San Antonio Independent School District v Rodriguez Brief of Amicus Curiae

    IN THE
JUL 22 uv

© u p r p m r  CUmtrt o f  %  I m t g fi jp...cgsk

October T erm, 1971 ^

No. 71-1332

SAN ANTONIO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, et al.,

Appellants,

v.

DEMETRIO P. RODRIGUEZ, et al.,
Appellees.

On Appeal from the United States District Court for 
the Western District of Texas

AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF THE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY

George F. K tjgler, Jr.,
Attorney General of New Jersey, 

Amicus Curiae,
State House Annex,

Trenton, New Jersey, 08625.

Stephen Skillman,
Assistant Attorney General,

Of Counsel and on the Brief.

Adams Press Corp., 11 Commerce Street, Newark, N. J.— Market 3-8611-12



TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

Interest of the A micus .................. .................— ............ 1

A rgument—The State interest in local control of 
education constitutes a rational basis for delegat­
ing the primary responsibility for public education, 
including the power to raise necessary revenues, to 
local school districts ............... .................................. 8

Conclusion ..............................................................- ........ - .....  14

Cases Cited

Burruss v. Wilkerson, 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 
1969), aff’d mem. 397 U.S. 44 (1970) ....................  14

Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U. S.
495 (1937).—.................. ...................... - ....... - ............ 9,14

Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970)............. 9,14
Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353 (1963)...................... 12
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U. S. 663 

(1966) ......- ........................ ....... ..... ....... .................—- 12
James v. Valtierra, 402 U. S. 137, 91 S. Ct. 1331, 28 

L. Ed. 2d 678 (1971)..................................................  H
Jefferson v. Hackney,------TJ. S .------- , 92 S. Ct. 1724,

32 L. Ed. 285 (1972)............... ..................- ............8,9,14
Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U. S. 621 

(1969) ..........- .................... - ..... ..................................  13
Lindsey v. Normet, 404 U. S. 818 (1971)................... — 13



TABLE OE CONTENTS

PAGE

s v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N. D. 111.
), affirmed Mem. sub 110m. Mclnnis v. Ogilvie,
U.S. 322 (19G9) ...................................................  14
ids v. Suns, 377 U. S. 533 (1964)................. - ....  I2
son v. Cahill, 118 N. J. Super. 223 (Law Div.

a -------------------- - — ----- -------------------- ------- 5’
lrg v. Maryland, 346 U. S. 545 (1954)..............—
i v. Ivucbel, 404 TJ. S. 357 (1971).................  ^
d States ex rcl. Buonoraba v. Commissioner of 
\, 316 F. Supp. 556 (S. D. N. Y. 1970).—..........
Morris Reg. Bd. of Ed. v. Sills, 58 N. J. 464 

t. den. 404 U. S. 986 (1971 )--...............................H ’ 1-

United States Constitution Cited
2 8•teenth Amendment .................................................  ’

New Jersey Constitution Cited
cle IV, Section 7, paragraphs 8, 9(7) (11), (12) ^
id (13), and 1 0 ..............- ........... - .............................

Statute Cited

l970, ch. 234 .........................................................."""

Other Authorities Cited
lill “ A  Master Plan for Tax Reform” :

5
p. 17 ....................................... ........

ecutive Order No. 5 of 1970 3

TABLE OE CONTENTS
ni

____________ ___________ _— " PAGE

1 Howard, Local Constitutional History of the United
States: ^

234-236 ................................................ .......................

Kurland, Equal Educational Opportunity: The Lun_ 
its of Constitutional Jurisprudence Undefined, 35 
u . of Ch. L. Rev. (1968):

583 ................... - ...................................................

Summary Report of the New Jersey Tax Policy 
Committee (Trenton, N. J- 1972).

P-16 ................................... ........................ .............  1
P- 17 ................. ................................ ...........



IN  TH E

fcuprmt (Court nt the Hiritei* S’tatra
October Term, 1971

No. 711332

SAN ANTONIO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL
DISTRICT, et al, A ppd M S t

v.

