United States v. Osorio Brief Amici Curiae

    IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

V.

LUIS COLON OSORIO

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Cr. No. 2:9200032 (TFGD)

BRIEF OF THE NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC. 
AND NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD AS AMICI CURIAE

Respectfully submitted,

JULIUS L. CHAMBERS (JC-3361)
CHARLES S. RALSTON (CR-0391)
NAPOLEON B. WILLIAMS, JR. (NW-9685)

99 Hudson Street, 16th Floor 
New York, NY 10013 
(212) 219-1900

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae

NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL
FUND, INC.

JOHN BRITTAIN (CT 10678)
65 Elizabeth Street 
Hartford, CT 06105 
(203) 241-4664

Attorney for Amicus Curiae

NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD



TABLE OF CONTENTS
Interest of Amici Curiae ..................................... 1
Argument ......................................................  2

I. The evidence in this case establishes a
violation of the federal jury selection act . . . .  2

II. The facts established by defendants show a
violation of the sixth amendment to the 
constitution ....................................... 10

C o n c l u s i o n .......................................................16

Table of A u t h o r i t i e s ............................................ii

i



TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases: Pages:

Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972)...............  1, 10

Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 192 (1946) ...........4

Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, (1979) ......... 10, 11, 13, 15

Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942) .... 3 , 4

Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 478-81 (1990) ........  8

Mireles v. Turnrose, Civ. No. H-85-926 (PCD) ................... 14
Neal V .  Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 397 (1881) ................... 9
Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463, 467-68 (1947) ...........9
Rabinowitz v. United States, 366 F.2d 34 44-55

(5th Cir. 1966) ..................................... 4, 5, 7

Santa v. Cimiano, No. 291 CV 01005 (PCD) ...................... 14
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 526-31 (1975) . . .  3, 10, 11

Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946) . 4, 7, 8

Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970)............................1
Statutes: Pages'

Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968
Title 28 U.S.C. §§1861-186 ................................  2

Other Authorities: Pages:

H. Rept. No. 1076 (90th Cong., 2nd Sess.) 1968
U.S. Code Cong, and Administrative News p. 1792
1794-95   5

Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery 
of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess., p. 605-06 .........................................

ii



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

V.

LUIS COLON OSORIO

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Cr. No. 2:9200032 (TFGD)

BRIEF AMICI CURIAE ON BEHALF OF THE NAACP 
LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC. AND 

THE NATIONAL LAWYERS' GUILD

Interest of Amicus Curiae
The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., is a non­

profit corporation organized under the laws of the State of New 

York as a legal aid society. It was formed to assist African 

Americans to secure their constitutional and civil rights through 

the courts. Of particular concern to the Legal Defense Fund has 

been racial discrimination against African Americans in the 

selection of juries. The Fund has represented both criminal 

defendants raising jury discrimination on direct appeal, e.q. . 

Alexander v. Louisiana. 405 U.S. 625 (1972), and African American 

who have been excluded from jury service, e.q.. Turner v. Fouche. 

396 U.S. 346 (1970). In light of the Legal Defense Fund's historic 

concern with and involvement in issues of jury discrimination, we 

have filed this brief amici curiae to assist the Court in applying 

the applicable legal principles for resolving issues of racial 

discrimination in the composition of the master jury lists for 

grand juries and petit juries for this district.



The National Lawyers Guild (Guild) is a national organization 

representing 10,000 lawyers, legal workers, law students and 

jailhouse lawyers in over 200 chapters throughout the United 

States. Since its founding in 1937, the Guild has provided legal 

support to virtually every struggle for racial, social and 

political justice. It has been particularly committed to the 

eradication of discrimination in the criminal justice system 

through litigation, training and day-to-day service by its members.

ARGUMENT

I.
THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE ESTABLISHES A 

VIOLATION OF THE FEDERAL JURY SELECTION ACT

The questions presented in the instant challenge raise

important issues in the application and interpretation of the Jury

Selection and Service Act of 1968, Title 28 U.S.C. §§1861-1869, in

resolving challenges to the composition of master jury lists used

in federal district courts for selecting grand and petit juries.

