Memorandum of Amici Curiae in Support of Emergency Application for Stay Pending Appeal

    No. A97-3-753 

  

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

October Term, 1997 

  

JAMES B. HUNT, JR, et al, 

Appellants, 

V. 

aL MARTIN CROMARTIE, ef al, 

2\ PW Appellees. 

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MEMORANDUM OF AMICI CURIAE ALFRED SMALLWOOD, ET AL. IN 
SUPPORT OF EMERGENCY APPLICATION FOR STAY PENDING APPEAL 

INTRODUCTION 

On April 3, 1998, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North 

Carolina issued an order granting summary judgment to plaintiffs, declaring North Carolina's 

Twelfth Congressional District unconstitutional, permanently enjoining elections under the 1997 

congressional redistricting plan, and ordering the State of North Carolina (“State”) to submit a 

schedule for the General Assembly to adopt a new redistricting plan and to hold elections under 

that plan." On Monday, April 6, 1998, North Carolina applied to the Chief Justice (as Circuit 

Justice for the Fourth Circuit) for a stay of that Order. Amici file this Memorandum to bring to 

the Court's attention additional reasons why such a stay is essential. Specifically, we argue below 

  

See Cromartie v. Hunt, No. 4:96CV104-BO(3) (E.D.N.C. April 3, 1998) (order and 

permanent injunction), attached as Appendix 1 to Emergency Application for Stay Pending 

Appeal of the Decision of the Three-Judge Court for the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of North Carolina (“Emergency Application”). 

 



  

2 

that the district court's order should be stayed because it does not comply with Rule 65(d), Fed. 

R. Civ. P. and because of the irreparable harm to voters (especially minority voters), as well as to 

the State and candidates, which would result if no stay is granted. 

INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE 

Amici curiae Alfred Smallwood, David Moore, William M. Hodges, Robert L. Davis, Jr., 

Jan Valder, Barney Offerman, Virginia Newell, Charles Lambeth and George Simkins (“amici” or 

“Smallwood, ef al.”’) are white and black registered voters residing in either North Carolina's First 

Congressional District or its Twelfth Congressional District (as reconfigured in the legislature's 

1997 plan). They sought on July 11, 1996, (days after appellees filed their complaint in this case) 

to intervene in this suit as defendants. On November 26, 1997 amici renewed their motion to 

intervene. Plaintiffs have not responded to either motion. In Shaw v. Hunt, amici were granted 

intervention and participated at every stage of the proceeding including oral argument before this 

Court. 

To date, the district court has not ruled on either of amici’s motions to intervene, pending 

now for over nine and four months respectively; instead the court issued its permanent injunction 

without ruling on the unopposed motions or holding a hearing on intervention. In fact, the district 

court expressly denied counsel for amici an opportunity to speak at the March 31, 1998 hearing it 

conducted on the cross-motions for summary judgment and request for preliminary injunction. 

Both the appellants and appellees have consented to this submission by amici. (Letters of consent 

from these parties have been lodged with the Clerk.) 

 



4 » 

3 

ADDITIONAL REASONS FOR GRANTING A STAY 

THE INJUNCTION ENTERED BY THE DISTRICT COURT 

DOES NOT COMPLY WITH FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d) 

In pertinent part, Rule 65(d) , Fed. R. Civ. P., states: “Every order granting an injunction 

and every restraining order shall set forth the reasons for its issuance; shall be specific in terms; 

[and] shall describe in reasonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other document, 

the act or acts sought to be restrained. . . .” The order entered by the district court does not meet 

these requirements and should, therefore, at least be stayed. 

As this Court stated in Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U.S. 473, 476 (1974) (citations and 

footnote omitted), 

Rule 65(d) was designed to prevent uncertainty and confusion on the part of those faced 

with injunctive orders, and to avoid the possible founding of a contempt citation on a 

decree too vague to be understood. . . . Since an injunctive order prohibits conduct under 
threat of judicial punishment, basic fairness requires that those enjoined receive explicit 

notice of precisely what conduct is outlawed. 

In Schmidt, the district court judgment was vacated because it did not satisfy Rule 65(d) 

requirements. Accord International Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local 1291 v. Philadelphia Marine 

Trade Ass'n, 389 U.S. 64 (1976) (original decree and contempt citation reversed because of Rule 

65(d) insufficiency). See also Gunn v. University Comm. to End the War in Vietnam, 399 U.S. 

383, 389 (1970) (Rule 65(d)’s specificity requirement is “absolutely vital in a case where a federal 

court is asked to nullify a law duly enacted by a sovereign State.”) 

In this case, the district court entered an order which ruled the Twelfth Congressional 

District unconstitutional; permanently enjoined elections under North Carolina's 1997 plan, and 

announced that the General Assembly would be given a limited “opportunity to correct the  



  

* » 

4 

constitutional defects in the 1997 plan,” failing which the court would adopt its own districting 

scheme. However, the district court failed to provide any explanation of its order, stating only 

that the “[m]emoranda with reference to this order will be issued as soon as possible.”> The order 

is not “specific” in outlining the “terms” of the injunctive relief granted. The order does not 

describe “in reasonable detail . . . the act or acts sought to be restrained.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d). 

It provides no explanation for the court's conclusion that District 12 in the 1997 plan is 

unconstitutional and makes no mention of appellees’ claim that District 1 in the 1997 plan is also 

unconstitutional. 

Most significantly, the order announces that the court will provide the North Carolina 

legislature with a limited time period within which to “correct the constitutional defects in the 

1997 plan” but offers no guidance as to the modifications which may be necessary to correct the 

constitutional violation found by the court. For all of these reasons, the order therefore violates 

Rule 65(d) because it is not framed “so that those who must obey [it] will know what the court 

intends to require and what it means to forbid,” International Longshoremen’s Ass'n, 389 U.S. at 

763 

  

’Cromartie v. Hunt, No. 4:96CV104-BO(3) (E.D.N.C. April 3, 1998) (order and 
permanent injunction) (attached as Appendix 1 to Emergency Application) at 2. 

The difficulties of compliance are hardly speculative. For example, North Carolina has a 

compelling state interest in enacting a redistricting plan that complies with the Voting Rights Act 
of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, including Section 2 of the Act as interpreted by this Court in 

Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). This Court has recognized that the intentional 

creation of majority-minority districts is not inherently unconstitutional. See Bush v. Vera, 116 S. 

Ct. 1941, 1951-1952 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2488 (1995), Shaw v. Reno, 

509 U.S. 630, 642 (1993); see also Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1969 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The 

district court's order, however, provides the legislature with no instructions on how to modify the 

congressional plan to “correct the constitutional defects” while still taking race into account to the 

extent permissible. Further, as the State argues in the Emergency Application, appellees relied 

 



  

5 

With less than a month until the primary election, the district court has postponed 

congressional primary elections throughout North Carolina and asked the state legislature to 

redistrict without giving any guidance whatsoever. The district court was bound by Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 65(d) to explain its view of the complicated legal and factual issues in the case before requiring 

the State to attempt to fashion a new districting plan. Because it did not do so, its order should 

be stayed and the electoral processes already under way allowed to continue. 

IL IRREPARABLE HARM WILL RESULT TO THE INTERESTS OF THE 

PUBLIC AND TO THE APPELLANTS IF A STAY IS NOT ISSUED 

The injury from disrupting election processes is significant and has been frequently 

recognized by this Court and the federal trial courts. In the seminal decision in Reynolds v. Sims, 

377 U.S. 533, 585 (1964), this Court cautioned that 

under certain circumstances, such as where an impending election is imminent and a 

State's election machinery is already in progress, equitable considerations might justify a 

court in withholding the granting of immediately effective relief in a legislative 
apportionment case, even though the existing apportionment scheme was found invalid. . . 

. [A] court is entitled to and should consider the proximity of a forthcoming election and 

the mechanics and complexities of state election laws, and . . . can reasonably endeavor to 

avoid a disruption of the election process which might result from requiring precipitate 

changes that could make unreasonable or embarrassing demands on a State in adjusting to 

the requirements of the court's decree. 

These principles have guided federal trial courts in both reapportionment and vote dilution cases.” 

  

below upon a “fruit of the poisonous tree” argument whose reach, to the extent (if any) that it 

was adopted by the district court, is unknown. The extent to which district lines in the 1997 plan 

must be redrawn will vary considerably dependent upon the rationale for the ruling below. For 

example, if all areas included within District 12 in the 1992 plan must be excluded from the 

Twelfth District in any acceptable remedial plan, very considerable remapping of the State, 

affecting numerous incumbents (contrary to the legislative purpose in 1997) may be necessary. 

‘See, e.g., Diaz v. Silver, 932 F. Supp. 462, 466 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (preliminary injunction 

denied to avoid harming public interest where elections scheduled in a few months, even though 

court found likelihood of success on Shaw claim and irreparable injury to plaintiffs); Cardona v. 

 



  

6 

The people of North Carolina have a legitimate interest in holding their primary election 

on the scheduled date and would suffer from a delay in the timetable. See, e.g., Chisom v. 

Roemer, 853 F.2d 1186, 1190 (5th Cir. 1988) (recognizing the uncertainty that delay introduces 

into election process). The district court issued its injunction when the election process for the 

1998 Congressional elections was already well under way. The thirty-one citizens who filed 

notices of candidacy have raised and spent large amounts of money for their campaigns and 

continue to raise and spend funds campaigning for the eight contested primary races. 

The State has already taken most of the various administrative steps necessary to hold an 

election at the public expense; indeed, absentee balloting began March 16, 1998 and votes have 

already been cast in this election. Candidates, North Carolina election officials and voters 

(including amici) will suffer significant, substantial and irreparable harm from the disruption of 

this election process, such as low voter turnout, voter confusion, additional burdens on 

  

Oakland Unified School District, 785 F. Supp. 837, 843 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (court refused to 

enjoin election where primary “election machinery is already in gear,” including the passage of 

deadline for candidates to establish residency and start of candidate nominating period); 

Republican Party of Virginia v. Wilder, 774 F. Supp. 400 (W.D. Va. 1991) (injunction denied in 

case with “uncertain cause of action with only possible irreparable harm” and where time for 

election was close and there was danger of low voter turnout if election postponed); Cosner v. 

Dalton, 522 F. Supp. 350 (E.D. Va. 1981) (three-judge court) (use of malapportioned plan not 

enjoined where elections were two months away); Shapiro v. Maryland, 336 F. Supp. 1205 (D. 

Md. 1972) (court refused to enjoin election where candidate filing deadline was imminent and 

granting relief would disrupt election process and prejudice citizens, candidates and state 

officials); Sincock v. Roman, 233 F. Supp. 615 (D. Del. 1964) (three-judge court) (per curiam) 

(enjoining election would result in disruption in ongoing election process which would cause 

confusion and possible disenfranchisement of voters); Meeks v. Anderson, 229 F. Supp. 271, 274 

(D. Kan. 1964) (three-judge court) (court held malapportioned districts unconstitutional but 

concluded that the “ends of justice” would “best be served” by permitting elections to proceed). 

 



  

candidates, and increased costs.’ 

These harms prompted the district court in Shaw v. Hunt to deny injunctive relief to 

plaintiffs in that case in 1996, where only a few months remained before the general election. As 

political scientist Dr. Bernard Grofman® testified in that case, altering the State's regular election 

calendar, conducting congressional elections without statewide races on the ballot, and 

conducting elections in close proximity to each other all contribute to low voter turnout. See 

Expert Witness Declaration in Shaw v. Hunt, Bernard N. Grofman, Ph.D., July 24, 1996, at 6, 

which has been lodged with the Clerk of the Court. According to Dr. Grofman, this result is 

exacerbated for minority groups, such as African Americans, because they tend to be poorer and 

less well educated than their white counterparts, and, consequently, tend to have lower levels of 

political participation. See id. at 9. This analysis caused Dr. Grofman to conclude in Shaw that 

“even if it were technically feasible that a new congressional plan could be drawn (either by the 

  

See Cordona, 785 F. Supp. at 842-43 (1992) (denying relief due to proximity of 
election); Banks v. Board of Educ. of Peoria, 659 F. Supp. 394, 398 (C.D. Ill. 1987) (“the 

candidates had already begun campaigning, forming committees to raise funds, making decisions 

about political strategy, and spending money for publicity purposes”); Knox v. Milwaukee County 

Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 581 F. Supp. 399, 405 (E.D. Wis. 1984) (“candidates’ election reports 

have been filed, campaign committees organized, contributions solicited, . . . literature 

distributed); Martin v. Venables, 401 F. Supp. 611, 621 (D. Conn. 1975) (denying relief where 

parties had selected their endorsed candidates and time for challengers to qualify for primaries had 

passed); Dobson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 330 F. Supp. 1290, 1301 (D. Md. 
1971) (disrupting election schedule would mean present candidates would lose, in large measure, 

the benefit of their campaigning to date); Klahr v. Williams, 313 F. Supp. 148, 152 (Ariz. 1970) 

(redistricting where filing deadline was less than two months away would involve serious risk of 

confusion and chaos), aff'd sub nom. Ely v. Klahr, 403 U.S. 108, 113 (1971). 

Dr. Grofman has been accepted as an expert in the areas of political participation and 

voting rights by numerous federal district courts. His work has also been often cited by federal 

courts in cases related to districting, including 7hornburgh v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) and 

Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 

 



  

8 

legislature or by the [district] court) and implemented within the next few months, any attempt to 

hold primary elections between now [July 24, 1996] and the November 5, 1996, election date 

under that plan would result in primary elections with especially low turnout,” id. at 12, and 

would be “a potential source of considerable voter confusion.” Id. at 13. The district court in 

Shaw accordingly refused to disrupt North Carolina’s election process on remand from this 

Court’s 1996 decision. 

The same undesirable effects, especially for minority voters, will inevitably result in 1998 if 

the order issued below is not stayed. The district court order will nullify the efforts of candidates 

to date, invalidate votes already cast by absentee voters, and result in lower voter participation 

and considerable confusion in any rescheduled elections. 

 



  

9 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, amici join in the application of the State for a stay pending 

appeal in this Court. 

Respectfully submitted, 

Ne 
  

ADAM STEIN TODD A. COX / 
ANITA S. HODGKISS NAACP Satie 

Ferguson, Stein, Wallas, Adkins, & Educational Fund, Inc. 

Gresham & Sumter, P.A. 1275 K Street, N.W., Suite 301 

741 Kenilworth Avenue, Suite 300 Washington, D.C. 20005 

Charlotte, North Carolina 28204 (202) 682-1300 

(704) 375-8461 

ELAINE R. JONES 

Director-Counsel 

NORMAN J. CHACHKIN 

JACQUELINE A. BERRIEN 

NAACP Legal Defense 

& Educational Fund, Inc. 

99 Hudson Street, Suite 1600 

New York, New York 10013 

(212) 219-1900 

Counsel for Proposed Amici Curiae 

 



  

No. A97-3-753 

  

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

October Term, 1997 

  

JAMES B. HUNT, JR. et al., 

Appellants, 
v 

MARTIN CROMARTIE, et al., 

Appellees. 

  

APPENDIX OF MATERIAL LODGED WITH CLERK 

BY AMICI CURIAE ALFRED SMALLWOOD, ET AL. 

  

INDEX 

Letters consenting {0 amicus curiae PATtCIPAHON.................ocorreinieesseiniosnirnnmponnissss APPENDIX A 

Expert Witness Declaration in Shaw v. Hunt, 

Bernard N. Grofiman, Ph.D, July 24, 1996.............c..cciieieiess 00 Ls diininaninnnn APPENDIX B 

 



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April 7, 1998 
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Mr. Eddie Speas 
North Carolina Deparment of Justice 

2 E. Morgan Street 

Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 

Re: Hunt v. Cromartie, Application for Stay Pending Appeal 

United States Supreme Court, No: 
  

Dear Mr. Speas: 

This is 10 request your consent for the filing of a brief amicus curiae in the above case on the stay 

application, by Alfred Smallwood, et al., the applicants for intervention in the case, in support of 

the petitioners. As you know, our motion [o intervene has been pending before the three-judge 

panel since November of last year, but has not been ruled on. 

I would appreciate your noting your consent on the enclosed copy of this letter. Please fax me a 

copy and return the copy with your orginal signature to my co-counsel Todd Cox in the enclosed 

FedEx package. Please givemea call if you have any questions. Thank you very much for your 

kind assistance. 

Sincerely yours, 

(Zeal bechfless 

Amita S. Hodgkiss 

ASH:cfd 

Enclosure 

I consent 10 the filing of a brief amicus cunae in the above case by Alfred Smallwood, et al 

proposed defendant-infervenors in this case, in support of the petitioners. 

