Puckett v. City of Louisville Brief for Appellant

    UNITED STATES C OURT OF APPEALS
F O R  THE SIXTH C I R C U I T

AT CINCINNATI

DOUGLAS PUCKETT, )
)

Plaintiff-Appellant )

v s - ) Case No. 92-5869
)

CITY OF LOUISVILLE )
LOUISVILLE CIVIL SERVICE BOARD )
LOUISVILLE POLICE DEPARTMENT )
LOUISVILLE FRATERNAL ORDER OF )

POLICE )
LOUISVILLE BLACK POLICE OFFICERS )

ASSOCIATION )
)

Defendants-Appellees )

ON APPEAL FROM
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 
AT LOUISVILLE 

NO. 90-0856-L(A)
HONORABLE CHARLES M. ALLEN, JUDGE

BRIEF FOR A P P E LLANT

TEDDY B/ GORDON 
Attorney for Appellant 
807 West Market Street 
Louisville, Kentucky 40202 
(502) 585-3534



UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

AT CINCINNATI

DOUGLAS PUCKETT, >

Plaintiff-Appellant )

V S - ) Case No. 92-5869

CITY OF LOUISVILLE )
LOUISVILLE CIVIL SERVICE BOARD )
LOUISVILLE POLICE DEPARTMENT )
LOUISVILLE FRATERNAL ORDER OF )

POLICE )
LOUISVILLE BLACK POLICE OFFICERS )

ASSOCIATION )

)
Defendants-Appellees )

CERTIF I C A T E  Q £  SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that copies of the foregoing 
have this 1  day of September, 1992, been mailed to David 
Leightty, Cecil Blye, Jr., Paul V. Guagliardo and Winston E.
King, Counsel for City of Louisville and Louisville Police 
Department, Department of Law, City of Louisville, 601 West 
Jefferson Street, Louisville, Kentucky 40202, Counsel for 
Defendants, City of Louisville and Louisville Police Department; 
Mark W. Dobbins, Tilford, Dobbins, Alexander and Buckaway, 1406 
One Riverfront Plaza, Louisville, Kentucky 40202, Counsel for 
Defendant Louisville Civil Service Board; Mark L. Miller, 802
?oonoliC B l d g’’ 429 West Muhammad Ali Blvd., Louisville, Kentucky 
40202;, Counsel for Defendant Louisville Fraternal Order of 
Police; Paul Soreff, Allison Soreff and Garber, 1326 South Third 
Street, Louisville, Kentucky 40208; Julius L. Chambers and Clyde 
E. Murphy 99 Hudson Street, Suite 1600, New York, New York 10013.

J * .  / /
TEDDY B/ GORDON 
Attorney for Appellant 
807 West Market Street 
Louisville, Kentucky 40202 
(502) 585-3534



UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH C I RCUIT

AT CINCINNATI

DOUGLAS PUCKETT, )

Plaintiff-Appellant )

VS >
) Case No. 92-5869

CITY OF LOUISVILLE )
LOUISVILLE CIVIL SERVICE BOARD )
LOUISVILLE POLICE DEPARTMENT )
LOUISVILLE FRATERNAL ORDER OF )

POLICE )
LOUISVILLE BLACK POLICE OFFICERS )

ASSOCIATION )

Defendants-Appellees )

DISCLOSURE OF C O R P ORATE A F F ILIATIONS 
AND FINANCIAL INTERESTS

Pursuant to 6th Cir. 
following disclosure:

R. 25, Douglas Puckett makes the

1. Is said party a subsidiary of affiliate of a publicly 
owned corporation? No

2. Is there a publicly owned corporation, nor a party to the
appeal, that has a financial interest in the outcome’ 
No

TEDDY B/ GORDON 
Attorney for Appellant 
807 West Market Street 
Louisville, Kentucky 40202 
(502) 585-3534

l



UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH C I RCUIT

AT CINCINNATI

DOUGLAS PUCKETT, )

Plaintiff-Appellant )

