Brown v. Board of Education Summary of Decision

    1953.
BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA 

*[4S31
‘ OLIVER BROWN et ah, Appellants,

b o a r d  o f  e d u c a t i o n  o f  TOPER A fu _  ' '
Kansas, et al ( N o 1) ShaWlee C° Unt^

347 V S
x 433 •

HARRY BRIGGS, Jr ., et al., Appellants, 
v.

R. W. ELLIOTT et al. (No. 2.) 

DOROTHY E. DAVIS et al., Appellants,
v.

C°U N TY SCHOOL BOARD OP PRINCE EDWARD
UUUISTY, Virginia, et al. (No. 4.)

FRANCIS B. GEBHART et al., Petitioners,

ETHEL LOUISE BELTON et al. (No. 10 )
(347 US 483, 9S L ed 873, 74 S Ct 6S6, 38 ALR2d 1180)

SUMMARY OF DECISION

were
state laws requiring or permitting s p w  te.nded by white children under 
were findings below that the Negfo and white a<5Jor{lin.ar to race- There 
equalized, or were bein- eaualize 1 hlte sf hools involved had been
qualifications and salaries of teachers anTSh* bu.i[din° s> curricula, 

In an opinion bv W arr en  Ch I tv,' f  6r tan° lble factors, 
that the plaintiffs; by reason of the seC T eeS®  unanimously held 
Pnved of the equal protection of thelaws , cfomJ,I« ned of> were de- 
Amendment. The “separate but equal’’ doctr1n y the Fourteenth
Ferguson 163 US 537, 41 L ed 256 16 t e l  1 1 in Pless-V v- 
transportation facilities, under which emnliv nf 't ln\olvmS quality in 
b> Piouding Negroes and whites substantinflv f tie.at™ent ,13 accorded 
acihties, was held to have no place in the f  iff eclua ’ tnough separate, 

In view of the complex nroble^ ? ° f public education, 
decrees, the cases were restored to the d o S t f  ^  th® formuIation of the

6 ao^ et -oi- argument by the parties.

SL EJECT OF ANNOTATION 
Beginning on page SS2

IHease :Retuf n To
LIBRARY 93 L ed S73



(
i

EEADXOTES
Classified to U.S. Supreme Court Digest, Annotated

247 us SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Oct. Term,

Supreme Court of the X'nited States § 70 — 
consolidated opinikm — racial segrega­
tion.

1. Even though cases involving the va­
lidity of racial segregation laws are prem­
ised on different facts and different legal 
conditions, the common legal question jus­
tifies their consideration together in a con­
solidated opinion.
Constitutional Law §  17 — Fourteenth 

Amendment — construction — con­
temporary history.

2. The legislative history as to the adop­
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment by 
Congress and its ratification by the states, 
the then existing practices in racial seg­
regation, and the views of proponents and 
opponents of the Amendment, although 
casting some light, are not sufficient to re­
solve the question whether laws requiring 
or permitting segregation according to 
race in public schools violate the equal 
protection clause of the Amendment.

[See annotation appended, hereto, and 
annotation reference 1.]

Constitutional Law § 9 ; Courts § 775 — 
construction of Constitution — prece­
dents — new conditions.

3. In determining whether segregation 
in public schools deprives Negro students 
of the equal protection of laws guaranteed 
by the Fourteenth Amendment, the court 
must consider public education in the light 
of its full development and its present 
place in American life throughout the na­
tion; the clock cannot be turned back to

the time when the Amendment was adopt­
ed (1S6S) nor to the time when the Su­
preme Court announced the “ separate but 
equal” doctrine (1896), under which equal­
ity of treatment is accorded by providing 
Negroes and whites substantially equal, 
though separate, facilities.

[See annotation appended hereto.]
Schools § 1 — equal opportunities.

4. Opportunity of education, where the 
state has undertaken to provide it, must be 
made available to all on equal terms.

[Sec annotation references 2, 3.]

Civil Rights § 6 — schools — racial segre­
gation.

5. The equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the 
states from maintaining racially segre­
gated public schools, even though the phys­
ical facilities and other tangible factors, 
such as curricula and qualifications and 
salaries of teachers, may be equal.

[See annotation appended hereto, and 
annotation references 2-5.] -

Civil Rights § 6 — schools —- separate but 
equal.

6. The “ separate but equal” doctrine an­
nounced in Plessy v. Ferguson, 162 US 537, 
41 L ed 256, 16 S Ct 1138, under which 
equality of treatment is accorded by pro­
viding Negroes and whites substantially 
equal, though separate, facilities, has no 
place in the field of public education.

[See annotation appended hereto, and 
annotation references 2, 3, 5.]

[Nos. 1, 2, 4, and 10.]