April /4 , 1993 
    

Eddie Speas, Counsel for Petitioners 

man ines ARMNREFSS: POST OFFICE BOX 36486 CHARLOTTE NORTH CAROLINA 2B236-6486  



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NENDERGDON Mit 

Mr. Robinson Everett 
Everett & Everett 

301 W. Main Street, Suite 300 

Durham, North Carolina 27702 

Re: Hunt v. Cromartie, Application far Stay Pending Appeal-United States 

Supreme Caurt, No: 
  

Dear Mr, Everett, 

This is to request your consent for the filing of a brief amicus curiae in the above case on the stay 

application, by Alfred Smallwood, et al., the applicants for intervention in the case, in support of 

the petitioners. As you know, our motion to intervene has been pending before the three-judge 

panel since November of last year, but has not been ruled on. 

I would appreciate your noting your consent on the enclosed copy of this letter. Please fax me a 

copy and return the copy with your original signawre to my co-counsel Todd Cox in the enclosed 

FedEx package. Please give me a call if you have any questions, Thank you very much for your 
kind assistance. 

Sincerely yours, 

Anita S. Hodgkiss 

ASH: cfd 
Enclosure 

I consent to the filing of a brief amicus curiae in the above case by Alfred Smallwood, et al, the 

proposed defendant-intervenors in {i 70 suppan of the petitioners. 

121. — April wy 1998 
Robinson OQ. Evefett, Counsel for Respondents 
  

MAILING AMDRESS: POST OFFICE BOX 36488 CHARLOTTE. NORTH CAROLINA 28236-6486 

 



FROM HC RAG SPECIAL LYTIGATION ® B4.088.1998 12:3 

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VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS 

Mr. Eddie Speas 

North Carolina Department of Justice 

2 E. Morgan Street 

Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 

Re: Hunt v. Cromartie, Application for Stay Pending Appeal 

United States Supreme Court, No: 
  

Dear Mr. Speas: 

This is 10 request your consent for the filing of a brief amicus curiae in the above case on the stay 

application, by Alfred Smallwood, et al., the applicants for intervention in the case, in support of 

the petitioners. As you know, our motion (0 intervene has been pending before the three-judge 

panel since November of last year, but has not been ruled on, 

I would appreciate your noting your consent on the enclosed copy of this letter. Please fax me a 

copy and retum the copy with your onginal signature to my co-counsel Todd Cox in the enclosed 

FedEx package. Please give me a call if you have any questions. Thank you very much for your 

kind assistance. 

Sincerely yours, 

7 
Anita S. Hodgkiss 

ASH:cfd 
Enclosure 

I consent 10 the filing of a brief amicus curiae in the above case by Alfred Smallwood, et al, the 

(«7 defendant-intervenors in this case, in support of the petitioners. 

april 24 1998 
      

Eddie Speas, Counsel for Petitioners 

wane ARMNRIFAS: POST OFFICE BOX 36486, CHARLOTTE. NORTH CAROLINA 28236-6486 

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Appendix B % iH 

Expert Witness Declaration in Shaw v. Hunt 

Bernard N. Grofman, Ph. D. 

  

1. Tam a Professor of Political Science at the University of California, 

Irvine, where I have taught since 1976. I received a B.S. in 

Mathematics from the University of Chicago in 1966 and 

a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago in 1972. 

2. Most of my research has been on topics related to political 

representation and voting. In 1991-93, 1 served as chair of the 

Section on Representation and Electoral Systems of the American 

Political Science Association. I have authored or co-authored one 

book and over 160 articles and research notes, and edited or co- 

edited eleven books. Among these are Representation and 

Redistricting Issues, 1982; Choosing an Electoral System, 1984; 

Electoral Laws and their Political Consequences, 1986; Political 

Gerrymandering and the Courts, 1990; Controversies in Minority 

Voting, 1992; Minority Voting and the Quest for Voting Equality, 

1992; Quiet Revolution in the South: The Impact of the Voting Rights 

Act, 1965-1990, 1994; Legislative Term Limits, 1996; and Elections 

in Japan, Korea and Taiwan under the Single Non-Transferable Vote, 

  

  

  

197 forthcoming. I have received numerous research grants from 

the National Science Foundation, and grants from major private 

foundations such as the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation 

and the Liberty Fund to support my research. A full listing of my 

 



  

research and other activities is contained in my c.v. appended to this 

Declaration. 

3. I am a specialist in comparative election methods, voting rights, 

voter turnout, and political science methodology for the study of 

elections and constituency boundary drawing. I have been accepted 

as expert in these areas by numerous federal district courts over the 

past fourteen years, beginning with my testimony in Carstens v. 

Lamm, 543 F. Supp. 68 (D. Col. 1982), a Colorado congressional 

redistricting case and continuing with testimony in cases such as 

  

  

  

Gingles v. Edmisten heard sub nom Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 

  

30 (1986), and Garza v. Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors, 

918 F. 2d 768 (1990). I have served as a consultant to the U.S. 

Department of Justice on a number of occasions in cases throughout 

the country, to state governments in Indiana and Rhode Island, to 

the City of Boston, to various major civil rights organizations, to 

Republican state party organizations (in Hawaii, Colorado, and 

Wisconsin), to Democratic state party organizations (in Rhode Island), 

and to the Republican National Committee (in cases in California and 

North Carolina). In 1990 I served as chief voting rights consultant 

to the New York City Districting Commission when new city council 

districts were being drawn. A list of the most important cases in 

which I have testified is appended as the last pages on my cC.v. 

4. My work has been often cited by federal courts in cases related to 

districting, including the U.S. Supreme Court (e.g., in Thornburg v. 

Gingles 478 U. S. at notes 12, 14 and 21, and in Shaw v. Reno in 
  

 



  

both the Opinion of the Court and in one of the dissents). In Flateau 

v, Anderson, 537 F. Supp. 257 (S. D. N. Y. 1982), I served as chief 

voting rights consultant to the Special Master appointed by the 

southern Federal District Court in New York to prepare 1980s 

congressional and legislative plans for that state. I have received 

conference funding from the Federal Judicial Center for a 1994 

conference on "The Civil Rights Act of 1964" held at their 

Washington headquarters, and I have been an invited lecturer at two 

continuing education sessions for federal judges organized by the 

Federal Judicial Center. I have also received conference funding 

from the American Bar Association Special Committee on Election 

Law for a 1980 conference on "Voter Turnout." 

5. In 1992, under the auspices of the Republican National Committee, 

I provided a declaration for the plaintiffs in Pope et al. v. Blue et al. 

Civ. No 3:92CV71 (W.D., N.C.) in which I analyzed various features of 

the North Carolina congressional districts whose lines were enacted 

into law in 1991. A major part of my testimony dealt with contiguity 

and shape, geographic reach, and community of interest aspects of 

the districts. In my declaration I asserted that the plan as a whole 

was a crazy patchwork quilt and that voter confusion was inevitable 

in that several of the district boundaries could not be specified in 

simple, commonsense terms based on recognizable geographic 

referents. I asserted that such non-cognizability of district lines 

damaged the realistic possibility of fair and effective representation. 

In particular, I criticized Congressional District 12 in considerable 

detail, arguing that it was so distorted and tortuous as to lack a 

 



rational state purpose. In 1996, Congressional District 12 was found 

to be unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court -- for 

reasons distinct from, but still closely related to, those specified in 

my Pope v. Blue affidavit. 
  

6. I have been asked by the counsel for the Gingles intervenors to 

discuss the likely consequences for voter turnout and voter confusion 

of possible alternative election arrangements for the 1996 elections 

to the U.S. House of Representatives in North Carolina. I hope that 

evidence bearing on the feasibility and likely effects of implementing 

alternative election calendars can be useful to this court, recognizing 

full well that, when a constitutional violation has been found, the 

issues of the appropriate balancing of competing harms and benefits 

is a legal judgment for the court to make. However, before I can 

discuss the implications of various specific alternative electoral 

arrangements for congressional elections in North Carolina, some 

general background on what political scientists have learned about 

turnout in different types of elections is required. 

7. Itis a well-established proposition in the political science 

literature on turnout that elections held at times other than the 

regular election calendar tend to have low turnout. 

8. It is a well-established proposition in the political science 

literature on turnout that elections which do not have presidential 

races on them tend to have lower turnout than those that do.  



9. It is a well-established proposition in the political science 

literature on turnout that elections which do not have top-of-the 

ticket races (e.g., statewide contests) on them tend to have lower 

turnout than those that do. 

.10. Itis a well-established proposition in the political science 

literature on turnout that, at least since the 1970s, primary elections 

tend to have lower turnout than the corresponding general election. 

11. Itis a well-established proposition in the political science 

literature on turnout that runoff elections tend to have lower turnout 

than the original election resulting in the runoff. 

12. Itis a well-established proposition in the political science 

literature on turnout that the more frequently voters are called to 

the polls within a given relatively short time frame, the lower, 

ceteris paribus, will average turnout in those elections be, i.e., voters 

suffer from a kind of election fatigue if they have to participate in 

multiple elections within a short time period. 

13. Itis a well-established proposition in the political science 

literature on turnout that, ceteris paribus, the presence of multiple 

elections contests on the same date tends to increase turnout, while 

the fact that there is only a single office on a ballot will tend to 

decrease turnout.  



  

14. These seven factors (elections off the regular election calendar, 

elections which do not include a presidential contest, elections 

which do not have statewide races on them, primary elections, , 

runoff elections, frequency of elections, elections with only a single 

office on the ballot) have a cumulative impact in reducing turnout. 

The more of these factors that are present, ceteris paribus,! the 

lower the voter turnout that can be expected relative to elections in 

which those factors are not present. The cumulative impact of these 

factors can lead to dramatic differences in levels of turnout among 

different elections within the same electoral consttuency. 

15. These general propositions are supported by evidence from North 

Carolina. For example, focusing just on the 1990s congressional 

districts that are at issue in this case, we can compare turnout in 

primaries with turnout in general elections. Our expectation is that 

turnout in primaries will, on average, be less than that in general 

elections. In 1992 there were Democratic primaries (but no 

Republican primaries) in 2 districts (CD1 and CD8) with an average 

turnout of 80,733 ; both Democratic primaries and Republican 

primaries in 1 district (CD12), with a turnout of 56,318 in the 

Democratic primary and a turnout of 8,687 in the Republican 

  

1There are, of course, other factors that affect turnout rates. For example, it is 

also a well-established proposition in the political science literature on 

turnout that elections that are uncontested (or essentially so) tend to have 

very low turnout for office, i.e., few voters bother to cast a ballot in 

uncontested elections even though the effort to do so is minimal since they are 

already in the polling booth. In general, turnout among those at the polls is 

lower, ceteris paribus, in contests that are not expected to be very competitive. 

Moreover, jurisdictions in which, for a long time, most of the elections taking 

place are noncompetitive, tend to have depressed registration and turnout. 

 



  

primary; and Republican primaries (but no Democratic primaries) in 

3 districts (CD2 , CDS and CD7 ) with an average turnout of 17,122. 

In the 1992 general election in these six districts, turnout more than 

quadrupled compared to that in the primaries (1,137,439 in the 

general election, as compared to 277,837 in the primaries).2 

Similar results are obtained when we examine the 1994 

congressional primaries. In 1994 there were Democratic primaries 

(but no Republican primaries) in 4 districts (CD2, CD5, CD8 and CD11) 

with an average turnout of 53,074 ; both Democratic primaries and 

Republican primaries in 1 district (CD9) , with a turnout of 20,457 in 

the Democratic primary and a turnout of 35,313 in the Republican 

primary; and Republican primaries (but no Democratic primaries) in 

2 districts (CD4 and CD7) with an average turnout of only 11,825. In 

comparison, total turnout in these seven districts in the 1994 general 

elections was 1,004,540, as compared to a primary turnout in the 

same districts of only 291,716, i.e., general election turnout was more 

than triple that in the primaries in those congressional districts in 

which primary elections took place. 

16. In like manner, we find, as expected, that turnout in runoff 

primaries in North Carolina is lower than that in the first round of 

such primaries. Again we focus on congressional elections. In the 

Republican primary runoff election in CD 9 required in 1994, turnout 

was only 25, 991 as compared to 35, 313 in the first round, and one 
  

ZIn the 1992 general elections, turnout was 173,262 in CD1, 211,569 in CD2, 
223,679 in CDS, 163,101 in CD7, 185,004 in CD8, and 180,824 in CD12. 

 



  

of the two candidates actually received 1,616 fewer votes in the 

runoff than he had in the first round despite the fact that three 

candidates had been dropped from the race. In the Democratic 

primary runoff election in CD 7 required in 1996, turnout was only 

31,153 as compared to 52,684 in the first round, In the Republican 

primary runoff election in CD 7 required in 1996, turnout was only 

9,982 as compared to 19,198 in the first round, In the Republican 

primary runoff election in CD 8 required in 1996, turnout was only 

5,321 as compared to 22,797 in the first round. 

17. In like manner, we find, as expected, that turnout in a non- 

presidential year, 1944, is considerably less than that in a 

presidential election year such as 1992 (despite population growth in 

North Carolina in the intervening two years): 1,588,154 as compared 

102,516,725. 

18. In North Carolina there are very few elections held off the 

regular election cycle. The one example of such a contest that has 

been brought to my attention, is a special election for State Senate 

district held on March 28, 1995, resulting from a tied election. In the 

special election total turnout was lower than in the comparable 

general election: only 20,746 as compared to a turnout for office of 

29, 975 in the 1994 general election in that same district, exactly as 

expected. This is a dropoff of 28%. Moreover, evidence from other 

states is also fully and strongly consistent with the expectation that 

elections held off the regular election cycle are characterized by 

especially low turnout compared to elections of the same type held at 

 



  

regularly scheduled times, especially if there are few or no other 

contests on the ballot at the same time. 

19. Itis a well-established proposition in the political science 

literature on turnout that, in general, groups that are low in income 

and education tend to register and vote at lower rates than do groups 

that are higher in income and education. 

20. Itis a well-established proposition in the political science 

literature that minority groups such as blacks and Hispanics of 

Mexican descent tend to be lower in income and education than non- 

Hispanic whites and to have lower levels of political participation 

among their eligible voters.. 

21. In North Carolina, as throughout the country, African-American 

voters tend to identify with the Democratic party. 

22. Itis a well-established proposition in the political science 

literature that, in general, voters who register Democratic or identify 

with the Democratic party tend to be lower in income and education 

than voters who register Republican or identify with the Republican 

party and that voters identified with the Democrat party tend to 

have lower levels of registration and political participation than 

voters identified with the Republican party. 

23. Itis a well-established proposition in the political science 

literature that, in general, low turnout elections have a lower 

 



  

proportion of their electorate coming from groups that are low in 

income and education than do high turnout elections. Here, we are 

referring not to the absolute levels of turnout in groups but to 

changes in relative turnout across different types of elections. In 

other words, the greatest difference in turnout among groups occurs 

in low turnout elections, such that groups that are generally low in 

turnout form an even smaller portion of the voters in low turnout 

elections than they do in elections with higher turnout. 

24. Having reviewed evidence on the general implications of 

alternative election schedules on voter turnout, I now turn to the 

consideraton of specific election calendar alternatives for North 

Carolina congressional elections. The first election proposal I 

consider is one which would require that a remedial plan and new 

primary election calendar be put into effect prior to the November 5, 

1996 elections. 

25. There are critical issues of feasibility in adopting and 

implementing a new congressional plan and scheduling primary 

elections under it prior to the November 5, 1996 regular election 

date that are especially grave within North Carolina as compared to 

other states facing similar election calendar questions. Because the 

plan would of necessity dramatically change district configurations 

throughout much of the state because of CD 12's geographic stretch, it 

is very likely that, because of what redistricting specialists call 

"ripple effects," remedying the problem with CD12 would, for all 

practical purposes, require a complete new plan for the entire state. 

