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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. City of Kansas City, Missouri v. WIlliams Brief for Appellees and Cross-Appellants, 1952. 83edf596-b99a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/d0d70917-5df1-464e-b648-f1c545d6b409/city-of-kansas-city-missouri-v-williams-brief-for-appellees-and-cross-appellants. Accessed August 19, 2025.
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Inited (Emtrt of App^ala Eighth Circuit No. 14,664— Civil CITY OF KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI, et al., Appellants, vs. ESTHER WILLIAMS, et al, Appellees. No. 14,666— Civil ESTHER WILLIAMS, et al., vs. Appellants, CITY OF KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI, et al., Appellees. A ppeal and Cross A ppeal F rom the D istrict Court op the U nited States por the W estern District of Missouri, W estern Division BRIEF FOR APPELLEES AND CROSS APPELLANTS Almer T. Adair, Carl R. J ohnson, R obert L. Carter, T hurgood Marshall, Counsel for Appellees-Appellants. David E. P insky, of Counsel. I N D E X PAGE Statement of the C ase ................................................... 1 Points and Authorities ........................................ 3 Argument—No. 14,664 ................................................. 5 I. The State has no power to impose distinctions among its citizens with respect to the use and enjoyment of public facilities ......................... 5 II. Where, as here, the facility maintained for the segregated group is unequal and inferior to that maintained for all other persons, the con stitutional mandate of equal protection of the laws is violated under all recognized theories of American constitutional law ........................ 7 No. 14,666 ....................................................................... 8 III. The right to maintain a class action under Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the benefit of a large group or class of persons similarly situated to secure rights guaranteed under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is supported by the overwhelming weight of au thority ........... 8 Conclusion ..................................................................... 13 Table of Cases Alton v. School Board of City of Norfolk, 122 F. 2d 992 (C. A. 4th 1940); cert. den. 311 U. S. 693 ......... 4,10 Asbury Hospital v. Cass County, 326 U. S. 207 . . . . 3, 5 Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson, 282 IJ. S. 499 .................. 3, 5 Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U. S. 28 . . . . 3, 6 11 Carter v. School Board of Arlington County, Va., 182 F. 2d 531 (C. A. 4th 1950)...................................... 4,10 Dominion Hotel v. Arizona, 249 U. S. 256 ................... 3, 5 Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. 160, 184 ................... 3, 6 Everglades Drainage League v. Napoleon B. Broward Dist., 253 Fed. 246 (S. D. Fla. 1918)...................... 4,11 Ex Parte Endo, 323 U. S, 283 .................................. . 3, 6 Gray v. Board of Trustees, 342 U. S. 517, 518........... 4, 9 Gonzales v. Sheeley, 96 F. Supp. 1004 (Ariz. 1951) .. 4,10 Gramling v. Maxwell, 52 F. 2d 256 (W. D. N. C. 1931) 4,11 Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 8 1 ................ 3, 6 Johnson v. Board of of Trustees of University of Ken tucky, 83 F. Supp. 707 (E. D. Ky. 1949) ............... 4,10 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214, 216.......... 3, 6 Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61 .. 3,5 Lopez v. Seccombe, 71 F. Supp. 769 (S. D. Cal. 1944) 4,10 McCabe v. A. T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 235 U. S. 151. 4,12 McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U. S. 637 3, 6 Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Co. v. Brownell, 294 U. S. 580 .......................................................... 3, 5 Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337 . .4, 5, 7,12 Mitchell v. Wright, 62 F. Supp. 580 (M. D. Ala. 1945), rev. 154 F. 2d 580 (C. A. 5th 1946) ......................4,12,13 Monk v. City of Birmington, 185 F. 2d 859 (C. A. 5th 1950)........................................................................ 5,10 Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U. S. 373 ................................ 3, 6 Morris v. Williams, 149 F. 2d 703 (C. A. 8th 1945).. 4, 9 Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536, 541 ........................ 3, 6 Nolen v. Riechman, 225 Fed. 812 (W. D. Tenn. 1915) 5,11 Oyama v. California, 332 U. S. 633 ......................... 3, 6 PAGE I l l Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 ........................... 4, 7 Railway Mail Association v. Corsi, 326 U. S. 8 8 ___ 3, 6 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 IT. S. 1 ................................. 3, 6 Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U. S. 5 0 ............................. 3, 6 Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 IT. S. 631................ 4, 7 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535 ......................... 3, 6 Smith v. Allwright, 321IJ. S. 649 .................................. 3, 6 Sweatt v. Painter, 339 IT. S. 629 ....................3, 4, 5, 6, 7,12 Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission, 334 U. S. 410 ............................................................................. 3, 6 Terry v. Adams, 95 F. Supp. 595 (S. D. Tex. 1950), rev. on other grounds 193 F. 2d 600 (C. A. 5th 1952) ......................................................................... 5,10 Wilson v. Beebe, 99 F. Supp. 418 (Del. 1951)........... 