Argued December 8-11, 1952. Restored to the docket for re­
argument June 8, 1953. Reargued December 7-9, 1953. Decided

May 17, 1954.

APPEAL by plaintiffs from a judgment of the United States District 
Court for the District of Kansas denying an injunction against enforce-

ANNOTATION REFERENCES
1. Resort to details of constitutional 

convention, committee reports, rec­
ords, etc., as aid in construction of 
Constitution, 70 AL<R 5.

2. Constitutional equality of school 
privileges as civil right, 44 L ed 262.

3. Equivalence of educational facil­
ities extended by public school system 
to members of white and members of 
colored race, 103 ALR 713.
9S L ed 874

4. Compare 134 ALR 1276 on sepa­
ration of pupils in recreational or so­
cial activities because of race, color, 
or religion.

5. Separate school for colored chil­
dren as common or public school with­
in contemplation of constitutional or 
statutory provision, 113 ALR 713.

\I



1953. BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA 347 trs

(NcT i f  ^ o 113113 Statl'te permittin°  racial segregation in public schools

r ^ PrEA f^ p,f mtl^ s from a judgment of the United States District 
Ccurt fox the Eastern District of South Carolina which denied an injunc-
2) A1 1ShmS segregatl0n in the public schools of South Carolina (No

ConrPtPfn^H1.b F Plf intifS - f/ ^  a judgment of the United States District 
enfnrrfm p^ Eastern District of Virginia denying an injunction against 
enforcement of provisions in the Virginia Constitution and statutes re­
quiring racial segregation in public schools (No. 4 ) . Also

™ WRI T °£  Ce.rti°rari to review a judgment of the Supreme Court 
of Delaware affirming a judgment of the Court of Chancery which en-
schnnt ftate ^ icia ls from refusing Negro children admittance to the 
schools for whites (No. 10).

Cases restored to docket for argument as to formulation of decrees 
i n o r  same cases below, 98 F Supp 797 (No. 1) ; 103 F Supp 920 (No 2) •

i°2d 86!UP(No l o r 0' «  ': -  Del -  81 A2d 137' ~  ™  Ch 87
Robert L. Carter, of New York City, 

argued the cause on the original argu­
ment and reargument for appellants in 
No. 1.

Thurgood Marshall, of New York 
City, and Spottswood W. Robinson III, 
of Richmond, Virginia, argued the 
cause on the original argument and 
reargument for appellants in Nos 2 
and 4.

' -r-v E °u*s E. Redding, of Wilmington, 
Delaware, argued the cause on the 
original argument, and Jack Green­
berg, of New York City, argued the 
cause on the original argument and 
reargument, for respondents in No. 10.

Thurgood Marshall, of New York 
City, argued the cause on reargument 
for respondents in No. 10.

Robert L. Carter, Thurgood Mar­
shall, Jack Greenberg, Constance Ba­
ker Motley, all of New York City, 
Spottswood W. Robinson III and Oliver 
W. Hill, both of Richmond, Virginia, 
Louis L. Redding, of Wilmington, Del­
aware, George E. C. Hayes and Frank 
D; Reeves, both of Washington, D. C., 
William R. Ming, Jr., of Chicago, Il­
linois, James M. Nabrit, Jr., of Hous­
ton, Texas, Charles S. Scott, of Topeka, 
Kansas, and Harold R. Boulware, of 
Columbia, South Carolina, were on the 
brief for appellants in Nos. 1, 2, and 
4, and respondent in No. 10.

George M. Johnson, of Sacramento, 
California, was on the brief for appel­
lants in Nos. 1, 2, and 4.

Loren Miller, of Los Angeles, Cali- 
fornia, was on the brief for appellants 
in Nos. 2 and 4.

Arthur D. Shores, of Birmingham, 
Alabama, and A. T. Walden, of Atlan­
ta, Georgia, were on the statement as 
to jurisdiction and a brief opposing a 
motion to dismiss or affirm in No. 2.

Paul E. Wilson, Assistant Attorney 
General of Kansas, argued the cause 
on the original argument and reargu­
ment, and, with Harold R. Fatzer, At­
torney General of Kansas, filed a brief 
for appellees in No. 1.

John W. Davis, of New York City, 
aad ,T: Justin Moore, of Richmond, 
Virginia, argued the cause on the orig­
inal argument and reargument, for ap­
pellees in Nos. 2 and 4.

T. C. Callison, Attorney General of 
South Carolina, Robert McC. Figg, Jr., 
of Charleston, South Carolina, S*. e ! 
Rogers, of Summerton, South Caro- 
Iina, and William R. Meagher and 
Taggart Whipple, both of New York 
City, were on the briefs for appellees 
in No. 2.

