Motley, Constance Baker; Gantt, Harvey; Meredith, James; and Others, 1964, undated - 4 of 5 (back)

    S010142

IN THE

Supreme Court
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

EMMA ROJO and TERESA MALONEY,
P lain tiffs/A ppellan ts,

vs.

IRWIN H. KLIGER and
IRWIN H. KLIGER, M.D., a Medical Corporation, et al.,

D efendan ts /R espondents.

RESPONDENTS’ REPLY BRIEF

ON REVIEW OF DECISION OF COURT OF APPEAL, 
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION THREE 

REVERSING JUDGMENT OF THE SUPERIOR COURT 
OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

HONORABLE J. KIMBALL WALKER, JUDGE

KNAPP, PETERSEN & CLARKE

THOMAS H. OTT 
BRYAN H. BAUMEISTER 

DAVID J. COHEN

Suite 400
70 Universal City Plaza 

Universal City, California 91608 
(818) 508-5000

A ttorn eys f o r  D efendants/R espondents  
IRWIN H. KLIGER and

IRWIN H. KLIGER, M.D., a Medical Corporation

Lawyers Brief Service / Legal Printers / (213) 383-4457 / (714) 720-1510



IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

EMMA ROJO and TERESA MALONEY,

Plaintiffs!Appellants,

VS.

IRWIN H. KLIGER and IRWIN H. 
KLIGER, M.D., a Medical Corporation, 

et al.,

Defendants/Respondents.

ON REVIEW OF DECISION OF COURT OF APPEAL, 
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION THREE 

REVERSING JUDGMENT OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

HONORABLE J. KIMBALL WALKER, JUDGE

RESPONDENTS’ REPLY BRIEF



APPELLATE BRIEFS

LAWYERS BRIEF SERVICE
LOS ANGELES 

(213)

V O ICE........  383-4457
FAX .............  383-4830
MODEM .... 383-7306

NEWPORT BEACH 
(714)

VOICE ........  720-1510
FAX..............  720-9431
MODEM .... 720-8005

3550 Wilshire Blvd. 
Suite 916

Los Angeles, CA 90010

250 Newport Center Dr. 
Suite 301

Newport Beach, CA 92660



TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................  2

I. THE LEGISLATURE INTENDED TO PREEM PT ALL
OTHER REMEDIES RELATING TO EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION BY ENACTING THE F E H A .................................. 3

A. The FEHA Provides Petitioners’ Exclusive
Remedy for Employment Discrimination............................................  3

B. Legislative Intent To Occupy The Field Of 
Employment Discrimination Can Be Inferred
From The Comprehensiveness Of The FEHA.................................. 5

II. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REM EDIES IS
MANDATORY PURSUANT TO THE F E H A .......................................... 6

III. ARTICLE I, SECTION 8 OF THE CALIFORNIA
CONSTITUTION DOES NOT PROVIDE EMPLOYEES 
WITH A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR EMPLOYMENT 
D ISC R IM IN A TIO N ........................................................................................... 8

A. Article I, Section 8 Requires State Action.........................................  8

B. Article I, Section 8 Is Not A Self-Executing
Provision.....................................................................................................  9

IV. CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE SECTION 51 DOES NOT 
ENCOMPASS EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
C L A IM S ...............................................................................................................  9

CO N CLU SIO N ............................................................................................................................... 10

PAGE

l



TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970)
2 Cal.3d 493, 500 .......................................................................................................................  9, 10

Bennett v. Borden, Inc. (1976)
56 Cal.App.3d 706, 709 ..................................................................................................................7

Brown v. Superior Court (1984)
37 Cal.3d A ll, 485 .......................................................................................................................  4, 6

Buxbom  v. Smith (1944)
23 Cal.2d 535 .................................................................................................................................... 8

Commodore Home Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court (1982)
32 Cal.3d 211 .......................................................................................................................  4, 6, 10

Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987)
43 Cal.3d 1379, 1386-7 ..........................................................................................................  3, 4, 6

Ficalora v. Lockheed Corp. (1987)
193 Cal.App.3d 489, 492 ............................................................................................................. 4, 6

Gay Law Students A ss’n. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. (1979)
24 Cal.3d 458, 468  8

Hollon v. Pierce (1967)
257 Cal.App.2d 468, 475 ..................................................................................................................7

IE . Associates v. Safeco Title Ins. Co. (1985)
39 Cal.3d 281, 285 .......................................................................................................................  3-5

In re William G. (1985)
40 Cal.3d 550 ......................................................................................................................................8

Isbister v. Boys’ Club o f Santa Cruz, Inc. (1985)
40 Cal.3d 72, 83 (fn.12) ..................................................................................................................10

Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank (1974)
11 Cal.3d 352 ......................................................................................................................................8

PAGE

ii



TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (cont.)