10 

 



At minimum, in addition to the need to redo the lines for District 12 

itself to assure a constitutional plan, a number of the districts that 

are adjacent to the meandering lines of the present District 12 would 

also need to be significantly reconfigured. The need for a "whole 

state" revised congressional plan (or at least something quite close to 

a "whole state" plan) in North Carolina contrasts markedly with the 

situation in other states. For example, in Texas, the congressional 

districts that have been found unconstitutional are largely or wholly 

within two metropolitan areas (two in Houston, and one in Dallas) 

and only relatively minimal redrawing is necessary outside of these 

metropolitan areas to correct constitutional problems; indeed, two- 

thirds (and possibly more) of the congressional districts in Texas can 

be left completely unchanged. If, as might be expected under the 

deference and comity principles laid down in cases such as Upham v, 

Seamon, 456 U.S. 37 (1982), this court permits the North Carolina 

legislature an opportunity to devise a constitutional remedy plan, but 

  

then requires that it do so in time for that plan to be reviewed by 

this court for constitutionality early enough for it still to be feasible 

to schedule a primary election prior to the November 5, 1996 

election, this will place a very difficult and perhaps impossible 

burden on the legislature. 3 

  

3The argument for permitting the North Carolina legislature an opportunity to 
redraw the plan(and a reasonable time period in which to do so) is enhanced 
by the simple fact that it was not until a month ago that therc was any federal 
court finding of unconstitutionality of the 1990s congressional lines in North 
Carolina. This is in total contrast to the situation in states such as Texas, 
Lousiana, or Georgia. Moreover, unlike jurisdictions found guilty of other 
types of voting rights violation (e.g., Section 2 vote dilution) in this instance, 
North Carolina, cannot be said to have acted in a fashion that might disqualify 
them from any deference from the court. Features of the plan found 
unconstitutional can be traced at least in part to a misunderstanding of what  



  

® ® 12 

26. The well-established propositions on turnout enumerated in 

earlier paragraphs above argue for the conclusion that, even if it 

were technically feasible that a new congressional plan could be 

drawn (either by the legislature or by this court) and implemented 

within the next few months, any attempt to hold new primary 

elections between now and the November 5, 1996 election date 

under that plan would result in primary elections with especially low 

turnout. First, the primaries would be off the regular cycle. 

Second, they would have no other contests on the ballot with them. 

Third, even if state law requiring runoff elections in primaries were 

overridden and plurality winners chosen as primary victors even if 

they did not receive 40 percent or more of the vote, this election 

calendar would still require an electorate to come to the polls three 

times (and in some cases four times, where runoffs had already 

occurred) within a six month period. Moreover, and perhaps most 

importantly, turnout among African-American voters in these off- 

cycle primaries without other contests on the ballot could be 

expected to be lower, probably considerably lower, than turnout in 

regularly scheduled primaries, and the proportion of the primary 

electorate that was African-American could be expected to decline. 

Given levels of racially polarized voting previously found by federal 

courts in North Carolina, such a decline in African-American turnout 

  

the Voting Rights Act of 1965 actually required and to a desire to redress past 
electoral discrimination against African-Americans and the candidates of 
their choice. Moreover, the standard under which the unconstitutionality was 
found was one which was not clearly enunciated until well after the 
congressional lines were drawn and it took time for that standard to be further 

clarified by subsequent Supreme Court decisions. 

 



  

® » 0s 

might well affect the result of some primary elections, especially 

those within the Democratic party. 

27. Even if a new congressional plan could be drawn and 

implemented within the next few months, any attempt to hold new 

primary elections between now and the November 5, 1996 election 

date under that plan, seeking to implement a plan too precipitously 

is a potential source of considerable voter confusion. Unlike the 

situation in states such as Texas where changes in district lines to 

remedy constitutional violations can be "localized," in North Carolina, 

as noted previously, any new congressional plan that met 

constitutional standards would of necessity involve dramatic 

changes in a number of district configurations throughout much of 

the state. Moreover, under this accelerated schedule, the time for 

campaigning (and for acquainting citizens with the new district 

configurations) would almost certainly be curtailed. 

28. Courts have generally been reluctant to interfere with an 

ongoing electoral process even in situations where a constitutional or 

Voting Rights Act violation has been found. Over the course of some 

dozen plus years of redistricting involvement, insofar as I can recall, 

I have only once been personally involved in a case where an 

election calendar that was already close to completion was not 

permitted to come to a natural end, namely Garza v. Los Angeles 

County Board of Supervisors . In Garza, in 1990 Judge Kenyon stayed 

a runoff election in a district challenged under Section 2 of the 

Voting Rights Act, and eventually ordered an entire new election and 

 



  

® ® 14 
runoff in 1991 when that district was redrawn#4 after a finding of a 

statutory violation. However, that case presents a number of 

factual circumstances (some rather unusual) that distinguish it from 

this one, and that suggest considerations that may be relevant in 

deciding when it is necessary to stop an ongoing electoral process. 

First, in that case there was evidence that the fragmentation of the 

Hispanic population found had occurred not just in the 1990s 

districting plan that was being challenged but also in 1980s and even 

1970s plans, and was intentional in its effects throughout this period. 

In North Carolina, the violation is by its nature only found in the 

1990s congressional plan. Second, in Garza, the court was able to 

confine its intervention in the ongoing electoral process to the single 

district where a Voting Rights claim had been made.¢ In North 

Carolina, any new plan would necessarily require stopping an 

ongoing electoral process in a large proportion of the state's 

congressional districts, perhaps in all of them. Third, in Garza, if a 

  

41 might also note that, in Garza, the jurisdiction was given an opportunity to 
redraw the lines; however it offered a remedial plan that the court found 
unacceptable. That remedial plan violated standard districting criteria and 
community of interest and socio-economic commonalities in a fashion that 
tended to dilute minority voting strength, e.g., it created an elongated 
supposed "minority" district that put Watts and Beverly Hills together and 
contained an extremely narrow tendril dropping down over the Santa Monica 
mountains. 

SThe appeal of the Section 2 aspect of this case appears at 918 F. 2d. 768 (9th Cir. 
1990). 

OThe only new election ordered was in the district created to remedy the 
Voting Rights Act violation; elections in the other four supervisorial districts 
under the old lines were allowed to stand even though there were new district 
lines for the entire county. Because changes required to redraw the district 
found to be violative of the Voting Right Act were spread among several other 
districts, the changes needed in any single one of these districts were 
relatively minimal. 

 



  

new election in the district found unconstitutional had not been 

15 

ordered for 1991, the next supervisorial election would not have 

taken place until after the 1990s redistricting, thus permitting the 

violation to remain in place for one full ten-year (census) election 

cycle. In contrast, in North Carolina, even if a new plan were not put 

into place until the 1998 elections, it would still be used for two 

elections, 1998 and 2000.7 

29. In sum, even if it were technically feasible that a new 

congressional plan could be drawn and implemented in North 

Carolina within the few months prior to November 5, 1996 , and the 

three-judge panel in Vera v, Bush, has already concluded that this   

would not be feasible in Texas, there are competing harms which 

need to be weighed: those arising in permitting ongoing November 

elections in a district whose lines have been found to be 

unconstitutional, on the one hand, versus those stemming from the 

likely injury to the democratic process caused by lowered voter 

turnout, lessened minority participation, voter confusion, and 

probable denial of a reasonable opportunity for the North Carolina 

legislature to play its proper role in the redistricting process, that 

  

71 might also note that the nature of the standard set forth in Shaw v. Reno 
gives rise to a constitutional violation different in character from the more 
common type of vote dilution claim (whether effects- based or purpose based) 
such as that dealt with in Garza. In North Carolina's congressional 
redistricting, there are no groups whose voting strength has been minimized 
or canceled out. Indeed, the Supreme Court found specifically to the contrary. 
In the Supreme Court's view, the nature of the harm under Shaw v. Reno is 
symbolic and stigmatic. Exactly how, if at all, this difference in type of 
constitutional violation affects the need for an immediate intervention into an 
ongoing state electoral process remains for this court to ascertain. 

 



  

would arise under a too hasty imposition of a remedial plan, on the 

16 

other. 

30. Let me turn now to scheduling of elections under new lines at a 

date after November 5, 1996. As stated above, delay past November 

1996 would permit a remedy to be crafted by the State without 

unreasonable deadline pressure, and with the District Court able to 

act were the North Carolina legislature unable to do so in a timely 

fashion or were the State to propose a remedy that failed to correct 

the constitutional violation. As for the specific timing of such post- 

November 1996 elections, the propositions about turnout given 

above suggest that the best calendar is one in which primaries and 

general elections occur at their normal time, i.e., May and November, 

and/or occur when there are other elections on the ballot. Thus, 

elections at their regularly scheduled time in 1998 would best 

maximize turnout. I would also emphasize that the worst possible 

scenario would be one in which the general election takes places 

under circumstances (off regular election cycle, at dates not generally 

recognized as election times, few or no other elections on the same 

ballot) likely to induce low turnout. If this were to be done there is 

grave risk that the unrepresentative electorate concomitant to a very 

low turnout election occurring under such circumstances could not 

only damage the legitimacy of election outcomes but introduce 

systematic racial and even partisan biases -- biases caused by 

disproportionately low turnout among African-American voters and 

among lower income and lower education voters who are more 

 



substantially Democratic in their partisan leanings than the rest of 

the electorate.8 

I declare under pain of perjury that the foregoing statements are 

true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. 

Dated: July 24, 1996 

{ 
Bernard N. Grofman 

  

  

81 focus here on the general election simply because it is the decisive election 
and thus the one where an unrepresentative electorate is the most critical.  



     
28 

3 SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES BERNARD NORMAN GROFMAN 

UC-Irvine JUNE 1996 

VITA 

BERNARD NORMAN GROFMAN, Professor 

EDUCATION 

B.S. University of Chicago, Mathematics (1966) 

M.A. University of Chicago, Political Science (1968) 
Ph.D. University of Chicago, Political Science (1972) 

ACADEMIC POSITIONS HELD 

1980- Professor of Political Science and Social Psychology, 
University of California, Irvine. 

1970-71 Instructor, Political Science, SUNY at Stony Brook. 

1971-76 Assistant Professor, Political Science, SUNY at Stony Brook. 

1973 Visiting Lecturer (Gastdozent), Lehrstuhl fuer Politische 
Wissenschaft, University of Mannheim (Summer Semester). 

1975 Adjunct Assistant Professor, Applied Mathematics, SUNY at 

Stony Brook (Spring Semester). 
1975-76 Visiting Assistant Professor, School of Social Sciences, 

University of California, Irvine (Winter and Spring 
Quarters). 

1976-80 Associate Professor of Political Science and Social 
Psychology, University of California, Irvine. 

1984 Guest Scholar (Sabbatical), Governmental Studies Program, 

Brookings Institution (Winter Quarter). 
1985 College Visiting Professor, Department of Political 

Science, University of Washington, Seattle (Spring Quarter). 

1985-86 Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral 

Sciences, Stanford. . 
1989 Visiting Professor, Department of Political Science, 

1976-77 

1978-79 

1978-79 

1979 

1980 

1980-82 

University of Michigan (Fall Semester). 

MAJOR RESEARCH GRANTS 

Modeling Jury Decision Processes, National Science 
Foundation, Law and Social Sciences Program (NSF SOC 

75-14091, $68,200). 
Electoral System: What Difference Does it Make? 

Science Foundation, Political Science Program 

(NSF SOC 77-24474, $35,800, with Howard Scarrow). 

Modeling Jury Decision Processes: The Multnomah Jury 
Archive, National Science Foundation, Law and Social 

Sciences Program (NSF SOC 77-24702, $73,800). 
A Conference on Voter Turnout. National Science 

Foundation, Political Science Program (NSF SOC 78-19433, 
$14,400, with Richard Brody and Herbert Weisberg). 

A Conference on Representation and Apportionment Issues in 

the 1980s. National Science Foundation, Political 

Science Program (NSF #SES 79-26813, $20,200, with Arend 

Lijphart, Robert McKay, and Howard Scarrow; additional 
$8,000 funding provided by the American Bar Association). 

Applications of Game Theory to the Study of Political 
Institutions. National Science Foundation, Political 

Science Program (NSF #SES 80-07915, $31,300 with Guillermo 

Owen) . 

National 

 



  

MAJOR RESEARCH GRANTS - (Continued) 

1981-83 

1982 

1983-84 

1985-86 

1985-87 

1987-89 

1988 

1988-92 

1989-90 

1991-92 

1991-92 

1991-93 

1994-95 

1994-95 

Reapportionment and Representation. National Science 
Foundation, Political Science Program (NSF #SES 81-07554, 
$49,970 with Guillermo Owen). ; 

A Conference on Information Pooling. National Science 
Foundation, Political Science Program (NSF #SES 82-09109, 
$26,300, with Guillermo Owen and Scott Feld). 

Analysis of the Multnomah Jury Archive, National Science 
Foundation, Law and Social Sciences Program (NSF SES 
#82-18588, $35,000). 

The Impact of Laws Relating to Elections and Representation, 
National Science Foundation, Political Science Program (NSF 
SES #B85-15468, $23,200). 

The Dynamics of Spatial Voting Games and Games on Graphs, 
National Science Foundation, Decision and Management 
Sciences Program (NSF SES #85-06376, $99,300, with 
Guillermo Owen). 

Ethnic Voting Patterns in Metropolitan Toronto (Social 
Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, 
$14,480, with Janet Landa and Michael Copeland). 

A Conference on "The Calculus of Consent": A Twenty-five Year 
Perspective (Liberty Fund, with Donald Wittman). 

Collaborative Research on the Voting Rights Act: 
Implementation, Effects, and Implications for Law and 
Society. National Science Foundation Law and Social 
Sciences Program (NSF SES #88-09392, $231,000, with 
Chandler Davidson); Supplementary Grant for Collaborative 
Research on the Voting Rights Act: The Effects of Changing 
Electoral Systems on the Election of Women. National 
Science Foundation Law and Social Sciences Program (NSF SES 
#88-09392, $8,500, with Chandler Davidson and Susan Welch). 

A Conference on the Voting Rights Act: A Twenty-five Year 
Perspective (Rockefeller Foundation, $50,000, with Thomas 
Mann and Chandler Davidson, under the auspices of The 
Brookings Institution). 

Workshops on Politics and the Democratization Process, 
(National Science Foundation, Political Science Program 

SES# 91-13984 ($42,000, with Russell Dalton and Harry 
Eckstein). 

Planning grant on Japanese, Korean and U.S. Election 
Practices in Comparative Perspective (UC Pacific Rim 
Research Program, with Sung Chull Lee, Rein Taagepera and 
Brian Woodall, $14,700). 

The Impact of Redistricting on the Representation of 
Racial and Ethnic Minorities, The Ford Foundation 

(#446740-47007, $166,000). 
Electoral Laws, Electoral Lists and Campaigning in the First 

Non-Racial South African General Election, National Science 
Foundation, National Science Foundation (NSF# SBR-93- 

21864, with Arend Lijphart, $39,512). 
Conference on the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in Thirty Year 

Perspective. Joyce Foundation (#446740-49317, $18,500 
with additional funding by the Federal Judicial Center). 

 



* » ; 
GRANTS FOR INSTRUCTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, COMPUTER LABS, AND GRADUATE 

FELLOWSHIP SUPPORT 

   
  

1992-93 Grant from UCI Committee on Instructional Development 

to develop a new course: "Introduction to Computer Use 

in the Social Sciences" ($15,500) 

1992 Small grant from the National Endowment for the 
Humanities to attend the NEH Summer Institute on 

"Athenian Democracy." ($3,250) 

1992-94 Grant for graduate student support in Public Choice 

(Sarah Scaife Foundation, $50,000, with Amihai Glazer) 

1993 Grant from the UC Center for German and European Studies, 

to develop a course on comparative political participation 

($10,000, with Pertti Pesonen). 

1994 Grant from the National Science Foundation to develop a 

computer lab for the technology enhanced teaching of under- 

graduate statistics ($55,497, with Judith Treas). 

1995 Grant from the UC President's Office to develop a long- 

distance learning course "The United States in Comparative 

Perspective.” ($13,200, with Arend Lijphart) 

PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS 

American Political Science Association 

Public Choice Society 
Law and Society Association 
American Institute of Parliamentarians 

EDITORIAL BOARDS 

1980-83 American Journal of Political Science 

1983-85 Law and Society Review 

1986-88 Society for Orwellian Studies 
1987-89 American Politics Quarterly 

1989-91 Political Analysis 

1991-93 ublic oice 

  

  

1996-98 Electoral Studies 

 



  

(P1) 

(E1) 

(E2) 

(E3) 

(E4) 

(ES) 

(E6) 

(E7) 

(EB) 

(EZ) 

(E10) 

(E11) 

ONS 

Books (published) 

Grofman, Bernard, Lisa Handley and Richard Niemi. Minority 
Representation and the Quest for Voting Equality. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992. 
  

Edited Books (published) 

Grofman, Bernard N., Arend Lijphart, Robert McKay and Howard Scarrow 
(Eds.), Representation and Redistricting Issues. Lexington, MA: 
Lexington Books, 1982. 

Lijphart, Arend and Bernard Grofman (Eds.), Choosing an Electoral 
System. New York: Praeger, 1984. 