J. Lindsay Almond, Jr., Attorney 
General of Virginia, argued the cause 
on the original argument, and, with 
Henry T. Wickham, T. Justin Moore 
Archibald G. Robertson, .John W 
Riely, and T. Justin Moore, Jr, all of 
Richmond. Virginia, filed a brief for 
appellees in No. 4,

93 L ed 375



347 V S SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Oct. Term,
H. Albert Young.-Attorney General 

of Delaware argued the cause on the 
original argument and reargument, 
and, with Louis J. Finger, of Wilming­
ton, Delaware, filed a 'brief for pe­
titioners in No. 10.

Assistant Attorney General J. Lee 
Rar.kin, of Washington, D. C., argued 
the cause on reargument, and, with 
Attorney General Herbert Brownell, 
Philip Elman, Leon Ulman, William J. 
Lamont, and M. Magdelena Schoch, 
also of Washington, D. C-, filed a brief 
for the United States, as amicus 
curiae, by special leave of Court in 
Nos. 2 and 4.

James P. McGranery, former Attor­
ney General, and Philip Elman, both 
of Washington, D. C., filed a brief for 
the United States on the original argu­
ment, as amicus curiae.

Shad Polier, of New York City, Will 
Maslow, and Joseph B. Robison, filed 
a brief for American Jewish Congress, 
in No. 1, amici curiae.

Edwin J. Lukas, Arnold Forster, Ar­
thur Garfield Hays, Frank E. Karelsen,

and Theodore Leslies, all of New York 
City, and Leonard Haas and Saburo 
Kido, filed a brief for American Civil 
Liberties Union et al.

John Ligtenberg, of Chicago, Il­
linois, and Selma M. Borchardt, of 
Washington, D. C., filed a brief for 
American Federation of Teachers.

Arthur J. Goldberg and Thomas E. 
Harris, both of Washington, D. C., for 
the Congress of Industrial Organiza­
tions, amici curiae.

Phineas Indritz, of Washington, D. 
C., filed a brief for American Veterans 
Committee, Inc., amici curiae.

Mr. Chief Justice Warren deliv­
ered the opinion of the Court.

These cases come to us from the 
States of Kansas, South Carolina, 
Virginia, and Delaware. They are 
premised on different facts and dif­

ferent local conditions, 
Headnote i but a common legal 

question justifies their 
consideration together in this con­
solidated opinion.1

1. In the Kansas case, Brown v. Board 
of Education, the plaintiffs are Negro 
children of elementary school age residing 
in Topeka. They brought this action in 
the United States District Court for the 
District of Kansas to enjoin enforcement 
of a Kansas statute which permits, but 
does not require, cities o f more than 
15,000 population to maintain separate 
school facilities for Negro and white 
students. Kan Gen Stat § 72-1724 (1949). 
Pursuant to that authority, the Topeka 
Board of Education elected to establish 
segregated elementary schools. Other 
public schools in the community, however, 
are operated on a nonsegregated basis. 
The three-judge District Court, convened 
under 28 USC §§ 2281 and 2284, found 
that segregation in public education has a 
detrimental effect upon Negro children, 
but denied relief on the ground that the 
Negro and white schools were substantially 
equal with respect to buildings, transporta­
tion, curricula, and educational qualifica­
tions of teachers. 98 F Supp 797. The case 
is here on direct appeal under 28 USC 
§ 1253.

In the South Carolina case, Briggs v. 
Elliott, the plaintiffs are Negro children 
oTboth elementary and high school age re­
siding in Clarendon County. They brought 
this action in the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of South 
Carolina to enjoin enforcement of provi- 
9S L ed S75

sions in the state constitution and statu­
tory code which require the segregation of 
Negroes and whites in public schools. SC 
Const, Art 11, § 7; SC Code § 5377 (1942). 
Tiie three-judge District Court, convened 
under 28 USC §§ 2281 and 2284, denied 
the requested relief. The court found that 
the Negro schools were inferior to the 
white schools and ordered the defendants 
to begin immediately to equalize the facili­
ties. But the court sustained the validity 
of the contested provisions and denied the 
plaintiffs admission to the white schools 
during the equalization program. 98 F 
Supp 529. This Court vacated the District 
Court’s judgment and remanded the case 
for the purpose of obtaining the court’s 
views on a report filed by the defendants 
concerning the progress made in the equal­
ization program. 342 US 350, 96 L ed 
392, 72 S Ct 327. On remand, the Dis­
trict Court found that substantial equality 
had been achieved except for buildings and 
that the defendants were proceeding to 
rectify this inequality as well. 103 F 
Supp 920 The case is again here on di­
rect appeal under'28 USC § 1253.