Pacific Scene, Inc. v. Penasquitos, Inc. (1988)
46 Cal.3d 407, 411 .......................................................................................................................  4? 5

Pasillas v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1984)
156 Cal.App.3d 312, 339 ..................................................................................................................8

Robinson v. Hewlett-Packard Corp. (1986)
183 Cal.App.3d 1108, 1124 .............................................................................................................4

Rojo v. Kliger (1989)
209 Cal.App.3d 10, 28-29 ..........................................................................................................  6, 8

Sail’er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby (1971)
5 Cal.3d 1, 8 .........................................................................................................................................8

State Personnel Bd. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1985)
39 Cal.3d 422, 432 .............................................................................................................................. 5

Takahashi v. Board o f Education (1988)
202 Cal.App.3d 1464, 1478 .......................................................................................................  4, 7

Weinstock, Lubin & Co. v. Marks (1895)
109 Cal.529 ........................................................................................................................................... 8

Westlake Community Hosp. v. Superior Court (1976)
17 Cal.3d 465, 475 .............................................................................................................................. 7

Williams v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1986)
186 Cal.App.3d 941, 949 ....................................................................................................................7

Winchester v. Howard (1902)
136 Cal.432, 440 ................................................................................................................................ 9

Yurick v. Superior Court (1989)
209 Cal.App.3d 1116, 1 1 2 3 ................................................................................................................7

PAGE

in



TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (cont.)

STATUTES

California Civil Code § 5 1 .............................................................................................  3 4 9 jq

California Civil Code §51 .7 ................................................................................  9

California Civil Code § 52(f) ........................................................................................  9

California Constitution, Article I, Section 3 ................................................................................ g

California Constitution, Article I, Section 2 ...........................................................................  g

California Constitution, Article I, Section 8 ......................................................................2, 8, 9

California Constitution, Article XX, Section 1 8 ........................................................................ g

California Government Code §12900 ..................................................................................... 3 5

California Government Code §12920 ...........................................................................................5

Government Code §12948 ................................................................................................ 9

Government Code § 12993(c) .................................................................................................. 3? 4

PAGE

IV



INTRODUCTION

Employment discrimination is neither a recent development nor an 
ephemeral concern. It is an unfortunate reality which cannot be eliminated through 
legislative or judicial decrees. However, its prevalence can be regulated and curtailed 
through an integrated, comprehensive scheme such as the California Fair Employment 
and Housing Act ("FEHA").

Petitioners and their Amici portray the FEHA as a skewed statute, 
designed to "protect" employers from claims of their employees. However, in today’s 
litigious society featuring overburdened courts and rapidly escalating fees, the FEHA 
provides the most efficient system for regulating employment discrimination. The 
overriding FEHA policy of prompt, economical resolution of discrimination claims can be 
realized only if the Legislature s intention to "occupy the field" is honored. Piercing the 
veil envisioned by the Legislature would circumvent the purpose of the FEHA, rendering 
the Act obsolete.

Contrary to the conclusion of the Court of Appeal, California employees 
are not afforded a cause of action for employment discrimination under Article I,
Section 8 of the Constitution. This Court has uniformly declined to apply similar 
Constitutional provisions to purely private conduct. Furthermore, the effectiveness of 
Article I, Section 8 depends upon enabling legislation, consistent with the framers’ clear 
intention, exhibited by the provision’s general nature. Finally, the Court of Appeal in­
advisedly meandered into the domain of the Legislature by creating a cause of action for 
tortious wrongful discharge in contravention of the public policy expressed in the FEHA.

Since an Article I, Section 8 prohibition of employment discrimination did 
not pre-date enactment of the FEHA, petitioners’ exclusive remedy is embodied within 
the detailed statutory scheme. Likewise, clear legislative intent excludes the field of 
employment discrimination from the scope of the Unruh Civil Rights Act. Permitting 
employees’ simultaneous pursuit of parallel remedial avenues would effectively abrogate 
successful legislative efforts.