Grofman, Bernard N. and Arend Lijphart (Eds.), Electoral Laws and 
eir iti s G . New York: Agathon Press, 1986. 

Grofman, Bernard N. and Guillermo Owen (Eds.), Information Pooling 
G cis] aking. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1986. 

Grofman, Bernard N. and Donald Wittman (Eds.), The "Federalist 
: w sti 1 . New York: Agathon Press, 1989. 

Grofman, Bernard N. (Ed.), Political Gerrymandering and the Courts. 
New York: Agathon Press, 1990. 

Grofman, Bernard and Chandler Davidson (Eds.), C ove 
: . Washington 

D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1992. 

Grofman, Bernard N. (Ed.), Information, Participation and Choice: An 

-Economic Theory of Democracy' in Perspective. Ann Arbor, Michigan: 
University of Michigan Press, 1993. 

Davidson, Chandler and Bernard Grofman (Eds.), Quiet Revolution in 
the South: The Impact of the voting Rights Act, 1965-1990. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994. 

Grofman, Bernard (Ed.) Legislative Term Limits: Public Choice 
Perspectives. Boston, MA: Kluwer, 1996. 

Edited Books (forthcoming) 

Grofman, Benard, ~Sung- -Chull Lee, Edwin Winckler, and Brian Woodall 

(Eds.) Taiwa nder the Single Non- 
Tos oie nstitution. 
Ann Arbor MI: mows of Michigan Press, 1997 forthcoming. 

 



  

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

(4) 

(3) 

(6) 

(7) 

(8) 

(9) 

(10) 

(11) 

(12) 

(13) 

(14) 

ofessional ticles (in print) 

  

Grofman, Bernard N., and Edward Muller. The strange case of relative 
gratification and potential for political violence: The V-curve. 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 67 (June 1973), 514-539.   

Grofman, Bernard N., and Gerald Hyman. Probability and logic in 
belief systems. Theory and Decision, Vol. 4 (1973), 179-195. 

Grofman, Bernard N. Helping behavior and group size, some 
exploratory stochastic models. Behavioral Science, Vol. 19 

(July 1974), 219-224. 

Grofman, Bernard N., and Gerald Hyman. The logical foundations of 
ideology. Behavioral Science, Vol. 19 (July 1974), 225-237. 

Grofman, Bernard N. The prisoner's dilemma game: Paradox 
reconsidered. In Gordon Tullock (Ed.), Frontiers of Economics, 
Vol. 1 (1975), 101-119. 

Mackelprang, A. J., Bernard N. Grofman, and N. Keith Thomas. 
Electoral change and stability: Some new perspectives. American 

Politics Quarterly, Vol. 3, No. 3 (July 1975), 315-339. 
  

Grofman, Bernard N. A review of macro-election systems. In Rudolph 
Wildenmann. (Ed.), German Political Yearbook (Sozialwissenschaftliches 
Jahrbuch fur Politik), Vol. 4, Munich Germany: Verlag, 1975, 303-352. 

  

Grofman, Bernard N., and Jonathan Pool. Bayesian models for iterated 
prisoner's dilemma games. General Systems, Vol. 20 (1975), 185-194. 

Grofman, Bernard N. Not necessarily twelve and not necessarily 
Johnson v. Louisiana. In Gordon Bermant, Charlan Nemeth and Neil 
Vidmar (Eds.), Psychology and the Law: Research Frontiers. 

Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1976, 149-168. 
  

Grofman, Bernard N. Jury decision-making models. In Stuart Nagel 
(Ed.), Modeling the Criminal Justice System, Sage Criminal Justice 
Systems Annuals, Vol. 7. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications (1977), 
191-203. 

  

Grofman, Bernard N., and Jonathan Pool. How to make cooperation the 

optimizing strategy in a two-person game. Journal of Mathematical 
Sociology, Vol. 5, No. 2 (1977), 173-186. 

Grofman, Bernard N. Judgmental competence of individuals and groups 
in a dichotomous choice situation. Journal of Mathematical 

Sociology, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1978), 47-60. 
  

Grofman, Bernard N., and Boward Scarrow. Iannucci and its aftermath: 
The application of the Banzhaf Criterion to weighted voting in the 
State of New York. In Steven Brams, Andrew Schotter and Gerhard 
Schwodiauer (Eds.), Applied Game Theory. Vienna: Physica-Verlag, 
1979, 168-183. : 

Grofman, Bernard N. A preliminary model of jury decision making. In 
Gordon Tullock (Ed.), Frontiers of Economics, Vol. 3 (1980), 98-110. 

   



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Professional ticles (Continued) 

Grofman, Bernard N. Jury decision-making models and the Supreme 
Court: The jury cases from Williams v. Florida to Ballew v. Geo 
Policy Studies Journal, Vol. 8, No. 5 (1980), 749-772. 

Grofman, Bernard N. The slippery slope: Jury size and jury verdict 
requirements--legal and social science approaches. Law and Politics 

Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 3 (July 1980), 285-304. 

Grofman, Bernard N., and Howard Scarrow. Mathematics, social science 
and the law. In Michael J. Saks and Charles H. Baron (Eds. ), The 
Use/Nonuse/Misuse of Applied Social Research in the Courts. 

Cambridge, MA: Abt Associates, 1980, 117-127. 

Grofman, Bernard N. Mathematical models of juror and jury decision 
making: the state of the art. In Bruce D. Sales (Ed.), Perspectives 
in Law and Psychology, Volume II: The Trial Processes. NY: Plenum, 
1981, 305-35]. 
  

Grofman, Bernard N. The theory of committees and elections: The 
legacy of Duncan Black. In Gordon Tullock (Ed.), Toward a Science of 
Politics: Essays in Honor of Duncan Black. Blacksburg, VA: Public 
Choice Center, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 
1581, 11-57, 

  

Weisberg, Herbert and Bernard N. Grofman. Candidate evaluations and 
turnout. American Politics Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 2 (April 1981), 
197-219. 

Grofman, Bernard N. and Howard Scarrow. Weighted voting in New York. 
Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 2 (May 1981), 287-304. 

Grofman, Bernard N. Alternatives to single-member plurality 
districts: Legal and empirical issues. Policy Studies Journal, Vol. 
9, Special Issue 3 (May 1981), 875-898. Reprinted in Bernard 
Grofman, Arend Lijphart, Robert McKay and Howard Scarrow (Eds.), 

Representation and Redistricting Igsues. Lexington, MA: Lexington 
Books, 1982, 107-128. 

Taagepera, Rein and Bernard N. Grofman. Effective size and number of 

components. Sociological Methods and Research, Vol. 10 (August 
1981), 63-81. 

Landa, Janet, and Bernard N. Grofman. Games of breach and the role 
of contract law in protecting the expectation interest. Research in 

Law and Economics Annual, Vol. 3 (1981), 67-90. 

Grofman, Bernard N. A dynamic model of protocoalition formation in 
ideological n-space. Behavioral Science, Vol. 27 (1982), 77-90. 

Grofman, Bernard N., Scott Feld, and Guillermo Owen. Evaluating the 
competence of experts, pooling individual judgements into a 
collective choice, and delegating decision responsibility to 
subgroups. In Felix Geyer and Hans van der Zouwen (Eds.), Dependence 

and Inequality. NY: Pergamon Press, 1982, 221-238. 

Grofman, Bernard N. Reformers, politicians and the courts: A 
preliminary look at U.S. redistricting in the 1980s. Political 
Geography Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 4 (October 1982), 303-316.  



Professional Articles (Continued) 

Grofman, Bernard N. and Howard Scarrow. Current issues in 

reapportionment. Law and Polic arterly, Vol. 4, No. 4 (October 

1982), 435-474. 

Grofman, Bernard N. and Guillermo Owen. A game theoretic approach to 

measuring degree of centrality in social networks. Social Networks, 

Vol. 4 (1982), 213-224. 

Grofman, Bernard N., Guillermo Owen and Scott L. Feld. Thirteen 

theorems in search of the truth. Theory and Decision, Vol. 15 

(1983), 261-278. 

Grofman, Bernard N. Measures of bias and proportionality in 

seats-votes relationships. Political Methodology, Vol. 9 (1983), 

295-327. 

Grofman, Bernard N. and Janet Landa. The development of trading 

networks among spatially separated traders as a process of 
proto-coalition formation: the Kula trade. Social Networks, Vol. 5 

(1983), 347-365. 

Owen, Guillermo and Bernard N. Grofman. Coalitions and power in 

political situations. In Manfred Holler (Ed.), Coalitions and 

Collective Action. Wuerzburg: Physica-Verlag, 1984, 137-143. 

Grofman, Bernard N. The general irrelevance of the zero sum 
assumption in the legislative context. In Manfred Holler (Ed.), 
Coalitions and Collective Action. Wuerzburg: Physica-Verlag, 1984, 

100-112. 
  

Glazer, Amihai, Deborah Glazer, and Bernard N. Grofman. Cumulative 

voting in corporate elections: Introducing strategy into the 

equations. South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Winter 1984), 
295-309. 

Feld, Scott L. and Bernard N. Grofman. The accuracy of group 

majority decisions in groups with added members. Public Choice, Vol. 

42 (1984), 273-285. 

Owen, Guillermo and Bernard N. Grofman. To vote or not to vote: 
The paradox of nonvoting. Public Choice, Vol. 42 (1984), 311-325. 

Shapley, Lloyd S. and Bernard N. Grofman. Optimizing group 
judgmental accuracy in the presence of interdependencies. Public 

Choice, Vol. 43, No. 3, (1984), 329-343. 

Grofman, Bernard N., Michael Migalski, and Nicholas Noviello. The 

“totality of circumstances' test in Section 2 of the 1982 extension 
of the Voting Rights Act: A social science perspective. Law and 

Policy, Vol. 7, No. 2 (April 1985), 209-223. 

Grofman, Bernard N. Criteria for districting: A social science 

perspective. UCLA Law Review, Vol. 33, No. 1 (October 1985), 77-184. 

Grofman, Bernard and Carole Uhlaner. Metapreferences and reasons for 
stability in social choice: Thoughts on broadening and clarifying the 
debate. Theory and Decision, Vol. 19 (1985), 31-50. 

   



  

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Professional ticles (Continued) 

  

Taagepera, Rein and Bernard Grofman. Rethinking Duverger's Law: 
Predicting the effective number of parties in plurality and PR 
systems--parties minus issues equals one. European Journal of 
Political Research, Vol. 13 (1985), 341-352. Reprinted in J. Paul 

Johnston and Harvey E. Pasis (Eds.). Representation and Electoral 

Systems: Canadian Perspectives. Englewood City, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 

1988. 

  

  

Niemi, Richard, Jeffrey Hill and Bernard Grofman. The impact of 
multimember districts on party representation in U.S. state 
legislatures. Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 4 (1985), 

441-455. 

Uhlaner, Carole and Bernard Grofman. The race may be close but my 
horse is going to win: Wish fulfillment in the 1980 Presidential 
election. Political Behavior, Vol. 8, No. 2 (1986), 101-129. 

Feld, Scott L. and Bernard Grofman. On the possibility of faithfully 
representative committees. American Political Science Review, Vol. 

80, No. 3 (1986), 863-879. 

Brace, Kimball, Bernard Grofman and Lisa Handley. Does redistricting 
aimed to help blacks necessarily help Republicans? Jo of 
Politics, Vol. 49 (1987), 143-156. (Reprinted in Ann M. Bowman and 
R.C. Kearney, State and Local Government. Boston, MA: Houghton 

Miflin, 1980.) 
  

Grofman, Bernard, Guillermo Owen, Nicholas Noviello and Amihai 
Glazer. Stability and centrality of legislative choice in the 
spatial context. American Political Science Review, Vol. 81, No. 2 
(June 1987), 539-553. 

  

Grofman, Bernard N. Models of voting. In Samuel Long (Ed.), 
Micropolitics Annual, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1987, 31-61. 

Glazer, Amihai, Bernard Grofman and Marc Robbins. Partisan and 
incumbency effects of 1970s congressional redistricting. American 
Journal of Political Science, Vol. 30, No. 3 (1987), 680-701. 
(Reprinted in Susan A. McManus (Ed.), Reapportionment and 
Representation in Florida, Lake Geneva, Wisconsin: Paladin House, 

1991.) 

Feld, Scott L., Bernard Grofman, Richard Hartley, Mark O. Kilgour and 
Nicholas Miller. The uncovered set in spatial voting games. 
Theory and Decision, Vol. 23 (1987), 129-156. 

Feld, Scott L. and Bernard Grofman. Necessary and sufficient 
conditions for a majority winner in n-dimensional spatial voting 
games: An intuitive geometric approach. American Journal of 

Political Science, Vol. 32, No. 4 (1987), 709-728. 

Owen, Guillermo and Bernard N. Grofman. Optimal partisan 
gerrymandering. Political Geography Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 1 (1988), 
5-22. 

Schofield, Norman, Bernard Grofman and Scott L. Feld. The core and 
the stability of group choice in spatial voting games. American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 82, No. 1 (1988), 195-211. 

 



® » 9 
Professional ticles (continued) 

    

(54) Grofman, Bernard and Scott L. Feld. Rousseau's general will: A 

Condorcetian perspective. American Political Science Review, 

Vol. 82, No.2 (1988), 567-576. (Reprinted in J. Paul Johnston and 
Harvey Pasis (Eds.), Representation and Electoral Systems: Canadian 

Perspectives, NJ: Prentice Hall of Canada, 1990. Translated and 

reprinted in abridged form as La volonte generale de Rousseau: Une 

perspective Condorceene. In P. Crepel and C. Gilain (Eds.), des 

Actes du Colloque International Condorcet. Paris: Editions Minerve, 
1989.) 

  

  

(55) Brace, Kimball, Bernard Grofman, Lisa Handley, and Richard Niemi. 

Minority voting equality: The 65 percent rule in theory and 

practice. Law and Policy, Vol. 10, No. 1 (January 1988), 43-62. 

(56) Feld, Scott L. and Bernard Grofman. Ideological consistency as a 

collective phenomenon. American Political Science Review, Vol. 82, 
No. 3 (1988), 64-75. 

(57) Grofman, Bernard and Michael Migalski. Estimating the extent of 

racially polarized voting in multicandidate elections. Sociological 

Methods and Research, Vol. 16, No. 4 (1988), 427-454. 

(58) Grofman, Bernard, Scott L. Feld and Guillermo Owen. Finagle's law 

and the Finagle point, a new solution concept for two-candidate 

competition in spatial voting games. American Journal of Political 

Science, Vol. 33, No. 2 (1989), 348-375. 

  

(59) Grofman, Bernard and Lisa Handley. Black representation: Making 

sense of electoral geography at different levels of government. 

Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 2 (1989), 265-279. 

(60) Feld, Scott L., Bernard Grofman and Nicholas Miller. Limits on 

agenda control in spatial voting games. Mathematical and Computer 

Modelling, Vol. 12, No. 4/5 (1989) 405-416. (Reprinted in Paul E. 

Johnson (Ed.), Mathematical Modelling in Political Science. Oxford: 

Pergamon Press, 1989.) 
  

(61) Erfle, Stephen, Henry McMillan and Bernard Grofman. Testing the 

regulatory threat hypothesis: Media coverage of the energy crisis 

and petroleum pricing in the late 1970s. American Politics 

Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 2 (April 1989), 132-152. 

  

(62) Miller, Nicholas, Bernard Grofman and Scott L. Feld. The geometry of 

majority rule. Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 1, No. 4, 

(1989), 379-406. 

(63) Grofman, Bernard and Barbara Norrander. Efficient use of reference 

group cues in a single dimension. Public Choice, Vol. 64 (1990), 

213-227. 

 



  

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Professional icles (Continued) 

  

Grofman, Bernard N. Toward a coherent theory of gerrymandering: 

Bandemer and . In Bernard Grofman (Ed.), Political 

Gerrymandering and the Courts. New York: Agathon Press, 1990, 29-63. 

  

  

Erfle, Stephen, Henry McMillan and Bernard Grofman. Regulation via 

threats: politics, media coverage and oil pricing decisions. Public 

Opinion Quarterly, (1990), 54(1): 48-63. 

Niemi, Richard G., Bernard Grofman, Carl Carlucci and Thomas 

Hofeller. Measuring compactness and the role of a competent standard 

in a test for partisan and racial gerrymandering. Journal of 

Politics, vol. "52, No. 4, 19%0, 1155-118]. 

Feld, Scott L. and Bernard Grofman. Collectivities as actors, 

Rationality and Society, Vol. 2, No. 4 (October 1990), 429-448. 