In Section 1861 of the Act, Congress declared that:

It is the policy of the United States that all 
litigants in Federal courts entitled to trial by 
jury shall have the right to grand and petit juries 
selected at random from a fair cross-section of the 
community in the district or division wherein the 
court convenes.

In furtherance of this policy the Act established a comprehensive 

scheme for the selection of jurors. As Section 1861 makes clear, 

the overriding purpose of Act is to insure that the master jury 

lists used in the federal courts represent as close as reasonably 

possible a fair cross-section of the community.

2



The statute effectuates this goal by imposing an affirmative 

duty on federal judicial officials to create master lists that are 

representative of the community in the district or division in 

which the court sits. In determining a violation of Section 1861 

of the Act, good faith compliance by federal officials or the 

officials' lack of discriminatory intent in complying with the 

Act's essential requirements is irrelevant. Cf. Glasser v. United 

States. 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942); Tavlor v. Louisiana. 419 U.S. 522, 

526-31 (1975).

In §1863(b)(2) of the Act, Congress provided that names of 

prospective jurors shall be selected either from voter registration 

lists or the lists of actual voters of a political subdivision 

within the district or division. However, the section also 

mandates that a jury selection plan developed by the district court 

"shall prescribe some other source or sources of names in addition 

to voter lists where necessary to foster the policy and protect the 

rights secured by §§ 1961 and 1862 of this title." The policies 

and rights referred to are that a fair cross-section result and 

that "no citizen shall be excluded from service . . .  on account of 

race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic status." 
28 U.S.C. § 1862.

That Congress intended to impose an affirmative obligation on 

federal courts to promulgate plans that will achieve as nearly 

fully representative jury lists as possible by the use of whatever 

sources as may be necessary, is demonstrated by the historical 

background and legislative history of the 1968 Act. In the period 

before 1968, the statutory requirements for selecting federal

3



juries went through a number of changes. First, from 1789 to 1948 

state jury lists were relied upon; from 1948 to 1957 federal 

standards were established but state exemptions were honored; 

finally, in 1957 all references to state qualifications were 

removed (see, Rabinowitz v. United States. 366 F.2d 34 44-55 (5th 

Cir. 1966), and Gewin, The Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968; 

Implementation in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. 20 Mercer Law 

Review 349, 351-57 (1969), for detailed discussions of the history 

of the federal jury selection statutes).

Whatever the prevailing statutory standards, however, the 

Supreme Court consistently held that in federal courts a jury must 

be as close as possible to being "a body truly representative of 

the community," Glasser v. United States. 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942).1 

See also, Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co.. 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946); 

Ballard v. United States. 329 U.S. 187, 192 (1946).

1In Glasser. decided when state jury lists were the source for 
federal juries, the Court held:

If that requirement [of representation] is 
observed, the officials charged with choosing 
federal jurors may exercise some discretion . . . .
But they must not allow the desire for competent 

jurors to lead them into selections which do not 
comport with the concept of the jury as a cross 
section of the community. Tendencies, no matter 
how slight, toward the selection of jurors by any 
method other than a process which will insure a 
trial by a representative group are undermining 
processes weakening the institution of jury trial, 
and should be sturdily resisted. That the motives 
influencing such tendencies may be of the best must 
not blind us to the dangers of allowing any 
encroachment whatsoever on this essential right.
Steps innocently taken may one by one lead to the 
irretrievable impairment of substantial liberties.
Ibid. (emphasis added).

4



It was in the context of these decisions that Congress amended 

the jury selection statutes in 1948 and 1957. Two concerns were 

uppermost; first, there was a desire to achieve uniformity in jury 

selection standards throughout the country; second, there was a 

growing awareness that, despite the Supreme Court's decisions, 

reliance on state lists or standards continued to result in African 

Americans being excluded from federal juries. See, Rabinowitz v. 

United States. 366 F.2d at 48-49.

Despite these statutory changes, both problems persisted, and 

it was the latter, the exclusion of African Americans, that was 

involved in Rabinowitz. There, the Fifth Circuit, relying on the 

cross-section decisions of the Supreme Court, struck down the key- 

man method of jury selection as it operated in the Middle District 

of Georgia because the court found that the system had resulted in 

a substantial under representation of African Americans.