5,10 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 IT. S. 356 ........................... 3, 6 PAGE Inttefc States OXnurt rtf Kppmlx Eighth Circuit — --------------------------------- o ----------- .— _ — — No. 14,664— Civil City of K ansas City, Missouri, et al. Appellants, v. E sther W illiams, et al. Appellees. No. 14,666—Civil E sther W illiams, et al., Appellants, v. City op K ansas City, Missouri, et al. Appellees. A ppeal and Cross A ppeal F rom the District Court op the U nited States for the W estern District of Missouri, W estern Division ----- ---------------- o---------------------- BRIEF FOR APPELLEES AND CROSS APPELLANTS Statement of the Case Esther Williams, Lena R. Smith and Joseph N. Moore, Negro citizens of the United States and of the State of Missouri, began the action in the court below seeking to enjoin the City of Kansas City, Missouri, the Board of Park Commissioners and the Superintendent of Parks of Kansas City from pursuing a policy, custom and usage of refusing to admit them, and other Negroes similarly 2 situated to Swope Park Swimming Pool, a public facility, solely because of their race and color. It was alleged that their exclusion, being based upon race and color alone, denied to them the equal protection of the laws as secured by the Fourteenth Amendment. Suit was brought by appellees1 as a class action in accordance with Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on their own behalf and on behalf of all other Negroes similarly situated—there being common questions of law and fact involved affecting the rights of all Negro citizens who reside in Kansas City, Missouri who are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court in a single litigation. A trial on the merits took place on February 15, 1952 (R. 61 et seq). On April 18, 1952, the court below entered its memorandum opinion (R. 24-35), findings of fact (R. 35-37) and conclusions of law (R. 37-44). The court held that “ plaintiffs may maintain the instant action in their own behalf, but same cannot be presented as a pure class action” (R. 37). On May 7, 1952, a final decree was entered restraining the City, Board of Park Commissioners and Superintendent of Parks from “ refusing to enter and make contracts with the plaintiffs for admission to the Swope Park Pool and from refusing to admit plaintiffs to said pool and all facilities operated in connection there with because of their race and color” (R. 46-47). From this final judgment and decree, an appeal (R. 50) and cross-appeal (R. 58) were taken. Appellees submit that the judgment of the court below should be affirmed except insofar as the court below ruled that the instant action could not be maintained as a class suit. With respect to the latter ruling, it is submitted that the judgment is erroneous and should be reversed. 1 Throughout this brief the term, appellees, will refer to plain tiffs below and the term appellants will refer to defendants below. 3 The facilities at the Swope Park Swimming Pool main tained exclusively for white persons and those of the Parade Park Pool maintained exclusively for Negroes is accurately described by the court below in its memorandum opinion (E. 26, 27, 35), and we adopt the court ’s statement as our counter-statement of facts. Points and Authorities A s to No. 14,664 I. The State has no power to impose distinctions among its citizens with respect to the use and enjoyment of pub lic facilities. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U. S. 637; Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629; Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission, 334 U. S. 410; Asbury Hospital v Cass County, 326 TJ. S. 207; Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson, 282 U. S. 499; Bob Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U. S. 28; Dominion Hotel v. Arizona, 249 U. S. 265; Edwards v. California, 314 TJ. S. 160; Ex Parte Endo, 323 U. S. 283; Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81; Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214; Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61; Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Co. v. Bromwell, 294 U. S. 580; Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U. S. 373; Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536, 541; Oyama v. California, 332 U. S. 633; Railway Mail Assn. v. Corsi, 326 U. S. 88; Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 TJ. S. 1; Shepherd v. Florida, 341 TJ. S. 501 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 TJ. S. 535; Smith v. Allwright, 321 TJ. S. 649 ; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 TJ. S. 356. 4 II. Where, as here, the facility maintained for the segregated group is unequal and inferior to that main tained for all other persons, the constitutional mandate of equal protection of the laws is violated under all recog nized theories of American constitutional law. Missouri ex rel Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337; Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537; Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U. S. 631; Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629. III. As to No. 14,666 The right to maintain a class action under Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the benefit of a large group or class of persons similarly situated to secure rights guaranteed under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is supported by the over whelming weight of authority. Gray v. Board of Trustees, 342 U. S. 517, 518; Alton v. School Board of the City of Norfolk, 182 F 2d 531 (C. A. 4th 1950) Morris v. Williams, 149 F 2d 703 (C. A. 8th 1945) Carter v. School