Since the Court of Appeal misapplied fundamental principles underlying the 
doctrines of administrative remedies, preemption and statutory interpretation,
Respondents respectfully urge this Court to reverse the ruling of the Court of Appeal 
and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

2



I.

THE LEGISLATURE INTENDED TO PREEMPT ALL 
OTHER REMEDIES RELATING TO EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION BY ENACTING THE FEHA

The FEHA Provides Petitioners’ Exclusive Remedy for Employment 
Discrimination.

The California Legislature designed and enacted an integrated, 
comprehensive administrative scheme for handling employment discrimination claims, 
now codified in Government Code §12900 et seq. The Fair Employment and Housing 
Act ("FEHA") provides a detailed system for the investigation and expedient resolution 
of discrimination claims at a pre-litigation stage. Government Code § 12993(c) explicitly 
affirms "the intention of the legislature to occupy the field of regulation of discrimination 
in employment and housing" through enforcement of the provisions of the FEHA .1

Petitioners argue that the Legislature intended to preempt only local laws 
by enacting the FEHA, implicitly exempting common law and state law from 
displacement. However, petitioners’ lengthy argument violates long-standing principles of 
statutory construction, thereby rendering it invalid.

The Court’s "first task in construing a statute is to ascertain the intent of 
the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. In determining such intent, a 
court must look first to the words of the statute themselves, giving to the language its 
usual, ordinary import . . .  in pursuance of the legislative purpose." (Dyna-Med, Inc. v. 
Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1386-7.)

Section 12993(c)’s assertion that the Legislature intended to occupy the 
field, exclusive of all other laws is a clear expression of the legislative purpose of the 
FEHA. In I.E. Associates v. Safeco Title Ins. Co. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 281, 285, this Court 
recognized that statutes supplant common law when it appears that the "[legislature 
intended to cover the entire subject or, in other words, to ‘occupy the field.’" (Italics 
added.) Clearly this Court has interpreted such statutory language as the equivalent of

1 California Government Code §12993(c) states in its entirety: "While it is the intention of the 
legislature to occupy the field of regulation of discrimination in employment and housing encompassed by 
the provisions of this part, exclusive of all other laws banning discrimination in employment and housing 
by any city, city and county, county, or other political subdivision of the state, nothing contained in this 
part shall be construed, in any manner or way, to limit or restrict the application of Section 51 of the 
Civil Code.”

3



preemption. Several California appellate courts have followed suit, denying common law 
claims of employees who failed to file with the Department of Fair Employment and 
Housing ("DFEH") prior to initiating civil actions.2

Even if the Legislature had not explicitly stated its intention to "occupy the 
field" of employment discrimination, such intent could be inferred from the detailed, 
comprehensive nature of the FEHA. (I.E. Associates v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., supra, 39 
Cal.3d at p. 285; Pacific Scene, Inc. v. Penasquitos, Inc. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 407, 411.) The 
comprehensiveness of the FEHA has been consistently acknowledged by this Court.3

Petitioners’ argument that the Legislature intended to preempt some, but 
not all employment discrimination laws would render the FEHA obsolete. Creative 
labeling would permit claimants to bypass the administrative remedy whenever doing so 
would work to the claimants’ advantage. This anomalous situation obviously was not the 
intention of the Legislature in enacting the FEHA. Furthermore, § 12993(c)’s explicit 
preservation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Cal. Civ. Code section 51) signifies the 
Legislature’s intention to occupy the field of employment discrimination. Petitioners’ 
argument that the Legislature intended to preempt only local laws through enactment of 
the FEHA would render the final clause of § 12993(c) mere surplusage. By expressly 
exempting Civil Code §51 from preemption, the Legislature implicitly declared its 
intention that the FEHA preempt all laws, whether local or state, except the Unruh Civil 
Rights Act.4

Petitioners’ argument depicts the FEHA as a unilateral "catch-22" designed 
to preclude employees from pursuing employment discrimination claims. In reality, 
however, the FEH A ’s administrative scheme directly benefits not only employers, but to 
an equal degree, employees and courts, while incidentally benefiting the general public. 
Rapid, informal and inexpensive procedures are advantageous to the participants, while 
simultaneously alleviating the burden on the courts. "[T]he [DFEH] bears the expense of 
investigating, conciliating and, where necessary, prosecuting the action on behalf of the

Ficalora v. Lockheed Corp. (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 489, 492 ("the [legislature has made dear its 
intent to ‘occupy the field of regulation of discrimination in employment’ by virtue of the FEHA."); 
Takahashi v. Board o f  Education (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 1464, 1478 (B[t]he Act is an attempt by the’ 
Legislature to ‘occupy the field’ of regulation of discrimination in employment and housing [Gov. Code, 
§12993, subd.(c).]"); Robinson v. Hewlett-Packard Corp. (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 1108, 1124 ("the legislature 
has expressly declared an intent to occupy the field of radal discrimination in employment").

