Thorpe v. Housing Authority of the City of Durham Reply Brief for Petitioner

    I n  the

Bwpvmt Okmrt of %  luttei*
October T eem, 1966 

No. 712

J oyce 0 . T horpe,
Petitioner,

H ousing A uthority op the City op D urham.

on writ op certioeaei to the supreme court 
OP NORTH CAROLINA

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

J ack Greenberg 
J ames M. Nabrit, III 
Charles Stephen R alston 
Charles H. J ones, J r.
Michael Meltsner 
S heila R ush J ones 

10 Columbus Circle 
New York, New York 10019

R. Michael F rank
1238A Carrollburg Place S.W. 
Washington, D. C.

M. C. B urt
213% West Main Street 
Durham, North Carolina

A nthony G. A msterdam 
3400 Chestnut Street 
Philadelphia, Pa. 19104

Attorneys for Petitioner

Of Counsel:
Martin Garbus 
E dward Y. Sparer 
H oward T horkelson



I N D E X

PAGE

Introduction ................ ................. —„ .... ........................... 1

I. The Judgment Below May Also Be Reversed on 
the Basis of a New Federal Administrative Rule 
Adopted February 7, 1967 ........   2

II. The History of the Superseded Policy Relied on 
by Respondent Shows Its Potential and Purpose 
for Abuse ...................................................................  8

A ppendix

Public Housing Administration Circular July 28,
1954 ......      la

H.U.D. Circular Dated May 31, 1966 .................... 2a
H.U.D. Circular Dated February 7, 1967 ............ . 4a

T able op Cases

Ashwander v. T.V.A., 297 U.S. 288 ----------------- — .....  8

Bowles v. Strickland, 151 F.2d 419 (5th Cir. 1945) ..... 4
Bruner v. United States, 343 U.S. 112 ..... ................... - 3

Congress of Racial Equality v. Clinton, 346 F.2d 911 
(5th Cir. 1964) ........ .......................................... .........  4

Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F .2d
150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert, denied 368 U.S. 930 ......... 7

Doughty v. Maxwell, 376 U.S. 202 ............................... 5

Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55 ............... - ...............-..... -  4



11

PAGE

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 .............................  5

Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir. 1964) .... 7
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609  ........... ........... .........  5

Hamm v. Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 ................ ................  4
Hoadley v. San Francisco, 94 H.S. 4 .............................  4
Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert, de­

nied, 375 U.S. 957 ............. ..........................................  7

Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 ........... ....... ........  5

Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 ...............................  4

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 ............................................  4, 5
Massey v. United States, 291 U.S. 608 .........................  4

O’Connor v. Ohio, 385 U.S. 92 ....................................... 5
Orr v. United States, 174 F.2d 577 (2nd Cir. 1949) .... 4

Rachel v. Georgia, 342 F.2d 336 (5th Cir. 1965) ......... 4
Rudder v. United States, 105 A.2d 741 (D.C. Mnn. App. 

1954), reversed 226 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1955) .....9,10,11

Schoen v. Mountain Producers Corporation, 170 F.2d 
707 (3rd Cir. 1948) ........................ ......... .......... .......... 4

United States v. Chambers, 291 U.S. 217............... ......  4
United States v. LaVallee, 330 F.2d 303 (2nd Cir.

1964) ...................................................... ........................  5
United States v. Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch. 103 ..... 4



I l l

Statutes:

Act August 31, 1951, c. 376, Title I, § 101, 65 Stat. 277 10
Act July 5, 1952, c. 578, Title I, § 101, 66 Stat. 403 ...... 10
Act July 31, 1953, c. 302, Title I, § 101, 67 Stat. 307 .... 10

42 U.S.C. § 1404(a) .........................................    3
42 U.S.C. § 1408 ..................        3
42 U.S.C. § 1411(c), Gwinn Amendment ..................  10

42 U.S.C. § 1434 ...................................      3

Other Authorities:

Local Housing Authority Management Handbook, Part 
IV, Section 1—Occupancy Policies, Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (July 1965) ....... 8, 9

41 Op. Atty. Gen., April 26 .............. ..... ......... ...... ........  10

PAGE



In the

tour! nf %  Inttefr l&tnteB
October Term, 1966

No. 712

J oyce C. T horpe, 

— v.—
Petitioner,

H ousing A uthority op the City op D urham.