In the Virginia case, Davis v. County 
School Board, the plaintiffs are Negro 
children of high school age residing in 
Prince Edward County. They brought 
this action in the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia 
to enjoin enforcement of provisions in the

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1953. BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA 347 TTS 
487—489

*[437]
*In each of the cases, minors of 

the Negro race, through their_ legal 
representatives, seek the aid of the 
courts in obtaining admission to the 
public schools of their community 
on a nonsegregated basis. In each 

*[4S8]
instance, *they had been denied ad­
mission to schools attended by white 
children under laws requiring or 
permitting segregation according to 
race. This segregation was alleged 
to deprive the plaintiffs of the equal 
protection of the laws under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. In each of 
the cases other than the Delaware 
case, a three-judge federal district 
court denied relief to the plaintiffs 
on the so-called “ separate but equal” 
doctrine announced by this Court in 
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 US 537, 41 
L ed 256, 16 S Ct 1138. Under that 
doctrine, equality of treatment is 
accorded when the races are pro­
vided substantially equal facilities, 
even though these facilities be sepa-
state constitution and statutory code which 
require the segregation of Negroes and 
whites in public schools. Va Const, 
§ 140 p Va Code § 22-221 (1950). The
thi’ee-judge District Court, convened under 

• 28 USC §§ 2281 and 2284, denied the re­
quested relief. The court found the Negro 
school inferior in physical plant, curricula, 
and transportation, and ordered the de­
fendants forthwith to provide substantially 
equal curricula and transportation and 
to “proceed with all reasonable diligence 
and dispatch to remove” the inequality in 
physical plant. But, as in the South Caro­
lina case, the court sustained the valid­
ity of the contested provisions and de­
nied the plaintiffs admission to the white 
schools during the equalization px-ogram. 
103 F Supp 337. The case is here on 
direct appeal under 28 USC § 1253.

In the Delaware case, Gebhart v. 
Belton, the plaintiffs are Negro children 
of both elementary and high school age 
residing in New Castle County. They 
brought this action in the Delaware 
Court of Chancery to enjoin enforcement 
of provisions in the state constitution and 
statutory code which require the segrega­
tion of Negroes and whites in public 
schools. Del Const, Art 10, § 2; Del 
Rev Code § 2631 (1935). The Chancellor 
gave judgment for the plaintiffs ar.d 
ordered their immediate admission to

rate. In the Delaware case, the Su­
preme Court of Delaware adhered to 
that doctrine, but ordered that the 
plaintiffs be admitted to the white 
schools because of their superiority 
to the Negro schools.

The plaintiffs contend that segre­
gated public schools are not “equal” 
and cannot be made “equal,” and 
that hence they are deprived of the 
equal protection of the laws. Be­
cause of the obvious importance of 
the question presented, the Court 
took jurisdiction.2 Argument was 
heard in the 1952 Term, and reargu­
ment was heard this Term on cer­
tain questions propounded by the 
Court.3

*[489]
*Reargument was largely devoted 

to the circumstances surrounding 
the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in 1868. It covered ex­
haustively consideration of the 
Amendment in Congress, ratification 
by the states, then existing practices
schools previously attended only by white 
children, on the ground that the Negro 
schools were inferior with respect to teach­
er training, pupil-teacher ratio, extra­
curricular activities, physical plant, and 
time and distance involved in travel. — 
Del Ch —, 87 A2d 862. The Chancellor 
also found that segregation itself results 
in an inferior education for Negro chil­
dren (see note 10, infra), but did not rest 
his decision on that ground. Id. 87 A2d 
at 865. The Chancellor’s decree was af­
firmed by the Supreme Court of Delaware, 
which intimated, however, that the defend­
ants might be able to obtain a modification 
of the decree after equalization of the 
Negro and white schools had been accom­
plished. — Del —, 91 A2d 137, 152. The 
defendants, contending only that the Dela­
ware courts had erred in ordering the 
immediate admission of the Negro plain­
tiffs to the white schools, applied to this 
Court for certiorari. The writ was 
granted, 344 US 89L, 97 L ed 689, 73 S Ct 
213. The plaintiffs,, who were successful 
below, did not submit a cross-petition.

2. 344 US 1, 141, 891, 97 L ed 3, 152, 
689, 73 S Ct 1, 124, CIS.

3. 345 US 972, 97 L ed 1383. 73 S Ct 
1114. The Attorney Genera! of the United 
States participated both Terms as amicus 
curiae.

93 L ed S77



SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES04 7  u s  
CCS-491
in racial segregation, and the views 
of proponents and opponents of the 
Amendment. This discussion and 

our own investigation 
Headnote 2 convince us that, al­

though these sources 
cast some light, it is not enough to 
resolve the problem with which w e  
are faced. A t best, they are incon­
clusive. The most avid propo­
nents of the post-War Amendments 
undoubtedly intended them to re­
move all legal distinctions among 
“ all persons born or naturalized in 
the United States.” Their oppo­
nents, just as certainly, were antag­
onistic to both the letter and the 
spirit of the Amendments and 
wished them to have the most lim­
ited effect. What others in Congress 
and the state legislatures had m 
mind cannot be determined with 
any degree of certainty.