Board of Arlington County, Va., 182 F. 2d 531 (C. A. 4th 1950); Everglades Drainage League v. Napoleon B. Broward Dist., 253 Fed. 246 (S. D. Fla. 1918); Gonzales v. Sheeley, 96 F. Supp. 1004 (Ariz. 1951); Gramling v. Maxwell, 52 F 2d 256 (W. D. N. C. 1931) ; Johnson v. Board of Trustees of University of Kentucky, 83 F. Supp. 707 (E. D. Ky. 1949); Lopez v. Seccombe, 71 F. Supp. 769 (S. D. Cal. 1944) ; McCabe v. A. T. & S. F. By. Co., 235 U. S. 151; Mitchell v. Wright, 62 F. Supp. 580 (M. D. Ala. 1945) , reversed 154 F. 2d 580 (C. A. 5th 1945); 5 Missouri ex rel Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337; Monk v. City of Birmingham, 185 F 2d 859 (C. A. 5th 1950); Nolen v. Riechmun, 225 Fed. 812 (W. D. Term. 1915); Sw-eatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629; Terry v. Adams, 95 F. Supp. 595 (S. D. Tex. 1950) rev. on other grounds, 193 F 2d 600 (C. A. 5th 1952); Wilson v. Beebe, 99 F. Supp. 418 (Del. 1951). ARGUMENT No. 14,664 I The State has no power to impose distinctions among its citizens with respect to the use and enjoy ment of public facilities. As to No. 14,664, there can he little question on an examination of the record, opinion of the court, and statement in appellants’ brief, heretofore filed, that the Swope Park Swimming Pool is far superior in physical appointments and facilities to the Parade Park Pool. It is our contention that appellants may not exclude appellees from the Swope Park Swimming Pool solely because of race. It is elemental doctrine that governmental classifica tions must be based upon some real difference having per tinence to a lawful legislative objective in order to con form to the requirements of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson, 282 IJ. S. 499; Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61; Asbury Hospital v. Cass County, 326 U. S. 207 ; Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Co. v. Brownell, 294 U. S. 580; Dominion Hotel v. Arizona, 249 U. S. 256. 6 Classifications and distinctions based upon race and color alone satisfy neither requirement and are the epitome of that arbitrariness and caprieiousness constitutionally im permissible under our system of government. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356; Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. 160, 184; Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536, 541. Only as a war measure de signed to cope with a grave national emergency was even the federal government permitted to level restrictions against persons of enemy descent. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81; Oyama v. California, 332 U. S. 633. This action, “ odious,” Hirabayashi v. United States, supra, at page 100, and “ suspect,” Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214, 216, even in times of national peril, must cease as soon as that danger has passed. Ex Parte Endo, 323 U. S. 283. Certainly for the past quarter of century, the Supreme Court of the United States has struck down state imposed racial restrictions and distinctions in each field of govern ment activity where question has been raised: selection for jury service, Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U. S. 50 ; owner ship and occupancy of real property, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1; gainful employment, Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission, 334 U. S. 401; voting, Smith v. All- wright, 321 U. S. 649; and graduate and professional educa tion. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U. S. 637; and Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629. The commerce clause, in proscribing the imposition of racial distinctions in in terstate travel, is a further limitation of state power. Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U. S. 373. On the other hand, when the state has sought to protect its citizenry against racial discrimination and prejudice, its action has been consist ently upheld, Railway Mail Association v. Corsi, 326 U. S. 88, even though taken in the field of foreign commerce. Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U. S. 28. 7 Thus, we submit, that under the present status of the law, even without reg*ard to the quality of facilities afforded, the state has no power to maintain and make a racial classification with respect to the use and enjoyment of its public swimming pool facilities. II W here, as here, the facility maintained for the segregated group is unequal and inferior to that main tained for all other persons, the constitutional man date of equal protection of the laws is violated under all recognized theories of American constitutional law. Whatever doubt may exist as to the present constitu tional status of racial segregation where equal physical facilities are provided, it would be frivolous indeed to argue that absent equal facilities racial segregation is permis sible. Plessg v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537; Missouri ex rel Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337. The right to equality of treatment is present and immediate, Svpuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U. S. 631, and where such equality is denied, racial barriers to the use and enjoyment of the superior facilities must be removed at once. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629. Here the record shows clearly that the Swope Park Swimming Pool maintained exclusively for white persons is far superior in all respects to the Parade Park Pool maintained exclusively for Negroes. Under these circumstances, the policy, custom and usage of pro hibiting Negroes from using the Swope Park Swimming Pool cannot continue, and the judgment and decree of the lower court was correct and should be affirmed. 