper of the Rolls of the State
5
Henrico Plaintiff-Intervenors’ Exhibit No. 11
C H A P T E R 2
An Act to amend and reenact § 24-12, as amended, o f the
Code of Virginia, relating to apportionment of the mem
bers of the House of Delegates.
[H 1]
Approved December 2, 1964
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Virginia:
1. That § 24-12, as amended, o f the Code o f Virginia, be
amended and reenacted as follows:
§ 24-12. Members o f the House o f Delegates shall be
distributed and apportioned, and each county, city and
combination is entitled to representation in the House of
Delegates by a delegate, or by delegates as follows:
* First.— Chesapeake, two.
Second.— Accomack and Northampton, one.
Third.— Albemarle and Greene, one.
Fourth.— Charlottesville, one.
Fifth.— Alexandria, two.
Sixth.— Alleghany, Botetourt, Covington and Clifton
Forge, one.
Seventh.— Amelia, * Lunenburg and Nottoway, one.
6
Eighth.— Amherst and Lynchburg, one.
Ninth.— Arlington, * four.
Tenth.— Augusta, Highland, Staunton and Waynesboro,
two.
Eleventh.— Bedford, one.
Twelfth..— Bland, * Craig, Giles, Pulaski and Wythe, *
two.
* Thirteenth.— Danville and Pittsylvania, one.
Fourteenth.— Brunswick and * Dinwiddie, one.
Fifteenth.— Buchanan, one.
Sixteenth.— Russell and Dickenson, one.
* Seventeenth.— Roanoke City and Roanoke County, one.
Eighteenth.— Campbell, one.
Nineteenth.— Caroline, King George, Essex and King
and Queen, one.
* Twentieth.— Fairfax County, and the cities of Alexan
dria, Fairfax and Falls Church, one.
Twenty-first.— * James City, * York and Williamsburg,
one.
Twenty-second.— Charlotte, Cumberland and Prince Ed
ward, one.
7
Twenty-third.— Chesterfield and Colonial Heights, * two.
Twenty-fourth.— Clarke, Frederick and Winchester, one.
Twenty-fifth.— Danville, one.
Twenty-sixth.— Hampton, * two.
Twenty-seventh.— Fairfax County and cities o f Fairfax
and Falls Church, * six.
Twenty-eighth.— Fauquier, Warren and Rappahannock,
one.
Twenty-ninth,— Fluvanna, Goochland, * Louisa and
Powhatan, one.
Thirtieth.— Franklin County and Floyd, one.
Thirty-first.— Gloucester, Mathews, New Kent, Charles
City and Middlesex, one.
Thirty-second.— Carroll, Grayson and Galax, one.
Thirty-third.— Greensville, Surry and Sussex, one.
Thirty-fourth.'— Halifax and South Boston, one.
Thirty-fifth.— Hanover and King William, one.
Thirty-sixth.— Henrico, * and city of Richmond, eight.
Thirty-seventh.— Henry, Patrick and Martinsville, two.
Thirty-eighth.— Isle o f Wight, * Southampton and * city
of Franklin, one.
8
Thirty-ninth.— Northumberland, Westmoreland, Lancas
ter and Richmond County, one.
Fortieth.— Newport News, three.
Forty-first.— Lee, Wise, and city o f Norton, two.
Forty-second.— Loudoun and Prince William, * two,
Forty-third.— Lynchburg, one.
Forty-fourth.— Madison, Culpeper and Orange, one.
Forty-fifth.— Mecklenburg, one.
Forty-sixth.— Montgomery and Radford, one.
Forty-seventh.— Nansemond and Suffolk, one.
Forty-eighth.— Nelson *, Appomattox and Buckingham,
one.
* Forty-ninth.— Norfolk City, * seven.
* Fiftieth.— Page *, Rockingham, Shenandoah and Har
risonburg, one.
* Fifty-first.— Petersburg *, one.