An additional reason for the in­
conclusive nature of the Amend­
ment’s history, with respect to 
segregated schools, is the status of 
public education at that time.4 In 
the South, the movement toward 

*[490]
free common schools, supported *by 
general taxation, had not yet taken 
hold. Education of white children 
was largely in the hands of private 
groups. Education of Negroes was 
almost nonexistent, and practically

Oct. Term,

all of the race were illiterate. _ In 
fact, any education of Negroes was 
forbidden by law in some states. To­
day, in contrast, many Negroes have 
achieved outstanding success in the 
arts and sciences as well as in the 
business and professional world. _ It . 
is true that public school education 
at the time of the Amendment had 
advanced further in the North, but 
the effect of the Amendment on 
Northern States was generally ig­
nored in the congressional debates. 
Even in the North, the conditions 
of public education did not approxi­
mate those existing today. _ The cur­
riculum was usually rudimentary; 
ungraded schools were common in 
rural areas; the school term was but 
three months a year in many states; 
and compulsory school attendance 
■was virtually unknown. As a conse­
quence, it is not surprising that 
there should be so little in the his­
tory of the Fourteenth Amendment' 
relating to its intended effect on 
public education.

In the first cases in this Court 
construing the Fourteenth Amend­
ment, decided shortly after its adop­
tion, the Court interpreted it as pro­
scribing all state-imposed discrim­
inations against the Negro race.

*[491]
The doctrine of *“separate but 
equal” did not make its appearance

4. For a general study of the develop­
ment of public education prior to the 
Amendment, see Butts and Cremin, A His­
tory of Education in American Culture 
(1953), Pts. I, II; Cubberley, Public 
Education in the United States (1934 ed), 
chs II-XII. School practices current at the 
time of the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment are described in Butts and 
Cremin, supra, at 269-275; Cubberley, su­
pra, at 288-339, 408-431; Knight, Public 
Education in the South (1922), chs \ III, 
IX. See also H Ex Doc No. 315, 41st 
Cong, 2d Sess (1871). Although the de­
mand for free public schools followed sub­
stantially the same pattern in both the 
North and the South, the development in 
the South did not begin to gain momentum 
until about 1850, some twenty years after 
that in the North. The reasons for the 
somewhat slower development in the South 
(e. g., the rural character of the South
98 L ed 878

and the different regional attitudestoward 
state assistance) are well explained in 
Cubberley, supra, at 40S-423. In the coun­
try as a whole, but particularly in the 
South, the War virtually stopped all 
progress in public education. Id., at 427- 
42sr The low status of Negro education 
in all sections of the country, both before 
and immediately after the W ar, is de­
scribed in Beale, A History of Freedom of 
Teaching in American Schools (1941). 112- 
132, 175-195. Compulsory school attend­
ance laws were not generally adopted 
until after the ratification of the Four­
teenth Amendment, and it was not until 
1918 that such laws were in force in all 
the states. Cubberley, supra, at 563- 
565.
/  5. Slaughter-House Cases (US) 16 Wall 
36, 67-72, 21 L ed 394, 405-407 (1873);

/Strauder v. W’est Virginia, 100 US 303, 
307, 308, 25 L ed 6C4-C6C (ItSO):

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1953.

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1953. BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA
in this Court until 1896 in the case of 
Plessy v. Ferguson (US) supra, in­
volving not education but transpor­
tation.6 American courts have since 
labored with the doctrine for over 
half a century. In this Court, there 
have been six cases involving the 
“ separate but equal’’ doctrine in the 
field of public education.7 In Cum- 
ming v. County Board of Education, 
175 US 52S, 44 L ed 262, 20 S Ct 
197, and Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 
US 78, 72 L ed 172, 48 S Ct 91, the 
validity of the doctrine itself was 
not challenged.8 In more recent 
cases, all on the graduate school

*[492]
*level, inequality was found in that 
specific benefits enjoyed by white 
students were denied to Negro stu­
dents of the same educational quali­
fications. Missouri ex rel. Gaines 
v. Canada, 305 US 337, 83 L ed 208, 
59 S Ct 232; Sipuel v. University

347 trs  
431 , 492

of Oklahoma, 332 US 631, 92 L  
ed 247, 68 S Ct 299; Sweatt v. Paint­
er, 339 US 629, 94 L ed 1114, 70 
S Ct 848; McLaurin v. Oklahoma 
State Regents, 339 US 637, 94 L 
ed 1149, 70 S Ct 851. In none of 
these_ cases was it necessary to re­
examine the doctrine to grant relief 
to the Negro plaintiff. And in 
Sweatt v. Painter (US) supra, the 
Court expressly reserved decision on 
the question whether Plessy v. Fer­
guson should be held inapplicable to 
public education.
. the instant cases, that question 
is directly presented. Here, unlike 
Sweatt v. Painter, there are findings 
below that the Negro and white 
schools involved have been equalized, 
or are being equalized, with respect 
to buildings, curricula, qualifications 
and salaries of teachers, and other 
“ tangible” factors.9 Our decision, 
therefore, cannot turn on merely a

