Stallworth v. Monsanto Company Brief of Appellants-Intervenors
Public Court Documents
November 3, 1975

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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Stallworth v. Monsanto Company Brief of Appellants-Intervenors, 1975. 298d83f2-c49a-ee11-be37-00224827e97b. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/26980adf-c623-4347-9cfb-5b7a0117fd44/stallworth-v-monsanto-company-brief-of-appellants-intervenors. Accessed April 27, 2025.
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FIFTH CIRCUIT CASE NO. 75-3425______________________ __ EDDIE STALLWORTH, et al., Plaintiffs, J. W. PALMER, et al, Intervenors-Appellants, vs . MONSANTO COMPANY, Defendant APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA BRIEF OF APPELLANTS-INTERVENORS D. L. MIDDLEBROOKS and JEFFREY A. CRAMER, Of Levin, Warfield, Middlebrooks, Graff, Mabie, Rosenbloum & Magie, P.A. 226 South Palafox Street Pensacola, Florida 32501 Attorneys for Appellants- Intervenors IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FIFTH CIRCUIT EDDIE STALLWORTH, et al., Plaintiffs, J. W. PALMER, et al., Intervenors-Appellants. vs. CASE NO. 75-3425 MONSANTO COMPANY, Defendant. certifies that the following listed parties have an interest in the outcome of this case . CERTIFICATE REQUIRED BY FIFTH CIRCUIT LOCAL RULE 13(a): The undersigned, counsel of record for Intervenors Plaintiffs Eddie Stallworth Angelo Moutrie Fred Henderson Robert Davis Jonas Fairlie Jessee Ford Sam Bonham Ernestine Young Henry Golsten Charles Powe Defendant Monsanto Company Intervenors J. W. Palmer G. C. Brantley Richard S. Brown E. V. Antason, Jr. C. B. Kelley James D. Roberson R. H. Woodard W. D. Roberson W. S. Howell L. E. Sellers J. D. Ingram Don S. Smith Marvin Sanders c. E. Bryan c. R. Nelson D. H. Morris H. L. McCrone L. D. Goodson D. H. Smith Bobby W. Morris Huey Courtney Pete Bartley W. L. Pugh J. W. Thompson C. E. McLelland H. C. Fowler W. L. Bingle R. D. Thomas R. C. Curtis Marcus Dobson A. J. McCroskey C. L. Payne Bill Morris C. F. Kast M. L. Chavers R. Y. Cotton Paul B. Vanlente R. K. Bryan These representations are made in order that Judges of this Court may evaluate possible disqualification or recusal pursuant to Local Rule 13 (a) . Attorney of Record for Appellants- Intervenors TABLE OF CONTENTS ( N‘ Page TABLE OF AUTHORITIES..................................... ii ISSUE PRESENTED.......................................... 1 STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS......................... 2 ARGUMENT - INTRODUCTION.................................. 3 I. THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE RENEWED MOTION TO INTERVENE..... 4 II. THE GRANTING OF THE RENEWED MOTION TO INTERVENE WOULD NOT PREJUDICE THE EXISTING PARTIES TO THE LITIGA TION, NOR UNDULY DELAY THE PROCEEDINGS.... 6 III. INTERVENTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED AS OF RIGHT............................... 9 CONCLUSION............................................... 12 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE................................... 13 o TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES CITED PAGE(S) General Motors Corp. v. Burns, 50 F.R.D. 401 (D. Hawaii 1970) 10 Hodgson v. United States Mine Workers of America, 473 F. 2d 118 (D. C. Cir. 1972) 4 Jackson v. Sargent, 394 F. Supp. 162, 173 (D. Mass. 1975) 11 NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345 (1973) 5 New York v. United States, 65 F.R.D. 10 (E.D.C. 1974) 5 New York Public Interest Research Group, Inc., v. Regents of the University of the State of New York, 516 F. 2d 350 (2nd Cir. 1975) 9, 10, 11 Raulie v. U .S., 400 F. 2d 487, 526 (10th Cir. 1968) 8 Smith Petroleum Service, Inc. v. Monsanto Chemical Company, 420 F. 2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1970) . 00V United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Industries, Inc., 517 F. 2d 826 (5th Cir. 1975) Zimmer v. McKeithan, 467 F. 2d 1381 (5th Cir. 1972) 3 55 ISSUE PRESENTED The issue on this appeal is whether the District Court erred in refusing to consider the motion to intervene. STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS This is an appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida denying the Appellants' (hereinafter referred to as Intervenors) renewed motion to intervene. An appeal has previously been taken from the denial of Intervenors' original motion to intervene in this litigation. The companion case, Number 75-2405, and the present appeal have been consolidated for argument purposes. Appellants initially moved to intervene in this pending litigation on April 4, 1975. (R. 51) An order denying that motion for intervention was entered on April 21, 1975. (R. 146-148) The Court's rationale for denying the motion was that it was untimely filed in that it would impede the progress of hearings before a special Master which were in process at that time. (R. 147) The Intervenors renewed their motion to intervene on July 8, 1975, when the Master's hearings relative to the issues of back pay had been concluded. (R. 149-150) At the time