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July 25, 1964
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Nos. 98-3597; 98-3622
RONALD ALEXANDER; FAYE ALEXANDER; FAIR HOUSING
PARTNERSHIP OF GREATER PITTSBURGH, INC.
AppeUants/Cross Appellees,
v.
JOSEPH RIGA; MARIA A. RIGA,
a/k/a CARLA AGNOTTI,
Appellees/Cross Appellants.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Civil Action No. 95-1239
BRIEF OF APPELLEES/CROSS APPELLANTS
THOMAS M. HARDEMAN
JOSEPH P. MCHUGH
Titus & McConomy LLP
Four Gateway Center, 20th FI.
Pittsburgh, PA 15222
(412) 642-2000
Counsel for Appellees/Cross Appellants
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..........................................................................................................iv
l. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ............................. 1
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction . ........................ 1
B. Appellate Jurisd iction .............. ............................................................................... 1
H. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR R E V IE W ............................................. 2
A. Appeal 98-3597 ......................................... 2
B. Cross Appeal 98-3622 ........................................................................................... 3
C. Statement Of Standard Or Scope Of Review ............................................... .. . 4
1. Issues Raised In Appeal 98-3597 ................................................... 4
2. Issues Raised In Cross Appeal 98-3622 ............................................... 6
m . STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES AND PROCEEDINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........................................................................................ 7
V. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS ..................................................................................... 8
VI. SUMMARY OF THE A R G U M EN T............................................................................ 12
VH. ARGUMENT IN APPEAL 98-3597 .............................................................................. 17
A. Plaintiffs Are Not Entitled To Compensatory
Damages Because The Jury Found No Liability
To The Alexanders And No Actual Damages
To F H P .................................................................................................................. 17
B. The District Court Properly Refused To Direct
An Award Of Nominal Damages Because No Absolute
Right Was Violated And There Was No Plain Error
In The Jury Instructions And Special V e rd ic ts ............................................... 22
1
1. Nominal Damages Are Permitted, But Not
Required, When The Interest Which Has
Been Violated Is Merely Statu tory ...........................................................23
2. Plaintiffs Misconstrue The Special
Verdicts And Damage Instructions ................................... .. ................. 27
C. The District Court Correctly Refused To Send The
Issue Of Punitive Damages To The Jury Because
There Was No Finding Of Liability To The Alexanders
And The Verdicts Demonstrated That The Jury Did
Not Believe Those Damages Were Warranted ................................... .. 28
1. Punitive Damages Cannot Be Awarded
Absent A Finding Of Liability ............................................................. 28
2. The Evidence Did Not Warrant Sending The
Issue Of Punitive Damages To The J u r y ............................................ 30
D. The District Court Correctly Refused To Send
The Issue Of Punitive Damages To The Jury As
To Mr. Riga Because There Was No Evidence Of
Any Personal Involvem ent................................................. ................................ 31
E. The District Court Correctly Refused To Enter
Injunctive Or Declaratory Relief Because There
Was No Finding Of Liability To The Alexanders,
No Finding Of Actual Damage To FHP And No
Need For Such R e lie f ..................................................................................... 32
F. The District Court Correctly Refused To Admit
The Deposition Testimony Of A Rebuttal Witness
Whose Testimony Was Unclear And Irrelevant And
Because Its Probative Value Would Have Been
Greatly Outweighed By Its Prejudicial Im p a c t ................................... .. 35
G. The District Court Correctly Determined That
Plaintiffs Were Not Prevailing Parties Because
Plaintiffs In No Way Altered The Legal
Relationship Between The Parties ................................................................... 37
V m . ARGUMENT IN CROSS APPEAL 98-3622 .............................................................. 39
A. The District Court Erred In Denying Summary
Judgment When The Uncontroverted Evidence
Indicated That The Alexanders Could Not
Prove A Prima Facie C a s e .................................................................................. 39
B. The District Court Erred In Denying Summary
Judgment Against FHP For Lack Of Standing
When FHP Had No Injury In Fact And Its
Role In The Litigation Was Gratuitous ........................................................... 41
C. The District Court Erred In Excluding Evidence
Of The Alexanders’ Poor Credit And Their History
Of Deception In A Case In Which Credit-Worthiness
And Credibility Were Of Central Importance ................................ .............. 44
D. The District Court Erred In Refusing To
Award Costs To The Rigas ...................................................................... .. 48
IX. CONCLUSION .................................................................................... ...................................49
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DATED MARCH 10, 1998
JUDGMENT, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DATED OCTOBER 9, 1998
CERTIFICATE OF BAR MEMBERSHIP
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES: Page
Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd.,
369 U.S. 355 (1962) ...................................... .. ........................................................................... 33
Avitia v. Metropolitan Club of Chicago, Inc.,
49 F.3d 1219 (7th Cir. 1995) ...................................... .................................. .............. .. 33
Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965) ............................................... .. .......................... 25
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) .......................................................... 20, 23, 24, 25, 26
Chauhan v. M. Alfieri Co., Inc.,
897 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1989) ............................................................................... .. 39-40
Chnapkova v. Koh, 985 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1993) .................................................................47, 48
City of Chicago v. Matchmaker Real Estate Sales Center,
982 F.2d 1086 (7th Cir. 1992) ............................................................................................. 30, 32
Crossman v. Marcoccio, 806 F.2d 329 (1st Cir. 1986) ............................................... 38-39, 48
Crumble v. Blumthal, 549 F.2d 462 (7th Cir. 1977) .......................... .. ............................... 31
Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974) ................................................................ 18, 19-20. 21
Davet v. Maccarone, 973 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1992) ....................................................... .. 26
Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F,2d 950 (3d Cir. 1980) ....................................................... 5
Deane v. Pocono Medical Center,
142 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 1998) ....................... .. .............................................................................. 6
Denneny v. Siegel, 407 F.2d 433 (3d Cir. 1969) ............................. .. ..................................... 5
Dillon v. Coles, 746 F.2d 998 (3d Cir. 1984) ......................................................................... 31
Dr. Franklin Perkins School v. Freeman,
741 F.2d 1503 (7th Cir. 1984) ................................................................................................... 29
Duncan v. Wells, 23 F.3d 1322 (8th Cir. 1994) ...................................................................... 29
IV
CASES: Page
Emerick v. U.S. Suzuki Motor Corp.,
750 F.2d 19 (3d Cir. 1984) ......................................................................................................... 29
Emmel v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago,
95 F.3d 627 (7th Cir. 1 9 9 6 ) .............................................................................. ................. .. 30
Failla v. City of Passaic, 146 F.3d 149 (3d Cir. 1998) ........................................................ 4 , 5
Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington, Inc., v.
BMC Marketing Corp., 28 F.3d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1994) . ................................... ................. 42
Fair Housing Council of Suburban Philadelphia v.
Montgomery Newspapers, 141 F.3d. 71
(3d Cir. 1 9 9 8 ).................................................... .. ................................................. .. ................. 42, 44
Farrar v. Cain, 756 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1985) ......................................................................... 25
Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1 9 9 2 ) .................................................................................. 37-38
Fassett v. Haeckel, 936 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1 9 9 1 ) ...................................................................... 25
Fort v. White, 530 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1 9 7 6 ) ............................................................................ 32
Gibeau v. Ellis, 18 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 1 9 9 4 )............................................................................... 25
Gore v. Turner, 563 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1977) . ....................................................................... 19
Grant v. City of Pittsburgh,
98 F.3d 116 (3d Cir. 1996) ............................................................................................................ 6
Gunby v. Pennsylvania Electric Co.,
840 F.2d 1108 (3d Cir. 1988) 18-19
Hamilton v. Svatik, 779 F.2d 383 (7th Cir. 1985) .................................................................... 32
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982) 41
Knight v. Snap-On Tools Corp.,
3 F.3d 1398 (10th Cir. 1993) .............................................................................................. 48-49
LeBlanc-Stemberg v. Fletcher,
67 F.3d 412 (2d Cir. 1995) ......................................................................................................... 25
CASES: Page
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1 9 9 2 ) .............................................................. 41
Marr v. Rife, 503 F.2d 735 (6th Cir. 1974) ............................................................................ 31
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) ............ .. ................. .. 39-40
Miller v. Apartments and Homes of
New Jersey, Inc., 646 F.2d 101 (3d Cir. 1981) ............................................ .. ............... 5, 32
Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275 (1st Cir. 1 9 7 8 ) ....................... .............. .. 37
New Jersey Coalition of Rooming and Boarding House
Owners v. Mayor of Asbury Park,
152 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 1 9 9 8 ) .......................................................................................... 4
Northeast Women’s Center, Inc. v. McMonagle,
689 F. Supp. 465 (E.D. Pa. 1 9 8 8 ) ....................... .................................................. .. .............. 20
O’Brien v. City of Greers Ferry,
873 F.2d 1115 (8th Cir. 1989 ).......................... ..................................................................... 39, 49
Osei-Afriyie v. Medical College of Pennsylvania,
937 F.2d 876 (3d Cir. 1 9 9 1 ) .........................................................................................................17
Rhoads v. Heberling, 451 A.2d 1378 (Pa. Super. 1982) ........................................................ 30
Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh,
120 F.3d 1286 (3d Cir. 1997) ............................................................................................. 6
Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177 (3d Cir. 1990) .......................................................... 6
Rotondo v. Keene Corp., 956 F.2d 436 (3d Cir. 1 9 9 2 ) ........................................................ 4 ; 5
Ryder v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 128 F.3d 128
(3d Cir. 1 9 9 8 )...................................................................................................................................... 5
Savarese v. Agriss, 883 F.2d 1194 (3d Cir. 1 9 8 9 ) ................................................................... 30
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) ............................................................................ 43
Silverman v. Eastrich Multiple Investor
Fund, L .P ., 51 F.3d 28 (3d Cir. 1995) ....................................................................................... 6
V I
CASES: page
Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983) . .......................... ............................................................. 30
Song v. Ives Laboratories, Inc.,
957 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1992) ....................... .. .........................................................................33
Spann v. Colonial Village, Inc., 899 F.2d 24
(D.C. Cir. 1990) ....................... 42
Texas State Teachers v. Garland Indep. School Dist.,
489 U.S. 782 (1989) 37
Tincher v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 118 F.3d 1125 (7th Cir. 1997) .................................................. 30
United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157 (1936) . .................................................................... 17
United States v. Beros, 833 F.2d 455 (3d Cir. 1987) ................................... .. ................. 47-48
United States v. Jackson, 882 F.2d 1444 (9th Cir. 1 9 8 9 ) .................................................. 46-47
United States v. McNeill, 887 F.2d 448 (3d Cir. 1989) .................................................. .. . 46
United States v. Rosa, 891 F.2d 1063 (3d Cir. 1989) .............................................................. 48
United States v. W .T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629 (1953) 34
United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1 (1985) ............................................................................... 18
Walker v. Anderson Elec. Connectors,
944 F.2d 841 (11th Cir. 1991) ..................................... .............................................. 24, 25, 27
Warren v. Fanning, 950 F.2d 1370 (8th Cir. 1991) . .............................................................. 26
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) ........................................................................................ 41
Watchom v. Town of Davie,
795 F. Supp. 1112 (S.D. Fla. 1 9 9 2 ) ........................................................................................... 26
White v. Moses Taylor Hosp.,
763 F. Supp. 776 (M.D. Pa. 1 9 9 1 )................................................................................................29
Willard v. Bic Corp., 788 F. Supp. 1059 (W.D. Mo. 1 9 9 1 ) ............................................... 29-30
vii
CASES. Page
Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277 (1 9 9 5 ) .......................................................... .............. 6
Woods-Drake v. Lundy, 667 F.2d 1198 (5th Cir. 1982) ................................... .................... 19
STATUTES:
Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601, et seg.................................................................. .. passim
42 U.S.C. § 3613(c) ................................................................................................... 33-34
42 U.S.C. § 3 6 1 3 (c )(2 ).............................................. 38
28 U.S.C. § 1291 1
28 U.S.C. § 1331 .................... .........................................................................................................1
28 U.S.C. § 1291 1
28 U.S.C. § 1331 1
42 U.S.C. § 1981 ................................... .. ................................................................... 1, 7, 40, 41
42 U.S.C. § 1982 ................................................................................................................ 7, 40, 41
RULES:
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(3) .......................................................................................................................1
Fed. R. App. P. 2 6 ............................................................................................................................... 1
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54 ............................................................................................................... 4, 17, 48
Fed. R. Civ. P. 68 ............................................................. .. ......................... 4, 17, 39, 48-49
Fed. R. Evid. 403 . . . ....................................................................................................................... 37
Fed. R. Evid. 4 0 4 (b ) ..........................................................................................................................37
Fed. R. Evid. 608(b) ......................................................................................................... 3, 17, 45
viii
MISCELLANEOUS: Page
Adv. Comm. Note to Subdivision (b) of Rule 608,
1972 Proposed R u les .......................................................................................................................... 46
Adv. Comm. Note to Subdivision (b) of Rule 608,
1974 Enactm ent...................................................................................................................................46
IX
I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
A. Subject M atter Jurisdiction.
Appellants/Cross Appellees (hereinafter "Appellants" or "Plaintiffs") Ronald and Faye
Alexander and The Fair Housing Partnership of Greater Pittsburgh, Inc. ("FHP") sued
Appellees/Cross Appellants (hereinafter "Appellees" or "Defendants") Joseph and Maria Riga
in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania alleging
discrimination on the basis of race in violation of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601,
et seg. and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, et seg. Because this was an
action arising under the laws of the United States, subject matter jurisdiction was conferred
on the District Court by the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
B. Appellate Jurisdiction.
Counsel for Appellees certify that the present appeal and cross-appeal are from a final
judgment following a jury trial and post-trial motions entered by the United States District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania on October 9, 1998 and from an order
denying Appellees’ Motion For Summary Judgment entered March 10, 1998 which became
appealable upon entry of final judgment on October 9, 1998. Appellate jurisdiction is,
therefore, conferred on this Court by the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Appellants filed
their appeal on November 5, 1998. Appellees filed their Cross Appeal on November 23,
1998, within the time permitted by Rules 4(a)(3) and 26 of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
n . STATEMENT O F ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
A. Appeal 98-3597.
1. Whether the District Court correctly refused to grant a new trial or additur of actual
damages when the jury found that the Rigas were not liable to the Alexanders and when FHP
was deemed by a jury not to have suffered any actual damages.
2. Whether there was a minimum quantum of evidence which justified the ju ry ’s
decision not to award even nominal damages to Plaintiffs.
3. Whether the District Court correctly refused to direct an award of nominal damages
because no absolute constitutional right was violated.
4. Whether the District Court’s nominal damages instruction and its special verdicts
permitted the jury to consider an award of nominal damages and, if not, whether any error
was plain error.
5. Whether the District Court correctly refused to send the issue of punitive damages to
the jury when the jury had found the Rigas not liable to the Alexanders and when the
verdicts demonstrated that the jury did not believe there was conduct warranting such
damages.
6 . Whether the District Court correctly ruled that Mr. Riga could not be subject to
punitive damages when he had been in Italy at the time of the discrimination and there was
no evidence of any personal involvement by Mr. Riga in the discrimination.
7. Whether the District Court correctly refused to enter a declaratory judgment in favor
of the Alexanders when the jury found that the Rigas were not liable to the Alexanders.
2
8. Whether the District Court correctly refused to hold a hearing or order declaratory or
injunctive relief against the Rigas when there was no liability to the Alexanders, no actual
damages suffered by FHP and no need for declaratory or injunctive relief because of
uncontroverted evidence that the Rigas have rented apartments to African-Americans.
9. Whether the District Court correctly refused to permit the testimony when its
prejudicial impact far outweighed any relevance and whether any error was harmless because
the testimony was pertinent only to the issue of discrimination, an issue which the jury
resolved in favor of the Alexanders.
10. Whether the District Court correctly concluded that Plaintiffs were not prevailing
parties entitled to costs when the jury found that the Rigas were not liable to the Alexanders
and when FHP obtained no actual relief , such that there was no material alteration of the
legal relationship of the parties.
B. Cross Appeal 98-3622.
1. Whether the District Court erred in denying summary judgment to the Rigas when the
Alexanders had such an abysmal credit history that they could not prove that they were
qualified to rent the Rigas’ apartment. (A38-40; A132-161).
2. Whether the District Court erred in denying summary judgment to the Rigas against
FHP when FHP had no standing to sue the Rigas because it suffered no injury in fact and its
role in the case was gratuitous. (A38-40; A132-161).
3. Whether the District Court abused its discretion in refusing to permit the Rigas to
offer evidence of the Alexanders’ history of bad credit and lying, pursuant to Rule 608(b) of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, when the case turned entirely on credibility, because the
3
Alexanders claimed they had met Mrs. Riga at the apartment and Mrs. Riga claimed she had
never seen them prior to the lawsuit. (A162-168; A249-253).
4. Whether the District Court abused its discretion in refusing to award the Rigas costs
as prevailing parties, under Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, when the
Alexanders and FHP obtained no relief against the Rigas and when the Alexanders failed to
establish any liability on the part of the Rigas. (A15, Docket Entry 87; A939).
5. Whether the District Court erred in refusing to award the Rigas costs incurred
subsequent to making an offer of judgment pursuant to Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. (A8, Docket Entry 15; A15, Docket Entry 92; A939).
C. Statement Of Standard Or Scope O f Review.
1. Issues Raised In Appeal 98-3597.
The issue with respect to whether Appellants should have been granted a new trial or
additur of actual damages is based on the jury’s factual determinations with respect to
liability and damages and is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review. Failla v
City of Passaic. 146 F.3d 149, 153 (3d Cir. 1998).1
Whether the District Court should have granted Plaintiffs’ motion for judgment as a
matter of law and entered an award of nominal damages is subject to plenary review, with
1 Appellants correctly state that the District Court’s decision to grant or deny a new
trial is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Appellants’ Brief at 12, citing Rotondo v. Keene
Cprp,., 956 F.2d 436, 438 (3d Cir. 1992). Inexplicably, Appellants then state a few
sentences later that refusal to grant a new trial is "reviewed as an error of law de novo."
Appellants’ Brief at 12, citing New Jersey Coalition of Rooming and Boarding House
Owners v. Mayor of Asbury Park. 152 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 1998). Appellants had it right the
first time. Nowhere in New Jersey Coalition does this Court make the point for which
Appellants cite the opinion.
4
this Court applying the same standard as the District Court. Rotondo v. Keene Corp.. 956
F.2d 436, 438 (3d Cir. 1992). Therefore, the Court must "view the evidence, together with
all reasonable inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the verdict winner" and
this Court must affirm the District Court’s denial of the motion "‘unless the record "is
critically deficient of that minimum quantum of evidence from which a jury might reasonably
afford relief.'” " IcL, quoting Dawson v. Chrysler Corp.. 630 F.2d 950, 959 (3d Cir. 1980),
in turn quoting Dennenv v, Siegel. 407 F.2d 433, 439 (3d Cir. 1969).
The issue of whether nominal damages are mandatory rests on application of legal
precepts and is subject to plenary review. Id. Review of Appellants’ issue as to whether the
District Court correctly instructed the jury on the issue of nominal damages is plenary if a
timely objection preserved the issue for appeal; and the Court must look at the jury
instructions as a whole to determine if the correct legal standard was stated. Ryder v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp.. 128 F.3d 128 (3d Cir. 1997), cert, denied. 118 S. Ct. 1052.
Appellants’ issue with respect to punitive damages against Mr. Riga rests on the
District Court’s application of legal precepts, over which this Court exercises plenary review.
Failla, 146 F.3d at 153 (3d Cir. 1998). Whether the District Court should have sent the
issue of punitive damages to the jury is reviewed for abuse of discretion because it turns on
the District Court’s assessment of the evidence. See Miller v. Apartments and Homes of
New Jersey. Inc.. 646 F.2d 101, 111 (3d Cir. 1981) (District Court’s award of punitive
damages not an abuse of discretion).
Whether the District Court should have entered a declaratory judgment for Appellants
is reviewed for abuse of discretion, although this Court will conduct a plenary review of any
5
conclusions of law. Silverman v. Eastrich Multiple Investor Fund. L .P .. 51 F.3d 28, 30 (3d
Cir. 1995). See also Wilton v. Seven Falls Co.. 515 U.S. 277, 289 (1995) (Under the
Declaratory Judgment Act, District Courts should be vested with discretion "because facts
bearing on the usefulness of the declaratory judgment remedy . . . are peculiarly within their
grasp").
Whether Appellants should have been awarded costs as prevailing parties is subject to
an abuse of discretion standard. Rode v. Dellarciprete. 892 F.2d 1177, 1182-83 (3d Cir.
1990). Appellants’ challenge to the District Court’s refusal to permit the testimony of an
individual is a challenge to a decision whether to admit evidence and is subject to an abuse of
discretion standard. Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh. 120 F.3d 1286, 1293 (3d Cir. 1997).
2. Issues Raised In Cross Appeal 98-3622.
Cross Appellants’ issues with respect to denial of their summary judgment motion are
subject to plenary review. Grant v. City of Pittsburgh. 98 F.3d 116 (3d Cir. 1996). This
Court applies the same test that the District Court should have applied. Deane v. Pocono
Medical Center. 142 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 1998). Cross Appellants’ issue with respect to
admission of evidence is subject to an abuse of discretion standard. Robinson. 120 F.3d at
1293. Cross Appellants’ issue with respect to an award of costs is subject to an abuse of
discretion standard. Rode. 892 F.2d at 1182-83.
HI. STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES AND PROCEEDINGS
Other than Appeal 98-3597 and Cross Appeal 98-3622, Appellees/Cross Appellants
are unaware of any related case pending before this Court or before any other court or
agency, state or federal.
6
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Alexanders and FHP filed suit against the Rigas alleging race discrimination in
violation of the Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.C. § 3601, et seq.) (the "FHA") and the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982). The Rigas moved for summary
judgment against the Alexanders on the basis that they could not establish a prima facie case
of discrimination and against FHP for lack of standing. (A38). The District Court denied
the Rigas’ summary judgment motion. (A160).
On the eve of trial, Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their Section 1981 and Section
1982 claims. The case proceeded to trial only on the FHA claims. Special verdicts were
prepared which included a requirement that the jury find that any discrimination was a legal
cause of harm to Plaintiffs. (A918-919). The jury was charged on this requirement. (A882-
883). Plaintiffs took no exception to the form of the special verdicts or the charge. (A858-
860). The jury also was charged that they could award nominal damages if they found that
the Plaintiffs were entitled to verdicts but did not find that they had sustained substantial
actual damages. (A887). Again, Plaintiffs took no exception to this charge. The jury
concluded that Mrs. Riga had discriminated against the Alexanders but that such
discrimination was not a legal cause of harm to either of the Alexanders. (A910-911, A918-
919). The jury awarded no damages to the Alexanders. Id , The jury concluded that
discriminatory conduct by Mrs. Riga was a legal cause of harm to FHP but awarded no
damages. (A911-912, A919-920).
At a sidebar immediately following the verdict, the Court denied a request that the
jury be required to award nominal damages to FHP, noting that the jury had not been
7
instructed that nominal damages were mandatory and that a finding of zero damages was not
uncommon. (A913-914). In addition, the Court denied a request that the issue of punitive
damages be submitted to the jury, noting that there was "not a legal cause of harm to either
of the two individual plaintiffs . . . (A915). Earlier in the trial, the Court had indicated
that, in any event, it would not submit to the jury the issue of punitive damages against Mr.
Riga, because "there has to be some personal involvement in the discrimination, and there
wasn’t any." (A658). The Court entered judgment for Defendants and against Plaintiffs on
May 26, 1998. (A958).
The Court denied Plaintiffs’ post-trial motions for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict or for a new trial on damages; for hearing on injunctive and equitable relief; for
attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses; and to tax costs against Defendants. (A961). The Court
granted FHP’s motion to correct an error in the May 26, 1998 judgment by which judgment
had been entered against FHP despite a finding of liability; but the Court denied the motion
to the extent it sought declaratory relief, nominal damages and costs. (A958-959). The
Court also denied Defendants’ motion to tax costs against Plaintiffs. (A962).
V. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Joseph and Maria Riga are Italian-Americans who emigrated to this country in 1958.
(A732). Mr. Riga found work in construction and remained a construction worker for much
of the next 40 years. (A733-734). Mrs. Riga is a high school custodian. (A737). Over
time, the Rigas purchased apartment buildings, including a five-unit building at 5839
Darlington Road in Pittsburgh, which they purchased in 1995. (A737, A991, A994).
8
In managing the building, Mr. Riga essentially served as a handyman. (A991-992,
A1011). Mrs. Riga handled the business aspects. (A1012). For example, she placed the
newspaper ads when an apartment was available, she handled the bank account, and she
worked with the accountant on the tax returns. (A995, A1012). Mrs. Riga managed the
building to such an extent that when Mr. Riga left for Italy in August 1995, he had no reason
to discuss anything about the building with his wife. (A996). Mrs. Riga handled the rent
for the building and never told Mr. Riga how much rent tenants were paying. (A1003).
Mrs. Riga decided how much rent to charge, although the two would sometimes discuss
whether to raise any rent amounts at the end of the year. (A1006-1007).
From August to November 1995, Mr. Riga was in Italy tending to matters relating to
his father’s death. (A735-736, A996). While in Italy, he and Mrs. Riga never discussed the
Darlington Road apartments, with the exception of a discussion about a tenant named Chan
who had abruptly vacated his apartment. (A1008, A1038-1039). The extent of that
discussion was that Mrs. Riga would need to re-rent the apartment and would be taking out
newspaper ads to do so. E
The Alexanders testified that it was in September of 1995, while Mr. Riga was in
Italy, that they went to Darlington to look at an apartment. (A534-535). Mrs. Riga testified
that she had never met the Alexanders until the lawsuit was filed. (A750, A1082).
According to the Alexanders, when they went to Darlington on September 18, Mrs. Riga
falsely told them the apartment they wanted to see, Apartment Two (the "Apartment"), was
not available. (A187, A539). Mr. Alexander then had a friend, Robin McDonough, call to
arrange an appointment; that friend was told on September 26 that the Apartment was
9
available. (A402). Also on September 26, Mr. Alexander, using the false name "James
Irwin," scheduled an appointment for September 29. (A546-547). Mr. Alexander testified
that when he went to that second appointment, Mrs. Riga falsely told him that she had
forgotten her keys to the building and he would need to schedule another appointment.
(A554-555). At about the same time, the Alexanders’ counsel, Caroline Mitchell, arranged
to have a detective agency assign an investigator to schedule an appointment. (A340). On
September 30, that investigator, Jeffrey Lang, called at approximately 3:30 p.m. to arrange
an appointment; he toured the Apartment at approximately 5:00 p.m. (A345, A350).
On September 28, Ms. Mitchell contacted FHP after Mr. Alexander had done his
own follow-up and at about the same time that arrangements had been made for the
detective. (A227-228).2 FHP waited until September 29 to join in the investigation.
(A228). At approximately 4:00 p.m. on September 29, FHP tester Dennis Orvosh arranged
an appointment with Mrs. Riga for the next day. (A448-449). On September 30 at
approximately 11:00 a.m ., Mr. Orvosh toured the Apartment. (A449).
Another FHP tester, an African-American woman named Daria Mitchell, spoke with
Mrs. Riga on September 29 and arranged an appointment for 1:00 p.m. the next day.
(A483). Daria Mitchell had the wrong address for the Apartment and did not arrive at the
Darlington building until approximately 1:30. (A489). Mrs. Riga was no longer at the
building. (A489). But she called Ms. Mitchell later in the afternoon, at 3:30 p .m ., and
2 FHP’s Executive Director testified that Caroline Mitchell, first contacted her on
September 20. That cannot be correct, because Ms. Blinn then proceeds to describe the
conversation as including information about Mr. Alexander calling on the 26th to arrange the
appointment for James Irwin. (A226-228). Later in her testimony, Ms. Blinn indicates
that the first conversation occurred on September 28. (A228).
10
arranged a new appointment for her at 5:30 that afternoon. (A489). Ms. Mitchell toured the
Apartment at that time, testifying that she was treated courteously by Mrs. Riga but was told
by her that "Jeff" had filled out an application and was going to get the Apartment. (A490-
491, A513-514). That was the extent of FH P’s involvement in the investigation.
During the first part of October 1995, the Alexanders and Mr. Alexander’s friend,
Robin McDonough, continued their own testing. Ms. McDonough toured the Apartment on
October 9. Caroline Mitchell also arranged for another individual, Heidi Sestrich, to conduct
a test. (A424). Ms. Sestrich placed a call on October 3 and received calls back indicating
the Apartment was available. (A428-430, A432-435).
On direct examination, Mrs. Alexander testified that she and Mr. Alexander "were
pretty upset" about the way Mrs. Riga had treated them, but she offered no testimony about
any specific damages. (A196). On cross-examination, Mrs. Alexander testified that she had
suffered no illness and no physical injury or distress as a result of what occurred; had not
visited a psychiatrist, psychologist or psychotherapist; had not enrolled in counseling of any
kind as a result of what occurred; had not suffered from insomnia; had not cried as a result;
and had only "periodically" even thought about what occurred. (A207-208). For his part,
although Mr. Alexander testified that what Mrs. Riga did "really hurt" him, he had never
gone to a psychiatrist, mental therapist or counselor; he "didn’t miss very much work" other
than time spent at the trial. (A575, A577-578). Mr. Alexander also testified that in his
deposition, he at first said he had suffered no emotional distress but then said "a little"
because "it went through my head, emotional distress could mean any discomfort or any, you
know, just, sick feeling I got and everything like that." (A649).
11
Andrea Blinn, FHP’s Executive Director, testified that FHP paid Mr. Orvosh and Ms.
Mitchell $25 each and incurred $2,250 in resources diverted to assisting in the investigation,
including participating in the trial. (A l l64-1165). Ms. Blinn also testified that the $2,250
figure was based on valuing her time at $100 per hour, although she could only "wish" that
that was what she was actually paid. (A1166). FHP also did "some education and outreach
as a result of that act of discrimination." (A1167). Finally, Ms. Blinn testified that FHP
had received approximately $274,000 in federal funding in 1995 to operate an office
consisting of herself and one other person. (A l l70).