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

Introduction

On February 7, 1967, after petitioner’s brief was filed 
in this Court, the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development issued a directive to all local housing au­
thorities prescribing new procedures for the eviction of 
low income public housing* tenants. The new federal re­
quirement refutes the argument made by the respondent 
Housing Authority in this case that its action conforms 
with the federal administrative policy.1 More importantly, 
the new federally prescribed procedures may afford a new 
and independent ground for reversal of the judgment of 
the North Carolina courts in petitioner’s case. We discuss 
the new procedural requirements and their relationship 
to this case in part I, infra.

In part II, infra, we discuss the previous policy of the 
federal Public Housing Administration,la relied upon by 
respondent to justify its actions in petitioner’s case.

1 See “ Brief for Housing Authority of the City of Durham,”  p. 11.
la Now the Housing Assistance Administration of the Department of 

Housing and Urban Development.



2

I.

The Judgment Below May Also Be Reversed on the 
Basis of a New Federal Administrative Rule Adopted 
February 7, 1967.

The February 7, 1967, circular issued to all local hous­
ing authorities by Mr. Don Hummel, who is Assistant 
Secretary for Renewal and Housing Assistance of the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (herein­
after referred to as HUD), is reproduced in the appendix 
to this brief, infra, pp. 4a-6a.

The circular first makes reference to pending lawsuits 
“challenging the right of a Local Authority to evict a 
tenant without advising him of the reasons for such evic­
tion.” It then states:

Since this is a federally assisted program, we believe 
it is essential that no tenant be given notice to vacate 
without being told by the Local Authority, in a private 
conference or other appropriate manner, the reasons 
for the eviction, and given an opportunity to make 
such reply or explanation as he may wish.

The directive then provides that, in addition to inform­
ing the tenant of the reason for any proposed eviction, 
each local authority shall maintain written records of 
every eviction which are to be available for review by 
HUD representatives, and should contain certain specified 
information. This circular superseded a prior circular 
dated May 31, 1966, which is reproduced in the appendix 
hereto, infra, p. 2a. The May 31, 1966, circular had 
stated that the Public Housing Administration “strongly 
urge[d], as a matter of good social policy, that Local 
Authorities in a private conference inform any tenants



3

who are given such notices of the reasons for . . . [evic­
tion]

The circular issued February 7, 1967, unlike the earlier 
circular-, contains mandatory language. The authority of 
the federal agency to make such rules and regulations is 
conferred by the federal housing laws.2 We believe that 
the new federal rule confers rights enforceable by in­
dividual low-income tenants, and submit that whatever 
may be the full scope of the individual rights conferred 
by the new rule, it must at least be available as a defense 
to a suit maintained in a state court by a local housing 
authority seeking to evict a tenant in violation of the 
rule.

It is plain, we think, that if the present rule had been 
in effect when the respondent sued to evict Mrs. Thorpe 
in September 1965, Mrs. Thorpe would have had a com­
plete defense to the suit. Under the Supremacy Clause 
the state courts would have been bound to recognize her 
defense that the Durham Authority issued its notice can­
celling her lease in violation of the governing federal 
procedural requirement.

We urge that this newly adopted procedural rule should 
now be applied to petitioner’s case in accordance with 
the generally applicable principle that modal or procedural 
changes will be applied to pending litigation. This gen­
eral tendency to apply new procedural regulations to 
pending cases is very strongly developed in the law. The 
policy is to apply the law as it exists at the time a court 
is called upon to decide pending litigation. It is exempli­
fied by such cases as Bruner v. United States, 343 U.8.

2 See 42 U.S.C. § 1408. See also, 42 U.S.C. § 1404a. The authority of 
the federal agency to require records to be maintained is conferred by 
42 U.S.C. § 1434."



4

112 (suit by employee against United States; pending 
certiorari in Supreme Court on question of jurisdiction 
of district court Congress amended statute making it clear 
that there was no such jurisdiction; the new statutory 
rule was applied to the pending case); Ex parte Collett, 
337 U.S. 55 (new code provision applying forum non 
conveniens to FELA cases applied to pending case); Orr 
v. United States, 174 F.2d 577 (2nd Cir. 1949) (change in 
venue provisions applied in pending case); Schoen v. 
Mountain Producers Corporation, 170 F.2d 707 (3rd Cir. 
1948) (change in rule of forum non conveniens applied in 
pending case); Bowles v. Strickland, 151 F.2d 419 (5th 
Cir. 1945) (procedural rule change relating to filing of 
suit under Emergency Price Control Act applied in pend­
ing case); Hoadley v. San Francisco, 94 U.S. 4 (change in 
removal statute applicable to case pending in state court); 
and Congress of Racial Equality v. Clinton, 346 F.2d 911 
(5th Cir. 1964), and Rachel v. Georgia, 342 F.2d 336 (5th. 
Cir. 1965) (change in statute to allow appeal of remand 
order in civil rights removal case applied to pending cases).