It ordains that no State shall deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law, or deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. What is this but 
declaring that the law in the States shall 
be the same for the black as for the white; 
that all persons, whether colored or white, 
shall stand equal before the laws of the 
States, and, in regard to the colored race, 
for whose protection the amendment was 
primarily designed, that no discrimination 
shall be made against them by law because 
of their color? The words of the amend­
ment, it is true, are prohibitory, but they 
contain a necessary implication of a posi­
tive immunity, or right, most valuable to 
the colored race,—-the right to exemption 
from unfriendly legislation against them 
distinctively as colored,—exemption from 
jegal discriminations, implying inferiority 
in civil society, lessening the security 
of their enjoyment of the rights which 
others enjoy, and discriminations which 
are steps towards reducing them to the 
condition of a subject race.”

See also Virginia v. Rives, 100 US 
313, 318, 25 L ed 667, 669 (1S80); Ex 
parte Virginia, 100 US 339, 344, 343 95 
L ed 676, 678, 679 (1SS0).

6. The doctrine apparently originated in 
Roberts v. Boston, 5 Cush IDS, 206 (1850, 
Mass), upholding school segregation 
against attack as being violative of a 
state constitutional guarantee of equality.

Segregation in Boston public schools was 
eliminated in 1855. Blass Acts 1855, ch 
256. But elsewhere in the North segrega­
tion in public education has persisted in 
some communities until recent years. It 
is apparent that such segregation has 
long been a nationwide problem, not mere­
ly one of sectional concern.

7. See also Berea College v. Kentucky, 
211 US 45, 53 L ed 81, 29 S Ct 33 (1908).

8. In the Cumming Case, Negro taxpay­
ers sought an injunction requiring the de­
fendant school board to discontinue the 
operation of a high school for white chil­
dren until the board resumed operation of 
a high school for Negro children. Sim­
ilarly, in the Gong Lum Case, the plaintiff, 
a child of Chinese descent, contended only 
that state authorities had misapplied the 
doctrine by classifying him with Negro 
children and requiring him to attend a 
NegTO school.

9. In the Kansas case, the court below 
found substantial eoualitv as to all such 
factors. 98 F Supp 797, 793. In the South 
Carolina case, the court below found that 
the defendants were proceeding “promptly 
and in good faith to comply with the 
court's decree.” 103 F Supp 920, 921. In 
tne \ irginia case, tne court below noted 
that the ^equalization program was al­
ready ‘‘afoot and progressing” (103 F 
Supp oo7, 341); since then, we have b^n 
advised, in the Virginia Attorney General's 
brief on reargument, that the program has

93 L ed S79



247 CS 492—4&4 SUPE

comparison of these tangible factors 
ir. the Negro and white schools in­
volved in each of the cases. We 
must look instead to the effect of 
segregation itself on public educa­
tion.

In approaching this problem, v.-e 
cannot turn the clock back to 186S 

when the Amendment 
Keadnote 3 was adopted, or even to 

1896 when Plessy v. 
Ferguson was written. We must 
consider _ public education in the 
light of its full development and its 
present place in American life 

*[493]
throughout *the Nation. Only in 
this way can it be determined if seg­
regation in public schools deprives 
these plaintiffs of the equal protec­
tion of the laws.

Today, education is perhaps the 
most important function of state 
and local governments. Compulsory 
school attendance laws and the great 
expenditures for education both 
demonstrate our recognition of the 
importance of education to our 
democratic society. It is required in 
the performance of our most basic 
public responsibilities, even service 
in the armed forces. It is the very 
foundation of good citizenship. To­
day it is a principal instrument in 
awakening the child to cultural 
values, in preparing him for later 
professional training, and in helping 
him to adjyst normally to his en­
vironment. In these * days, it is 

doubtful that any child 
Headnoie 4 may reasonably be ex­

pected to succeed in life 
if he is denied the opportunity of an 
education. Such an opportunity, 
where the state has undertaken to 
provide it, is a right which must be 
made available to all on equal terms.

We come then to the question pre­
sented: Does segregation of children 

in public schools solely 
Headnote 5 on the basis of race, even 

though the physical 
facilities and'other “ tangible’’_fac-

EjJE COURT OF

now been completed. In the Xlelaware case, 
the court below similarly noted that the 
9S L ed SSO

tors may be equal, deprive the chil­
dren oi tne minority group of equal 
educational opportunities? We be­
lieve that it does.