2
Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment and Housing Com., supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 1383-84; Brown v. 

Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 477, 485; Commodore Home Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court (1982) 32 
Cal.3d 211.

4California Civil Code §51 is not an available remedy to Petitioners in this case, as discussed 
further at pages 9-10.

4



claimant." {State Personnel Bd. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 
422, 432.) This Court has recognized the efficiency and effectiveness of the FEH A ’s 
administrative scheme, citing the D FEH ’s "25 years of administrative expertise solely in 
the prevention and remedying of civil rights discrimination." {Id., at p.432.)

Petitioners’ incongruent analogies to Vehicle Code preemption cannot 
detract the clear legislative intent to preempt all other remedies relating to employment 
discrimination through enactment of the FEHA. Petitioners request a departure from 
sound, long-standing procedures, yet offer no policy as justification. Clear legislative 
intent should not be capriciously ignored in light of the effectiveness of the present 
system.

B. Legislative Intent To Occupy The Field Of Employment Discrimination
Can Be Inferred From The Comprehensiveness Of The FEHA.

The FEHA furnishes a detailed, comprehensive statutory system to promote 
its underlying public policy of "protecting] and safeguarding] the right and opportunity 
of all persons to seek, obtain, and hold employment without discrimination or 
abridgement on account of race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical 
handicap, medical condition, marital status, sex, or age." (California Government Code 
§12920.)

This Court has inferred legislative intent to supersede preexisting common 
law from similar comprehensive statutes. (I.E. Associates v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., supra, 
39 Cal.3d at page 285: "[G]eneral and comprehensive legislation, where course of 
conduct, parties, things affected, limitations and exceptions are minutely described, 
indicates a legislative intent that the statute should totally supersede and replace the 
common law dealing with the subject matter."); {Pacific Scene, Inc. v. Pehasquitos, Inc., 
supra, 46 Cal.3d at page 413: "In view of the detailed statutory remedies now 
encompassing virtually all claims previously asserted in equity against the former 
shareholders of dissolved corporations, we must similarly conclude that the Legislature 
has occupied the field and precluded resort to dormant common law doctrines for the 
provision of extra-statutory relief.")

The FEHA resembles these statutes previously held to supersede 
preexisting common law. The DFEH is afforded extensive powers to regulate the field 
of discrimination in employment, including investigation, discovery, issuing subpoenas, 
initiating civil administrative proceedings and determining and employee’s right to pursue 
a private action.5 The FEHA so clearly defines the parties it affects and the types of

5California Government Code §12900 et seq.

5



conduct it regulates, that this Court has acknowledged that "[t]he FEHA establishes a 
comprehensive scheme for combating employment discrimination." (Brown v. Superior 
Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 477, 485.) Thus, FEHA preemption of preexisting common law is 
entirely consistent with the Legislature’s intention to occupy the field of employment 
discrimination.

II.

EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES IS 
MANDATORY PURSUANT TO THE FEHA

The FEHA "provides two avenues for resolution of claims: ‘first, a 
complaint to the [DFEH]; second, if that agency fails to act, a private court action.’" 
(Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com., supra, 43 Cal.3d at p.1400 [Italics 
added].) Well-established policy objectives support application of the doctrine of 
exhaustion of administrative remedies to employment discrimination claims.6

Petitioners argue that the doctrine of exhaustion is inapplicable to the 
FEHA because the statute provides an alternative judicial remedy, (Petitioners’ Brief, at 
p. 10) and thus constitutes cumulative remedies. However, petitioners offer no authority 
in support of this theory. In fact, the Court of Appeal accurately concluded that 
exhaustion of administrative remedies is mandatory in claims for violations of the FEHA.7 
(Rojo v. Kliger (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 10, 28-29.)