Of course, Hamm v. Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306, illustrates 
the application of the rule applying a new statute to de­
cide substantive rights in a pending case. See also, United 
States v. Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch. 103; United States 
v. Chambers, 291 U.S. 217; Massey v. United States, 291 
U.S. 608. The effectuation of the purpose of the new 
statutory regulation, as perceived by this Court, was 
strongly influential in these cases. And, similarly, in de­
ciding whether or not to apply new judicial decisions to 
pending cases—or even retrospectively to cases which have 
become final—the Court has looked to the purpose of the 
rule involved.3

3 See, for example, Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, holding that 
the rule of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, would be applied only prospee-



5

Application of the new HUD rule of February 7, 1967, 
in this case is justified by a variety of considerations, in­
cluding the language of the circular, its purpose, and the 
general tendency of this Court’s decisions, just discussed, 
to apply procedural innovations to pending cases.

First, we believe that analysis of the language of the 
circular supports its application to petitioner’s case. The 
first paragraph of the circular (appendix, infra, p. 4a) 
which refers to the dissatisfaction caused by the prior 
practices and the litigation filed throughout the United 
States challenging those practices, reflects a concern for 
doing justice for the individuals who have focused atten­
tion on the practice. The second paragraph {ibid.) pre­
scribing an “essential” requirement that a tenant be told 
the reasons for the eviction and “given an opportunity to 
make such reply or explanation as he may wish” is time­
less. The paragraph contains no language of futurity. In 
contrast, the third paragraph {ibid.), establishing a record­
keeping requirement, does expressly refer to the future 
and applies “ from this date,” i.e., February 7, 1967. The 
final paragraph, which says that the earlier circular 
(strongly urging that tenants be told reasons for evic­
tion) is now superseded, is also suggestive of a displace­
ment of policy in a manner consistent with retroactivity.

Second, just as was true with respect to the federal 
policy in Ilamm v. Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306, it is fair and

tively because the purpose of the rule was to deter unlawful conduct, and 
this purpose would not be served by retrospective application of the 
exclusionary rule. Of course, the Mapp decision was applied to cases 
pending on appeal at the time of Mapp. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 
U.S. 719, 732. See also, O’Connor v. Ohio, 385 U.S. 92, which applies 
the Fifth Amendment principle of Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, to 
a pending case. And see the decisions giving retrospective effect to the 
right to counsel as declared in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, e.g., 
Doughty v. Maxwell, 376 U.S. 202; United States v. LaVallee, 330 F.2d 
303 (2nd Cir. 1964).



6

just to apply the new and more enlightened policy so that 
it will benefit those whose protests prompted the new rule.

Third, this case involves a procedural regulation in the 
classic sense; it relates to notice and the right to be heard. 
The new rule requires procedural safeguards prior to 
the initiation of an action to evict, but does not deprive 
the local housing authority of its right to maintain evic­
tion proceedings after compliance with the prescribed pro­
cedures. The requirement would not be duplicated or waste­
ful since the respondent authority has never given peti­
tioner the benefit of such procedures.

There remains, of course, the question of whether the 
new federal administrative rule conforms to the require­
ments of the Constitution and does actually provide pro­
cedures sufficient to protect petitioner’s rights under the 
Due Process Clause. We have argued in our Brief that 
petitioner was entitled to notice of the reason her low 
income housing benefits were cancelled and also was en­
titled to an administrative hearing in order to contest the 
factual basis for the local authority’s action. The HUD 
circular of February 7, 1967, is not explicit with respect 
to several important matters affecting the constitutional 
claim. We urge that the Court construe the HUD rule to 
require at least the minimum safeguards necessary to 
afford basic fairness.

The HUD circular states that tenants must be told “ the 
reasons for the eviction” and that the records shall con­
tain a statement of “Specific reason(s) for notice to 
vacate.” It indicates that “if a tenant is being evicted 
because of undesirable actions, the record should detail 
the actions which resulted in the determination that evic­
tion should be instituted.” We urge that the Court con­
strue these provisions to mean that tenants must be ad­



7

vised of the facts on the basis of which the agency pro­
poses to take action, including a statement of the informa­
tion on the basis of which the agency believes the facts 
asserted to be true.