DEMETRIO P. RODRIGUEZ, et a l>

On Appeal from the United States District Court for 
the Western District of Texas

Interest of the Amicus

The State of New Jersey is filing a separate amicus 
mriac brief in this matter because of its extreme impor- 
f  fn the State and also because an examination of 

°em of puwic school fe n c in g  in New Jersey and 
rten t efforts to change it, may illustrate in concrete 
the practical implications for a particular s a e 
Resent Campaign to read far-reaching n ^ t h
respect to public school financing into the Equal



2

tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The brief does 
not attempt to present a full length argument for reversal 
of the district court judgment, since those arguments have 
already been fully set forth in the brief for the appel­
lants, nor does it canvas all posible ramifications of ac­
ceptance of appellees’ constitutional theories, since this 
has been done in the amicus brief of Montgomery County, 
Maryland and the State of Maryland, et al. Rather, 
the objective of the brief is to set forth the particular 
significance of the case to the State of New Jersey, which 
is actively seeking reform of public school financing 
through its legislative and executive branches but at the 
same time takes the position tliat the imposition of such 
change by judicial decree is neither authorized by the 
Equal 1 rotection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment nor 
desirable as a matter of policy if appropriate balances are 
to be maintained between the federal and state govern­
ments and between the judicial and legislative branches.

The present system of financing public school education 
in New Jersey, enacted as chapter 234 of the Laws of 1970, 
resulted from the recommendations of a joint legislative 
and executive commission which spent more than two 
years studying alternative proposals to improve educa­
tional financing. The program of state aid enacted by the 
Legislatore pursuant to the Coimnission’s recommenda­
tions, known as “ incentive equalization aid,” guarantees 
each district in the State at least $30,000 in equalized valu­
ations per pupil for purposes of raising operating reve­
nues through local property taxation. This amount of 
guni an teed equalized valuation may be raised as high as 
$45,000 for a particular school district if it improves the 
quality of its educational program. I f a district has less 
than the guaranteed quantum of ratables per pupil avail­
able, then the State makes up the difference by distribut­
ing aid in an amount that allows a district to levy a tax

3

as if it had the greater amount of ratables per pupil. In 
determining the number of pupils in a district, the legisla­
tion includes a “ weighting” factor which in effect causes 
each pupil from a family receiving aid under the Aid to 
Families With Dependent Children program to count as 1.75 
pupils, thus providing more State aid to poorer districts. 
Due to the fiscal problems now being encountered by the 
State of New Jersey, this new program is only partially 
funded at the present time.

Shortly after assuming office, Covernor William T. 
Cahill created by Executive Order No. 5 of 1970 a Tax 
Policy Committee wliicli was given the responsibility 
of studying the entire structure of revenue raising and 
allocation of the costs of governmental services among 
the various levels of government in New Jersey. Near­
ly two years later, the Committee transmitted its re­
port and recommendations, consisting of six volumes 
and nearly 500 pages, to the Governor. Regarding public 
school education, one of the main subjects of the report, 
the Committee noted that while most people agree upon 
the goal of equality of educational opportunity, there is 
substantial disagreement as to what it is:

“ There are substantial disagreements as to what 
constitutes equality of educational opportunity. 
Among standards discussed are equal expenditures 
per pupil, equal taxable valuations per pupil, a spe­
cified limit to variations among districts, specified 
minimum attainments such as ability to read by age 
9, allocation of resources in accordance with ability 
to pay, and development of the full potentialities 
of all pupils.” Summary Report of the New Jersey 
Tax Policy Committee, p. 1G (Trenton, N. J. 1972).