VI. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs’ theme is simple: Mrs. Riga discriminated against the Alexanders and she
and her husband must be punished, regardless of what the jury said. Defendants’ theme also
is simple: listen to the jury. The jury saw and heard all of the witnesses and concluded that
whatever happened was not a legal cause of any harm to the Alexanders. The jury also
concluded that an organization which received more than $270,000 in federal funding in 1995
should not recover any damages for paying $50 to two testers sent to the Rigas’ building.
Plaintiffs (and the Department of Justice and the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund, Inc., which filed amicus briefs) are outraged at these results. Plaintiffs want money
for themselves, fees for their attorneys and injunctive relief which would serve no purpose.
Plaintiffs believe that if they and their attorneys are paid, the public policy objective of
eliminating discrimination will be satisfied. The law does not require that Plaintiffs and their
lawyers be paid. The law requires that they receive a fair trial. They received a fair trial
and lost.
12
After hearing from many witnesses for Plaintiffs - and hearing very little of the
evidence which the Rigas wished to present - the jury found that Mrs. Riga had
discriminated against the Alexanders but it was not a legal cause of harm to the Alexanders.
Thus, the Alexanders did not prove their case. Plaintiffs do not challenge the jury’s finding
as to causation. Instead, having failed to take exception to either the District Court’s
instruction or its special verdicts on causation, Plaintiffs now argue that discrimination alone,
without proof of causation, is sufficient to impose liability. Appellants’ Brief at 24-33.
Plaintiffs waived this argument by failing to timely object to the District Court’s causation
instruction and special verdicts. Moreover, the argument is meritless. Plaintiffs cite no case
law which supports the proposition that discrimination alone which is not a legal cause of
harm is sufficient to impose liability.3 As to FHP, the jury found that Mrs. Riga’s
discrimination against the Alexanders was a legal cause of harm to FHP. But the jury,
having heard that FHP had received more than $270,000 in 1995 to run a two-person office,
chose to award zero dollars in damages.
Plaintiffs contend that an award of compensatory damages is mandatory where the
FHA has been violated. IdL at 34. But this is contrary to controlling law, which holds that
damages must be awarded only if actual damages are proven. The Alexanders failed to
prove that the discrimination was a legal cause of harm. Thus, there is no basis even to
3 Nor does either Amici give any consideration to the jury’s causation finding. Both
Amici simply equate a finding of discrimination with a finding of liability. See, e .g ..
Department of Justice Brief at 11 ("The jury found here that Maria Riga had intentionally
discriminated . . . . Despite the jury verdict of liability for this pattern of blatant racial
discrimination, the Defendants will suffer no adverse consequences"). Contrary to the
Justice Department’s assertion, the jury did not find the Rigas to be liable to the Alexanders.
13
address the issue of damages. And the District Court correctly noted that the jury might well
have concluded that FHP suffered no actual damages in light of the large amount of federal
funding it received to do precisely what it did in this case — investigate possible
discrimination.
As an alternative to compensatory damages, the Alexanders and FHP argue that
nominal damages must be awarded based on the special verdicts. Appellants’ Brief at 24-33.
With respect to the Alexanders, there is no basis for damages of any kind, nominal or
otherwise, because there has been no finding of liability. And with respect to both the
Alexanders and FHP, the Court properly charged the jury on nominal damages. An award
of nominal damages is not mandatory unless an absolute constitutional right has been
violated. Moreover, by failing to object to the instructions and special verdicts, Plaintiffs
have waived any right to argue that the award of nominal damages is mandatory.
Plaintiffs’ contend that the District Court was obligated to submit the issue of punitive
damages to the jury on behalf of the Alexanders because punitives can be awarded even
absent actual damages. Plaintiffs further contend that had the District Court sent the issue to
the jury, it would have been error not to permit the jury to award punitives against Mr. Riga
based on Mrs. Riga’s actions, something which the District Court refused to do. Appellants’
Brief at 15-21. Neither the Rigas nor the District Court have ever stated that compensatory
damages are a prerequisite to punitive damages. The District Court refused to send the issue
to the jury because they found that the Rigas were not liable to the Alexanders and because
the jury verdicts made it quite clear that they did not believe Mrs. Riga’s conduct to have
resulted from the type of evil motive or reckless or callous indifference necessary to award
14
punitive damages. With respect to Mr. Riga, the District Court correctly noted that there
must be personal involvement for an individual to be subject to punitive damages, and there
was no evidence that Mr. Riga in any way acquiesced in the discriminatory conduct of Mrs.
Riga.
Nor do Plaintiffs have any basis for disputing the District Court’s denial of
declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs never raised the issue before, during, or
immediately after trial. This reflects their disinterest in such relief - until they realized
some time later that it might be an avenue to recover attorneys’ fees which are otherwise
unavailable. The issue is whether declaratory and injunctive relief is necessary, not whether
such relief should be awarded in order to give Plaintiffs a basis for claiming attorneys’ fees.
Whether to award declaratory and injunctive relief is within the District Court’s discretion.
The District Court heard the testimony of all of the witnesses and saw all of the documentary
evidence. It was in the best position to determine whether injunctive and declaratory relief
was necessary.
The Alexanders failed to prove their case and both the Alexanders and FHP failed to
obtain any relief whatsoever. Under these circumstances, the District Court correctly
concluded that Plaintiffs were not prevailing parties entitled to recover costs. Plaintiffs
brought about no change in the legal relations of the parties.
Plaintiffs raise only one evidentiary issue: that the deposition testimony of a rebuttal
witness, Steven Denson, should have been admitted as evidence of a separate act of
discrimination by Mrs. Riga. Appellants’ Brief at 42-44. The District Court correctly
excluded the testimony. It was unclear from Mr. Denson’s testimony whether he had ever
15
taken students to view the Apartment. In fact, his testimony strongly suggested that he had
not been at the Darlington building. Thus, Mr. Denson’s testimony was irrelevant to this
disparate treatment case. The tenuous probative value of the proffered evidence also was
greatly outweighed by the risk of prejudice. The jury easily could have been confused about
which building Mr. Denson visited as Mr. Denson himself did not clearly recall. The only
purpose of the evidence was to cause the jury to believe that Mrs. Riga was more likely than
not to have discriminated against the Alexanders. Indeed, for that reason, exclusion of the
evidence was harmless. The jury concluded that Mrs. Riga had discriminated. It did not
need Mr. Denson’s testimony.
Indeed, there was no need for a jury to have considered any of Plaintiffs’ evidence.
Summary judgment should have been granted against the Alexanders based on voluminous
evidence of their bad credit and history of lying. As part of their prime facie case, the
Alexanders should have been required to prove that they were qualified to rent the Rigas’
Apartment. The credit evidence amassed by the Rigas was such that no reasonable jury
could have concluded that the Alexanders were qualified to rent the Apartment. As to FHP,
it lacked standing because it suffered no injury in fact. It willingly intervened in the
Alexanders’ investigation, the very purpose for which FHP exists. The mere diversion of
resources which FHP experienced was insufficient to confer standing
Having mistakenly denied the Rigas’ summary judgment motions, the District Court
compounded its error at trial by excluding the bulk of the Rigas’ evidence. The Rigas were
barred from offering any evidence of the Alexanders’ credit history and their history of
lying. The credit information was directly relevant to an element of the Alexanders’ case;
16
and the evidence of lying bore directly on their credibility. This case, more so than many,
turned almost entirely on credibility. There were no witnesses to the Alexanders’ claimed
visit to Darlington and Mrs. Riga claimed they were never there. The jury should have been
permitted to learn of the Alexanders’ history of mendacity in order to assess their credibility
pursuant to Rule 608(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Despite being subjected to the hazards and expenses of trial, the Rigas prevailed
against the Alexanders. The jury found they were not liable to the Alexanders. As such,
they should have been awarded costs as prevailing parties under Rule 54 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure. At minimum, they should have been awarded costs incurred subsequent to
the date when they made a Rule 68 offer of judgment to the Alexanders in the amount of
$ 20, 000.
VII. ARGUMENT IN APPEAL 98-3597
A. Plaintiffs Are Not Entitled To Compensatory Damages Because The Jury
Found No Liability To The Alexanders And No Actual Damages To FHP.
Simply ignoring the jury’s determination that Mrs. Riga’s conduct was not a legal
cause of harm to the Alexanders (A918-919), Plaintiffs argue that "[cjompensatory damages
are mandatory where the factfinder has determined that the Fair Housing Act was violated. "4
4 In making this argument, Plaintiffs imply that the jury should not have considered
causation. But by failing to object, Plaintiffs permitted the jury to be instructed on, and
answer special verdicts regarding, causation. (A846-848). When no objection is made, an
instruction is reviewed only for plain error. Osei-Afrivie v. Medical College of
Pennsylvania, 937 F.2d 876, 881 (3d Cir. 1991). Plain errors are "those errors that
‘seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings’ . . . .
They are errors that ‘undermine the fundamental fairness of the trial and contribute to a
miscarriage of justice.’" IcL at 881, citing United States v. Atkinson. 297 U.S. 157, 160
(1936) and United States v. Young. 470 U.S. 1, 16 (1985). For the reasons that follow,
there was no error in the charge or the special verdicts on causation, let alone plain error.
17
Appellants’ Brief at 34. This argument is contradicted by controlling law. As is clear from
the case Plaintiffs themselves cite, Curtis v. Loether. 415 U.S. 189 (1974), whether
compensatory damages are due turns on more than a finding of discrimination: "if a plaintiff
proves unlawful discrimination and actual damages, he is entitled to a judgment for that
amount." I d at 197. Here, the jury found that any discrimination was not a legal cause of
harm to the Alexanders and that FHP had suffered no actual damages. (A918-920).
Plaintiffs seek to avoid this result by changing the equation to one where discrimination alone
creates liability, regardless of causation. Plaintiffs want to presume that discrimination
causes damage. Plaintiffs are not entitled to such a presumption. See Gunbv v.
Pennsylvania Electric C o,. 840 F.2d 1108 (3d Cir. 1988).
In Gunby. this Court expressly refused to presume that damage flowed from
discrimination and reversed a jury award for want of proof: "We agree with the contention
that Gunby presented no evidence upon which the jury could reasonably conclude that he had
suffered emotional distress as a result o f being denied the position . . . ." Gunbv. 840 F.2d
at 1121 (emphasis added). "We decline Gunby’s invitation to presume damages . . . .
Damages do not follow of course in Section 1981 and Title VII . . . ." IcL (emphasis
added). In short, being discriminated against is not enough. The discrimination must be a
legal cause of harm.
In Gunby this Court actually reversed a jury award of $15,000 for emotional distress
in a Title VII race discrimination case where the only evidence was the plaintiffs testimony
that being passed over for a job had made him "very upset" and that he "had been done
wrong" and "had been treated unfairly" and "unjustly." I d at 1120. Gunby "offered no
18
specific evidence of emotional distress related to his being passed over for the managerial job
. . ." and "presented no evidence upon which the jury could reasonably conclude that he had
suffered emotional distress as a result of being denied the position . . . Id. at 1120-21.
This Court explicitly rejected Gunby’s argument that damage should be presumed to flow
from discriminatory conduct: "The justifications that support presumed damages in
defamation cases do not apply in § 1981 and Title VII cases. Damages do not follow of
course in § 1981 and Title VII cases and are easier to prove when they do." IcL at 1121.
The principle should be no different in a housing discrimination claim under Title VTTT That
Mr. Gunby was discriminated against in employment and the Alexanders were discriminated
against in housing is an irrelevant distinction. The Alexanders, no less than Mr. Gunby, had
to prove that they had been harmed.
None of the cases cited by Plaintiffs supports the proposition that discrimination
alone, absent causation, creates liability and authorizes an award of compensatory damages.
To the contrary, in one of the cases cited by Plaintiffs, Woods-Drake v.Lundy. 667 F.2d
1198 (5th Cir. 1982), the appellate court directed the district court to award compensatory
damages flowing from an eviction for racially discriminatory reasons "assuming there is
causation between the eviction and the injury." IcL at 1203. And that court, in turn, cited to
Gore v. Turner. 563 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1977). The Gore court stated that "an award for
emotional distress must be preceded by a finding of a sufficient causal connection between
the defendant’s illegal actions and the plaintiffs injury." Id. at 164.
The point made by this Court in Gunbv and by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Gore and Woods-Drake is consistent with Curtis in which the Supreme Court observed that a
19
damages action under the Fair Housing Act "sounds basically in tort - the statute merely
defines a new legal duty, and authorizes the courts to compensate a plaintiff for the injury
caused by the defendant’s wrongful breach." Curtis. 415 U.S. at 195 (emphasis added). It
also is consistent with another Supreme Court opinion cited by Plaintiffs, Carey v. Piphus.
435 U.S. 247 (1978). In Carey, a case involving denial of procedural due process, the
Supreme Court agreed with petitioners that injury from mental and emotional distress "cannot
be presumed to occur" and "plaintiffs should be put to their proof on the issue, as plaintiffs
are in most tort actions." Carey. 435 U.S. at 262. The Supreme Court also recognized that
there should be no "particular difficulty in producing evidence that mental and emotional
distress actually was caused by" the civil rights violation. I d "Distress is a personal injury
familiar to the law, customarily proved by showing the nature and circumstances of the
wrong and its effect on the plaintiff." I d at 263-64.
Here, the Alexanders simply failed to meet that burden. The jury quite reasonably
concluded that the Alexanders were unharmed by the discriminatory conduct. The jury’s
verdict on causation was reasonable and must stand. This Court should not supplant the
jury’s role as fact-finder absent manifest injustice or exceptional circumstances. See
Northeast Women’s Center. Inc, v. McMonagle. 689 F. Supp. 465 , 468 (E.D. Pa. 1988),
modified on other grounds. 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir. 1989) ("jury’s verdict may be set aside
only if manifest injustice will result if it were allowed to stand").
The jury heard Faye Alexander testify that she and Mr. Alexander "were pretty
upset" about the way Mrs. Riga had treated them (A196), but that she had suffered no
illness, physical injury or distress as a result of what occurred; had not visited a psychiatrist,
20
psychologist or psychotherapist; had not enrolled in counseling of any kind; had not suffered
from insomnia; had not cried as a result; and had only "periodically" thought about what
occurred. (A207-208). For his part, although Mr. Alexander testified that what Mrs. Riga
did "really hurt" him, he had never gone to a psychiatrist, mental therapist or counselor and
he "didn’t miss very much work" other than time spent at the trial. (A575, A577-578). He
also testified that in his deposition, he at first said he had suffered no emotional distress but
then said "a little" because "it went through my head, emotional distress could mean any
discomfort or any, you know, just, sick feeling I got and everything like that." (A649). The
jury reasonably concluded that Mrs. Riga’s discrimination had not been a substantial factor in
causing any harm to the Alexanders.
As to FHP, the jury found causation. But it stated that there were zero damages
"sustained by the plaintiff Fair Housing Partnership of Greater Pittsburgh, Inc. as a result of
Mrs. Riga’s unlawful conduct." (A919-920). In other words, the jury concluded that FHP
had not proven actual damages. And without such proof, there is no basis to award
compensatory damages. See Curtis. 415 U.S. at 197. The jury’s conclusion was reasonable.
Andrea Blinn, FHP’s Executive Director, testified that FHP paid Mr. Orvosh and Ms.
Mitchell $25 each; that the cost of its resources diverted to assisting in the investigation,
including participating in the trial, was $2,250; and that FHP did "some education and
outreach as a result of that act of discrimination." (A1164-1165, 1167).
Ms. Blinn also testified that the $2,250 figure was based on valuing her time at $100
per hour, a rate which she could only "wish" she was actually paid. (A1166). The amount
was based on an unexplained formula developed by fair housing organizations themselves
21
(A1171), not on any realistic determination of damage actually incurred by FHP. Ms. Blinn
also testified that FHP had received approximately $274,000 in federal funding in 1995 to
operate an office consisting of herself and one other person. (A1170). And the jury heard
testimony from three witnesses for the Alexanders who had themselves established the
availability of the Apartment both before and after FHP was involved. (Jeff Lang - A343-
345, A350; Robin McDonough - A402-405; Heidi Sestrich - A425, A432).
It was reasonable for the jury to weigh this information and conclude that FHP had
suffered no actual damages. The evidence indicates that FHP was an officious intermeddler
doing nothing more than the very work for which it already was receiving large amounts of
taxpayer funding. Significantly, FHP failed to establish any facts which the Alexanders and
their friends and agents had not already established on their own. If anything, FHP undercut
the Alexanders’ case by using an African-American tester, Daria Mitchell, who received an
appointment, was told the Apartment was available, was treated cordially and shown the
Apartment. (A514-525).
B. The District Court Properly Refused To Direct An Award Of
Nominal Damages Because No Absolute Right Was Violated And There
Was No Plain Error In The Jury Instructions And Special Verdicts.
The jury acted properly in denying Plaintiffs nominal damages and the District Court
committed no error in refusing to require such an award. Plaintiffs requested and received
an instruction on nominal damages to which they never objected. (A853, A887).
Nevertheless, Plaintiffs argue that the instruction was plain error so their waiver of the issue
should be disregarded. Appellants’ Brief at 24-27. Specifically, Plaintiffs claim that when
the jury instruction is read in conjunction with the special verdicts, it was "impossible for the
22
jury to award nominal damages unless legal harm and ‘insubstantial’ actual damages were
first found." Appellants Brief at 26. But Plaintiffs themselves concede that the instruction
on nominal damages was "boilerplate." Moreover, when that instruction is read in
conjunction with the special verdicts, the jury had five potential alternatives and was not
constrained to reach the result plaintiffs allege. In addition, Plaintiffs completely misconstrue
the law when they claim that nominal damages were required because of the discrimination
finding. As is explained herein, nominal damages are not required when a private citizen
violates the statutory rights of another.
I. Nominal Damages Are Permitted, But Not Required When
The Interest Which Has Been Violated Is Merely Statutory.
In Carey, the Supreme Court held that a party claiming a denial of procedural due
process is entitled to recover nominal damages without proving actual injury "[bjecause the
right to procedural due process is ‘absolute’ in the sense that it does not depend upon the
merits of a claimant’s substantive assertions, and because of the importance to organized
society that procedural due process be observed . . . ." Id, at 266 (citations omitted).
Thus, the critical inquiry is whether an interest is "absolute. "5 The interest in Carey also
was a constitutional right. The Supreme Court has never extended its holding in Carey to
statutory rather than constitutional claims.
5 The NAACP argues that Plaintiffs’ interests are of constitutional magnitude because
the civil rights statutes "were passed in order to enforce the underlying rights embodied in
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution." NAACP Brief at 3. This
has no bearing on whether a right is absolute within the Supreme Court’s meaning. Indeed,
every right created by federal statute must have a constitutional foundation or, ipso facto, the
statute creating the right is unconstitutional.
23
In the sense articulated by the Supreme Court, there is nothing "absolute" about the
interests invoked by the Alexanders (the right to be free from discrimination) and FHP (the
right to accurate information about the availability of housing). They claim housing
discrimination by private citizens in violation of the FHA, not violation of their constitutional
right to due process by the government. Nor are their interests independent of the merits of
their substantive assertions. Although a party is always entitled to procedural due process
from the government, even for meritless claims, Plaintiffs here have no right to redress
under the FHA when their claims fail.
Indeed, the rights invoked by Plaintiffs are neither absolute nor constitutional. They
are merely statutory. This important distinction has been recognized by the Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit, which has expressly refused to hold that a Title VII violation
requires an award of nominal damages. Walker v. Anderson Elec. Connectors. 944 F.2d
841, 845 (11th Cir. 1991). Just as the jury in this case found that there had been
discrimination but no legal injury, the jury in Walker found that the defendant had sexually
harassed the plaintiff in violation of Title VII and had invaded her privacy but also found that
Walker had sustained no damage as a proximate result of those violations.6 IcL at 843.
Consequently, the district court entered final judgment against the plaintiff and denied all of
her post-trial motions seeking attorneys’ fees, nominal damages, injunctive relief or a new
trial. Affirming the district court’s denial of a post-trial motion for nominal damages, the
Court of Appeals held that Carey does not mandate an award of nominal damages for
6 Significantly, the jury in Walker answered special verdicts that were essentially
identical in structure to those answered by the jury in the instant case.
24
statutory violations. Id., at 845. Like Walker’s Title VD claim, Plaintiffs’ claim here is
solely statutory, based on the FHA (Title VIII). Like the defendant in Walker. Mrs. Riga
committed no violation of an absolute constitutional right which requires an award of
nominal damages.7
None of the cases cited by Plaintiffs hold that nominal damages are mandatory when a
private citizen violates the statutory rights of another. The cases in which nominal damages
are deemed mandatory involve constitutional violations by state actors. See, e .g .. Gibeau v.
Ellis, 18 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 1994) (violation of Eighth Amendment rights by jail officer);
Fassett v. Haeckel, 936 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1991) (violation of Fourth Amendment rights by
policeman); Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965) (Eighth Amendment violations by
police officers); Farrar v. Cain, 756 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1985) (Section 1983 action for civil
rights violations by Texas state officials); LeBlanc-Stemberg v, Fletcher. 67 F.3d 412 (2d
Cir. 1995) (FHA and First Amendment violations by municipality and its officers). In the
remaining cases cited by Plaintiffs in which merely statutory rights were violated, the
appellate courts have affirmed lower court awards of nominal damages or directed an award
of nominal damages as a form of remittitur when the appellate court has determined that the
7 Without citing to any authority, Plaintiffs simply assert that "[t]he Eleventh Circuit
was wrong in its holding in Walker . . . ." Appellants’ Brief at 32. Plaintiffs argue that the
right at issue is the fundamental right to hold and use property, recognized by the Supreme
Court in dicta in 1883. I d Regardless of whether Plaintiffs are correct in that assertion, the
Supreme Court in Carey did not refer to fundamental rights. Instead, it was concerned with
absolute rights in a very specific sense — rights so basic that they exist regardless of the
merits of a claim (e.g.. procedural due process). A right to hold and use property does not
exist in any such absolute sense. The right exists only if facts can be proven establishing the
right.
25
award of compensatory damages was inappropriate. In other words, such cases do nothing
more than affirm that nominal damages are permitted, but not required.
Unlike the cases cited by Plaintiffs, in this case neither the jury nor the trial court
believed Plaintiffs should receive any damages, nominal or otherwise. And this case did not
involve violation of an absolute constitutional right by a state actor. Plaintiffs ask this Court
to take the unprecedented step of ordering the District Court to award nominal damages for
the violation of a statute by a private citizen. There is no basis for this Court to take such a
step.
Moreover, even if Plaintiffs were correct that nominal damages are mandatory for a
violation of the FHA, there is no plain error in the District Court’s use of permissive
language because the jury still had the option of awarding nominal damages. See, e .g ..
Warren v. Fanning. 950 F.2d 1370 (8th Cir. 1991). In Warren, the jury found that the
plaintiff had been subjected to cruel and unusual punishment but declined to award even
nominal damages. The jury had received a permissive instruction to which the plaintiff had
never objected. I d at 1374. The Court of Appeals found that "the effect of the incorrect
instruction is only that it left the jury with discretion to decline to award Warren nominal
damages. Clearly, the erroneous instruction has not resulted in a miscarriage of justice and
does not constitute plain error." I d See also. Davet v. Maccarone. 973 F.2d 22 (1st Cir.
1.992); Watchom v. Town of Davie. 795 F. Supp. 1112 (S.D. Fla. 1992).8
8 The courts in Warren and Watchom agreed that the instruction should have made an
award mandatory. But both cases involved violations of constitutional rights bringing them
within the ambit of Carey. For reasons noted above in the discussion of Walker this case
involves only a statutory violation and thus it was not error (and certainly not plain error) to
describe an award of nominal damages as permissive.
26
2. Plaintiffs Misconstrue The Special Verdicts And Damage Instructions.
Plaintiffs contend that the District Court’s nominal damages instruction, when read in
conjunction with the special verdicts, required the jury to find "insubstantial" actual damages
before it could award nominal damages. Appellants’ Brief at 26. This simply is not so.
The special verdicts required the jury to find discrimination and causation (i.e .. that the
discrimination had been a legal cause of harm). (A917-920). If it found discrimination and
harm, the jury was to determine an amount of damages, if any, to be awarded. That amount
could be zero, $1 or more. The District Court’s instructions on nominal and compensatory
damages were not inconsistent with the special verdicts. Plaintiffs themselves acknowledge
that those instructions were "boilerplate." Appellants’ Brief at 26. The District Court
instructed the jury that:
if you find that the plaintiffs are entitled to verdicts in their favor in
accordance with these instructions, but you do not find that the plaintiffs have
sustained substantial actual damages, then you may return a verdict for the
plaintiffs in some nominal sum, such as one dollar, on account of actual
damages.
(A887). There was no error in that instruction.
The special verdicts treated separately the issues of discrimination, causation and
damages, which left the jurors five options:
1. They could find no discrimination and thus no liability;
2. They could find discrimination but no legal cause of harm and
thus no liability (as they did with the Alexanders);
3. They could find discrimination and harm but no actual damages
and could choose not to award nominal damages (as they did
with FHP);
27
4. They could find discrimination and harm but no actual damages and could
choose to award nominal damages; or
5. They could find discrimination and harm and actual damages,
prompting an award of compensatory damages.
Nothing in the special verdicts or instructions precluded the jurors from choosing any of
these five options. There was no error, let alone plain error sufficient to overcome
Plaintiffs’ failure to object to the special verdicts and instructions.
C. The District Court Correctly Refused To Send The Issue Of Punitive
Damages To The Jury Because There Was No Finding Of Liability To
The Alexanders And The Verdicts Demonstrated That The Jury
Did Not Believe Those Damages Were Warranted.
Plaintiffs and the Justice Department spend a considerable portion of their argument
on a non-issue, arguing that punitive damages can be awarded even where no actual damages
have been awarded. Appellants’ Brief at 15-21; Justice Department Brief at 18. The Rigas
have never argued otherwise; nor did the District Court refuse to send the issue of punitive
damages to the jury because actual damages had not been awarded. The District Court
refused to send the issue to the jury because the jury concluded that the Rigas were not liable
to the Alexanders and because the jurors’ verdicts made it clear that they did not believe
Mrs. Riga had acted with the necessary degree of recklessness or callousness to warrant
punitive damages. (A948-951).
1. Punitive Damages Cannot Be Awarded
Absent A Finding Of Liability._____
Just as there was no basis for the jury to award nominal or compensatory damages
given the Alexanders’ failure to prove their case, there was no basis for an award of punitive
damages and this Court properly refused to charge the jury on such damages. The
28
Alexanders’ failure to prove their underlying case rendered them ineligible for punitive
damages. Plaintiffs incorrectly imply that the reason the District Court refused to send the
issue of punitive damages to the jury is that the jury failed to award compensatory damages.
See Appellants’ Brief at 15-21.9 This severely mischaracterizes the basis for the District
Court’s decision. The Alexanders did not have to recover compensatory damages to receive
punitive damages. But they did have to prevail on their claim. Because they failed to
establish liability, they are not entitled to any relief whatsoever and it was not an abuse of
discretion for the District Court to keep the issue from the jury. See Duncan v. Wells. 23
F.3d 1322 (8th Cir. 1994) (proper not to submit punitive damages claim in Section 1983
excessive force case when plaintiff failed to prove claim).
Punitive damages "are not an independent cause of action. They represent a specific
type of relief." Dr. Franklin Perkins School v. Freeman. 741 F.2d 1503, 1524 (7th Cir.
1984) (punitive damages not available when evidence did not support fraud claim). Because
Plaintiffs failed to prove their underlying claim, they cannot seek punitive damages. See
also, Emerick v, U.S. Suzuki Motor Corp.. 750 F.2d 19, 22 (3d Cir. 1984) (punitive
damages issue could not be submitted to jury until liability had been established); White v.
Moses Taylor H osp.. 763 F. Supp. 776, 792 (M.D, Pa. 1991) (punitive damages request
must be dismissed when underlying Section 1983, Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth
Amendment claims are dismissed); Willard v. Bic Corp.. 788 F. Supp. 1059 (W.D. Mo.
1991) (punitive damages claim fails "as natural consequence" of dismissal of substantive
9 The NAACP goes further by incorrectly asserting that "[w]ith regard to punitive
damages, the district court held that they cannot be awarded unless there is an award of
compensatory damages." NAACP Brief at 7.
29
legal claims); Rhoads v. Heberling. 451 A.2d 1378, 1383 (Pa. Super. 1982) (trial court
properly instructed jury on punitives despite lack of compensatory damages because it
explained that liability was required).
2. The Evidence Did Not Warrant Sending
The Issue O f Punitive Damages To The .Turv.
Not only did the Alexanders fail to prove their claim, the jury chose to award no
damages of any kind to FHP, clearly indicating that punitive damages were not warranted.
Punitive damages "in general represent a limited remedy, to be reserved for special
circumstances." Savarese v. Agriss, 883 F.2d 1194, 1205 (3d Cir. 1989). In fair housing
cases, "punitive damages are awarded to punish and deter outrageous conduct." City of
Chicago v. Matchmaker Real Estate Sales Center. 982 F.2d 1086, 1099 (7th Cir. 1992).
Punitive damages are appropriate in civil rights cases "when the defendant’s conduct is
shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous
indifference to the federally protected rights of others." Savarese. 883 F.2d at 1204, citing
Smith v. Wade. 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983) (emphasis in original).
The fact that the jury found that Mrs. Riga discriminated cannot itself serve as proof
of evil motive or intent or reckless or callous indifference. If this were so, punitives would
be required whenever a civil rights violation occurs, undermining the Third Circuit’s rule,
articulated in Savarese. that punitives be reserved for special circumstances. On this point,
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has recognized that to recover punitive
damages, plaintiffs "must jump ‘a higher hurdle than merely proving the underlying unlawful
discrimination.’" Tincher v. Wal-Mart, Inc.. 118 F.3d 1125, 1132 (7th Cir. 1997), citing
Bfflmel v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago. 95 F.3d 627, 636 (7th Cir. 1996). See also
30
Crumble v. Blumthal. 549 F.2d 462, 467 (7th Cir. 1977) (in FHA case, "the fact that a
wrong is an intentional act does not compel an award of punitive damages as a matter of
law").