Hall, Richard L. and Bernard Grofman. The committee assignment 

process and the conditional nature of committee bias. American 

Political Science Review, Vol. 84, No 4 (December 1990), 1149-1166. 

Grofman, Bernard, and Lisa Handley. The impact of the Voting Rights 

Act on black representation in southern state legislatures. 

Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 1 (February 1991), 

111-127. 

Feld, Scott L. and Bernard Grofman. Incumbency advantage, voter 

loyalty and the benefit of the doubt. Journal of Theoretical 

Politics, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1991), 115-1237. 

  

Grofman, Bernard. Statistics without substance: A critique of 

Freedman et al. and Clark and Morrison. Evaluation Review, Vol. 15, 

No. 6, (December 1991), 746-769. 

Grofman, Bernard and Lisa Bandley. Identifying and remedying racial 

gerrymandering. Journal of Law and Politics, Vol. 8, No. 2, (Winter 

1992), 345-404. 

Grofman, Bernard and Scott L. Feld. .Group decision making over 

multidimensional objects of choice, Organizational Behavior and Human 
Performance, Vol. 52, 1992, 39-63. 

Grofman, Bernard. Expert witness testimony and the evolution of 

voting right case law. In Bernard Grofman and Chandler Davidson 

(Eds.), Controversies in Minority Voting: The Voting Rights Act in 

Perspective. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1992, 

197-229. 

Grofman, Bernard. An expert witness perspective on continuing and 

emerging voting rights controversies: From one person, one vote to 

political gerrymandering. Stetson University Law Review, 1992, 21 

(3): 783-818. (A revised and expanded version appears under the 

title "What happens after one person-one vote: Implications of the 

U.S. experience for Canada,” in John Courtney and David Smith (Eds.), 

Drawing Boundaries, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan: Fifth House Publishers, 

1992, 156-178.) 

10 

 



Professional Articles (continued) 

Grofman, Bernard. Would Vince Lombardi have been right if he had 
said, "When it comes to redistricting, race isn't everything, it's 
the only thing'? Cardozo Law Review, Volume 14, No. 5, (April 1993), 

1237-1276. 

Grofman, Bernard. Toward an institution rich theory of political 
competition, with a supply-side component. In Bernard Grofman (Ed.), 

formatio ticipation, and oice: An Economic Theo of 

Democracy' in Perspective. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of 

Michigan Press, 1993, 179-193. 

Grofman, Bernard. The use of ecological regression to estimate 
racial bloc voting. University of San Francisco Law Review, 

Vol. 27, No. 3 (Spring 1993), 593-625. 

Grofman, Bernard. Public choice, civic republicanism, and American 

politics: Perspectives of a “reasonable choice' modeler. Texas Law 

Review, Vol 71, No. 7 (June 1993), 1541-1587. 

Brischetto, Robert, David R. Richards, Chandler Davidson, and Bernard 

Grofman. Texas. In Davidson, Chandler and Bernard Grofman (Eds.), 

Quiet Revolution in the South: The Impact of the Voting Rights Act, 

1365-1990. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994. 
  

  

Grofman, Bernard and Chandler Davidson. The Effect of Municipal 
Election Structure on Black Representation in Eight Southern States. 
In Davidson, Chandler and Bernard Grofman (Eds.), Quiet Revolution in 

the South: The Impact of the Voting Rights Act, 1965-1990. Princeton, 

NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994. 
  

Handley, Lisa and Bernard Grofman. Black Office holding in Southern 
State Legislatures and Congressional Delegations. In Davidson, 

Chandler and Bernard Grofman (Eds.), Quiet Revolution in the South: 

The Impact of the Voting Rights Act, 1965-1990. Princeton, NJ: 

Princeton University Press, 1994. 

Glazer, Amihai, Robert Griffin, Bernard Grofman and Martin 

Wattenberg. Strategic vote delay in the U.S. House of 

Representatives. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 1995. 

Skaperdas, Stergios and Bernard Grofman. Modeling negative 

campaigning. American Political Science Review, 1995. 

Grofman, Bernard. New Methods of Valid Ecological Inference. 

In Munroe Eagles (Ed.), Spatial and Contextual Models in Political 
Research. London: Taylor and Francis, 1995. 

Grofman, Bernard and Peter van Roozendaal. Toward a theoretical 

explanation of premature cabinet termination: With application to 
post-war cabinets in the Netherlands. European Journal of Political 

Research, 1995.  



P essional icles (forthcoming) 

Grofman, Bernard. Extensions of a dynamic model of protocoalition 

formation. In Norman Schofield (Ed.), Theory of Social Choice and 

Political Economy. Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff, 1996 forthcoming. 

Grofman, Bernard, Nicholas Noviello and Phillip Straffin. The 

sequential dynamics of cabinet formation, stochastic error, and a 

test of competing models. In Schofield, Norman (Ed.) Theory of Social 

Choice and Political Economy. Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff, 1996 

forthcoming. 

Landa, Janet, Michael Copeland and Bernard Grofman. Ethnic voting 

patterns: a case study of metropolitan Toronto. Political Geography, 

1996 forthcoming. 

Anderson, Richard and Bernard Grofman. Elite Rhetorical Strategies 
in the Pre-Coup Soviet Union. Public Choice, 1996 forthcoming. 

Grofman, Bernard. Downsian Political Economy. In Robert Goodin and 

Hans-Dieter Klingemann (Eds.) New Handbook of Political Science. New 

York and London: Oxford University Press, 1996 forthcoming. 

Grofman, Bernard and Lisa Handley. Voting rights in the 1990s: Cases 

and Controversies. University of Mississippi Law Review, 1996 

forthcoming. 
  

Grofman, Bernard. The Supreme Court, the Voting Rights Act, and 
minority representation. In Anthony Peacock (ed.) The Supreme Court 

and Minority Representation (title tentative). Washington, D.C.: 

American Enterprise Institute, 1996 forthcoming. 

Grofman, Bernard and Peter van Roozendaal. Modelling cabinet 
durability/cabinet termination: A synthetic literature review and 
critique. British Journal of Political Science, 1996 forthcoming. 

Merrill, Samuel and Bernard Grofman. Directional and proximity models 
of voter utility and choice: a new synthesis and an illustrative test 
of competing models. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1997 

forthcoming. 

Glazer, Amihai, Bernard Grofman, and Guillermo Owen. A neo-Downsian 

model of group-oriented voting. Public Choice, 1997 forthcoming. 

Merrill, Samuel and Bernard Grofman. Modeling large electorates with 
Fourier series: With applications to Nash equilibria in proximity and 
directional models of spatial competition. Social Choice and 

Welfare, 1997 forthcoming. 

Falmagne, Jean-Claude, Michel Regenwetter and Bernard Grofman. A 

stochastic model for the evolution of preferences. In A. J. Marley 
(Ed.) Choice, Decision and Measurement: Essays in Honor of R. Duncan 

Luce. New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1997 forthcoming. 

Grofman, Bernard, Christian Collet and Robert Griffin. Analysing the 

turnout-competitiveness link with aggregate data. Public Choice, 

1997 forthcoming.  



    

Professional Articles (forthcoming) (continued) 

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Owen, Guillermo and Bernard Grofman. Estimating the likelihood of 
fallacious ecological inference: Linear ecological regression in the 
presence of context effects. Political Geography, 1997 forthcoming. 

Grofman, Bernard. SNTV, STV,and Single Member District Systems: 
Theoretical Comparisons and Contrasts. In Bernard Grofman, Sung- 
Chull Lee, Edwin Winckler, and Brian Woodall (Eds.) Elections 
in Japan, Korea and Taiwan under the Single Non-Transferable Vote: 

The Comparative Study of an Embedded Institution. Ann Arbor, MI: 
University of Michigan Press, 1997 forthcoming. 

  

Grofman, Bernard. SNTV: An inventory of theoretically derived 
propositions and a brief review of the evidence from Japan, Korea, 
Taiwan and Alabama. In Bernard Grofman, Sung-Chull Lee, Edwin 
Winckler, and Brian Woodall (Eds.) Elections in Japan, Korea and 
Taiwan under the Single Non-Transferable Vote: The Comparative Study 
of an Fmbedded Institution. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan 
Press, 1997 forthcoming. 

  

13 

 



  

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Research Notes and Minor Articles (in print) 
  

Grofman, Bernard N. Some notes on voting schemes and the will of the 
majority. Public Choice, Vol. 7 (Winter 1969), 65-80. 

Grofman, Bernard N. The 1971 American Political Science Association 
election. PS (commissioned for Summer 1972), 278-289. 

Pool, Jonathan and Bernard N. Grofman. Computer programs as a means 
of efficiency and control in cross-cultural experimental games. 
Experimental Study of Politics, Vol. 4, No. 2 (July 1975), 27-57. 
  

Grofman, Bernard N. and Scott IL. Feld. A note on clique avoidance 
in repeated jury selection from among a fixed pool of jurors: 
Comparisons of manpower savings in six- and twelve-member juries. 
Public Choice, Vol. 26 (Summer 1976), 145-150. 

Feld, Scott and Bernard N. Grofman. Variation in class size, the 
class size paradox, and some consequences for students. Research in 
Higher Fducation, Vol. 6, No. 3 (1977), 215-222. 

Grofman, Bernard N. A pilot study of individual behavior as mediated 
by the group context: three- and five-member mock juries. 
Experimental Study of Politics, Vol. 7 (1979), 41-54. 
  

Grofman, Bernard N. Abstention in two-candidate and three-candidate 
elections when voters use mixed strategies. Public Choice, Vol. 34, 
No. 2 (1979), 189-200. 

Feld, Scott and Bernard N. Grofman. Conflict of interest between 
faculty, students and administrators: Consequences of the class size 
paradox. In Gordon Tullock (Ed.), Frontiers of Economics, Vol. 3 

(1980), 111-1186. 

Grofman, Bernard N. Fair apportionment and the Banzhaf index. 
American Mathematical Monthly, Vol. 88. No. 1 (1981), 1-5. 
  

Grofman, Bernard N. and Howard Scarrow. Introduction to “Special 
Issue on Reapportionment.' Policy Studies Journal, Special Issue No. 

3, Vol. 9, No. 6 (1980-81), 817-825. 

Grofman, Bernard N. Fair and equal representation. Ethics, Vol. 91 

(April 1981), 477-485. 

Grofman, Bernard N. For single-member districts, random is not 
equal. In Bernard Grofman, Arend Lijphart, Robert McKay and Howard 
Scarrow (Eds.), Representation and Redistricting Issues, Lexington 

Brody, Richard and Bernard N. Grofman. Stimulus differentiation vs. 
stimulus complexity as factors affecting turnout in two-candidate and 
multi-candidate races. Political Behavior, Vol. 4, No. 1 (1982), 
83-92. 

  

14 

 



  

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— ® 1s 
esearch Notes and Minor Articles (Continued) 

  

Grofman, Bernard N., Guillermo Owen and Scott L. Feld. Average 

competence, variability in individual competence, and the accuracy of 
statistically pooled group decisions. Psychological Reports, Vol. 50 

(1982), 683-688. 

  

Grofman, Bernard N. and Scott L. Feld. Group size and the 
performance of a composite group majority: Statistical truths and 
empirical results. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 

Vol. 33 (1984), 350-359. 

Lijphart, Arend and Bernard Grofman. Introduction. In Arend 

Lijphart and Bernard Grofman (Eds.), Choosing an Electoral System. 

NY: Praeger, 1984, 3-12. 

Grofman, Bernard N. The neglected role of the status quo in models 

of issue voting. Journal of Politics, Vol. 47 (1985), 231-237. 

Grofman, Bernard N. and Nicholas Noviello. Jai-Alai outcomes as a 

function of player position and player skill level. Simulation and 

Games, Vol. 16, No. 2 (June 1985), 211-223. 

Grofman, Bernard N. The accuracy of group majorities for disjunctive 
and conjunctive decision tasks. Organizational Behavior and Buman 

Performance, 35 (1985), 119-123. 

Grofman, Bernard N. The effect of restricted and unrestricted 

verdict options on juror choice. Social Science Research, 14 (1985), 

195-204. 

Grofman, Bernard N. and Arend Lijphart. Introduction. In Bernard 
Grofman and Arend Lijphart (Eds.), ectora aws and Thei olitica 

Consequences. NY: Agathon, 1986, 1-15. 
  

Grofman, Bernard, Michael Migalski and Nicholas Noviello. Effects of 

multimember districts on black representation in state legislatures. 
Review of Black Political Economy, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Spring 1986), 

65-78. 

Grofman, Bernard N. and Guillermo Owen. Condorcet models: Avenues 
for future research. In Bernard Grofman and Guillermo Owen (Eds.), 

Information Pooling and Group Decisjon Making, Greenwich, CT: JAI 

Press, 1986, 93-102. 

Grofman, Bernard N. and Scott L. Feld. Determining optimal weights 

for expert judgment. In Bernard Grofman and Guillermo Owen (Eds.), 
Information Pooling and Group Decision Making, Greenwich, CT: JAI 

Press, 1986, 167-172. 

Feld, Scott L. and Bernard Grofman. Partial single-peakedness: an 

extension and clarification. Public Choice, Vol. 51 (1986), 71-80. 

Glazer, Amihai and Bernard Grofman. Two plus two plus two equals 

six: Term lengths of representatives and senators. Legislative 

Studies Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 4 (1987), 555-563. 

Glazer, Amihai and Bernard Grofman. Limitations of the spatial 

model. Public Choice, Vol. 58 (1988), 161-167. 

 



    

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Research Notes and Minor Articles (Continued) 

Feld, Scott L., Bernard Grofman and Nicholas Miller. Centripetal 

forces in spatial voting: On the size of the yolk. Public Choice, 

Vol. 59 (1988), 37-50. 
  

Norrander, Barbara and Bernard Grofman. A rational choice model of 

citizen participation in high and low commitment electoral 
activities. Public Choice, Vol. 59 (1988), 187-192. 

Feld, Scott L. and Bernard Grofman. Majority rule outcomes and the 

structure of debate in one-issue-at-a-time decision making. Public 

Choice, Vol. 59 (1988) 239-252. 

Feld, Scott L. and Bernard Grofman. The Borda count in n-dimensional 

issue space. Public Choice, Vol. 59 (1988) 167-176. 

Owen, Guillermo and Bernard Grofman. A theorem on the optimal 

allocation of effort. Revista Colombiana de Matematicas, Vol. 21 

(1987) 201-212. 

Grofman, Bernard. Richard Nixon as Pinocchio, Richard II, and Santa 

Claus. Journal of Politics, Vol. 51, No. 1 (February 1989), 165-173. 

Glazer, Amihai and Bernard Grofman. Why representatives are 
ideologists though voters are not. Public Choice, Vol. 61 (1989), 

29-39. 

Grofman, Bernard and Scott L. Feld. Toward a sociometric theory of 

representation. In Manfred Kochen (Ed.), The Small World. Norwood, 

NJ: Ablex, 1988, 100-107. 

Owen, Guillermo, Bernard Grofman and Scott L. Feld. Proving a 

distribution-free generalization of the Condorcet jury theorem. 

Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 17 (1989), 1-6. 

Grofman, Bernard. The comparative analysis of coalition formation 
and duration: Distinguishing between-country and within-country 
effects. British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 19 (1989), 

291-302. 
  

Grofman, Bernard. Introduction. In Bernard Grofman and Donald 

Wittman (Eds.), The "Federalist Papers' and the New Institutionalism. 

NY: Agathon Press, 1989, 7-9. : 

Glazer, Amihai, Bernard Grofman and Guillermo Owen. A model of 
candidate convergence under uncertainty about voter preferences. 
athematical and C uter Modelling, Vol. 12, No. 4/5 (1989), 

437-450, reprinted in Paul E. Johnson (Ed.), Mathematical Modelling 

in Political Science. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1989. 

Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, Bernard Grofman and Janet Campagna. The 

Political Science 400: Citations by Ph.D. Cohort and by Ph.D.- 
Granting Institution. PS (June 1989), 258-270. 

Glazer, Amihai and Bernard Grofman. Must liberals always vote for 
liberals, and need the more competent candidate always be 

preferred? British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 19 (1989), 

154-159. 

 



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Research Notes and Minor Articles (Continued) 
  

Grofman, Bernard and Lisa Handley. Minority population proportion 
and Black and Hispanic congressional success in the 1970s and 1980s. 
American Politics Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 4 (October 1989), 436-445; 
reprinted in revised and updated form under the title "Preconditions 
for Black and Hispanic congressional success," in Wilma Rule and 
Joseph Zimmerman (Eds.) The Election of Women and Minorities. New 
York. Greenwood Press, 1992. 