VS >
) Case No. 92-5869

CITY OF LOUISVILLE )
LOUISVILLE CIVIL SERVICE BOARD )
LOUISVILLE POLICE DEPARTMENT )
LOUISVILLE FRATERNAL ORDER OF )

POLICE )
LOUISVILLE BLACK POLICE OFFICERS )

ASSOCIATION )

Defendants-Appellees )

MOTION FOR ORAL ARGUMENT

Comes the Plaintiff/Appellant, by Counsel, pursuant to 6th 

Circuit Rule 9, and hereby moves that Oral Argument be heard in

this case for the following reasons:

1. This case presents novel questions in the application of 

Consent Decrees in class action discrimination cases which would

best be resolved through Oral Argument as well as through written 

briefs.

2. The argument in this case would center upon the

comparison of Martin v. Wilks. 490 U.S. 755 (1989) with this

Court's decision of y. City of Cinninn»ti 989 F. 2d 584

(6th C i r ., 1992).

li



Respectfully submitted,

T
Attorney ror Appellant 
807 West Market Street 
Louisville, Kentucky 40202 
(502) 585-3534

i n



TABLE. Q £  C O N TENTS

DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS......

MOTION FOR ORAL ARGUMENT....................

TABLE OF CONTENTS.......

TABLE OF CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES 

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW......

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS 
INTERPRETATION OF MARTIN V. WTT.KS. 490 U.S 
755 (1989) AND ITS APPLICATION OF SAID CASE 
TO DENY APPELLANT HIS DAY IN COURT.

JURISDICTION

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 

ARGUMENT...........

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF 
MARTIN V . WILKS, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) AND ITS 
APPLICATION OF SAID CASE TO DENY APPELLANT HIS 
DAY IN COURT

CONCLUSION.........................

DESIGNATION OF APPENDIX CONTENTS



T ABLE OF CASES AMD 
O T H E R  A U THORITIES

CASES i

Vogel v City of Cincinnati. 959 F. 2d 594
(6th Cir., 1992)............................... ii, 4, 5, 8, 10

Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989)............. iv, 1, 3, 4, 5,
6, 7, 8, 10

McDonnell Douglas v. Grfiftn . 411 U.S. 792,
902 S. CT. 1817 (1973) ..................................... 8,9

Texas Department of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U. S. 258, 67 L. Ed.
2d 207, 101 S. Ct. 1089 (1981)............................. 8

Beaven v. Commonwealth of Kentucky. 783 F 2d
672 (6th Cir . , 1986)........................................ 9

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. 477 U.S. 242, 251-251 (1986)..... 11

Celotex Coro. v. Catrett. 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)........... 11

Street v. J. C. Bradford & Co.. 866 F. 2d
1472 (6th Cir. , 1986)........................................ 11

STATUTES:

28 U.S.C. §144 ( a ) and (b)..........................................  1

28 U.S.C. 1443(2)..................................................  1

28 U.S.C. §1291.....................................................  1

RRS 344.450............................................................. 3, 6

KRS 344.040(a).......................................................  3

42 U.S.C. 2000(e).................................................... 6

v



UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
F O R  THE SIXTH C I R CUIT

AT CINCINNATI

DOUGLAS PUCKETT, )

)
Plaintiff-Appellant )

v s - ) Case No. 92-5869

CITY OF LOUISVILLE )
LOUISVILLE CIVIL SERVICE BOARD )
LOUISVILLE POLICE DEPARTMENT )
LOUISVILLE FRATERNAL ORDER OF )

POLICE )
LOUISVILLE BLACK POLICE OFFICERS )

ASSOCIATION )

)
Defendants-Appellees )

BRIEF F O R  APPELLANT  

I S S UE PRESENTED FOR RKVTEH

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF 
MA RTIN V . W ILKS, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) AND ITS APPLICATION 
OF SAID CASE TO DENY APPELLANT HIS DAY IN COURT.

JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction is properly with this Court pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. §144(a ) and (b); 28 U.S.C. 1443(2), said statutes having 

been the basis for removal from the State Court to the Federal 

Court as determined by the Trial Court. Appellate jurisdiction is 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1291.

STATEMENT OF THE CART?