Plaintiffs cite a number of cases in which punitive damages were awarded against an
individual found to have engaged in discriminatory conduct. But the issue is not whether
other juries have imposed punitive damages in discrimination cases. The issue is whether on
the facts of this case, the evidence demonstrates conduct by Mrs. Riga so outrageous that the
District Court abused its discretion in keeping the issue from the jury. Whether to award
punitive damages is a matter entrusted to the discretion of the fact-fmder. Dillon v. Coles.
746 F.2d 998 (3d Cir. 1984). Mrs. Alexander testified that Mrs. Riga was cordial to her
and that even when she concluded that Mrs. Riga had discriminated against her, it had not
caused her to cry or suffer any physical or psychological harm. (A207-208). Mr. Alexander
initially admitted that the discrimination had not caused him any emotional distress. (A648).
Plaintiffs offered no evidence of anything more than intentional discrimination by Mrs. Riga.
There are no facts which suggest any outrageous behavior unless discrimination is ipso facto
outrageous, a principle that is contrary to all of the cases cited above.
D. The District Court Correctly Refused To Send The
Issue Of Punitive Damages To The Jury As To Mr. Riga
Because There Was No Evidence Of Any Personal Involvement.
The District Court correctly applied the law in determining not to send to the jury the
issue of punitive damages as to Mr. Riga. Generally, in housing discrimination cases a
principal cannot be liable for punitive damages unless he was, "by action or knowledgeable
inaction, involved in the wrongdoing." Marr v. Rife. 503 F.2d 735, 745 (6th Cir. 1974)
31
(cited by this Court in Miller v. Apartments and Homes of New Jersey. Inc.. 646 F„2d 101,
111 (3d Cir. 1981)). See, also. City of Chicago v. Matchmaker Real Estate Sales Center.
Inc.. 982 F.2d 1086, 1099-1101 (7th Cir. 1992), cert, denied. 508 U.S. 972 (1993);
Hamilton v. Svatik. 779 F.2d 383, 389 (7th Cir. 1985); Fort v. White. 530 F.2d 1113,
1116-17 (2d Cir. 1976).
It is undisputed that in September of 1995 Mr. Riga was in Italy visiting relatives.
(A735). There is no evidence that Mr. Riga directed or endorsed any discriminatory
conduct by Mrs. Riga. (A658-659). He and Mrs. Riga did not even discuss the Darlington
building while he was in Italy, with the exception of some discussion about a tenant named
Chan who had abruptly vacated his apartment. (A1008, A1038-1039). The extent of that
discussion was that Mrs. Riga would need to re-rent the apartment and would be taking out
newspaper ads to do so. Id. The only evidence tying Mr. Riga to this case is his co-
ownership of the apartment building with his wife. Mere ownership is insufficient to impose
punitive damages. Thus, as a matter of law, the jury could not have imposed punitive
damages on Mr. Riga and this Court properly refused to charge the jury on such damages.10
E. The District Court Correctly Refused To Enter Injunctive Or Declaratory
Relief Because There Was No Finding Of Liability To The Alexanders, No
Finding Of Actual Damage To FLIP And No Need For Such Relief.
In arguing for injunctive and declaratory relief, Plaintiffs and Amici continue to
ignore the Alexanders’ failure to prove their case. Plaintiffs argue that a finding of
discrimination mandates equitable, declaratory and injunctive relief. Appellants’ Brief at 37.
10 Plaintiffs attempt an end run on this well-settled law by recasting the issue as one "of
first impression . . . whether Landlord-husband as principal can be vicariously liable for
punitive damages . . . ." Appellants’ Brief at 23-24. This argument was never raised in the
District Court; Plaintiffs cite no cases in support of the argument; and they offer a scant four
sentences of text on the subject. On such a record, this Court should decline Plaintiffs’
invitation to make new law and vastly expand the scope of punitive damages liability.
32
They cite no cases for this proposition and, in fact, point out that the District Court could not
enter a judgment which disregarded a material finding of fact by the jury. Id,, citing
Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores. Inc, v. Ellerman Lines. L td.. 369 U.S. 355, 364 (1962).
Likewise, a judge making equitable determinations is bound by the jury’s factual findings.
Avitia v ._Metropolitan Club of Chicago. Inc.. 49 F.3d 1219, 1231 (7th Cir. 1995). A judge
sitting in equity may not render a verdict inconsistent with a jury on a claim involving the
same essential elements. Song v. Ives Laboratories. Inc.. 957 F.2d 1041, 1048 (2d Cir.
1992). Yet that is precisely what Plaintiffs demand - that the District Court enter judgment
for the Alexanders awarding declaratory and equitable relief even though the jury explicitly
held that Mrs. Riga was not even liable to the Alexanders.11
The Rigas have searched in vain for any case in which a court has awarded injunctive
relief to a plaintiff after a jury has returned a verdict for the defendant. The FHA permits
injunctive relief where a cause of action has been proven. See 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c). There
is nothing in the FHA which permits, let alone mandates, the imposition of injunctive relief
where the cause of action has not been established and legal relief has been denied.
Plaintiffs’ assertion that equitable relief is mandatory upon a finding of discrimination is
flatly contradicted by the FHA, which, as conceded by the Justice Department, vests
discretion in the District Court. Justice Department Brief at 23. Under 42 U.S.C. §
3613(c): "if the court finds that a discriminatory housing practice has occurred or is about to
11 Plaintiffs incorrectly assert that the jury found that the Rigas discriminated against
each Plaintiff. Appellants’ Brief at 37. The jury found that Mrs. Riga discriminated against
the Alexanders. It made no finding of discrimination by Mr. Riga and no finding of
discrimination against FHP. (A917-920)
33
occur, the court , . . may grant as relief, as the court deems appropriate, any permanent or
temporary injunction, temporary restraining order, or other order . . . (emphasis added).
The Justice Department believes the District Court abused its discretion in refusing to
"hold a hearing or consider injunctive relief . . . Justice Department Brief at 23. As the
Supreme Court has stated, Plaintiffs "must satisfy the court that relief is needed. The
necessary determination is that there exists some cognizable danger of recurrent violation .
• ■" United_States v. W.T. Grant C o.. 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953). The District Court
reasonably concluded that there was no need for such a hearing or such relief. The District
Court presided over the trial and heard the testimony of numerous witnesses for Plaintiffs. It
learned through properly submitted affidavits that the Rigas had rented to two African-
Americans since this action had been commenced. (A955). Nothing prevented Plaintiffs
from offering their own affidavits in support of equitable relief. Moreover, the District
Court was aware of testimony by Steve Denson which Plaintiffs believed proved another
instance of discrimination by Mrs. Riga at about the time of the incident with the
Alexanders. (A651-653). Therefore, the District Court had available to it all of the
information which Plaintiffs would have offered at a hearing.
Weighing all of this information, it was reasonable for the District Court to conclude
that none of the vast equitable relief sought by Plaintiffs was necessary to prevent future
discrimination. There was nothing approaching the sort of pattern or practice of
discrimination which would make it an abuse of discretion for the District Court to refuse
equitable relief. Even assuming, arguendo, that all of Plaintiffs’ witnesses were credible,
Mrs. Riga showed the apartment to everyone who wanted to see it, black or white, male or
34
female, single or married with children, except for the Alexanders. Even if the excluded
testimony of Mr. Denson is considered, Mrs. Riga showed the apartment to an African-
American. (A685-689). Indeed, Mr. Denson was troubled not by anything Mrs. Riga did
or said, but by "a little bit of a difference . . . she just was not as gracious as she had
previously been." (A688). When all such evidence is considered, it was reasonable for the
District Court to refuse equitable relief.12
F. The District Court Correctly Refused To Admit The
Deposition Testimony Of A Rebuttal Witness Whose Testimony
Was Unclear And Irrelevant And Because Its Probative Value
Would Have Been Greatly Outweighed By Its Prejudicial Impact.
Plaintiffs contend that the District Court abused its discretion in refusing to admit the
deposition testimony of Mr. Denson to rebut Mrs. Riga’s testimony that a man named Steven
had accompanied two African-American students from CMU to the Darlington building to
view an apartment. (A1133). Appellants’ Brief at 42. Mr. Denson’s testimony was
properly excluded as irrelevant and because its probative value was far outweighed by its
prejudicial impact.
Plaintiffs wrongly claim that the District Court excluded the testimony because of
"unfair surprise" to the Rigas. Appellants’ Brief at 43. The Rigas never claimed unfair
12 Remarkably, Plaintiffs seek to turn their failure to prosecute their claims for equitable
relief into a waiver by the Rigas of any right to challenge such claims. Appellants’ Brief at
41. The record is clear that, despite many conferences with the District Court, Plaintiffs
never made any mention of equitable relief during the trial. Plaintiffs’ belated resurrection
of their request for such relief was a transparent attempt to recover attorneys’ fees which
were otherwise unavailable because they did not prove their legal case. That Plaintiffs are
not truly interested in such relief is reflected in their half-hearted assertion that a declaratory
judgment declaring Mrs. Riga’s conduct unlawful would be of help to FHP. Appellants’
Brief at 40, n.12. The special verdicts already serve that purpose. (A910-911).
35
surprise.13 Moreover, the District Court excluded the evidence based on relevance. It
explained its reasoning at length and read a number of excerpts from the deposition to
support its decision to preclude Mr. Denson’s testimony:
[T]he deposition not only is uncertain whether it was the Darlington apartment
or another apartment, but it seems almost clear that it was not apartment
number two at Darlington Road . . . . Now, based on all of that [referring to
the deposition excerpts] it seems clear to me, number one, that it [Denson’s
visit] happened before apartment two was ever advertised. Second, it was not
apartment number two. If it was in the Darlington building, it was another
apartment, and probably apartment number five. And, third, it is far from
certain that it was the Darlington building at all.
(A813-821). In its memorandum opinion, the District Court merely observed that Mr.
Denson was not listed as a witness. (A953). It nowhere stated that its decision to exclude
the testimony was based on unfair surprise to the Rigas. Its decision was based on unfair
prejudice.
The District Court correctly excluded the testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence
404(b) "because the court believed that the relevance of such testimony would be
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice under Federal Rule of Evidence
403." (A953). This was a reasonable conclusion. It was unclear which Riga building Mr.
Denson had visited with Mr. Snow and Mr. Bowen; and the visit occurred almost certainly
13 Plaintiffs’ imply that counsel for the Rigas, Mr. McHugh, sandbagged them by
refusing to provide location information for Mr. Denson, Michael Bowen and Chris Snow.
Appellants’ Brief at 42-43. This is unfair of Plaintiffs. In their own Amended Pretrial
Narrative Statement, filed nearly one year prior to trial, Plaintiffs identified Mr. Denson and
they listed Mr. Bowen and Mr. Snow as witnesses, including their addresses. They also
described the likely testimony of Mr. Bowen and Mr. Snow. If Plaintiffs chose not to
conduct their own investigation to learn Mr. Denson’s address, that is no fault of Mr.
McHugh, who had no obligation to provide such information. Mr. Denson told Mr.
McHugh that he had taken Bowen and Snow to the Rigas’ Alderson building. (A827). The
District Court had ruled that the Alderson building was irrelevant. (A827).
36
in July 1995, well before the incidents at issue in this case. Moreover, as noted earlier, Mr.
Denson had nothing concrete to offer about Mrs. Riga’s conduct, only that she seemed less
friendly than she had on a previous visit. The District Court properly excluded his
testimony. And even if it were error to exclude the testimony, it was harmless error. As the
District Court observed, Mr. Denson’s testimony turned out to be even more irrelevant than
originally believed because his testimony bore only on whether Mrs. Riga engaged in
discriminatory conduct. Even without the benefit of Mr. Denson’s vague testimony, the jury
concluded that Mrs. Riga had discriminated. (A953-954). Accordingly, Mr. Denson’s
testimony could not have added anything to the case.
G. The District Court Correctly Determined That Plaintiffs
Were Not Prevailing Parties Because Plaintiffs In No Way
Altered The Legal Relationship Between The Parties.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2), "the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing
party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee and costs." 42 U.S.C. §
3613(c)(2) (1994). As the term "prevailing party" suggests, attorney’s fees and costs are not
awarded to civil rights plaintiffs without regard to whether they won or lost their lawsuit.
Such plaintiffs must prevail on some "‘significant issue in the litigation which achieved some
of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit . . . . ’" Texas State Teachers v. Garland
Indep. School D ist.. 489 U.S. 782, 791-92 (1989), quoting with approval Nadeau v.
Hglgemoe. 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir. 1978). As the Supreme Court stated in Farrar v.
Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992):
The plaintiff must obtain an enforceable judgment against the defendant from whom
fees are sought . . . . A plaintiff ‘prevails’ when actual relief on the merits of his
claim materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the
defendant’s behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff . . . . To be sure, a
37
judicial pronouncement that the defendant has violated the Constitution,
unaccompanied by an enforceable judgment on the merits, does not render the
plaintiff a prevailing party. Of itself, ‘the moral satisfaction [that] results from any
favorable statement of law’ cannot bestow prevailing party status. No material
alteration of the legal relationship between the parties occurs until the plaintiff
becomes entitled to enforce a judgment, consent decree or settlement against the
defendant.
Id , 506 U.S. at 111-13.
There was no conceivable basis for the District Court to have deemed the Plaintiffs
prevailing parties. Judgment was entered against the Alexanders and FHP obtained no relief;
there was no material alteration of the legal relationship between Plaintiffs and Defendants.
The jury’s determination that Mrs. Riga discriminated against the Alexanders did not result
in a legally enforceable judgment against her. Such a finding at best provided nothing more
to the Alexanders than what the Supreme Court described as "moral satisfaction" which is
insufficient to bestow prevailing party status. And in light of the jury’s and the District
Court’s award of no relief of any kind to FHP, it obtained no "actual relief" on its claim.
Without citing to any authority, Plaintiffs assert that proof of an FHA violation absolutely
entitles them to an award of costs. Appellants’ Brief at 46. The Supreme Court’s opinion in
Farrar demonstrates otherwise.
Moreover, even if the Alexanders were somehow deemed prevailing parties, they
received zero dollars in damages, an amount far below the Rule 68 offer of judgment for
$20,000 served and filed by the Rigas in October of 1996. As such, pursuant to Rule 68,
the Alexanders cannot recover their post-offer costs and the Rigas are entitled to recover
their post-offer costs from the Alexanders. See Crossman v. Marcoccio. 806 F.2d 329 (1st
38
Cir. 1986); Knight v. Snap-On Tools Corp.. 3 F.3d 1398 (10th Cir. 1993); O’Brien v. City
of Greers Ferry, 873 F.2d 1115 (8th Cir. 19891.
V m . ARGUMENT IN CROSS APPEAL 98-3622
A. The District Court Erred In Denying Summary Judgment Against
The Alexanders When The Uncontroverted Evidence Indicated
That The Alexanders Could Not Prove A P rim a F acie Case.
In June of 1997, the Rigas moved for summary judgment against Plaintiffs. The
complaint against the Rigas was strictly a disparate treatment claim, as the District Court
recognized and the Plaintiffs have never disputed. (A953). The Rigas moved for summary
judgment against the Alexanders based on uncontested evidence indicating that the
Alexanders were not financially qualified to rent the Apartment. (A39). The District Court
denied the motion, finding that there was a dispute as to whether the Rigas would have
conducted a credit check. (A151). This was error. The burden was on Plaintiffs to prove
that they were qualified, not on the Rigas to prove that they would have done a credit check.
The test enunciated by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.
411 U.S. 792 (1973), applies to disparate treatment claims such as those the Alexanders
brought under the FHA. See Chauhan v. M. Alfieri Co.. Inc.. 897 F.2d 123, 126-27 (3d
Cir. 1989) (following the lead of other circuits which have applied the McDonnell Douglas
test to such claims).14 Under McDonnell Douglas, the Alexanders must first make out a
14 At the time the summary judgment motion was filed, the Alexanders were pursuing
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1982, as well as the FHA. Plaintiffs dismissed the
Section 1981 and 1982 claims on the eve of trial. Chauhan involved only a Section 1981
claim, but this Court recognized that the McDonnell Douglas formula has been applied to
claims under the FHA and Sections 1981 and 1982 as well. I d at 126-27. Indeed, this
Court explicitly noted that it was following the lead of those circuits which have applied the
formula "to the leasing context." I d
39
prima facie case by proving that: (1) they are members of a protected class; (2) they
attempted to lease the Apartment; (3) they were qualified applicants; and (4) the Apartment
was still available after they applied. Chauhan. 897 F.2d at 127.
At the time the Alexanders’ allegedly tried to view the Apartment, they had defaulted
on numerous credit accounts. Documentary evidence of this fact, submitted with the
summary judgment motion, was undisputed. (A70-111). Given the state of their credit as
of September of 1995, the Alexanders were patently unqualified for the Apartment. As of
September of 1995, the Rigas had Landlord Service Bureau do such credit checks. (A63-
66). Without exception, Landlord Service Bureau rejects applicants who have ever been late
in making a payment on a credit account. (A67-69). The Rigas always followed such
recommendations. (A63-66). The Alexanders by their own admission had, by September of
1995, defaulted many times on many different accounts. (A45-62). Thus, if the Alexanders
had applied for the Apartment using their real names, they would have been rejected as
uncreditworthy. Because the Alexanders were not qualified for the Apartment, they could
not establish a prima facie case of housing discrimination under the FHA or Section 1981 or
Section 1982. Thus, their claims should have been dismissed.15
15 The District Court noted that the Alexanders were not required to prove they were
qualified to rent the Apartment in order to prevail on their claim that they were denied the
opportunity to view the Apartment based on their race in violation of the FHA. (A151-152).
This too was error. The District Court failed to consider the need to prove that such a
violation was a legal cause of harm. Because the Alexanders were unqualified to rent the
Apartment, nothing that Mrs. Riga did or did not do could have been the legal cause of
harm.
40
B. The District Court Erred In Denying Summary Judgment
Against FHP For Lack Of Standing When FIIP Had No Injury
In Fact And Its Role In The Litigation Was Gratuitous.
FHP claimed it had been damaged because: (i) its resources were diverted in order to
investigate the Alexanders’ discrimination claim and (ii) it had been denied truthful and
accurate information from Defendants as to the availability of housing. (A29-30). The
Rigas moved for summary judgment against FHP because neither type of alleged damage is
sufficient to confer standing. The District Court disagreed, finding that diversion of
resources to this litigation was a sufficient injury in fact and that Mrs. Riga’s treatment of
FHP tester Daria Mitchell might have violated the FHA provision making it unlawful to
represent to anyone on the basis of race that an apartment is unavailable. (A157-159). This
was error because any harm to FHP was self-inflicted.
Standing involves "whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits
of the dispute or of particular issues." Warth v. Seldin. 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). Unless
FHP has suffered some threatened or actual injury, a district court lacks jurisdiction to hear
its claim. L± at 498-99. The first requirement for FHP to have standing is that it suffer
injury in fact, defined as an invasion of a legally-protected interest which is concrete and
particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Luian v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). For an organization such as FHP to establish injury in
fact, it must show "concrete and demonstrable injury to [its] activities." Havens Realty
£o£P, v. Coleman. 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982). It is not enough that FHP may have suffered
some "setback to [its] abstract social interests." Id
41
FHP cannot establish injury in fact. FHP claimed that its resources were diverted
because it had incurred expense testing and suing the Rigas. (A29). In other words, the
resources it expended on the investigation for the purpose of assisting the Alexanders’
litigation created the injury in fact which it believed gave it standing to sue. This argument
was rejected last year by this Court. See Fair Housing Council of Suburban Philadelphia v.
Montgomery Newspapers. 141 F.3d 71 (3d Cir. 1998).
In Montgomery Newspapers, this Court specifically rejected the Fair Housing
Council’s argument that "the diversion of resources to litigation is alone sufficient to confer
standing under Article HI." IcL at 78. In reaching its decision, this Court approved of the
reasoning of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Spann v Colonial
Village. Inc.. 899 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1990) and Fair Employment Council of Greater
Washington. Inc, v. BMC Marketing Corp.. 28 F.3d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1994). I d at 79.
Summarizing the import of Spann and BMC, this Court held: "the pursuit of litigation alone
cannot constitute an injury sufficient to establish standing under Article H I." I d at 80.
This Court’s holding in Montgomery Newspapers is both fair and reasonable. If the pursuit
of litigation could confer standing,
the time and money that plaintiffs spend in bringing suit against a defendant would
itself constitute a sufficient ‘injury in fact,’ a circular position that would effectively
abolish the [injury in fact] requirement altogether. Indeed an organization devoted
exclusively to advancing more rigorous enforcement of selected laws could secure
standing simply by showing that one alleged illegality had deflected it from pursuit of
another . . . .
BMCMarketing Corp.. 28 F.3d at 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
The only other damage claimed by FHP was that it was "denied truthful and accurate
information from Defendants as to availability of housing . . . ." (A29). As a logical
42
matter, FHP cannot be damaged in that way. Presumably, all housing offered for rent is
available to all regardless of race. What FHP is really claiming is that its mission of
insuring there are no properties closed to African-Americans was frustrated by the Rigas’
alleged misconduct. This too is insufficient to confer standing. See Sierra Club v, Morton.
405 U.S. 727 (1972). In that case, the Sierra Club sought to enjoin development of a ski
resort in a national forest and claimed standing based on its interest in preserving wilderness,
an interest which would be impaired if the development went forward. Sierra Club. 405
U.S. at 739. The Supreme Court denied standing, noting that "if a ‘special interest’ in this
subject were enough to entitle the Sierra Club to commence this litigation, there would
appear to be no objective basis upon which to disallow a suit by any other bona fide ‘special
interest’ organization . . . ." IdL Similarly, FHP, in claiming damage due to misinformation
about housing, bases its claim to standing on its special interest in equal housing opportunity.
But one can think of any of a number of other organizations (for example, the NAACP)
which share such an interest. Just as the NAACP has no standing to sue the Rigas, FHP
lacks standing. There has been no direct injury to the NAACP and there has been no direct
injury to FHP.
Finally, FHP did not prove any ripple effects from the Rigas’ alleged discriminatory
conduct which might have perceptibly impaired its program. FHP genetically claimed that it
would have to engage in outreach to counteract the effect of discrimination "such as" Mrs.
Riga’s conduct. See Affidavit of Andrea Biinn attached to FH P’s Brief in Opposition to the
Rigas’ Summary Judgment Motion. (A ll, Docket Entry 45). But it offered no specific
evidence of any outreach conducted in response to Mrs. Riga’s conduct. The only specific
43
damages identified in response to the summary judgment motion were damages from
investigating the Rigas. Id. At the summary judgment stage, FHP could no longer rest on
"bare allegations of damage . . . Montgomery Newspapers. 141 F.3d at 78.16
FH P’s lack of standing, its lack of any legitimate interest in the case, is further
evident from the wholly gratuitous nature of its involvement. Any harm to FHP was self-
inflicted. FHP claims it had no choice but to get involved, like an ambulance responding to
an accident. (A1162-1163). The more apt analogy is of an ambulance responding to an
accident even though it already knows the victims are en route to the hospital in their own
cars. Any discrimination had already been established by the Alexanders and Robin
McDonough before FHP was even consulted. (A49, A119-121). FHP’s involvement was
pointless, unless trying to create a cause of action for itself is deemed a legitimate objective.
C. The District Court Erred In Excluding Evidence Of The Alexanders’
Poor Credit And Their History Of Deception In A Case In Which
Credit-Worthiness And Credibility Were Of Central Importance.
Because the Alexanders were obligated to prove that they were qualified to rent the
Rigas’ apartment, their credit history was directly at issue in this case. Thus, evidence
related to the Alexanders’ qualifications to rent the Apartment was relevant and probative; its
admission was essential to permit the jury to determine whether the Alexanders could prove
by a preponderance of the evidence one of the elements of their claims. The District Court
abused its discretion in excluding such evidence. Moreover, because the Alexanders claimed
16 Indeed, even at trial, FHP could do no more than make assertions and engage in
speculation about the effect of discrimination in the marketplace. See Andrea Blinn
Testimony at A665.
44
they were at the Apartment and Mrs. Riga claimed she had never met the Alexanders until
this lawsuit was filed, the case turned largely on credibility. Thus, the District Court abused
its discretion in refusing to admit evidence of the Alexanders’ mendacity.
The Rigas sought to cross-examine the Alexanders regarding a number of falsehoods.
The Rigas’ proffer included evidence that Mr. Alexander lied on employment applications
about degrees he had not received and impermissibly listed his wife as a references by using
her maiden name; that he submitted a credit application using a false social security number;
that the Alexanders defrauded Equitable Gas in order to obtain gas service, which they
otherwise would have been denied due to their poor credit history with Equitable Gas; and
that Mrs. Alexander submitted a rental application in which she falsely stated that she had
not been delinquent on any credit payments for 60 days or more and that credit collection
procedures had never been instituted against her. (A249-252). The cross-examination the
Rigas sought to conduct is expressly permitted by Rule 608(b) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.
Under Rule 608(b), "[sjpecific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose
of attacking or supporting the witness’ credibility . . . may not be proved by extrinsic
evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or
untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness . . . concerning the
witness’ character for truthfulness or untruthfulness." The Advisory Committee Notes make
clear that "[p]articular instances of conduct, though not the subject of criminal conviction,
may be inquired into on cross-examination of the principal witness . . . . Effective cross-
examination demands that some allowance be made for going into matters of this kind."
45
Adv. Comm. Note to Subdivision (b) of Rule 608, 1972 Proposed Rules. In 1974, Rule
608(b) was amended to delete a requirement that incidents not be remote in time,
"emphasiz[ing] the discretionary power of the court." IdL, 1974 Enactment. Put
differently, ”[i]n order to encourage flexibility, Congress deleted this requirement." U.S. v.
Jackson. 882 F.2d 1444, 1448 (9th Cir. 1989).
The Rigas did not seek to use extrinsic evidence. Such evidence is "evidence offered
through other witnesses, rather than through cross-examination of the witness himself or
herself." LLS..._y_-._McNeill, 887 F.2d 448, 453 (3d Cir. 1989). The prohibition against the
use of extrinsic evidence "has been interpreted to prohibit the admission into evidence of
documents or testimony by another witness to prove prior misconduct not resulting in
conviction." Jackson. 882 F.2d at 1448. It does not prohibit the cross-examination of the
witness himself about prior misconduct or the use of extrinsic documents in that cross-
examination. Thus, in McNeill, cross-examination of the witness about prior misconduct by
the witness was not "extrinsic evidence" and could not be barred as such. IcL The trial
court’s decision to bar the cross-examination was proper in that case not because it was
extrinsic evidence (it was not) but because the court had allowed inquiry into the witness’
credibility in a number of other ways. Id. at 453.
Nor should the Rigas’ evidence have been excluded because it was not related to the
Alexanders’ action. There is no requirement that impeaching evidence elicited on cross-
examination be somehow derived from or based on the underlying action. What is important
is that it be probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness. In Jackson, the defendant was
charged with conspiracy and fraud - not misappropriating client funds, the subject of the
46
impeaching evidence. Indeed, it is quite inconceivable how the 14-year-old evidence of
misconduct which was allowed on cross-examination could be tied to the underlying case.
The pertinent fact was that misappropriation of client funds directly reflected on the
defendant’s honesty. See also Chnapkova v. Koh. 958 F.2d 79, 82 (2d Cir. 1993) (medical
malpractice case in which cross-examination regarding failure to file income tax returns was
permitted as "obviously a matter which affects the witness’s credibility").
Decisions by this Court reflect that the subject of cross-examination need not be based
on or derived from the subject of the underlying action. See e .g .. U.S. v, Beros. 833 F.2d
455 (3d Cir. 1987). In Beros, a defendant accused of embezzlement was properly cross-
examined about a lie he had made on an application for a Nevada marriage license. I d at
463. This Court stated that "[t]he propriety of the district court’s exercise of discretion in
this matter is too evident to merit discussion." I d It could not be disputed that "Beros’s
character and honesty were central issues to his case. Further, when he took the stand, he
subjected his credibility to scrutiny as do all witnesses." I d Nor did this Court give much
credit to a claim that the evidence was unduly prejudicial:
The evidence in question may well have tended to demonstrate
Beros’s capacity for untruthfulness, but that is the legitimate
purpose for which it was offered. We are aware that the
detriment to his credibility that Beros suffered as the result of
the admission of this evidence may have been great, given the
magnitude of his attempted falsehood. We are unpersuaded,
however, that because of this significance the evidence should
have been excluded. We agree with the district court that there
was no genuine potential for unfair prejudice to Beros as the
result of the admission of the evidence.
47
Id at 464 (emphasis in original). See also U.S. v. Rosa. 891 F.2d 1063 (3d Cir. 1989)
(cocaine distribution case in which cross-examination was permitted regarding a fraudulent
insurance claim).
In the present case, the Alexanders took the stand to tell their side of the story. By
doing so, they placed their credibility in issue. As in Chnapkova and other cases cited
above, credibility is central to this case. The Rigas’ first defense was that Mrs. Riga had
never met the Alexanders before this lawsuit was filed. It was the Alexanders’ word against
Mrs. Riga’s. Because the Rigas were denied the opportunity to cross-examine the
Alexanders on specific prior misconduct probative of truthfulness, they were deprived of a
meaningful opportunity to defend themselves.
D. The District Court Erred In Refusing To Award Costs To The Rigas.
The District Court entered judgment for the Rigas against the Alexanders but refused
to award the Rigas costs pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54. (A960). The
District Court stated that "regardless whether defendants were, technically, the prevailing
parties as to the Alexanders" there "should be some consequence to the Rigas" given the
jury’s finding that Mrs. Riga had violated the FHA. (A960). This was an abuse of
discretion. Not only was judgment entered against the Alexanders, FHP received no relief of
any kind. The magnitude of Plaintiffs’ loss is particularly striking when considered in light
of the fact that the Alexanders rejected an offer of judgment for $20,000.