the renewed motion to intervene was filed, there was a hiatus in the litigation. Unlike the original motion, the renewed motion sought only to rectify the injustices resulting from the Court's order of March 7, 1975, abolishing group seniority as to all workers at defendant company. Intervenors intended to argue to the District Court that testimony would not have been necessary to decide this question of law and that it could have -2- been decided upon a single hearing. Nevertheless, the District Court summarily denied the renewed motion to intervene, without the benefit of any hearing on the matter. (R. 173-176) It is from that denial of the renewed motion to intervene that this appeal is taken. Since many of the factual circumstances have been pre sented and legal arguments concerning this appeal have been made previously in Case Number 75-2405, this brief will concern itself largely with matters relative to the renewed motion to intervene and incorporated herein are all arguments previously made in Case Number 75-2405. ARGUMENT THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE RENEWED MOTION TO INTERVENE. •Since 1966, this Court has consistently held that under Rule 24(a)(2), F.R.C.P., intervention as of right must be measured by a practical rather than techical yardstick. E .g, United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Industries, Inc., 517 F. 2d 826 (5th Cir. 1975). The decision of the lower court in denying the renewed motion to intervene fails to take into account the "practical" effects of the motion to intervene, but instead denies the motion on the purely "technical" ground that the length of time that the suit has been pending since the filing of the original motion to intervene has -3- increased. The Court apparently considered the Intervenors' argu ment that the hearings of the Master would not need to be reopened as its order stated "If they were not, or if reopening of them was not required for other reason, then, nonetheless, there would be additional delay in getting to final determination of this long pending suit already too long delayed." (R. 174). No factual basis for this statement is found in the record. The District Court, then, measured the prejudice to the existing parties purely in terms of the length of time that this litigation has been pending. The amount of time which has elapsed since the litigation began is not in itself the determinative test of timeliness. Hodgson v. United States Mine Workers of America, 473 F. 2d 118 (D. C. Cir. 1972) ; Smith Petroleum Service, Inc, v. Monsanto Chemical Company, 420 F. 2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1970). I. THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE RENEWED MOTION TO INTERVENE._________________________________ The District Court Judge expressed some reservations in his order concerning that Court's jurisdiction to consider the renewed motion to intervene. The renewed motion to intervene was properly brought in the District Court. The motion to intervene which was filed on April 4, 1975, attempted to present to the Court two questions for determination. One of those questions concerned "bumping" of certain white workers from the positions they held at the time of the March 7, 1975 order. 4_ The other question concerned the abolition of the group seniority system as it applied to all workers of the defendant company by the March 7 order. In denying that motion on the ground of timeliness, the Court would necessarily have considered the effect of the pre sentation of those two issues before the Court at that time. The renewed motion to intervene was filed on July 8, 1975, at a time when the active status of the litigation had changed. The renewed motion presented only the question of the abolition of the group seniority system as it applied to all workers of the defendant com pany. Thus, the renewed motion could have been considered by taking into account the circumstances as they existed on July 8, 1975 and the effect that the presentation of this one narrow issue would have on the proceedings at that time. The issue presented to the Court in the renewed motion to intervene is thus entirely different from the issue presented on the original motion and the jurisdiction over the contentions in the renewed motion would not have passed to the appellate court. The District Court's reliance on Zimmer v. McKeithan, 467 F. 2d 1381 (5th Cir. 1972) is thus misplaced. Intervenors brought the renewed motion to intervene pursuant to holdings in NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345 (1973) and New York v. United States, 65 FRD 10 (E.D.C. 1974). Those cases stand for the proposition that if a motion to intervene was denied on the ground of timeliness, because it would unnecessarily prejudice the existing _5_ parties to the litigation, that motion could be renewed at a later date when such prejudice would not occur. The NAACP was allowed to intervene in the above mentioned litigation subsequent to the completion of the elections for that particular year. In the case at bar, the Court expressed its opinion that intervention in