  

Grofman, Bernard and Scott L. Feld. Democratic theory and the public 
interest: Condorcet and Rousseau revisited. American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 83, No. 4 (December 1989), 1328-1340. 

Grofman, Bernard, Robert Griffin and Amihai Glazer. Identical 
geography, different party: A natural experiment on the magnitude of 
party differences in the U.S. Senate, 1960-84. In Johnston, R.J., 
F.M. Shelley and P.J. Taylor (Eds.), Developments in Electoral 

Geography. London: Routledge, 1990, 207-217. 

Miller, Nicholas, Bernard Grofman and Scott L. Feld. Cycle avoiding 
trajectories, strategic agendas, and the duality of memory and 
foresight: An informal exposition. Public Choice, Vol. 64 (1990), 
265-2717. 

  

Grofman, Bernard N. Introduction. In Bernard Grofman (Ed.), 
Political Gerrymandering and the Courts. NY: Agathon Press, 1990, 
3-9. 

Grofman, Bernard. Investing in knowledge production: Should 
political scientists be paid to think? Journal of Theoretical 
Politics, Vol. 2 No. 2 (1990), 231-236. 

Campagna, Janet and Bernard Grofman. Party control and partisan bias 
in 1980s congressional redistricting. Journal of Politics, Vol. 52, 
No. 4 (November 1990) 1242-1257. 

Miller, Nicholas, Bernard Grofman and Scott L. Feld. The Structure 

of the Banks Set. Public Choice, Vol. 66 (1990), 243-251. 

Feld, Scott L. and Bernard Grofman. The half-win set and the 

geometry of spatial voting. Public Choice, Vol. 70, 1991, 245-250. 

Grofman, Bernard, Robert Griffin and Amihai Glazer. Is the Senate 
more liberal than the House?: Another look. Legislative Studies 

Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 2 (May 1991), 281-295. 
  

Brady, David and Bernard Grofman. Sectional differences in partisan 
bias and electoral responsiveness in U.S. House elections, 1850-1980. 
British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 21, Part 2, (1991) 
247-256. 

Feld, Scott L. and Bernard Grofman. Voting in one's head as a source 
of nearly transitive preferences over multi-dimensional issues. 

annals of Operations Research, Vol. 23 (1991), 257-263. 

Grofman, Bernard. Multivariate methods and the analysis of racially 
polarized voting: Pitfalls in the use of social science by the 
courts. Social Science Quarterly, Vol. 72, No. 4 (December 1991), 
826-833.  



Research Notes and Minor Articles (continued)   

Brady, David W. and Bernard Grofman. Modeling the determinants of 

swing ratio and bias in U.S. House elections, 1850-1980. Political 

Geography Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 3 (July 1991), 254-262. 

Glazer, Amihai and Bernard Grofman. A positive relationship between 

turnout and plurality does not refute the rational voter model. 
ality and tity, ‘1992, 26, 85.93. 

Feld, Scott L. and Bernard Grofman. Who's afraid of the big bad 
cycle? Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 4, No. 2 (1992) 

231-237. 

Thomas, Scott J. and Bernard Grofman. Determinants of legislative 
success in House committees, Public Choice, Vol. 74, 1992, 233-243. 

Grofman, Bernard and Chandler Davidson. Postscript: What is the best 

route to a color-blind society? In Bernard Grofman and Chandler 
Davidson (Eds.), Controversies in Minority Voting: The Voting Rights 

Act in Perspective. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 

1992, 300-317. 

Grofman, Bernard, Robert Griffin and Amihai Glazer. The effects of 
black population on electing Democrats and liberals to The House of 
Representatives. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 1992, 17 (3): 365- 

379. 

Thomas, Scott J. and Bernard Grofman. The effects of congressional 

rules about bill cosponsorship on duplicate bills: Changing 
incentives for credit claiming. Public Choice, Vol. 75, 1992, 

93-98. 

Grofman, Bernard. Meeting Dynamics. In Gregory Phifer (Ed.) 
Readings in Parliamentary Law. Pubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Bunt, 1992, 

53-58 (reprinted from Parliamentary Journal, Vol 18, October 1977). 

Grofman, Bernard. Editor's Introduction, Information, Participation 

and Choice: "An Economic Theory of Democracy' in Perspective. Ann 

Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1993, 1-13. 
  

Grofman, Bernard and Julie Withers. Information pooling models of 

electoral competition. In Bernard Grofman (Ed.), Information. 

Participation and Choice: "An Economic Theory of Democracy' in 

Perspective. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 

1993, 55-64. 

  

(R65)Wattenberg, Martin and Bernard Grofman. The President and 
Vice-President as a package deal. In Bernard Grofman (Ed.), 

ormation, Participatj and ice: "An Economic Theory of 

Democracy' in Perspective. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of 

Michigan Press, 1993, 173-177. 

  

Grofman, Bernard. Voting Rights in a Multi-Ethnic World. Chicano- 

Latino Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 15 (1993), 15-37. 

Davidson, Chandler and Bernard Grofman. Editors' Introduction. 

In Davidson, Chandler and Bernard Grofman (Eds.), Quiet Revolution in 

the South: The Impact of the Voting Rights Act, 1965-1990. Princeton, 

NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994. 

   



Research Notes and Minor Articles (Continued) 

Davidson, Chandler and Bernard Grofman. The Voting Rights Act and 

the Second Reconstruction. In Davidson, Chandler and Bernard Groiman 

(Eds.), Quiet Revolution in the South: The Impact of the Voting 

ights Act 965-1990. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 

1994. 

  

Grofman, Bernard and Lisa Handley. Racial context, the 1968 Wallace 

vote, and Southern presidential dealignment: Evidence from North 

Carolina and elsewhere. In Munroe Eagles (Ed.), Spatial and 

Contextua odels 3 oliti esearch. London: Taylor and Francis, 

1995. 

Grofman, Bernard, Robert Griffin and Gregory Berry. House members who 

become senators: Learning from a 'natural experiment' in 

representation. Legislative Studies Quarterly 1995. 
  

Grofman, Bernard and Neil Sutherland. The effect of term limits 

on legislative tenure when challenge is endogenized: A preliminary 

model. In B. Grofman (Ed.) Term Limits: Public Choice Perspectives. 

Boston: Kluwer, 1996. 
  

Grofman, Bernard and Neil Sutherland. Gubernatorial Term 

Limits and Term Lengths in Historical Perpsective, 1790-1990. 
In B. Grofman (Ed.) Term Limits: Public Choice Perspectives. 

Boston: Kluwer, 1996. 

Research Notes and Minor Articles (forthcoming) 

Grofman, Bernard and Andrew Reynolds. Modeling the dropoff 
between minority population share and the size of the minority 
electorate in situations of differential voter eligibility across 

groups. Electoral Studies, 1996 forthcoming. 
  

Feld, Scott L. and Bernard Grofman. Stability induced by no 

quibbling. Group Decision and Negotiation, 1996 forthcoming. 

Handley, Lisa, Bernard Grofman, and Wayne Arden. Black population 

proportion and Black electoral success in the U.S. House of 
Representatives and in state legislatures in the 1990s. National 

Political Science Review, 1996, forthcoming. 

Grofman, Bernard. The 1990s round of redistricting: A schematic 

outline of some key features. National Political Science Review, 1996 

forthcoming. 

Hanks, Christopher and Bernard Grofman. Turnout in gubernatorial 
and senatorial primary and general elections in the south, 1922-90: 
a rational choice model of the effects of short-run and long-run 

electoral competition on relative turnout. Public Choice, 1996 

forthcoming. 

Merrill, Samuel and Bernard Grofman. Conceptualizing voter choice 
for directional and discounting models of two-candidate spatial 
competition in terms of shadow candidates. Public Choice, 1997 

forthcoming.  



  

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Research Notes and Minor Articles (forthcoming) (continued) 

  

Grofman, Bernard. Seven durable axes of cleavage in political 

science. In Kristen Monroe (Ed.). Contemporary Political Science 

(title tentative) Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997 

forthcoming. 

  

Grofman, Bernard. Preface: Methodological Steps toward the 

Study of Embedded Institutions. In Bernard Grofman, Sung-Chull Lee, 

Edwin Winckler, and Brian Woodall (Eds.) Elections in Japa orea 

and Taiwan under the Single Non-Transferable Vote: The Comparative 

Study of an Embedded Institution. Ann Arbor, MI: University of 

Michigan Press, 1997 forthcoming. 

  

  

Curricular Materials (in print) 

Grofman, Bernard N. Note: Mo Fiorina's advice to children and other 

subordinates. Mathematics Magazine, Vol. 52, No. 5, (November 1879), 

292-297. 

Grofman, Bernard N. Modelling jury verdicts. University Modules in 

Applied Mathematics (1982). 

  

Grofman, Bernard N. The pure theory of elevators. Mathematics 

Magazine, Vol. 55, No. 1 (January 1982), 30-37. 

Straffin, Philip and Bernard Grofman. Parliamentary coalitions: A 

tour of models. Mathematics Magazine, Vol. 57, No. 5 (November 

1984), 259-274. 

Grofman, Bernard. Pig and proletariat: Animal Farm as History, San 

Jose Studies 1990, 5-39. 

  

 



  

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(T9) 

(T10) 

(T11) 

(T12) 

Prepared Testimony and Photo-Offset Conference Proceedings 

  

Mathematics and politics: Mathematical reasoning and optimal jury 
decision processes. Plus, Reply. In Max Black (Ed.), Problems of 

Choice and Decision: Proceedings of a Colloquium Held in Aspen 

Colorado, June 24-July 6, 1974. Cornell University Program on 

Science, Technology, and Society and Aspen Institute for Humanistic 
Studies: Photo-offset, 1975, 331-337; 544-547. 

    

  

A comment on Black's ‘rationality and cultural relativism.' In Max 
Black (Ed.), Problems of Choice and Decision: Proceedings of a 

Colloguium Held in Aspen, Colorado, June 24-July 6, 1974. Cornell 

University Program on Science, Technology, and Society and Aspen 
Institute for Humanistic Studies: Photo-offset, 1975, 161-190. 

Grofman, Bernard, Scott L. Feld and Guillermo Owen. Synopsis: A 
Bayesian approach to optimal decision making. In J. L. Elohim (Ed.), 

Proceedings of the Fifth International Congress of Systems and 

Cybernetics, Mexico City, Auqust 13-17, 1981, photo-offset, 1981. 
  

Comment on H.R. 2349, a bill on standards for congressional 
redistricting. Prepared for the staff of the Wednesday Study Group, 

U.S. House of Representatives, April 1981. 

Report on the constitutionality of Hawaii Reapportionment 
Commission's proposed state legislative redistricting. Prepared 
testimony in Travis v. King, U.S. District Court for the State of 

Hawaii, March 23-24, 1982, photo-offset. 

Report to the Special Master on methodology used to insure compliance 
with standards of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Flateau v. Anderson. 

U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, June 7, 1982, 

photo-offset. 

The disadvantageous effects of at-large elections on the success of 
minority candidates for the Charlotte and Raleigh City Councils. 

Prepared testimony in Gingles v. Edmisten. U.S. District Court for 

the State of North Carolina, August 1983, photo-offset. 

Effects of multimember districts in state legislative elections in 
eight North Carolina counties, 1978-1982. Prepared testimony in 
Gingles v. Edmisten, U.S. District Court for the State of North 

Carolina, August 1983, photo-offset. (Also see R22.) 

Report on prima facie evidence of political gerrymandering in the 
1983 California Congressional redistricting plan, plus Rejoinder. 

Prepared testimony in Badham v. Eu, U.S. District Court for the State 

of California, December 1983, photo-offset. 

Report on the effects of the proposed redistricting plan for the 
South Carolina Senate. Prepared testimony in South Carolina v. U.S., 

U. S. District Court for the District of Columbia, photo-offset, July 
1984. 

Affidavits in Haskins v. Wilson County, U.S. District Court for the 

State of North Carolina, photo-offset, 1985-86. 

Affidavit in Jackson v. Nash County, U.S. District Court for the 
  

State of North Carolina, April 1986. 

21 

 



Prepared Testimony and Conference Proceedings (continued) 

22 

  

  

(T1l3) Affidavits in U.S. v. City Council of Los Angeles, U.S. District 
Court for the State of California, July 1986. 
  

(T1l4) Declarations in Gomez v. City of Watsonville, U.S. District Court for 
the State of California, August and October 1986. 
  

(T1l5) Declarations in McGhee et al. v. Granville County of North Carolina, 
U.S. District Court for the State of North Carolina, 1987. 

  

(T16) Declarations in Badillo et al. v. City of Stockton, U.S. District 
Court for the State of California, December 1987 and February 1988. 

  

(T17) Affidavits in Republican National Committee of North Carolina v. 
James G. Martin, U.S. District Court for the State of North Carolina, 
July, August 1988. 

(T18) Report in Chisom v. Roemer, Civil Action No. 86-4075 in the Eastern 
District of Louisiana, October 1988, revised March 1989. 

  

(T19) Affidavits regarding minority representation in the 1988 Republican 
National Convention, August 5, 1988, and August 8, 1988. 

(T20) Report in Garza v. Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. U.S. 
District Court for the State of California, April 1989; Declaration, 
October 26, 1989. 

  

(T21) Report for the Alaska Districting Commission on racially polarized 
voting in elections to the Alaska legislature, May 1991. 

(T22) Report in Republican State Party of Massachusetts v. Connolly, U.S. 
District Court for the State of Massachusetts, December 1991. 

  

(T23) Declaration in Pope et al. v. Blue et al., U.S. District Court, 
Western District, Charlotte, North Carolina Division, March 5, 1992. 

  

(T24) Declaration in Prosser v. State of Wisconsin Board of Elections, U.S. 
‘District Court for the State of Wisconsin, April 1992. 
  

(T25) Reports for State of Alaska on the 1992 legislative districts, 
November 1993, January 1994. 

(T26) Declaration in Republican Party of North Carolina v. James B. Hunt, 

Governor of North Carolina, April 1994. 
  

 



  

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(B8) 

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* » 23 
Book Notes, Reviews and Communications (in print) 

  

Book note: Robert's Rules of Order (New, Revised). American 

Political Science Review, Vol. 64 (December 1970), 1288-1290. 

A note on "A caveat to the 1970 APSA election." PS (Summer 1972), 

290. 

A note on some generalizations of the paradox of cyclical majorities. 

Public Choice, Vol. 12 (Spring 1972), 113-114. 

Book note: John Sohnquist, Multivariate Model Building. American 

Political Science Review, Vol. 69 (December 1974), 17489. 

Rational choice models and self-fulfilling and self-defeating 

prophecies. In W. Leinfellner and E. Kohler (Eds.), Developments in 

the Methodology of Social Science, Boston: Reidel, 1974, 381-383. 

Book note: William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook, An Introduction 

to Positive Political Theory. Theory and Decision, (1976), 231-234. 

A comment on "Democratic theory: A preliminary mathematical model." 

Public Choice, Vol. 21 (Spring 1975), 100-103. 

A comment on "Single-peakedness and Guttman scales: Concept and 

measurement." Public Choice, Vol. 28 (Winter 1976), 107-111. 

Communication: Sloppy sampling - a comment on ~six-member juries in 

the Federal Courts.' Social Action and the Law Newsletter, Vol. 4, 

No. 2 (July 1977), 4-5. 

Communication: “Differential effects of jury size. . .' revisited. 

Social Action and the Law Newsletter, Vol. 4, No. 2 (July 1977), 

7-11 * 

  

Monopoly, the state of the art: A review of The Monopoly Book and 

000 Ways to Wi onopo es. Simulation and Games, Vol 9 (1978), 

245-251. 

  

Monopoly is a capitalist plot. Simulation and Games, Vol. 9, No. 2 

(1978), 252-254. (Reprinted in Puzzles and Games, Vol. 70 (1979) .) 

Book note: Keith M. Baker, Condorcet: From Natural Philosophy to 

Social Mathematics. American Political Science Review, Vol. 72 
(March 1978), 212-213. 

Book note: Oliver Thomson, Mass Persuasion in History. Journal of 

Communication, (Autumn 1978), 204-205. 

  

A comment on Dye and McManus' use of discriminant function analysis. 

Political Methodology, Vol. 5 (1978), 241-248. 

Book note: Michael Saks, Jury Verdicts. Social Action and the Law 

Newsletter, Vol. 5, No. 1 (February 1979), 9-11. 

  

Book note: Michael Tracey, The Production of Political Television. 

Journal of Communication, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Autumn 1979), 211-212. 

A note on Abraham Lincoln in probabilityland. Theory and Decision, 

Vol. 11 (1979), 453-455. 