And regardless of the District Court’s exercise of discretion under Rule 54, it should
have awarded the Rigas’ post-offer costs under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68. See
Crossman v. Marcoccio. 806 F.2d 329 (1st Cir. 1986); Knight v. Snap-On Tools Corp.. 3
48
F.3d 1398 (10th Cir. 1993); O ’Brien v. City of Greers Ferrv. 873 F.2d 1115 (8th Cir.
1989). There is no discretionary language in Rule 68. It states simply that "[i]f the
judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the offeree
must pay the costs incurred after the making of the offer." Fed. R. Civ. P. 68. The District
Court had no discretion to refuse to award the Rigas their post-offer costs.
IX. CONCLUSION
The District Court s Order dated March 10, 1998 should be reversed and remanded
with directions to enter summary judgment in favor of the Rigas and against Plaintiffs,
together with costs. Alternatively, the District Court’s Judgment and Order dated October 9,
1998 should be affirmed in all respects with one exception: Plaintiffs should be required to
pay the Rigas’ costs. If a new trial is ordered, the District Court’s decision excluding the
Rigas’ proffered evidence regarding credit history and credibility should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
Thomas M. Hardiman
Pa. I.D. #65252
Joseph P. McHugh
Pa. I.D. #77489
TITUS & MCCONOMY LLP
Firm #662
Twentieth Floor
Four Gateway Center
Pittsburgh, PA 15222
(412) 642-2000
DATED: June 29, 1999 Counsel for Appellees/Cross-Appellants
49
I N THE UNITED STATES D I S T R I C T COURT
FOR THE WESTERN D I S T R I C T OF PENNSYLVANIA
RONALD ALEXANDER, FAYE )
ALEXANDER a n d t h e F A I R )
HOUSING PA RTNERSH IP OF )
GREATER PITTSBURGH, I N C . , )
)
P l a i n t i f f s , )
)
v s - ) C i v i l A c t i o n N o . 9 6 - 4 9
)
JOSEPH RIGA a n d MARIA A . RIG A , )
a / k / a CARLA A G N O T T I , )
)
D e f e n d a n t s )
MEMORANDUM
I
I n t h i s c i v i l a c t i o n , p l a i n t i f f s , R o n a l d A l e x a n d e r ,
Faye A l e x a n d e r a n d t h e F a i r H o u s i n g P a r t n e r s h i p o f G r e a t e r
P i t t s b u r g h , I n c . , s e e k d a m a g e s f r o m d e f e n d a n t s , J o s e p h R i g a a n d
Maria A. R i g a , u n d e r t h e F a i r H o u s i n g A c t , T i t l e V I I I o f t h e
C i v i l R i g h t s A c t o f 1 9 6 8 , 4 2 U . S . C . § 3 6 0 1 e t s e ^ . , 1 a l l e g i n g
t h a t d e f e n d a n t s d i s c r i m i n a t e d a g a i n s t t h e i n d i v i d u a l p l a i n t i f f s
on t h e b a s i s o f t h e i r r a c e i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e i n d i v i d u a l
1- The F a i r H o u s i n g A c t p r o h i b i t s d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n t h e s a l e o r
r e n t a l o f h o u s i n g , i n c l u d i n g t h e r e f u s a l t o n e g o t i a t e f o r t h e
r e n t a l o f , o r o t h e r w i s e m a k e u n a v a i l a b l e o r d e n y , a d w e l l i n g t o
anY P e r s o n b e c a u s e o f r a c e ; t o d i s c r i m i n a t e a g a i n s t a n y p e r s o n i n
the t e r m s , c o n d i t i o n s o r p r i v i l e g e s o f r e n t a l o f a d w e l l i n g
e c a u s e o f r a c e ; o r t o r e p r e s e n t t o a n y p e r s o n b e c a u s e o f r a c e
"•hat a n y d w e l l i n g i s n o t a v a i l a b l e f o r i n s p e c t i o n , s a l e o r r e n t a l
when s u c h d w e l l i n g i s , i n f a c t , s o a v a i l a b l e . S e e 42 U . S . C .
§§ 3604 (a) , (b ) a n d (d ) .
p l a i n t i f f s ' a t t e m p t s t o v i e w a r e n t a l p r o p e r t y o w n e d b y
d e f e n d a n t s . T h e i n d i v i d u a l p l a i n t i f f s a l s o a s s e r t a c l a i m
a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t s f o r r a c e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n u n d e r S e c t i o n s 1 9 8 1
and 1 9 8 2 o f t h e C i v i l R i g h t s A c t o f 1 8 6 6 , 4 2 U . S . C . §§ 1 9 8 1 a n d
1 9 8 2 . 2 P r e s e n t l y , b e f o r e t h e c o u r t i s d e f e n d a n t s ' m o t i o n f o r
summ ary j u d g m e n t p u r s u a n t t o F e d . R . C i v . P . 5 6 . F o r t h e r e a s o n s
s e t f o r t h b e l o w , t h e m o t i o n w i l l b e d e n i e d .
2. T h e s e s t a t u t e s p r o v i d e :
§ 1981. Equal rights under the law
(a) Statement of equal rights
A l l p e r s o n s w i t h i n t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n o f t h e U n i t e d
S t a t e s s h a l l h a v e t h e s a m e r i g h t i n e v e r y S t a t e a n d
T e r r i t o r y t o m a k e a n d e n f o r c e c o n t r a c t s , t o s u e , b e
p a r t i e s , g i v e e v i d e n c e , a n d t o t h e f u l l a n d e q u a l
b e n e f i t o f a l l l a w s a n d p r o c e e d i n g s f o r t h e s e c u r i t y o f
p e r s o n s a n d p r o p e r t y a s i s e n j o y e d b y w h i t e c i t i z e n s ,
a n d s h a l l b e s u b j e c t t o l i k e p u n i s h m e n t , p a i n s ,
p e n a l t i e s , t a x e s , l i c e n s e s , a n d e x a c t i o n s o f e v e r y
k i n d , a n d t o n o o t h e r .
42 U . S . C . § 1 9 8 1 .
§ 1982. Property rights of citizens
A l l c i t i z e n s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s s h a l l h a v e t h e s a m e
r i g h t , i n e v e r y S t a t e a n d T e r r i t o r y , a s i s e n j o y e d b y
w h i t e c i t i z e n s t h e r e o f t o i n h e r i t , p u r c h a s e , l e a s e ,
s e l l , h o l d , a n d c o n v e y r e a l a n d p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y .
42 U . S . C . § 1 9 8 2 .
2
I I
F o r p u r p o s e s o f t h e p r e s e n t m o t i o n , t h e f o l l o w i n g f a c t s
a r e u n d i s p u t e d : 3
P l a i n t i f f s R o n a l d A l e x a n d e r a n d F a y e A l e x a n d e r
( c o l l e c t i v e l y , t h e A l e x a n d e r s ) , h u s b a n d a n d w i f e , a r e A f r o -
A m e r i c a n . D e f e n d a n t s J o s e p h R i g a a n d M a r i a R i g a ( c o l l e c t i v e l y ,
t h e R i g a s ) , h u s b a n d a n d w i f e , a r e C a u c a s i a n . T h e R i g a s a r e t h e
ow ners o f s i x r e n t a l p r o p e r t i e s i n t h e C i t y o f P i t t s b u r g h ,
i n c l u d i n g a f i v e - u n i t d w e l l i n g l o c a t e d a t 5 8 3 9 D a r l i n g t o n R o a d i n
t h e S q u i r r e l H i l l s e c t i o n o f t h e C i t y o f P i t t s b u r g h t h a t w a s
p u r c h a s e d b y t h e R i g a s i n M a y , 1 9 9 5 . ( P l a i n t i f f s ' A p p e n d i x i n
O p p o s i t i o n , E x h . 6 , p p . 1 1 - 1 3 , 2 4 ) .
On S u n d a y , S e p t e m b e r 1 7 , 1 9 9 5 , M r . A l e x a n d e r s a w a n a d
in t h e P i t t s b u r g h P o s t - G a z e t t e , a d v e r t i s i n g a u n i t f o r r e n t i n
the R i g a s ' D a r l i n g t o n R o a d p r o p e r t y . 4 M r s . A l e x a n d e r c a l l e d t h e
3 - As t h e y m u s t , d e f e n d a n t s a c c e p t a s t r u e a n y f a c t s p l e a d e d b y
P l a i n t i f f s r e g a r d i n g t h e a l l e g e d e f f o r t s o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l
P l a i n t i f f s a n d i n d i v i d u a l s a c t i n g o n b e h a l f o f t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l
p l a i n t i f f t o v i e w a n a p a r t m e n t a d v e r t i s e d f o r r e n t b y d e f e n d a n t s
t o r p u r p o s e s o f t h e i r s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t m o t i o n . ( D e f e n d a n t s '
®r i e f i n S u p p o r t , p . 2 ) . N e v e r t h e l e s s , d e f e n d a n t s m a i n t a i n t h a t
Lhey a r e e n t i t l e d t o a j u d g m e n t i n t h e i r f a v o r a s t o a l l c l a i m s
as s e r t e d i n p l a i n t i f f s ' a m e n d e d c o m p l a i n t .
4l The a p a r t m e n t a d v e r t i s e d f o r r e n t i n t h i s f i v e - u n i t b u i l d i n g
Was A p a r t m e n t N o . 2 . ( D e f e n d a n t s ' M o t i o n f o r S u m m a r y J u d g m e n t ,
( c o n t i n u e d . . . )
3
t e l e p h o n e n u m b e r i n t h e a d t o m a k e a n a p p o i n t m e n t t o s e e t h e
a p a r t m e n t , a n d s h e s p o k e t o a wom an n a m e d M a r i a . 5 A n a p p o i n t m e n t
t o s e e t h e a p a r t m e n t w a s s c h e d u l e d f o r t h e n e x t d a y , S e p t e m b e r
18, 1 9 9 5 , a t 1 2 : 0 0 p . m . D u e t o M r . A l e x a n d e r ' s w o r k s c h e d u l e ,
h o w e v e r , t h e A l e x a n d e r s c h a n g e d t h e a p p o i n t m e n t t o 1 : 0 0 p . m .
( P l a i n t i f f s ' A p p e n d i x i n O p p o s i t i o n , E x h . 1 , p . 5 3 , E x h . 2 , p p .
15-16) .
On S e p t e m b e r 1 8 , 1 9 9 5 , t h e A l e x a n d e r s w e n t t o t h e
R i g a s ' D a r l i n g t o n R o a d p r o p e r t y t o v i e w t h e a p a r t m e n t a t t h e
s c h e d u l e d t i m e , p a r k i n g i n f r o n t o f t h e p r o p e r t y a d j a c e n t t o t h e
R i g a s ' p r o p e r t y . S h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r , M r s . R i g a d r o v e u p
D a r l i n g t o n R o a d i n a d a r k c o l o r e d J e e p - l i k e v e h i c l e , a n d s h e
p a r k e d i n t h e d r i v e w a y o f h e r D a r l i n g t o n R o a d p r o p e r t y . M r s .
Riga w a l k e d u p t o t h e A l e x a n d e r s ' c a r , t a p p e d o n t h e d r i v e r ' s
window a n d i n f o r m e d t h e A l e x a n d e r s t h a t t h e y s h o u l d n o t h a v e
c hanged t h e t i m e o f t h e i r a p p o i n t m e n t t o s e e t h e a p a r t m e n t
b e c a u s e s h e h a d r e n t e d t h e a p a r t m e n t i n t h e m e a n t i m e . M r s . R i g a s
to l d t h e A l e x a n d e r s t h a t s h e h a d t r i e d t o c a l l t h e m t o t e l l t h e m
4 - ( • . . c o n t i n u e d )
Exh. d , P l a i n t i f f s ' A p p e n d i x i n O p p o s i t i o n , E x h . 6 , p . 1 6 ) .
"' ^ e t e l e p h o n e n u m b e r i n t h e P i t t s b u r g h P o s t - G a z e t t e a d w a s
(412) 9 6 3 - 8 7 0 6 , w h i c h i s t h e R i g a s ' u n l i s t e d t e l e p h o n e n u m b e r .
P l a i n t i f f s ' A p p e n d i x i n O p p o s i t i o n , E x h . 6 , p . 2 4 ) .
4
t h a t t h e a p a r t m e n t h a d b e e n r e n t e d ; h o w e v e r , w h e n t h e A l e x a n d e r s
s u b s e q u e n t l y c h e c k e d t h e m e s s a g e s o n t h e i r t e l e p h o n e a n s w e r i n g
m a c h i n e , t h e r e w a s n o m e s s a g e f r o m M r s . R i g a . ( P l a i n t i f f s '
A p p e n d i x i n O p p o s i t i o n , E x h . 1 , p p , 5 7 , 9 9 - 1 0 2 ) .
On S u n d a y , S e p t e m b e r 2 4 , 1 9 9 5 , M r . A l e x a n d e r s a w
a n o t h e r a d i n t h e P i t t s b u r g h P o s t - G a z e t t e f o r t h e a p a r t m e n t i n
the R i g a s ' D a r l i n g t o n R o a d p r o p e r t y , a n d , i n r e s p o n s e t o t h i s a d ,
Mr. A l e x a n d e r a s k e d a f r i e n d , R o b i n M c D o n o u g h , a w h i t e f e m a l e , t o
c a l l t h e t e l e p h o n e n u m b e r i n t h e a d t o s c h e d u l e a n a p p o i n t m e n t t o
see t h e a p a r t m e n t . 6 M s . M c D o n o u g h s p o k e t o a w o m a n a n d s c h e d u l e d
an a p p o i n t m e n t t o s e e t h e a p a r t m e n t o n S e p t e m b e r 2 7 , 1 9 9 5 ;
how ever , M s . M c D o n o u g h d i d n o t k e e p t h i s a p p o i n t m e n t .
( P l a i n t i f f s ' A p p e n d i x i n O p p o s i t i o n , E x h . 1 , p p . 1 0 4 - 1 0 5 , E x h . 8 ,
P- 10 , E x h . 9 ) .
B e c a u s e M r . A l e x a n d e r w a s a n g r y t h a t M s . M c D o n o u g h h a d
been g i v e n a n a p p o i n t m e n t t o s e e t h e a p a r t m e n t , w h i c h w a s
a l l e g e d l y r e n t e d w h e n t h e A l e x a n d e r s a t t e m p t e d t o v i e w i t o n
Se p tem b e r 1 8 , 1 9 9 5 , h e c a l l e d t h e t e l e p h o n e n u m b e r i n t h e
5; E x h i b i t Q t o d e f e n d a n t s ' m o t i o n f o r s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t i s a
Pittsburgh P o s t - G a z e t t e i n v o i c e d e m o n s t r a t i n g t h a t M r s . R i g a
a<i v e r t i s e d A p a r t m e n t N o . 2 f o r r e n t i n t h e P i t t s b u r g h P o s t -
G a z e t t e o n S e p t e m b e r 2 4 , 1 9 9 5 . A c c o r d i n g t o t h e R i g a s , t h e
A l e x a n d e r s p r o d u c e d t h i s i n v o i c e . ( D e f e n d a n t s ' M o t i o n f o r
Summary J u d g m e n t , p . 1 5 ) .
5
n e w s p a p e r a d o n S e p t e m b e r 2 6 , 1 9 9 5 a n d s c h e d u l e d a n a p p o i n t m e n t
u n d e r t h e f i c t i t i o u s n a m e , J a m e s I r w i n , t o s e e t h e a p a r t m e n t o n
S e p t e m b e r 2 9 , 1 9 9 5 a t 1 1 : 3 0 a . m . ( P l a i n t i f f s ' A p p e n d i x i n
O p p o s i t i o n , E x h . 1 , p p . 1 0 5 - 1 0 6 ) .
M r . A l e x a n d e r d r o v e t o t h e R i g a s ' D a r l i n g t o n R o a d
p r o p e r t y o n S e p t e m b e r 2 9 , 1 9 9 5 , p a r k e d a r o u n d t h e c o r n e r f r o m t h e
p r o p e r t y a n d w a l k e d t o i t . M r s . R i g a w a s s i t t i n g o n t h e f r o n t
s t e p s o f t h e p r o p e r t y , a n d , w h e n M r . A l e x a n d e r i n d i c a t e d t h a t h e
was t h e r e t o s e e t h e a p a r t m e n t , M r s . R i g a s t a t e d t h a t s h e h a d
f o r g o t t e n h e r k e y s . 7 When M r . A l e x a n d e r a s k e d M r s . R i g a i f h e
c o u l d m a k e a n o t h e r a p p o i n t m e n t t o s e e t h e a p a r t m e n t , s h e t o l d h i m
to c a l l h e r . A s M r . A l e x a n d e r s t a r t e d t o w a l k d o w n t h e s t e p s t o
the d r i v e w a y t o l e a v e t h e p r o p e r t y , M r s . R i g a g o t u p f r o m t h e
f r o n t s t e p s o f t h e p r o p e r t y a n d e n t e r e d t h e p r o p e r t y b y u s i n g h e r
keys . M r . A l e x a n d e r t h e n w e n t h o m e a n d c o n t a c t e d h i s a t t o r n e y ,
C a r o l i n e M i t c h e l l , a s w e l l a s A n d r e a B l i n n o f t h e d e f e n d a n t F a i r
Hous ing P a r t n e r s h i p o f G r e a t e r P i t t s b u r g h , I n c . ( F a i r H o u s i n g
'• I n t h i s c o n n e c t i o n , M r . A l e x a n d e r t e s t i f i e d d u r i n g h i s
d e p o s i t i o n t h a t , w h e n h e w a l k e d u p t o M r s . R i g a o n S e p t e m b e r 2 9 ,
1995, " s h e p u t h e r h a n d s , l i k e , o v e r h e r k e y s , a n d s h e s a i d I
f o r g o t my k e y s . " ( P l a i n t i f f s ' A p p e n d i x i n O p p o s i t i o n , E x h . 1 , p .
109) .
6
P a r t n e r s h i p ) , c o n c e r n i n g h i s p e r c e i v e d d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . 8
( P l a i n t i f f s - A p p e n d i x i n O p p o s i t i o n , E x h . 1 , p p . 1 0 6 , 1 0 9 - 1 1 4 ) .
M r . A l e x a n d e r c a l l e d M r s . R i g a a p p r o x i m a t e l y n i n e t i m e s
a f t e r S e p t e m b e r 2 9 , 1 9 9 5 i n a n a t t e m p t t o s c h e d u l e a n o t h e r
a p p o i n t m e n t t o s e e t h e a d v e r t i s e d a p a r t m e n t i n t h e R i g a s '
D a r l i n g t o n R o a d p r o p e r t y . W hen M r . A l e x a n d e r ' s t e l e p h o n e c a l l s
were a n s w e r e d b y a w o m a n , s h e t o l d h i m t h a t t h e a p a r t m e n t h a d
been r e n t e d , a n d , w h e n M r . A l e x a n d e r l e f t m e s s a g e s o n t h e R i g a s '
t e l e p h o n e a n s w e r i n g m a c h i n e , h i s c a l l s w e r e n o t r e t u r n e d .
( P l a i n t i f f s ' A p p e n d i x i n O p p o s i t i o n , E x h . 1 , p p . 1 1 5 - 1 1 6 ) .
On S e p t e m b e r 2 9 , 1 9 9 5 , J e f f r e y L a n g , a w h i t e m a l e ,
c a l l e d M r s . R i g a a n d l e f t a m e s s a g e o n h e r t e l e p h o n e a n s w e r i n g
m ac h ine , i n d i c a t i n g t h a t h e w a n t e d t o s e e t h e a p a r t m e n t i n t h e
D a r l i n g t o n R o a d p r o p e r t y t h a t w a s a d v e r t i s e d f o r r e n t . M r s . R i g a
^ t u r n e d M r . L a n g ' s t e l e p h o n e c a l l a n d a n a p p o i n t m e n t w a s
s c h e d u l e d f o r S a t u r d a y , S e p t e m b e r 3 0 , 1 9 9 5 a t 5 : 0 0 p . m . P r i o r t o
8- A n d r e a B l i n n i s t h e E x e c u t i v e D i r e c t o r o f t h e F a i r H o u s i n g
P a r t n e r s h i p , a n o n - p r o f i t c o r p o r a t i o n o r g a n i z e d u n d e r t h e l a w s o f
fche C o m m o n w e a l t h o f P e n n s y l v a n i a . T h e m i s s i o n o f t h e F a i r
f u s i n g P a r t n e r s h i p , a s s t a t e d i n i t s b y - l a w s , i s " t o e l i m i n a t e
o u s i n g d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a n d t o p r o m o t e f a i r h o u s i n g i n t h e G r e a t e r
P i t t s b u r g h a r e a t h r o u g h c o l l a b o r a t i v e u n d e r t a k i n g s i n e d u c a t i o n ,
M o n i t o r i n g a n d r e s e a r c h , l e g i s l a t i v e r e f o r m , a n d c o m m u n i t y
i n v o l v e m e n t . " ( F a i r H o u s i n g P a r t n e r s h i p ' s B r i e f i n O p p o s i t i o n , Exh. i )
7
t h e a p p o i n t m e n t , M r . L a n g w a s n o t a s k e d a b o u t h i s c r e d i t h i s t o r y .
On S a t u r d a y , S e p t e m b e r 3 0 , 1 9 9 5 , M r s . R i g a s h o w e d A p a r t m e n t N o . 2
in t h e D a r l i n g t o n R o a d p r o p e r t y t o M r . L a n g . H e w a s g i v e n a
r e n t a l a p p l i c a t i o n a n d t o l d t h a t h e w o u l d h a v e t o p a y f o r a
c r e d i t c h e c k . M r . L a n g d i d n o t m a k e a n y c o m m i t m e n t s t o M r s . R i g a
r e g a r d i n g h i s i n t e n t i o n t o l e a s e t h e a p a r t m e n t , f i l l o u t t h e
a p p l i c a t i o n o r p a y f o r a c r e d i t c h e c k . 9 ( P l a i n t i f f s ' A p p e n d i x i n
O p p o s i t i o n , E x h . 9) .
D e n n i s O r v o s h , a w h i t e m a l e , s e r v e s a s a v o l u n t e e r
t e s t e r f o r t h e F a i r H o u s i n g P a r t n e r s h i p . 10 On T h u r s d a y ,
S e p t e m b e r 2 8 , 1 9 9 5 , M r . O r v o s h w a s a s k e d t o c a l l M r s . R i g a
c o n c e r n i n g t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y o f t h e a p a r t m e n t i n t h e D a r l i n g t o n
Road p r o p e r t y . 11 On F r i d a y , S e p t e m b e r 2 9 , 1 9 9 5 , M r s . R i g a
9- I t i s n o t c l e a r f r o m t h e p r e s e n t r e c o r d i n t h i s c a s e w h e t h e r
Mr. L a n g w a s a s k e d b y t h e A l e x a n d e r s o r t h e F a i r H o u s i n g
P a r t n e r s h i p t o c o n t a c t t h e R i g a s r e g a r d i n g t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y o f
A p a r tm e n t N o . 2 i n t h e D a r l i n g t o n R o a d p r o p e r t y .
10• " T e s t e r s " a r e i n d i v i d u a l s w h o , w i t h o u t a n y i n t e n t t o r e n t o r
P u r c h a s e a h o m e o r a p a r t m e n t , p o s e a s r e n t e r s o r p u r c h a s e r s f o r
the p u r p o s e o f c o l l e c t i n g e v i d e n c e o f d i s c r i m i n a t o r y h o u s i n g
P r a c t i c e s . S e e H a v e n s R e a l t y C o m , v . C o l e m a n . 4 5 5 U . S . 3 6 3 , 3 7 3
(1982) .
■'-I' B a s e d o n t h e d a t e t h a t M r . O r v o s h c l a i m s t h a t h e w a s a s k e d
to c a l l M r s . R i g a f o r p u r p o s e s o f s e r v i n g a s a t e s t e r f o r t h e
Pair H o u s i n g P a r t n e r s h i p , i t a p p e a r s t h a t t h e A l e x a n d e r s
c° n t a c t e d t h e F a i r H o u s i n g P a r t n e r s h i p p r i o r t o M r s . R i g a ' s
( c o n t i n u e d . . . )
8
r e t u r n e d M r . O r v o s h ' s t e l e p h o n e c a l l a n d t o l d h i m t h a t t h e
a p a r t m e n t w a s a v a i l a b l e . An a p p o i n t m e n t f o r M r . O r v o s h t o s e e
the a p a r t m e n t w a s s c h e d u l e d f o r t h e n e x t d a y . P r i o r t o t h e
a p p o i n t m e n t , M r s . R i g a d i d n o t q u e s t i o n M r . O r v o s h a b o u t h i s
c r e d i t h i s t o r y , a n d , o n S a t u r d a y , S e p t e m b e r 3 0 , 1 9 9 5 , M r s . R i g a
showed M r . O r v o s h t h e a p a r t m e n t i n t h e D a r l i n g t o n R o a d p r o p e r t y .
Mrs. R i g a t o l d M r . O r v o s h t h a t , i f h e w a s i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e
a p a r t m e n t , h e w o u l d h a v e t o f i l l o u t a r e n t a l a p p l i c a t i o n a n d
u n d e rg o a c r e d i t c h e c k . ( P l a i n t i f f s ' A p p e n d i x i n O p p o s i t i o n ,
Exh. 10) .
A t t h e r e q u e s t o f t h e F a i r H o u s i n g P a r t n e r s h i p , M r .
Orvosh c a l l e d M r s . R i g a o n O c t o b e r 2 , 1 9 9 5 a n d s c h e d u l e d a n o t h e r
a p p o i n t m e n t t o s e e A p a r t m e n t N o . 2 i n t h e D a r l i n g t o n R o a d
p r o p e r t y o n O c t o b e r 4 , 1 9 9 5 . D u r i n g t h i s t e l e p h o n e c o n v e r s a t i o n ,
Mr. O r v o s h w a s i n f o r m e d b y M r s . R i g a t h a t t h e a p a r t m e n t w a s s t i l l
a v a i l a b l e . A g a i n , M r s . R i g a d i d n o t m e n t i o n M r . O r v o s h ' s c r e d i t
h i s t o r y . On O c t o b e r 3 , 1 9 9 5 , M r . O r v o s h c a n c e l e d h i s a p p o i n t m e n t
with M r s . R i g a t o s e e t h e a p a r t m e n t f o r a s e c o n d t i m e .
( P l a i n t i f f s ' A p p e n d i x i n O p p o s i t i o n , E x h . 10) .
* • ( • • • c o n t i n u e d )
f a i l u r e t o s h o w M r . A l e x a n d e r t h e D a r l i n g t o n R o a d a p a r t m e n t o n
®eP t e m b e r 2 9 , 1 9 9 5 .
9
A c c o r d i n g t o t h e O c t o b e r 4 , 1 9 9 5 " T e s t i n g S u m m a r y "
p r e p a r e d b y A n d r e a B l i n n , E x e c u t i v e D i r e c t o r o f t h e F a i r H o u s i n g
P a r t n e r s h i p , M r . O r v o s h w a s " p a i r e d " w i t h D a r i a M i t c h e l l , a b l a c k
f e m a l e , f o r t h e t e s t i n g o f t h e R i g a s ' D a r l i n g t o n R o a d p r o p e r t y b y
the F a i r H o u s i n g P a r t n e r s h i p . P u r s u a n t t o t h i s t e s t , M s .
M i t c h e l l c a l l e d ( 4 1 2 ) 9 6 3 - 8 7 0 6 f o u r t i m e s o n S e p t e m b e r 2 9 , 1 9 9 5 ,
l e a v i n g t h r e e m e s s a g e s r e g a r d i n g t h e a d i n t h e P i t t s b u r g h P o s t -
G a z e t t e f o r t h e a p a r t m e n t i n t h e R i g a s ' D a r l i n g t o n R o a d p r o p e r t y .
Mrs. R i g a c a l l e d b a c k a n d l e f t a m e s s a g e o n M s . M i t c h e l l ' s v o i c e
mail , i n d i c a t i n g t h a t s h e c o u l d s e e t h e a p a r t m e n t t h e n e x t d a y ,
S e p t e m b e r 3 0 , 1 9 9 5 , b e t w e e n 1 1 : 0 0 a . m . a n d 1 1 : 3 0 a . m . L a t e r t h a t
e v e n i n g , M r s . R i g a c a l l e d M s . M i t c h e l l b a c k a n d r e s c h e d u l e d t h e
a p p o i n t m e n t t o s e e t h e a p a r t m e n t t o 1 : 0 0 p . m . t h e n e x t d a y . A t
that t i m e , M r s . R i g a t o l d M s . M i t c h e l l t h a t t h e a d d r e s s o f t h e
p r o p e r t y w a s 5 8 3 D a r l i n g t o n R o a d . ( D e f e n d a n t s ' M o t i o n f o r
Summary J u d g m e n t , E x h . 0 ) .
W h e n M s . M i t c h e l l w e n t t o s e e t h e a p a r t m e n t t h e n e x t
daY< s h e c o u l d n o t f i n d t h e a d d r e s s g i v e n t o h e r b y M r s . R i g a .
a r e s u l t , s h e w a l k e d d o w n D a r l i n g t o n R o a d , l o o k i n g f o r a " F o r
Rent" s i g n w i t h t h e R i g a s ' t e l e p h o n e n u m b e r . M s . M i t c h e l l f o u n d
the s i g n o n t h e p r o p e r t y l o c a t e d a t 5 8 3 9 D a r l i n g t o n R o a d . S h e
ran9 t h e d o o r b e l l b u t n o o n e a n s w e r e d . A s a r e s u l t , s h e l e f t a n d
10
w a lk e d b a c k t o h e r c a r . ( D e f e n d a n t s ' M o t i o n f o r S u m m a r y
J u d g m e n t , E x h . 0 ) .