May It Please This Honorable Court:

Douglas Puckett, hereinafter referred to as Puckett, was 

employed by the City of Louisville Police Department on June 3, 

1974 (R.29). On or about June 26, 1982, Puckett achieved and was

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promoted to the rank of Sergeant. On or about September 8, 1984, 

the Defendant/Appellee, City of Louisville Civil Service Board 

administered a test for the rank of Lieutenant, which was taken by 

Puckett CR.29). The test results from this promotional 

examination were certified October 29, 1984 and Puckett was listed 

as the tenth (10th) designee for promotion to the rank of 

Lieutenant (R.29). Puckett is a White employee of the City of 

Louisville Police Department.

On or about July 6, 1985, the 13th designee on the same list, 

namely, Jeffries Moody, was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant in 

the City of Louisville Police Department (R.29). His test score 

was more than two (2) points below that of Puckett's, as well as 

three (3) positions on the list below that of Puckett's (R.29).

Jeffries Moody is a Black employee of the City of Louisville 

Police Department (R.28).

On or about January 25, 1986, Paul Paris was promoted to the 

rank of Lieutenant for the City of Louisville Police Department. 

Paul Paris is a Black employee of the City of Louisville Police 

Department. He was four (4) positions below Puckett on the 

official eligibility list to be promoted to the rank of Lieutenant 

and his score was almost five (5) full points below the score of 

Puckett (R.29).

On or about September 12, 1986, Willie Henry was promoted to 

the rank of Lieutenant. Willie Henry is a Black employee of the 

City of Louisville Police Department. Willie Henry's name appears 

five (5) positions below that of Puckett on the official

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eligibility list for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant and his 

test score is more than five (5) points below that of Puckett's 

(R.29).

A total of ten (10) Lieutenant vacancies were filled prior to 

the expiration of the official eligibility list which occurred on 

October 27, 1986. Thirty (30%) percent of those promoted from the 

list were Black. The list subsequently expired prior to the 

promotion of the Appellant, Douglas Puckett (R.29).

Puckett then sought relief through the Jefferson Circuit 

Court of the Commonwealth of Kentucky pursuant to the civil 

remedies allowed to him by KRS 344.450 and KRS 344.040(a) (the 

Kentucky Civil Rights Act). The Defendants then removed the

action to the United States District Court for the Western

District of Kentucky at Louisville due to its nexus with Civil 

Action No. ' C74106L(A), Louisville Black Police Offinpr^ 

Association, et a l v . City of Louisville, et a l . hereinafter

designated and referred to as LBP0A v. City of Louisville (R.4).

It is unrefuted that Puckett was qualified for the position 

of Lieutenant and that but for the Consent Decree found in LBP0A 

v. City of Louisville, would have been promoted (R.29). It is 

further unrefuted, pursuant to Martin v. Wilks. 490 U.S. 755 

(1989), that Puckett has standing to proceed with his cause of 

action herein and, further, is not collaterally estopped from 

bringing said action. It is further unrefuted that whenever a 

Black officer was promoted through “goal promotion" that the next

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White officer on the list became the "designated promotion" and 

was then promoted.

Instead of any type of extension of the list, the list was 

allowed to expire with three (3) White officers, including 

Puckett, being skipped for goal promotions for positions to which 

they would have been promoted (R.29).

Motions for Summary Judgment were made by Defendants/ 

Appellees and responded to by Puckett with the Court granting the 

Defendants Summary Judgment on June 10, 1992, from which a timely 

appeal was made (R.49).

It is further unrefuted that this promotional list was

allowed to expire two (2) days short of a two-year period, same

being from October 29, 1984 to October 27, 1986. Puckett was not 

promoted, but would have been promoted if he had not been skipped 

for goal promotions (R.29).

ARGUMENT

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF MARTTN V
WILKS, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) AND ITS APPLICATION OF SAID
CASE TO DENY APPELLANT HIS DAY IN COURT.