After consideration of all aspects of public financing in 
New Jersey, the Committee concluded that “ the time has



4

come for substantially full funding of the public elemen­
tary and secondary school system by the state govern­
ment.” Id. at 17. But while the Committee recommended 
that the State assume responsibility for all the operating 
costs of a “ standard quality education,” it also concluded 
that local school districts, by public referendum, should be 
allowed to expend additional amounts to attain a superior 
system of education for the children residing therein. The 
State would continue to participate in such additional edu­
cational expenditures, in accordance with a formula based 
upon the equalized valuation per pupil of real property in 
the district, up to an amount one-third greater than that 
determined to be necessary for a “ standard quality edu­
cation.” In recognition of the fact that the cost of a “ stand­
ard quality education” is not the same in every school dis­
trict, the Committee also recommended that additional 
amounts continue to he alloted to districts in accordance 
with the number of pupils from families receiving AFDC 
benefits and that regional cost differences be taken into 
account. The Committee further recommended that a re­
gional collective bargaining system for teachers’ salaries 
and fringe benefits be established in connection with the 
assumption hy the State of substantially all funding of 
public education.

At about the same time that the Governor’s Committee 
began its investigation of the tax structure of New Jersey, 
a suit was filed challenging the validity under the State and 
Federal Constitutions of the present system of financing 
public school education in New Jersey. One month before 
the Committee issued its report, the trial court before whom 
the case had been brought issued an opinion declaring the 
entire present system of financing public schools in New 
Jersey to be unconstitutional and ordered the Legislature 
to enact a “ nondiscriminatory system of taxation” prior to

January 1, 1973. Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N. J. Super. 
223, 280 (Law Div. 1972). The opinion nowhere in­
dicates what specific legislative amendments will be re­
quired to satisfy the trial judge’s conception of a “non­
discriminatory system of taxation.” Would a uniform 
state real property tax or increase in the state sales tax 
suffice, even though such taxes are generally considered to 
be regressive, or is the Legislature required to fund edu­
cation through an income tax? The court also declined 
to determine whether its constitutional theories would re­
quire invalidation of any local expenditures for public edu­
cation beyond the state funding needed to provide an ade­
quate education. 118 N. J. Super, at 278 n. 21. The 
court further ordered that if the Legislature does not 
act by January 1, 1973, then some of the funds which 
the Legislature has previously appropriated to implement 
the duly enacted present system of public school financing 
are to be redistributed in a manner which will satisfy the 
court’s notions of equality. The Attorney General has ap­
pealed from this judgment to the Supreme Court of New 
Jersey, where the matter is now pending.

On May 18, 1972 Governor Cahill delivered to the Legis­
lature a message entitled, “A Master Plan for Tax Re­
form,” which urged the enactment of legislation embody­
ing the recommendations of the Tax Policy Committee. 
The primary means proposed to pay for a “ standard qual­
ity education” wholly from State revenues were an income 
tax and a 1% State tax on real property. The Governor 
also took specific note at p. 41 of his message of recent 
equal protection challenges to the school financing law, and 
expressed the hope that the efforts of some school districts 
to provide superior educational programs would not be 
thwarted by judicial mandate:

“ Localities must be permitted to supplement State
funds with local resources as the people from each



G

community determine the wisest course for the edu­
cation of their children. I recognize there are un­
resolved constitutional differences in this area. Un­
less judicially mandated to the contrary, we should 
not foreclose a district where the citizens desire to 
provide the ultimate in educational programs.

The tax reform bills proposed by Governor Cahill were 
introduced in the New Jersey Legislature, but initial at­
tempts to secure enactment have been unsuccessful.

The State of New Jersey is therefore currently operat­
ing under the “ incentive equalization aid” program de­
scribed in the second paragraph of this brief, as modified 
,by the trial court order directing certain redistribution of 
funds appropriated for this program if the Legislature 
does not enact “ non-discriminatory system of taxation 
by next January 1. Since the trial court judgment is 
based partly on State constitutional grounds, a decision 
favorable to the appellant in this case would not be 
dispositive of the pending challenge to the New Jersey 
system of financing public school education. However, 
aii affirmance of the district court judgment would re­
sult in the imposition upon New Jersey by judicial decree 
of a system of school financing with an immense im­
pact not only on the educational and fiscal programs 
of the State, but also on the fundamental allocation of 
responsibility for public services among the different levels 
of government, which the people of the State, through 
their duly elected representatives in the Legislature, have 
only recently refused to modify. Such alteration of the 
tax structure and responsibility for public services in 
New Jersey by the federal judiciary would be funda­
mentally inconsistent with basic democratic principles. 
Furthermore, even if the view is taken that the end result

