Clark v. Flory Petition
Public Court Documents
August 23, 1955
Cite this item
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Clark v. Flory Petition, 1955. 5984b5aa-ad9a-ee11-be37-00224827e97b. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/24af8301-a230-4c55-80de-291daf9dd21a/clark-v-flory-petition. Accessed November 23, 2025.
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Supreme Court
COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA
Mrs. Etta Clark, Et Al ., Plaintiffs
vs.
C. H. Flory, Et Al ., Defendants
P E T I T I O N
John H. W righten,
230 Coming Street,
Charleston, South Carolina,
W. Newton Pough,
P. 0. Box 81,
Orangeburg, South Carolina
Attorneys for Petitioners
I N D E X
Page
Petition ................................................................ ...................... la-4a
Order ........................................................................................... 5a-6a
Statements ...........................................................................-...... 7a-Sa
££>tate of i£>outt) Carolina
in tfje
Supreme Court
COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA
Mrs. Etta Clark, Et Al ., Plaintiffs
vs.
C. H. Flory, Et Al ., Defendants
P E T I T I O N
The undersigned, Petitioners, through their attorneys,
John H. Wrighten and W. Newton Pough, by leave of the
United States District Court, Eastern District of South
Carolina, Charleston Division, move before this Honorable
Court for the purpose of having this Honorable Court to
take jurisdiction of the above entitled action under the
Constitution of South Carolina, Article 5, Section 4 of the
Constitution of South Carolina. The same being taken with
leave from the United States District Court, Eastern Dis
trict of South Carolina, Charleston Division. The basis of
this action is for an Order of Injunction, the grounds for
which Order will hereafter more specifically appear. The
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court is also sought under
15-121 Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1952 and Rules
of the Supreme Court, Rule 20, Section 1.
The issues raised by the Petitioners are of great Public
interest, public welfare and they are peculiar in nature,
to w it: The statutes in question exclude Colored People who
are taxpayers in certain areas or sections of this State from
the use of the Edisto State Park Beach. The statutes of the
State of South Carolina; 51-181, 51-182, 51-183 and 51-184,
Code of Laws, 1952 exclude Colored taxpayers from the
full use and enjoyment of the property which has been set
aside and designated for the use of the General Public and
are being operated by the State of South Carolina out of
Public funds; that the statutes when passed, was directed
to Charleston County because it was the only County with
a City that met the specifications as to population at that
time making the said statutes local in its application when
it should have been general in nature. The exclusion of
Colored People who are taxpayers from the use of the
Edisto State Park is believed to be a denial of the constitu
tional rights of those taxpayers under the United States
Constitution, the 14th Amendment and the Constitution
of South Carolina, Article 1, Section 5, South Carolina’s
Constitution of 1895.
The above innumerated issues comes within the category
as set out in Rule 20, Section 1 of the South Carolina Su
preme Court Rules and are of great Public interest at least
to a large segment of the population of the State of South
Carolina.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Plaintiffs, Mrs. Etta Clark, J. Arthur Brown, John
L. Chisolm and Charles C. Mason, Citizens of the State
of South Carolina and the United States of America are
residents of and domiciled in the County of Charleston,
State of South Carolina. They are over the age of 21 and
are taxpayers and property owners in the County of
Charleston, State of South Carolina and of the United
States of America. All of the Plaintiffs are classified as
Negroes under the Laws of South Carolina. The Defend
ants, C. H. Flory, C. West Jacocks, are members of the
State Commission of Forestry, which said Commission was
oa
created under the laws of South Carolina and vested with
power and authority to establish and supervise bathing-
beaches, bathhouse facilities and other recreational facili
ties for the benefit of citizens and residents of the State of
South Carolina pursuant to authority vested in them under
Section 29-1 of the 1952 Code of Laws of South Carolina
and Section 51-1 of the 1952 Code of Laws of South Caro
lina. Donald B. Cooler is the Superintendent of the Edisto
Beach State Park, Edisto Island, South Carolina, who is
appointed by the State Park Director, an instrumentality
of the State of South Carolina with authority to maintain,
supervise and control the operation of the recreational fa
cilities maintained by the State, at Edisto Island, for the
benefit and use of citizens of the State of South Carolina.
On or about May 12, 1955, the Plaintiffs directed letters
to Mr. J. M. Pope, who was then the Superintendent of
the Edisto Beach State Park, asking and begging for the
permission to use the said Park on May 25th, at about
11:30 A.M. for outdoor and recreational purposes, Mr.
Donald B. Cooler, Superintendent of the Edisto State Park
Beach, Mr. J. M. Pope’s successor in office, answered the
communication, to w it:
“ I have been instructed by our Central Office in Co
lumbia to advise you that the Forestry Commission is
not empowered with the authority to grant your per
mission to visit Edisto State Park. This Park was
established in 1935 for the exclusive use of White per
sons, and based on custom and precedence, we will have
to deny your request.”
The Plaintiffs then instituted a cause of action against the
Defendants in the United States District Court, Eastern
District of South Carolina, Charleston Division. At the
hearing in Charleston, South Carolina August 23, 1955,
before the Honorable Ashton H. Williams, Judge of said
Court, it was agreed by the Attorney for Plaintiffs and
Defendants, that the sections of South Carolina’s Laws that
were being challenged by Plaintiffs were never ruled upon
by this Honorable Court. The Sections being; 51-181, 51-
182, 51-183 and 51-184 of the 1952 Code of Laws of South
Carolina, and it therefore becomes necessary to have this
Honorable Court construe and pass upon the validity of
the above sections and as to their constitutionality.