The Trial Court, in granting Summary Judgment for the

Appellees, determined that there were no material facts to be 

introduced at a trial of this case. The Trial Court further 

determined that there was a strong community of interests between 

the Louisville Fraternal Order of Police and the interests of 

Douglas Puckett and, further, that the recent case of

Y ogel v City of Cincinnati. 959 F. 2d 594 (6th Cir., 1992) denies 

Puckett his day in Court regardless of the Supreme Court of United

-4-



States holding in tlartin V._Wilks. Supra. In reaching its

conclusions in its Order granting Summary Judgment to the 

Defendants/Appellees, the Trial Court further determined that the 

Consent Decree was justified by a compelling state interest; and 

that Puckett had not attempted to offer any material challenging 

the justification of the Consent Decree. (Mem. Opin., p.  2) 

Said conclusion of the Trial Court that there was a strong 

community of interests between Puckett and the FOP is erroneous.

Once the Trial Court reached its erroneous decision that the 

Consent Decree was valid, and that there was a strong community of 

interests between the Louisville FOP and Puckett, Summary Judgment 

was granted.

The Trial Court erred in its judgment that the Consent Decree 

was valid as it applied to Puckett and that there was a strong 

community of interests between Puckett and the FOP because it 

failed to accurately make the basic determination as to exactly 

what the interest of Puckett were under the Consent Decree and 

what the interests of the FOP were under the Consent Decree and 

compare and contrast those interests to determine the similarities 

and the dissimilarities of the interests of Puckett and the FOP. 

Had the Court accurately made such a determination, it would have 

been left with the conclusion that the interests of the FOP and 

the interests of Puckett were, in fact, different.

Without a detailed and correct finding of the interests of 

Puckett and the F O P , the Court could not properly apply the 

holding of Yogel y. City of Cincinnati. supra. to rule against

-5-



Puckett on his claim brought pursuant to KRS 344.450 as 

interpreted by 42 U.S.C. 2000(e) and ttartin v. Wilks, supra.

Had the Trial Court determined Puckett's interests, it would 

have determined that his interests were unique, being one of only 

three officers who were passed over for promotion to Lieutenant. 

The Court should further recognize that the Consent Decree did not 

contain any provision protecting the civil rights of those three 

officers who were passed over pursuant to its terms.

The FOP represents all police officers regardless of race. 

The FOP is not, nor should it be, a race conscious organization. 

The interests of the Black police officers were protected by a 

race conscious and race specific organization, the Black Police 

Officers Association. For the Court to determine that the 

interests of the White officers were adequately protected by a 

racially neutral organization which had to work for all officers 

regardless of race, working in an adversary process with an 

organization which was race specific and which had racially 

motivated goals representing Black officers is clearly erroneous. 

The finding by the Court that the FOP adequately represented 

Puckett s interests is clearly erroneous. In an adversary system, 

for any organization to adequately represent the interests of 

Puckett, that organization should have been not a racially neutral 

organization, but a racially specific and racially motivated 

organization.

Assuming that the Consent Decree was justified by compelling 

state interests, were Puckett's interests ever adjudicated, let

-6-



alone represented? Martin V. Wilks, supra. allows Puckett 

standing to bring this question before the Court. In Martin v 

■ supra, at 2184, the Court said that affirmative action 

plans are favored, but that they "must yield to the policy against 

requiring third parties to submit to bargains in which their 

interests were either ignored or sacrificed."

The Court further stated at 2187:

"No one can seriously contend that an employer 
might successfully defend against a Title VII 
claim by one group of employees on the ground 
that its actions were required by an earlier 
decree entered in a suit brought against it by 
another, if the latter group did not have 
adequate notice or knowledge of the earlier 
suit. "

At 2188, the Court stated:

"A voluntary settlement in the form of a 
consent decree between one group of employees 
and their employer cannot possibly 'settle' 
voluntarily or otherwise, the conflicting 
claims of another group of employees who do 
not join the agreement."

This ruling clearly demonstrates that it was impossible for 

the racially neutral Louisville FOP to adequately represent the 

interests of Puckett in an adversary proceeding involving a 

racially centered and motivated organization, the Black Police 

Officers Association.