* Fifty-second.—Pittsylvania, * one.
* Fifty-third.— Portsmouth, * three.
* Fifty-fourth.— Prince George * and Hopewell, one.
* Fifty-fifth.— * Virginia Beach, two.
* Fifty-sixth.— Roanoke County, one.
* Fifty-seventh.— Roanoke City, two.
* Fifty-eighth.— Rockbridge, Bath and Buena Vista, one.
* Fifty-mnth.— Rockingham and Harrisonburg, * one.
* Sixtieth.— Smyth, one.
* Sixty-first.— Spotsylvania, Stafford and Fredericks
burg, one.
* Sixty-second.— Tazewell, one.
* Sixty-third.— Washington, Scott and Bristol, two.
And the districts hereby created are hereby numbered one
(1 ) to * sixty three (63) inclusive.
The reference to a county or city in this section is to the
area comprising such county or city as of January one,
nineteen hundred sixty-five.
2. I f any part or parts, section, subsection, sentence, clause
or phrase o f this act or the application thereof to any person
or circumstance is for any reason declared unconstitutional,
such decisions shall not affect the validity of the remaining
portions of this act which shall remain in force as if such
act had been passed with the unconstitutional part or parts,
section, subsection, sentence, clause, phrase or such ap
plication thereof eliminated; and the General Assembly
hereby declares that it would have passed this act if such
10
unconstitutional part or parts, section, subsection, sentence,
clause or phrase had not been included herein, or if such
application had not been made.
Dec. 10, 1964
A TR U E COPY, T E S T E :
George R. R ic h
Clerk of the House of Delegates and
Keeper of the Rolls of the State
APPENDIX D
1
APPENDIX TO AND EXCERPT FROM
RICHMOND PLAINTIFF-INTERVENORS’ REPLY BRIEF
IN THE DISTRICT COURT
Public Documents Reflecting Virginia’s Official Reaction To Brown v.
Board of Education And Related Fourteenth Amendment Rights
Senate Document No. 1, 1955 Extra Session— Report o f
Commission on Public Education.
Acts o f Assembly 1955, Extra Session, Chapter 2— Pro
posing amendment to § 141 of the Constitution.
Acts o f Assembly 1956, Chapter 1— Providing for con
stitutional convention.
Senate Joint Resolution No. 3, 1956 Session— Interposi
tion.
Acts o f Assembly 1956, Extra Session:
Ch. 31— Registration of corporations supporting litiga
tion.
Ch. 32— Same; Penalties for refusing information.
Ch. 33— Provision for disbarment or suspension of
lawyers.
Ch. 34— Committee on Offenses Against the Adminis
tration of Justice.
2
Ch. 35— Redefining Barratry.
Ch. 36—-Punishing the encouragement o f litigation.
Ch. 37— Committee on Law Reform and Racial Activ
ity.
Ch. 39— Accreditation of certain public and private
schools.
Ch. 47— Prescribing conditions for legal aid.
Ch. 56— Making public school funds available for
private schools.
Ch. 57— Authorizing payment o f local funds.
Ch. 58— Requirement of funds for nonsectarian
schools.
Ch. 59— Providing that no child be required to attend
integrated school.
Ch. 60— Providing for payment of pupil transporta
tion.
Ch. 61— Superintendent given power to assign and re
assign teachers.
Ch. 62— School Board empowered to pay grants with
out approval o f Supervisors.
3
Ch. 63— Providing for employment o f attorneys to
defend school boards.
Ch. 64— Extending retirement benefits to private
school teachers.
Ch. 65— Authorizing Attorney General to assist
school boards.
Ch. 66-—Providing for shortening school terms.
Ch. 67— Adjusting school budget procedures.
Ch. 68— Vesting power to control schools in Governor.
Ch. 69— Defining efficient system of public schools.
Ch. 70— Creating Pupil Placement Board.
Ch. 71, Items 133, 134,137, 138 and 143— Amendment
o f Appropriation Act.