The Rabinowitz decision was at the forefront in the 

deliberations on the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968. See, 

e-g-, H. Rept. No. 1076 (90th Cong., 2nd Sess.) 1968, U.S. Code 

Cong, and Administrative News p. 1792, 1794-95; Hearings on S. 989 

[28 U.S.C. §§ 1861 et seg. ] , Subcommittee on Improvements in 

Judicial Machinery of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 90th Cong., 

1st Sess., p. 605-06 (Statement of Hon. Harrison L. Winter); 114 

Cong. Rec. 3990 (90th cong., 2nd Sess.) (Remarks of Cong. Celler 

introducing the bill). In enacting the 1968 Act, Congress sought 

to solve jury selection problems once and for all by: (1) setting 

up a truly uniform method of selection; and (2) assuring random 

selection from lists representative of the community. It could not

5



be more clear that the 1968 Act was intended to be a reform that

would codify and enforce decisions of the Supreme Court and those 

of the lower courts in cases such as Rabinowitz. The primary 

concern of Congress was to end continued instances of the 

exclusion, whether deliberate or inadvertent, of African. Americans 

and other minorities from full participation in federal juries.

These goals were to be achieved in two ways. First, bases for 

disqualifying prospective juries were narrowly and specifically 

defined, thus limiting the influence and role of subjective 

judgment in the selection process. Second, all federal courts were 

to use the same basic source for names of potential jurors, recent 

voter registration rolls or lists of actual voters, thus 

eliminating recourse to any version of a key-man system, and 

providing a source that in most instances would be representative 
of the community.

However, it is also clear from the legislative history that

Congress was fully aware that, in a substantial number of

instances, voter lists would have to be supplemented. In

particular, it was cognizant of the relationship between the Voting

Rights Act of 1965 and the 1968 Jury Act. Thus, Representative

Kastenmeier stated during the House Debates:

In the past, in some parts of the country, Negroes were 
largely excluded from the electoral process. The Voting 
Rights Act of 1965 has altered this situation 
significantly. Still, there are some areas where the 
percentage of Negroes registered to vote are much lower 
than that for whites. In such areas, the jury-selection 
plan must prescribe sources in addition to voter lists. 
114 Cong. Rec. 3998 (90th cong., 2nd Sess.) (emphasis
added). See also, H. Rept. No. 1076 (90th Cong., 2nd
Sess.), 1968 U.S. Code Cong. Adm. News at 1799-1800.

It was recognized, of course, that the fact that there were "minor"

6



deviations from a perfect cross-section of the community in the 

voter lists themselves would not require supplementation. However, 

if there were "substantial percentage deviations" from a fair 

cross-section, the Act required that they be corrected. Congress 

specifically left the definition of "substantial" to judicial 

decision.2

It is important to note that a challenge under § 1867 to the 

composition of the jury is to the overall plan on the ground of 

failure to comply with the Act. Thus, the fact that the particular 

venire and the jury selected might have percentages of African 

Americans or Hispanics reasonably close to that in the community is 

irrelevant. In Thiel v. Southern Pacific Company. 328 U.S. at 225, 

the Supreme Court held that it was "immaterial" that the jury that 

tried the case had five members of the class whose exclusion was 

challenged. The issue there, as here, was whether Congressional 

standards had been followed in the overall selection methods. See 

also, Rabinowitz v. United States. 366 F.2d at 34.3 Congress

Congressman Celler, in introducing the bill in the House, 
stated:

The bill uses the term "fair cross section of the 
community" recognizing that there will be minor 
deviations from a fully accurate cross section. The 
voting list need not perfectly mirror the percentage 
structure of the community, but any substantial 
percentage deviations must be corrected by the use of 
supplemental sources. The community would leave the 
definition of "substantial" to judicial decision. 114 
Cong. Rec. 3990 (90th Cong., 2nd Sess.). See also, H.R. 
Rept. No. 1076 (90th Cong., 2nd Sess.) 1968

3There, the Fifth Circuit held that the government's position 
that since there were five blacks on the grand jury that indicated 
the defendants the indictment should not be quashed, evidenced "a

7



clearly intended that defendants, the United States, or any other

party should have standing to challenge noncompliance with the Act

without showing any prejudice in a particular case. Thus, the

House Report in support of the bill states:

A committee amendment to S. 989 eliminates the need to 
prove prejudice as a condition of judicial intervention 
when substantial noncompliance with the act is 
established. The committee believes that the "prejudice" 
requirement would unduly burden the procedure established 
by the bill for challenging noncompliance. Moreover, 
such burden goes beyond what has been required to sustain 
a constitutional challenge. See, e.q.. Thiel v. Southern 
Pacific Co.. 328 U.S. 217, 225.