Puckett has never been allowed to present factual evidence at 

the trial of his case demonstrating the harm of the racial 

discrimination against him. Had any organization represented the 

interests of Puckett, alternatives were available to achieve the

-7-



same time protecting thegoals of the Consent Decree while at the 

interests of Puckett. Martin v Wilks, supra., in its wisdom, is 

clearly stating that unless all classes of police officers

affected by a consent decree were represented, they are entitled 

to their day in court.

It is not the obligation nor the burden of proof of Puckett

to contest the previous Consent Decree. It is the burden of

Puckett only to show that his interests were not represented

within the Consent Decree and that he was discriminated against. 

Further, as long as Puckett shows at this stage of the proceedings 

that there is a question of material fact, whether or not his 

interests were ever protected by the Louisville FOP, the case is 

totally distinguishable from Yflgel v. City of Cincinnati, supra. 

Puckett has made his prima facie case of race discrimination.

There are basically two ways that a prima facie case of race 

discrimination can be proven. The traditional method is the four 

prong test of MsDonneli Douglas v. Grssn. 411 U.S. 792, 903 S. Ct 

1817 (1973) as modified to meet the facts of the situation

pursuant to Xsxas Department of Community Affairs y, R „ H i no 450 

U.S. 248, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207, 101 S. C t . 1089 (1981).

The four prong test of McDonnell as applied to this

case, would be as follows:

1. Appellant is a member of race protected by KRS Chapter 

344 .

The Appellant is White (R .24).

-8-



2. There was a promotion to Lieutenant which Appellant did 

not get (R.29).

3. The Appellant was qualified for the job of Lieutenant.

The Appellant scored higher on the promotional test and was

higher on the promotion list than were three non—Whites who were 

promoted to Lieutenant (R.29, R .24).

4. The persons who were promoted were of a different race 

than Appellant.

Three individuals with lower test scores and promotional 

standing than Appellant were promoted, while Appellant was not 

promoted.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has 

ruled that the four prong test in McDonnell Douglas was never 

intended to be rigid, mechanized or ritualistic. See: B e a v f t n  v

Commonwealth of Kentucky. 783 F. 2d 672 (6th Cir., 1986). The 

Court in Beaven i supra., rules that a prima facie case could be 

established simply by showing that a Black person and a White 

person were treated differently under substantially similar 

circumstances. In this case, Puckett was not promoted to 

Lieutenant even though he had substantially higher scores on the 

promotional test than did the Blacks who were promoted. It is 

further undisputed that the only reason for this disparate 

treatment is that Puckett is White.

Puckett, therefore, has established that the sole basis for 

his non-promotion was his race, White, and he has established a

-9-



prima facie case under both the McDonnell Douglas and the B e a v e n  

standards.

To uphold the Trial Court's opinion, this Court must find:

1. That it was mandatory for Puckett to offer material to 

indicate that the Consent Decree was not justified by compelling 

state interests; and

2. Puckett's interests were totally and completely

represented by the Louisville FOP in the LBPOA v. City of

Louisville, et al case; and

3. That in so finding that Vogel v. City of Cincinna-M

supra, can negate the Supreme Court holding in Marti n y, Wi l kc; |

supra, to deny Puckett his day in court; and

4. There was no other material issue of fact to be presented 

at trial.

Those four (4) points, in essence, are the reasoning in the 

Memorandum Opinion to deny Plaintiff his day in Court. This 

reasoning totally and completely fails.

Further, Puckett s rights and interests were never 

adjudicated nor represented by the Louisville FOP as to what 

percentage of an existing list should be promoted when there is a 

limited number of promotions for the life of the list. Puckett's 

rights and interests were never adjudicated nor represented by the 

Louisville FOP in extending a list to accommodate the class of 

police officers who would have been promoted but for goal 

promotions. Puckett s rights and interests were never adjudicated 

nor represented by the Louisville FOP through the Consent Decree

-10-



or otherwise as to whether or not those White officers who were 

not promoted solely because of Black goal promotions should be 

allowed placement on the next promotional list after their list 

expires. The Consent Decree did not address the interests of 

Whites who were bypassed for promotion because of their race. 