7

of “ equality of educational opportunity” justifies depar­
ture from the normal process of democratic decision ma - 
in" there is substantial disagreement as to what system 
meets this ideal. This makes the entire subject an inap­
propriate one for resolution by constitutional adjudica­
tion, because the judicial decision making process lends 
itself to the establishment of an inflexible rule of equal­
ity” of educational opportunity in accordance with the 
views in vogue at the present time which further study 
may show to be imperfect. Thus, the present system of 
“ power equalization” contained m the New Jersey law 
is considered by most people to be a progressive system 
to achieve the goal of “ equality of educational oppor­
tunity” even though inequalities may occur with respect 
to districts which have ratables per pupil in excess o 
the guaranteed level or which vote, to 
neighboring communities on education, but that syste 
has been held to be in conflict with the Equal Protection 
Clause. Robinson v. Cahill, supra, 118 N. J. Super, a 
207-80 So too the proposals of the Tax Policy Com­
mittee' are almost universally thought to be progressive 
social measures which would still further improve the sys­
tem of educational financing m New Jersey. However, 
the recent cases discerning in the Equal Protection Clause 
a rigid requirement of equality of expenditures for educa­
tion cast substantial doubt on the validity of the proposal 
to allow local school districts to spend more than the 
sum appropriated by the state to .provide a “ standard 
quality education.” It is clear, therefore, that the State 
of New Jersey, along with the other states participating 
as amici curiae in this matter, has a vital interest in 
preserving the authority of its Legislature to adopt pro­
visions for financing public education which are consistent 
with its views of proper allocation of functions among 
the various levels of government, and which will enable 
local school districts to provide the highest quality edu­
cation possible.



8

a r g u m e n t

The State interest in local control of education
rauonalbasis for delegating the primary

power to ^  M PUbHc educa,io" ’ '"eluding the 
districts necessary revenues, to local school

dettheaE a u ? P rS ali-n8eA Validity of R a t i o n  un-aer the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend

i r r s ;  < r v he hcavy bMd™ *  z gthat the Legislature has acted in an invidiously discrim- 
ory or palpably unreasonable manner. Jefferson v

U-S- 1— ’ 92 S- Ct- 1724’ 32 L- Ed 2d 285 
chAllpi’ 1G PnnClpIeS governing equal protection in any

K u eb e*m v .S ™ v (W n J 'f  smmnarized ™ SckOb v.

“ ‘The prohibition of the Equal Protection Clause 
Willi n° fUrthrr than invidi011s discrimination.’ 
U955) V; w 6 ° P t lC a l  C ° - ’  348 U’S- 483> 489 
con stitu tin g  UreS T  PreSllmed t0 have «*ed
tions will b 7 ;  ' ' f  th6ir statntory classifica- tions udl be set aside only if no grounds can be
conceived to justify them. . . . With this much
discretion, a legislature traditionally has been a 1

“0M stcP at a «™e, S e a t
°  itself to the phase of the problem which seems 

most acute to the legislative mind.’”  McDonald

809 (lOCO) T Wn Commissioners> 304 U.S. 802,
been ^ 9 :1 a ^  “ easnre of ecl™l protection has been described variously as whether ‘ the distinc
tions drawn have some basis in practical experi-
33ie’n S f ^  Caroh™  v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 
SSI (1966), or whether the legislature’s action falls

vh<i>  f n r  i7nVvdi0US disCrimination,’ Williamson v Lee Optical Co., supra, 348 U.S., at 489 or
whether any state of facts reasonably may be con-
ceived to justify’ the statutory d i s c r e t i o n
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961)’
see United States v. Maryland Savinys-Share Ins’
Corp., 400 U.S. 4, 6 (1970), or whether the c la s l'

laT ed 'to lb  \ the. baSiS ° f  C1'iteria chatty 2 1
C  4V u es v-
ed. 225 (1971).” ’ ’ Ct' 251’ 2o4' 30 L'

The. sf,me Principles clearly control any equal protec

s Z h ^ i  coalf r * / T 88? ™ 4 ° f ‘ aXeS v.southern Coal £  Cole Co., 301 U.S. 495 f l 9q7 U nr- oil
cation of government revenues. Band rid ae v W'll' °" 397 U S  471 H07m t  r. i na()e v. Williams, 
o i • n i Tn Dandndye the Court reiected
a claim that a Maryland welfare regulation, establishing 
a maximum grant for any AFDC family, den ed o ual 
protection to children in large families, spying.