April of 1975 would seriously disrupt the hearings before the Master. Intervenors then moved to protect their rights by filing a timely notice of appeal. Once the hearings before the special Master were concluded, Intervenors again sought intervention pursuant to the holdings in the above mentioned cases. The Court failed to take these additional factors into consideration in denying the renewed motion to intervene solely on the basis of an increase in the length of time that the litigation had been pending. (R. 174) II. THE GRANTING OF THE RENEWED MOTION TO INTERVENE WOULD NOT PREJUDICE THE EXISTING PARTIES TO THE LITIGATION, NOR UNDULY DELAY THE PROCEEDINGS. Before beginning a factual discussion of the lack of pre judice that this intervention would cause, Intervenors would point out that the defendant company, Monsanto, did not oppose the original motion to intervene (R. 86-90) and that the plaintiffs have not opposed the renewed motion to intervene. (R. 158-159) Thus, at one time or another, there was a recognition by all of the parties to this litigation that Intervenors had a right to be represented. The plaintiffs were legitimately protecting their -6- interests at the time of the original motion which attempted to present a bumping question to the court. Since that question is no longer sought to be placed before the Court, the plaintiffs have apparently recognized that they would not be prejudiced in any manner by the determination of the question which Intervenors seek to place before the court. The complete turnabout in the defendant company's position is particularly shocking, especially in the light of the letter which the company presented to the Court on July 17, 1974, which states in pertinent part: "Monsanto accordingly respectfully urges the Court upon grounds of fundamental due process and basic fairness to notify or direct notification of Monsanto's white employees of the pendency of this action and give them a reasonable opportunity to intervene, or be joined as defendants, and to be represented and heard at any and all hearings at which relief is con sidered which will or may adversely affect their interests. Monsanto feels so strongly about the equities involved that it will, with the Court's per- ■ mission, voluntarily undertake to post such notices on its bulletin boards. It is also willing to include Mr. Spriggs' statement of plaintiffs' case with such notice." (e.s.) (R. 48) This letter was attached as an exhibit to the defendant company's response stating that the company did not oppose the motion to intervene. (R. 86-90) Subsequent to the writing of the above letter, the defendant company presented to this Court a lengthy brief in opposition to the motion to intervene and strenuously objected to the renewed motion to intervene. (R. 160-172) The defendant - 7 - company's original position, while not technically amounting to judicial estoppel, presents such a diametrically opposite position that the lower court should have evaluated this glaring inconsistency when determining the possible prejudice to the company by allowing intervention on July 8 , 1975. c.f. , Raulie v. U.S., 400 F. 2d 487 , 526 (10th Cir. 1968). The record clearly shows that no such evalua tion was made. This further evidences that timeliness was not determined from all of the circumstances involved as mandated by this Court in Smith Petroleum Service, Inc, v. Monsanto Chemical Company, 420 F. 2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1970) . Arguments that intervention would unnecessarily delay these proceedings must also be placed in context. This is a complex civil rights action which has been pending for over two years in the District Court. In such a case, many issues are involved. The issues which have been decided and the injunctive relief which has been granted to the black employees of the company are not challenged by Intervenors. The question of a formula for back pay awards, which has been the subject of the hearings before the Master, will not in any way be involved in the question which Intervenors seek to present to the Court. It is readily apparent from the docket entries in this case that there are other questions yet to be resolved in this litigation. (R. 1-31). As of July 8, 1975, the Master had not presented his opinion and findings of fact to the court. Surely the lower court could have arranged a hearing on Intervenors' con tentions while it was awaiting the Master's report. Other hearings _8_ have been scheduled. The litigation continues. How would a hearing on the merits of Intervenors1 contentions further delay the litigation? Obviously it could not. Since the litigation has continued and the Intervenors seek no redetermination of any questions previously presented to the District Court, a hearing on their claims could in no way delay the litigation any more than it has already been delayed. The lack of prejudice to the existing parties to this litigation is thus readily apparent. It is respectfully submitted that the lower court's opinion that a hearing on the merits of Intervenors' motion for relief from order would further delay