The issues are as follows:
1. Whether or not Sections: 51-181, 51-182, 51-183 and
51-184 of the Code of Laws of South Carolina, and the
policy, custom and usage and practice of the Defendants
under authority and color of said statutes, and otherwise,
in denying on account of race and/or color to Plaintiffs and
other Colored Citizens similarly situated, rights and privi
leges of attending and making use of the bathing beach and
bathhouse facilities at the Edisto State Park Beach, re
pugnant to the 14th Amendment of the United States Con
stitution and Article 1, Section 5 of the Constitution of
South Carolina.
2. Whether or not these Sections are repugnant to Arti
cle 3 of the Constitution of South Carolina, Section 34.
3. Whether or not Sections: 51-181, 51-182, 51-183 and
51-184 violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article
1, Section 5 of the Constitution of South Carolina.
4. Whether or not Sections: 51-181, 51-182, 51-183 and
51-184 are violative of the Due Process of Law under the
14th Amendment of the United States Constitution and the
5a
Constitution of South Carolina, Article 1, Section 5.
Mrs. Etta Clark
J. Arthur Brown
John L. Chisolm
Charles C. Mason
Petitioners.
John H. W righten
W. Newton Bough
Attorneys for Petitioners
♦
Copy Copy
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
SOUTH CAROLINA
CHARLESTON DIVISION
C/A No. 5082
Mrs. Etta Clark, Et Al ., Plaintiffs
vs.
C. H. Flory, Et Al ., Defendants
O R D E R
This matter was heard today with reference to the ques
tion of whether or not a three-judge court should be con
vened to hear the issues herein.
It was agreed by both parties that the case of Daivson,
et al, vs. The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore would
be controlling in this case.
The defendants insisted that the case should be held in
abeyance until an opportunity was afforded to the Supreme
Court of the State of South Carolina to pass upon the con
6a
stitutionality of the act. A full discussion was had in open
court and both parties thereupon agreed that the matter
would be submitted to the State Supreme Court to pass
upon the questions involved, and specifically the question
of the constitutionality of Sections 51-181 through 51-184,
inclusive, of the 1952 Code of Laws of the State of South
Carolina.
It was further agreed that the federal court would retain
jurisdiction until the questions raised in the complaint
were passed on by the State Supreme Court.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that this court will retain jurisdiction of the
above entitled case until the Supreme Court of the State
of South Carolina has had an opportunity to pass upon the
constitutionality of the above sections, and/or upon any
other issues raised in the case over which the State Supreme
Court would have jurisdiction. The parties are directed to
take prompt and appropriate action to bring these matters
before the Supreme Court of the State of South Carolina.
A shton H. W illiams,
United States District Judge
Charleston, S. C.
August 23, 1955.
7 a
Copy Copy
(The following is an excerpt of the proceedings held in
the case of Mrs. Etta Clark, et al, vs. C. H. Flory, et al,
C /A 5082, August- 23, 1955, at Charleston, S. C.)
THE COURT: Let me get this clear. I understand that
there is no objection by either side to the State Court pass
ing on the constitutionality of this act. Is that correct?
MR. WRIGHTEN: Yes, sir.
MR. CALLISON: We have no objection.
THE COURT: All right. Provided the federal court re
tains jurisdiction for final action in the matter.
MR, WRIGHTEN: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Do you have any objection to that, Mr.
Callison?
MR. CALLISON: Your Honor, that is exactly what the
Dupre case held and directed.
MR. VERN ER: We have no objection.
THE COURT: Well, just make a statement as to what
you agree to, Mr. Verner.
MR. VERNER: We have no objection.
THE COURT: Well, make a statement as to what you
agree to and I will see whether he agrees to it, and I will
put that in the form of an Order.
MR. VERNER: We have no objection on behalf of the
8a
State of South Carolina for this matter to remain pending
and in status quo until the State Supreme Court of South
Carolina has passed upon the questions involved in this
ease.
THE COURT: You can’t add anything to that?
MR. WRIGHTEN: No, sir; but I should like to point
out there that he said “questions involved in this case,” and
we should like to be specific. Certainly we have no objec
tion to letting the State Supreme Court of South Carolina
pass on the constitutionality of those sections that we have
quoted, which are Sections 51-181 through 51-184. I believe
those are the sections. We have no objection to letting the
State Supreme Court pass on the constitutionality of those
sections.
THE COURT: Well, as I understand it, that is the only
question before the court.
MR. VERN ER: Pass on the questions in the case, what
ever they are.
THE COURT: Well, the only question about constitu
tionality of an act is the constitutionality of the act relat
ing to Edisto Beach.
MR. VERNER: That is all. But there are many phases
of the constitutionality of the act, all phases that may
come up under the constitution, state or federal.
THE COURT: Well, it seems to me,— I don’t know,—
that the federal court can retain jurisdiction. And it seems
to me that the quickest and simplest way to get to the
United States Supreme Court is to appeal from the Su
preme Court of the State of South Carolina.