8 No. 14,666 III The right to maintain a class action under Rule 2 3 (a ) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the benefit o f a large group or class of persons similarly situated to secure rights guaranteed under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is sup ported by the overwhelming weight o f authority. This case was brought as a class suit pursuant to Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which pro vides as follows: “ (a) Representation. If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, such of them, one or more, as will fairly insure the adequate representation of all may, on behalf of all, sue or be sued, when the character of the right sought to be enforced for or against the class is “ (1) joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the owner of a primary right refuses to enforce that right and a member of the class thereby becomes entitled' to enforce it; “ (2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims which do or may affect specific property involved in the action; or “ (3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the several rights and a common relief is sought.” It was brought not only in behalf of named appellees, but on behalf of all other Negroes residing in Kansas City, Missouri, who are affected by the practice, policy, custom 9 and usage of appellants in excluding Negroes from using the Swope Park Swimming Pool solely because of their race and color. The District Court was of the opinion that a class action could not be maintained because the rights involved are individual. The overwhelming weight of authority, however, is to the effect that a class action is a proper method to secure redress where the state had denied a large group of its citizenry the equal protection of the law. In Gray v. Board of Trustees, 342 U. S. 517, action was brought by Negro plaintiffs who had been denied admission to the University of Tennessee because of race. The action was pursued as a class suit on behalf of the named plain tiffs and all other Negroes similarly situated. In the course of the argument in the Supreme Court of the United States, counsel for the University announced that the school authorities were now ready to admit the plaintiffs. The Court stopped the argument and subsequently issued a per curiam opinion saying at 518: "Since appellants’ request for admission to the University of Tennessee had been granted and since there is no suggestion that any person "similarly situated” will not be afforded similar treatment * * * the judgments below are vacated and the Dis trict Court is directed to dismiss the action upon the ground that the cause is moot.” This is a clear recognition by the Supreme Court that a class action was appropriate and that under its decree other Negroes not named as parties could obtain relief against discriminatory practices by University officials. In Morris v. Williams, 149 P 2d 703 (C. A. 8th 1945), a Negro teacher in Little Rock, Arkansas commenced suit for herself and on behalf of other Negro teachers and principals of Little Rock similarly situated. On appeal 10 from a judgment dismissing* the complaint, this Court re versed and remanded, holding that the record clearly revealed the existence of a policy, custom and usage of paying Negro teachers less than white teachers because of race and color. This Court recognized that the cause was being litigated as a class suit and impliedly approved the propriety of this procedure. Alston v. School Board of City of Norfolk, 122 F 2d 992 (C. A. 4th 1940); cert. den. 311 U. S. 693, was among the first of the teacher-salary cases to be decided at the Court of Appeals level. It was there recognized that a Negro attacking state discriminatory action as violative of the equal protection clause may sue on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated pursuant to Rule 23a of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Class actions have been allowed in suits involving: the right to equal school facilities, Carter v. School Board of Arlington County, Va., 182 F 2d 531 (C. A. 4th. 1950)( Gonzales v. Sheeley, 96 F. Supp. 1004 (Ariz. 1951); the constitutionality of racial segregation in public schools, Wilson v. Beebe, 99 F. Supp. 418 (Del. 1951); a zoning* ordinance, Monk v. City of Brimingham, 185 F 2d 859 (C. A. 5th 1950), cert, denied, 341 U. S. 940; voting, Terry v. Adams, 90 F. Supp. 595 (S. D. Tex. 1950), reversed on other grounds, 193 F 2d 600 (C. A. 5th 1952); admission to graduate school of a state University, Johnson v. Board of Trustees of University of Kentucky, 83 F. Supp. 707 (E. D. Ky. 1949); use of a public bath house, swimming pool and playground, Lopez v. Seccombe, 71 F. Supp. 769 (S. D. Cal 1944). Even prior to adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure federal courts have generally upheld class suits where large numbers of citizens have attacked state action as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. 