In Sweatt v. Painter (US) supra, 
in finding that a segregated law 
school for Negroes could not provide 
them equal educational opportuni-' 
ties, this Court relied in large part 
on “ those qualities which are in­
capable of objective measurement 
but which make for greatness in a 
law school.” In McLaurin v. Okla­
homa State Regents, ‘839 US 637, 94 
L ed 1149, 70 S Ct 851, supra, the 
Court, in requiring that a Negro ad­
mitted to a white graduate school 
be treated like all other students, 
again resorted to intangible con­
siderations: “ . . . his ability to
study, to engage in discussions and 
exchange views with other students, 
and, in general, to learn his profes- 

*[494]
sion.” *Such considerations apply' 
with added force to children in grade 
and high schools. To separate them 
from others of similar age and quali­
fications solely because of their race 
generates a feeling of inferiority as 
to their status in the community 
that may affect their hearts and 
minds in a way unlikely ever to be 
undone. The effect of this separa­
tion on their educational opportuni­
ties was well stated by a finding in 
the Kansas case by a court which 
nevertheless felt compelled to rule 
against the Negro plaintiffs:

“Segregation of white and colored 
children in public schools has a det- 
rimental effect upon the colored 
children. The impact is greater when 
it has the sanction of the law; for 
the policy of separating the races is 
usually interpreted as denoting the 
inferiority of the negro group. A  
sense of inferiority affects the moti­
vation of a child to learn. Segrega­
tion with the sanction of law, there­
fore, has a tendency to [retard] the 
educational and mental development 
of Negro children and to deprive

state’s equalization program was well un­
der way. — Del —, 91 A2d 137, 149.

TKt. EXITED STATES Oct. Term,

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1953. BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA

them of some of the benefits they 
would receive in a racial [ly] inte­
grated school system.” 10

Whatever may have been the ex­
tent of psychological knowledge at 
the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this 
finding is amply supported by 
modern authority.11 Any language 

*[495]
*in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to 
this finding is rejected.

We conclude that in the field of 
public education the doctrine of 

“ separate but equal” has 
Headnote 6 no place. Separate edu­

cational facilities are in­
herently unequal. Therefore, we 
hold that the plaintiffs and others 
similarly situated for whom the ac­
tions have been brought are, by 
reason of the segregation com­
plained of, deprived of the equal 
protection of the laws guaranteed by 
the Fourteenth Amendment. This 
disposition makes unnecessary any 
discussion whether such segregation

347 U 3 
494-495

also violates the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.12

Because these are class actions, 
because of the wide applicability of 
this decision, and because of the 
great variety of local conditions, the 
formulation of decrees in these cases 
presents problems of considerable 
complexity. On reargument, the 
consideration of appropriate relief 
was necessarily subordinated to the 
primary question— the constitution­
ality of segregation in public educa­
tion. We have now announced that 
such segregation is a denial of the 
equal protection of the laws. In 
order that we may have the full 
assistance of the parties in formu­
lating decrees, the cases will be re­
stored to the docket, and the parties 
are requested to present further 
argument on Questions 4 and 5 
previously propounded by the Court 
for the reargument this Term.13 The 

*[49G]
Attorney General *of the United

10. A similar finding was made in the 
Delaware case: “ I conclude from the tes­
timony that in our Delaware society, State- 
imposed segregation in education itself re­
sults in the Negro children, as a class, 
receiving educational opportunities which 
are substantially inferior to those avail­
able to white children otherwise similarly 
situated.” — Del Ch —, 87 A2d 8G2, 865.

11. K. B. Clark, Effect of Prejudice and
Discrimination on Personality Develop­
ment (Midcentury White House Confer­
ence on Children and Youth, 1950); Wit- 
mer and Kotinsky, Personality in the 
Making (1952), ch VI; Deutscher and 
Chein. The Psychological Effects of En­
forced Segregation: A Survey of Social
Science Opinion, 26 J Psychol 259 (1948); 
Chein, What are the Psychological Effects 
of Segregation Under Conditions of Equal 
Facilities?, 3 Int J Opinion and Attitude 
Res 229 (1949); Brameld, Educational
Costs, in Discrimination and National 
Welfare (Maclver, ed, 1949), 44-48;
Frazier, The Negro in the United States 
(1049), 674-631. And see generally
Myrdal, An American Dilemma (1944).

.12. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 US 497, 
93 L'ed 334, 74 S Ct 693, post, p 334, con­
cerning the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment.

13. ‘ ‘4. Assuming it is decided that sag- 
56

regation in public’ schools violates the 
Fourteenth Amendment

“ (a) would a decree necessarily follow 
providing that, within the limits set by 
normal geographic school districting, 
Negro children should forthwith be ad­
mitted to schools of their choice, or

“ (6) may this Court, in the exercise of 
its equity powers, permit an effective grad­
ual adjustment to be brought about from 
existing segregated systems to a system 
not based on color distinctions?