California Courts have consistently supported the province of the DFEH by 
requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to pursuit of a civil action. In 
Ficalora v. Lockheed Corp. (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 489, 492, the Court of Appeal stated:

6These policy objectives are discussed extensively in Respondent’s Brief at pp.3-5.

7The Court of Appeal relied upon, inter alia, Commodore Home Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court 
(1982) 32 Cal.3d 211, 218-219 ("the availability of court remedies remains within the [DFEH’s] control," 
and "the right [of private civil action] is ‘limited,’ in the sense that extensive administrative procedures are 
a precondition to its accrual." (Italics added); and Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com., 
supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1384 ("[i]f an accusation is not issued within 150 days after the filing of the 
complaint or if the department earlier determines not to prosecute the case and the matter is not 
otherwise resolved, the department must give the complainant a ‘right to sue’ letter. The complainant 
may then bring a civil suit in superior court." (Italics added).

6



"Even if a common law cause of action existed before 
retaliation was identified in the Act as an unlawful 
employment practice, the Legislature has made clear its intent 
to ‘occupy the field of regulation of discrimination in 
employment’ by virtue of the FEHA."

Most recently, in Yurick v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1116, 1123, 
the Court of Appeal acknowledged that permitting a claimant to pursue a private cause 
of action without first exhausting administrative remedies "would undermine vital policy 
interests embodied in FEHA, i.e., the resolution of disputes and elimination of unlawful 
employment practices by conciliation."8

Petitioners’ argument that the administrative remedy is cumulative because 
common law and statutory remedies predated the FEHA is fatally flawed. In Westlake 
Community Hosp. v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 465, 475, this Court barred plaintiffs 
common law claims because of the overriding policy objectives embodied in the doctrine 
of exhaustion. Furthermore, "[t]he prohibitions on employment discrimination contained 
in the FEPA [the predecessor of the FEHA] are in no sense declaratory of preexisting 
common law doctrine." (Williams v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 
941, 949.) "Where a new right is created by statute, the party aggrieved by its violation 
is confined to the statutory remedy if one is provided." (id., at p.949.)

Petitioners’ historical argument urges this Court to discard a sound doctrine 
firmly ingrained in California law. Their argument that the present system prejudices 
claimants by closing the courtroom doors at their feet is simply untrue. The doctrine of 
exhaustion of administrative remedies only requires the claimant to utilize the 
administrative forum prior to seeking redress from the overcrowded judicial system.
None of the claimant’s rights are impaired while the burden on the courts is substantially 
alleviated. The present scheme provides the most efficient method of investigating and 
resolving employment discrimination claims, and therefore, should not be curtailed.

®A long line of cases is in accord, including: Holton v. Pierce (1967) 257 Cal.App.2d 468, 475 
(”[w]here an administrative remedy is provided by statute, relief must be sought from the administrative 
body and the remedy exhausted before the courts will act"); Bennett v. Borden, Inc. (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 
706, 709 (”[e]xhaustion of the administrative remedy is a jurisdictional prerequisite to resort to the 
courts"); Takahashi v. Board o f Education (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 1464.

7



III.

ARTICLE I, SECTION 8 OF THE CALIFORNIA 
CONSTITUTION DOES NOT PROVIDE EMPLOYEES 
WITH A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION

A. Article I. Section 8 Requires State Action.

Article I, Section 8 of the California Constitution provides that "[a] person 
may not be disqualified from entering or pursuing a business, profession, vocation, or 
employment because of sex, race, creed, or national or ethnic origin."9 Petitioners’ 
argument that this Constitutional provision is applicable to private sector employers is 
premised on erroneous interpretations of decisions of this Court. As support for their 
argument, petitioners cite two early decisions, not even remotely analogous to the present 
case.10

This Court has consistently declined to apply similar constitutional 
provisions to private conduct.11 Most notable, is the Court’s decision in Sail’er Inn, Inc. v. 
Kirby (1971) 5 Cal.3d 1, 8: "[Article XX] Section 18 constitutes a restraint upon the law­
making power of the state, and legislative enactments contrary to its provisions are void." 
(Italics added.) Likewise, California appellate courts have recognized that purely private 
actions are not regulated by similar Constitutional provisions. (E.g. Pasillas v. Agricultural 
Labor Relations Bd. (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 312, 339 (Article I, Sections 2 and 3): 'The 
common starting point for these claims is the question of ‘state action.’") If "changing 
circumstances and mores" (Rojo v. Kliger (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 10, 26) warrant a 
departure from well-established principles yielded by prior Supreme Court decisions, the 
California Legislature has succeeded through enactment of the FEHA.