The HUD circular does not use the word “hearing” but, 
rather, refers to notice being given “in a private con­
ference or other appropriate manner” and states that the 
tenant should he “given an opportunity to make such 
reply or explanation as he may wish.” HUD also requires 
that a record be kept including, inter alia, a “summary 
of any conferences with tenant[s], including names of 
conference participants.” We urge that these provisions 
be interpreted to include the right to be heard in person 
or by counsel at such a hearing or “conference,” and also 
to include fair opportunities to challenge the grounds of 
the local authority’s proposed action, to probe the facts 
relied upon by the authority, and to present the tenant’s 
own version of the facts. The provision should also be 
interpreted to include a requirement that the agency deci­
sion be rendered on the basis of the facts presented to it.

It should be stated that petitioner does not contend that 
due process necessarily requires in all cases any particular 
set of judicial-type hearing rules or common law eviden­
tiary principles. We contend only for such procedures as 
may reasonably be necessary to give a complete and fair- 
airing of the controverted facts. The detailed requirements 
will, of course, depend upon the circumstances of the par­
ticular cased 4

4 Note, for example, the minimum requirements adopted by the Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in a state college expulsion case. Dixon 
v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F.2d 150, 158-159 (5th Cir. 
1961), cert, denied 368 U.S. 930. Cf. the procedures for parole revoca­
tion set forth in Hyser v. Heed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert, 
denied, 375 U.S. 957. Cf. also, Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570, 578 
(D.C. Cir. 1964), involving the basic standards necessary to insure fair­
ness prior to debarment from participating in government contracts.



I f this Court agrees with petitioner’s view that the new 
HUD regulation gives the sort of full and fair hearing 
which we have just described, there is, of course, an ad­
ditional reason to apply the new procedure to petitioner’s 
case. Such an application, affording petitioner the full 
measure of relief sought in the present case, would per­
mit the Court to avoid unnecessary decision of constitu­
tional questions. See Ashwander v. T.V.A., 297 U.S. 288, 
341 et seq. (Mr. Justice Brandeis dissenting in part). 
Such a route to disposition of the case would justify 
reversal of the judgments below and a remand of the 
cause with directions to set aside the eviction, leaving the 
authority to take such further steps as may be conformable 
to law.

II.

The History of the Superseded Policy Relied on by 
Respondent Shows Its Potential and Purpose for Abuse.

The Brief of the Housing Authority of the City of 
Durham, p. 11, argues that: “In following the provisions 
of the lease and the published directives of the Federal 
Public Housing Administration the local Housing Author­
ity did not act arbitrarily.” In a footnote to the sentence 
just quoted, the Authority’s Brief sets out a portion of a 
provision in an HUD publication known as the L ocal H ous­
ing A uthority Management H andbook, P art IV, Section 1 
— Occupancy P olicies (July 1965), p. 8. We quote the 
entire subparagraph:

6.d. It is recommended that each Local Authority’s 
lease:

(1) Be drawn on a month-to-month basis when­
ever possible. This should permit any neces­
sary evictions to be accomplished with a mini­



9

mum of delay and expense upon the giving 
of a statutory Notice To Quit.5

(2) Contain no provision absolving the Local Au­
thority from liability for its own negligence.

(3) If Local Authority policy provides for charges 
for utility consumption in excess of specified 
amounts, contain a provision obligating the 
tenant to pay amounts assessed by the Local 
Authority for overconsumption of utilities.

Of course, as we have shown in part I, supra, the federal 
administrative policies upon which respondent relies have 
now been superseded by new and more enlightened policies 
which, far from condoning a refusal to disclose the grounds 
of an eviction notice, compel disclosure and a fair oppor­
tunity to reply. But, in any event, the former federal 
policy invoked by respondent, and which was in effect at 
the time of the notice to vacate in this case, displays in 
its language, and its history, the clearest example of po­
tential and purpose for abuse, and gives compelling force 
to petitioner’s constitutional claims.