Then and only then would the rights and interests of Puckett have 

been adjudicated and represented by the Louisville FOP.

With respect to the standard Plaintiff Puckett must meet, it 

is well established that the essential inquiry is whether the 

evidence in this case presents a sufficient disagreement to 

require submission to a jury, or whether it is so one-sided that 

one party must prevail as a matter of law. A n d e r s o n  y ,  T , i h P r f v  

477 u -s - 242, 251-252 (1986). This inquiry •'necessarily

implicates the standard of proof that would apply at the trial on 

the merits. Li. at 252. Summary Judgment will be granted "after 

adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who 

fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of 

an element essential to the party's case, and on which that party 

will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celntay C o r n  v 

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The burden is on the party

moving for Summary Judgment to produce evidence showing the 

absence of a genuine issue on which the non-moving party bears the 

burden of proof. at 325. But, in order to defeat a Motion

for Summary Judgment, the Respondent must present affirmative 

evidence of the disputed material fact. Street v. J C  R a d f o r d  ft 

Cfl... 866 F. 2d 1472 (6th Cir., 1989).

-11-



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CONCLUSION

The Plaintiff, Douglas Puckett, has demonstrated that there 

are substantial and material issues of fact and law which preclude 

Summary Judgment in this case. Plaintiff Puckett has demonstrated 

that he is neither a party to LBPOA v. City of L o u i s v i l l e .  nor 

bound by it; he lacks sufficient community of interests with the 

previous intervening Defendant, FOP, because the FOP never

litigated the issue of promotion beyond filing objections to the

final Consent Decree in LB.PQA y .— City— &£_Louisville; nor was there

ever a community of interests between the Louisville FOP and 

Puckett. Puckett's rights and interests were never litigated.

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff respectfully requests that this 

Honorable Court reverse the Memorandum Order of the United States 

District Court granting Summary Judgment to the Defendants and 

allow this case to proceed to trial.

Respectfully submitted,

T
A
807 West Market Street 
Louisville, Kentucky 40202 
(502) 585-3534

-12-



UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE SIXTH C I RCUIT

Case No. 92-5869 

Case Caption:

DOUGLAS PUCKETT

Plaintiff-Appellant

VS.

CITY OF LOUISVILLE
LOUISVILLE CIVIL SERVICE BOARD
LOUISVILLE POLICE DEPARTMENT
LOUISVILLE FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE
LOUISVILLE BLACK POLICE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION

Defendants-Appellees

A PPELLANT'S DESIGN A T I O N  OF A P P E N D I X  CONTENTS

Appellant, pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 11(b), hereby 
designates the following filings in the district court's record as 
items to be included in the joint appendix:

DESCRIPTION Q£ ENTRY DAIEL
RECORD 

ENTRY NO.

Docket Sheet, C-90-0856-L(A)

Notice of Removal from Jefferson 
Circuit Court 12/21/90

12/21/90

1

Motion to File Amended Complaint 
with Tendered Complaint 8/8/91 15

Motion for Summary Judgment by 
Defendant, Civil Service Board 12/27/91 25

Motion for Summary Judgment by 
Defendant, City of Louisville 12/27/91 26

Response to Plaintiff's Request 
for Admissions by Defendant, 
City of Louisville

-13-

1/3/92 28



29

Answers to Interrogatories 
Propounded by Plaintiff by 
Defendant, City of Louisville

Motion for Summary Judgment by 
Defendant, Louisville Black Police 
Officers Association

Deposition of Capt. Richard Dotson 
for Plaintiff (2/19/92)

Plaintiff s Response to Summary 
Judgment Motions

Memorandum Opinion Granting 
Summary Judgment

Summary Judgment for Defendants

1/3/92

2/4/92

3/9/92

3/9/92

6/10/92

6/10/92

34

43

44

48

49

Respectfully submitted,

/
Jm-vt-j /H U

TEDDY B./GORDON 
Attorney for Appellant 
807 West Market Street 
Louisville, Kentucky 40202 
(502) 585-3534

-14-