Acts o f Assembly, 1958:
Ch. 4b— Authorizing Governor to operate schools
policed by military troops.
Ch. 213— Providing for appearance o f attorneys in
certain proceedings.
Ch. 253— Regulating legal aid; disbarment for viola
tion.
4
Ch. 319— To close schools under certain conditions.
Ch. 373— Committee on Offenses Against the Admin
istration o f Justice.
Ch. 500— Pupil Placement Board.
Ch. 506— Registration of members o f corporations
“ engaged in practice of law.”
Ch. 540— Orders from Federal government to State
Militia.
Ch. 608— Subpoena power of joint committees.
Ch. 631— Restoring closed school to school system.
Ch. 642, Item 129—Mixed schools not efficient.
House Joint Resolution No. 50, 1958 Session— Directing
Virginia State Bar to review and act upon information ob
tained by legislative investigating committees.
Acts o f Assembly 1959, Extra Session:
Ch. 1— Tuition grants.
Ch. 3, Item 158A— Appropriation for tuition grants.
Ch. 6— Tuition grants.
Ch. 32— To close schools policed by Federal authority.
5
Ch. 39— R e : Committee on Offenses Against the Ad
ministration of Justice.
Ch. 49— Transportation grants for school children.
Ch. 50— Repayment o f teachers’ scholarships.
Ch. 53— Scholarship grants.
Ch. 71— Pupil placement.
Ch. 79— Changed local school budget procedure.
Ch. 80— Waiver of building standards for private
schools.
Ch. 96, Items 158 A and B— Scholarship grants.
Acts o f Assembly, 1960:
Ch. 97— Increased penalties for trespass.
Ch. 98— Encouraging others to trespass.
Ch. 99— Conspiring to trespass.
Ch. 191— Tax credits for contributions to private
schools.
6
EXCERPT FROM REPLY BRIEF
* * *
[page 7]
There yet remain in Virginia’s Constitution and statutes
several items o f legislation the history, purpose or effect of
which reflect official opposition to the aims of the framers
o f the Fourteenth Amendment or suggest legislative reex
amination in the light o f the policy o f the Nation on the
subject of race relations, e .g .:
[page 8]
The 1956 Amendment to Section 141 of the Con
stitution permitting support o f “ private” segregated
schools.
Section 140 of the Constitution yet purporting to
proscribe the teaching o f white and colored children
in the same school.
Code § 1-14. Colored persons and Indians defined.
Code §2-86.1. Advice and legal assistance to local
school boards. (1956 Ex. Sess., C. 65.)
Code § 2-90.1. Attorney General may expend funds
for special counsel to prosecute persons illegally prac
ticing law. (1958, C. 235.)
Code §7-35. Official song (for text o f which see Acts
1940, p. 942). [Carry Me Back to Old Virginia]
Code §§ 9-48.1 through 9-48.6. Commission on Con
stitutional Government. (1958, C. 233.)
Code §§20-50 through 20-60. Colored Persons; Mar
riage between white and colored persons.
7
Code §§ 22-115.29 through 22-115.37. Grants for
Educational Purposes.
Code §§ 22-188.50 and 22-188.51. Schools disturbed
by Federal Policing. (1959 Ex. Sess., C. 32.)
Code §§ 22-232.1 through 22-232.31. Enrollment or
Placement of Pupils. (1956 Ex. Sess., Ch. 70; 1959
Ex. Sess., Ch. 71.)
Code §§ 23-10 through 23-13. Aid to persons denied
admission to state institutions of higher learning.
Code §§ 23-165 through 23-181 Virginia State Col
lege and Virginia State School.
Code §§ 30-42 through 30-51. Committee on offenses
against the administration o f justice. (A revision o f
Ch. 37 Acts 1956, Extra Session.)
Code §§ 37-5, -6, -7, -183, -185, -192, -212, etc.
(State Institutions for Insane Persons, etc.)