The recommendation was first made to local housing 
authorities in a Public Housing Administration circular 
dated July 28, 1954, which is reproduced in the appendix, 
infra, p. la. The circular states that it was issued in 
response to the ruling of the Municipal Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia in Rudder v. United States, 
105 A.2d 741 (D.C. Mun. App. 1954), subsequently reversed 
226 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1955). Rudder involved a constitu­

5 Note the difference between the wording of 6 .d (l) above and the 
language quoted in the Authority’s brief which contains the words “with­
out stating reasons for such notice”  at the end of the second sentence. 
It may be that the Authority’s brief quotes an earlier edition of the 
Handbook.



1 0

tional challenge to the so-called Gw inn Amendment, tempo­
rary legislation which formerly barred subversives from 
occupying public housing units.6 The Municipal Court of 
Appeals held in Rudder that since the local agency invoked 
the Gwinn Amendment provision in its lease to evict the 
tenants, the tenants could defend the eviction on the ground 
that the eviction was unlawful by attacking the constitu­
tionality of the Gwinn Amendment. The court sustained 
the eviction by holding the Gwinn Amendment valid. The 
July 28, 1954, circular (appendix, infra, p. la) was issued 
in response to this decision and before the District of 
Columbia Circuit reversed the eviction order. The circu­
lar summarized the Rudder litigation and said that the 
agency could have terminated the monthly tenancy by serv­
ing a statutory notice to evict without revealing its rea­
sons, but had erred by assigning a specific reason that 
could be challenged as unconstitutional. The circular con­
cluded :

In light of this decision it is suggested that all exist­
ing tenant lease forms be reviewed to determine 
whether there are contained therein any provisions 
which might be interpreted by a Court as being con­
trary to a simple monthly tenancy, thus precluding 
tenancy being terminated by merely giving the statu­
tory Notice to Quit. It is also suggested that all future 
Notices to Quit cite only the provision of the lease 
which permits termination within a specified time with­
out reference to any other provision.

6 The Gwinn Amendment was former section 1411(c) of Title 42 of the 
U. S. Code. The provisions were contained in three appropriations acts. 
See Act, Aug. 31, 1951, c. 376, Title I, § 101, 65 Stat. 277; Act July 5, 
1952, c. 578, Title I, § 101, 66 Stat. 403; Act July 31, 1953, c. 302, Title I, 
% 101, 67 Stat. 307. The Attorney General ruled that the Gwinn Amend­
ment was temporary legislation which has expired. 41 Ops. Att’y. Gen., 
April 26. Note, however, that the lease in the instant case still contains 
an anti-subversive provision (R. 17).



1 1

Thus the Federal Government originally urged the local 
housing authorities to terminate without giving reasons 
for the specific purpose of enabling them to evict people 
for reasons that might he challenged as without factual 
basis or as violative of federal constitutional rights—in 
the Rudder case, rights protected by the First Amendment 
—by evicting only under a provision that did not require 
giving a reason for the action. Thus the government in 
1954 encouraged precisely the kind of misuse of a termi­
nation provision that petitioner challenges here; that is, 
the housing authority concealing a possibly unconstitutional 
motive behind an eviction for which no reason need be 
given.

Respectfully submitted,
J ack Greenberg
J ames M. Nabrit, III
Charles Stephen R alston
Charles H. J ones, J r.
Michael Meltsner
Sheila R ush J ones 

10 Columbus Circle 
New York, New York 10019

R. Michael F rank
1238A Carrollburg Place S.W. 
Washington, D. C.

M. C. B urt
213% West Main Street 
Durham, North Carolina

A nthony G. A msterdam 
3400 Chestnut Street 
Philadelphia, Pa. 19104

Attorneys for Petitioner
Of Counsel:

Martin Garbus 
E dward V. Sparer 
H oward T horkelson



APPENDIX



H O U G I N G  A N D  H O M E  F I N A N C E  A G E N C Y W A S H I N G T O N  25, D. C .

CIRCULAR 
■ 7-28-5U

TO} Local Authorities
Field Office Directors

SUBJECT: Decision in Rudder v, US of A and Its Importance Re Tenant
Lease Forms

The decisicfo made in the case of John Rudder andDoris Rudder, Appellants, 
v * United States of America, Appellee*! NoTl)i29~ in “the Fnnicipal Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia, on June 9, 195U, is one which should 
be of interest to all local Authorities as it affects the issuance of 
Notices To Vacate and the right to evict any tenant, either in the Lanham 
Act or the low-rent propram.