L a t e r t h a t d a y , M r s . R i g a p a g e d M s . M i t c h e l l a n d s a i d
t h a t s h e c o u l d s e e t h e a p a r t m e n t a t 5 : 3 0 p . m . W h e n M s . M i t c h e l l
q u e s t i o n e d M r s . R i g a a b o u t b e i n g g i v e n t h e w r o n g a d d r e s s , M r s .
Riga i n s i s t e d t h a t s h e h a d g i v e n Ms. M i t c h e l l t h e c o r r e c t
a d d r e s s . W h e n M s . M i t c h e l l a r r i v e d a t t h e D a r l i n g t o n R o a d
p r o p e r t y a t 5 : 3 0 p . m . , M r s . R i g a w a s c o m i n g o u t o f t h e p r o p e r t y
with a m a n n a m e d J e f f . M r s . R i g a i n d i c a t e d t h a t J e f f h a d j u s t
c o m p l e t e d a n a p p l i c a t i o n f o r t h e a p a r t m e n t , a n d t h a t h e w a s g o i n g
to " g e t t h e m m o n e y . " D e s p i t e t h e a p p a r e n t r e n t a l o f t h e
a d v e r t i s e d a p a r t m e n t , M r s . R i g a o f f e r e d t o s h o w i t t o M s .
M itchell. W h e n M s . M i t c h e l l a s k e d M r s . R i g a i f J e f f w a s g o i n g t o
get t h e a p a r t m e n t , s h e r e s p o n d e d " y e s . " M r s . R i g a s h o w e d M s .
Mitchell a p i e c e o f p a p e r , i n d i c a t i n g t h a t i t w a s a c h e c k f r o m
^ef f . H o w e v e r , M s . M i t c h e l l d i d n o t t h i n k t h a t t h e p i e c e o f
Paper l o o k e d l i k e a c h e c k . S h e t h a n k e d M r s . R i g a a n d s h o o k h e r
hand. M r s . R i g a t h e n s a i d t h a t s h e w o u l d c a l l M s . M i t c h e l l i f
another a p a r t m e n t b e c a m e a v a i l a b l e . B a s e d o n t h e s e e v e n t s , Ms .
BH n n c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e r e w a s e v i d e n c e o f p o s s i b l e h o u s i n g
i s c r i m i n a t i o n a n d s t a t e d s o i n h e r " T e s t i n g S u m m a r y . "
d e f e n d a n t s ' M o t i o n f o r S u m m a r y J u d g m e n t , E x h . O) .
11
O n T u e s d a y , O c t o b e r 3 , 1 9 9 5 , H e i d i S e s t r i c h , a w h i t e
f e m a l e , w a s a s k e d b y t h e A l e x a n d e r s ' a t t o r n e y , C a r o l i n e M i t c h e l l ,
to s e r v e a s a t e s t e r f o r t h e F a i r H o u s i n g P a r t n e r s h i p b y c a l l i n g
Mrs. R i g a t o i n q u i r e i n t o t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y o f t h e a d v e r t i s e d
a p a r t m e n t i n t h e D a r l i n g t o n R o a d p r o p e r t y , a n d M s . S e s t r i c h
a g r e e d t o d o s o . S h e c a l l e d t h e R i g a s ' t e l e p h o n e n u m b e r a n d l e f t
a m e s s a g e o n t h e i r t e l e p h o n e a n s w e r i n g m a c h i n e . T h e n e x t d a y ,
O c t o b e r 4 , 1 9 9 5 , a t a p p r o x i m a t e l y 1 : 5 0 p . m . , a w o m a n r e t u r n e d Ms.
S e s t r i c h ' s t e l e p h o n e c a l l , l e a v i n g a m e s s a g e t h a t t h e a p a r t m e n t
was s t i l l a v a i l a b l e a n d t h a t s h e c o u l d s c h e d u l e a n a p p o i n t m e n t t o
see i t . M s . S e s t r i c h w a s i n s t r u c t e d t o c a l l b e f o r e 2 : 3 0 p . m . t o
make a n a p p o i n t m e n t . When s h e r e c e i v e d t h i s m e s s a g e , M s .
S e s t r i c h i n f o r m e d A t t o r n e y M i t c h e l l o f t h e m e s s a g e . ( P l a i n t i f f s '
A p p e n d ix i n O p p o s i t i o n , E x h . 1 2 ) .
O n F r i d a y , O c t o b e r 6 , 1 9 9 5 a t a p p r o x i m a t e l y 1 1 : 5 1 a . m . ,
and o n S a t u r d a y , O c t o b e r 7 , 1 9 9 5 a t a p p r o x i m a t e l y 9 : 0 8 a . m . , a
woman c a l l e d M s . S e s t r i c h a g a i n , l e a v i n g m e s s a g e s a b o u t t h e
a d v e r t i s e d a p a r t m e n t i n t h e R i g a s ' D a r l i n g t o n R o a d p r o p e r t y . Ms .
Sestrich i n f o r m e d A t t o r n e y M i t c h e l l o f t h e s e t e l e p h o n e m e s s a g e s ,
and, o n M o n d a y , O c t o b e r 9 , 1 9 9 5 , M s . S e s t r i c h a n d A t t o r n e y
Mitchell p l a y e d b a c k t h e m e s s a g e s o n Ms. S e s t r i c h ' s t e l e p h o n e
answering m a c h i n e c o n c e r n i n g t h e R i g a s ' a p a r t m e n t . T h e t a p e
12
r e c o r d e d m e s s a g e s w e r e g i v e n t o A t t o r n e y M i t c h e l l a t h e r r e q u e s t .
( P l a i n t i f f s ' A p p e n d i x i n O p p o s i t i o n , E x h . 1 2 ) .
On O c t o b e r 8 , 1 9 9 5 , M r . A l e x a n d e r ' s f r i e n d , R o b i n
McDonough, c a l l e d M r s . R i g a a g a i n t o s c h e d u l e a n o t h e r a p p o i n t m e n t
to s e e t h e a d v e r t i s e d a p a r t m e n t i n t h e D a r l i n g t o n R o a d p r o p e r t y .
Mrs. R i g a s c h e d u l e d a n a p p o i n t m e n t f o r M s . M c D o n o u g h f o r M o n d a y ,
O c t o b e r 9 , 1 9 9 5 , a n d M s . M c D o n o u g h w a s s h o w n t h e a p a r t m e n t .
P r i o r t o b e i n g s h o w n t h e a p a r t m e n t , M s . M c D o n o u g h w a s n o t a s k e d
about h e r c r e d i t h i s t o r y . ( P l a i n t i f f s ' A p p e n d i x i n O p p o s i t i o n ,
Exh. 9) . A p a r t m e n t N o . 2 i n t h e R i g a s ' D a r l i n g t o n R o a d p r o p e r t y
u l t i m a t e l y w a s l e a s e d t o D r . R a j e n d r a a n d K i m b e r l y S i n h a i n
November, 1 9 9 5 . 12 ( D e f e n d a n t s ' M o t i o n f o r S u m m a r y J u d g m e n t , E x h .
D).
W i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e R i g a s ' t e n a n t s i n t h e D a r l i n g t o n
Road p r o p e r t y , A p a r t m e n t N o . 1 w a s r e n t e d t o S u s a n A u g u s t i t u s
12 • i n c o n t r a s t t o t h e A l e x a n d e r s ' a l l e g a t i o n s , d u r i n g h e r
d e p o s i t i o n , M r s . R i g a t e s t i f i e d s h e d o e s n o t r e m e m b e r r e c e i v i n g a
ca l l f r o m M r s . A l e x a n d e r i n S e p t e m b e r , 1 9 9 5 , r e g a r d i n g t h e
aP a r t m e n t a d v e r t i s e d f o r r e n t i n t h e D a r l i n g t o n R o a d p r o p e r t y ;
that s h e d o e s n o t r e m e m b e r m e e t i n g t h e A l e x a n d e r s a t t h e
A r l i n g t o n R o a d p r o p e r t y o n S e p t e m b e r 1 8 , 1 9 9 5 ; t h a t s h e d o e s n o t
remember t e l l i n g t h e A l e x a n d e r s t h a t t h e y s h o u l d n o t h a v e c h a n g e d
the t i m e o f t h e i r a p p o i n t m e n t b e c a u s e s h e h a d r e n t e d t h e
aP a r t m e n t i n t h e i n t e r i m ; a n d t h a t s h e d o e s n o t r e m e m b e r m e e t i n g
any A f r o - A m e r i c a n c o u p l e f o r p u r p o s e s o f s h o w i n g t h e m t h e
aP a r t m e n t a d v e r t i s e d f o r r e n t i n t h e D a r l i n g t o n R o a d p r o p e r t y .
P l a i n t i f f s ' A p p e n d i x i n O p p o s i t i o n , E x h . 6 , p p . 6 8 - 7 2 ) .
13
s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e R i g a s p u r c h a s e d t h e p r o p e r t y i n M a y , 1 9 9 5 .
A p a r t m e n t N o . 2 w a s l e a s e d t o C h a n g S u C h a n a n d h i s w i f e , J i n g
Chan, w h o e n t e r e d i n t o a l e a s e w i t h t h e R i g a s a f t e r t h e i r
p u r c h a s e o f t h e b u i l d i n g . M r . C h a n ' s l e a s e w a s d u e t o e x p i r e i n
F e b r u a r y , 1 9 9 6 . H o w e v e r , A p a r t m e n t N o . 2 b e c a m e a v a i l a b l e t o
r e n t a n d w a s a d v e r t i s e d b y t h e R i g a s i n S e p t e m b e r , 1 9 9 5 b e c a u s e
Mr. a n d M r s . C h a n m o v e d o u t p r i o r t o t h e e x p i r a t i o n o f t h e i r
l e a s e w i t h t h e R i g a s . A p a r t m e n t N o . 3 w a s l e a s e d t o M a r t h a
T e p l i c a , w h o h a d b e e n a t e n a n t o f t h e p r e v i o u s o w n e r o f t h e
b u i l d i n g . A p a r t m e n t N o . 4 w a s l e a s e d t o R o s e A b r a m s i n J u n e ,
1995, a n d A p a r t m e n t N o . 5 w a s l e a s e d t o E l i s s a H e l m s a n d
C a t h e r i n e S e r v e n t i i n N o v e m b e r , 1 9 9 5 . 13 ( P l a i n t i f f s ' A p p e n d i x i n
O p p o s i t i o n , E x h . 6 , p p . 1 9 - 2 1 , 3 7 ) .
P r i o r t o t h e R i g a s ' r e n t a l o f A p a r t m e n t N o . 2 i n t h e
D a r l i n g t o n R o a d p r o p e r t y t o t h e S i n h a s i n N o v e m b e r , 1 9 9 5 , M r s .
Rigas a s k e d L a n d l o r d S e r v i c e B u r e a u t o p e r f o r m a c r e d i t c h e c k o n
Mrs. S i n h a , a n d M r s . R i g a r e c e i v e d a c e r t i f i c a t e o f
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n f o r M r s . S i n h a . M r s . R i g a d i d n o t a s k L a n d l o r d
13• P r i o r t o t h e l e a s e o f A p a r t m e n t N o . 5 t o M s . H e l m s a n d Ms.
S e r v e n t i , t h e u n i t h a d b e e n v a c a n t b e c a u s e i t r e q u i r e d r e p a i r s .
( P l a i n t i f f s ' A p p e n d i x i n O p p o s i t i o n , E x h . 6 , p . 3 7 ) .
14
S e r v i c e B u r e a u t o p e r f o r m a c r e d i t c h e c k o n D r . S i n h a . 14
( D e f e n d a n t s ' M o t i o n f o r S u m m a r y J u d g m e n t , E x h . D ) . A s t o t h e
i s s u e o f w h e t h e r c r e d i t c h e c k s w e r e p e r f o r m e d o n t h e R i g a s ' o t h e r
t e n a n t s i n t h e D a r l i n g t o n R o a d p r o p e r t y , i n r e s p o n s e t o d i s c o v e r y
r e q u e s t s , t h e R i g a s f a i l e d t o p r o d u c e a n y e v i d e n c e t o s h o w t h a t
c r e d i t c h e c k s h a d b e e n r e q u e s t e d f o r , o r p e r f o r m e d o n , a n y o t h e r
t e n a n t i n t h e b u i l d i n g .
A t t h e t i m e t h e A l e x a n d e r s a t t e m p t e d t o v i e w A p a r t m e n t
No. 2 i n t h e R i g a s ' D a r l i n g t o n R o a d p r o p e r t y , M r . A l e x a n d e r h a d
d e f a u l t e d o n c r e d i t a c c o u n t s w i t h L a n e B r y a n t , K a u f m a n n ' s ,
L a z a r u s a n d J . C . P e n n e y , a n d M r s . A l e x a n d e r h a d d e f a u l t e d o n a
s t u d e n t l o a n a n d a n a c c o u n t w i t h B e l l A t l a n t i c . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e
A l e x a n d e r s h a d d e f a u l t e d o n i n d i v i d u a l a c c o u n t s w i t h E q u i t a b l e
Gas.15 ( D e f e n d a n t s ' M o t i o n f o r S u m m a r y J u d g m e n t , E x h . A , p p .
1 4 7 - 1 5 1 , E x h . B, p p . 3 9 - 4 0 ) . H o w e v e r , p r i o r t o d i s c o v e r y i n t h i s
case, t h e R i g a s d i d n o t r e q u e s t a n y i n f o r m a t i o n f r o m t h e
14• I n a n a f f i d a v i t s u b m i t t e d i n s u p p o r t o f d e f e n d a n t s ' m o t i o n
lor s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t , M r s . R i g a s t a t e s t h a t , b a s e d o n M r s .
S inha ' s g o o d c r e d i t h i s t o r y a n d D r . S i n h a ' s p r o f e s s i o n a l s t a t u s ,
she d i d n o t r e q u e s t a c r e d i t c h e c k o n D r . S i n h a . ( D e f e n d a n t s '
Motion f o r S u m m a r y J u d g m e n t , E x h . D) .
12• T h e t o t a l a m o u n t o f t h e d e b t o n t h e s e d e f a u l t e d a c c o u n t s
exceeds $ 6 , 7 0 0 . 0 0 . ( D e f e n d a n t s ' M o t i o n f o r S u m m a r y J u d g m e n t ,
Sxh s . G t o M) .
15
A l e x a n d e r s r e g a r d i n g t h e i r c r e d i t h i s t o r y , a n d t h e y h a d n o
k n o w l e d g e o f t h e A l e x a n d e r s ' c r e d i t h i s t o r y . 16 ( P l a i n t i f f s '
A p p e n d i x i n O p p o s i t i o n , E x h s . 3 a n d 4 ) .
I l l
R u l e 5 6 ( c ) o f t h e F e d e r a l R u l e s o f C i v i l P r o c e d u r e
m a n d a t e s t h e e n t r y o f s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t , a f t e r a d e q u a t e t i m e f o r
d i s c o v e r y a n d u p o n m o t i o n , a g a i n s t a p a r t y w h o f a i l s t o m a k e a
show ing s u f f i c i e n t t o e s t a b l i s h t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a n e l e m e n t
e s s e n t i a l t o t h a t p a r t y ' s c a s e , a n d o n w h i c h t h a t p a r t y w i l l b e a r
the b u r d e n o f p r o o f a t t r i a l . C e l o t e x C o r p . v . C a t r e t t . 4 7 7 U . S .
317, 3 2 2 , 1 0 6 S . C t . 2 5 4 8 , 2 5 5 3 , 91 L . E d . 2 d 2 6 5 , 2 7 3 ( 1 9 8 6 ) . A t
the s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t s t a g e , t h e c o u r t ' s f u n c t i o n i s n o t t o w e i g h
the e v i d e n c e a n d d e t e r m i n e t h e t r u t h o f t h e m a t t e r , b u t t o
d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r t h e r e i s a g e n u i n e i s s u e f o r t r i a l . A n d e r s o n
I ^ L i b e r t v L o b b y . I n c . . 4 7 7 U . S . 2 4 2 , 2 4 9 , 1 0 6 S . C t . 2 5 0 5 , 2 5 1 1 ,
91 L . E d . 2 d 2 0 2 , 2 1 2 ( 1 9 8 6 ) . T h e e x i s t e n c e o f a f a c t u a l d i s p u t e
16• M r . R i g a w a s i n I t a l y f r o m A u g u s t 5 , 1 9 9 5 u n t i l m i d -
November, 1 9 9 5 . ( P l a i n t i f f s ' A p p e n d i x i n O p p o s i t i o n , E x h . 7 , p .
• A s a r e s u l t , t h e A l e x a n d e r s d e a l t e x c l u s i v e l y w i t h M r s .
Rigas i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e i r a t t e m p t s t o v i e w A p a r t m e n t N o . 2
ln t h e R i g a s ' D a r l i n g t o n R o a d p r o p e r t y . H o w e v e r , b e c a u s e t h e
ût y n o t t o d i s c r i m i n a t e i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h h o u s i n g u n d e r t h e
aP p l i c a b l e s t a t u t e s i s a n o n - d e l e g a b l e d u t y , M r . R i g a w o u l d b e
l i a b l e f o r a n y d i s c r i m i n a t i o n b y M r s . R i g a a s t h e c o - o w n e r o f t h e
A r l i n g t o n R o a d p r o p e r t y .
16
b e t w e e n t h e p a r t i e s w i l l d e f e a t a n o t h e r w i s e p r o p e r l y s u p p o r t e d
m o t i o n f o r s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t o n l y i f t h e r e i s a " g e n u i n e " i s s u e o f
" m a t e r i a l " f a c t . I d . 4 7 7 U . S . a t 2 4 8 , 1 0 6 S . C t . a t 2 5 1 0 , 91
L . E d . 2 d a t 2 1 1 . K e e p i n g t h i s s t a n d a r d i n m i n d , t h e c o u r t t u r n s
to d e f e n d a n t s ' m o t i o n f o r s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t .
IV
T u r n i n g f i r s t t o t h e A l e x a n d e r s ' c l a i m s a g a i n s t t h e
R igas , i n C h a u h a n v . M. A l f i e r i C o , . I n c . . 8 9 7 F . 2 d 1 2 3 ( 3 d
C i r . 1 9 9 0 ) , a p r o s p e c t i v e t e n a n t , a n I n d i a n n a t i o n a l , b r o u g h t a n
a c t i o n a g a i n s t a l a n d l o r d u n d e r 42 U . S . C . § 1 9 8 1 a f t e r t h e
l a n d l o r d d e n i e d t h e p r o s p e c t i v e t e n a n t ' s a p p l i c a t i o n f o r t h e
l e a s e o f r e t a i l s p a c e i n t h e l a n d l o r d ' s o f f i c e b u i l d i n g . T h e
d i s t r i c t c o u r t g r a n t e d t h e l a n d l o r d ' s m o t i o n f o r s u m m a r y
j u d g m e n t , a n d t h e p r o s p e c t i v e t e n a n t a p p e a l e d . On a p p e a l , t h e
Uni ted S t a t e s C o u r t o f A p p e a l s f o r t h e T h i r d C i r c u i t r e v e r s e d ,
h o l d i n g t h a t m a t e r i a l i s s u e s o f f a c t e x i s t e d a s t o w h e t h e r t h e
l a n d l o r d ' s r e a s o n s f o r n o t r e n t i n g t o t h e p r o s p e c t i v e t e n a n t w e r e
P n e t e x t u a l . W i t h r e g a r d t o t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s p r i m a f a c i e c a s e i n
an a c t i o n a l l e g i n g h o u s i n g d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , t h e T h i r d C i r c u i t
s t a t e d :
★ * ★
17
A s u c c e s s f u l s e c t i o n 1 9 8 1 c l a i m r e q u i r e s p r o o f o f
i n t e n t i o n a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . G e n e r a l B u i l d i n g
C o n t r a c t o r s A s s o c i a t i o n v . P e n n s y l v a n i a . 4 5 8 U . S . 3 7 5 ,
3 8 9 , 1 0 2 S . C t . 3 1 4 1 , 3 1 4 9 , 73 L . E d . 2 d 8 3 5 ( 1 9 8 2 ) ;
C r o k e r v . B o e i n g C o . . 6 6 2 F . 2 d 9 7 5 , 9 8 8 ( 3 d C i r . 1 9 8 1 ) .
H o w e v e r , b e c a u s e o f t h e e v i d e n t i a r y d i f f i c u l t i e s
i n v o l v e d i n p r o v i n g d i s c r i m i n a t o r y i n t e n t , we h a v e h e l d
t h a t s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t m o t i o n s i n s e c t i o n 1 9 8 1 c a s e s a r e
g o v e r n e d b y t h e w e l l - k n o w n b u r d e n s h i f t i n g p r o v i s i o n s
l a i d d o w n i n M c D o n n e l l D o u g l a s C o r p . v . G r e e n . 4 1 1 U . S .
7 9 2 , 8 0 2 , 93 S . C t . 1 8 1 7 , 1 8 2 4 , 3 6 L . E d . 2 d 6 6 8 ( 1 9 7 3 ) ,
a n d r e f i n e d i n T e x a s D e p a r t m e n t o f C o m m u n i t y A f f a i r s v .
B u r r l i n e , 4 5 0 U . S . 2 4 8 , 2 5 2 - 5 3 , 1 0 1 S . C t . 1 0 8 9 , 1 0 9 3 - 9 4 ,
6 7 L . E d . 2 d 2 0 7 ( 1 9 8 1 ) . S e e G u n b v v . P e n n s y l v a n i a
E l e c t r i c C o . . 8 4 0 F . 2 d 1 1 0 8 , 1 1 1 5 ( 3 d C i r . 1 9 8 8 ) , c e r t .
d e n i e d . ____ U . S . ____ , 1 0 9 S . C t . 3 2 1 3 , 1 0 6 L . E d . 2 d 2 0 7
( 1 9 8 1 ) ; L e w i s v . U n i v e r s i t y o f P i t t s b u r g h . 7 2 5 F . 2 d
9 1 0 , 9 1 4 ( 3 d C i r . 1 9 8 3 ) , c e r t , d e n i e d . 4 6 9 U . S . 8 9 2 , 1 0 5
S . C t . 2 6 6 , 83 L . E d . 2 d 2 0 2 ( 1 9 8 4 ) . A l t h o u g h we h a v e n o t
h a d o c c a s i o n t o c o n s i d e r w h e t h e r t h e M c D o n n e l l D o u g l a s
f o r m u l a s h o u l d b e a p p l i e d t o t h e l e a s i n g c o n t e x t , o t h e r
c o u r t s h a v e d o n e s o , s e e , e . a . . S e l d o n A p a r t m e n t s v .
U n i t e d S t a t e s D e p a r t m e n t o f H o u s i n g a n d U r b a n
D e v e l o p m e n t . 7 8 5 F . 2 d 1 5 2 , 1 6 0 ( 6 t h C i r . 1 9 8 6 ) ( F a i r
H o u s i n g A c t , 4 2 U . S . C . § 3 6 0 1 a n d § 1 9 8 1 a n d § 1 9 8 2 ) ;
P h i f f e r v . P r o u d P a r r o t M o t o r H o t e l . I n c . . 6 4 8 F . 2 d
5 4 8 , 5 5 1 ( 9 t h C i r . 1 9 8 0 ) ( § 1 9 8 2 ) ; R o b i n s o n v . 12 L o f t s
R e a l t y , I n c . . 6 1 0 F . 2 d 1 0 3 2 , 1 0 3 8 - 3 9 ( 2 d C i r . 1 9 7 9 ) ( F a i r
H o u s i n g A c t , 4 2 U . S . C . § 3 6 0 4 ( a ) ) , a n d w e w i l l f o l l o w
t h e i r l e a d .
A p p l y i n g t h e M c D o n n e l l D o u g l a s f o r m u l a t o t h i s
c o n t e x t , C h a u h a n e s t a b l i s h e s a p r i m a f a c i e c a s e b y
p r o v i n g t h a t : (1 ) h e i s i n a p r o t e c t e d c l a s s ; ( 2 ) h e
a t t e m p t e d t o l e a s e t h e s p a c e ; ( 3 ) h e w a s a q u a l i f i e d
a p p l i c a n t ; a n d (4 ) t h e s p a c e r e m a i n e d u n f i l l e d a f t e r h e
a p p l i e d . O n c e a p r i m a f a c i e c a s e i s e s t a b l i s h e d , t h e
b u r d e n t h e n s h i f t s t o M. A l f i e r i t o o f f e r a l e g i t i m a t e ,
n o n - d i s c r i m i n a t o r y r e a s o n f o r r e f u s i n g t o d o b u s i n e s s
w i t h C h a u h a n . I f M. A l f i e r i p r o f f e r s s u c h a r e a s o n ,
t h e b u r d e n s h i f t s b a c k t o C h a u h a n t o s h o w t h a t M.
A l f i e r i ' s e x p l a n a t i o n i s p r e t e x t u a l . T h e d i s t r i c t
c o u r t p r o p e r l y f o l l o w e d t h i s f o r m u l a . H o w e v e r , i n
18
c o n c l u d i n g t h a t " t h e i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s p o i n t e d o u t b y
C h a u h a n , w h i l e p e r h a p s d e m o n s t r a t i n g s o m e b u s i n e s s
i n e f f i c i e n c y a n d m i s c o m m u n i c a t i o n i n t h e o p e r a t i o n o f
A l f i e r i , d o n o t l e n d a n y s u p p o r t t o [ C h a u h a n ' s ]
c o n t e n t i o n [ o f p r e t e x t ] , " 7 0 7 F . S u p p . a t 1 6 6 , t h e
d i s t r i c t c o u r t a p p e a r s i n a d v e r t e n t l y t o h a v e s t r a y e d
i n t o t h e f a c t f i n d i n g r e a l m .
* * ★
897 F . 2 d a t 1 2 6 - 1 2 7 .
I n s e e k i n g a j u d g m e n t i n t h e i r f a v o r a s a m a t t e r o f l a w
as t o t h e A l e x a n d e r s ' c l a i m s o f h o u s i n g d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , t h e R i g a s
a s s e r t t h a t t h e A l e x a n d e r s c a n n o t e s t a b l i s h a p r i m a f a c i e c a s e o f
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n b e c a u s e , b a s e d o n t h e i r " a b y s m a l c r e d i t , " t h e
A l e x a n d e r s w e r e n o t q u a l i f i e d t o r e n t A p a r t m e n t N o . 2 i n t h e
R igas ' D a r l i n g t o n R o a d p r o p e r t y . ( D e f e n d a n t s ' M o t i o n f o r S u m m a r y
J u d g m e n t , p . 2 ) . I n s u p p o r t o f t h i s a s s e r t i o n , t h e R i g a s
m a i n t a i n t h a t t h e y a l w a y s r e q u i r e b o t h s p o u s e s t o b e s i g n a t o r i e s
on t h e i r l e a s e s , a n d t h a t t h e y t y p i c a l l y d o c r e d i t c h e c k s o n b o t h
the h u s b a n d a n d w i f e . W i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e f a c t t h a t a c r e d i t
check w a s p e r f o r m e d o n l y o n M r s . S i n h a i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e
r e n t a l o f A p a r t m e n t N o . 2 t o D r . a n d M r s . S i n h a , t h e R i g a s
con tend t h a t t h e A l e x a n d e r s w o u l d n o t h a v e q u a l i f i e d f o r t h e
aP a r t m e n t r e g a r d l e s s o f w h e t h e r a c r e d i t c h e c k h a d b e e n d o n e o n
doth M r . a n d M r s . A l e x a n d e r o r o n l y o n e o f t h e m b e c a u s e t h e y b o t h
have a h i s t o r y o f p o o r c r e d i t .
19
A f t e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n , t h e c o u r t c o n c l u d e s t h a t m a t e r i a l
i s s u e s o f f a c t p r e c l u d e a j u d g m e n t i n t h e R i g a s ' f a v o r a s a
m a t t e r o f l a w b a s e d o n t h e A l e x a n d e r s ' a l l e g e d f a i l u r e t o
e s t a b l i s h a p r i m a f a c i e c a s e o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . 17 S p e c i f i c a l l y ,
f a c t u a l d i s p u t e s e x i s t r e g a r d i n g t h e R i g a s ' c l a i m t h a t t h e y
always r e q u i r e d c r e d i t c h e c k s t o q u a l i f y p r o s p e c t i v e t e n a n t s . A s
noted i n t h e r e c i t a t i o n o f t h e u n d i s p u t e d f a c t s , i n r e s p o n s e t o
the A l e x a n d e r s ' d i s c o v e r y r e q u e s t s , t h e R i g a s f a i l e d t o p r o d u c e
any e v i d e n c e t o s h o w t h a t c r e d i t c h e c k s h a d b e e n p e r f o r m e d o n a n y
t e n a n t i n t h e R i g a s ' D a r l i n g t o n R o a d p r o p e r t y , o t h e r t h a n M r s .
Sinha. U n d e r t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t h e R i g a s ' m o t i o n f o r s u m m a r y
judgment a s t o t h e A l e x a n d e r s ' d i s c r i m i n a t i o n c l a i m s w i l l b e
d e n i e d . 18
17. F o r p u r p o s e s o f d e f e n d a n t s ' s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t m o t i o n , t h e
court w i l l a s s u m e t h a t t h e p r i m a f a c i e c a s e u r g e d b y t h e R i g a s
a c c u r a t e l y s e t s f o r t h t h e p r i m a f a c i e c a s e a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e
f a c t s o f t h i s c a s e . H o w e v e r , b e c a u s e t h e A l e x a n d e r s w e r e n e v e r
even g i v e n t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o v i e w A p a r t m e n t N o . 2 i n t h e R i g a s '
D a r l i n g t o n R o a d p r o p e r t y , l e t a l o n e s u b m i t a r e n t a l a p p l i c a t i o n
for t h e a p a r t m e n t , t h e c o u r t i s n o t c o n v i n c e d t h a t t h e R i g a s h a v e
a c c u r a t e l y s e t f o r t h t h e p r i m a f a c i e c a s e a p p l i c a b l e i n t h i s
s i t u a t i o n . S e e M c D o n n e l l D o u g l a s . 4 1 1 U . S . 7 9 2 , 8 0 2 n . 13 ( 1 9 7 3 )
^he f a c t s n e c e s s a r i l y w i l l v a r y , a n d t h e s p e c i f i c a t i o n o f t h e
Prima f a c i e p r o o f r e q u i r e d f r o m r e s p o n d e n t i n t h i s T i t l e V I I c a s e
is n o t n e c e s s a r i l y a p p l i c a b l e i n e v e r y r e s p e c t t o d i f f e r i n g
f a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n s ) .