9The predecessor of Article I, Section 8 (amended in 1974), Article XX, Section 18, as enacted in 
1879, stated: "No person shall, on account of sex, be disqualified from entering or pursuing any lawful 
business, vocation or profession."

10Petitioners cite Weinstock, Lubin & Co. v. Marks (1895) 109 Cal.529 (trademark infringement) and 
Buxbom v. Smith (1944) 23 Cal.2d 535 (unfair competition, breach of contract). These cases neither allude 
to nor relate to Article XX, Section 18.

l lKruger v. Wells Fargo Bank (1974) 11 Cal.3d 352 (due process clause); Gay Law Students A ss’n. v. 
Pacific Tel. & Tel Co., (1979) 24 Cal.3d 458, 468 (equal protection clause); In re William G. (1985) 40 
Cal.3d 550 (search and seizure clause).

8



B. Article I, Section 8 Is Not A Self-Executing Provision

Petitioners contend that Article I, Section 8 is self-executing and therefore 
provides employees "an independent right of action for private conduct in derogation of 
its guarantees." (Petitioners’ brief at p. 23). Yet petitioners cite the very case requiring 
the opposite conclusion. In Winchester v. Howard (1902) 136 Cal.432, 440, this Court 
ruled that constitutional provisions that can be given reasonable effect without enabling 
legislation are presumed to be self-executing unless a contrary intent is shown. "Such 
intent would be manifested not only when expressly so stated, but when only a general 
principle or policy is declared, or when . . .  it is ordained that certain acts shall or shall 
not be prohibited, and only the legislature can make the prohibition, or when certain acts 
are forbidden, and no penalties or other means of making the prohibition effective have 
been provided, and in other like cases." (Id., at p.440.)

Article I, Section 8 is clearly such an expression of "general principle or 
policy," whose effectiveness is dependent upon the FEHA. Thus, the provision does not 
afford employees a distinct cause of action against private sector employers.

IV.

CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE SECTION 51 DOES NOT 
ENCOMPASS EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS

Amicus NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. ("NAACP") 
argues that the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Cal. Civ. Code §51) was explicitly intended to 
supplement the FEH A .12 Amicus seizes upon the Legislature’s use of the conjunctive 
"also" as foundation for its position that an employee-complainant may simultaneously 
pursue multiple remedial avenues. However, this Court succinctly concluded otherwise in 
Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 500:

Amicus specifically cites to §51.7, addressing freedom from violence, and §52(f), which provides 
n[a]ny person claiming to be aggrieved by an alleged unlawful practice in violation of Section 51 or 51.7 
may also file a verified complaint with the Department of Fair Employment & Housing pursuant to 
Section 12948 of the Government Code."

9



"Although this court has held that the term ‘business 
establishments’ in section 51 was used in the ‘broadest sense 
reasonably possible’ [citation], it is doubtful that the Legislature 
intended these sections to apply to discrimination in employment.

"Although the Fair Employment Practices Act can not be 
deemed to have repealed any provisions of the Civil Rights 
Act (see Lab. Code, §1432), we conclude that the concurrent 
enactment o f the former act indicated a legislative intent to 
exclude the subject o f discrimination in employment from the 
latter act." (Italics added.)

Therefore, regardless of whether §51 provides an independent remedy, it 
does not encompass employment discrimination claims, and consequently, is unavailable 
to petitioners.13

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth in Respondents’ brief and herein, as well as those 
discussed in Amicus briefs, Respondents respectfully urge the Court to reverse the ruling 
of the Court of Appeal and affirm the judgment entered in trial court.

DATED: December 1989 Respectfully submitted,

KNAPP, PETERSEN & CLARKE 
THOMAS H. OTT 
BRYAN H. BAUMEISTER 
DAVID J. COHEN

B y ^ ^ ____________
l DAVID J. COHEN

Attorneys for Defendants/Respondents 
IRWIN H. KLIGER and IRWIN H. 
KLIGER, M.D., a Medical Corporation

13This Court has consistently affirmed its interpretation in Alcorn: Commodore Home Systems,
Inc. v. Superior Court (1982) 32 Cal.3d 211, 220; Isbister v. Boys’ Club o f Santa Cruz, Inc. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 
72, 83 (fn.12).