The questions at issue were whether the l!„S. Government (National. Capital 
Housing Authority) is required to reveal its reason for seeking to termi­
nate tenancy and whether, if a reason were given, the tenant had the right 
to defend on the ground that the reason given was improper or unlawful.
The Appellate Court stated that the Government, like any private landlord, 
has the right to terminate a monthly tenancy by serving a statutory Notice 
To Quit without revealing the reason therefor, providing, that such action 
is in accord with the existing lease agreement with the tenant. Although, 
in this case, the lease agreement did provide for termination upon 30- days’ 
notice, the Housing Authority included in the lease a provision that it 
could bo terminated for any one of eight listed reasons. The Appellate 
Court held that the Government in citing one such reason j_n its Notice To 
Quit was in effect saying that eviction woulu b., sought only for one or 
more of these eight stated reasons. It therefore hold that the Trial Court 
should have, entertained the defense of the tenant. However, because of 
another more compelling consideration the Appellate Court did not reverse 
the decision of the Trial Court,

In light of this decision it is suggested that all existing tenant lease 
forms be reviewed to determine whether there are contained therein any 
provisions which might, be interpreted by a Court as being contrary to a 
simple monthly tenancy, thus precluding tenancy being terminated by merely 
giving the statutory Notice To Quit, It Is also suggested that all future 
Notices To Quit cite only the provision of the lease vliich permits termi­
nation within a specified time without reference to any other provision.

A  ~ e .
A c wing Commi s slo nor



la

APPENDIX



2a

(See Opposite) EST



DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT 

PUBLIC HOUSING ADMINISTRATION
5

W A S H IN G T O N  13, C . 204«S

CIRC UTAH.
5-31-66

TO: Local Authorities 
Regional Directors
Central Office Division and Branch Heads

FROM s Commissioner

SDEJECT:; Terminations of tenancy in low-rent projects

The Public Housing Administration has for a number of years recommended 
that tenant leases be drawn on a month-to-month basis noting that this 
practice should permit any necessary evictions to be accomplished upon 
the giving of a notice to vacate# There is as you may be aware growing 
opposition and challenge from individuals and organisations to the prac­
tice of simply giving the statutory notice without stating the reason or 
reasons therefor®

In connection with the above practice, we strongly urge, as a matter of 
good social policy, that Local Authorities in a private conference inform 
ary tenants who are given such notices of the reasons for this action.

Also, not all Local Authorities have kept their tenant lease forms current 
with the result that, in some cases, obsolete and unenforceable lease 
conditions are being challenged legally. We urge that all Local Authorities 
review their lease forms and remove any such conditions. Regional Offices 
will provide advice and assistance in connection with such reviews as may 
be desired.

Commissioner



3a



4a

(See Opposite) SS?"



DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT 
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20410

O F F I C E  O F  T H E  A S S I S T A N T  S E C R E T A R Y  
F OR R E N E W A L  AND HOUSING AS S I ST A N C E

CIRCULAR
2-7 -6?

TO: Local Housing Authorities
Assistant Regional Administrators for Housing Assistance 
HAA Division and Branch Heads

FROM: Don Hummel

SUBJECT: Terminations of Tenancy in Lew-Rent Projects

Within the past year increasing dissatisfaction has been expressed with 
eviction practices in public low-rent housing projects. During that period 
a number of suits have been filed throughout the United States generally 
challenging the right of a Local Authority to evict a tenant without advising 
him of the reasons for such eviction.

Since this is a federally assisted program, we believe it is essential that 
no tenant be given notice to vacate without being told by the Local Authority, 
in a private conference or other appropriate manner, the reasons for the 
eviction, and given an opportunity to make such reply or explanation as he may 
wish.

In addition to informing the tenant of the reason(s) for any proposed eviction 
action, from this date each Local Authority shall maintain a written record of 
every eviction from its federally assisted public housing. Such records are to 
be available for review from time to time by HUD representatives and shall con­
tain the following information:

1, Name of tenant and identification of unit occupied®

2, Date of notice to vacate,

3, Specific reason(s) for notice to vacate. For example, if a tenant 
is being evicted because of undesirable actions, the record should 
detail the actions which resulted in the determination that eviction 
should be instituted.

(Cont*d)



5a



(See Opposite)



2

iu Date and method of notifying tenant with summary of any conferences 
with tenant, including names of conference participants®

5. Date and description of final action taken®

The Circular on the above subject from the PHA. Commissioner, dated May 31, 
1966, is superseded by this Circular®

Assistant Secretary for Renewal 
and Housing Assistance



7a



MEILEN PRESS INC. —  N. Y.