H.R. Rep. No. 1076 (90th Cong., 2nd Sess.), pp. 15-16; 1968 U.S. 

Code Cong. & Adm. News p. 1804. See also, S. Rep. 891 (90th Cong., 

1st Sess.), pp. 33-34.* 4

The evidence in this case, we submit, demonstrates a 

substantial deviation from a cross section of the community. The 

total exclusion of residents of two major cities necessarily 

resulted in juries that were not representative of the community, 

particularly with regard to race, national origin, and economic 

status, and perhaps with regard to religion as well. 28 U.S.C. § 

1862. Further, comparing the juries in the Hartford Division with 

juries in Connecticut state courts, where sources other than voter 

registration lists are used, vividly demonstrates the exclusion of

basic misconception":

The focus of the law is on the list from which the jury 
is drawn and not on the composition of a particular jury 
or grand jury. Ibid.

See also Holland v. Illinois. 493 U.S. 474, 478-81 (1990).

4 See also, Peters v. Kiff. 407 U.S. 493 (1972).

8



discreet groups of minorities.

The reasons for the under representation of grand juries in 

the Hartford Division proffered by Ms. Joan Haworth, a government 

witness, in her affidavit are legally insufficient. First, the 

affidavit acknowledges that Hispanics and African Americans are 

under represented in the voter registration rolls. Haworth 

Affidavit, p. 6. Therefore, the exclusive use of those rolls 

necessarily violates 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2). Haworth, in her 

affidavit, at pp. 7-8, states "There is also a difference between 

the voting age population and those eligible to serve on a jury 

since the latter group includes only those persons who are 

registered to vote.11 (Emphasis added.) This assertion is wrong as 

a matter of law. All persons eighteen and over are eligible to 

serve as jurors unless disqualified by alien status, age, or 

inability to read, write, understand, or speak English, or by an 

infirmity resulting from being charged with or convicted of a 
felony. 28 U.S.C. § 1866(b).

Second, the justifications given by Ms. Haworth for the under 

representation of minorities on the grand jury —  lack of English 

language proficiency and a higher proportion of felony convictions 

—  are not legally sufficient as presented. They are generalized, 

abstract claims. The Supreme Court has consistently and repeatedly 

in its decisions rejected generalized allegations purporting to 

prove that African Americans are under represented on juries 

because of lack of qualifications, higher conviction rates, etc. 

See, e.g.. Neal v. Delaware. 103 U.S. 370, 397 (1881); Patton v. 

Mississippi. 332 U.S. 463, 467-68 (1947).

9



These decisions establish that the burden is on the government 

to demonstrate that such factors are actual causes of the 

statistical disparities. The Haworth affidavit fails to do this. 

It merely sets out general statistics for various population groups 

without describing the effect these statistics have on the pool of 

persons eligible for jury service.

For example, the fact that 48.3% of persons in Connecticut 

prisons are African American does not tell the whole story. 

Missing from the Haworth affidavit is a statement of the reduction 

of African Americans eligible for jury service. The amount of this 

reduction, however, can not be determined without identifying the 

number of inmates and the number of former inmates whose civil 

rights have not been restored (see 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(5)).

Moreover, the Haworth affidavit does not establish that the 

minority prisoners were residents of the State prior to their 

incarceration. Only if such information is supplied will it be 

possible to reach any conclusion on the degree to which the number 

of minority residents of voting age population has been reduced by 

incarceration in prison. Such a showing is necessary to overcome 

the presumption that minority residents of voting age are 

presumptively eligible for jury service. See. Alexander v. 