10



PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL Page 1 of 2

In Re: RESPONDENTS’ REPLY BRIEF; No. S010142
Caption: Emma Rojo and Teresa Maloney vs. Irwin H. Kliger and Irwin H.

Kliger, M.D., a Medical Corporation
Filed: IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

STATE OF CALIFORNIA )
) ss:

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES )

I am a citizen of the United States and a resident of or employed in the City and County 
of Los Angeles; I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within action; 
my business address is: 3550 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 916, Los Angeles, California 
90010. On this date, I served the persons interested in said action by placing one copy of 
the above-entitled document in sealed envelopes with first-class postage fully prepaid in 
the United States post office mail box at Los Angeles, California, addressed as follows:

Lorraine Grindstaff, Esq.
Patten, Faith & Sanford 
635 West Foothill Boulevard 
Monrovia, CA 91016-2097 

(Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Rojo & Maloney)

Steven G. Drapkin, Esq.
Proskauer, Rose, Goetz & Mendelsohn 
2121 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 2700 
Los Angeles, CA 90067-5010 

(Attorneys for Amicus Curiae 
Merchants & Manufacturer’s 
Association)

Willard Z. Carr, Jr., Esq.
Pamela L. Hemminger 
J. Kevin Lilly 
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher 
800 Newport Center Drive 
Post Office Box 2490 
Newport Beach, CA 92660-6395 

(Attorneys for Amicus Curiae 
California Chamber of Commerce)

(Additional Counsel

California Employment Law Council 
Lawrence A. Michaels, Esq.
Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker 
555 South Flower Street, 22nd Floor 
Los Angeles, CA 90071

(Attorneys for California 
Employment Law Council)

Talmadge R. Jones, Director 
Department of Fair Employment 
& Housing
2016 “T” Street, Suite 210 
Sacramento, CA 95814

(Attorney for Department of Fair 
Employment & Housing)

Steven C. Owyang
Executive and Legal Affairs Secretary 
Fair Employment & Housing 
Commission
1390 Market Street, Suite 410 
San Francisco, CA 94102-5377

(Attorney for Fair Employment & 
Housing Commission)

listed on next page)

I certify (or declare) under penalty of peijury that the foregoing is true and correct. 
Executed on December 19, 1989 at Los Angeles, California.

AV771 D. JOHNSON
Lawyers Brief Service / Lcg^l Printers / (213) 383-4457 / (714) 720-1510



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Fred J. Hiestand
Association for California Tort Reform 
1130 “K” Street, Suite 250 
Sacramento, CA 95814

(Attorney for Association for 
California Tort Reform)

Law Offices of David C. Anton 
580 Grand Avenue 
Oakland, CA 94610

Roy G. Weatherup 
Haight, Brown & Bonesteel 
201 Santa Monica Boulevard 
Post Office Box 680 
Santa Monica, CA 90406

(Attorneys for Amicus Curiae 
Women Lawyers’ Association of 
Los Angeles)

Joseph Posner, Esq.
16311 Ventura Boulevard, Suite 555 
Encino, CA 91436

(Attorney for Amicus Curiae 
California Employment Lawyers 
Association)

Robert J. Rose
Bird, Marella, Boxer, Wolpert & Matz 
10960 Wilshire Boulevard, 24th Floor 
Los Angeles, CA 90024

(Attorneys for Amicus Curiae 
NAACP Legal Defense and 
Educational Fund, Inc.)

Julius s LeVonne Chambers 
NAACP Legal Defense and 
Educational Fund, Inc.
99 Kudson Street 
New York, NY 10013

(Attorney for Amicus Curiae 
NAACP Legal Defense and 
Educational Fund, Inc.

Christine Littleton, Professor of Law 
UCLA School of Law 
405 Hilegard Avenue 
Los Angeles, CA 90024

(Attorney for Amicus Curiae 
ACW of Southern California)

Frank S. Zolin, County Clerk 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
For: Hon. J. Kimball Walker, Judge 
111 North Hill Street, Room 105E 
Los Angeles, CA 90012

Clerk, Court of Appeal 
Second Appellate District 
Division Three
For: Hon. Joan Dempsey Klein 
3580 Wilshire Boulevard, Room 301 
Los Angeles, CA 90010