“ In the area of economics and social welfare a 
State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause 
merely because the classifications made by its laws 

are imperfect. I f the classification has some ‘rea 
sonable basis,’ it does not offend the Constitution 
srniply because the classification ‘is not madeTith 
mathematical nicety or because in practice it fc  
suits in some inequality.’ Lindsley v. National Car 

honor Oas Co..220 U.S. 01, 7 8 U S at 48? 
See also Jefferson v. Hackney, supra.

In this case the disparities in expenditures for eduea
r o „  T f C ,Wrea in the taxes assessed 1>V different 

school districts are simply by-products of the ig is l lt ir e  
determination to delegate the primary responsibm y r

9



10

public education to the local school districts of the State. 
From an early date in our history each school district has 
been considered “ a miniature democracy where the people, 
within certain limits, enact their own laws, levy their own 
taxes, and choose their own officers,” which thereby fosters 
“ a spirit of vigorous self-government.” 1 Howard, Local 
Constitutional History of the United States, 234-23G. 
Local self-government in the area of education is only 
one aspect of the home rule principle, which also involves 
local decision making with regard to police and fire pro­
tection, health, land use planning and various other areas 
vital to the health, safety and welfare of the citizenry. 
This principle is so fundamental that it even finds expres­
sion in the New Jersey Constitution, Art. IV, § 7, para. 11, 
also Art. IV, §7, paras. 8, 9(7), (11), (12) and (13), 
and 10.

Moreover, there are substantial policies which are 
served by the legislative emphasis on local responsibility 
for education. The fact that the educational accomplish­
ments of the local children immediately affect the well­
being of the district acts as an incentive to the citizens 
thereof to allocate sufficient sums for educational purposes. 
At the same time, the fact that local tax revenues are 
allocated for this purpose motivates the citizens of the 
area to prevent wasteful and unnecessary expenditures. 
Such planning at the local level also allows the citizens 
to weigh carefully the various services to be provided 
by the local governmental unit and to determine what per­
centage of the tax revenues shall be allocated for each one. 
As a natural and expected consequence of such local con­
trol, diversity exists throughout the State in the amount 
of money spent on education. However, these differences 
are not mandated by the Legislature, nor do they result

v

from a legislative policy which separates the wealthy from 
the poor. The Legislature has simply recognized the value 
of community control and has entrusted to the local school 
district the duty to provide for the education of the chil­
dren residing therein.

Since there is a rational basis for reposing the primary 
responsibility for public education with local school dis­
tricts, the controlling Federal and State case law leave no . 
doubt that this legislative judgment is consistent with the 
equal protection guarantees of the Federal Constitution. 
In James v. Valtierra, 402 U. S. 137 (1971), the Court up­
held the power of local governmental units to exclude low- 
income housing projects from within their boundaries 
through referendums mandated by the State Constitution. 
It found that the referendum which effectively excluded 
such housing was basically a procedure for democratic de­
cision making, and since the State did not single out low 
income people desiring public housing for such mandatory 
referendums, it was constitutionally valid. The court said:

“ This procedure ensures that all the people of a 
community will have a voice in a decision which 
may lead to large expenditures of local govern­
mental funds for increased public services and to 
lower tax revenues. It gives them a voice in deci­
sions that will affect the future development of their 
own community.” 402 U. S. at 143.