Louisiana. 405 U.S. 625, 627 (1972)).

II.

THE FACTS ESTABLISHED BY DEFENDANTS SHOW A 
VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION

In Duren v. Missouri. 439 U.S. 357, (1979), the Supreme

Court reaffirmed its holding in Taylor v. Louisiana. 419 U.S. 522 

(1975), that a jury- selection process for criminal cases which

10



results in jury pools "not 'reasonably representative' of the 

community", Duren v. Missouri, supra. 439 U.S. at 358- 359, 

violates a criminal defendant right under the Sixth Amendment to 

the Constitution of the United States to a "jury selected from a 

fair cross section of the community". Id., at 359. The Court's 

decision in Duren v. Missouri, supra. held that the statute of 

the State exempting women from jury service upon request violated 

a defendant's rights under the Sixth Amendment as guaranteed 

through the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Court went on to hold that the defendant in a criminal 

case has standing to challenge the violation of the fair cross 

section requirement irrespective of whether the defendant is a 

member of the class excluded by the jury selection process. See. 

Taylor v. Louisiana, supra. 419 U.S. at 526; Duren v. Missouri. 
supra. 439 U.S. at 539, n. 1.

Compliance with the Sixth Amendment's command, the Court 
held, requires that:

jury wheels, pools of names, panels, or venires from 
which juries are drawn must not systematically exclude 
distinctive groups in the community and thereby fail to 
be reasonably representative thereof. Tavlor v. 
Louisiana. supra. 419 U.S. at 538.

This is a three- part test requiring a defendant to show:

(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a 
"distinctive" group in the community; (2) that the 
representation of this group in venires from which 
juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in 
relation to the number of such persons in the 
community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due 
to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury- 
selection process. Duren v. Missouri, supra. 439 U.S. 
at 364.

In the instant action, defendant Osorio satisfied the first

11



part of the test by showing the exclusion of two distinct groups, 

(1) non registered African American and Hispanic voters, and (2) 

all residents of the cities of Hartford and New Britain.

With respect to the first group, defendant showed that the 

sole source of potential jurors on the Hartford Division Master 

Jury Wheel is the compilation of random samples of 10% of the 

names taken from each of the list of registered voters provided 

by the towns comprising the Hartford Division.

These lists, as defendant proved, have an African American 

representation of 3.08% and a Hispanic representation of 0.77%. 

However, 6.34% of the voting age population of the Hartford 

Division are African American and 5.07% of the same population 

are Hispanic. See. DX 501; DX 502; DX 504; DX 513; DX 514.

Thus, substantial numbers of African American and Hispanic 

residents of voting age are excluded by the jury selecting method 
used in the Hartford Division.

Concerning the second group, it is undisputed that the 

Hartford Division's jury selecting method excludes residents of 

the cities of Hartford and New Britain. See. Testimony of R. 

Masotta; Testimony of K. Rowe; DX 511. Because the two cities 

are the largest two cities in the Hartford Division and together 

have more than 65% of the minority voting age population, the 

exclusion of the two cities from the jury wheel of the Hartford 

Division exacerbates substantially the exclusion of minorities 

from grand and petit juries. See. Testimony of J. Waldfogel; DX 
503; DX 512.

Defendant certainly satisfied the second part of the three-

12



prong test. In Duren v. Missouri, supra. where the Supreme Court 

held that Missouri's jury selecting method violated the Sixth 

Amendment, only 38% of the relevant population was excluded. By 

contract, the Hartford Division's jury wheel excludes 100% of the 

residents of the cities of Hartford and New Britain. Thus, 

defendant satisfied the second prong of the test with respect to 

the exclusion of resident of the two cities.

Similarly, defendant satisfied the second part of the three 

prong test of Duren v. Missouri, supra. with respect to the 

exclusion of African American and Hispanic residents by showing 

that minority representation on the jury wheel was 3.08% African 

American and 0.77% Hispanic while minority representation in the 

voting age population was 6.34% African American and 5.07% 
Hispanic.

This is a gross discrepancy between the percentage of 

minorities in the voting age population and the percentage of 

minority representation in jury wheel of the Hartford Division. 