18• One f u r t h e r p o i n t s h o u l d b e a d d r e s s e d i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e
( c o n t i n u e d . . . )
2 0
V
N e x t , t h e R i g a s s e e k a j u d g m e n t i n t h e i r f a v o r w i t h
r e s p e c t t o t h e c l a i m o f t h e F a i r H o u s i n g P a r t n e r s h i p u n d e r t h e
Fair H o u s i n g A c t . T h e R i g a s m a i n t a i n t h a t t h e F a i r H o u s i n g
P a r t n e r s h i p l a c k s s t a n d i n g t o s u e i n t h i s c a s e b e c a u s e i t h a s
f a i l e d t o a l l e g e a s u f f i c i e n t i n j u r y i n f a c t . A f t e r
c o n s i d e r a t i o n , t h e c o u r t d o e s n o t a g r e e .
W i t h r e s p e c t t o i t s i n j u r y i n t h i s c a s e , i n t h e a m e n d e d
c o m p l a i n t , t h e F a i r H o u s i n g P a r t n e r s h i p a l l e g e s t h e f o l l o w i n g
f a c t s :
* * *
1 8 . T h e [ F a i r H o u s i n g P a r t n e r s h i p ] h a s s u f f e r e d a
c o n c r e t e a n d d e m o n s t r a b l e i n j u r y t o i t s i n t e r e s t s i n
18. (. . . c o n t i n u e d )
Rigas' m o t i o n f o r s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t o n t h e A l e x a n d e r s ' F a i r
Housing A c t c l a i m . S e c t i o n 3 6 0 4 (d ) o f t h e F a i r H o u s i n g A c t
s p e c i f i c a l l y m a k e s i t u n l a w f u l t o r e p r e s e n t t o a n y p e r s o n b e c a u s e
of r a c e t h a t a n y d w e l l i n g i s n o t a v a i l a b l e f o r i n s p e c t i o n o r
r e n t a l w h e n s u c h d w e l l i n g i s , i n f a c t , s o a v a i l a b l e , a n d t h e
A l e x a n d e r s h a v e a s s e r t e d a c l a i m a g a i n s t t h e R i g a s u n d e r t h i s
s e c t i o n . S e c t i o n 3 6 0 4 ( d ) h a s b e e n h e l d b y t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s
Supreme C o u r t t o g i v e s t a n d i n g t o s u e t o " t e s t e r s , " w h o m a y h a v e
a p p r o a c h e d a r e a l e s t a t e a g e n t f u l l y e x p e c t i n g t o r e c e i v e f a l s e
I n f o r m a t i o n a n d w i t h o u t a n y i n t e n t i o n o f b u y i n g o r r e n t i n g a
h° te . H a v e n s R e a l t y C o r n , v . C o l e m a n , 4 5 5 U . S . 3 7 3 , 3 7 4 ( 1 9 8 1 ) .
Hased o n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s S u p r e m e C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n i n H a v e n s ,
the c o u r t c o n c l u d e s t h a t t h e A l e x a n d e r s ' c r e d i t h i s t o r y h a s n o
f a r i n g o n t h e i r c l a i m u n d e r S e c t i o n 3 6 0 4 ( d ) t h a t t h e R i g a s a r e
l i a b l e f o r m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y
of A p a r t m e n t N o . 2 i n t h e D a r l i n g t o n R o a d p r o p e r t y .
21
s e c u r i n g f a i r h o u s i n g , a n d h a s s u f f e r e d a d i v e r s i o n o f
i t s r e s o u r c e s i n o r d e r t o i n v e s t i g a t e a n d r e d r e s s
d i s c r i m i n a t o r y h o u s i n g p r a c t i c e s s e t f o r t h i n t h e
i n s t a n t C o m p l a i n t , i n t h a t s a i d p r e v i o u s l y - a v e r r e d a c t s
o f h o u s i n g d i s c r i m i n a t i o n t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l P l a i n t i f f s
a d d e d t o t h e e x i s t i n g w o r k l o a d o f t h e [ F a i r H o u s i n g ]
P a r t n e r s h i p , a n d c a u s e d t h e [ F a i r H o u s i n g ] P a r t n e r s h i p
t o d i v e r t i t s r e s o u r c e s a n d i n c u r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c o s t s ,
e x p e n s e s a n d o v e r h e a d i n r e d r e s s i n g s a i d i n d i v i d u a l
C o m p l a i n t s .
1 9 . T h e [ F a i r H o u s i n g P a r t n e r s h i p ] h a s s u f f e r e d
f u r t h e r c o n c r e t e i n j u r y t o i t s i n t e r e s t i n t h a t i t h a s
b e e n d e n i e d t r u t h f u l a n d a c c u r a t e i n f o r m a t i o n f r o m
D e f e n d a n t s a s t o a v a i l a b i l i t y o f h o u s i n g , a n d h a s
s u f f e r e d a d i v e r s i o n o f i t s r e s o u r c e s a n d o u t - o f - p o c k e t
c o s t s i n e f f o r t s t o o b t a i n r e d r e s s f o r t h e i n d i v i d u a l
P l a i n t i f f s .
★ * ★
(Amended C o m p l a i n t , p p . 8 - 9 ) . 19
T h e R i g a s r e l y o n t h e d e c i s i o n o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s
Court o f A p p e a l s f o r t h e D i s t r i c t o f C o l u m b i a C i r c u i t i n F a i r
Bio l o y m e n t C o u n c i l o f G r e a t e r W a s h i n g t o n . I n c , v . BMC M a r k e t i n g
SSQL., 2 8 F . 3 d 1 2 6 8 ( D . C . C i r . 1 9 9 4 ) i n s u p p o r t o f t h e i r m o t i o n f o r
19- I n s u p p o r t o f i t s a l l e g a t i o n s i n t h e a m e n d e d c o m p l a i n t a n d
hi o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e R i g a s ' m o t i o n f o r s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t , t h e F a i r
Housing P a r t n e r s h i p s u b m i t t e d t h e a f f i d a v i t o f A n d r e a B l i n n , i t s
E x e c u t iv e D i r e c t o r . M s . B l i n n d e s c r i b e s , i n t e r a l i a . t h e m i s s i o n
°f t h e F a i r H o u s i n g P a r t n e r s h i p a n d t h e m e t h o d s b y w h i c h i t
Can r i e s o u t i t s m i s s i o n . Ms . B l i n n t h e n s e t s f o r t h t h e c o s t s
i n c u r r e d t o i n v e s t i g a t e t h e A l e x a n d e r s ' d i s c r i m i n a t i o n c o m p l a i n t ,
which i n c l u d e s $ 1 , 2 0 0 . 0 0 f o r Ms. B l i n n ' s s e r v i c e s , $ 3 5 0 . 0 0 f o r
Michele G i t t l e m a n ' s s e r v i c e s a n d $ 1 7 5 . 0 0 i n t e s t i n g e x p e n s e s .
(Hrief i n O p p o s i t i o n , E x h . 1) .
22
summary j u d g m e n t a s t o t h e c l a i m a s s e r t e d b y t h e F a i r H o u s i n g
P a r t n e r s h i p u n d e r t h e F a i r H o u s i n g A c t . I n BMC M a r k e t i n g , a f a i r
e m ploym en t o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d t w o o f i t s b l a c k t e s t e r s b r o u g h t s u i t
a l l e g i n g t h a t a n e m p l o y m e n t a g e n c y v i o l a t e d 4 2 U . S . C . § 1 9 8 1 a n d
T i t l e V I I o f t h e C i v i l R i g h t s A c t o f 1 9 6 4 , 4 2 U . S . C . § 2 0 0 0 e e t
s e g . , w h e n i t d e n i e d r e f e r r a l s t o b l a c k t e s t e r s , w h i l e w h i t e
t e s t e r s w i t h c o m p a r a b l e c r e d e n t i a l s r e c e i v e d r e f e r r a l s . T h e
d i s t r i c t c o u r t d e n i e d t h e e m p l o y m e n t a g e n c y ' s m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s
the c o m p l a i n t f o r w a n t o f s t a n d i n g , a n d a n i n t e r l o c u t o r y a p p e a l
was p e r m i t t e d . T h e D i s t r i c t o f C o l u m b i a C i r c u i t h e l d , i n t e r
a l i a , t h a t t h e f a i r e m p l o y m e n t o r g a n i z a t i o n h a d A r t i c l e I I I
s t a n d i n g . H o w e v e r , i n r e a c h i n g i t s c o n c l u s i o n a s t o t h e f a i r
employment o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s s t a n d i n g , t h e D i s t r i c t o f C o l u m b i a
C i r c u i t s t a t e d t h a t i t e x p l i c i t l y r e j e c t e d t h e f a i r e m p l o y m e n t
o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s s u g g e s t i o n t h a t t h e m e r e e x p e n s e o f t e s t i n g t h e
employment a g e n c y c o n s t i t u t e d " i n j u r y i n f a c t " f a i r l y t r a c e a b l e
to t h e e m p l o y m e n t a g e n c y ' s c o n d u c t . A l t h o u g h t h e d i v e r s i o n o f
r e s o u r c e s t o t e s t i n g m i g h t w e l l h a r m t h e f a i r e m p l o y m e n t
Org a n i z a t i o n ' s o t h e r p r o g r a m s , t h e D i s t r i c t o f C o l u m b i a C i r c u i t
st a t e d t h a t i t w a s a s e l f - i n f l i c t e d h a r m w h i c h d i d n o t r e s u l t
23
from t h e e m p l o y m e n t a g e n c y ' s a c t i o n s . R a t h e r , i t r e s u l t e d f r o m
the f a i r e m p l o y m e n t o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s o w n b u d g e t a r y c h o i c e s . 20
A l t h o u g h t h e T h i r d C i r c u i t h a s n o t c o n s i d e r e d t h e i s s u e
of w h e t h e r a f a i r h o u s i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n h a s s t a n d i n g t o s u e i n
c i r c u m s t a n c e s w h e r e t h e o n l y i n j u r y c l a i m e d b y t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n
is a d i v e r s i o n o f i t s r e s o u r c e s , o t h e r c i r c u i t s t h a t h a v e
c o n s i d e r e d t h e i s s u e h a v e c o n c l u d e d t h a t s t a n d i n g e x i s t s . S e e .
L3„- , R a g i n v . H a r r y M a c k l o w e R e a l E s t a t e C o . . 6 F . 3 d 8 9 8 ( 2 d
C i r . 1 9 9 3 ) ( f a i r h o u s i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n h a d s t a n d i n g t o s u e w h e r e i t
e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t i t s a c t i v i t i e s r e l a t i n g t o i d e n t i f y i n g a n d
c o u n t e r a c t i n g t h e d e f e n d a n t s ' a d v e r t i s i n g p r a c t i c e s d i v e r t e d t h e
a t t e n t i o n o f i t s s t a f f m e m b e r s f r o m t h e i r r e g u l a r t a s k s ) ; H o o k e r
L - W e a t h e r s . 9 9 0 F . 2 d 9 1 3 ( 6 t h C i r . 1 9 9 3 ) ( o r g a n i z a t i o n t h a t w o r k e d
to e l i m i n a t e d i s c r i m i n a t o r y h o u s i n g p r a c t i c e s h a d s t a n d i n g t o s u e
t r a i l e r p a r k , i t s m a n a g e r a n d u n n a m e d c o - o w n e r o f p a r k f o r
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n o n b a s i s o f f a m i l i a l s t a t u s i n v i o l a t i o n o f F a i r
housing A c t w h e r e o r g a n i z a t i o n d e v o t e d r e s o u r c e s t o i n v e s t i g a t e
2o- T h e s t a t e m e n t o f t h e D i s t r i c t o f C o l u m b i a C i r c u i t i n BMC
M e e t i n g w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e s t a n d i n g o f a n a d v o c a c y g r o u p t o
h i e s u i t b a s e d s o l e l y o n i t s d i v e r s i o n o f r e s o u r c e s t o
i n v e s t i g a t e a l l e g e d d i s c r i m i n a t i o n w a s f o l l o w e d b y t h e d i s t r i c t
courts i n F a i r H o u s i n g C o u n c i l o f S u b u r b a n P h i l a d e l p h i a v .
featg o m e r v N e w s p a p e r s . 1 9 9 7 U . S . D i s t . L e x i s 2 7 ( E . D . P a . 1 9 9 7 ) , a n d
H o u s i n g C o u n c i l o f S u b u r b a n P h i l a d e l p h i a v . M a i n L i n e T i m e s .
1997 U . S . D i s t . L e x i s 5 9 6 (E . D . P a . 1 9 9 7 ) .
24
d e f e n d a n t s ' p r a c t i c e s a n d a l l e g e d t h a t i t h a d c o n f i r m e d t h a t
d e f e n d a n t s d i s c r i m i n a t e d o n t h e b a s i s o f f a m i l i a l s t a t u s ) ; C i t y
of C h i c a g o v , M a t c h m a k e r R e a l E s t a t e S a l e s C e n t e r , I n c . . 9 8 2 F . 2 d
1086 ( 7 t h C i r . 1 9 9 2 ) , c e r t , d e n i e d . 5 0 8 U . S . 9 7 2 , 1 1 3 S . C t . 2 9 6 1 ,
125 L . E d . 2 d 6 6 2 ( 1 9 9 3 ) ( n o n p r o f i t c o r p o r a t i o n t h a t s e r v e d a s f a i r
h o u s in g a g e n c y h a d s t a n d i n g t o b r i n g a c t i o n b a s e d o n a l l e g e d
r a c i a l s t e e r i n g o n p a r t o f r e a l e s t a t e s a l e s a g e n t s , s i n c e , b y
c o n d u c t i n g i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n t o a c t i v i t i e s o f r e a l e s t a t e a g e n c y ,
c o r p o r a t i o n d e f l e c t e d i t s t i m e a n d m o n e y f r o m c o u n s e l i n g t o l e g a l
e f f o r t s d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ) ; V i l l a g e o f B e l l w o o d v .
D w ive d i . 8 9 5 F . 2 d 1 5 2 1 ( 7 t h C i r . 1 9 9 0 ) ( o n l y i n j u r y w h i c h n e e d b e
shown t o c o n f e r s t a n d i n g o n f a i r h o u s i n g a g e n c y t o b r i n g h o u s i n g
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a c t i o n i s d e f l e c t i o n o f a g e n c y ' s t i m e a n d m o n e y
from c o u n s e l i n g t o l e g a l e f f o r t s d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ) . 21
21. S e v e r a l d i s t r i c t c o u r t s t h a t h a v e c o n s i d e r e d t h e i s s u e o f
s t a n d i n g w h e n a n a d v o c a c y g r o u p ' s o n l y i n j u r y i s a d i v e r s i o n o f
r e s o u r c e s h a v e a l s o r e a c h e d a c o n c l u s i o n t h a t i s c o n t r a r y t o t h e
D i s t r i c t o f C o l u m b i a C i r c u i t ' s s t a t e m e n t i n BMC M a r k e t i n g . S e e
Lou i s i a n a A c o r n F a i r H o u s i n g v . Q u a r t e r H o u s i n g , 9 5 2 F . S u p p . 352
(E.D.La. 1 9 9 7 ) ( n o n p r o f i t c o r p o r a t i o n w h i c h a c t e d a s f a i r h o u s i n g
sgency h a d s t a n d i n g t o b r i n g f e d e r a l c i v i l r i g h t s a c t i o n a g a i n s t
t i t e s h a r e r e s o r t w h i c h h a d a l l e g e d l y d i s c r i m i n a t e d a g a i n s t
^embers o f i d e n t i f i a b l e g r o u p s , i n w h i c h a g e n c y s o u g h t d a m a g e s
tased o n i t s s t a f f t i m e , v o l u n t e e r t i m e , a n d o t h e r c o s t s i t h a d
U p e n d e d i n e f f o r t s w h i c h w e r e t h w a r t e d b y r e s o r t a n d i t s
( c o n t i n u e d . . . )
25
T h e c o u r t i s p e r s u a d e d b y t h e d e c i s i o n s o f t h e S e c o n d ,
S ix th a n d S e v e n t h C i r c u i t s , a s w e l l a s t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t c a s e s
noted i n f o o t n o t e 2 1 , t h a t t h e F a i r H o u s i n g P a r t n e r s h i p h a s
s t a n d i n g t o s u e t h e R i g a s i n t h i s c a s e b a s e d s o l e l y o n i t s
d i v e r s i o n o f r e s o u r c e s t o i n v e s t i g a t e t h e A l e x a n d e r s ' c l a i m o f
ho u s in g d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . T h e c o u r t r e a c h e s t h i s c o n c l u s i o n
d e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t M r . A l e x a n d e r h a d o b t a i n e d e v i d e n c e o f
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n b y M r s . R i g a s b e f o r e t h e t e s t e r s f r o m t h e F a i r
Housing P a r t n e r s h i p b e c a m e i n v o l v e d i n t h e m a t t e r o n h i s
b e h a l f , 22 a n d d e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t t h i s c a s e i s l i m i t e d t o a n
21. ( . . . c o n t i n u e d )
owners) ; G a s k i n v . C o m m o n w e a l t h o f P e n n s y l v a n i a . 1 9 9 5 WL 1 5 4 8 0 1
(E .D.Pa. 1 9 9 5 ) ( w h e r e a d e f e n d a n t ' s v i o l a t i o n s o f t h e l a w c a u s e a
n o n - p r o f i t a d v o c a c y o r g a n i z a t i o n t o u s e i t s o w n r e s o u r c e s t o
remedy t h e v i o l a t i o n , t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n s u f f e r s a n i n j u r y i n
f a c t ) ; P u m p h r e v v . S t e p h e n H o m e s . I n c . . 1 9 9 4 WL 1 5 0 9 4 7 ( D . M d .
2994), a f f ' d i n p a r t a n d r e v ' d i n p a r t . ( 4 t h C i r . 1 9 9 7 ) ( f a i r
bousing o r g a n i z a t i o n h a d s t a n d i n g t o s u e w h e r e i t d e v o t e d
s i g n i f i c a n t t i m e a n d r e s o u r c e s b y s e n d i n g o u t t e s t e r s t o c o n f i r m
a p a t t e r n o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , t h e r e b y d i v e r t i n g e s s e n t i a l f u n d s
from i t s o t h e r a c t i v i t i e s ) .
22. As n o t e d i n t h e u n d i s p u t e d f a c t s , p r i o r t o t h e t e s t e r s b e i n g
ssked b y t h e F a i r H o u s i n g P a r t n e r s h i p t o c o n t a c t M r s . R i g a s a b o u t
fbe a v a i l a b i l i t y o f t h e a p a r t m e n t i n t h e D a r l i n g t o n R o a d
p r o p e r t y , M r . A l e x a n d e r a s k e d h i s f r i e n d , R o b i n M c D o n o u g h , a
white f e m a l e , t o c a l l M r s . R i g a s a b o u t t h e a p a r t m e n t . C o n t r a r y
f° t h e i n f o r m a t i o n p r o v i d e d t o t h e A l e x a n d e r s b y M r s . R i g a s , Ms.
McDonough w a s t o l d t h a t t h e a p a r t m e n t w a s a v a i l a b l e , i n d i c a t i n g
P o s s i b l e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n .
26
a p p a r e n t i s o l a t e d i n c i d e n t o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n b y t h e R i g a s . 23
However , i t s h o u l d b e n o t e d t h a t a d i v e r s i o n o f i t s r e s o u r c e s i s
not t h e o n l y b a s i s f o r t h e F a i r H o u s i n g P a r t n e r s h i p ' s c l a i m
a g a i n s t t h e R i g a s u n d e r t h e F a i r H o u s i n g A c t i n t h i s c a s e . T h e
Fair H o u s i n g P a r t n e r s h i p a l s o a l l e g e s t h a t t h e R i g a s v i o l a t e d i t s
r i g h t t o t r u t h f u l a n d a c c u r a t e i n f o r m a t i o n r e g a r d i n g t h e
a v a i l a b i l i t y o f A p a r t m e n t N o . 2 i n t h e i r D a r l i n g t o n R o a d p r o p e r t y
based o n t h e i n f o r m a t i o n p r o v i d e d b y M r s . R i g a t o i t s b l a c k
t e s t e r , D a r i a M i t c h e l l . 24 I f e s t a b l i s h e d , t h i s a c t i o n v i o l a t e s
S e c t i o n 3 6 0 4 (d ) o f t h e F a i r H o u s i n g A c t . U n d e r t h e
c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t h e m o t i o n o f t h e R i g a s f o r a j u d g m e n t i n t h e i r
23. The Rigas attempted to distinguish several of the cases
relied upon by the Fair Housing Partnership in support of its
position that a diversion of resources is sufficient to establish
standing on the part of a fair housing organization by noting
that the discrimination in those cases was more widespread than
the alleged discrimination in this case, involving either racial
steering or discriminatory advertising practices. However, the
court can find no support for such a distinction. In both
situations, resources are diverted. The only difference is the
extent of the diversion.
As n o t e d i n t h e T e s t i n g S u m m a r y c o m p l e t e d b y M s . B l i n n ,
which w a s s u b m i t t e d b y t h e R i g a s i n s u p p o r t o f t h e i r m o t i o n f o r
summary j u d g m e n t , M r s . R i g a s t o l d M s . M i t c h e l l o n S e p t e m b e r 3 0 ,
1995 t h a t s h e w a s g o i n g t o r e n t A p a r t m e n t N o . 2 i n t h e D a r l i n g t o n
Road p r o p e r t y t o " J e f f , " a n d t h a t s h e w o u l d c a l l M s . M i t c h e l l i f
an a p a r t m e n t b e c o m e a v a i l a b l e . D e s p i t e t h e a p p a r e n t f a i l u r e o f
Jef f " t o r e n t A p a r t m e n t N o . 2 , t h e r e i s n o i n d i c a t i o n t h a t M r s .
Rigas e v e r a t t e m p t e d t o c o n t a c t M s . M i t c h e l l t o i n f o r m h e r o f i t s
P l i a b i l i t y . ( M o t i o n f o r S u m m a r y J u d g m e n t , E x h . 0 ) .
27
f a v o r a s t o t h e c l a i m a s s e r t e d b y t h e F a i r H o u s i n g P a r t n e r s h i p
under t h e F a i r H o u s i n g A c t w i l l b e d e n i e d .
A n o r d e r f o l l o w s .
28
I N THE UNITED STATES D I S T R I C T COURT
FOR THE WESTERN D I S T R I C T OF PENNSYLVANIA
RONALD ALEXANDER, FAYE
ALEXANDER a n d t h e FA IR
HOUSING PARTNERSHIP OF
GREATER PITTSB URGH, INC
Plaintiffs,
v s . ) C i v i l A c t i o n N o . 9 6 - 4 9
JOSEPH R I G A a n d MARIA A. R IG A , )
a /k / a CARLA AGNOTTI , )
)
D e f e n d a n t s )
ORDER
AND NOW, t h i s j o & d a y o f M a r c h , 1 9 9 8 , i n a c c o r d a n c e
with t h e f o r e g o i n g m e m o r a n d u m , i t i s ORDERED t h a t t h e m o t i o n o f
d e f e n d a n t s , J o s e p h R i g a a n d M a r i a A . R i g a , f o r s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t
p u r s u a n t t o F e d . R . C i v . P . 56 b e , a n d h e r e b y i s , d e n i e d .
W i l l i a m L . S t a n d i s h
U n i t e d S t a t e s D i s t r i c t J u d g e
AO 450 (Rev. S/8S) Judgment In « Civil Case «
S ta tes d istr ict Court
WESTERN_____________________ _ DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA___________
RONALD ALEXANDER, FAYE ALEXANDER
and t h e F A I R HOUSING PARTNERSHIP AMENDED
OF GREATER PITTSBURGH, I N C . JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE
v.
JOSEPH RIGA a n d MARIA A . RIGA,
a / k / a CARLA AGNOTTI
CASE NUMBER: CA 9 6 - 4 9
J3 Jury Verdict. This action came before the Court for a trial by jury. The issues have been tried and the jury has rendered
its verdict, b y s p e c i a l v e r d i c t s .
Q Decision by Court. This action came to trial or hearing before the Court. The issues have been tried or heard and a
decision has been rendered.
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED a s f o l l o w s :
1 . T h e j u d g m e n t e n t e r e d b y t h e c o u r t o n May 2 6 , 1 9 9 8 i s h e r e b y
v a c a t e d .
2 . I n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e S p e c i a l V e r d i c t s r e t u r n e d b y t h e j u r y
on May 2 2 , 1 9 9 8 , j u d g m e n t i s e n t e r e d i n f a v o r o f d e f e n d a n t s a n d a g a i n s t
p l a i n t i f f s R o n a l d A l e x a n d e r a n d F a y e A l e x a n d e r .
3 . I n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e S p e c i a l V e r d i c t s r e t u r n e d b y t h e j u r y
on May 2 2 , 1 9 9 8 , j u d g m e n t i s e n t e r e d i n f a v o r o f p l a i n t i f f F a i r H o u s i n g
P a r t n e r s h i p o f G r e a t e r P i t t s b u r g h , I n c . a n d a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t s a s t o
l i a b i l i t y u n d e r t h e F a i r H o u s i n g A c t . No d a m a g e s a r e a w a r d e d i n f a v o r
of s a i d p l a i n t i f f .
4 . T h e p a r t i e s a r e t o b e a r t h e i r ow n c o s t s .
JUDGMENT I S HEREBY ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
(By) Deputy Clerk
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
RONALD ALEXANDER, - FAYE
ALEXANDER a n d t h e FAIR
HOUSING PARTNERSHIP OF
GREATER PITTSBURGH, I N C . ,
Plaintiffs,
v s .
JOSEPH RIGA a n d MARIA A. RIGA , )
a / k / a CARLA AGNOTTI, )
)
D e f e n d a n t s )
MEMORANDUM
I
B e f o r e t h e c o u r t a r e t h e f o l l o w i n g p o s t - t r i a l m o t i o n s
f i l e d b y t h e p a r t i e s i n t h i s a c t i o n b r o u g h t p u r s u a n t t o t h e F a i r
Hous ing A c t ( F H A ) , T i t l e V I I I o f t h e C i v i l R i g h t s A c t o f 1 9 6 8 , 42
H.S.C. § 3 6 0 1 e t . s e q . : 1
1• P l a i n t i f f s ' M o t i o n f o r J u d g m e n t N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e
V e r d i c t o r f o r a New T r i a l o n D a m a g e s ( D o c u m e n t N o . 8 2 ) ;
2 . P l a i n t i f f s ' M o t i o n f o r H e a r i n g o n I n j u n c t i v e a n d
E q u i t a b l e R e l i e f ( D o c u m e n t N o . 8 3 ) ;
3 . P l a i n t i f f s ' M o t i o n f o r A w a r d o f A t t o r n e y s ' F e e s ,
Costs a n d E x p e n s e s i n t h e i r F a v o r a s P r e v a i l i n g P a r t i e s ( D o c u m e n t
Ho. 84) ;
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
) C i v i l A c t i o n N o . 9 6 - 4 9
. b e f o r e t h e c o m m e n c e m e n t o f t r i a l , p l a i n t i f f s a b a n d o n e d t h e
a im s t h e y h a d a s s e r t e d a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t s u n d e r S e c t i o n s 1 9 8 1
19821 9 8 2 ° f t h S C i v i l R i g h t s A c t o f 1 8 6 6 ' 4 2 U . S . C . § § 1 9 8 1 a n d
J
4 . P l a i n t i f f s ' M o t i o n t o T a x C o s t s a g a i n s t D e f e n d a n t s
( D oc um e n t N o . 8 5 ) ;
5 . P l a i n t i f f s ' R u l e 60 M o t i o n N u n c P r o T u n c t o C o r r e c t
E r r o r i n J u d g m e n t a n d f o r R u l e 5 9 ( e ) R e l i e f N u n c P r o T u n c f r o m
J u d g m e n t ( D o c u m e n t N o . 9 6 ) ; a n d
6 . D e f e n d a n t s ' M o t i o n t o T a x C o s t s A g a i n s t P l a i n t i f f s
(Docum en t N o . 8 7 ) .
A f t e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n , a n d f o r t h e r e a s o n s s e t f o r t h
be low , t h e m o t i o n s w i l l b e d e n i e d , w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n o f
p l a i n t i f f s ' R u l e 60 M o t i o n N u n c P r o T u n c t o C o r r e c t E r r o r i n
Ju d g m e n t a n d f o r R u l e 5 9 ( e ) R e l i e f N u n c P r o T u n c f r o m J u d g m e n t ,
which w i l l b e g r a n t e d i n p a r t a n d d e n i e d i n p a r t .
II
T h e p r o c e d u r a l h i s t o r y o f t h i s c a s e m a y b e s u m m a r i z e d
as f o l l o w s :
On J a n u a r y 1 1 , 1 9 9 6 , p l a i n t i f f s , R o n a l d A l e x a n d e r , F a y e
A l e x a n d e r a n d t h e F a i r H o u s i n g P a r t n e r s h i p o f G r e a t e r P i t t s b u r g h ,
Inc. ( F H P ) , f i l e d t h i s c i v i l a c t i o n a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t s , J o s e p h
Riga a n d M a r i a A. R i g a . I n t h e i r c o m p l a i n t , p l a i n t i f f s s o u g h t
d a m a ge s , a s w e l l a s e q u i t a b l e a n d i n j u n c t i v e r e l i e f , f o r a l l e g e d
w e e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . S p e c i f i c a l l y , p l a i n t i f f s a l l e g e d t h a t
d e f e n d a n t s d i s c r i m i n a t e d a g a i n s t t h e i n d i v i d u a l p l a i n t i f f s o n t h e
b a s i s o f t h e i r r a c e i n v i o l a t i o n o f t h e FHA i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h
the a t t e m p t s o f M r . a n d M r s . A l e x a n d e r t o v i e w a r e n t a l p r o p e r t y
2
owned b y d e f e n d a n t s i n t h e S q u i r r e l H i l l s e c t i o n o f t h e C i t y o f
P i t t s b u r g h . 2
F o l l o w i n g a n e i g h t - d a y t r i a l i n M a y , 1 9 9 8 , a j u r y
r e t u r n e d e i g h t s p e c i a l v e r d i c t s . W i t h r e s p e c t t o M r . a n d M r s .