The position of prospective low income residents of a mu­
nicipality which determines to exclude low income housing 
is akin to that of students in a municipality which does 
not make available funds for education comparable to 
those provided by a neighboring municipality. See also 
Salsbury v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 545 (1954); West Morris 
Reg. Bd. of Ed. v. Sills, 58 N. J. 404 cert. den. 404 U. S. 980

11



12

(1971); United States ex rel. Buonoraba v. Commissioner 
of Cor., 316 F. Supp. 556 (S. D. N. Y. 1970).

The ultimate jurisprudential question posed by the deci­
sion below and the cases which have followed it is whether 
such judicial activism can be reconciled with basic demo­
cratic principles. As set forth in the interest of the amicus 
portion of this brief, the New Jersey Legislature, duly 
elected by the people of this State, has determined to dele­
gate the primary responsibilty for public education to 
local school districts. This determination has far-reaching 
implications with respect to the structure of state govern­
ment, the exercise of the power of taxation, and the alloca­
tion of governmental revenues. See Kurland, Equal Pro­
tection Opportunity: The Limits of Constitutional Juris­
prudence Undefined, 35 U. of Oh. L. Rev. 583 (196S). These 
are all areas of controversy primarily entrusted to the 
Legislature to resolve in conformity with the will of the 
majority of the people, and not to be resolved for all time 
by the judiciary iu accordance with notions of equality 
currently in vogue. In this respect, the legislative judg­
ment challenged in this case is fundamentally different 
from questions of criminal procedure or the exercise of the 
franchise, with respect to which the judiciary has a pri- 
mary responsibility for the protection of individual rights. 
See e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U. S. 663 
(1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533 (1964); Douglas 
v. California, 372 U. S. 353 (1963). In fact, the active 
role which the court has assumed in voting rights cases 
such as Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections and Rey­
nolds v. Sims is in furtherance of the fundamental demo­
cratic principle that all citizens have a right to cast an 
effective ballot to influence decisions concerning the struc­
ture of government, taxation, the distribution of govern­
mental revenues and other matters of vital concern. This

13

point was well made in Kramer v. Union Free School Dis­
trict, 395 U. S. 621 (1969) where the Court, in explaining 
its reasons for applying a strict standard of judicial re­
view in votings rights cases, said:

“ The presumption of constitutionality and the ap­
proval given ‘rational’ classifications in other types 
of enactments are based on an assumption that the 
institutions of state government are structured so 
as to represent fairly all the people. However, when 
the challenge to the statute is in effect a challenge 
of this basic assumption, the assumption can no 
longer serve as the basis for presuming constitu­
tionality.”  395 U. S. at 628.

By contrast, the recent decisions invalidating state financ­
ing legislation on equal protection grounds do not protect 
the democratic political process, but to the contrary, they 
effectively remove one of the most important areas of pub­
lic policy from that process. It is certainly not the func­
tion of courts to choose between competing claims for pub­
lic revenues or conflicting educational and political theo­
ries.  ̂ Even assuming that the present system of financing 
public education in many states leaves much to be desired, 
it should be remembered that “ . . . the Constitution does 
not provide judicial remedies for every social and eco­
nomic ill.” Lindsey v. Normet, 404 U. S. 818 (1972).

»



CONCLUSION

The District Court failed to give due consideration to 
the equal protection principles governing this case set
forth expressly in Jefferson v. Hackney, ------  U.S. ____,
92 S. Ct. 1724, 32 L. ed. 2d 285 (1972); Dandridge v. 
Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); and Carmichael v. South­
ern Coal <£• Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937), and implicitly 
in the Court’s summary affirmances in Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 
293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. 111. 1968), affirmed Mem. sub nom. 
Mclnnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969) and Burruss v. 
Wilkerson, 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969), aff’d mem. 
397 U.S. 44 (1970). It is respectfully, submitted that the 
application of those principles to this case clearly demon­
strates that the decision below is erroneous and therefore 
that it should be reversed.

Kespectfully submitted,

George F. K tjgler, Jr.,
Attorney General of New Jersey, 

Amicus Curiae,
State House Annex,

Trenton, New Jersey, 0S625.

14

Stephen Siollman ,
Assistant Attorney General,

Of Counsel and on the Brief.

!