11 In Everglades Drainage League v. Napoleon B. Broward Dist., 253 Fed. 246 (S. D, Fla. 1918), the League and others brought a bill of equity against the Drainage District and others to enjoin defendants from collecting a uniform acreage tax on the ground that the tax was violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. The League, a voluntary association claiming more than 1000 members, commenced the action on behalf of itself and all others similarly situ ated. On a motion to dismiss the bill, the court held that the action was properly maintained as a representative action under Equity Rule 38.2 In Nolen v. Riechman, 225 Fed. 812 (W. D. Tenn. 1915), a class suit was considered proper where a large group sought to enjoin enforcement of a state statute regulating “ jitney” transportation on the ground that it violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Similarly, where a large group of peach growers attacked the constitutionality of a licensing tax statute as violative of the commerce clause and other provisions of the Constitution, the propriety of a class suit was upheld. Gramling v. Maxwell, 52 F. 2nd 256 (W. D. N. C. 1931). In so holding, the court declared at page 260 : “ The case is not one, however, involving merely the right of a single taxpayer. It is a class suit instituted in behalf of a large number of peach growers affected by the statute; and we think that it may be maintained in equity for the purpose of avoiding the multiplicity of suits which would other wise result. Whatever may have been the rule for merly as to the right to maintain a class suit of this character in the federal courts, we think that, since the adoption of the 38th Equity Rule (28 U. S. C. A. 2 Equity Rule 38, in effect at the time this case was decided, reads as follows: ‘‘When the question is one of common or general interest to many persons constituting a class so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the whole. 12 723), the right to maintain such a suit cannot be denied. ’ ’ The District Court in the instant case rested its deci sion on four cases: McCabe v, A. T. <& S. F. By. Co., 235 U. S. 151; Missouri ex rel Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337, 351; Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629 ; and Mitchell v. Wright, 62 F. Supp. 580 (M. D. Ala. 1945). Neither Gaines nor Sweatt arose in the federal courts and hence they cannot be considered authority on a ques tion of federal procedure. Moreover, neither case was brought as a class action. The assertion in both cases that the right to the equal protection of the laws is a per sonal right was meant to define the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment with respect to the injury suffered and is not indicative of any negation of the class suit remedy in these types of cases. The McCabe case, we submit, offers no support for the position of the District Court. Plaintiffs in that case, five Negro citizens of Oklahoma, brought a bill in equity to restrain several railroad companies from complying with an Oklahoma statute—which required railroads to provide separate accommodations for white and Negro passengers. The action was commenced prior to the effec tive date of the statute and none of the plaintiffs, there fore, had suffered any injury. It is not clear from the opinion whether this action was prosecuted a class suit. But even if the action was so brought, the case stands only for the proposition that no one can qualify as a proper representative of a class seeking redress against an uncon stitutional enactment, if he has himself suffered no injury. The Mitchell case stands alone in support of the District Court. There, action was brought against Alabama regis tration officials to restrain them from requiring Negro citizens to submit to tests more rigid than those given white citizens in order to qualify to vote. The court held that a class action was improper on the theory that regis tration was an individual matter and each voter’s qualifica 13 tion must be considered on its own merits. For this and for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the court dis missed the complaint. On appeal, however, judgment was reversed, 151 F. 2d 580 (C. A. 5th 1946). The opinion of the Court of Appeals deals exclusively with the question of administrative remedies but it was held that the action had been improperly dismissed. Most of the vitality of this lower court holding, we submit, was destroyed by the reversal of the Court of Appeals. At any rate, until the decision in the instant case, Mitchell v. Wright stood alone in rejecting the propriety of a class suit as a method of redress available to Negroes in equal protection cases. Conclusion The discriminatory action here complained of is the state’s refusal to permit Negroes to use the Swope Park Swimming Pool, solely because of their race and their color. The court found appellants’ practices were uncon stitutional because the Parade Park Pool was not equal in physical facilities and recreational value to the Swope Park Pool. While the named parties are before the court and have been injured by a specific refusal of admission to Swope Park, these particular appellees are merely examples of the discriminatory effect of the state practice. If the judgment below is allowed to stand in this respect, it will be an open invitation to any state so inclined to defy the Fourteenth Amendment until it is literally harassed with a great number of suits. The appellants can hardly claim the right to litigate and relitigate the identical issue. A class suit represents the only effective way whereby a large group of citizens can avail themselves of the safeguards of the Fourteenth Amendment. The effect of the judg ment here is thus to sap the equal protection clause of 14 its effectiveness. It is urged, therefore, that the judgment of the District Court should he reversed in so far as it held that a class suit could not be maintained. Respectfully submitted, A lmer T. A dair, 220 Lincoln Building, Kansas City, Missouri, Carl R. J ohnson, 231 Lincoln Building, Kansas City, Missouri, R obert L. Carter, T htjrgood Marshall, 20 West 40th Street, New York, New York, Counsel for Appellees-Appellants. David E. P insky, of Counsel. S upreme P rinting Co., I nc ., 41 M urray Street, N . Y., B A rclay 7-0348