A l e x a n d e r , t h e j u r y f o u n d t h a t M r s . R i g a h a d d i s c r i m i n a t e d
a g a i n s t t h e m i n v i o l a t i o n o f t h e FHA. H o w e v e r , t h e j u r y f o u n d
that t h e d i s c r i m i n a t o r y c o n d u c t o f M r s . R i g a w a s n o t a l e g a l
cause o f h a r m t o e i t h e r M r . o r M r s . A l e x a n d e r , a n d a w a r d e d t h e m
no m o n e t a r y d a m a g e s . 3 A s t o t h e FHP, t h e j u r y f o u n d t h a t t h e
d i s c r i m i n a t o r y c o n d u c t o f M r s . R i g a w a s a l e g a l c a u s e o f h a r m t o
the FHP. H o w e v e r , t h e j u r y a w a r d e d n o m o n e t a r y d a m a g e s t o t h e
FHP. 4 B a s e d o n t h e s p e c i a l v e r d i c t s , t h e c o u r t e n t e r e d j u d g m e n t
2. T he FHA p r o h i b i t s d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n t h e s a l e o r r e n t a l o f
hous ing , i n c l u d i n g t h e r e f u s a l t o n e g o t i a t e f o r t h e r e n t a l o f , o r
o t h e r w i s e m a k e u n a v a i l a b l e o r d e n y , a d w e l l i n g t o a n y p e r s o n
because o f r a c e ; t o d i s c r i m i n a t e a g a i n s t a n y p e r s o n i n t h e t e r m s ,
c o n d i t i o n s o r p r i v i l e g e s o f r e n t a l o f a d w e l l i n g b e c a u s e o f r a c e ;
°r t o r e p r e s e n t t o a n y p e r s o n b e c a u s e o f r a c e t h a t a n y d w e l l i n g
is n o t a v a i l a b l e f o r i n s p e c t i o n , s a l e o r r e n t a l w h e n s u c h
w e l l i n g i s , i n f a c t , s o a v a i l a b l e . S e e 42 U . S . C . § § 3 6 0 4 ( a ) ,
lb) a n d (d ) .
3' Although both Mr. and Mrs. Riga were defendants at trial, the
special verdicts that were submitted to the jury were limited to
etermining the liability of Mrs. Riga for discriminatory conduct
because only Mrs. Riga was involved in the events leading to this
awsuit. Mr. Riga was in Italy at all relevant times. However,
toder the law of agency, as well as the fact that the duties
imposed by the FHA are non-delegable, Mr. Riga would be liable
J?r anY compensatory or nominal damages resulting from his wife's
discriminatory conduct in connection with the rental of their
Jointly owned apartments.
The i s s u e o f p u n i t i v e d a m a g e s h a d b e e n b i f u r c a t e d f r o m t h e
lssues o f l i a b i l i t y a n d c o m p e n s a t o r y o r n o m i n a l d a m a g e s . A f t e r
(continued...)
3
in f a v o r o f d e f e n d a n t s a n d a g a i n s t p l a i n t i f f s , t o g e t h e r w i t h
c o s t s , o n May 2 6 , 1 9 8 8 .
Ill
T h e c o u r t w i l l d i s c u s s t h e p a r t i e s ' p o s t - t r i a l m o t i o n s
s e q u e n t i a l l y .
A. Plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or for a New Trial on Damages
I n t h i s m o t i o n , p l a i n t i f f s a s s e r t t h a t a j u d g m e n t
n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e v e r d i c t , 5 a s w e l l a s t h e a d d i t u r o f n o m i n a l
d a m a g e s i n t h e a m o u n t o f o n e d o l l a r f o r e a c h p l a i n t i f f , i s
r e q u i r e d b a s e d o n e v i d e n c e t h a t e a c h p l a i n t i f f s u s t a i n e d a c t u a l
harm. I n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e , p l a i n t i f f s a s s e r t t h a t a n e w t r i a l on
d a m a g e s i s r e q u i r e d b e c a u s e (1 ) t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n r e f u s i n g t o
i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y t h a t a n a w a r d o f n o m i n a l d a m a g e s i n f a v o r o f
each p l a i n t i f f w a s r e q u i r e d b a s e d o n t h e e v i d e n c e ; (2 ) t h e c o u r t
e r r e d i n r e f u s i n g t o c h a r g e t h e j u r y o n t h e i s s u e o f p u n i t i v e
d a m a g e s , , d e s p i t e t h e j u r y ' s f a i l u r e t o a w a r d c o m p e n s a t o r y
d a m a g e s ; (3 ) t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n r e f u s i n g t o i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y
t h a t a n a w a r d o f c o m p e n s a t o r y a n d e x e m p l a r y d a m a g e s i n f a v o r o f
th e FHP w a s r e q u i r e d b a s e d o n t h e e v i d e n c e ; a n d ( 4 ) t h e c o u r t
e r r e d i n r e f u s i n g t o a d m i t t h e t e s t i m o n y o f S t e v e D e n s o n , M i c h a e l
4 • ( • . . c o n t i n u e d )
the r e t u r n o f t h e j u r y ' s s p e c i a l v e r d i c t s , t h e c o u r t d e c l i n e d t o
Put t h e i s s u e o f p u n i t i v e d a m a g e s t o t h e j u r y .
5 - As n o t e d b y d e f e n d a n t s , p l a i n t i f f s s h o u l d h a v e f i l e d t h i s
m o t i o n u n d e r R u l e 5 0 ( b ) o f t h e F e d e r a l R u l e s o f C i v i l P r o c e d u r e ,
s e e k i n g a j u d g m e n t i n t h e i r f a v o r a s a m a t t e r o f l a w .
4
Bowen a n d M i c h a e l Snow r e g a r d i n g o t h e r a l l e g e d a c t s o f
i n t e n t i o n a l r a c e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n b y M r s . R i g a a g a i n s t b l a c k
a p p l i c a n t s f o r a p a r t m e n t s .
1 . T u r n i n g f i r s t t o t h e i s s u e o f n o m i n a l d a m a g e s ,
d u r i n g t h e c h a r g e c o n f e r e n c e o n May 2 1 , 1 9 9 8 , C a r o l i n e M i t c h e l l ,
E s q u i r e , o n e o f p l a i n t i f f s ' c o - c o u n s e l , r e q u e s t e d t h e i n c l u s i o n
of a c h a r g e o n n o m i n a l d a m a g e s i n t h e c o u r t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n s t o t h e
j u r y . T h e r e q u e s t w a s g r a n t e d , a n d t h e c o u r t i n c l u d e d a n
i n s t r u c t i o n o n n o m i n a l d a m a g e s i n i t s p r o p o s e d c h a r g e , w h i c h was
p r o v i d e d t o c o u n s e l i n i t s e n t i r e t y p r i o r t o t h e t i m e t h e j u r y
was c h a r g e d .
T h e j u r y w a s i n s t r u c t e d , i n r e l e v a n t p a r t , a s f o l l o w s :
* * *
. . . F i n a l l y , i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e i s s u e o f d a m a g e s , i f
y o u f i n d t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f s a r e e n t i t l e d t o v e r d i c t s
i n t h e i r f a v o r i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e s e i n s t r u c t i o n s ,
b u t y o u d o n o t f i n d t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f s h a v e s u s t a i n e d
s u b s t a n t i a l a c t u a l d a m a g e s , t h e n y o u m a y r e t u r n a
v e r d i c t f o r t h e p l a i n t i f f s i n s o m e n o m i n a l s u m , s u c h a s
o n e d o l l a r o n a c c o u n t o f a c t u a l d a m a g e s . . . .
★ ★ rk
N e i t h e r M s . M i t c h e l l n o r h e r c o - c o u n s e l , T i m o t h y P . O ' B r i e n ,
E s q u i r e , o b j e c t e d t o t h e f o r m o f t h e c h a r g e o n n o m i n a l d a m a g e s
b e f o r e o r a f t e r i t w a s g i v e n t o t h e j u r y , d e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t
the c h a r g e p e r m i t t e d , b u t d i d n o t r e q u i r e , t h e j u r y t o a w a r d
n o m i n a l d a m a g e s i f t h e j u r y f o u n d t h a t p l a i n t i f f s d i d n o t s u s t a i n
s u b s t a n t i a l a c t u a l d a m a g e s . T h e f i r s t t i m e t h e l a n g u a g e o f t h e
5
c h a r g e o n n o m i n a l d a m a g e s w a s c h a l l e n g e d b y p l a i n t i f f s w a s i n a
p o s t - t r i a l m o t i o n , a f t e r t h e j u r y h a d b e e n d i s c h a r g e d .
P l a i n t i f f s a r g u e t h a t t h e h o l d i n g o f t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t
of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i n C a r e y v ..P i p h u s . 4 3 5 U . S . 2 4 7 , 98 S . C t .
1042, 55 L . E d . 2 d 2 5 2 ( 1 9 7 8 ) , r e q u i r e s a n a w a r d o f n o m i n a l d a m a g e s
when a f a c t f i n d e r d e t e r m i n e s t h a t a v i o l a t i o n o f a n " a b s o l u t e
r i g h t , s u c h a s t h e r i g h t t o b e f r e e f r o m r a c e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ,
has o c c u r r e d w i t h o u t p r o o f o f a c t u a l i n j u r y . I n r e s p o n s e t o t h i s
a r g u m e n t , d e f e n d a n t s t a k e t h e p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e " a b s o l u t e r i g h t "
r e f e r r e d t o i n C a r e y , a d e n i a l o f p r o c e d u r a l d u e p r o c e s s , w a s
a b s o l u t e ' b e c a u s e t h e d e n i a l w a s a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t o r t i n
v i o l a t i o n o f 42 U . S . C . § 1 9 8 3 , a n d t h a t t h e v i o l a t i o n o f a
s t a t u t o r y r i g h t , s u c h a s a v i o l a t i o n o f t h e FHA, i s n o t a
v i o l a t i o n o f a n " a b s o l u t e r i g h t , " e n t i t l i n g t h e v i c t i m t o n o m i n a l
damages i n t h e a b s e n c e o f p r o o f o f i n j u r y .
I n s u p p o r t o f t h e i r p o s i t i o n , d e f e n d a n t s c i t e Walker v .
Ander s o n E l e c . C o n n e c t i o n , 944 F . 2 d 8 4 1 ( 8 t h C i r . ) , cert, d e n i e d .
506 U . S . 1 0 7 8 , 1 1 3 S . C t . 1 0 4 3 , 1 2 2 L . E d . 2 d 3 5 2 ( 1 9 9 8 ) , a c a s e
i n v o l v i n g s e x u a l h a r a s s m e n t i n v i o l a t i o n o f T i t l e V I I o f t h e
C i v i l R i g h t s A c t o f 1 9 6 4 ( T i t l e V I I ) , 42 U . S . C . § 2 0 0 0 ( e ) e t
£££[•, i n w h i c h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o u r t o f A p p e a l s f o r t h e E i g h t h
C irc u i t s t a t e d :
* * *
W a l k e r a r g u e s t h a t C a r e v v . P i p h u s , 4 3 5 U . S . 2 4 7 ,
98 S . C t . 1 0 4 2 , 55 L . E d . 2 d 2 5 2 ( 1 9 7 8 ) , r e g u i r e s t h e
a u t o m a t i c a w a r d o f n o m i n a l d a m a g e s u p o n t h e f i n d i n g o f
6
a T i t l e V I I v i o l a t i o n r e g a r d l e s s o f R u l e 51 a n d t h e
f e d e r a l C o u r t s ' d i s l i k e o f a d d i t u r . C a r e y d o e s n o t ,
h o w e v e r , a d d r e s s t h e i s s u e o f n o m i n a l d a m a g e s i n a
T i t l e V I I a c t i o n .
C a r e y i n v o l v e d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f 4 2 U . S . C . § 1 9 R 3 ,
( f o o t n o t e o m i t t e d ) w h i c h p r o v i d e s a r e m e d y f o r
v i o l a t i o n s o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s b y p e r s o n s a c t i n g
u n d e r c o l o r o f s t a t e l a w . E m p h a s i z i n g t h e a b s o l u t e
n a t u r e o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s a n d " t h e i m p o r t a n c e t o
o r g a n i z e d s o c i e t y t h a t t h o s e , r i g h t s b e s c r u p u l o u s l y
o b s e r v e d , " C a r e y , 4 3 5 U . S . a t 2 6 6 , 98 S . C t . a t 1 0 5 3 ,
t h e C o u r t m a n d a t e d t h e a w a r d o f n o m i n a l d a m a g e s u p o n
t h e f i n d i n g o f a p r o c e d u r a l d u e p r o c e s s v i o l a t i o n e v e n
w h e r e n o a c t u a l i n j u r y h a d b e e n s h o w n . By c o n t r a s t ,
t h i s c a s e i n v o l v e s , n o t a v i o l a t i o n o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
r i g h t s , b u t m e r e l y , a v i o l a t i o n o f p u r e l y s t a t u t o r y
r i g h t s u n d e r T i t l e V I I . N o t h i n g i n C a r e y m a n d a t e s t h e
a w a r d o f n o m i n a l d a m a g e s f o r s t a t u t o r y v i o l a t i o n s ,
( f o o t n o t e o m i t t e d ) .
* * *
944 F. 2 d a t 8 4 5 .
A f t e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n , t h e c o u r t b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e
d i s t i n c t i o n m a d e b y t h e E i g h t h C i r c u i t i n W a l k e r c o n c e r n i n g
s t a t u t o r y v i o l a t i o n s a s o p p o s e d t o v i o l a t i o n s o f " a b s o l u t e
r i g h t s " c o n f i r m e d b y t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n i s a v a l i d o n e , a n d t h a t
the v i o l a t i o n o f t h e A l e x a n d e r s ' r i g h t s u n d e r t h e FHA d i d n o t
mandate a n a w a r d o f n o m i n a l d a m a g e s i n f a v o r o f t h e m o r t h e F H P . 6
• I n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h p l a i n t i f f s ' m o t i o n f o r t h e a d d i t u r o f o n e
d o l l a r i n n o m i n a l d a m a g e s f o r e a c h p l a i n t i f f , o n S e p t e m b e r 2 1 ,
1998 , p l a i n t i f f s ' c o - c o u n s e l , M r . O ' B r i e n , s e n t a l e t t e r t o t h e
court t o b r i n g t o t h e c o u r t ' s a t t e n t i o n t h e d e c i s i o n o f t h e
f e l t e d S t a t e s C o u r t o f A p p e a l s f o r t h e S e c o n d C i r c u i t i n G i b e a u
•t—N e l 3 i s , 18 F . 3 d 1 0 7 ( 2 d C i r . 1 9 9 4 ) . I n G i b e a u . a c r i m i n a l
contemnor, who w a s i n c a r c e r a t e d , b r o u g h t a S e c t i o n 1 9 8 3 a c t i o n
g a i n s t a j a i l o f f i c e r , a l l e g i n g e x c e s s i v e u s e o f f o r c e . T h e
d j s t r i c t c o u r t e n t e r e d j u d g m e n t o n t h e j u r y v e r d i c t , f i n d i n g t h a t
he o f f i c e r h a d u s e d e x c e s s i v e f o r c e , b u t a w a r d i n g n o d a m a g e s .
( c o n t i n u e d . . . )
7
I n a n y e v e n t , i t a p p e a r s t o t h e c o u r t t h a t p l a i n t i f f s
have w a i v e d t h e i r r i g h t t o a s s e r t a p o s t - t r i a l c l a i m o f e r r o r
b a s e d o n t h e f o r m o f t h e n o m i n a l d a m a g e c h a r g e g i v e n t o t h e j u r y
by f a i l i n g t o o b j e c t t o t h e c h a r g e , a s w r i t t e n , e i t h e r b e f o r e o r
a f t e r t h e c h a r g e w a s g i v e n t o t h e j u r y . When a p a r t y f a i l s t o
make a t i m e l y o b j e c t i o n t o a j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n , t h e o b j e c t i o n i s
w a iv e d a n d t h e i n s t r u c t i o n i s r e v i e w e d o n l y f o r " p l a i n e r r o r . "
I n Q s e i - A f r i v i e v . M e d i c a l C o l l e g e o f P e n n s y l v a n i a . 937
F.2d 87 6 ( 3 d C i r . 1 9 9 1 ) , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o u r t o f A p p e a l s f o r
the T h i r d C i r c u i t a d d r e s s e d t h e i s s u e o f p l a i n e r r o r , s t a t i n g :
★ * *
P l a i n e r r o r s a r e t h o s e e r r o r s t h a t " s e r i o u s l y
a f f e c t t h e f a i r n e s s , i n t e g r i t y o r p u b l i c r e p u t a t i o n o f
6. (. . . continued)
On a p p e a l , t h e S e c o n d C i r c u i t h e l d , i n t e r a l i a , t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t
c o u r t s h o u l d h a v e i n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y t h a t i t w a s r e q u i r e d t o
award n o m i n a l d a m a g e s i f i t f o u n d t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s E i g h t h
Amendment r i g h t s w e r e v i o l a t e d . T h e S e c o n d C i r c u i t t h e n r e m a n d e d
the c a s e t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o r t h e e n t r y o f n o m i n a l d a m a g e s
m f a v o r o f t h e p l a i n t i f f , c o n c l u d i n g t h a t s u c h a c t i o n w o u l d n o t
i m p e r m i s s i b l y i n v a d e t h e p r o v i n c e o f t h e j u r y b e c a u s e n o m i n a l
damages w e r e m a n d a t o r y u n d e r t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f t h a t c a s e .
D e f e n s e c o u n s e l , T h o m a s M. H a r d i m a n , E s q u i r e , r e s p o n d e d
to M r . O ' B r i e n ' s l e t t e r o n S e p t e m b e r 2 4 , 1 9 9 8 , n o t i n g t h a t t h e
d e c i s i o n o f t h e S e c o n d C i r c u i t i n G i b e a u i s i n a p p o s i t e b e c a u s e
the c a s e i n v o l v e d a c l a i m u n d e r S e c t i o n 1 9 8 3 f o r t h e v i o l a t i o n o f
a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t b y a s t a t e a c t o r , n o t a s t a t u t o r y c l a i m
a g a i n s t a p r i v a t e c i t i z e n . B a s e d o n t h e c o u r t ' s c o n c l u s i o n t h a t
the d i s t i n c t i o n m a d e b y t h e E i g h t h C i r c u i t i n W a l k e r c o n c e r n i n g
s t a t u t o r y v i o l a t i o n s a s o p p o s e d t o v i o l a t i o n s o f " a b s o l u t e
r i g h t s " u n d e r t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n i s a v a l i d o n e , t h e d e c i s i o n o f
the S e c o n d C i r c u i t i n G i b e a u d o e s n o t a l t e r t h e c o u r t ' s
c o n c l u s i o n t h a t a n a w a r d o f n o m i n a l d a m a g e s i s n o t m a n d a t e d i n
t h i s c a s e .
8
[ j u d i c i a l p r o c e e d i n g s . " U n i t e d S t a t e s v . A t k i n s o n . 2 9 7
U . S . 1 5 7 , 1 6 0 , 56 S . C t . 3 9 1 , 3 9 2 , 80 L . E d . 2 d 5 5 5
( 1 9 3 6 ) . T h e y a r e e r r o r s t h a t " u n d e r m i n e t h e
f u n d a m e n t a l f a i r n e s s o f t h e t r i a l a n d c o n t r i b u t e t o a
m i s c a r r i a g e o f j u s t i c e . " U n i t e d S t a t e s v . Y o u n g . 4 7 0
U . S . 1 , 1 6 , 1 0 5 S . C t . 1 0 3 8 , 1 0 4 7 , 84 L . E d . 2 d 1 ( 1 9 8 5 ) .
T h e S u p r e m e C o u r t h a s c a u t i o n e d t h a t t h e d o c t r i n e i s t o
b e u s e d " s p a r i n g l y , " U n i t e d S t a t e s v . F r a d y . 4 5 6 U . S .
1 5 2 , 1 6 3 n . 1 4 , 1 0 2 S . C t . 1 5 8 4 , 1 5 9 2 n . 1 4 , 71 L . E d . 2 d
8 1 6 ( 1 9 8 2 ) , a n d o n l y w h e r e t h e e r r o r w a s s u r e t o h a v e
h a d " a n u n f a i r p r e j u d i c i a l i m p a c t o n t h e j u r y ' s
d e l i b e r a t i o n s , " Y o u n g , 4 7 0 U . S . a t 16 n . 1 4 , 1 0 5 S . C t .
a t 1 0 4 7 n . 1 4 .
* * *
937 F . 2 d a t 8 8 1 - 8 8 2 .
A p p l y i n g t h i s s t a n d a r d i n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , t h e c o u r t s i m p l y
c a n n o t c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e n o m i n a l d a m a g e c h a r g e g i v e n t o t h e j u r y
" u n d e r m i n e [ d ] t h e f u n d a m e n t a l f a i r n e s s o f t h e t r i a l a n d
c o n t r i b u t e [ d ] t o a m i s c a r r i a g e o f j u s t i c e , " o r t h a t t h e c h a r g e
had " a n u n f a i r p r e j u d i c i a l i m p a c t o n t h e j u r y ' s d e l i b e r a t i o n s . "
T h e r e f o r e , t h e c o u r t d e c l i n e s t o g r a n t p l a i n t i f f s ' r e q u e s t f o r
j u d g m e n t n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e v e r d i c t o r f o r t h e a d d i t u r o f o n e
d o l l a r i n n o m i n a l d a m a g e s f o r e a c h p l a i n t i f f .
2 . A s t o t h e i s s u e o f p u n i t i v e d a m a g e s , s u c h d a m a g e s
®ay b e a w a r d e d f o r v i o l a t i o n s o f f e d e r a l l a w w h e n a d e f e n d a n t ' s
c o n d u c t i s " m o t i v a t e d b y e v i l m o t i v e o r i n t e n t , o r w h e n i t
i n v o l v e s r e c k l e s s o r c a l l o u s i n d i f f e r e n c e t o t h e f e d e r a l l y
P r o t e c t e d r i g h t s o f o t h e r s . " S a m a r i t a n I n n s . I n c , v . D i s t r i c t o f
S o iu m b ia , , 1 1 4 F . 3 d 1 2 2 7 , 1 2 3 9 ( D . C . C i r . 1 9 9 7 ) , q u o t i n g . S m i t h v .
S ide , 4 6 1 U . S . 3 0 , 5 6 , 103 S . C t . 1 6 2 5 , 1 6 4 0 , 75 L . E d . 2 d 6 3 2
(1982) . As n o t e d i n f o o t n o t e 4 , t h e i s s u e o f p u n i t i v e d a m a g e s
9
was b i f u r c a t e d a n d w a s n o t s u b m i t t e d t o t h e j u r y w i t h t h e i s s u e s
of l i a b i l i t y a n d c o m p e n s a t o r y o r n o m i n a l d a m a g e s . A f t e r t h e j u r y
r e t u r n e d i t s v e r d i c t s a w a r d i n g n e i t h e r c o m p e n s a t o r y n o r n o m i n a l
da m a g e s t o a n y p l a i n t i f f , t h e c o u r t d e c l i n e d t o s u b m i t t o t h e
j u r y t h e i s s u e o f p u n i t i v e d a m a g e s a n d t h e j u r y w a s d i s c h a r g e d .
T h e c o u r t b e l i e v e d , a n d c o n t i n u e s t o b e l i e v e , t h a t , b y
i t s r e f u s a l t o a w a r d c o m p e n s a t o r y o r n o m i n a l d a m a g e s , t h e j u r y
d id n o t c o n s i d e r t h e c o n d u c t o f M r s . R i g a t o h a v e b e e n t h e r e s u l t
of ^ri e v i l m o t i v e o r i n t e n t o r t o h a v e i n v o l v e d r e c k l e s s o r
c a l l o u s i n d i f f e r e n c e t o t h e f e d e r a l l y p r o t e c t e d r i g h t s o f
p l a i n t i f f s . M o r e o v e r , a s t o M r . a n d M r s . A l e x a n d e r , t h e j u r y
found t h a t M r s . R i g a 1s c o n d u c t w a s n o t a l e g a l c a u s e o f h a r m t o
them. A f t e r t h e j u r y v e r d i c t s w e r e r e t u r n e d , t h e c o u r t c o n c l u d e d
t h a t , b e c a u s e t h e j u r y h a d f o u n d t h a t M r s . R i g a ' s d i s c r i m i n a t i o n
did n o t c a u s e h a r m t o t h e A l e x a n d e r s , i t w o u l d b e i n a p p r o p r i a t e
to p e r m i t t h e j u r y t o a w a r d p u n i t i v e d a m a g e s t o t h e m .
T h e c o u r t a g r e e s w i t h d e f e n d a n t s t h a t , i n o r d e r t o
r e c o v e r p u n i t i v e d a m a g e s , t h e A l e x a n d e r s s h o u l d b e r e q u i r e d t o
Prove m o r e t h a n i n t e n t i o n a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n b y M r s . R i g a .
O t h e r w i s e , p u n i t i v e d a m a g e s w o u l d f o l l o w a s a m a t t e r o f c o u r s e i n
e v e ry c a s e i n w h i c h i n t e n t i o n a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n w e r e e s t a b l i s h e d ,
c o n t r a r y t o t h e g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e t h a t p u n i t i v e d a m a g e s
" r e p r e s e n t a l i m i t e d r e m e d y , t o b e r e s e r v e d f o r s p e c i a l
c i r c u m s t a n c e s . " S a v a r e s e v . A a r i s s . 8 8 3 F . 2 d 1 1 9 4 , 1 2 0 5 ( 3 d
O i r . 1 9 8 9 ) . ( D e f e n d a n t s ' R e s p o n s e t o P l a i n t i f f s ' M o t i o n f o r
10
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or for a New Trial on
Damages, p. 12).
According to the court's recollection of the trial
testimony and the court's trial notes, Mrs. Alexander testified
that Mrs. Riga's conduct did not cause her to cry, to become ill,
to suffer any emotional distress or to. seek medical or
psychological care, and Mr. Alexander testified that, although he
suffered emotional distress as a result of Mrs. Riga's conduct,
he sought no medical attention or psychological counseling.
Based on the Alexanders' own testimony, the court agrees with
defendants that there was no evidence suggesting outrageous
conduct on the part of Mrs. Riga "beyond that which may attach to
any finding of intentional discrimination." (Defendants'
Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the
Verdict or for a New Trial on Damages, pp. 13-14). Accordingly,
the court believes that the evidence offered by plaintiffs at
trial did not support an award of punitive damages in the
Alexanders' favor.
With respect to the FHP, the jury did find that Mrs.
Riga’ s discrimination was a legal cause of harm to the FHP, but
declined to award damages. There was no evidence, however, that,
Prior to the initiation of this action, Mrs. Riga was aware of
the existence of the FHP or its involvement in the matter during
the period in which the discriminatory conduct occurred. Because
°f her lack of awareness of the involvement of the FHP, Mrs. Riga
11
c o u l d n o t h a v e a c t e d w i t h a n e v i l m o t i v e o r i n t e n t t o w a r d t h e
FHP, o r w i t h r e c k l e s s o r c a l l o u s i n d i f f e r e n c e t o i t s f e d e r a l l y -
p r o t e c t e d r i g h t s . F u r t h e r , w h e n t h e j u r y v e r d i c t s w e r e r e t u r n e d ,
t h e c o u r t b e l i e v e d i t w o u l d b e i n a p p r o p r i a t e t o p e r m i t a n a w a r d
of p u n i t i v e d a m a g e s i n f a v o r o f t h e FHP, i n l i g h t o f t h e f a c t
t h a t t h e j u r y h a d a w a r d e d n e i t h e r c o m p e n s a t o r y n o r n o m i n a l
dam ages t o i t , a s w e l l a s t h e f a i l u r e o f M r . a n d M r s . A l e x a n d e r
to o f f e r a n y e v i d e n c e s u g g e s t i n g o u t r a g e o u s c o n d u c t o n t h e p a r t
of M r s . R i g a " b e y o n d t h a t w h i c h m a y a t t a c h t o a n y f i n d i n g o f
i n t e n t i o n a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . " A c c o r d i n g l y , t h e c o u r t d e c l i n e s t o
g r a n t p l a i n t i f f s ' r e q u e s t f o r a n e w t r i a l b a s e d o n t h e c o u r t ' s
a l l e g e d e r r o r i n r e f u s i n g t o c h a r g e t h e j u r y o n t h e i s s u e o f
p u n i t i v e d a m a g e s .