 



Book Notes, Reviews and Communications (in print) (continued)   

(B19) The case for majority jury verdicts. Trial Ma azine, Vol. 18, No. 12 
(December 1979), 23-25, 29, 47-48. 

(B20) Book review: Michael Taylor, Anarchy and Cooperation. Theory and 
Decision, Vol. 12 (1980), 107-114. 

(B21) Book note: Susan Hensley, Body Politics: Power, Sex, and Nonverbal 

Communication. American Political Science Review, Vol. 72 (March 

1980), 122-123. 

  

Book note: Howard D. Hamilton, Electing the Cincinnati City 

Council: An Examination of Alternative Electoral-Representation 
Systems. American Political Science Review, Vol. 75 (1981), 771-772. 

Comment: Should representatives be 'typical' of their constituents? 
In B. Grofman, A. Lijphart, R. McKay, and H. Scarrow (Eds.), 
Representation and Redistricting Issues. Lexington, MA: Lexington 

Books, 1982, 97-99. 
  

Book note: Bruce J. West (Ed.), Mathematical Models as a Tool for 
the Social Sciences. Social Sciences Quarterly, Vol. 63 (September 

1982), 610-611. 

(B25) Book review: Political geography. American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 76, No. 4 (December 1982), 883-885. 

(B26) Abstract: Measuring the political consequences of electoral laws. 
Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 4, No. 2 (1983), 184-186. 
  

(B27) Comment: Models of voter turnout: A brief idiosyncratic review. 

Public Choice, Vol. 41 (1983), 55-61. 
  

(B28) Advice to the expert witness in court. S (Winter 1984), 60-61. 

(B29) Should you brush your teeth on November 6, 19842? PS (Summer 1984), 

577-580. 

(B30) Introduction to minisymposium: Political gerrymandering: Badham v. 
Eu, Political science goes to court. PS (Summer 1985), 538-543. 

(B31) Grofman Declarations in Badham v. Eu (excerpts). PS (Summer 1985), 

544-549, 573-574. 

(B32) Expert vs. expert: Lessons from Badham v. Eu. PS (Summer 1988), 
576-581. 

(B33) Book review: Reasonable methods for aggregating preferences, a 
review of Steven J. Brams and Peter C. Fishburn, Approval Voting. 

Journal of Mathematical Psychology, Vol. 29, (1985), 128-132. 

(B34) Reflections on academia. PS (Winter 1986), 57-61. 

(B35) Everything you always wanted to know about parliamentary procedure in 
an academic senate and were afraid to ask. PS (Summer 1986), 
661-668. 

Book note: Gunnar Boalt, The Political Process. Contemporary 

Sociology, Vol. 15, No. 3 (May 1986), 469.  



(B50) 

Book Notes, Reviews and Communications (in print) (continued) 
  

Book review: Michael Dummett, Voting Procedures. Contemporary 

Sociology, Vol. 15, No. 4 (July 1986), 637-638. 

Biographical entry: Duncan Black. The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of 

Economics (1987). New York: Stockton Press, 250-251. 

Biographical entry: Lewis Carroll. The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of 

Economics (1987). New York: Stockton Press, 371-372. 
  

Book review: Schmuel Nitzan and Jacob Paroush, Collective 

Decision-Making: An Economic Outlook. Journal of Economic Behavior 

and Organization (1987), 168-170. 

Grofman, Bernard and Michael Migalski. The return of the native: The 
supply elasticity of the American Indian population, 1950-1980. 

Public Choice (1988), 57: 85-88. 

The minimax blame rule for voter choice: Help for the undecided voter 
on November 8, 1988. PS (Summer 1988), 639-640. 

Book note: Manfred Holler (Ed.), The logic of multi-party systems. 

Political Geography Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 3 (July 1988), 300-301. 
  

Book note: Michael Hechter, Principles of Group Solidarity. American 

Political Science Review (1989) Vol. 83, No. 2: 323-324. 
  

Pool, Jonathan and Bernard Grofman. Linguistic artificiality and 

cognitive competence. In Klaus Schubert (Ed.), Interlinguistics: 

Aspects of the Science of Planned Languages. Berlin: Mouton de 

Gruyter, 1989, 145-156. 

Uncle Wuffle's advice to the advanced graduate student. PS (December 

1989), 838-839. 

Feld, Scott L. and Bernard Grofman. A theorem connecting 

Shapley-Owen power scores and the radius of the yolk in two 

dimensions. Social Choice and Welfare, 1990, Vol. 7, 71-74. 

Hofeller, Thomas and Bernard Grofman. Comparing the compactness of 

California congressional districts under three different plans, 1980, 
1982 and 1984. In B. Grofman (Ed.), Political Gerrymandering and the 

Courts. NY: Agathon Press, 1990, 281-288. 

Kernell, Samuel and Bernard Grofman. Determining the predictability 
of partisan voting patterns in California elections, 1978-1984. In 

B. Grofman (Ed.), Politica andering and the Courts. NY: 

Agathon Press, 1990, 289-295. 

Book review: Edward Carmines and James Stimson, Issue Evolution. 

International Journal of Public Opinion Research, Vol. 2, No. 2 

(1990), 185-190. 

Rejoinder: Straw men and stray bullets, a reply to Bullock. Social 

Science Quarterly, Vol. 72, No. 4 (December 1991), 840-843. 
   



  

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(B61) 

(B62) 

(B63) 

(B64) 

(B65) 

Book Notes views and Communications (in print) (continued) 

  

Grofman, Bernard. Questions of Electoral Fairness (translated into 
Japanese by Kyoji Wakata) in Nomp No. 2 (December 1991) Kansai 
University Institute of Legal Studies, Osaka, Japan, 19-24. 

Grofman, Bernard and Chandler Davidson. Editors' Introduction: 
Issues and controversies in voting rights. In Bernard Grofman and 
Chandler Davidson (Eds.), Controversies in Minority Voting: A 25 
Year Perspective on the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Washington, D.C. 
The Brookings Institution, 1992. 

  

  

Zimmerman, Joseph F. and Bernard Grofman, In Memoriam: Leon Weaver. 
PS, Vol. 25, No. 1 (March 1992), 97. 

Grofman, Bernard. A corollary to the third axiom of general 
semantics. Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 4, No. 2, April 
1992, 238-240. 
  

Grofman, Bernard. Book note: Laver and Schofield, Coalitions, 
Social Choice and Welfare, 1992, 265-266. 

Grofman, Bernard. Is turnout the paradox that ate rational choice 
theory? In Bernard Grofman (Ed.), Information, Participation and 
Choice: "An Economic Theory of Democracy' in Perspective. Ann Arbor, 
Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1993, 93-103. 
  

Grofman, Bernard. On the gentle art of rational choice bashing. In 
Bernard Grofman (Ed.) Information, Participation and Choice: “An 
Economic Theory of Democracy' in Perspective. Ann Arbor, Michigan: 
University of Michigan Press, 1993, 239-242. 

  

  

Grofman, Bernard. Uncle Wuffle's Advice to the Assistant Professor, 
PS, March 1993, 89-90. 

Grofman, Bernard. Editor's Introduction, Information, Participation, 
and Choice: "An Economic Theory of Democracy' in Perspective. 
Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1993. 

  

Grofman, Bernard. The political economy of the automobile - 
4 approaches. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 5 No 3, (July, 1993): 
409-412. 

Grofman, Bernard. Throwing darts at double regression and missing 
the target. Social Science Quarterly, Vol. 74, No. 3 (September) 
1993, 478-487. 

Grofman, Bernard. Lessons of Athenian democracy: Editor's 
Introduction, The 2500th Anniversary of Democracy. PS, September 
1993, 471-474. 

Grofman, Bernard. Book review. John Craven, Social Choice: 
ewo or Collective Decisions an dividual Judgem Ss. 

Ethics, Vol. 104, No. 2 (January 1994), 430-431. 

Grofman, Bernard. Book note: Geoffrey Brennan and Loren Lomansky, 
Democracy and Decision: The Pure Theory of Electoral Preference. 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 2 (June 1994), 
439-440. 

26 

 



  

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(S35) 

(S6) 

(S7) 

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Booknotes, Reviews and Communications (in print) (continued) 

  

Grofman, Bernard. Anthony Downs. In S.M. Lipset et al. 
(Eds.), Encyclopedia of Democracy, 1995 

  

Grofman, Bernard. Districting. In S.M. Lipset et al. 
(Eds.), Encyclopedia of Democracy, 1995 

Booknotes, Reviews and Communications (forthcoming) 

Grofman, Bernard. Editor's Introduction: Minisymposium on 
Race and Redistricting. National Political Science Review, 1996, 

forthcoming. 

Grofman, Bernard and Christian Collet. Why Democrats shouldn't bother 
to vote (with acknowledgments to Robert Erikson). Journal of 

Theoretical Politics, 1997 forthcoming. 

Grofman, Bernard, Sung-Chull Lee, Edwin Winckler, and Brian Woodall, 

Introduction. In Bernard Grofman, Sung-Chull Lee, 
Edwin Winckler, and Brian Woodall (Eds.) Elections in Japan, Korea 

and Taiwan under the Single Non-Transferable Vote: The Comparative 

Study of an Embedded Institution. Ann Arbor,MI: University of 

Michigan Press, 1997 forthcoming. 

Social Sciences Working Papers and Research Reports 
  

Note: Confessions of a mad modeler, Research Report R6, School of 
Social Sciences, University of California, June 1978. 

Note: The paradox of voting in a faculty appointment decision (with 
Steven Brown). Research Report R6, School of Social Sciences, 

University of California, Irvine, June 1978. 

Semiprofessional Publications (in print) 

Voting tactics: A neglected study, parts I, II. Parliamentary 

Journal, vol. 12 (July 1971), 3-15; (October 1971), 19-26. 

Who knows the score on the board of supervisors? Opinion-Editorial 
Page, Newsday, March 6, 1977. (With Howard Scarrow.) 

My years as parliamentarian to the United States National Student 
Association. Parliamentary Journal, Vol. 20 (1979), 18-21. 

Grofman, Bernard N. and Howard Scarrow. The riddle of apportionment: 
Equality of what? National Civic Review, Vol. 70, No. 5 (May 1981), 

242-254. 

The Democratic party is alive and well. Society (July/August 1984), 

18-21. 

Baker, Gordon E. and Bernard Grofman. Court should plunge deeper 

into gerrymandering thicket. Opinion-Editorial Page, Los Angeles 

Times, July 15, 1986. 

Baker, Gordon E. and Bernard Grofman. California's gerrymander and 

the U.S. Supreme Court. Opinion-Editorial Page, The Sacramento Bee, 

July 30, 1986. 

 



  

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(S9) 

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“ » 28 
Semi ssional Publications (in print) (continued) 

  

Should city councils be elected by district? PRO. Western Cities 

Magazine, March 1987, 4, 30-31. 

  

Baker, Gordon E. and Bernard Grofman. What now for gerrymandering? 

Opinion-Editorial Page, The San Diego Union, November 18, 1988. 

Loewen, James W. and Bernard Grofman. Comment: Recent developments 

in methods used in voting rights litigation. Urban Lawyer Vol. 21, 

No. 3 (1989), 589-604. 

Grofman, Bernard. Voting Rights, Voting Wrongs: The Legacy of Baker 

v. Carr. A Report of the Twentieth Century Fund. New York: Priority 

Press (distributed through the Brookings Institution), 1991. 

Grofman, Bernard. Opinion-Editorial page: Voting rights may be an 

issue in Santa Ana. Los Angeles Times (Orange County Edition), 

August 5, 1991. 
  

Grofman, Bernard. Opinion-Editorial page: Race and Redistricting: 

No one is using the Voting Rights Act to "whiten" majority districts. 

Washington Post, October 21, 1991. 
  

Grofman, Bernard. Opinion-Editorial page: High court ruling won't 

doom racial gerrymandering. Chicago Tribune, July 9, 1993. 
  

Grofman, Bernard. Opinion-Editorial page: The Denny beating trial: 

justice in the balance. Chicago Tribune, November 3, 1993. 

Reynolds, Andrew S. and Bernard N. Grofman. Opinion-Editorial page: 

Everyone loses in South Africa boycott. Chicago Tribune, March 28, 

1994. 

  

Grofman, Bernard. An introduction to racial bloc voting analysis. 

With an annotated select bibliography on racial bloc voting and 

related topics. Atlanta, GA: Southern Regional Council. 

Other Publications 

Chicago. In David Glazier (Ed.), Student Travel in America. New 

York: Pyramid Publication, 1968. (Under pseudonym.) 
  

Chicago: Hyde Park and the University of Chicago, the Loop and 

Near-North. In Where the Fun jis: East of the Mississippi. NY: 
  

Simon and Schuster, 1969. (Under pseudonym.) 

 



  

(C26) 

(C30) 

(C31) 

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(C35) 

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(C42) 

(C43) 

a » 29 
Recent Conference Papers (unpublished) 

  

Avila, Joaquin and Bernard Grofman. The effects of the Voting Rights 

Act on Hispanic representation in California. Prepared for delivery 

at the NSF Conference on "The Voting Rights Act," Rice University, 

Houston, Texas, May 11-12, 1990. 

Grofman, Bernard and Neil Sutherland. Terms limits of the third 

kind. Prepared for delivery at the Interdisciplinary Focused 

Research Program in Public Choice Conference on Term Limits, May 

1991. 

Grofman, Bernard and Scott L. Feld, Social choice theory and the 

tyranny of the majority. Prepared for delivery at the American 

Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Panel on Social Choice 

and Democratic Stability, Washington, D.C., August 29-September 1, 

1991. 

Feld, Scott L. and Bernard Grofman. Distinguishing between 

ideological and judgmental bases of transitive majority choice. 

Prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American 

Sociological Association, Chicago, August 1992; presented in revised 

form at the Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society, Long Beach, 

California, March 24-26, 1995. 

Grofman, Bernard. Justice Department enforcement of the Voting 

Rights Act: Compromised compliance? Republican plot? or Great 

American success story? Prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting 

of the American Political Science Association. Chicago, 

September 1992. 

Grofman, Bernard. What is a constitution? Presented at U.C. Irvine 

conference on "Constitutional Design," June 1993. 

Reynolds, Andrew S. and Bernard Grofman. Choosing an electoral 

system for the new South Africa: the main proposals. Presented at 

the Conference on Electoral Reform and Democratization, Columbia 

Institute for Western European Studies, Columbia University, April 

18-19, 1994. 

Grofman, Bernard. Should parties converge? Prepared for delivery at 

the World Congress of the International Sociological Association, 

Bielefeld, Germany, July 21-24, 1994. 

Brians, Craig and Bernard Grofman. Voter registration laws and 

turnout in the U.S. states: a longitudinal analysis. Prepared for 

the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 

New York, September 1994. 

Grofman, Bernard. Are voting rights special? Presented at the 

Conference on the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in Perspective, Washington 

D.C. Federal Judicial Center, November 11-12, 1994. 

Grofman, Bernard, Christian Collet and Robert Griffin. Do Democrats 

do better in elections with higher turnout? Prepared for delivery at 

the Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society, Long Beach, 

California, March 24-26, 1995. 

 



Recent Conference Papers (unpublished) (continued) 

Owen, Guillermo, and Bernard Grofman. Expressive voting and 

equilibrium in two-stage electoral competition involving both 

primaries and a general election. Prepared for delivery at the 
Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society, Long Beach, California, 

March 24-26, 1995. (A revised version presented at the Conference on 
Strategy and Politics, Center for the Study of Collective Choice, 

University of Maryland, College Park, MD, April 12, 1996.) 

Regenwetter, Michel and Bernard Grofman. Choosing subsets: A size 

independent random utility model and the quest for a social welfare 
ordering. Prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the Public 
Choice Society, Long Beach, Ccalifornia, March 24-26, 1995. 

Regenwetter, Michel and Bernard Grofman. Approval voting, Borda 
winners and Condorcet winners: evidence from seven elections.. 

Prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the Public Choice 

Society, Long Beach, Ccalifornia, March 24-26, 1995. 

Grofman, Bernard, Lisa Handley and Robert Griffin. Homicide on the 

Hill: Is the voting rights act responsible for Republican control of 

the house in 1994? Presented at the Anual Meeting of the American 
Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, August 30-September 

3,%1995, 

Brunell, Thomas and Bernard Grofman. Explaining divided U.S. Senate 
delegations, 1788-1994. Prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting 

of the Public Choice Society, Houston, Texas, March 1996. 

Koetzle, William, Brunell, Thomas and Bernard Grofman. Determinants 

of congressional midterm elections. Prepared for delivery at the 

Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society, Houston, Texas, March, 

1996. 