“ 5. On the assumption on which ques­
tions 4 (a) and (6) are based, and as­
suming further that this Court will ex­
ercise its equity powers to the end de­
scribed in question 4 (6),

“ (a) should this Court formulate de­
tailed decrees in these cases;

“ (b) if so, what specific issues should 
the decrees reach;

“ (c) should this Court appoint a special , 
master to hear evidence with a view to I 
recommending specific terms for such de-J 
crees;

“ (d) should this Court remand to the 
courts of first instance with directions to 
frame decrees in these cases, and if so 
what general directions should the decrees 
of this Court include and what procedures 
should the courts of first instance follow 
in arriving at the specific terms, of more 
detailed decrees?”

93 L ed SSI



S47 US 
426

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

States is again invited to  participate. 
The Attorneys General o f the states 
requiring or permitting, segregation 
in public education will also_ be per­
mitted to appear as amici curiae 
upon request to do so by September

15, 1954, and submission of briefs 
by October 1, 1954.14 

It is so ordered.

14. See Rule 42, Revised Rules of this 
Court (effective July 1, 1954).

ANNOTATION

Race discrimination—Supreme Court cases 
[See US Digest, Anno: Civil Rights §§ 1-13.]

[a] Generally.
This annotation supplements the 

earlier ones in 94 L ed 1121 and 96 L 
ed 1291.1

In the past the law touching upon 
race discrimination has been greatly 
affected by the “separate but equal” 
doctrine, first announced in Plessy v. 
Ferguson (1896) 163 US 537, 41 L ed 
256, 16 S Ct 1138, by which enforced 
separation of the races is validated by, 
and its validity is dependent upon, the 
equality of the separate facilities.

In a decision which is a landmark 
in constitutional law, the United States 
Supreme Court, in Brown v. Board 
of Education (1954) 347 US 483, 98 
L ed 873, 74 S Ct 686, 38 ALR2d 1180, 
has held that the “separate but equal” 
doctrine has no place in the field of 
public education. Although the Su­
preme Court has not expressly over­
ruled Plessy v. Ferguson (US) supra, 
the doubt which might be expected to 
exist with regard to the continued ap­
plicability of the separate but equal 
doctrine in fields other than that of 
public education has been considera­
bly lessened by the Court’s action in 
such fields.*

Moreover, in finding in the Brown 
Case that segregation of white and 
colored children in public schools has 
a detrimental psychological^ effect 
upon the colored children, the court 
expressly rejected any language in

Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this 
finding. Plessy v. Ferguson, dealing 
with segregation in trains, contains 
no language concerning segregation 
of Negroes in public schools. The 
only language in the Plessy Case 
which may be fairly said to be “con­
trary to this finding” is the following: 
“Laws permitting, and even requiring 
their separation in places where they 
are liable to be brought into contact- 
do not necessarily imply the inferiori­
ty of either race to the other . . . .  
We consider the underlying fallacy 
of the plaintiff’s argument to consist in 
the assumption that the enforced sep­
aration of the two races stamps the 
colored race with a badge of inferiori­
ty. If this be so, it is not by reason 
of anything found in the act, but sole­
ly because the colored race chooses to 
put that construction upon it.” If this 
language is rejected, it must be reject­
ed in its totality, and not in its con­
ceivable application to public educa­
tion only.

The decision in the Brown Case vin­
dicates Mr. Justice Harlan’s dissent 
in Plessy v. Ferguson, where he said: 
“ Our Constitution is color-blind, and 
neither knows or tolerates classes 
among citizens.”

[b] Right to education.
The equal protection clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the

1. As to racial discrimination in se­
lection of grand or petit jury as pro­
hibited by Federal Constitution, see 
the United States Supreme Court cases 
collected in an annotation in 94 L ed 
856, supplemented in 97 L ed 1249.

See also Hernandez v. Texas (1954) 
347 US 475, 98 L ed 866, 74 S Ct 667, 
wThere it was held that exclusion of 
persons of Mexican descent from jury 
service amounted to a denial of equal 
protection.

2. See [d], infra.

/

states : 
regatec 
ical fa: 
tors, si 
tions a 
equal. 
(1954) 
6S6, 38

The 
Amend 
tion in 
trict oi 
(1954) 
693.

The ] 
tends : 

in f : 
of Coni 
1112, 7 
Supren 
the Suj 
2d 162 
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substai 
forded 
ported 
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Court ( 
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In 1 
Dist. v 
F2d 63 
was or 
other ' 
forthw 
college 
admiss 
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US 974

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(1953, 
(DC) : 
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Supre: 
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98 L ed 8S2