The former percentage is almost four times the latter. In Duren 

v. Missouri, supra. the percentage of women in the community 

(54%) was only slightly over three times the percentage of women 

(15%) in the venires from which juries were drawn. Id.439 U.S. at 

365. Thus, the discrepancy here is greater than the discrepancy 

in Duren which the Supreme Court disallowed.

The third prong of the Duren test was satisfied by showing 

that both the underrepresentation of minorities and the 

underrepresentation of residents of Hartford and New Britain were 

due to systematic exclusion of the groups by the jury selection

13



process.

Defendant's proof conclusively met this requirement with 

respect to residents of Hartford and New Britain. Defendant 

showed that no questionnaires were sent to any persons residing 

in either city and that no jurors were found on the Hartford 

Division Master Jury Wheel who were residents of Hartford or New 

Britain. See. testimony of R. Masotta and K. Rowe; DX 511. The 

systematic exclusion of residents of the two cities also 

systematically excluded minorities from the jury venires since 

the two cities contained more than 65% of the minorities of 

voting age in the Hartford Division.

Additionally, the State's history of past discrimination 

against minorities in voting works, in conjunction with the 

Hartford Division's exclusive reliance on voting registration 

lists, to further the systematic exclusion of minorities from the 

jury wheel. The extent of registration of minorities is likely 

to be low as a result of (1) the State's use of a literacy test 

requirement until 1970, Conn. Gen. Stats. § 9-20 (1967), Public 

Act 768, Sec. 6 (1971), and (2) discriminatory purging of 

Hispanic voters in Hartford and New Britain. See. Santa v. 

Cimiano. No. 291 CV 01005 (PCD); Mireles v. Turnrose. Civ. No. H- 
85-926 (PCD).

A disproportionate and systematic exclusion of minorities 

from the Hartford's jury wheel is clearly caused by the use of 

the jury selection system by which juries are selected in the 

Hartford Division. However, no governmental interests can be 
cited in favor of the exclusion.

14



In Duren v. Missouri, supra. the State of Missouri sought 

unsuccessfully to justify its exclusionary jury selecting system 

on the ground of what it alleged to be significant state 

interests, id., 439 U.S. at 367- 368. In the instant action, 

however, no countervailing federal interest can be asserted to 

support the exclusion and underrepresentation of minorities since 

the Jury Selection and Service Act expresses the relevant federal 

interest. That Act, as we have emphasized previously, requires 

the jury selection plan of the Hartford Division "to prescribe 

some other source or sources of names in addition to voter lists 

where necessary to foster the policy and protect the rights 

secured by §§ 1961 and 1862 of this title." This has not been 

done and the resulting failure to insure that grand juries are 

drawn from a fair cross section of the community therefore 

constitutes a violation of the Sixth Amendment.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the indictment should be 

dismissed since the lists from which the grand jury was drawn 

were constituted in violation of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-63.

Dated: New York, New York
August lQ , 1992

Respectfully submitted,

JULIUS L. CHAMBERS (JC-3361) 
CHARLES S. RALSTON (CR-0391) 
NAPLEON B. WILLIAMS, JR. (NW-9685) 

99 Hudson Street, 16th Floor 
New York, NY 10013 
(212) 219-1900

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae

15



NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL 
FUND, INC.

, .r,^pHN BRITTAIN ( C T 10678) K  // li ft J 65 Elizabeth Street , "'r* A'
Hartford, CT 06105 
(203) 241-4664

Attorney for Amicus Curiae

NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD

16



CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a set of copies of the foregoing brief 

amicus curiae and motion to file brief amicus curiae has been 

mailed, postage prepaid, this 10th day of August, 1991, 

seperately to each of the following counsel at the addresses set 
forth below:

David N. Rosen 
Rosen & DOlan 
400 Orange Street 
New Haven, CT 06511

Attorneys for Defendant

John Danaher 
Assistant U.S. Attorney 
United States Courthouse 
450 Main Street 
Hartford, CT 06103

JoNel Newman
Connecticut Civil Liberties 
Union Foundation 
32 Grand Street 
Hartford, CT 06106

Susan Tipograph 
Linda Backiel 
120 Duane Street 
New York, NY 10009

16