Grofman, Bernard, Michael McDonald, William Koetzle, and Thomas 

Brunell. A new explanation for split ticket voting: The comparative 
midpoints model. Presented at the Conference on Strategy and 
Politics, Center for the Study of Collective Choice, University of 

Maryland, College Park, MD, April 12, 1996. 

 



   9 ® 51 
Honors and Awards 

  

Pi Sigma Alpha Award, Best Paper, 1979 Annual Meeting of the Midwest 
Political Science Association. 

Co-Chair, 1982-85, Conference Group on Representation and Electoral 
Systems, American Political Science Association. 

1985 co-recipient (with Philip Straffin) of the Carl B. Allendoerfer Award, 
Mathematical Association of America, for exposition in mathematical 
writing for undergraduates. 

Chair, 1991-93, Section on Representation and Electoral Systems, American 
Political Science Association. 

1995 Co-recipient for (with Chandler Davidson) of the Richard Fenno Prize 
of the Legislative Studies Section of the American Political Science 
Association for the best book published in 1994 in the field of 
legislative studies (Quiet Revolution in the South). 

P essional S ice 

Chair, 1982-83, Lippincott Prize Committee for book-length work in 
political theory, American Political Science Association. 

Section Program Organizer, Panels on "Positive Theory," Annual Meeting of 
the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., August 
1984. 

Member, 1985-86, Working Group on Collective Choice Institutions, 
appointed by the Committee on Basic Research in the Behavioral and 
Social Sciences, National Research Council. 

Member, Executive Committee, 1986-89, Section on Representation and 
Electoral Systems, American Political Science Association. 

Chair, 1988-92, George Hallett Book Prize Award Committee, Section on 
Representation and Electoral Systems, American Political Science 
Association. 

Section Program Co-organizer, Panels on "Political Organizations," Annual 
Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Sept. 1990. 

Member, 1990-91, Lasswell Prize Committee, International Society of 
Political Psychology. 

Member, 1995-96, Carey McWilliam Award for Journalists Committee, American 
Political Science Association. 

Chair, 1995-96, Richard Fenno Prize Committee, Legislative Studies Section, 
American Political Science Association. 

 



32    
REFEREE ING 

1972-82 Manuscript Review Board: Behavioral Science. 
1975- Occasional referee: erican Journal of Political Science; 

Theory and Decision; Public Choice. 

1976- Occasional referee: Political Methodology; National Science 

Foundation, Political Science Program. 
1977- Occasional referee: American Political Science 

Association, Division of Educational Affairs; Journal of the 
American Statistical Association; Social Science Research; aculty 
Research Award Program of the City University of New York 
(Political Science). 

1978- Occasional referee: Psychological Review; National Science 
Foundation, Law and Social Sciences Program; Journal of 

Personality and Social Psychology; European Journal of Social 

Psychology; Journal of Mathematical Sociology. 
1979- Occasional referee: Social Networks; National Science Foundation, 

Applied Mathematics Program. 
1980- Occasional referee: Law and Policy Quarterly; National Institute of 

Mental Health; American Political Science Review, National Science 
Foundation, Sociology Program; National Science Foundation, 
Economics Program; Journal of Conflict Resolution; Legislative 
Studies Quarterly. 

1981- Occasional referee: American Mathematical Monthl 

Decigion Sciences, Economic Inquiry. 
1982- Occasional referee: Social Science Quarterly; 

Sociological Methods and Research; Western Political 

Quarterly, Guggenheim Foundation; National Science 

Foundation, Developmental and Social Psychology Program; 
National Science Foundation, Decision, Risk and 
Management Science Program. 

1983- Occasional referee: Journal of Politics, Political 

Geography Quarterly. 

1984- Occasional referee: National Science Foundation, 

Information Systems Program; National Science Foundation, 
Program in Social Measurement and Analysis. 

1986- Occasional referee: Review of Economic Studies. 

1987~ Occasional referee: British Journal of Political Science, 

Journal of Political Fconomy, Comparative Political Studies. 

1988- Occasional referee: Social Choice and Welfare, Political 
Analysis, Polity. 

1989- Occasional referee: National Science Foundation, Program in 
History and Philosophy of Science. 

1991- Occasional referee: Demography. 

1992- Occasional referee: European Journal of Political Research. 

1993- Occasional referee: Electoral Studies 

  

  

  

  

  

  

  
  

  

  

 



ARTICIPATION 

    

Discussant, Panel on "Reapportionment in the 1990's: The Western States," 
Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association, Newport Beach, 
March 1990. 

Co-organizer, NSF Conference on "The Voting Rights Act," Rice University, 
Houston, Texas, May 11-12, 1990. 

Organizer, Interdisciplinary Focused Research Program in Public Choice 

Conference on "Modelling Race and Electoral Politics," UCI, May 19, 1990. 

Invited Participant, NAACP-LDF Conference on "The Voting Rights Act," Panel 
on "Recent Developments in Section 2 Litigation," New Orleans, May 1990. 

Co-organizer, Rockefeller Foundation Conference on "The Voting Rights Act: 

Law and Society." The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., October 19, 
1990. 

Keynote speaker, National Conference of State Legislatures Reapportionment 
Task Force Redistricting Conference, Dallas, TX, February 25-27, 1991. 

Chair, Panel on "Empirical Issues in Representation" Annual Meeting of the 
Public Choice Society, New Orleans, March 15-18, 1991. 

Roundtable Participant, "James Coleman's Foundations of Social Theory" 

Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society, New Orleans, March 15-18, 
1991. 

  

Discussant, Panel on "Conceptual Approaches to Public Choice" Annual 
Meeting of the Public Choice Society, New Orleans, March 15-18, 1991. 

Co-Chair, Panel on "The Voting Rights Act," Annual Meeting of the Western 

Political Science Association, Seattle, March 22, 1991. 

Invited Participant, NCGIA Conference on Geographic Information Systems in 
the Social Sciences, Santa Barbara, March 22-24, 1991. 

Discussant, panel on "Formal Modeling," Annual Meeting of the American 

Political Science Association, Wash. D.C., August 28-September 2, 1991. 

Invited spearker, Federal Judicial Center Conference for Federal Judges of 

the 6th and 8th Circuits, Orlando, Florida, January 13, 1992. 

Chair, panel on "Issues and Controversies in Legislative and Congressional 
Redistricting." Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science 
Association, San Francisco, March 19-21, 1992. 

Participant, National Endowment for Humanities Workshop on Athenian 
Democracy, UC Santa Cruz, June 21-July 30, 1992. 

Chair, "Roundtable on Ethnic and Linguistic Conflict and the Art of 

Constitutional Design.” Annual Meeting of the American Political Science 
Association, Chicago, September 3-6, 1992. 

Invited speaker, Southern Regional Council "Conference on Voting Rights." 
Atlanta, October 1-3, 1992. 

Invited panelist, "Roundtable on Uses of Operations Research in the Social 
Sciences.” Annual Meeting of ORSA-TIMS, San Francisco, November 2-4, 1992. 

33 

 



  

RECENT CONFERENCE PARTICIPATION (continued) 

34 

  

Chair, panel on "Social Contract Theory," Conference on Democracy, 

Rationality and the Social Contract. Focused Research Project in Public 

Choice, University of California, Irvine, December 11-12, 1992. 

Organizer, Conference on the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in Perspective, 

Washington D.C. Federal Judicial Center, November 11-12, 1994. 

Invited participant, IGCC Conferences on "Ethnic Conflict," University of 
California, San Diego, May 11-12, 1994; Palm Springs, California, December 

12, 1995, 

Invited panelist. National Conference of State Legislators Annual Meeting, 

Panel on "Redistricting Decisions of the Supreme Court." St Louis, 
Missouri, Juley 29-31, 1996. 

Recent Invited Colloquia 

May 4, 1990 Program in Law and Economics, Columbia University Law 

School 

May 6, 1990 Program in Ethics and Public Policy, University of Chicago. 

June 13, 1990 Department of Political Science, Kwansei Gakuin University, 

Nishinomiya, Japan. 

June 16, 1990 Institute of Legal Studies, Kansai University, Osaka, Japan 

June 25, 1990 Department of Social Psychology, Tokyo University, Japan. 

Nov 7, 1951 Department of Political Science, University of Alberta, 
Canada 

Nov 13, 1939] Department of Political Science, University of Calgary, 
Canada 

April 17, 1992. Department of Government, Harvard University 

Sept 12-17, Landsdowne Guest Speaker, Department of Political Science, 
1992 University of Victoria, Canada 

July: 27, 1994 Department of Economics, Fern Universitet Hagen, Germany 

 



University UCI Service, 
  

1977-79 

1977-79 

1983-84 

1987-89 

1988-89 

1988-91 

1991-92 

1994-96 

1994-95 

Service to the School of Social Sciences, 

Member, University Committee on Lectures 

Faculty Advisor, UCI Chapter, Student Model United Nations 

Member, University Library Committee 

Member, Privilege and Tenure Committee Hearing Panel 

Member, Tierney Chair Search Committee 

Member, University Committee on Rules and Jurisdictions 

Acting Chair, Focused Research Program in Public Choice 

Member, University Committee on Rules and Jurisdictions 

Member, Chancellor's Taskforce on Use of Educational Technology 

gc 
  

1978-79 

1979-85 

1980-81 

1981-82 

1982-83 

1983-84 

1986-87 

1988-89 

1988-89 

1988-89 

1988-91 

1991-92 

1991-93 

1992-96 

1992-96 

1996-97 

1996-97 

Chair, Program in Politics and Society. 

Organizer, Program in Politics and Society 

Colloquium Series (Winter Quarters). 

Special Schoolwide Selection Committee: 

Scholars Program. 

Distinguished Student 

Chair, School of Social Sciences Faculty. 

Acting Co-Chair, Program in Politics and Society (Spring 
Quarter). 

Political Science Graduate Student Adviser. 

Organizer, Program in Politics and Society Colloquium Series 
(Spring Quarter). 

Organizer, Program in Politics and Society Colloquium Series 

(Fall and Winter Quarters). 

Political Science Graduate Student Adviser. 

Chair, Recruitment Committee in Mathematical Political Science. 

Member, Recruitment Committee in Public Law. 

Chair, Committee for the Interdisciplinary Concentration in Public 

Choice. 

Member, Joint Recruitment Committee in African-American Studies 

Member, Political Science Graduate Comittee 

Member, Committee for the Interdisciplinary Graduate Concentration 
in Public Choice 

Member, Executive Committee, UCI Center for the Study of Democracy 

Chair, Recruitment Committee for Pacific Rim FTE in Political Science  



Current Research 

My current research is on mathematical models of group and individual 
decision making with a focus on electoral behavior and voter choice, and 
issues connected with representation and redistricting. I also have strong 
side interests in individual and group information processing and decision 

heuristics; political propaganda, particularly political cartooning and 
satire; in law and social science, particularly in the domain of civil 
rights, and in using computers as a teaching aid. 

Courses Taught 

Computer-Based Research Methods in the Social Sciences 

Introduction to Public Choice 
The United States in Comparative Perspective 
Statistics for Citizenship 
Representation and Redistricting 
Elections and Voter Choice 

The Federalist Papers and the Art of Constitutional Design 

Law and Social Science 

Models of Collective Decision Making 
Introduction to Decision Analysis 
Game Theory Applications in the Social Sciences 
Small Group Behavior 

Introduction to Mathematical Models in the Social Sciences 
Coalition Theory 

Political Satire 

 



Major Redistricting Cases in Which Bernard Grofman Has 
Participated as an Expert Witness or Court-Appointed Consultant 

Consultant to Case Name Type 
  

Republican Party of Colorado 

Special Master, U.S. Distict Court 
Southern District of New York 

Republican Party of Hawaii 

Democranc Party of Rhode Island 
and, subsequently, State of Rhode 
[sland 
NAACP Legal Defense Fund 

U.S. Department of Justce 

State of Indiana 

City of Boston 

Mexican American Legal Defense and 
Educanon Fund 

U.S. Department of Justice 

U.S. Deparment of Jusdce 

NAACP Legal Defense Fund 

Carstens v, Lamm, 543 F. Supp. 68 
(D. Colorado, 1982) 

+537 F. Supp. 
257 (8. D. New York, 1982) 

. 552 F. Supp. 554; 
S552 F. Si 1200 (D. Hawaii, 
1982) 
Holmes v. Bums (Super. Ct., R.L. 
1982) aff’d, No., 83-149 (R.I. S.Ct. 
4/10/84) 
Gingles v. Edmisten, consol. with 
Pugh v. Brock, 590 F. Supp. 345 
(E.D. North Carolina, 1984) heard 

sub nom. Thomburg v. Gingles, 
S. Ct. 2752, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) 

106 

South Carolina v. U.S, (D.D.C,, 
1984) settled out of court by 
preclearance of a new plan for South 
Carolina Senate 

603 F. Supp. 
1479 (1984). (S.D. Indiana, 1983), 
reversed sub nom Davis v. 
Bandemer, 106 S. Ct. 2797, 
___ U.S. __ (1986); initially consol. 
with Indiana Branches of the 
NAACP v, Orr 603 F. Supp. 1479 
(1984) (S.D. Indiana,1983) 

A 

, 609 F. Supp. 739 
(D. Mass., 1985) 

v, Ci Ww le (D. 

Calif., 1986), 863 F. 2nd 1407 (9th 
cir. 1988) cert. denied, 109 Sct. 
1534 (1989) 
Ketchum v, Byme II (D. Illinois 
1985), settled by consent decree 
U.S. v, City of Los Angeles (D. 
Calif., 1986), settled out of court by 
adoption of a new plan for L A. City 
Council with an additional majority 
Hispanic seat 

McGhee v, Granville County, No, 
87-29-CIV-5) (E.D. North Carolina, 
2/5/88); 860 F 2nd 110 (4th circuit 
1988) 

Congress: failure of the legislature 
act | 
Congress and both houses of state 
legislature: failure of legislature to 
act; minority voting rights 
State legislature: equal populanon 

State house: minority vote dilution, 
compactness, communities of interes! 

Multimember districts in the state 
legislature; Section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act 

State Senate: Secuon 5 of the Voung 
Rights Act preclearance denial 

State legislature: parusan 
gerrymandering, minonty vote 
dilution 

Boston City Council: munonty vote 
dilution 

Watsonville City Council: Secuon 2 
of the Voting Rights Act 

Chicago City Council: minonty vote 
diluton 
Los Angeles City Council: Section 2 
of the Voung Rights Act 

Granville County Board of | 
Supervisors: Section 2 of the Voung 
Rights Act  



    

Consultant to Case Name Type 
  

Republican National Committee Badham v, Eu, 721 F. 2d 1170 (D. Congress: partisan gerrymandernng 

Calif., 1983), dismissed for want of 
a federal claim, cert. denied. 

U.S. Department of Justice v County Board: Section 2 of the 

of Supervisors (D. Calif., 1990),80 Voting Rights Act 

ACD O5-8138-(Oth cir. 1990) cert. 
~ denied January 1990 — a 

~~ F. aad 70 

Republican National Committee Pope et al. v. Blue et al. 14th Amendment 
Liv. No. 3:92CV71-P, U.S. 
District Court, Western District 
Charlotte Division 

  

Republican Party of Wisconsin Prosser et al. v. Election Section 2 Voting Rights Act 
Board of State of Wisconsin 
  

  

No. 92-C-0078-C, U.S. District 
Court, Western District of 
Wisconsin 

 



  

No. A97-3-753 

  

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

October Term, 1997 

  

JAMES B. HUNT, JR, ef al, 

Appellants, 

V. 

MARTIN CROMARTIE, ef al, 

Appellees. 

  

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I, Todd A. Cox, a member of the Bar of this Court, hereby certify that on this 8th day of 

April, 1998, served by first-class mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the Brief of 

Amici Curiae Alfred Smallwood, ef al. in Support of Emergency Application for Stay Pending 

Appeal of the Decision of the Three-Judge Court for the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of North Carolina and Appendix to Robinson O. Everett, Suite 300 First Union 

National Bank Building, Post Office Box 586, Durham, North Carolina 27702 and Edwin M. 

Speas, Jr., Senior Deputy Attorney General, North Carolina Department of Justice, Post Office 

Box 629, Raleigh, North Carolina 27602-0629, counsel for all of the petitioners and respondents 

herein. I further certify that all parties Sas beeps served. 7 

Todd A. Cox bd 
NAACP Legal Defense 

& Educational Fund, Inc. 

1275 K Street, N.-W., Suite 301 

Washington, D.C. 20005 

(202) 682-1300 

  

Counsel for Proposed Amici Curiae