3 . R e g a r d i n g t h e c o u r t ' s r e f u s a l t o i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y
t h a t a n a w a r d o f c o m p e n s a t o r y d a m a g e s i n f a v o r o f t h e FHP w a s
r e q u i r e d b a s e d o n t h e e v i d e n c e , t h e c o u r t b e l i e v e s t h a t a
r e a s o n a b l e j u r y c o u l d h a v e c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e FHP w a s n o t
e n t i t l e d t o r e c o v e r a n y d a m a g e s a s a r e s u l t o f M r s . R i g a ' s
d i s c r i m i n a t o r y c o n d u c t . P r i o r t o t h e i n v o l v e m e n t o f t h e FHP i n
t h i s c a s e , M r . A l e x a n d e r h a d p r o c u r e d e v i d e n c e o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n
t h r o u g h t h e u s e o f h i s own " t e s t e r , " R o b i n M c D o n o u g h , a w h i t e ,
f e m a le f r i e n d . 7 I n a d d i t i o n , M s . M i t c h e l l , o n e o f p l a i n t i f f s '
7- " T e s t e r s " a r e i n d i v i d u a l s w h o , w i t h o u t a n y i n t e n t t o r e n t o r
P u r c h a s e a h o m e o r a p a r t m e n t , p o s e a s r e n t e r s o r p u r c h a s e r s f o r
the p u r p o s e o f c o l l e c t i n g e v i d e n c e o f d i s c r i m i n a t o r y h o u s i n g
( c o n t i n u e d . . . )
12
c o - c o u n s e l , e m p l o y e d a p r i v a t e i n v e s t i g a t o r , J e f f r e y L a n g , t o a c t
as a t e s t e r " t o g a t h e r e v i d e n c e o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a g a i n s t M r s .
R i g a . U n d e r t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t h e j u r y m a y h a v e c o n c l u d e d t h a t
t h e s e r v i c e s o f t h e FHP w e r e i n s i g n i f i c a n t o r o f n o v a l u e i n t h i s
c a s e , a n d t h a t , t h e r e f o r e , t h e FHP s h o u l d n o t r e c o v e r a n y
c o m p e n s a t o r y d a m a g e s .
F u r t h e r , w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e t e s t i m o n y o f f e r e d b y t h e
FHP t h r o u g h A n d r e a B l i n n , i t s E x e c u t i v e D i r e c t o r , c o n c e r n i n g i t s
a l l e g e d d a m a g e s , w h i c h c o n s i s t e d o f " t e s t e r " f e e s , M s . B l i n n ' s
t ime a n d t h e t i m e o f i n - h o u s e c o u n s e l f o r t h e FHP, d e f e n d a n t s
e l i c i t e d t e s t i m o n y f r o m Ms. B l i n n o n c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n r e g a r d i n g
the s u b s t a n t i a l f e d e r a l f u n d i n g r e c e i v e d b y t h e FHP i n 1 9 9 5 .
Based o n t h i s t e s t i m o n y , a r e a s o n a b l e j u r y c o u l d h a v e c o n c l u d e d
t h a t t h e FHP s u s t a i n e d n o a c t u a l d a m a g e s a s a r e s u l t o f
i n v e s t i g a t i n g M r s . R i g a ' s c o n d u c t . A c c o r d i n g l y , t h e c o u r t
d e c l i n e s t o g r a n t p l a i n t i f f s ' r e q u e s t f o r a n e w t r i a l b a s e d o n
the c o u r t ' s a l l e g e d e r r o r i n r e f u s i n g t o c h a r g e t h e j u r y t h a t i t
was r e q u i r e d t o a w a r d c o m p e n s a t o r y d a m a g e s i n f a v o r o f t h e FHP
based o n t h e e v i d e n c e .
4 . F i n a l l y , i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h p l a i n t i f f s ' a s s e r t i o n
that t h e c o u r t e r r e d b y e x c l u d i n g t h e t e s t i m o n y o f S t e v e D e n s o n ,
Michael B o w e n a n d M i c h a e l S n o w , t h i s t e s t i m o n y w a s a p p a r e n t l y t o
^ . c o n t i n u e d )
P r a c t i c e s . H a v e n s R e a l t y C o r p . v . C o l e m a n . 4 5 5 U . S . 3 6 3 , 1 0 2
S-Ct. 1 1 1 4 , 71 L . E d . 2 d 2 1 4 ( 1 9 8 2 ) .
13
be p r o f f e r e d b y p l a i n t i f f s t o s h o w o t h e r i n t e n t i o n a l a c t s o f r a c e
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n b y M r s . R i g a . S p e c i f i c a l l y , i n t h e i r a m e n d e d
p r e t r i a l s t a t e m e n t , p l a i n t i f f s s t a t e : " M i c h a e l Snow w i l l t e s t i f y
t h a t h e a n d o t h e r CMU s t u d e n t s M i c h a e l B o w e n ( b l a c k ) a n d S t e v e n
D e n s o n ( n a t i v e a m e r i c a n ) w e r e s h o w n a n a p a r t m e n t i n S q u i r r e l H i l l
by M a r i a R i g a , a n d w e r e t r e a t e d l e s s f a v o r a b l y w h e n t h e R i g a s
l e a r n e d t h a t o n e o f t h e r o o m m a t e s ( B o w e n ) w o u l d b e a b l a c k m a n .
Bowen a n d Snow w i l l t e s t i f y t h a t t h e s t u d e n t s w e r e s o t r o u b l e d b y
s u c h b e h a v i o r t h a t i t w a s f e l t t h a t t h e R i g a s s h o u l d n o t b e
a l l o w e d t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e c a m p u s h o u s i n g p r o g r a m d u e t o t h e i r
d i s c r i m i n a t o r y a t t i t u d e a g a i n s t b l a c k s . " ( P l a i n t i f f s ' A m e n d e d
P r e t r i a l S t a t e m e n t , p . 1 2 ) .
W i t h r e s p e c t t o M r . D e n s o n , t h e c o u r t n o t e s , a s a n
i n i t i a l m a t t e r , t h a t , a l t h o u g h M r . S n o w a n d M r . B ow e n w e r e l i s t e d
as p o t e n t i a l l i a b i l i t y w i t n e s s e s i n p l a i n t i f f s ' a m e n d e d p r e t r i a l
s t a t e m e n t , M r . D e n s o n w a s n o t s o l i s t e d . I n a n y e v e n t , t h e
p r e s e n t c a s e w a s a d i s p a r a t e t r e a t m e n t , n o t a d i s p a r a t e i m p a c t ,
c a s e . T h e r e f o r e , t h e c o u r t r u l e d t h a t t h e d e p o s i t i o n t e s t i m o n y
of M r. D e n s o n s h o u l d n o t b e a d m i t t e d i n e v i d e n c e p u r s u a n t t o
F e d e r a l R u l e o f E v i d e n c e 4 0 4 ( b ) , b e c a u s e t h e c o u r t b e l i e v e d t h a t
t h e r e l e v a n c e o f s u c h t e s t i m o n y w o u l d b e s u b s t a n t i a l l y o u t w e i g h e d
by t h e d a n g e r o f u n f a i r p r e j u d i c e u n d e r F e d e r a l R u l e o f E v i d e n c e
403. R e g a r d l e s s w h e t h e r t h e e x c l u s i o n o f t h e t e s t i m o n y o f M r .
Oenson w a s p r o p e r u n d e r t h e F e d e r a l R u l e s o f E v i d e n c e , h i s
t e s t i m o n y w o u l d h a v e b e e n r e l e v a n t o n l y t o t h e i s s u e o f M r s .
14
R i g a ' s d i s c r i m i n a t o r y c o n d u c t , a n d n o t t o t h e i s s u e o f t h e h a r m
l e g a l l y c a u s e d t o t h e A l e x a n d e r s b y s u c h c o n d u c t o r t o t h e i s s u e
of d a m a g e s . F o r t h i s r e a s o n a l o n e , t h e e x c l u s i o n o f t h e
t e s t i m o n y o f M r . D e n s o n c o u l d n o t j u s t i f y t h e g r a n t o f a n e w
t r i a l i n t h i s c a s e .
As t o M r . Snow a n d M r . B o w e n , t h e c o u r t d o e s n o t
b e l i e v e t h a t p l a i n t i f f s p r o f f e r e d t h e i r t e s t i m o n y a t t r i a l .
H o w e v e r , i f t h e i r t e s t i m o n y w a s a l s o e x c l u d e d , i t w a s f o r t h e
same r e a s o n a s t h e e x c l u s i o n o f M r . D e n s o n ' s t e s t i m o n y a n d d o e s
n o t j u s t i f y a n e w t r i a l i n t h i s c a s e .
B. Plaintiffs' Motion for Hearing on Injunctive and Equitable
Relief
On May 2 8 , 1 9 9 8 , s i x d a y s a f t e r t h e j u r y ' s v e r d i c t s
were r e t u r n e d i n t h i s c a s e , a n d t h e j u r y w a s d i s c h a r g e d ,
p l a i n t i f f s f i l e d t h e i r M o t i o n f o r H e a r i n g o n I n j u n c t i v e a n d
E q u i t a b l e R e l i e f . A l t h o u g h p l a i n t i f f s h a d r e q u e s t e d i n j u n c t i v e
and e q u i t a b l e r e l i e f i n t h e i r c o m p l a i n t a n d i n t h e i r o r i g i n a l a n d
a m e n d e d p r e t r i a l s t a t e m e n t s , a t n o t i m e d u r i n g t h e p r e t r i a l
c o n f e r e n c e s w i t h t h e c o u r t o r d u r i n g t h e t r i a l i t s e l f , d i d
p l a i n t i f f s ' a t t o r n e y s r e f e r t o t h e i r r e q u e s t s f o r i n j u n c t i v e a n d
e q u i t a b l e r e l i e f . B a s e d o n t h e f a i l u r e o f p l a i n t i f f s ' c o u n s e l t o
r a i s e t h e i s s u e o f i n j u n c t i v e a n d e q u i t a b l e r e l i e f p r i o r t o t h e
c o n c l u s i o n o f t h e t r i a l o f t h i s c a s e , t h e c o u r t d e c l i n e s t o g r a n t
t h e i r r e q u e s t f o r s u c h r e l i e f .
15
A s s u m i n g , a r g u e n d o , t h a t p l a i n t i f f s h a d t i m e l y r a i s e d
t h e i s s u e o f e q u i t a b l e a n d i n j u n c t i v e r e l i e f , t h e c o u r t
n e v e r t h e l e s s w o u l d d e c l i n e t o g r a n t s u c h r e l i e f b a s e d o n t h e
c o n c l u s i o n t h a t i t i s u n n e c e s s a r y . F i r s t , t h e c o n d u c t o f M r s .
R i g a t h a t w a s t h e s u b j e c t o f p l a i n t i f f s ' d i s c r i m i n a t i o n c l a i m s
o c c u r r e d i n 1 9 9 5 . No e v i d e n c e w a s o f f e r e d o f a n y s u c h
d i s c r i m i n a t o r y c o n d u c t s i n c e 1 9 9 5 , a n d t h e c o u r t b e l i e v e s t h a t
t h e r e i s v e r y l i t t l e r i s k o f r e c u r r e n t v i o l a t i o n s o f f e d e r a l l a w
by M r s . R i g a t h a t w o u l d w a r r a n t i n j u n c t i v e r e l i e f . S e c o n d , i n
t h e c o u r t ' s o p i n i o n , i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t t h e R i g a s h a v e r e n t e d
u n i t s i n t h e i r a p a r t m e n t b u i l d i n g s t o A f r i c a n A m e r i c a n s s i n c e t h e
e v e n t s g i v i n g r i s e t o t h i s l a w s u i t a s e v i d e n c e d b y t h e a f f i d a v i t s
of V e r a J e f f e r s o n a n d D o r o t h y W i l l i a m s o n , w h i c h w e r e s u b m i t t e d b y
d e f e n d a n t s i n o p p o s i t i o n t o p l a i n t i f f s ' M o t i o n f o r H e a r i n g o n
I n j u n c t i v e a n d E q u i t a b l e R e l i e f . U n d e r t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t h i s
p o s t - t r i a l m o t i o n w i l l a l s o b e d e n i e d .
C. Plaintiffs' Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees, Costs and
Expenses in their Favor as Prevailing Parties
N e x t , p l a i n t i f f s a s s e r t t h a t t h e y a r e p r e v a i l i n g
P a r t i e s i n t h i s a c t i o n , a n d t h e y s e e k a n a w a r d o f a t t o r n e y s ' f e e s
and c o s t s u n d e r t h e FHA, w h i c h p r o v i d e s i n r e l e v a n t p a r t :
* * *
§ 3613 Enforcement by private persons
* ★ ★
(c) Relief which may be granted
16
* * *
( 2 ) I n a c i v i l a c t i o n u n d e r s u b s e c t i o n ( a ) o f t h i s
s e c t i o n , t h e c o u r t , i n i t s d i s c r e t i o n , m a y a l l o w t h e
p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y , o t h e r t h a n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , a
r e a s o n a b l e a t t o r n e y ' s f e e a n d c o s t s . . . .
42 U . S . C . § 3 6 1 3 ( c ) ( 2 ) .
I n t u r n , S e c t i o n 3 6 0 2 (o ) o f t h e FHA p r o v i d e s t h a t " p r e v a i l i n g
p a r t y " h a s t h e s a m e m e a n i n g a s s u c h t e r m h a s i n t h e C i v i l R i g h t s
A t t o r n e y ' s F e e s A w a r d s A c t o f 1 9 7 6 , 42 U . S . C . § 1 9 8 8 .®
i n F a r r a r v . H o b b y . 5 0 6 U . S . 1 0 3 , 1 1 3 S . C t . 5 6 6 , 1 2 1
L . E d . 2 d 4 9 4 ( 1 9 9 2 ) , t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s
d i s c u s s e d t h e s t a n d a r d t o b e a p p l i e d i n d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r a
c i v i l r i g h t s p l a i n t i f f w a s a p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y i n o r d e r t o q u a l i f y
f o r a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s u n d e r S e c t i o n 1 9 8 8 a s f o l l o w s :
* * *
. . . t o q u a l i f y a s a p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y , a c i v i l r i g h t s
p l a i n t i f f m u s t o b t a i n a t l e a s t s o m e r e l i e f o n t h e
m e r i t s o f h i s c l a i m . T h e p l a i n t i f f m u s t o b t a i n a n
e n f o r c e a b l e j u d g m e n t a g a i n s t t h e d e f e n d a n t f r o m whom
f e e s a r e s o u g h t , H e w i t t , s u p r a , a t 7 6 0 , o r c o m p a r a b l e
r e l i e f t h r o u g h a c o n s e n t d e c r e e o r s e t t l e m e n t , M a h e r v .
G a g n e , 4 4 8 U . S . 1 2 2 , 1 2 9 ( 1 9 8 0 ) . W h a t e v e r r e l i e f t h e
p l a i n t i f f s e c u r e s m u s t d i r e c t l y b e n e f i t h i m a t t h e t i m e
o f t h e j u d g m e n t o r s e t t l e m e n t . S e e H e w i t t , s u p r a , a t
7 6 4 . O t h e r w i s e t h e j u d g m e n t o r s e t t l e m e n t c a n n o t b e
s a i d t o " a f f e c [ t ] t h e b e h a v i o r o f t h e d e f e n d a n t t o w a r d
8. 42 U . S . C . § 1 9 8 8 p r o v i d e s i n r e l e v a n t p a r t :
" I n a n y a c t i o n o r p r o c e e d i n g t o e n f o r c e a p r o v i s i o n o f
s e c t i o n s 1 9 8 1 , 1 9 8 2 , 1 9 8 3 , 1 9 8 5 , a n d 1 9 8 6 o f t h i s
t i t l e , t i t l e IX o f P u b l i c Law 9 2 - 3 1 8 . . . , o r t i t l e VI
o f t h e C i v i l R i g h t s A c t o f 1 9 6 4 . . . , t h e c o u r t , in i t s
d i s c r e t i o n m a y a l l o w t h e p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y , o t h e r than
t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , a r e a s o n a b l e a t t o r n e y ' s f e e as part
o f t h e c o s t s . "
17
t h e p l a i n t i f f . " R h o d e s , s u p r a , a t 4 . O n l y u n d e r t h e s e
c i r c u m s t a n c e s c a n c i v i l r i g h t s l i t i g a t i o n e f f e c t " t h e
m a t e r i a l a l t e r a t i o n o f t h e l e g a l r e l a t i o n s h i p o f t h e
p a r t i e s " a n d t h e r e b y t r a n s f o r m t h e p l a i n t i f f i n t o a
p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y . G a r l a n d , s u p r a , a t 7 9 2 - 7 9 3 . I n
s h o r t , a p l a i n t i f f " p r e v a i l s " w h e n a c t u a l r e l i e f o n ‘t h e
m e r i t s o f h i s c l a i m m a t e r i a l l y a l t e r s t h e l e g a l
r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e p a r t i e s b y m o d i f y i n g t h e
d e f e n d a n t s b e h a v i o r i n a w a y t h a t d i r e c t l y b e n e f i t s
t h e p l a i n t i f f . . . .
* * *
. . . . T o b e s u r e , a j u d i c i a l p r o n o u n c e m e n t t h a t t h e
d e f e n d a n t h a s v i o l a t e d t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n , u n a c c o m p a n i e d
b y a n e n f o r c e a b l e j u d g m e n t o n t h e m e r i t s , d o e s n o t
r e n d e r t h e p l a i n t i f f a p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y . O f i t s e l f ,
" t h e m o r a l s a t i s f a c t i o n [ t h a t ] r e s u l t s f r o m a n y
f a v o r a b l e s t a t e m e n t o f l a w " c a n n o t b e s t o w p r e v a i l i n g
p a r t y s t a t u s . H e w i t t , 4 8 2 U . S . , a t 7 6 2 . No m a t e r i a l
a l t e r a t i o n o f t h e l e g a l r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e
p a r t i e s o c c u r s u n t i l t h e p l a i n t i f f b e c o m e s e n t i t l e d t o
e n f o r c e a j u d g m e n t , c o n s e n t d e c r e e , o r s e t t l e m e n t
a g a i n s t t h e d e f e n d a n t . . . .
* * *
506 U . S . a t 1 1 1 - 1 1 3 , 113 S . C t . a t 5 7 3 - 5 7 4 .
B a s e d o n t h e s p e c i a l v e r d i c t s r e t u r n e d b y t h e j u r y i n
t h i s c a s e , a s w e l l a s t h e c o u r t ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t p l a i n t i f f s
a r e n o t e n t i t l e d t o i n j u n c t i v e o r e q u i t a b l e r e l i e f , t h e c o u r t
c o n c l u d e s t h a t p l a i n t i f f s a r e n o t p r e v a i l i n g p a r t i e s . S i m p l y
P u t , t h i s l i t i g a t i o n d i d n o t e f f e c t a " m a t e r i a l a l t e r a t i o n o f t h e
l e g a l r e l a t i o n s h i p o f t h e p a r t i e s . " T h e d e f e n d a n t s ' b e h a v i o r h a s
n o t b e e n m o d i f i e d " i n a w ay t h a t d i r e c t l y b e n e f i t s t h e
p l a i n t i f f s . " A t b e s t , t h e j u r y ' s s p e c i a l v e r d i c t s p r o v i d e d
P l a i n t i f f s w i t h " m o r a l s a t i s f a c t i o n , " w h i c h i s i n s u f f i c i e n t t o
b e s t o w p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y s t a t u s o n t h e m . U n d e r t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,
18
p l a i n t i f f s ' M o t i o n f o r A w a r d o f A t t o r n e y s ' F e e s , C o s t s a n d
E x p e n s e s i n t h e i r F a v o r a s P r e v a i l i n g P a r t i e s w i l l b e d e n i e d .
D. Plaintiffs' Motion to Tax Costs against Defendants
B e c a u s e t h e c o u r t c o n c l u d e s t h a t p l a i n t i f f s a r e n o t
p r e v a i l i n g p a r t i e s i n t h i s l i t i g a t i o n f o r t h e r e a s o n s s e t f o r t h
a b o v e , t h e c o u r t w i l l a l s o d e n y t h e i r M o t i o n t o T a x C o s t s a g a i n s t
D e f e n d a n t s .
E. Plaintiffs' Rule 60 Motion Nunc Pro Tunc to Correct Error in
Judgment and for Rule 59 (e) Relief Nunc Pro Tunc from Judgment
A s n o t e d a b o v e i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e p r o c e d u r a l
h i s t o r y o f t h i s c a s e , t h e c o u r t e n t e r e d a j u d g m e n t i n f a v o r o f
d e f e n d a n t s a n d a g a i n s t p l a i n t i f f s o n M ay 2 6 , 1 9 9 8 b a s e d o n t h e
j u r y ' s s p e c i a l v e r d i c t s . T h a t j u d g m e n t r e a d s a s f o l l o w s :
I T I S ORDERED AND ADJUDGED t h a t , i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h
t h e s p e c i a l v e r d i c t s r e t u r n e d b y t h e j u r y o n May 2 2 ,
1 9 9 8 , j u d g m e n t b e , a n d h e r e b y i s , e n t e r e d i n f a v o r o f
D e f e n d a n t s J o s e p h R i g a a n d M a r i a A . R i g a , a / k / a C a r l a
A g n o t t i , a n d a g a i n s t t h e P l a i n t i f f s R o n a l d A l e x a n d e r
a n d F a y e A l e x a n d e r a n d t h e F a i r H o u s i n g P a r t n e r s h i p o f
G r e a t e r P i t t s b u r g h , I n c . , t o g e t h e r w i t h c o s t s .
( D o c u m e n t N o . 8 0 ) .
In t h e i r R u l e 60 M o t i o n N u n c P r o T u n c t o C o r r e c t E r r o r i n
J u d g m e n t a n d f o r R u l e 5 9 ( e ) R e l i e f N u n c P r o T u n c f r o m J u d g m e n t ,
p l a i n t i f f s s e e k " a n o r d e r g r a n t i n g j u d g m e n t a s a m a t t e r o f l a w
f o r P l a i n t i f f s , c o r r e c t i n g t h e e n t r y o f j u d g m e n t t o r e f l e c t
d e c l a r a t o r y a n d n o m i n a l d a m a g e s a n d c o s t s f o r P l a i n t i f f s , n o t
D e f e n d a n t s , o p e n i n g t h e e n t r y o f j u d g m e n t a n d c o s t s f o r
d e f e n d a n t s a s p r e m a t u r e l y g r a n t e d , a n d c o n t i n u i n g g e n e r a l l y t h e
19
t i m e w i t h i n w h i c h P l a i n t i f f s m u s t f i l e a F e e P e t i t i o n u n t i l a f t e r
a f i n a l o r d e r i s e n t e r e d d i s p o s i n g o f P l a i n t i f f s ' p o s t t r i a l
m o t i o n s . " ( D o c u m e n t N o . 9 6 , p . 4 ) .
A f t e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n , t h i s p o s t - t r i a l m o t i o n o f
p l a i n t i f f s w i l l b e g r a n t e d t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t a n a m e n d e d j u d g m e n t
w i l l b e f i l e d , e n t e r i n g j u d g m e n t i n f a v o r o f t h e FHP a n d a g a i n s t
d e f e n d a n t s o n t h e i s s u e o f l i a b i l i t y u n d e r t h e FHA o n l y a n d
d i r e c t i n g e a c h p a r t y t o b e a r t h e i r own c o s t s . I n a l l o t h e r
r e s p e c t s , t h e j u d g m e n t , a s e n t e r e d o n May 2 6 , 1 9 9 8 , w i l l r e m a i n
t h e s a m e . 9
F. Defendants' Motion to Tax Costs against Plaintiffs
F i n a l l y , w i t h r e s p e c t t o d e f e n d a n t s ' M o t i o n t o T a x
C o s t s a g a i n s t P l a i n t i f f s , a s n o t e d a b o v e , t h e c o u r t , u p o n f u r t h e r
c o n s i d e r a t i o n , c o n c l u d e s t h a t t h e j u d g m e n t e n t e r e d o n May 2 6 ,
1998 s h o u l d b e a m e n d e d t o d i r e c t t h a t t h e p a r t i e s b e a r t h e i r own
c o s t s . 10 B e c a u s e t h e j u r y f o u n d t h a t M r s . R i g a ' s d i s c r i m i n a t o r y
c o n d u c t w a s n o t t h e l e g a l c a u s e o f h a r m t o t h e A l e x a n d e r s a n d
d e c l i n e d t o a w a r d c o m p e n s a t o r y o r n o m i n a l d a m a g e s i n f a v o r o f a n y
p l a i n t i f f , d e f e n d a n t s a r g u e t h a t t h e y w e r e t h e p r e v a i l i n g p a r t i e s
9. T h e c o u r t ' s w i l l i n g n e s s t o a m e n d t h e j u d g m e n t o r i g i n a l l y
e n t e r e d o n May 2 6 , 1 9 9 8 i n f a v o r o f d e f e n d a n t s a n d a g a i n s t t h e
FHP d o e s n o t a f f e c t , i n a n y w a y , t h e c o u r t ' s c o n c l u s i o n s
r e g a r d i n g t h e F H P ' s m o t i o n f o r n o m i n a l d a m a g e s o r m o t i o n f o r a
new t r i a l o n c o m p e n s a t o r y a n d p u n i t i v e d a m a g e s o r a l t e r t h e
c o u r t ' s c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e FHP i s n o t a p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y i n t h i s
a c t i o n .
10. D e f e n d a n t s s e e k t o r e c o v e r c o s t s i n t h e a m o u n t o f $ 5 , 3 2 7 . 9 5
from p l a i n t i f f s .
2 0
i n t h i s c a s e a n d t h a t t h e y s h o u l d b e e n t i t l e d t o r e c o v e r t h e i r
c o s t s i n d e f e n d i n g t h i s a c t i o n . H o w e v e r , i n v i e w o f t h e j u r y ' s
d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t M r s . R i g a d i d , i n d e e d , v i o l a t e t h e FHA b y
e n g a g i n g i n d i s c r i m i n a t o r y c o n d u c t , t h e c o u r t b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e r e
s h o u l d b e s o m e c o n s e q u e n c e t o t h e R i g a s f o r s u c h c o n d u c t .
A c c o r d i n g l y , r e g a r d l e s s w h e t h e r d e f e n d a n t s w e r e , t e c h n i c a l l y , t h e
p r e v a i l i n g p a r t i e s a s t o t h e A l e x a n d e r s , t h e c o u r t d e c l i n e s t o
e x e r c i s e i t s d i s c r e t i o n t o a w a r d c o s t s i n f a v o r o f d e f e n d a n t s a n d
a g a i n s t t h e A l e x a n d e r s .
An o r d e r f o l l o w s .
IN THE UNITED STATES D I S T R I C T COURT
FOR THE WESTERN D I S T R IC T OF PENNSYLVANIA
RONALD ALEXANDER, FAYE )
ALEXANDER a n d t h e FA IR )
HOUSING PARTNERSHIP OF )
GREATER PITTSBURGH, I N C . , )
)
P l a i n t i f f s , )
)
v s - ) C i v i l A c t i o n N o . 9 6 - 4 9
)
JOSEPH RIGA a n d MARIA A . RIGA , )
a / k / a CARLA AGNOTTI, )
)
D e f e n d a n t s }
ORDER
AND NOW, t h i s 9 t h d a y o f O c t o b e r , 1 9 9 8 , i n a c c o r d a n c e
w i t h t h e f o r e g o i n g m e m o r a n d u m , i t i s ORDERED a s f o l l o w s :
1 . P l a i n t i f f s ' M o t i o n f o r J u d g m e n t N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e
V e r d i c t o r f o r a New T r i a l o n D a m a g e s ( D o c u m e n t N o . 8 2 ) i s
d e n i e d .
2 . P l a i n t i f f s ' M o t i o n f o r H e a r i n g o n I n j u n c t i v e a n d
E q u i t a b l e R e l i e f ( D o c u m e n t N o . 8 3 ) i s d e n i e d .
3 . P l a i n t i f f s ' M o t i o n f o r A w a r d o f A t t o r n e y s F e e s ,
C o s t s a n d E x p e n s e s i n t h e i r F a v o r a s P r e v a i l i n g P a r t i e s ( D o c u m e n t
No. 8 4 ) i s d e n i e d .
4 . P l a i n t i f f s ' M o t i o n t o T a x C o s t s a g a i n s t D e f e n d a n t s
( D o c u m e n t N o . 85 ) i s d e n i e d .
5 . P l a i n t i f f s ' R u l e 60 M o t i o n N u n c P r o T u n c t o C o r r e c t
E r r o r i n J u d g m e n t a n d f o r R u l e 5 9 ( e ) R e l i e f N u n c P r o T u n c f r o m
J u d g m e n t ( D o c u m e n t N o . 9 6 ) i s g r a n t e d i n p a r t a n d d e n i e d i n p a r t .
22
6 . D e f e n d a n t s ' M o t i o n t o T a x C o s t s A g a i n s t P l a i n t i f f s -
( D o c u m e n t N o . 8 7 ) i s d e n i e d .
cc: C a r o l i n e M i t c h e l l , E s q .
3 7 0 0 G u l f T o w e r
7 0 7 G r a n t S t r e e t
P i t t s b u r g h , PA 1 5 2 1 9
T i m o t h y P . O ' B r i e n , E s q .
4 2 9 F o r b e s A v e n u e
1 7 0 5 A l l e g h e n y B u i l d i n g
P i t t s b u r g h , PA 1 5 2 1 9
T h o m a s M. H a r d i m a n , E s q .
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CERTIFICATE OF BAR MEMBERSHIP
Pursuant to Local Rule 46.1 of the Rules of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit, Thomas M. Hardiman and Joseph P. McHugh, counsel for
Appellees/Cross Appellants Joseph and Maria Riga, certify that they are members in good
standing of the Bar of this Court.
Thomas M. Hardiman
CERTIFICATE O F SERVICE
The undersigned, counsel for Appellees/Cross Appellants Joseph and Maria Riga,
certifies that he served two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellees/Cross
Appellants on the following this 29th day of June 1999 by First Class Mail, postage prepaid,
addressed to:
Counsel Parties Represented
Caroline Mitchell, Esquire Ronald and Faye Alexander
3700 Gulf Tower
707 Grant Street
Pittsburgh, PA 15219-1913
Timothy P. O’Brien, Esquire Fair Housing Partnership of
1705 Allegheny Building Greater Pittsburgh
429 Forbes Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA 15219
Charles Stephen Ralston, Esquire
NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund, Inc.
99 Hudson Street, Suite 1600
New York, NY 10013
Rebecca K. Troth, Esquire Amicus Curiae Department of Justice
Department of Justice
P. O. Box 66078
Washington, D.C. 20035-6078
Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.
Thomas M. Hardiman