the proceedings has no basis in fact and con stitutes an abuse of the court's discretion. The renewed motion to intervene was therefore timely filed and the Court's denial of the motion to intervene should be reversed. III. INTERVENTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED AS OF RIGHT. With respect to the other requirements for intervention as of right under Rule 24(a)(2), F.R.C.P., Intervenors would supplement discussion as to intervention as of right. In New York Public Interest Research Group, Inc, v. Regents of the University of the State of New York, 516 F. 2d 350 (2nd Cir. 1975) a pharmaceutical association and three individual pharmacists moved to intervene in an action brought by consumers to enjoin the regents of the University of the State of New York - 9- from enforcing a state-wide regulation prohibiting the price of prescription drugs from being advertised. The District Court for the Northern District of New Yorh denied the motion to intervene n with respect to the association and the Court of Appeals reversed. With respe of pharmacists, the Court held that it had a sufficient interest to permit it to intervene since the validity of a regulation from which its members benefited was challenged. A similar situation is presented in the case at bar. interveners and other employees of Monsanto have benefited for many years from a system of group seniority which formed the basis t. K nnfifq at the defendant company's plant, for promotions and other benefits at the • :rv Y\as been completely abolished. It is thus That system of seniority has Deen u ^ clear that the Interveners have a significantly protectable interest which would permit them to intervene as of right in the case at bar. ern tt p n 401 (D. HawaiiSee also, G e n e r a l _ M o t o r ^ ^ 1970). . The court in New_Jfork_IhibPr^— discussed how the disposition of that action would as a practical matter impair or impede the pharmacists' ability to protect their interests. In stating that it was clear that the pharmacists an the association were so situated that the disposition of the action would as a practical matter impair or impede their ability to pro ec their interests, the Court was not persuaded by the contention o the plaintiffs that the pharmacists could protect their interests after an adverse decision in the instant case by attaching any new 10_ regulation on constitutional, anti-trust, or unfair competition grounds. The Court held that such contentions ignored the possible stare decisis effect of an adverse decision. Id., at 352. As argued in the briefs in Case Number 75-2405, the stare decisis effect of the case at bar on the rights of Intervenors would certainly be as great and more than likely of greater detriment than that in New York Public Interest Research Group. In Jackson v. Sargent, 394 F. Supp. 162, 173 (D. Mass. 1975), an action was brought against state officials charging racial discrimination on the part of defendant officials with respect to hiring and promotion in various state agencies. In discussing several procedural aspects of that case, the Court stated that it could see an arguable interest on the part of white applicants for state jobs and promotions and would entertain motions to intervene from interested parties should they desire to so intervene. This is a case of first impression and presents a signi ficant question in the continually expanding area of civil rights law. Past intervention decisions have been attempts to determine whether individual minority plaintiffs or larger organizations purporting to represent the interests of those minorities should carry the ball in litigation. Not one employment discrimination case has focused upon the rights of "majority" employees who might be adversely affected by a Court's ruling. A reversal of the lower Court's decision in the case at bar is thus necessary to provide a -11- vehicle for aggrieved "majority" employees to complain of errors committed by the courts in civil rights litigation, which errors have the effect of substantially impairing majority employees' rights. CONCLUSION Since intervention should have been allowed as of right and because the District Court abused its discretion in denying the motion to intervene on the ground of timeliness, Intervenors- Appellants respectfully submit that the denial of the renewed motion to intervene should be reversed. D. L. MIDDLEBROOKS and JEFFREY A. CRAMER, Of Levin, Warfield, Middlebrooks, Graff, Mabie, Rosenbloum & Magie, P.A. Seville Tower - 226 South Palafox St. Pensacola, Florida 32501 Attorneys for Intervenors-Appellants -1 2- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing Brief has been furnished to Kent Spriggs, Esquire, 324 W. College Avenue, Tallahassee, Florida; Elaine R. Jones, Esquire, 10 Columbus Circle, Suite 2030, New York City, N.Y. 10019; R. Lawrence Ash, Jr., Esquire, and Susan A. Cahoon, Esquire, 3100 The Equitable Building, Atlanta, Georgia, 30303; Robert P. Gaines, Esquire, P. 0. Box 12950, Pensacola, Florida, by regular U. S. Mail and Hand Delivery, this V '1 ̂day of 1975. o Of Counsel for Intervenors- Appellants -13-